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Power indices when players can commit to reject coalitions

Kóczy, Á. László (2013) Power indices when players can commit to reject coalitions. Working Paper Series (1401). Keleti Károly Faculty of Business and Management, Óbuda University, Budapest.

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Item Type: Book
Subjects: J Political Science / politológia > J0 General legislative and executive papers / állam- és jogelmélet általában
SWORD Depositor: MTMT SWORD
Depositing User: MTMT SWORD
Date Deposited: 04 Mar 2018 03:49
Last Modified: 04 Mar 2018 03:49
URI: http://real.mtak.hu/id/eprint/75652

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