

THE ‘*CELÂLÎ*’ EFFECT’ ON RURAL PRODUCTION AND DEMOGRAPHY IN CENTRAL ANATOLIA

THE *WAQF* OF HATUNIYYE (1590s TO 1638)

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The *Celâli* rebel armies ravaged the central Anatolian countryside from the late 16th up to the mid-17th century. The *Celâli* movements brought about demographic changes and had a long-lasting impact on agricultural economy in some regions. Anatolian *waqf* institutions being dependent on rural taxpayers and agricultural production for their budgets were seriously harmed by the *Celâli* rebellions. This paper examines the *Celâli* effect through the *Waqf* of Hatuniyye which had villages scattered across central Anatolian districts. The *waqf* fell into a deep financial crisis and its regular functioning was disrupted in the early 17th century. The *waqf* finance was unable to recover for decades after the crisis, which indicates that rural economy in *waqf* villages suffered from a perpetual production and population crisis.

Key words: rural economy, Central Anatolia, agricultural crisis, *Celâli*, *waqf*, Hatuniyye.

Starting from the last decades of the 20th century, the idea that the Ottoman Empire underwent through a long period of crises and changes in the 16th and 17th centuries has begun to pervade among the historians, and in the new millennium, the crisis and change became a prevailing perspective in historiography.¹ Ottoman historians developed a criticism towards the decline perception in the works of early generations of Ottoman historians as early as the 1970s and extended their critical reading to the works of 17th-century contemporary writers, which culminated in the re-evaluation of historical events and authors’ reflections on these events, a revision or denial of

¹ For some works explaining the comprehension of these two centuries as a period of stagnation and decline by the contemporaries, their imaginative conception of perfect “Order” or “Golden Age” as the central element in their decline diagnosis and the reproduction of their arguments by early generations of Ottomanists, see Lewis (1962); İnalcık (1970, pp. 342 ff; 1985, pp. 283–285; 1998); Fleischer (1986); Fodor (1986); Howard (1987, pp. 23–26; 1988); Abou-El-Haj (1991); Woodhead (1995); Öz (1997).

the golden age notion and the alleged decline concept in the early modern literature. Eventually historians mounted a challenge to the arguments with ideological tuning and produced by modern scholarship in the positivist political history of the early 20th century (Owen 1976; Kafadar 1995). Not only the critical reading of narrative sources, of course, but the influence of literature developed around the 17th century general crisis theory in the West, examining the Ottoman experience in the framework of the world systems theory, the impact on research fields in Ottoman history of *Annales* school and the vivid debates on price revolution and military revolution inspired new approaches to and research questions for the 16th and 17th centuries (Faroqhi 2010). Fed by vast primary sources from recently reorganised and opened archives, research expanding on varying questions and fields proliferated in Ottoman history. As D. Quataert (2003, p. 3) pointed out “As the field of Ottoman history has developed, so has the critique on the decline paradigm”. Thus, the view of crisis and change replaced the previous “stagnation and decline paradigm” which prompted historians to interpret any change or transformation as a sign of dissolution, deterioration, corruption and any conjectural crisis just a phase towards the inevitable ending, the collapse of the Empire.² However, the crisis and change understanding, in turn, developed into a new paradigm and defined a distinct period leaving the previous period largely intact to the periodisation of classical age and the still obscure 18th century to the forthcoming scholarship (Peirce 2004).

Historians began to reveal crises and transformations in real, fiscal and monetary sectors alongside political crises and dramatic demographic changes. In the real sector, a production decline in the urban and rural economy and a contraction in the volume of foreign trade were arguments taken from the decline paradigm but toned down in the new crisis allowing for recovery and survival (Owen 1977; Naff 1977; Quataert 1993; Faroqhi 1994).³ The deep fiscal crisis of the state was surmounted by the transformation in fiscal management through adapting taxation and tax collection methods to the recent conditions of financial distress (İnalçık 1985; Darling 1996, pp. 1–21; 1997). The decline, which has been argued above for the political and military fields, gave birth to new concepts and perspectives in the new approach (Kunt 1983; 1995; Abou-El-Haj 1991; Fodor 1994; Tezcan 2010). The decline of the Empire as a political entity was now the birth of the Second Empire (Tezcan 2010). The Ottoman army was not a victim of but one of the participants in the military revolution, though with some lag in certain technologies (Ágoston 1993; 1994; 2005; Grant 1999; Börekçi 2006; Çalışır 2011). The thesis of demographic catastrophe was rejected or revised, at least for the Balkan provinces (McGowan 1981; Todorova 1988; Todorova–Todorov 1992; Kiel 1990).

² For the development of the “Modern Approach” or the “Idea of Transformation” in Ottoman historiography, in addition to the works in the previous footnote, see Faroqhi (1995) and Quataert (2003).

³ The decline of the Bursa silk industry was redefined as conjectural contraction, Cf. the following two authors: Dalsar (1960); Çizakça (1980; 1987). Also see Çizakça (1985) and Gerber (1988).

One of the undisputed and most enduring contentions in both of the paradigms is the agricultural crisis. The crisis in the agricultural sector combined with social unrest and turmoil was defined as the contraction in arable cultivation, the inadequate supply of grain production for sustaining the increasing population, the advance of stockbreeding and pasture at the disadvantage of agricultural land, the dissolution of small family farms and the rise of large market-oriented commercial farmlands (İnalçık 1985; Akdağ 1945; 1995a; 1995b; Güçer 1964; Öz 2000; Özel 2004). The *Celâlî* rebellions were considered to be the most palatable reason for the agricultural crisis. The adverse effect of climate on agricultural production has been presented in a couple of works (Griswold 1983; 1993; Goldstone 1988; 1991). Furthermore, quite recently, inspired by the rising interest in the debate on the general crisis of the 17th century, a monograph assigned climate change an essential role in explaining agricultural deterioration (White 2011). Thus, rebellions and climate change were considered primary causes of agricultural crisis while demographic growth and price inflation together with oppression and extortion of local prebend holders, and protracted wars on two fronts were developments affecting agricultural conditions, inciting rebellions and in turn leading to agricultural decline.

The *Celâlî* effect on agricultural economy was deserted villages, decline in production and price shocks (Akdağ 1945; 1995a; Öz 2000; Özel 2004; 2016). *Celâlîs* looted and sacked the villages for grain, sheep and goats and other foodstuffs. Peasants having lost their land and harvest were no longer able to cultivate the land and fled to safer places in dread of the *Celâlîs* (Uluçay 1944; Akdağ 1945; 1995a).

The thesis pertaining to the agricultural crisis and recently supported by the supposed adverse effect of climate change on agricultural production has become a preconception and supplied a framework for the discussion of developments in the early modern Ottoman Empire (White 2011).

The archival sources available to researchers to illuminate the crisis in agriculture are the records of deserted villages, difficulties in tax collection from these villages and the emigrant peasants in the court registers (*seriye sicilleri*) and the draft registers of imperial decrees (*mühimme defterleri*). Survey registers (*tahrir defterleri*), poll tax registers and later on the *avarız* registers⁴ have allowed researchers to observe the mass demographic movements and conclude that the agricultural crisis exacerbated as a consequence of population loss (İnalçık 1965; Özel 1999).

Briefly, the crisis was defined on the basis of demographic data, official corresponding and price series from imperial capital, which were, to a certain extent, employed rather than the economic indicators such as the level of agricultural production, changes in local prices and income collection difficulties by local institutions in the affected regions. Sporadic price data and snapshot views provided by survey and *avarız* registers from two quite distant years are inadequate to answer questions of the extent and duration of the crisis, how deep it was, and when the agricultural economy recovered.

⁴ Registers kept for the collection of extraordinary taxes which turned into regular taxes around the turn of the 17th century.

Monographs on large *waqf* institutions in Central Anatolia enhance the crisis literature by supplying more detailed data and reliable evidence from the localities, thus allow revealing the actual course of crisis and dating both the crisis and recovery. The *Celâli* rebellions were major but only one of the developments that affected the agricultural economy. The agricultural and urban economy, particularly at the local level, were exposed to natural hazards and sudden shocks due to various events such as inclement weather, epidemics, earthquakes, fires, and locust invasions. Local monographic studies would assist in discovering the effect of these events and the *Celâli* effect on the economy.

The *waqf* account books are one of the most valuable archival sources available to observe local economic developments. These accounts reveal the financial conditions of *waqfs*, which were interdependent, having a local economy. Therefore, financial analyses of *waqf* institutions can be used as an indicator of the local economic developments.

Barkan introduced Ottoman historians to the *waqf* account books (Barkan 1964; 1971a; 1971b; 1971c; see also Orbay 2007a; 2013). However, these archival sources have been largely neglected, although a couple of historians have employed them as primary sources of their work on the local economy of the Ottoman Empire (Faroghi 1974; 1981; 1988; Orbay 2007b; 2010). The present paper utilises a series of main account books belonging to the *Waqf* of Hatuniyye in the central Anatolian town of Tokat to analyse the *Celâli* effect on the *waqf* in terms of their finance and charitable activities, and on the regional agricultural economy.

The *Waqf* of Hatuniyye in Tokat founded by Gülbahar Hatun, the mother of Sultan Bayezid II, composed of a *medrese*, a noble mosque and a public kitchen (*imâret*), was one of the wealthiest *waqfs* in 16th-century Anatolia. Not including the money carried forward from the previous year and the accounts receivable, its annual income in any current fiscal year in the late 16th century was around half a million akçe.⁵ Tax revenues of many villages scattered across different districts (*kazâ*) including those of Çerkeş, Kangırı, Kalecik and Mecidözü were endowed to the *waqf*.⁶ Hence, the *waqf* collected income from villages across a vast rural area extending from the east of the town of Çorum, to Çankırı and to the northeast part of Ankara. Having vast agricultural holdings and the *waqf* budget wholly consisting of rural taxes rendered the *waqf* an indispensable part of regional agricultural economy.

Taxes on rural population and agricultural production were considered relatively safe and stable sources of income in the traditional economy of the Empire, thus suitable for endowing to a charitable foundation. More importantly, only rural taxes would generate sufficiently large sums to cover immense expenditure of the large imperial *waqfs*. Therefore, rural revenues were an essential part of the budgets of these *waqfs*.

⁵ From the account register of MAD 2076 housed in the “Maliyeden Müdevver” section of the Prime Ministerial Ottoman Archive in İstanbul.

⁶ For a full list of villages endowed to the *waqf* see its endowment deed (*vakfiyye*) dated A.H. 898 (A.D. 1492) and housed under the call number VGMA:740:405/158 in the archive of the Directorate General of Foundations in Ankara.

Although the size of the harvest and the price of grain fluctuated from year to year in the traditional agricultural economy of central Anatolia, this was hardly noticeable and had no serious negative effect on the *waqfs*' finance and maintenance of their services and buildings. As many other large imperial *waqfs*, Hatuniyye was well endowed and achieved a considerable budget surplus in an ordinary year. Thus, the *waqf* was able to cover all the expenditures and compensate for a mild loss in overall income resulting for instance from a harvest deficiency in a couple of villages. The *waqf* was even able to absorb financial hardships by resorting to budgetary measures such as suspending salary payments to the *waqf* staff and the beneficiaries, purchasing on credit, curtailing the amount of stored food or reducing their quality for a lower price. In other words, short-term and relatively modest financial difficulties were overcome by delaying expenditure on certain items until the forthcoming financial year.

Nevertheless, the dependence of the *waqf* budgets on the agricultural population and their production could drive all these *waqfs* into financial dire straits and could even harm the daily running of the institution if harvest size and prices showed extreme moves out of the anticipated band of fluctuation. Even today it is difficult to estimate a harvest and the possible prices of agricultural products and in the 16th century agricultural economy, the yield was far more susceptible to weather conditions and diseases. Food prices moved up and down on an annual basis, sometimes sharply, and seasonal volatility was also exhibited. However, these harvest and price fluctuations might not necessarily result in financial distress for the producers and *waqfs*. In fact, grain prices are negatively correlated with the yield. A harvest failure results in an increase in grain price and, since the demand for grain is highly price-inelastic, the total income of both the farmers and *waqfs* increase despite a fall in the amount of goods in kind collected in payment for the taxes demanded by the *waqfs*. However, the peasants would suffer greatly in certain extreme cases such as a complete or nearly complete crop failure due to a severe natural disaster for instance flood or locust invasion. In the event of a complete harvest failure the peasants would have no grain to sell in the market, would not be able to save seed to sow in next season, and total income would definitely decline irrespective of the price of grain in the market.⁷

In addition to natural events, widespread rebellions were another factor that might have led directly or indirectly to a decline in agricultural production. In the last decades of the 16th century, several villages of the *Waqf* of Hatuniyye were affected by the *Celâlî* movements. The *Celâlî* events in the Anatolian provinces of the Ottoman Empire recurred intermittently for more than a half-century left their mark on several spheres and had an effect on many developments of the 16th and 17th centuries which can be conceptualised as the "*Celâlî* Effect" in the Ottoman "transformation period". The effects of the *Celâlî* revolts on Ottoman demography had varied facets. In the

⁷ Nonetheless, in the Ottoman taxation system taxpayer peasants were often not entitled to defer or abate payment but they could be granted full relief from tax liabilities if they could prove that their situation was desperate. Furthermore, if the farmers had no stored seed from the previous season, which was unlikely, or their store was empty since the seed had been consumed or sold in despair, they could easily buy or borrow seed for the next season, thus maintaining the level of the crop yield.

short-term, the revolts led to the depopulation of villages and increased the population of more distant and safer settlements in other provinces caused by many people fleeing from the *Celâlis*. Demographic historians maintain that the population decline followed social turmoil and large-scale migrations were a long-term effect of rebellions (Özel 2004; 2016).

In fiercest years of the *Celâli* insurrection, large rebel armies laid siege to towns, interrupted the regular course of home and international trade, disrupted the tax collection system, plundered villages and extorted cash and crops from the peasants. Villagers, fearful and desperate, left their farms and fled to the highlands, sheltered in guarded fortifications and migrated to safer villages and towns away from rebels. The period between 1603 and 1608 saw massive migrations, which were referred to as the Great Flight (Büyük Kaçgun) (Akdağ 1945; 1995a).

The decline in agricultural production was primarily due to the migration of the rural population and the disrupted trade network. Not only was the available supply of grain reduced but also the demand decreased in the regions attacked by the *Celâli* raids. In this case, the prices did not rise rapidly. Since much of the grain had been looted neither the peasants nor the *waqfs* had grain to sell at high prices at the markets. Furthermore, since the *Celâlis* large and small bandit factions roamed the countryside even if the peasants had enough grain to sell they would have had problems in travelling to fairs or markets in order to sell and convert their grain into cash.

The situation might not always have been that difficult for the peasants, since security was not constantly absent at every corner at any moment. Moreover, although the peasants could not sell grain and earn money, they were mostly either exempted from tax or the tax collectors were unable to visit them due to insecurity on the roads.

On the other hand, the large Anatolian *waqfs* were in a worse situation (Faroqhi 1974; 1987; 1988; Orbay 2004; 2012). These institutions were located in town centers but needed to collect taxes from remote villages and transport them to pantry storage place in the *waqf* or require the tax farmers to do this. The tax collectors of the central treasury had similar difficulties in undertaking their duty (Darling 1996; Özel 2005; 2011). Two situations drove the *waqfs* into financial distress. First, there was the difficulty of collecting and delivery of taxes, in kind and cash, to the *waqf*. The second, and possibly a greater problem, was the loss of a large portion of the cash taxes levied on the population, which could not be collected because many people had left their villages moving to safer provinces.

The situation of the *Waqf* of Hatuniyye in the early 17th century can be seen in its account books over these troubled years. The financial well-being of the *waqf* was intertwined with rural economy and demography, its deteriorating finances in this period is a reflection of the worsening agricultural conditions, social turbulence and depopulation in inner Anatolia. Details from these financial records are given below.

The earliest dated account book of the Hatuniyye available in the Prime Ministerial Archive in İstanbul pertains to the year 1593 (MAD 2076). The book has a regular accounting period covering a full year. The expected income of the *waqf* from the financial year is about 500,000 akçe. The *waqf* collected its rural revenues through tax farming and *emânet*. Tax farming, consisted of one or more villages grouped as

a tax unit (*mukâta'a*) and auctioned to the tax farmer who made the highest bid. The *waqf* offered two tax-farming units for a total of 95,000 akçe in 1593, each unit consisted of several villages. The remainder of the *waqf* villages was divided into tax collection regions (*cibâyet*) composed of several nearby villages. The villages in each of these collection regions were again grouped into tax-farm units and farmed out, sometimes to different tax farmers. However, contrary to the usual practice, only some taxes were farmed out in this manner with the remaining taxes being collected by the *emânet* method by the salaried tax collectors (*câbî*) in the *waqf* staff or the trustees (*emin*). For instance, *çift*-tax, taxes from orchards and mills were collected by the collectors and trustees.

Tithe (*öçr*) in these tax collection regions was mostly farmed out. It seems that the *waqf* mostly received the cash equivalent of the tithe from the tax farmers. Only a few portions of the total in-kind tax collection was transferred to the pantry of *waqf*'s kitchen to be used in meals served in the *imâret*. For each region, the amounts of tithe on wheat and barley were recorded in *kile* and priced at different levels, and their total worth was also calculated and recorded by the scribe. For instance, wheat was priced from 30 to 60 akçe per *kile* in 1593. This appears to be a wide price range over a year and may indicate an adverse development in agricultural production. The average price in this year was about 38 akçe per *kile*, then approximately 33 akçe in 1614 and skyrocketed to 100 akçe in 1615. The latter figure refers to an extreme event. Other examples of extreme prices occurred in the first part of the 17th century; in 1628 wheat price was 100 akçe per *kile* and about 156 akçe in 1638 while price levels were actually low in general in these decades.

The *Waqf* of Hatuniyye, as the other dynastic *waqfs*, was an institution that created a redistributive economy and provided employment. In 1593, the *waqf* expenditure was around 430,000 akçe of which about 115,000 akçe was paid to 78 *waqf* employees and 14 stipend holders. Kitchen expenditure was 270,000 akçe of which largest part was spent for meat and wheat purchase, 68,000 and 73,000 akçe respectively. All these outgoings were undertaken within a town economy and supported the economic and commercial activity in that town. The *waqf* transferred regular income and thus, purchasing power to its employees through salary payments. This redistributive function of the *Waqf* of Hatuniyye must have been significant for the urban economy and wealth of the relatively small town of Tokat.

The account book of 1593 records no arrears. The *waqf* was supervised by the central authorities and bound to transfer its budget surplus. After the cash deliveries to the central treasuries, the account was closed with a budget surplus of circa 184,000 akçe which shows that financial situation of the *waqf* was strong in that year.

An uninterrupted series of account books are available until 1599 which show us pre-Celâlî situation. The rural income of the *waqf* for each year from 1593 to 1599 fluctuated slightly depending mainly on the harvest size and price of various food-stuffs. The total rural income of the *waqf* declined if the harvest was good and consequently prices were low. For the same reasons kitchen expenditure declined. When harvests fell short, prices went up steeply and the total income increased but so did the kitchen expenses.

The number of employees and beneficiaries and the amount of salary payments did not change during the period 1593 to 1599. The *waqf* did not experience any serious difficulty in tax collection, which implies that the agricultural situation was stable in the tax farming regions. Certainly, the size of the harvest and prices fluctuated from year to year but this had been within the anticipated range in traditional agricultural production. As mentioned above, when annual income was somewhat low, the *waqf* maintained its budget balance by known methods such as using credit to purchase certain items, delaying salary payments, and reducing the amount of stored food. In this way, the *waqf* was able to make fulfil its obligations to deliver cash to the central treasuries and sustain a budget surplus at the end of each financial year.

In sum, the *Waqf* of Hatuniyye in Tokat seems to be in a financially good situation in the last decade of the 16th century before the *Celâlîs* attacked the region. Although the revenues of the *waqf* depended on the agricultural production and prices, the effects of harvest fluctuations appeared to have only a moderate impact on the *waqf*'s budget and did not drive the *waqf* into financial difficulty.

Unfortunately, account books are lacking for the first decade of the 17th century during the time in which the *Celâlî* rebellions intensified in central Anatolia (Akdağ 1945; 1995a; Griswold 1983). Not only the large *Celâlî* rebel armies but also several large and small brigand bands were roaming, plundering and spreading terror in Anatolian countryside in these years.⁸ Peasants in fear of their life abandoned land and the large-scale flight, known as the Great Flight took place between the years 1603 and 1608. Demographic historians are unable to give a figure for the size of depopulation within this decade due to the lack of archival sources. However, comparative research using the survey registers of the late 16th century and the detailed (*mufassal*) *avârız* registers of the 1640s showed that the population in some districts was reduced by 50%, 40% of rural settlements had disappeared from the tax records, and the overall taxpayer population reduced by 80% between 1576 and 1642 (Öz 1999; 2000; Ünal 1999; Açikel 1999; Özel 2004; 2016).

The Celâlî Effect on *Waqf*'s Finance, Population and Agricultural Production

After a gap of ten years, the account books of the *Waqf* of Hatuniyye became available again showing that the *waqf* revenues from 1610 had fallen drastically. It seems that the *waqf* had already been in financial difficulty before this time, but it is unclear when this occurred. In 1599, the *waqf* income was about 443,000 akçe and in 1610 this had declined to approximately 119,000 akçe. The most reasonable explanation for this decline is that the *waqf* lost its rural tax base as the peasants abandoned their villages and fled to safer districts. Since the agricultural population was dispersed

⁸ Vagrants had already been engaged in brigandage as small bands in the Ottoman countryside, see Uluçay (1944); Cezar (1965); Akdağ (1995a).

and production declined, the *waqf* was unable to collect any kind of taxes whether in cash or in kind.

The financial deterioration continued as the revenues further declined from the 1610 figure to 78,000 akçe in 1612. Although the *waqf* income increased in some years, there was no indication of any significant recovery in agricultural production and population. The agricultural crisis as defined in reference to the late 16th century persisted in the *waqf* villages at least to the late 1630s. It is most likely that the commencement of crisis might be dated to the early years at the turn of the century when the *Celâli* armies of Karayazıcı and his brother Deli Hasan plundered and wintered in the villages and towns and imposed their own taxes on the population of the north-central Anatolian province of Rûm. The rebellious armies of the *Celâli* leaders Kalendaroğlu and Abaza Mehmed Pasha visited the region in 1607–1608 and between 1623–1628, respectively.⁹

The latest dated account book referred to in this paper is from 1638. Neither this account book nor those up to this year give any figures concerning income or expenses, which imply an improvement in the financial condition of the *waqf*. This means that the “*Celâli* effect” on the *waqf*’s finance was quite strong, reducing its annual income by 75% and it was long lasting. Thus, the *waqf* was unable to make a financial recovery after the troubled years of the *Celâli* movements in the early years of the 17th century. It has been assumed that the depopulation in the *Celâli* period in Anatolia caused a demographic decline in the long term, which showed itself in the *waqf*’s finance and regional agricultural economy for decades.

It is reasonable to suppose that in this period of time, undertaking a tax farm became a risky business for the tax farmers. They either reduced their bids or chose not to bid. Let me remind the reader that the *Waqf* of Hatuniyye farmed out the collection of taxes from a few tax farming units (*mukâta‘a*) each consisting of several villages. The *waqf* continued to engage in tax farming for some villages during the 1610s and 1620s. However, the *waqf* had organised most of its villages under tax collection regions (*cibâyet*) and a mixed method was used in tax collection. A significant part of the taxes from these regions were collected through the tax farming method while the remainder was collected either by the *waqf*’s tax collectors or by those who undertook the task of tax collection as *emin* or trustee. In the latter case, differing from the tax-farming method, the trustee did not sign a contract with the *waqf* for the delivery of a fixed sum to the *waqf*. He collected and delivered the taxes to the *waqf*’s safe box in return for an amount of money or for a share of the taxes levied.

In 1612 and 1614, for instance, none of the taxes was farmed out in these tax collection regions. All the taxes were collected through the *emânet* method. This change in the collection method was most likely brought about by the general insecurity in the region, unstable agricultural conditions and unpredictable amount of tax income from production and population.

⁹ For these *Celâli* rebellions and their destructive effects, see Akdağ (1945; 1995a); Griswold (1983); Özel (2016).

The *Celâli* Effect on the Functioning of *Waqf* and the Charitable Activities

The *Waqf* of Hatuniyye supported commercial activity and economic development in the town of Tokat. It funneled agricultural revenues into the town economy and transferred purchasing power to a large section of its employees and beneficiaries through salary and stipend payments. When the *waqf* suffered, a great financial loss due to *Celâlis*, its redistributive function and charitable activities were disrupted.

The *waqf* employed 78 skilled and unskilled persons including learned men such as the *müderris*, scribes and twelve *medrese* students. These employees, some of whom had families to support on their salary from the *waqf* were paid about 100,000 akçe in a year. In addition, though their total number might change from year to year, the *waqf* was maintained a group of about fifteen beneficiaries who were allocated a monthly payment from the *waqf*'s budget surplus. These beneficiaries were needy people such as the poor, widows without livelihood, and retired *waqf* officers.

In 1612, the number of fully paid *medrese* employees totalling four people and twelve students did not change. However, the twenty employees in the mosque in 1593 were reduced to thirteen in 1612. Accordingly, the salary payment to this group of employees declined from about 16,000 akçe to 12,600 akçe. Surprisingly, the number of Qur'an reciters increased from fifteen to seventeen.

The overall amount of annual salary payments declined between 1593 and 1612. In addition to the reduction in the mosque staff, the employees in the *waqf* kitchen declined in number. In 1593, the *waqf* had employed twenty people including the trustee (*mütevelli*) and his scribe who, in total, were paid about 35,000 akçe per year. Their number declined to only six persons who were paid approximately 22,000 akçe.¹⁰ In fact, the public kitchen (*imâret*) was not operating in this period and in the account books of 1610 and 1612 there is no record of any expenditure for the kitchen.

A storehouse account pertaining to 1593 shows that the *waqf* was serving flat bread (*fodula*) daily, soup every morning and night during Ramadan, *dâne*¹¹ and *zerde*¹² on Fridays and nights in Ramadan. The total amount of kitchen expenditure was about 270,000 akçe in 1593. In the accounting period of 1614, covering about nine months, some expenditure records for the kitchen reappeared. However, the total amount was only 5,820 akçe. This means that the kitchen was not serving meals except maybe for a limited number of *waqf* employees and the needy. There are also records showing that the *waqf* was also serving meal to guests but fewer in number than previously.

The account books record quite different levels for the kitchen expenditures in certain years until 1638 with no kitchen expenditures being recorded in various annual periods. In 1615, the *waqf* spent approximately 30,000 akçe for food for the

¹⁰ The storekeeper was not paid his salary, see MAD 2076.

¹¹ Rice dish with meat.

¹² A dessert made with rice, saffron and starch.

kitchen. In 1619–1620, the expenses for the kitchen were 26,410 akçe, 21,234 akçe of which was for food bought on credit. In 1632, the *waqf* kitchen expenditure was 12,000 akçe and about 23,000 akçe in 1638. Considering that, the kitchen expenditure was always over 200,000 akçe in any year from 1593 to 1598 these figures imply that the kitchen was not operating at full capacity or regularly during these years.

In 1619–1620, the salary and stipend payments were approximately 122,000 akçe, but only 27,640 akçe was actually paid with 94,800 akçe remaining unpaid (*nâ-resîd*). However, it is likely that the *waqf* made the payments in the following years. The *waqf* was on the edge of financial crisis each year having lost great part of its revenue due to the activities of the *Celâlis*. It seems that the *waqf* tried to adapt to the new financial circumstances by prioritising expenditure on repairs and some salary payments. In 1624, for instance, the *waqf* did not allocate any money for the kitchen and spent almost all its revenue on salary and stipend payments amounting to 131,000 akçe.

The financial collapse of the *waqf* affected the beneficiaries more than any other group of *waqf* employees. There were 14 beneficiaries registered in 1593 who were paid about 20,000 akçe. Their numbers fluctuated over years as new people became entitled to receive a monthly allowance and others died; however, after the *waqf*'s finances were ruined by the *Celâlis*, the number of beneficiaries was radically reduced to two in 1610 or possibly earlier. A note written at the end of the 1610 account book commenting that the distribution of budget surplus to *waqf* beneficiaries was forbidden by an imperial decree (*fermân*) until the *waqf*'s financial situation improved.

To summarise, the *waqf* was compelled to cease a few of its most crucial charitable functions. It closed a public kitchen or operated it at very low capacity only to serve meals to a few people and guests. Beneficiaries were no longer paid except for those who most gravely needed the monthly payment. The *waqf* was regularly sending 200 gold pieces, the equivalent of 24,000 akçe to the Holy Places as stipulated in its endowment deed. Since the overall *waqf* income was substantially reduced, the *waqf* no longer had any significant surplus. In this situation, the *waqf* was operating in almost permanent financial distress; thus, it was unable to send the amounts of money to the Holy Places as it did previously.

Conclusion

The *Waqf* of Hatuniyye was a wealthy institution in the late 16th century. It operated a public kitchen, regularly paid the salaries of the staff, performed the other services stipulated in its foundation charter and achieved a budget surplus. However, its fortune radically changed from the first decade of the 17th century onwards during which time large numbers of the *Celâlî* rebels disrupted agricultural production and caused population dispersal. The rebel armies of Karayazıcı, Deli Hasan, Tavi Ahmed, Abaza Mehmed and many other less-famous rebel leaders ravaged the central Anatolian provinces. Since the *Waqf* of Hatuniyye was dependent solely on rural taxes, the

Celâlis inflicted a serious loss on the *waqf* and it was unable to recover from the financial collapse for decades until at least the mid-17th century.

The decline in agricultural production and ensuing financial crisis of the *waqf* was long lasting because of various reasons. Firstly, the large rebel armies occupied the region for quite a long time sometimes wintering in central Anatolia. Secondly, for decades different *Celâlî* armies attacked and looted settlements in the countryside one after the other. Their lasting negative impact on agricultural production stemmed from depopulation, which was the chief reason for the long-term decline in agricultural production and the erosion of the *waqf*'s tax base.

The agricultural conditions in the *waqf* villages and the consequential decline in the financial capacity of the *waqf* did not allow it to undertake charitable services as it did before the *Celâlî* rebellions. The *waqf* allocated its reduced budget to salary payments and to the upkeep of buildings. However, there was not enough financial support to keep the kitchen open and to send money to the Holy Places.

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