

Gábor Demeter
Krisztián Csaplár-Degovics

**A Study in the Theory and Practice
of Destabilization: Violence and
Strategies of Survival in Ottoman
Macedonia (1903-1913)**

This study has been supported by the Bolyai János Research Scholarship of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences.

This book was produced under the auspices of the Research Centre for the Humanities of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences and with the support of the National Bank of Hungary.

Gábor Demeter, PhD (2007) in History and (2008) in Earth Sciences at Debrecen University is a research fellow at the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Research Centre for the Humanities, Institute of History (Budapest). His main research topics are: social and economic development on the Balkan Peninsula, diplomatic relations between Austria-Hungary and the Balkan States (1878-1914), historical geography of Hungary in 19th century. Secretary of the Bulgarian–Hungarian Joint Academic Commission of Historians and editor of the Hungarian Historical Review. Habilitated in 2017 at Debrecen University.

Krisztián Csaplár-Degovics, PhD in History (2008, Eötvös Loránd University of Budapest) is a senior research fellow at the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Research Centre for the Humanities, Institute of History (Budapest), leader of the Department for Southeastern European Studies (2015-2017). Formerly he taught at the Eötvös Loránd University (2008-2012), he was an academic co-worker of the Südost-Institut in Munich (2003-2004) and of the Library of the Albanien-Institut at the Institute for East European History (University of Vienna, 2005-2006). Currently he deals with the Balkan-policy of Austria-Hungary, the nation- and state-building processes in the Balkans, Humanitarian Interventions in the Balkans and with the history of Albania, Serbia, Kosovo and Macedonia in the 19th and 20th century. He is member of the Bulgarian–Hungarian Joint Academic Commission of Historians and of the private Albanien-Institut housed in Munich and in Vienna. Since 2013 he is the editor of the book series *Edition Ungarische Geschichte* in Berlin (Osteuropa-Zentrum Berlin-Verlag).

Contents

I. Introduction	5
Concepts, goals, methods.....	8
The location	13
General remarks	21
Historical background (1903-1908)	33
II. The background to the tensions and the komitadji phenomenon.....	39
Conflict types – general overview.....	39
The escalation of the conflicts.....	41
Some temporal and spatial patterns of <i>četa</i> activity	44
<i>Četa</i> types and their origins.....	48
The social background and functions of the revolutionary organizations	55
Financial sources.....	62
Methods of rule.....	64
III. Violence in Skopje Sanjak.....	67
Everyday violence	67
The practice of destabilization – other forms of violence.....	90
IV. Conflict types in Prizren Sanjak	103
General tendencies	103
Traditional banditry – weakening central power.....	122
Banditism vs. the state authorities	123
The state treatment of banditism – a successful solution?	124
Violence as an alternative source of income for Ottoman state officials.....	127
Conflicts indirectly generated by the competition between the Powers.....	128
The case of the Bogoslovie in Prizren (1899-1900).....	130
Protests against the opening of new consulates and trade agencies	132
Actions against sacred places during Christian festivals	133
The Albanian village vs. the town	134
Conflicts stemming from border positions.....	136

V. Local strategies of coexistence and survival, the politics of neighbouring states and the attempts of the Ottoman government and Great Powers to restore peace	142
Scratching the surface: exit strategies–symptoms of economic breakdown or of collapsing public security?	142
The macroeconomic situation before 1903 and attempts at reform.....	145
Prevailing agrarian (social) problems after 1903	150
The response to the challenge I: The central government and local society.....	154
The <i>četa</i> problem reloaded	169
Community-level response to the changes II: the strategy of the Serbs in Macedonia	172
Strategies of intimidation and strategies of survival	182
VI. Epilogue.....	193
Notes in the margin: the limits to Muslim-Christian cooperation.....	197
The new order.....	201

I. Introduction

This book is written primarily for Western readers and political actors, with the purpose of making 'Balkan phenomena' (instability, nationalism, corruption) more comprehensible, and to highlight the fact that even thorough knowledge and preparedness cannot be considered a guarantee for success (only as an essential but not sufficient condition). Attitudes towards the Balkans are often extreme. Beyond those who ignore the Balkan question (either because of disinterest, or because of considering the situation hopeless) there were and still there are so-called experts "*who arrived yesterday with the resolution to solve problems by tomorrow,*"¹ who have to face the challenge that solutions offered by Western civilization do not always work, because of deep-rooted cultural differences. One of the morals of the numerous attempts to settle disputes in the Balkans is that solving problems is almost impossible without the involvement of experts of local origin (but trained in the West) simply because, due to their knowledge of local circumstances, they identify different phenomena as the key problems. And as any political system tends to rely on local agents and local social basis in the long run, knowledge of local circumstances is essential: the peace restoration attempts in the Balkans in the last decades proved that the improper selection of allies often led to the emergence of warlords, smugglers, etc., who managed to legitimize their informal power owing to their cooperation with Western decision-makers (the Kosovo experience).

European Powers have tried to settle disputes several times in the past too, but interventions often failed partly because of their deep involvement (power interests, balance of power) in the Balkan question, and partly because what was problematic for a Western observer was not considered problematic by local societies and *vice versa*. An example of the failure of this approach, called '*humanitarian imperialism*'² (a combination of humanitarian intervention and classical colonization – to bring modernization through occupation), is the Austro-Hungarian experience in Albania. "*We wanted to establish a colony. Our megalomaniac dreams have almost been fulfilled. This masterpiece of the art of violence, hurry, clumsiness and the lack of principles was observed by the author of these lines from the first row, because he was appointed as civil governor of the*

1 Quotation from the sarcastic article on the Albanian policy of Austria-Hungary by Rubin, László. 'Albánia állammá alakulása.' *Huszadik Század* 20, no. 3 (1919): 135–41.

2 For the different interpretations of this term see: Bricmont, Jean. *Humanitarian Imperialism: Using Human Rights to Sell War*; Chomsky, Noam. *Humanitarian Imperialism: The New Doctrine of Imperial Right*. *Monthly Review*, 2008. September, <https://chomsky.info/200809/>. In Macedonia 'selling war' was not the case, intervention was propagated in order to avoid the escalation of the conflict and the unilateral intervention of *one* Power. The idea of intervention reasoned by securing peaceful conditions and the development of the 'savage' was doctored by John Stuart Mill, and Benjámín Kállay also used up this theory to reason Austro-Hungarian presence in Bosnia.

area in the name of General Können-Horák, who rather acted like a twit 'Tischlermeister'. The main goal was the establishment of bureaucratization. The new statehood was manifested indeed in bureaucratization. Albania soon became flooded by so many military officials that the proportion of officers reached one for each hundred of sheep. The highest levels of administration were immediately established. In Scutari hundreds of k.u.k. officers were deposited and garrisoned who grew ideas and produced documents. You could see them hurrying in the streets, holding plans under their arms, each was 'Albanienkenner', who arrived from the West yesterday to solve the Eastern Question by tomorrow. For these plenty of officers new palace-like barracks were erected to store these documents. The age of documents has arrived to a country where nobody could write and read. Hundreds of orders were issued, which were not executed, because nobody could read them, and no one dared enter the central parts of the country called 'Sauland'. The structure of administration was similar to an upside-down pyramid. ... In Scutari each case, like collecting turtles, forestry or mining had a special reference person, but nobody collected frogs and turtles, nobody dared go to the woods, and the mines did not exist at all."³ The left-leaning scholar Ervin Szabó interpreted this "scientifically confirmed superiority and 'chosenness' that gave authorization to intervene into Balkan affairs" as a false indoctrination that could lead to incomprehensible failures. Though Austria-Hungary was among the most prepared states in its knowledge of the peninsula with sufficient field-experience, and its contribution to the creation of the Albanian nation and state was inevitable, by the time the fruits of her activity were ripened, these efforts became out of date (from a political perspective), as the Dual Monarchy had ceased to exist by that time. It seems that strong political determination was an essential but still not sufficient condition for success in creating 'Lebensfähig'⁴ entities, as the same remedy – creating a suprareligious national community based on common language regardless of religious tensions – simply did not work for Bosnia.⁵ The Macedonian reform movement represented another type of humanitarian intervention because of the involvement of *all* the Powers, but it also failed – partly because of mutually opposing interests, partly because of the overly short time period⁶ – confirming again our thesis regarding the inapplicability of a 'general model'.

3 Ibid.

4 'Viable'. Creating a structure is one thing, but maintenance of an entity is another problem that needs investment of time, invention and money. Albania was consolidated by Italian money between the two World Wars, and the same method is applied by the EU to its peripheries.

5 In case of Albania there was no attraction exerted by a 'mother nation', unlike in the case of Bosnia, where the existence of Croatia and Serbia was attractive enough to divide Slavic speakers.

6 Brooks, Julian. 'A 'Tranquilizing' influence? British 'Proto-peacekeeping' in Ottoman Macedonia 1904–1905'. *Peace and Change* 36, no. 2 (2011): 172–90.

The last hundred years have seen several more unsuccessful interventions. The events in Bosnia in the last decades proved that even the *lack* of power interest cannot help solve problems. Because of the cultural difference, Western public opinion is and was susceptible only to certain types of affairs reaching their response threshold, for which the press has great responsibility, such as in offering simplistic, one-sided, easily interpretable or balanced approaches. This was also true at the turn of the 20th century (and probably even now), as contemporary observer, Edith Durham recognized. “*When a Moslem kills a Moslem it does not count; when a Christian kills a Moslem it is a righteous act; when a Christian kills a Christian it is an error of judgment better not talked about; it is only when a Moslem kills a Christian that we arrive at a full-blown ‘atrociousness’.*”⁷ (This trend reversed – but only temporarily – due to the Bosnian experience after 1992, and the pendulum swing back again with the appearance of al-Qaida and ISIS).

But this present work does not intend to investigate either the history of these interventions in the Balkans or the causes of these failures. Nor do we offer a general remedy for conflict management, but rather we emphasize the opposite: remedies offering a cure for problems in other regions do not necessarily work for the Balkans. Readers may feel our approach one-sided or narrow, as our goal was neither to compare the relevance of numerous interpretations, nor to analyze the reliability of the literature (either being patriotic or hypercritical).⁸

Not even the Macedonian question (as a part of the complicated Balkan question) is grasped in its full complexity here – it has already had a substantial analysis from different perspectives.⁹ At the centre of our interest remains (1) the so-called *komitadji*-phenomenon, which is considered as *a destabilizing factor*, among many others (we refrain from judging how much their political ideas were progressive or justifiable or not), and (2) the different responses of society (survival strategies) and (3) reactions to the central power to this challenge (these reactions could either contribute to the escalation of the violence or mitigate tensions, depending on the type and scope of the response). This way we investigate the interactions and

7 Durham, Edith. *Burden of the Balkans*. London: Arnold, 1905. 4. This type of approach characterized the liberal Balkan Committee led by the Buxtons. See Perkins, James Andrew. *British liberalism and the Balkans, c. 1875-1925*. PhD thesis, Birkbeck, University of London, 2014 accessed through ORBIT.

8 As the institutionalization of history writing was realized within the frameworks of nation states, nation-centric and nation-state-centric thinking determined historical writing in the Balkans. This limits the liberty of research (including topics, transnational or comparative character, tone-style and argument), thus distorting the perception and understanding of events in Macedonia.

9 Lange-Akhund, Nadine. *The Macedonian Question 1893–1908. From Western Sources*. Boulder: East European Monographs, 1998. Soward, Steven W. *Austria’s policy of Macedonian Reform 1902–1908. East European Monographs*, 260. New York–Boulder, Col.: Columbia University Press, 1989; Gounaris, Basil K. ‘*The Macedonian Struggle 1903–1912. Paving the Way for the Liberation.*’ In *Modern and Contemporary Macedonia*, vol. 1, edited by I. Koliopoulos and I. Hassiotis, 508–29. Thessaloniki: Papazisis–Paratiritis, 1992.

feedbacks between these three actors¹⁰ (including local-central tensions, which could also invoke violence) rather than the history of the Macedonian question.

Concepts, goals, methods

While the complexity of the *komitadji* phenomenon offers a broad range of interpretations, none of them is holistic or claims to cover the ultimate truth: the concepts rather focus on investigating the phenomenon from different perspectives, putting the question into different context. The *komitadji* phenomenon includes various themes loosely connected together: the formation of collective identities and political culture; processes of state-building and state-failure; social movements and political organizations; social banditry and racketeering; revolutions and insurgencies-rebellions; organized crime, individual and collective violence, and ethnic conflicts and ethnic cleansings as pointed out by Alp Arslan Yenen in a conference held recently at the Middle Eastern Studies of Department of Social Sciences, University of Basel.¹¹ Hakan Yavuz listed several issues to be addressed: the problem of conceptualizing and the typologies of *komitadji*, the transformation of the *komitadji*, emergence of a new political language that attributes redemptive value to violence, the relationship between Ottoman state and borderlands, and the problem of sources. Yavuz interpreted the phenomenon of the *komitadji* by framing it as part of a new political consciousness and as activities, which reshaped the boundaries of identity or identities and helped overcome the fear of the state through resistance and violence. Others, like Ramazan Öztan, suggested challenging the role of ideology and methodological nationalism in the study of late Ottoman political movements. Esmer claimed¹² that empires did not usually have a monopoly over violence (cf. pirates becoming privateers in 16th c. British seafaring networks), and thus the boundaries between the conventional and the unconventional, the legitimate and illegitimate violence were open to contestation. Neither *komitadji* as a phenomenon nor the loss of state monopoly over violence is unique: patterns could be even traced back to the Jalali revolts, the Kirdjali era is similar period and organized violence also appeared in India.

10 This triangle can be even broadened by the interference of Powers and Small states, but from among the numerous possible interaction types we only analyze those pointing to the *komitadji* and the local community. In other words, diplomatic affairs are not investigated.

11 The Age of the *Komitadji*. Entangled Histories and Political Sociology of Insurgencies in the Ottoman World (1870s-1920s). 22-24. January 2015, University of Basel Conference convened by Middle Eastern Studies, Department of Social Sciences, University of Basel, Turkish Studies.

12 Esmer, Tolga (CEU). 'Criminals' Policing Empire: Trans-regional Networks of Violence, Governance, and Confessional cum Ethnic Boundaries in the Ottoman Nineteenth Century.' In: The Age of the *Komitadji*.

The *komitadji* phenomenon is considered rather multifaceted, with different roots and behavior patterns ranging from banditry driven by social resistance (Hobsbawm) through business enterprises (Elwert) to flag-bearers of the national idea and rights. The conflicting aims and ideas of IMRO's radical political wing (with their nationalist or radical socialist ideas) against their Christian warlord partners and their traditional notions of religious solidarity, manhood and individual retribution are also worth discussion.¹³

The Macedonian (or Armenian) experience of the Young Turk officers influenced their military and political behavior as well, and thus the impact did not remain isolated. The practices and experience helped the Young Turk and Kemalist movement to defend state power, but also made the Turkish political cultural more manipulative and aggressive.¹⁴ The anti-liberal and semi-legal activities of intimidation, public defamation and mob mobilization became general practices during the constitutional era¹⁵ (the Young Turks themselves were not interested in the mass participation of the Ottoman people in politics, because the Macedonian case proved its risks). Getting acquainted with unconventional guerrilla warfare, the Young Turk officers usually shared their admiration towards komitadji activities (including both organizational questions and propaganda) and their devotion to the national causes. The rise of anti-imperialist sentiments in the face of foreign interventions in the Ottoman Balkans was also the product of this era (see the failure of the Mürzsteg reforms), and the nationalism of the *çeta* fighters also contributed to the development of modern Turkish nationalism.¹⁶

As for the Western literature, the interpretation of violence and the komitadji phenomena – before the evident turn mentioned above – was long influenced by the concept of '*social banditry*' as propagated by Hobsbawm,¹⁷ though we consider the phenomenon more complex, of which '*social banditry*' forms only a part. Hobsbawm states that banditism is a primitive or archaic (without a negative connotation) and rural form of social agitation/resistance against central authorities or certain classes.¹⁸

13 Kostopoulos, Tasos. 'Between Primitive Rebellion and National Exclusiveness: Macedonian Christian Warlords in the Service of IMRO and/or its Rivals', lecture given in the same conference and seminar.

14 Arisan, Mehmet. 'Komitacilik: A Basis or an Obstacle for Nation-State Building?'

15 Lecture by Ileana Moroni (University of Basel)'s: 'The CUP and Civil Komitacılık after 1908: Some First Remarks and Research Questions' in the same conference.

16 Excerpt from Murat Kaya's (University of Basel) lecture in the same conference.

17 Hobsbawm, Eric John. *Primitive Rebels: Studies in Archaic Forms of Social Movement in the 19th and 20th centuries*. Manchester, 1959, Manchester University Press. I. Introduction, 1-12., 28.

18 The resistance of industrial workers against industrial society is also included into this type such as opposition to state institutions (police, taxation). The leaders are considered honorable persons (like the '*Balkan celebi*' by Brophy and St.Clair) attributed by idealtypic terms. The social bandit is often heroized either by contemporaries or even by historiography: as he represents the social justice even murder does not

He considered the 'social bandit' (the Robin Hood archetype) to be positive, as an intermediary step in the history of development of rural protest and resistance, a 'bridge' between the purely mercenary activity of rebel bands 'trading with violence' and the revolutionary works of nationalist organizations. The less conscious members of Macedonian bands were also considered social bandits, because the revolutionary organizations practised vengeance against the official authorities. But the truth is that vengeance against official authorities was only one among many other forms of violence. Furthermore, Hobsbawm considers banditism as a rural phenomenon – while in our case *četas* are active in urban places as well. Many of the Serbian *četa* leaders lived in urban communities of South Hungary previously. Hobsbawm also states that it is social injustice that they fight against first, and advertising political goals is another step in their 'natural evolution', but this model not always fits Macedonia, where among the more than 100 bands (1907) with various aims, each stage of development can be observed.

Contrary to Hobsbawm, Anton Blok considered all bandits as parasites of a community, whose appearance merely resulted in the duplication of burdens and coercion (beyond the coercion practised by state authorities). Stefano Petrunaro¹⁹ also denies the views of Hobsbawm, stating that bandits cannot be heroized²⁰ - heroization appeared not only in leftist but also in nationalistic historiography. He emphasized the *role of rough geographical conditions*, offering a terrain and numerous *niches* for violence and for the persistence of competing ideologies/traditions. On the one hand the spread of new theories and idea(l)s were hindered by geographical obstacles, like mountain ranges, and therefore neither of these could become exclusive by completely outcompeting the other. On the other hand the Macedonian borders were surrounded by small states and thus were also exposed to the infiltration of new, different ideas. Therefore external factors also influenced the patterns. As Macedonia was a geographically dissected area, this resulted in heterogeneity (splintered territorial patterns) and numerous fault lines both in ideology and traditions. Beyond territorial fragmentation, social cleavages also appeared in the form of an urban-rural dichotomy. Petrunaro claims that the

illegitimate his positive role. The frequency of resistance of this type has significantly grown by the 19-20th century, while premodern forms of banditism were gradually transforming in this era.

19 Petrunaro, Stefano. *Balceni. Una storia di violenza?* Roma, 2012, 16., 71.

20 Isa Blumi adds further that the *stereotipization* of bands (the thesis that Muslim rebel bands are counterrevolutionary, while Christian *četas* played positive role and were fighting for national goals is flawed) simplifying the task of former history writing has to be abandoned. Some of the Muslim Albanian groups were also fighting for national goals at the same time opposing Christians also fighting for national goals, bands of the CUP fighting for still revolutionary, but different aims (constitutionalism, Ottomanism) and the official army. As a counterpoint, some Christian groups showed no nationalistic attitude at all. Some of the bands could only be classified on the basis of *fighting against* rather than that of *fighting for*.

radicalized form of the *četa* is of Serbian origin and spreads from 1903 on - so he considered the pre-*Ilinden* forms a different type, while Keith Brown finds a general lineage between the pre- and post-*Ilinden* types, with only their tactics having changed.²¹ On the other hand it is true, that ethnic tensions played significantly greater role after 1903 than before (when social tensions were as important).

Another approach (using the methods and terminology of sociology) is offered by Georg Elwert, through his interpretation of violence - within the frameworks of '*Gewaltgemeinschaften*' and '*Gewaltmarkt*' - as an 'enterprise'.²² In our study we decided to use this latter approach (discussed below in detail), as our goal was neither a moral judgement on events (who is a terrorist and who is a freedom fighter) nor a criticism or comparison of different (national-,²³ supra- and transnational)²⁴ historiographies, but to reveal the laws and patterns (if there are any) of violence and destabilization processes – in order to give guidelines on how to handle a possible future conflict and to restore peaceful conditions, while also pointing to the dangers of miscalculated interventions.²⁵ This does not mean the refusal of nationalist approach, rather the implementation of other aspects that have to be calculated with.

We do not undertake to analyze all questions and discuss thoroughly the relevance of all interpretations mentioned in the above pages, but we try to reflect on these new ideas and approaches - as much as our sources have made this possible. Our focus is centred on the use of sources, and not on one well-defined question.

21 Brown, Keith S. *Loyal unto Death: Trust and Terror in Revolutionary Macedonia*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2013.

22 See details below. Elwert, Georg. 'Gewaltmärkte, Beobachtungen zur Zweckrationalität der Gewalt.' In *Soziologie der Gewalt*. Sonderheft der Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie, ed. Trutz, von Trotha. Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1997. 86–101.

23 For example, for the Bulgarian point of view see: Елдъров, Светлозар. *Сръбската въоръжена пропаганда в Македония (1901–1912)*. Sofia: ВК "Св. Георги Победоносец", 1993; Елдъров, Светлозар. *Тайните офицерски братства в освободителните борби на Македония и Одринско 1897–1912*. Sofia: Военно издателство, 2002; Елдъров, Светлозар. *Върховният македоно-одрински комитет и Македоно-одринската организация в България (1895–1903)*. Sofia: Иврай, 2003. Георгиев, Георги. 'Спомени на Евгим Янкулов за Балканските войни и Охридско-дебърското въстание (1912–1913 г.)' *Македонски преглед* 36, no. 4 (2013): 119–129; Георгиев, Георги. 'Бежанският въпрос в Албания и българската хуманитарна акция през 1913 г.' *Македонски преглед* 35, no. 1 (2012): 39–67; Георгиев, Величко - Трифонов, Стайко. *Гръцката и сръбската пропаганда в Македония (Краят на XIX – началото на XX век)*. Нови документи. Sofia: Македонски научен институт, 1995.

24 Lory, Bernard. 'Schools for the Destruction of Society: School Propaganda in Bitola 1860–1912.' In *Conflicting Loyalties in the Balkans*, edited by Hannes Grandits, Nathalie Clayer, and Robert Pichler, 46–63. London–New York: I.B. Tauris, 2011.

25 For example, the reforms of the gendarmerie failed in Macedonia between 1903–1908, but not because the selected persons were unsuitable for armed service. We are convinced that the application of Kosovar people to a supranational army for the EU would decrease tensions and the appearance of violence in the region, while it could stabilize a local society through permanent occupation, thus mitigating the risks of a shift towards religious radicalism. At the same time it would increase the EU's ability to handle any conflict, decreasing its dependency on NATO (in Bosnia this worked: Muslim Bosniaks were the best soldiers of Austria-Hungary during WWI).

Thus our work is not a synthesis, but rather an analysis of certain sources, and it is also a methodological experiment – an investigation into what could be concluded from a certain amount of available material written by different persons (belonging to different groups and states) from different perspectives on the same topic.²⁶ Neither did we undertake to broaden the circle of sources and involve new material in order to find answers to questions that remained unresolved using our sources, and thus the scope of our conclusions is not universal. *We can not offer an 'ultimate truth'* as most of our conclusions are spatially limited; only a broader selection of sources can validate the representativeness of our work. Our goal was simply (1) to draw the attention on the benefits of using different source-types that (1a) could offer different interpretations for the same event (see the different interpretations of the conflict around Slepče and Zrze monasteries in pro-Serbian newspapers and in Bulgarian consular reports, or the Dečani question), or (1b) could be used for mutual control (either confirming or challenging old *topoi*); (2) to illustrate the versatility of violence and strategies of survival (their diverse scientific interpretations, spatial and temporal aspects) and (3) to compare the relevance of different methods of analysis.

The present book focuses on the period after the Ilinden Uprising until the outbreak of the Balkan Wars, and aims to identify certain social dividing lines, fractures and motivations that accelerated the escalation of 'everyday violence'.²⁷ In our study we do not intend to evaluate the evolution of ideas or the ideological fights

26 Research in the Austrian State Archives was conducted within the framework of the project 'Politics and Society in Late Ottoman Kosovo. An Edition of Austro-Hungarian Consular Reports from Kosovo, 1870–1913', funded by the Austrian Science Fund FWF (Projekt No. P 21477-G18; project leader: Prof. Oliver Jens Schmitt; main researcher: Eva Anne Frantz; part time co-worker in 2010–11; Krisztián Csaplár-Degovics, part time co-worker (2013-), and Daniela Javorić.

27 The term is later discussed in detail. The methodological approach and idea of this study to focus on everyday violence in the Sanjak of Skopje stems from Frantz, Eva Anne. 'Gewalt als Faktor der Desintegration im Osmanischen Reich - Formen von Alltagsgewalt im südwestlichen Kosovo in den Jahren 1870–1880 im Spiegel österreichisch-ungarischer Konsulatsberichte', *Südost-Forschungen* 68 (2009): 184–204, esp. 184–187. Different forms of coexistence including violence in the Vilayet of Kosovo is also the topic of Frantz, Eva Anne. 'Muslime und Christen im spätoosmanischen Kosovo: Lebenswelten und soziale Kommunikation in den Anfängen eines ethno-politischen Konflikts, 1870–1913' (PhD-diss., University of Vienna, 2014). On this question see also Frantz, Eva Anne. 'Religiös geprägte Lebenswelten im spätoosmanischen Kosovo - Zur Bedeutung von religiösen Zugehörigkeiten, Eigen- und Fremdwahrnehmungen und Formen des Zusammenlebens bei albanischsprachigen Muslimen und Katholiken.' In *Religion und Kultur im albanischsprachigen Südosteuropa*, edited by Oliver Jens Schmitt. Wien: Lang, 2010. 127–150, and Frantz, Eva Anne. 'Violence and its Impact on Loyalty and Identity Formation in Late Ottoman Kosovo: Muslims and Christians in a Period of Reform and Transformation.' *Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs* 29, no. 4 (2009): 455–468.

A German research group investigating the comparative historical and sociological interpretations of the role of communities based on trading in violence also served as an inspiration to the authors. The logic and terminology of the present study are based on the questions, investigated subjects and frameworks defined by Forschergruppe 'Gewaltgemeinschaften': Finanzierungsantrag und Forschungsprogramm 1. Juli 2009 bis 30. Juni 2012. November, 2008, Justus-Liebig-Universität-Giessen. 15–39.

between the different factions of the revolutionary organizations, because the *komitadji* phenomenon has other, less traditional and underinvestigated approaches.

This study is a supranational or *denationalized story*, which investigates the phenomena and consequences of general breakdown and *dehumanization* in human behaviour. Beyond this general approach our goals include the analysis of the organization and tactics of the komitadji before and after the two turning points, 1903 and 1908, and beside these the identification of some microsocial strategies at the family and community level – considered as responses to local coercion and governmental repressions. We investigate both territorial and cultural patterns of violence, specific and general motives, as well as the contribution of foreign intervention (including both the attempts of the Great Powers to settle the question and the propaganda activity of the neighbouring Small States) and local traditions (customary law) appertaining to the nature and extent of violence. Beside the typization of forms of violence, the authors have also examined changes in the support policy of neighbouring small states, including its profitability and local acceptance at a time when the selection of an identity no longer entailed only advantages, but also imposed threats to the individual and the community.

The location

Macedonia as an area was very heterogeneous. The French (anarchist) geographer Reclus wrote that Macedonia is an 'impossibly complex unfriendly terrain', and therefore physical geographical boundaries cannot be applied to separate ethnic groups from each other. Its area was c. 70,000 km², including the Kosovo, Manastir and Selanik Vilayets with approx. 2 million inhabitants, surrounded by the Šar Planina in the North, the Rhodopi Mts. in the East and Lake Ohrid in the West. Its population was ethnically diverse too, as none of the (numerous) groups exceeded 50% of the total population using either religious or ethnic categorization, partly because of the fluid and multiple identity patterns, and partly because of the unreliability of statistics and their different interpretations. Religious, ethnic and linguistic borders did not coincide here.²⁸ With its intermingling communities, Macedonia was an 'impossibly complex unfriendly terrain' for the *national idea* as well – simply unsuitable for the emergence of a nation state without major changes. Having a central location (situated at the crossroads of the N-S Vardar-Morava axis and the E-W route of Via Egnatia), the Ottoman (Muslim Turk) settlement was

28 Demeter, Gábor – Zsolt Bottlik – Krisztián Csaplár-Degovics. *The Role of Ethnic Mapping in Nation-Building and its Influence on Political Decision-Making across the Balkan Peninsula*. Regensburg, in press, 2018.

significant here. Husbandry and land cultivation played an equal role (within the latter, *čiftlik* lands played a key role in creating social tensions); land use sometimes showed ethnic and social patterns as well (Albanian and Vlach shepherds; Muslim large estate owners and Slavic sharecroppers), sometimes not (Muslim and Slavic smallholders, Muslim landlords smallholders and sharecroppers in Albania). The urban population was under 20%, of which the Aegean port of Saloniki had the greatest share. Beyond the state, the Church and the local leaders (through the traditional customs) also had informal power, but neither was great enough to overcome and outcompete the others.

One of the locations to be investigated is the Sanjak of Skopje in Kosovo Vilayet (organized in 1875–78) between the years 1903 and 1912, with an outlook over the neighbouring territories to assess the specific or general character of the events evaluated. The study area is suitable for analyzing the problems related to the birth of modern nations: due to the ethnic and religious heterogeneity in the Sanjak of Skopje, tensions within and between its Eastern Orthodox and Muslim communities can be easily identified and demonstrated (*Map 1, Table 1*). Moreover, the sanjak was located close to the borders of Bulgaria and Serbia, both with territorial pretensions toward this administrative unit of the Ottoman Empire, which made the situation more complicated. Furthermore, the area lied near the Austro-Hungarian sphere of influence, and therefore the interests of a Power (Austria-Hungary) also had an effect on events. This also means a variety of available sources: the investigation made use not only of the archival material of the Bulgarian consulate in Skopje, but also that of the Austro-Hungarian consuls, which offers a more detailed and balanced approach.

As it would be methodologically incorrect to generalize our results based on the investigation of only one region, we decided to select another district (Prizren Sanjak) and use it as a control area. There were numerous differences between the two sample areas. The ethnic distribution of the population was less diverse in Prizren (but still not homogeneous enough as to neglect interethnic and interreligious conflicts). While the Skopje Sanjak had a central localization in terms of physical geographical features (it reached the Morava-Vardar Axis and hosted the centre of the Vilayet), but at the same time was limitrophe with two of the competing small states, in the Prizren Sanjak the situation was different. Owing to its localization the rivalry of small states (neither Serbia nor Bulgaria was limitrophe with the region, limiting the possibilities of direct cross-border interference) was supposed to be less intense. Though the interference of the Powers (the Mürzsteg convention omitted this area from the zones controlled by the Powers) was also supposed to be limited, we will see – through the example of Austrian-Russian rivalry – that it was greater in

fact when compared to Skopje Sanjak (Prizren lied at the crossroads of Austrian and Serbian aspirations towards the Vardar Axis on the one hand and to the Adriatic Sea on the other). The period investigated was also different (rather broader), and the types of conflict were supposed to be dissimilar. Our hypothesis was that due to the larger proportion of Muslims and due to the fact that religious and linguistic cleavages coincided more (in Prizren Muslims predominantly spoke Albanian, and had their specific customs and economic habitat, while in the Skopje Sanjak the Muslims were Albanians, Slavs and Turks; and were both urban dwellers and villagers), here ethnic conflicts were supposed to be more frequent, but less diverse in type. Unlike the urbanized Skopje, Prizren town was only a local centre with different level of administration and number of officials or soldiers, which might induce different governing methods; the different composition of the population would require different tactics to tackle these different problems.

In our study Macedonia is considered a *frontier* not only because the contemporary observers like Frederick More were of the same opinion (using the word *trail* for the region in 1906).²⁹ The main features of the 'frontier' – budget deficits, a high proportion of military and administrative-bureaucratic costs relative to the total expenditure of the province,³⁰ a high ratio of deviant (imprisoned and handicapped) persons,³¹ alternative sources of power (beyond central government), a high migration rate and solutions or reactions differing from generally accepted social norms – were characteristic of Macedonian regions as well.

Beyond being a frontier zone, Macedonia was in a *borderland* position too.³² *Borderlands represented special frontier zones*, either separating political entities (thus functioning as buffer zones) or divided between states (disputed areas), far away from centres. On the one hand, the centre was unable to maintain and assert its power here, but on the other hand neither could local authorities - contesting central power - manage to gain full legitimation (either rational or traditional, in Weberian terms). This implies that the operation of the state and the coexistence of social groups showed various patterns and was based on several models (whether autochthonous or not), which made it impossible to live according to ubiquitous, standardised rules. As there was no consensus about the established, accepted forms

29 The same word that was adapted to the US frontier-zone. Moore, Frederick. *The Balkan Trail*. London: Smith, Elder and Co., 1906. 223-224.

30 K. u. K. Ministerium des Äusseren. *Diplomatische Aktenstücke über die Reformaktion in Mazedonien 1902–1906*. Wien: Druck der K. K. Hof- und Staatsdruckerei. 1906. 166–174. No. 160. 29. 04. 1906.

31 Demeter, Gábor. *A Balkán és az Oszmán Birodalom. Társadalmi és gazdasági és gazdasági átalakulások a 18. század végétől a 20. század közepéig* II. Budapest: MTA BTK TTI, 2016.

32 Wolff, Larry. *Inventing Eastern Europe. The Map of Civilization on the Mind of the Enlightenment*. Stanford: Stanford Univ. Press, 1994, vii, xi, 4, 6–8, 41, 284–331, 357.

of coexistence, borderlands as transition and friction zones of cultures hosted numerous interactions (with different responses) and were characterized by multiple, parallel, but often constrained (elite-less) and fragmented societies. Fault lines were not only determined by ethnic and religious categories, but were also overwritten by social differences (state officials-subjects, urban-rural, landlord-peasant, etc.). Such societies are able to coexist in parallel relatively peacefully for centuries, but without real integration, mutually freezing their conflicts.³³ Borderlands are often exposed to external challenges, too, which complicates the situation further. In our case this meant both imperial challenges and challenges from nation states (manifested in different ideologies). The latter proved to be more attractive, as these were new,³⁴ expansive and radical (aggressive, in fact - there was a difference between the attitude of empires and nation states towards minorities: the (modern) imperial attitude (unlike the national paradigm) was not intolerant to minorities). The spreading of nationalism changed identity and loyalty patterns (such as imperial challenges were able to modify them),³⁵ and thus it redefined the terms 'community' and 'minority', as well. This was a huge shock for these already polarized and incomplete societies: new patterns appeared and surpassed, overwrote old differences without making the latter disappear, thus increasing the number of potential conflicts.

Being the collision zone of at least four nation states and three empires, the geographically and socially fragmented Macedonia was a special border zone. The parallel existence of several external centres functioning as attraction zones made the integration of the three vilayets impossible. Not only did they differ from each other in an economic sense (in Kosovo and Monastir the taxes came from land tax, while in Saloniki the share of land taxes was of secondary importance) – while they were similar in showing low per capita (central) incomes compared to neighbouring countries – but the centrifugal tendencies slowly tore their connections apart (neighbouring countries were characterised by lower tax rates!). As the central power was unable to come up with an acceptable integrative ideology (Ottomanism failed), and the era of relative economic wellbeing was also over by 1878 (prosperity could

33 Bartov, Omer - Eric D. Weitz. 'Introduction. Coexistence and Violence in the German, Habsburg, Russian, and Ottoman Borderlands.' In: *Shatterzone of Empires. Coexistence and Violence in the German, Habsburg, Russian, and Ottoman Borderlands*, edited by Omer Bartov - Eric D. Weitz. Bloomington – Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2013. 1, 2, 4, 9-11.

34 The inhabitants of Macedonia have already been subjects of an empire for centuries, thus had experience about being integrated into a large inhomogeneous, multiethnic and multiconfessional entity where the feeling of supracommunal togetherness usually manifested only in the dynastic rule.

35 Russian and Austrian penetration was able to generate cohesion for sub-groups by creating the notion of enemy or ally on the one hand, but on the other hand it was unable to unify the people of the Ottoman Empire any further.

hold together parts with different character even when there was no common ideology), the cohesive forces vanished. Macedonia became a 'no man's land', where the power vacuum manifested in its entirety, implying the emergence of a new (social) order based on local power (violence), which was supported by persisting archaic (pre-Christian) traditions and customs. Violence in Macedonia exited from the interpretative frameworks of statehood in the beginning of the 20th century: Ottoman authorities lost their monopoly over power and violence. Ottoman *imperial* structures still existed, but the 'state' did not refer to 'law and order' any more (either for the inhabitants of the Ottoman Empire or for the neighbouring Christian states).

This book investigates the events when this exit from the interpretative framework of the state had just begun. The spread of violence after the turn of the century was not a consequence of wars,³⁶ on the contrary, wars were the consequence of the unresolved situation culminating in a clash involving the four small states and the three powers (similarly as happened after 1875 during the Great Eastern Crisis). Furthermore, violence spread neither along fixed nor along continuous fault lines: front lines moved with incredible intensity within and between the groups of Macedonian society. These fault lines were only temporarily delimited by and manifested in the fights of irregular bands. The cleavages even reached the basic building blocks of society: families and settlements became divided or had to face several different types of conflict, often at the same time (class fight, ethno-religious tensions, economic differences and more often a mixture of these). Under these circumstances, 'nation-building' or the 'maintenance of order' easily became only political slogans that sometimes even the bands and the state forgot to emphasize when applying coercive measures.

Macedonia, this 'shatterzone of Empires',³⁷ became a borderland: its external boundaries surrounding the forsaken land of chaos and desolation delimited the end of the *civilized area* (the rule of law defined by central power).³⁸ (People living here were originally grouped into the '*savage*' category by Western observers, but as the dominating Darwinist evolutionary approach was extended to other disciplines of scholarly enquiry - including the evolution of nations, of which the final form is the nation state - by the turn of the century the inhabitants were considered '*half-civilized*' because of the presence of national consciousness and of the ongoing national

36 In this sense the phenomenon differs from those observable after WWI.

37 Bartov - Weitz: 'Introduction'; Wolff, *Inventing Eastern Europe*.

38 Beyond the generally smaller tax rates and more balanced societies of the small states, the feeling of security was also attractive for the inhabitants of Macedonia. And when we are talking about the attractiveness of the national idea, we do not have to forget about these practical considerations and circumstances - most of the dwellers of Macedonia saw the national idea as appealing not because of its unquestionable ideological-intellectual content, as most of them were not susceptible to political philosophy.

struggle pointing towards the formation of the nation state.)³⁹ But even this chaos was somehow systematic, with its own rules and trends. This book traces just these rules and patterns focusing on the organization, institutionalization and nationalization of violence (regarded as a marketable product) in the first part, and investigates the reactions of society (strategies of survival) and the central state in the second part.

As the book partly deals with forms of violence, a typization of the latter and the clarification of different terms used here is necessary. Soward claims that more than 8500 persons were killed in 1903-1908,⁴⁰ during the era of the international intervention (this high number also points to the failure of the latter) and 'only' 3500 of the killed were members of revolutionary organizations or bands. This means that the remainder of victims could either have been non-armed members of these groups (*legalen člen*), who played an important role in supplying the bands with shelter, information and food (discussed later), or collaborators with the central authorities (civilian enemies, targets) – but they could have been innocent civilians as well. In our study we mainly deal with conflicts *where at least one of the participants (either the victim or the perpetrator or both) is considered civilian*. (As civilian involvement in revolutionary movements often remained unknown to the investigating Ottoman or foreign authorities, these atrocities with hidden political character were inseparable from the 'pure' group of 'everyday violence', and thus were also included in our investigation.) Among the atrocities we make a distinction between murders and other forms of injury as two major sub-groups. Cases were categorized along socio-economic and religious fault lines, too. The investigation also includes a spatial and temporal comparison of the different forms of violence (and their clearance rate) in order to trace which type was more frequent prior to, during and after the international intervention.

So, in using the expression 'everyday violence', the authors refer to those acts of violence *which took place among the civil population on a daily basis and were not connected to the law enforcement activity of the authorities* (military reprisals, border clashes, etc.).⁴¹ To explain the occurrence of 'everyday violence', the theory of Georg Elwert provided an important methodological basis for the present work. He stresses that the weakening of the state creates a demand and thus a market for violence in society

39 But it seems that this evolution did not mean a decrease in violence, and so – from our point of view – an increase in the level of civilization.

40 Soward, *Austria's policy*, 76. Ottoman sources estimate 10,000 political murders in ten years. Ottoman Diplomatic Documents II, No. 1642. 05.06.1908.

41 From another aspect we interpret everyday violence a little bit more narrowly, as Anne Eva Frantz does, as we did not intend to deal with stealing of girls, forced marriages and other traditional forms of violence that were built into the culture and were characteristic prior to the turn of the century.

(*Gewaltmärkte*), which is operated by communities organized for trading in violence and coercive measures as commodities (*Gewaltgemeinschaften*). If these *Gewaltgemeinschaften* [vendors] are formed primarily for economic reasons (besides spreading political propaganda), they can be considered as enterprises for which the laws of economics are at least partially true. Even contemporary observers, like the Hungarian historian Thallóczy, wrote that for Mirdite Albanians of Lezhe banditry was some kind of ‘family enterprise’ (unlike Malisor Albanians, who were combative, but not robbers).⁴² Economic factors could be abundant on the demand side as well: economic rivalry between groups over scarce resources could appear under the guise of ideological conflict and in the form of prejudice against ‘the other’ (manifesting in political conflicts often emphasizing ethno-religious differences). These groups, which gradually take control over the monopoly of using force from the state, have their own dynamics, including operating conditions and laws.⁴³

This phenomenon was examined primarily by sociologists and historians through case studies, concentrating on the reasons for violence and the formation of communities trading in violence. However, the internal cohesion and integrative power of these structures, as well as their regulative functions and social spheres of action, are considered to be underinvestigated. The uniqueness of this study is that it approaches the problem from economic aspects as well, stressing that special economic conditions triggered and accelerated the escalation, ethnicization and nationalization (organization) of violence in Macedonia. The authors would also like to draw attention to the practice (*Gewaltpraxis*) and the regularity in the recurrence (yearly cycle) of violence. Beyond the social life and social background of *Gewaltgemeinschaften* (perpetrators), the victims of violence are also examined at different levels from different aspects.⁴⁴

As for the responses to the violence (survival strategies), the authors would also like to show that everyday survival strategies also had an economic character, and their goal was adaptation to the changing economic circumstances. So, although

42 Thallóczy, Lajos. *Utazás a Levantében. A keleti kereskedelem története Magyarországon*. Budapest: Pfeifer N. 1882. 65.

43 Elwert, ‘*Gewaltmärkte*’, 86–101.

44 Speitkamp, Winfried. ‘Einführung.’ In *Gewaltgemeinschaften. Von der Spätantike bis ins 20. Jahrhundert*, edited by Winfried Speitkamp. Göttingen: V&R Unipress, 2013. 8–12. and Grandits, Hannes, Nathalie Clayer and Robert Pichler. ‘Introduction. Social (Dis)Integration and the National Turn in the Late- and Post-Ottoman Balkans: Towards an Analytical Framework.’ In *Conflicting Loyalties in the Balkans: The Great Powers, the Ottoman Empire and Nation-Building*, eds. Hannes Grandits et al. London: Tauris, 2011. 3–5.

loyalties may change quickly, there is a constant element behind them – the economic factor.⁴⁵

When investigating these problems, we utilized a special type of source: the observations of Austrian consuls of everyday violence as compared to contemporary Bulgarian consular reports. From a methodological point of view, a combination of Austrian and Bulgarian archival sources (a comparison of data obtained from independent observers and participants in events) supplemented by official Ottoman diplomatic documents (which represent a different level) can be promising in order to avoid partiality, since not only the terminology used in Austrian and Bulgarian documents is different,⁴⁶ but so is the interpretation of events. As the case of the Slepče and Zrze monasteries proves (see later),⁴⁷ Serbian and Bulgarian sources tell a different story of the same events, and thus a broadening of sources is inevitably needed to come to more balanced conclusions. The reinterpretation of some sources using a comparative approach would also be worthwhile.

The authors also aimed to investigate whether statements in earlier scholarly works regarding the main fault lines or the nature and forms of violence can be considered realistic (whether these can be validated using a larger dataset and numerous concrete examples) or should be revised. To realize the aforementioned goals the study applies a *statistical analysis* of quantitative data regarding victims and perpetrators when tracing patterns, differences and general features. Analysis of selected individual *case studies* and the role of the *economic background* will be discussed further in *Chapter V*. As we were interested in the specific problems mentioned, general political questions (the history of Macedonian reform movements, Young Turk movements, parliamentary elections, etc.) and diplomatic affairs are not investigated. Neither do the limits of this study allow us to examine the origin of all fault lines and all interactions: the authors therefore focus on the tensions between Muslims and Christians and the antagonism between Patriarchists

45 Grandits – Clayer – Pichler. 'Introduction,' 5–8.

46 It is important to note that the word 'Bulgarian' is not equivalent to 'Exarchist' in Austrian documents. Österreichische Haus-, Hof-, und Staatsarchiv, Politisches Archiv (hereinafter ÖStA HHStA PA), VII/Fasz.434, Rappaport to Pallavicini, March 21, 1907. No. 330, Beilage No.26, 5. See also the Kral consul's map from 1903 in Nachlass Szapáry, ÖStA HHStA. Cited also by Толева, Теодора. *Виянието на Австро-Унгария за създаването на албанска нация, 1896-1906*. Sofia: Ciela, 2012. 540–544 (maps). By contrast, in the reports of the Bulgarian consul in Skopje, the term 'Bulgarian' is synonymous with Exarchist. The word 'Bulgarian' instead of 'Exarchist' often occurs even in Exarchist ecclesiastical documents. See: Централен Държавен Архив, (Sofia, hereafter ЦДА), ф. 331k. оп. 1. а.е. 309. л. 31. In Bitola, for example, 'Bulgarian school', and 'Bulgarian church' are used. There were even Patriarchist Bulgarian villages according to Bulgarian sources (some of them were converted as a result of Serbian propaganda, though some were not affected). Ottoman diplomatic documents also prefer the use of the word 'Bulgarian'.

47 See Volarić, Klara. 'Between the Ottoman and Serbian State: Carigradski glasnik, an Istanbul-based Paper of Ottoman Serbs, 1895-1909.' *Hungarian Historical Review* 3, no. 3 (2014).

and Exarchists. The existing debates between Muslim communities of different origin and identity is only partly investigated – to prove that intra-community conflicts also existed beyond interconfessional and interethnic conflicts.

General remarks

However, prior to the discussion of the social conflicts, it is necessary to make some general remarks in order to place the subject of our investigation in its historical (and historiographical) context.

First general remark. Internal problems I: the role and persistence of traditional patterns in determining the behavior of Muslim communities. As a consequence of the Tanzimat reforms, the differences between Muslims and Christians had been gradually diminishing, which deeply frustrated the Muslim community that was in the process of losing its privileges. On the other hand, economic inequality in this very region (unlike in other areas) did not decrease, as the landlords were mainly Muslims: this frustrated the Christians, who remained economically subjugated to the landlords (half of Macedonian lands were in large estates called *çiftlik*, mainly in Muslim hands,⁴⁸ while one-third was *waqf* [Islamic land endowment], and only the remaining one-sixth was in the hand of freeholders in 1910).⁴⁹ And since not all Muslims were rich, an abolition of their privileged position would eliminate the last factor that differentiated them from the Christian *rayah*. These (often rural) Muslim communities of the central Balkans formed one of the most conservative (and often intolerant) religious groups in the empire, refusing to live within the framework of a modern state and harbouring no desire to be treated equally to Christians. The state largely relied on them when it was unable to maintain full control or had to get rid of ideologies challenging central authority (like the *bektaşî movement*), but, as decades passed, they were more of an obstacle to modernization (both from the perspective of the *hamidian* rule urging for centralization and from the aspect of socio-economic modernization urged by external pressure – though there was also an antagonism between these two perspectives).⁵⁰ The reforms satisfied neither Muslims nor

48 See: *Memorandum des Syllogues Grecs de Constantinople*. Jean D. Aristocles, 6 Avril, 1878. M.A.H. Layard, Ambassadeur de Sa Majesté Britannique à Constantinople. Correspondence respecting the Objections raised by Populations inhabiting Turkish Provinces against the Territorial Changes proposed in the Preliminary Treaty signed at San Stefano. Presented to both Houses of Parliament by Command of Her Majesty. London: Harrison and sons, 1878, 61.

49 Strauss, Adolf. *Großbulgarien*. Posen–Leipzig–Warshau–Budapest: Mitteleuropäischer Buch- und Lehrmittelverlag, 1917. 52-60. There were 15,000 *çiftlik* owners and only 10,000 freeholders in the region.

50 Hamidian reforms were considered conservative and were to hinder external interference aimed at changing the existing structures.

Christians, nor did these reinforce trust towards each other or towards the viability of the state. The reforms generated confrontation between the Muslims and the central government, but the true victim of the Muslims' anger and frustration was usually the local Christians, as this conservative rural Muslim layer thought that they were responsible for all unfavourable changes and suspected them of being 'a fifth column' of the Powers. (This card was also played out at an early stage by the central government, but as it usually resulted in external intervention, the practice was soon abandoned: the *hamidian* regime wanted to strengthen central power in order to decrease external interference.) Therefore this layer became burdensome for all actors, but from different reasons: for sultan Abdulhamid because their activity invoked external interference, for the Powers because they caused calamities, and for the local Christians because they meant a constant threat.⁵¹ Knowing all this, the paradox of why these classes could be convinced by the CUP to support their movement (including constitutionalism) is not a paradox any more – these echelons simply wanted to get rid of a government that challenged their privileges; they fought *against* the present situation and not *for* the new. (When they realized that the subsequent changes did not improve their position, they turned against the Young Turks also.)

The reason for the negative attitude of these traditionalist Muslim groups against Christians (whom they identified with the Powers) should be found in historical events. After 1878 the situation deteriorated further when 40,000 Muslim refugees from Bosnia and the Sanjak of Niš arrived to Kosovo Vilayet (constituting one-third of the population in Priština, a quarter of the population in both Vučitrn and Gjilan and ten per cent of the population of Skopje).⁵² At the same time, neighbouring small states were established. These *muhadjir* families had lost everything they had during the war, and the Ottoman government declined to provide them with support. Fleeing from the Austro-Hungarian occupation or from the Serbian army, the absence of state support and the pressing need to provide for their families prompted these refugees to take desperate measures. They expelled thousands of the local Slavic peasant families, mainly from eastern Kosovo, who then fled to Serbia (*Mala Seoba*). These Muslim refugees, however, assimilated with the local society over the

51 To conclude, there was an antagonism in the Hamidian internal policy, as every step toward centralization in order to decrease external intervention and the role of rural destabilizing forces resulted in the activity of the latter targeted against the Christians, which increased the interference of power, despite the aims of the central government, resulting in a vicious circle. In this way an internal problem became externalized; this made the consolidation of central power almost impossible. Had the hatred of local Muslims been targeted only against the central government, it would have remained an internal conflict.

52 *Osmanlı Arşiv Belgelerinde. Kosova vilayeti*. İstanbul: T.C. Başbakanlık. Devlet Arşivleri Genel Müdürlüğü, 2007. BOA, Y. PRK. UM, 1/99. 332-34.

long term, and thus formed a social stratum in the province that could be best characterized by its constant restlessness.⁵³ Their assimilation was not always full-scale and not always generated new (nationalistic) loyalties, but rather was based on their privileged status and the disdain felt towards the Christian *reaya*. It seems that atrocities and massacres became inseparable from (or became an organic part of) the modernization process and executing state reforms in Macedonia⁵⁴ – *regardless of the type* (as both traditional and new forms invoked violence) of loyalty and identity (self-determination).

Second general remark. Internal problems II: the emergence of new identities and loyalties. By the final third of the nineteenth century, the social changes that had reached the Balkans had transformed or abolished the majority of the formerly existing identity patterns. This world was in transition in a religious, social and economic sense as well. The identity of the local, South Slavic-speaking Eastern Orthodox peasantry was also in crisis, though it was not the recognition of Christians as equal citizens that challenged this identity. This recognition took place too late, as it almost coincided with the birth of modern nationalistic ideas in the neighbouring small states—and (as mentioned earlier) equal citizenship did not represent a real alternative, since neither Muslims nor Christians were satisfied with the reforms.⁵⁵ The reception of liturgy in Slavic language from 1859, then the excommunication of the nascent Bulgarian Exarchate in 1872 for being “schismatic”, accused of “ethnophyletism”⁵⁶ (the “love of a certain ethnicity” instead of promoting regional-territorial identity) by the Greek Patriarchate, which wanted to preserve its ‘ecumenical-universal’ role with the Patriarch as the sole ‘ethnarchos’, clearly

53 Clewing, Konrad. ‘Mythen und Fakten zur Ethnostruktur in Kosovo – ein geschichtlicher Überblick.’ In *Der Kosovo-Konflikt. Ursachen-Akteure-Verlauf*, edited by Konrad Clewing and Edvin Pezo. München: Bayerische Landeszentrale für Politische Bildungsarbeit, 2000. 46-47; Kaser, Karl. ‘Raum und Besiedlung.’ In *Südosteuropa. Ein Handbuch*, edited by Margaditsch Hatschikjan and Stefan Troebst. München: Beck, 1999. 53-72; and Schmitt, Oliver Jens. *Kosovo. Kurze Geschichte einer zentralbalkanischen Landschaft*. Wien-Köln-Weimar: Böhlau, 2008. 79-84, 153-56.

54 Rodogno, Davide. *Against Massacre. Humanitarian Interventions in the Ottoman Empire, 1815–1914. The Emergence of a European Concept and International Practice*. Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2012. 9.

55 In contrast to Bulgaria, where economic prosperity grew together with the replacement of Spahis (as layers that were not cost-effective) and resulted in the economic emergence of the Bulgarian smallholder in the 1850s, in Macedonia the peasants remained economically deprived under Muslim landlords with no hope for prosperity after 1873–1878, when U.S. and Russian crops invaded Western markets, thereby lowering grain prices. It was the crop boom of the 1840s (thus an external factor) that prolonged the existence of the Ottoman Empire, not the reforms themselves. These reforms did not create economically favorable conditions (it was only a successful response to existing opportunities), but the contrary: the tax reforms of Midhat Pasha, providing a surplus for the central government, could be carried out due to the favorable economic situation. This was missing in the 1870s, when the Empire continued its reforms, and this contributed profoundly to the failure of social modernization. Demeter, Gábor. *A Balkán és az Oszmán Birodalom I*. Budapest: MTA BTK TTI, 2014.

56 Yosmaoğlu, Ipek. *Blood Ties: Religion, Violence and the Politics of Nationhood in Ottoman Macedonia, 1878–1908*. Cornell Univ., 2013. 53.

indicated this change (the ethnicization of identity). The appearance of new identity patterns using the old structures resulted in a transitional period, where state functions were also performed by the new Bulgarian Church (taxation, jurisdiction, social care, economic enterprises, banking). The consequence was that Orthodoxy within the boundaries of the Ottoman Empire ceased to be an united *millet* any more. The loss of income after the secession of Exarchist areas (and also of the Romanian Church) caused such a critical situation for the Constantinople Patriarchate that if it wanted to avoid the fate of the Ipek Patriarchate (its former rival),⁵⁷ it had to accept the financial support of the Greek state (which was up to then not considered as an ally, because it created a national autocephalous Greek Church in the 1830s instead of accepting the supremacy of Constantinople, thus taking the first step towards the disintegration of Balkan Orthodoxy). This meant another heavy blow, as it invited a secularized institution to the fight, which brought its new 'tribal-nationalistic' and not 'universal' patterns of identity. Though the Greek state supported the activity of the Patriarchate with 1.5 yearly million drachmas by 1906, through its organizations like the Syllogos (from 1869, established to promote the Hellenic education of youngsters in Macedonia) or the Committees (1886), it also tried to exert pressure on the Patriarchate itself through these institutions – for example not to finance Patriarchist schools in which Slavic language is taught (1883).

There were also some Greeks who expressed their pleasure over the schism more than their frustration, because (1) they thought that it would lead to the nationalization of the Patriarchate as well, and (2) they were convinced that the integration of the remainder patriarchist Slavs into Hellenism would have been easier had there had been millions of Slavic speakers. The same thought was shared by Paparrigopoulos, the leader of the state-supported Syllogos, while the Patriarchate – still considering itself ecumenical and not national – tried to move towards the abolition of the schism, which was not welcomed by Greece. Another Patriarch, Antimios VII, also went against the Greek government's interests when he entered into a deal with the Serbs (in order to decrease the isolated situation and dependency of the Patriarchate and to hinder the advance of the Exarchate), which was refused by the Syllogos.

So, the arrival of nationalism generated new fault lines within the population, such as religion had created earlier, but without erasing the old differences. The several types and layers of identities were overlapping one another, creating chaos in people's minds, rivalry between the political ideologies (the loyal-liberal and the

⁵⁷ It was incorporated in 1767 by Constantinople in return for consolidating the debts, thus establishing Greek dominance over the Christians of the peninsula for 100 years, though this was not enough to Hellenize the local Slavs.

nationalistic-revolutionary),⁵⁸ unconsolidated identities and an upsurge of social change. Peasants' hunger for land was also exploited by national movements. Furthermore, in our case,⁵⁹ not only religious and nationalistic divisions tended to face one another *at the same time*,⁶⁰ but in addition to the collision of competing internal ideologies an external threat also manifested itself as a transmitter of the nationalistic idea, offering a real alternative (a smallholder society with private property) for the oppressed.

While in the Ottoman Empire the opportunity for an essentially sectarian identity to develop and transform into something new (the "Ottoman nation") arose at a rather slow pace, the numerous and elaborated national ideologies suddenly seemed to "flood" the local population. And, soon enough, a violent rivalry broke out among the representatives of the different South Slav national creeds.⁶¹ These ideologies were no longer (or not only) promoted or propagated by the *nationalized church* subjected to/or allies of the Ottoman state, but by *patriot foreigners* from the nation states built on *secular society* or by the *local intelligentsia*, also resulting in a multiplication of agents and ideologies, which presented ordinary people with a difficult choice. Identities became fuzzy and multidimensional because of the persistence of multiple reference systems. National indifference, the abundance of multidimensional or complex identities, regional and hidden identities and involuntary-forced identities were the additional results of this process of congestion of ideologies.

Oliver Jens Schmitt set up a model for Kosovo, sketching the evolution of identity from traditional towards ethnicized identity patterns. In our opinion the Macedonian case (the ethnicization of South Slavs) was similar. In Schmitt's model *in the first phase* the Orthodox millet undergoes a nationalization process, therefore first a new "Slavic" identity is created to oppose the Greek Church. Within the *millet* the so-called '*Konfessionsnationen*'—confessional nations—are evolving.⁶² The problem is that the fragmentation of the Christian *millet* did not stop here, because not only one centre existed/was created: the ethnicization/nationalization of religious identity took

58 The third one, traditionalist, was rather a Muslim political behavior with anti-Christian sentiments, as explained above.

59 The same had also taken place in France (1789–1815) and Central Europe (1848–49), leading to violence there as well. So the redefinition of national identity that stirs up sentiment is not a particularly Balkan phenomenon.

60 In Europe religious opposition preceded the occurrence of the nationalistic by many centuries, but religious wars fought then were just as violent.

61 Schmitt, *Kosovo*, 160–67.

62 After the abolition of the Patriarchate in Ipek [Peć], the goal of the Greek Patriarchate to uniformize the population failed, with the exception of the Vlachs, mainly because this kind of assimilation was based on the presence of the urban Greek population, which simply did not exist in either Macedonia or Kosovo after the numerous Albanian raids in southern Macedonia in the 1820s that broke up the "Greek" Orthodox merchant communities.

place not simply in contrast to the Muslim or Greek community, but also within the Christian community.

Prior to the mass establishment of state-financed schools for the illiterate masses and consulates (or trade agencies) to promote state interests, the Church was the only institution that could transmit national(istic) ideologies. Furthermore, it was the Church, which appointed local teachers, with the approval of local authorities. Therefore establishing control over the (parts of the) Church⁶³ was extremely important for the small states, as shown by the Bogoslovie conflict in Prizren (which we turn to in detail later). If the Church had financial problems, then the state intervened, but – in return for financial support – it expected the transmission of *its* nationalistic propaganda.

Due to its early territorial autonomy, Serbia had plenty of time to build up an institutional system of its own in parallel to the Church (The Serbian Church became independent from Constantinople only in 1879, but without the Macedonian territories, where the authority of the Greek Patriarchate prevailed until 1918, although Slavic language in ceremonies was allowed to be used from 1859 on, and in the 1890s there was agreement between Constantinople and Belgrade to harmonize their measures taken against the Bulgarian advance). The main measures were the foundation of the Serb cultural commission in Belgrade in 1868 in order to hinder the Islamization of the Eastern Orthodox population; then, state stipends in Serbia were established; this was followed by the establishment of Društvo Svetog Save in 1886 to coordinate cultural activities that could not be undertaken by the Church.⁶⁴

In the case of the Greeks we have already shown that the relationship between the universalist Church and the nationalistic state was not always harmonious, causing frictions with the Patriarchate over questions of authority and the curriculum of schools. In contrast, in Bulgaria the establishment of the National Church preceded that of the state; the former adopted state functions which it managed to keep even later in areas that were not incorporated into the nascent Bulgarian state (in Macedonia).

Thus, while Serbian identity became *nationalized-secularized* (the establishment of the secularized institutional background went in parallel with the activity of the Church, which later became nationalized and integrated into this system), Bulgarian identity, according to Schmitt, remained *national-religious* (the members of the Exarchate were considered Bulgarian of ethnicity, and the Exarchate was the

63 This is called the 'nationalization of Church', which split Orthodoxy apart.

64 Schmitt, *Kosovo*, 160–65.

precursor of the state performing numerous state functions).⁶⁵ While in the Greek case the authority over schools generated a debate between national and ecclesiastic interests for decades, in the Bulgarian case the interest of the state and the church more or less coincided; their activities rather reinforced one another, resulting in a synergy. But the nationalization of the Church was slow even here: the schism between the Exarchate and the Patriarchate deepened only gradually. Initially the leader of the Exarchate refused the peasants' demand for native speaker teachers,⁶⁶ and a radical turn in this question was observable only after 1901, when the Exarchate went on the offensive in South Macedonia.

In this *second stage of nationalization*, a local *civilian-secularized nationalistic elite* was formed (with the support of external interference) that questioned the leadership of the local *priests*, often overthrowing the influence of the latter. During the *third stage* the Small States overtly interfered in this process by "offering" teachers and priests to help influence the target groups.

But as ethnic affiliations were not directly derived from religious differences – new fault lines fragmented society not only in parallel to the original religious differences, but also perpendicular to these (Muslim Slavs, Exarchist Serbs, Patriarchist Bulgarians, and even Patriarchist Bulgarian-speaking Greeks) – this did not result in the consolidation of new patterns. The old patterns also prevailed (villages claiming themselves 'Christian' during the population census). Indirectly this also implied plenty of conflict between nationalist organizations (from guerrilla groups to consular agencies) and religious institutions. So, the cooperation between ecclesiastic and nationalist propaganda was not as free of conflict as we might think. As in rural regions traditional religious identity was better "embedded", a broad transitional zone between "consolidated" ethnicized identities developed, which did not appear on the "flattened" maps, only in statistics, on which these maps were based. The Ottoman census of 1903 probably illustrates this confused situation the best, as (1) it mixed the old and newly introduced ethno-religious categories as well, and thus (2) generated an uncertainty as to whether self-declaration, or the classification favoured by ecclesiastic authorities or the categorization of imperial authorities should be taken into consideration (and what terms should be used).⁶⁷

65 Bulgarian nationalists also include Patriarchist Slavs and Pomaks in the category of the Bulgarian nation.

66 From 1895 onwards Bulgarian schools in Macedonia were subjected to the Exarchate – teachers were appointed by the Exarchate. On the other hand, teacher training colleges existed only in Bulgaria, and so, although 90% of the teachers teaching in the schools of the Exarchate were born in Macedonia, they were educated in Bulgaria.

67 As there were 'silent' – unconscious or intimidated – communities and 'loud' ones, protesting with petitions against the classifications.

As religious identity was only slowly dissolved into the newly evolving ethnic identity, ethnicized identity patterns – according to Schmitt – also remained unconsolidated among Orthodox South Slavs. First, the new type of ethnicization reached only 5% of the population: masses of the peasantry remained untouched or were characterized by old or fluid, amorphous identity patterns.⁶⁸ As late as 1903 in the Sanjak of Prizren 17,000 Eastern Orthodox Exarchists and 22,000 Patriarchists lived together; thus half of the Slavs in Kosovo (a part of whom was described as Bulgarian as early as in 1861) were still not Serbianized.⁶⁹ (Had Bulgaria started to build its nation or its Church 30 years earlier, the entire Slavic population in Kosovo could have been made Bulgarian).

Second, even Serbian and Greek historians like Volarić,⁷⁰ Terzić and Gounaris agreed that, beyond nationalist or religious sentiments, self-determination was also based on pragmatic personal or economic interests and decisions. Joining the Bulgarian Exarchate implied some financial benefits, e.g. newcomers escaped from some tax impositions made by the Patriarchal eparches; Bulgarian schools offered a stipend, while a student of Greek schools paid tuition fee,⁷¹ and many other reasons had to be taken into account, such as geographical position, intimidation of guerrillas, local clan divisions, etc. In other words, pragmatic as well as idealistic reasons determined church affiliation and nationhood.⁷² Branislav Nušić, in 1892 vice-consul in Bitola, vividly described what Greek, Bulgarian, and Serbian propaganda yielded among the local population of one entirely Slavic-speaking village: *“The church is Greek, the school is Exarchist, the two priests are ‘Serbomans’ ... In the house of the priest Serbian books are hidden in a basement, periodicals from Sofia are on the table, one son is a student in Belgrade, the second son is the teacher of the Exarchate in Skopje, the third son is a former student of the Austrian Catholic mission, and two children*

68 In 1865, only 150 students studied Serbian in Peć: thus a narrow, but resolute and devoted national élite was formed. Schmitt, *Kosovo*, 159–72. While the nationalization of this elite seems to be obvious, Schmitt did not find any evidence that the same process took place among the peasantry by 1900. The behavior of these peasant masses were still determined by the representatives and teachings of the Church until the mass establishment of state-supported schools began (after 1900).

69 Hahn (then in Serbian service) described the Orthodox population of Gjilan (in Kosovo) as Bulgarian during his famous travel.

70 Volarić, Klara. 'Between the Ottoman and Serbian State: Carigradski glasnik, an Istanbul-based Paper of Ottoman Serbs, 1895–1909.' *Hungarian Historical Review* 3 (2014): 3. 560–586.

71 For example, in their secondary school in Salonica, Bulgarians received accommodation and a yearly grant of 350 francs. It is not surprising that (1) the social composition of Bulgarian secondary schools differed from that of the Greek, targeting a different social class, and that (2) students became susceptible to the Bulgarian national cause. Most of the leaders of the Bulgarian national idea were trained in Salonica, and later managed to integrate social banditry into the national schemes (Yosmaoğlu, *Blood Ties*, 71–72, 78.). While Bulgarian schools became a hotbed of state propaganda through state grants and focused on training an elite with an obligation to the nation, Greek schools focused more on transmitting universal erudition.

72 Gounaris, Basil. 'Social Cleavages and National 'Awakening' in Ottoman Macedonia.' *East European Quarterly* 29, (1995): 409–426.

are attending the elementary school of the Exarchate."⁷³ In the second part of our investigation, which comprises government and local strategies, some new evidence of this phenomenon (fluidness of ethnicized identity and the role of pragmatic interests) is collected and analyzed through numerous case studies. The first part of the booklet analyzing the specific forms of violence (which is also considered as a symptom of declining state power)⁷⁴ also stresses the role of personal motives beyond group consciousness (the latter often serving as a pretext to settle old, personal disputes).

Third general remark. The external factor I: the Powers. The wave of violence in Macedonia reached Western readers at the turn of the century, and the publicity it obtained also urged politicians to intervene. The basis of intervention was the 23rd and 62nd articles of the Berlin Congress. The latter made the interference of the Powers in the internal affairs of the Empire possible, if the Porte refused to treat its subjects equally and according to the general European practices and expectations, while the former stipulated the introduction of reforms in Macedonia as a self-governing province of Turkey (though its scale and method of execution was left to the Porte, and thus it excluded European interference). But as neither was autonomy realized nor security increased, the Powers were finally vindicated in their right to intervene in 1903 (the Porte wanted to hinder this step; that is why it decided to implement some reforms prior to this, which were considered inadequate by both the Powers and the political leaders of the IMRO). The interference of the Powers was based on the Armenian (1895) and Cretan (1897–99) experience, where the pretext of intervention was also the 62nd article. The intervention was considered as a 'humanitarian' one even by contemporary observers, because it targeted only the defence of a certain group, the Christians.⁷⁵ The problems of local Muslims, who also suffered several types of abuse, mistreatment and violence, were irrelevant from the Powers' point of view.⁷⁶ But even the suffering of the Catholic and Orthodox population could only gain political significance because it involved two competing Powers (Russia and Austria-Hungary, protectors of their co-religionists), and the advance of any Power *alone* in the Balkans had to be hindered, as the balance of power between the two forming Power groups, the Entente and the Triple alliance, had to be maintained. Thus the interference of the Powers can better be called

73 Terzić, Slavenko. 'Конзулат Краљевине Србије у битолју (1889-1897).' *Историјски часопис* 57, (2008): 338-39.

74 The loss of the state monopoly on violence is a typical feature of frontier zones.

75 Durham *Burden of the Balkans*, 4.

76 Rodogno, *Against Massacre*, 9-10, 170, 229.

'humanitarian imperialism' – meaning here the *colonization efforts justified by the necessity of humanitarian intervention*.⁷⁷

This joint intervention of the Powers proved to be a failure (not for the last time): the new gendarmerie led by the international board of officers was unable to secure peace. The common political pressure of the Powers after 1906 was also insufficient, unable as it was to enforce the implementation of new reforms. The Powers remained quite underinformed regarding the situation in the three vilayets – a lesson not learned even later – and committed several mistakes beyond applying an inadequate number of gendarme officers. Hiring more was hindered by the fact that the budget of the provinces showed a huge deficit even when tax reforms were implemented and tax arrears were collected.⁷⁸ The opposing parties thought that the Powers' proposal to rearrange the administrative borders would be carried out according to the ethnic composition,⁷⁹ and the subsequent enactment of the (regular) Ottoman population census (1903-05) was thought to be a measure to prepare for this – especially because numerous new ethnolinguistic categories were introduced that way approaching the Ottoman concept to Western terminology.⁸⁰ Thus, the two independent bureaucratic reforms acquired a political context.⁸¹ There was also a remarkable contradiction in arguing for the necessity of humanitarian intervention (which was regarded as legitimate by the press and public opinion) and at the same time considering local minorities as being able to defend themselves.⁸² As a result, compared to the earlier cases, it was not solely the Ottoman Empire that was blamed for the failure of the reforms, but the Macedonian paramilitary troops as well, which were not only no longer considered to be groups fighting for national goals and against oppression (as they were in 1903), but were also seen to be criminals.⁸³

Fourth general remark. Regional vs. national identity – the Macedonian factor. The clash of imperial and national thought over the Balkans and the growing rivalries between the competing groups had an important consequence. Debated or ill-defined territorial claims and geographical terms (Macedonia) appeared in mental maps,

77 The occupation of Bosnia was reasoned that way. See: Asbóth, János. *Bosznia és Hercegovina*. Budapest, 1887. (He had strong ties to Benjámín Kállay). See a similar evaluation of Kállay's policy also from Gratz Gusztáv. 'Bosznia Kállay halála korában.' *Huszadik Század* 5, no. 1 (1904).

78 Douglas Dakin. *Greek Struggle in Macedonia 1897-1913*. Salonica: Institute for Balkan Studies, 1966, 150.

79 This was first accepted by the Powers, causing upheavals and objections, then later dropped, also causing dissatisfaction.

80 Yosmaoğlu, *Blood ties*, Chapter 4.

81 The former population census was carried out ten years earlier, in 1893.

82 "Massacres in the Macedonian provinces aroused a smaller amount of sympathy among the European public than had the massacres of Armenians. Whereas the Armenians were the archetype of defenseless victims, European newspapers portrayed the Macedonian people as brave insurgents able to defend themselves. The Macedonian Question could not be portrayed as a struggle of oppressor versus oppressed." Rodogno, *Against Massacre*, 234.

83 Rodogno, *Against Massacre*, 238-43.

which did not take into consideration local forms of identity: instead of overlapping and fitting existing reality, these instead created new cleavages and further complicated tensions. The evolving regional-geographical identity did not fit into the concepts of the neighbouring nation states (see the Bulgarians' contemporary view of Misirkovism and of Chupovski),⁸⁴ because it was bound primarily to territory, not to language or religion or commitment towards any of the new political centres. While the Bulgarians claimed that Macedonia should be Bulgarian (and not only because of the language, or because of the fabricated historical past, but because of the legal constructions they used in their argument – the constitution of Tarnovo was approved by the representatives of Macedonia as well, during the great national assembly in 1878, and the area was the part of the Exarchate, which *de facto* undertook state tasks), Chupovski, in his letter blaming the Bulgarians for the events of 1912-13, put the territorial integrity of Macedonia first and considered any partition harmful.⁸⁵

For this pro-Macedonian elite (like Pop-Arsov), the basis of mobilization was their belonging to Macedonia and not belonging to any state and nation (either Bulgarian or Serbian).⁸⁶ Autonomy – promised in Berlin – and territorial unity were the foremost goals for them, whether realized within the boundaries of the Ottoman Empire or within Bulgaria, etc.⁸⁷ But it is also true that autonomy was regarded only as a tactical element for many of the influential personalities in the IMRO (like Goce

84 June 25, 1910. Archimandrite Neophyte in Skopje to Bulgarian Exarch Joseph in Constantinople. Cited in: 'Diskusija – Misirkov i nacionalno-kulturni razvoj na makedonskiot narod do Oslobođuvanje.' In *Zbornik Misirkov*, Simpozium, edited by S. Dimevski. Skopje: Institut za makedonski jazik, 1975, 338-39.

85 What did Bulgaria represent for Macedonia? "...*The role of Bulgaria as regards to Macedonia was from the very beginning criminal; it was first to violate...the article of the Berlin Treaty which bound Turkey to introduce reforms in Macedonia... strove to destroy in them any idea of an autonomous Macedonia... in 1888, the Bulgarian Government destroyed the 'Macedonian Literary Society' under the presidency of Georgi Pulevski...Two years later, in that same Sofia, the Bulgarian Government closed the evening schools, specially opened for the emigrant Macedonian craftsman...*" Chupovski, Dimitrija. 'Macedonia and the Macedonians,' *Makedonskij Golos*, 1913, 130-33.

86 "...*We have been Macedonian fighters and we will fight to the end for the Macedonian people, but we do not fight for Bulgaria or Serbia, nor Greece; they are free and live freely ... We are not against any nationality of either Bulgaria, Serbia, or Greece; we should recognize the merit of those who would help us. If there had been any Serbian, Bulgarian or Greek land here, they should not have waited for us to die in the mountains but should have liberated Macedonia with their armies; only then they could have demanded Serbia, Bulgarian or Greek land here...*" A letter of a Macedonian warlord to another. Taken from 'Blazhe Krusheski DA SSID – Fond Izvrshnog odbora Srpske narodne organizacije F-6 (1906)'.

87 The IMRO *officially* considered Macedonia an indivisible territory and claimed all of its inhabitants to be "Macedonians", irrespective of their religion or ethnicity. In practice, most of their followers were Bulgarians. Officially it opposed foreign propaganda according to its statute of 1902 prior to Ilinden and after it in 1906. Chapter I. Art. 1. – *The goal of the Internal Macedonian-Adrianople Revolutionary Organization is to unite any and all dissatisfied elements in Macedonia and the Adrianople Vilaet without regard to their nationality so that political autonomy can be achieved for these two regions.* Art. 2. *The Organization opposes any other country's intentions to divide and conquer these two regions. ... Chapter II. Art. 3. To achieve this goal, the Organization aims to abolish chauvinist propaganda and nationalistic disputes ...* Excerpt from the statute of IMARO, 1906 (in Bulgarian, amended at the general congress in 1906).

Delchev⁸⁸ and Hristo Tatarchev): for them the desired outcome of the events was a unification with Bulgaria.⁸⁹ On the other hand Jane Sandanski (who, having the greatest social conscience, urged socio-economic change) remained an autonomist. This division (revealed also in the amendments of the statute of the IMRO) decreased the success of the revolutionary organization.

So, to apply Philipp Ther's term, Macedonian vilayets became 'lands caught in-between': intermediary spaces not only in geographical but also in cultural and ethnic terms. Beyond national thought infiltrating from 'abroad', the emerging 'local patriotism' originating from local dialects and traditions also became a basis of self-identification.⁹⁰ This concept considered Macedonia not as a periphery of an existing entity (as the neighbouring states considered it), but as a separate centre.⁹¹

This internal Macedonian factor should not be ignored when discussing the roots and types of conflicts. In general, neither national nor regional ideas were strong enough to capture the minds of the overwhelming majority, and this made the population partly resistant, partly apathetic and hesitant, and it also contributed to the emergence violence.

Fifth general remark. The external factor II. The aspirations of small states. Contrary to that explained above, the Christian nation states of the Balkans considered areas under Ottoman rule as a potential part of their countries. Citing religious issues (using the Exarchate as a Trojan horse) or the state's interest (refugee questions, railways, etc.), they – competing with each other – continuously demanded interference in the internal affairs of the Ottoman state. The nation state building attempts of these small states can also be interpreted as some kind of colonization

88 *The idea of autonomy was strictly political and did not imply a secession from Bulgarian ethnicity*, as one of the founders, Hristo Tatarchev pointed out in his memoirs. Cindy C. Combs and Martin W. Slann, *Encyclopedia of terrorism*. New York: Infobase Publishing, 2009. 135. Delchev wrote that the autonomy then was only a tactic, aiming at future unification with Bulgaria. "Firstly, the revolutionary organization began to work among the Bulgarian population, not even among the whole of it, but only among this part, which participated in the Bulgarian Exarchate. IMARO treated with suspicion the Bulgarians who were members of other churches, such as the Greek Patriarchate, the Catholic Church and the Protestant Church. As to the revolutionary activity among the other nationalities, such as the Turks, Albanians, Greeks and Vlachs, such a question did not exist for the founders of the organization. For IMARO, these other nationalities were foreign people... Later, when the leaders of IMARO saw that the idea of the liberation of Macedonia could find followers among the Bulgarian non-Exarchists, as also among the other nationalities in Macedonia, and under the pressure from IMARO members with left, socialist or anarchist convictions, they changed the statute of IMARO in the sense that a member of IMARO can be any Macedonian, regardless of ethnicity or religious denomination." Мемоари на Димитар Влахов. Скопје, 1970, p. 21. See also *Борбите на македонският народ за освобождение*. Библиотека Балканска Федерация, no. 1, Vienna, 1925. 11. Dimitar Vlahov became later the vice-president of Yugoslavia, formerly oscillating between pro-Macedonian and pro-Bulgarian nationalism.

89 Гоцев, Димитър. *Идеята за автономия като тактика в програмите на национално-освободителното движение в Македония и Одринско 1893–1941*. Sofia: Изд. на Българска Академия на Науките, 1983, 34.

90 Ther Philipp. 'Caught in Between. Border Regions in Modern Europe.' In *Shatterzone of Empires*, 487-88, 496-97.

91 They argued that in 1878 two Bulgarian autonomous principalities were originally planned by the Powers: an eastern and a western one, the latter including Macedonia, with Sofia as its centre.

effort (according to the socialist theorist Dimitrije Tucović, the behavior of small states during the Balkans Wars was very similar to that of the Powers in Africa).⁹² Their struggle for Macedonia escalated into a 'cold war', where the Serbian, Bulgarian and Greek interests collided and clashed indirectly with each other (and with the aspirations of the Powers) on foreign terrain at the cost of the local population. This 'cold war' first erupted in an allied war against Turkey (the First Balkan War), then reached the next stage in the form of a direct showdown between the small states (the Second Balkan War) and finally it culminated in a war with the most interested power (Austria-Hungary) as a rival (WWI).⁹³

So, the speciality of Macedonia (as a geographical term) was that it was not only exposed to the colonization attitude of the Powers, but also to the aspirations of the small states⁹⁴ – resulting in a multiplayer situation (which explains the diversity of ideas and political groups). Such an exacerbated state of affairs was more difficult to handle than a simple two-player system.

Historical background (1903-1908)

As the story we outline here is not a linear one, a brief summary of the events between 1903-1908 – beyond the discussion of the interpretative frameworks detailed in the previous chapter – is also necessary.

In the aftermath of the 1878 Great Eastern Crisis, the remainder of the Balkan Peninsula had irreversibly become a frontier zone of the Ottoman Empire, a territory in which the collapsing central government was in direct contact with the rival Great Powers and the dynamically modernizing nation states nurturing expansive ambitions. This new situation sparked violence on the Ottoman side of the border, aggression that authorities either failed or did not even attempt to stop. By the end of the first decade of the twentieth century, Ottoman central power almost totally collapsed in the Kosovo Vilayet, leaving a vacuum for the propagandistic activity of Small States. This manifested itself in a competition for souls, schools and religious posts between Serbs and Bulgarians proclaiming nationalistic views and aspirations (a revival of ethnic mapping), and in the establishment of the revolutionary Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization (IMRO).

92 Tucović, Dimitrije. *Srbija i Arbanija. Jedan prilog kritici zavojevačke politike srpske buržoazije*. Beograd-Zagreb: Kultura, 1946, 107-108.

93 "It began as a war of liberation, it became rapidly a war of conquest and it has ended... in being a war of extermination." Hansard's Parliamentary Debates, Fifth Series, vol. 56. p. 2293. Edward Grey, 12 August, 1913. Recent events proved that the problems of the region are still not resolved.

94 Petrunaro, *Balcani*, 30-36.

IMRO was established in 1895 as a secret organization, but its cover was blown following a robbery of 800 Ottoman lira two years after its establishment. In 1896 an external branch was founded to help migrants/refugees and to promote cooperation with the Supreme Organization (the Verhovists), founded in the same year, with the purpose of fighting for liberation and the unification of Macedonia with Bulgaria. The latter proposed a general uprising and the militarization of the organization (instead of conspiracy, network-building and training and influencing teachers as propagated by the internal organization), in order to provoke the intervention of the Powers. The IMRO wanted to avoid uprisings, considering them premature. But the following developments gradually made leaders change their minds: the failure of Verhovist Bulgarian officers in 1902 in the Gorna Dzhumaya uprising (due to the lack of local IMRO support); the subsequent intervention and reform plans of the Ottoman Empire and of the Powers (both considered unsatisfactory by the IMRO); the change in the support policy of the Danev government (a condition of the Russian loans was to decrease the support of Macedonian organizations), then after his failure the appointment of General Racho Petrov as prime minister (which brought Verhovists back into favourable positions); the bad publicity of the bomb attacks in Saloniki committed by the radical wing (which made the impression in the Western press that IMRO is a terrorist organization); and a series of revelations brought by the cooperation of Greeks and Ottoman authorities⁹⁵ (the Patriarchist metropolite Germanos Karavangelos betrayed many activists). In order to prevent reforms considered unsatisfactory⁹⁶ and to preserve its leading role as opposed to the Verhovists, IMRO stepped out from the shadows, and its activity culminated in an attempt to relieve the oppressed peasantry with the active contribution of 15,000 guerrillas and the local population.⁹⁷ But the Ilinden revolt (1903) soon took an anti-Ottoman turn, though its leaders demanding autonomy for *all* inhabitants of Macedonia regardless of faith did not favour this outcome of events. Soon the participants began to march under Bulgarian flags, singing Bulgarian songs, which the leadership also wanted to avoid to preserve the general and indigenous local character of the uprising.

95 An example from Ottoman sources: *Ottoman Diplomatic Documents* I. 345. 09.04.1902. See also: *Ottoman Diplomatic Documents*, II. No. 1190. 02.03. 1905. The Greek bands, explaining their own movement as organized as self-defence against Bulgarian aspirations, offered an alliance to the Ottomans.

96 In the reform plan Huseyn Hilmi Pasha included the application of penal law to local authorities (instead of sharia), to which Christian representatives were also invited; he proposed a school for every settlement above 50 households and the strengthening of the gendarmerie with Christian members (but still not proportional to their local representation). These reforms were not accepted by the Powers, who wanted Christian local militia for Christian areas and the joint administration of the three Macedonian vilayets.

97 The second phase is the intervention of the Great Powers in 1903–1908; the third is the revival of violence after the failure of these Powers to settle the question.

With the Ilinden revolt (1903), the Macedonian question entered the next stage. The subsequent plundering of 200 villages, committed mainly by irregular Ottoman forces, producing 30,000 refugees and 70,000 homeless, resembled the era of 1875-1876, triggering growing violence from each side as a consequence.⁹⁸ Thus this new phase was characterized by the peace-keeping efforts of the Great Powers to restore order in the European Ottoman provinces and by the sharpening of national rivalry.

Table 1. Atrocities in Macedonian vilayets during the Ilinden Uprising

Vilayet	House burnt	Killed	Raped	Made homeless
Monastir	8417	1752	2017	50211
Edirne	2610	2565		12888
Saloniki	1090	290		5772
Skopje sanjak	94	60		577

+ 30 000 displaced migrants

HHStA, Liasse XL, Interna, 316kt. Kopien von Denkschriften / La Macédoine et le vilayet d'Adrianople, 1893-1903. 6.

After this failure, IMRO found itself in a vacuum: Bulgaria came to an agreement with Serbia in which they proposed the dismemberment of Macedonia according to their spheres of interest. And though the Bulgarian-Ottoman agreement from the same year proposed an amnesty for all imprisoned IMRO members, the Bulgarian government refrained from the active support of IMRO, in favour of the Verhovists. Soon Greek bands alarmed by the uprising in 1903 (they used Cretan volunteers, as they were Ottoman citizens, and thus could move around freely without strict controls) appeared, and the failure to secure autonomy by dint of their own strength, together with the above, resulted in a general shift to the right in IMRO. The pro-Bulgarian Garvanov and Boris Sarafov, who advertised terror as a necessary step, gained influence, pushing back the autonomist supporters of Sandanski and Gruev, who objected to violence. In 1905, during the Rila congress of the revolutionary organization, the Verhovists dominating the IMRO (while the left wing was engaged in fights against the Greeks around Seres) finally gave up their concept of sticking to violence and accepted the idea of promoting national propaganda through education – this naturally meant Bulgarian education. This strategy meant a return to the instruments applied during the Stambolovist regime a decade earlier.⁹⁹ Without substantial opposition (Gruev was killed) Verhovists managed to position

⁹⁸ During the two and half months of fighting in the Ilinden uprising, only 1000 activists were killed, but the civilian toll reached 4500 dead. Brailsford, H. N. *Macedonia. Its Races and their Future*. London: Methuen, 1906. 166.


⁹⁹ Perry, Duncan, M. *The Politics of Terror*, 32-33.

themselves in the Prizren, Monastir and Skopje sanjaks. Feeling themselves tricked, the autonomists held their next congress separately in Dupnica in 1907, while the Verhovists held their meeting in Sofia (the venue obviously alludes to their connections).¹⁰⁰

The situation became more complicated by 1908. The Mürzsteg convention (regulating the intervention of the Powers) created more problems than it solved, as it contributed to the spread of violence instead of limiting it. Beside this, the shortage of financial sources also endangered Macedonian reforms, but the British opposed the increase of local tariffs from the low level of 8% to 11% because it would have been detrimental to their economic interest. Though they managed to put financial affairs under the auspices of all the Powers (which resulted in Austro-Hungarian objections, as it meant that the leading role was taken away from Russia and Austria-Hungary), the Ottomans refused any substantial changes unless their demand for the tariff increase be approved. When Sir Edward Grey demanded more reforms in 1908,¹⁰¹ the Porte refused it (this put an end to the cooperation between the Powers and the Ottomans), and tried to reach a separate agreement with Austria-Hungary (using the old principle of 'divide and rule'), offering the concession of the strategically important Uvac-Mitrovica railway (that would enable Austria-Hungary to reach Saloniki by rail) in return for their support. The cooperation between the Powers, and thus the reform movement, failed, though it did not put an end to the Powers' plans regarding the Ottoman Empire. When rumours from the Reval meeting between Edward VII and the Russian Nicholas II on Macedonian autonomy spread across the land, this urged the Young Turks' Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) to intervene. This political group managed to unite local Muslim bands with different or no political goals at all. Meanwhile Sarafov and Garvanov were murdered. Sandanski and the CUP entered into an armistice after the success of the CUP revolution, while Verhovists had to fight against Serbs supported by the CUP and against the Greeks as well. This meant that the possibilities for both the internal organization and the Verhovists became limited, and they became dependent on the financial, political and military support of their neighbours.

100 Yosmaoğlu, *Blood Ties*, 39-45.

101 According to these, the governing pasha of the 3 vilayets would have been responsible only to the Powers; reforms included an increase in the number of gendarmes, but a decrease in the numbers of official troops.




Legend

Distribution of the population (350992) in Skopje sanjak according to


a, ethnicity

- Albanian speaking
- Slavic speaking
- Exarchist
- Patriarchist
- Muslim
- Turkish speaking
- Other



b, religion

- Muslim
- Orthodox
- Exarchist
- Patriarchist
- Other



Map 1. Kaza-level religious and ethnic map of the Sanjak of Skopje.

Cartography by Zsolt Bottlik.

Table 2. Ethnic composition of the *kazas* of the Sanjak of Skopje in 1903, based on Austrian consular reports¹⁰²

Nationality		Kaza									Total
		Skopje	Kumanovo	Kriva Palanka	Kratovo	Kočani	Maleš Osmanie	Radovište	Štip (Ištib)	Veles (Köprülü)	
Albanian	Muslim	21,387	5,595	-	-	7,800	-	-	-	1,500	36,282 (10%)
Slav	Exarchist (Bulgarian)	25,921	23,710	22,141	17,391	16,524	16,536	7,622	19,472	29,394	178,711 (50%)
	Patriarchist	4,406	8,358	108	954	1,090	288	-	-	4,130	19,334 (5,5%)
	Muslim (Pomak)	5,600	-	-	-	-	9,234	-	-	5,242	20,076 (5,5%)
Aromun		360	120	-	102	1,680		-	-	900	3,162 (1%)
Ottoman (Muslim)		9,949	6,765	1,929	3,815	11,600	425	10,464	25,764	12,512	83,223 (23%)
Gypsies		2,404	1,008	336	336	712	485	390	378	664	6,713 (2%)
Total		72,789	45,784	24,514	22,604	39,406	26,968	18,476	46,094	54 357	350,992

Minorities such as Greeks and Jews, which comprise under one per cent of the population are omitted.

102 ÖStA, HHStA 19. Nachlässe, Nachlaß August Kral, Kt. 2, "Statistische Tabelle der Nationalitäts- und Religions-Verhältnisse im Vilajet Kossovo (1903)".

II. The background to the tensions and the komitadji phenomenon

Conflict types – general overview

It was the ethnic and denominational-sectarian conflicts that claimed the most victims in Skopje Sanjak in the period from 1903 to 1908. But the question was too complicated to be reduced to Muslim-Christian opposition. In fact, these conflicts can be classified into three major groups – and this number is even doubled if we make a distinction as to the direction of the violence. Furthermore, not always religious or ethnic issues were in the background (as is evident in the case of numerous Muslim-Muslim conflicts).

The first type of religious conflict is represented by the rivalry between Patriarchists and Exarchists that began in the 1870s.¹⁰³ Since the Skopje Sanjak was a collision zone of interests (referred to later as *spornata zona* or *zone contestée*) located between Serbia and Bulgaria, this type was quite frequent, although the proportion of Patriarchists did not exceed 10 per cent, compared to the 50 per cent of Exarchists. These tensions were not limited to this region – the same phenomena occurred in the Vilayet of Bitola (Monastir) and Saloniki (Selanik). This is demonstrated by the case of the Eastern Orthodox secondary grammar school in Prizren at the turn of the century. Atrocities over disputed symbolic places and institutions usually dominated in the first phases of these conflicts, followed by struggles against symbolic personalities and culminating in the fight against the local population.

From the sectarian aspect, the second type, Muslim-Christian conflicts, proved to be the most serious among the peasantry in Kosovo Vilayet. A typical source of conflict was the Muslim raids on Christian churches, the perpetrators of which were hardly ever captured by Ottoman law enforcement forces. The latter often encouraged such attacks in order to punish *četa* groups, but it had greater impact on the civilian population than on paramilitary units.¹⁰⁴ A good example of this type of attack is a Muslim Albanian raid of February 12, 1907, in which Eastern Orthodox churches in the villages of Zubovce, Požaranje and Galata near Gostivar were ransacked and burned down. These villages were maintained *jointly* by the Serbian and Bulgarian religious communities of Gostivar, where the denominational identity

103 The existence of the Exarchate evidently served nationalistic goals, as the liturgy mentioned the name of Bulgarian rulers instead of the Sultan or the Patriarch, thus challenging their legitimacy. This was the case with regard to the Varnava affair late in 1913, when Tsar Ferdinand of Bulgaria was mentioned in an exarchist village under Serbian occupation. Compared to this, the Greek Patriarchate was more popular in urbanized areas and among educated communities.

104 Which tried to retaliate in response to these incursions, also against civilians, triggering a vicious circle.

was at the time still stronger than national differences. However, the delinquents were known to be Muslim Albanians originating from surrounding villages, and the authorities did nothing in spite of the fact that even foreign consuls were voicing protest to the Grand Vizier.¹⁰⁵ We must also stress that this sectarian dividing line was not identical to dividing lines between nationalities: for example, in Shkodra Vilayet (today west Kosovo), the Muslim Albanians launched attacks on the shrines of the local Christian Albanians, as well.¹⁰⁶

The third type of religious conflict took place between Muslim communities (including numerous sub-types: Bektaşi-Sunni; rural-urban; citizen-official, Albanian blood feuds). Our statistical analysis will stress that conflicts of this type were not negligible in the Skopje Sanjak, either.

The three types of conflict often appeared together in the same area: sometimes their motives can genuinely be traced back to sectarian differences, sometimes to customary law, though they can also be attributed to economic, social or personal antagonisms, and were often encouraged by foreign pressure. So, tensions and conflicts were not always monocausal and thus not exclusively of ethno-religious character – though even multicausal differences could manifest themselves in ethnic tensions (which are easy to perceive), generating simple, but often superficial explanations. The truth is that although ethnic differences often served as a pretext to trigger violence, but behind the surface other processes were also responsible for the outburst of tensions including economic problems (poverty, restricted accessibility to sources), or migration (during which people also became exposed of new ideologies beside exerting demographic pressure to a region), the distrust towards the central authorities (which was unable to find solutions for the existing socio-economic problems). The tensions between the landlords and peasants, capitalists and workers also had several layers – of which ethnic character was only one (Muslim landlord, Greek factory owner, etc.)

The diversity of problems that could result in violence of (seemingly) ethnic character can be well observed even in small areas, as the remarks of Vasil Kanchov, the Bulgarian school inspector, have shown (*Table 3*).

105 ÖStA HHStA PA, VII/Fasz.434, Rappaport to Pallavicini, February 12, 1907, No.14/pol. (Beilage No. 131.res Rappaport to Oppenheimer, 8).

106 Ibid. For similar conflicts see: Clayer, Natalie. 'The Dimension of Confessionalization in the Ottoman Balkans at the time of Nationalisms.' In *Conflicting Loyalties in the Balkans*, 89–109.

Table 3. Diversity of economic problems and ethnicity in a small region south of the Bulgarian border

	Bulgarian households	Pomak households	Turkish households	Vlach households	Bulgarian dwellers	Pomak dwellers	Ottoman dwellers	Remarks of Kanchov, cca 1900
Fotovishta	103	40			303	200		mineral water, bath
Markovo čiftlik	46				200			no church, carpenters
Obidish	220				1050			great poverty
Krimen	214				1090			great poverty
Musomishta	90		90		450		468	
Garmen	160							No local revenue sources: dwellers travel to Bulgaria to earn their living, thus easily turned into Bulgarians
Vyazem	115		120		553		608	
Eles	45		200		200		990	Bulgarian-Turkish dispute: the Turks want to get the land and income sources of Bulgarians
Zrnevo	380		55		1855		380	Graecoman-Bulgarian-Turkish dispute, partly on an economic basis: fertile lands, but limited water accessibility
Karaköy	294				1300			divided: Sandanski's supporters are "terrorizing" the others
Gaytaninovo	200				1000			the religious war began 70 years ago, with the establishment of the Church (1839)

Извори за българската етнография. Етнография на Македонија [Sources of Bulgarian Ethnography. The Ethnography of Macedonia]. Sofia: Ak. Izd. Marin Drinov, 1998.77-87.

The escalation of the conflicts

The Skopska Crna Gora (Karadag) Mountains, located north of Skopje, represented one of the major hotspots of nationalistic tensions beginning in 1907 (as this was the zone in which Albanian, Serbian and Bulgarian interests collided and overlapped). (The same was true for the *kazas* of Kriva Palanka, Kočani and Radovište.) Serbian refugees from Stara Srbija had settled here in numerous villages between 1689 and 1739, and these refugees were not obedient to the Bulgarian Exarchate. The conflict broke out following a number of unrelated murders. One of the killing sprees was provoked by Serbians led by Voivode Petko Ilić, when they attacked an Albanian village. Another incident took place in the village of Brodec: during a raid, Bulgarian attackers killed two Serbian men and kidnapped seven more, who were never found. (Kidnapping was a rewarding activity. The self-subsistence and the military potential of IMRO was established by 14,500 liras paid as ransom for a Miss Stone, which

facilitated the purchase of 5000 rifles with 200,000 rounds of ammunition).¹⁰⁷ The motives remained unknown in both cases. In addition to the constant Bulgarian and Serbian propaganda and the activity of infiltrating irregular foreign troops, the situation was further exacerbated by the fact that the peasants of Skopska Crna Gora lived in traditional communities in which the unwritten customs of the family blood feud entailed obligations for family members. The two series of events mentioned infuriated the local communities, which wished to avenge the dead. A few months later everybody was fighting with one another. In this case, the local conflicts stemmed from the consequences of local customs over which state law had seemingly no authority whatsoever,¹⁰⁸ while the presence of foreign influence complicated the situation even further. The authorities did nothing, although the local people had asked not only them, but the consulates of the Great Powers to intervene as well. The subsequent peace negotiations were led by an Archimandrite from a local monastery named Sava, who unsuccessfully tried to make a peace based on unwritten customs instead of official law. Although his efforts were thwarted by the local Albanians, who did not wish to give *besa* for the peace, his activity clearly illustrates that local people did not trust official Ottoman administrators as much as religious leaders with respect (*charisma*), and that local customs were much more authoritative than imperial law.¹⁰⁹

Problems occurred not only at the Ottoman-Serbian border. Just another example how complicated the situation could be if a third party, a state (with different preferences and pretensions) is involved into blood feud. In the spring of 1901 an Albanian from Gruda tribe shot a miller near Podgorica in Montenegro, because the miller was said to have shot one of his relatives years ago. However, the miller happened to be a relative of Nikola, prince of Montenegro, who asked for punishment from Ottoman authorities. As this delayed, Nikola sent a punishing expedition force of 25 men penetrating into Ottoman area. This force near the town Tuzi opened fire on an Albanian gathering, killing seven people as a revenge for the one miller. The Gruda tribe soon took revenge and killed 5 gendarmes along the Podgorica-Plavnica road. Violence escalated further, because the relatives of the

107 Yosmaoğlu, *Blood Ties*, 32. But by 1907 ransom became of secondary importance. Hostages were taken to blackmail communities to leave the Exarchate and return under the authority of the Patriarchate according to the policy of Serbian bands. For details see Chapter III. Documents from: ИЦА, ф. 335к. оп. 1 а.е. 396.

108 ÖStA HHStA PA, VII/Fasz.434, Rappaport to Pallavicini, July 27, 1907, No.55/pol, 17 and October 29, 1907, No.71/pol, 14.

109 For information about the *Lebenswelt* of mountains and plains, including social norms corresponding to geographical attributes and constraints, see Frantz, 'Zwischen Gewalt', 63–79, and Frantz, Anne Eva, 'Soziale Lebenswelten imspätosmanischen Kosovo, 1870–1913. Zur Bedeutung von Berg und Ebene, Ökologie und Klima.' In *Studime përnder të Rexhep Ismajlit me rastin e 65-vjetorit të lindjes*, edited by Bardh Rugova. Prishtinë: KOHA, 2012. 261-73, esp. 262.

gendarmes also took revenge by killing some innocent fishermen on Lake Scutari. However these poor guys belonged to the Hoti tribe, thus the revenge was mistargeted. Thus the Hoti tribe was also involved into this chain of murders based on blood feud and a Hoti tribesman killed two Montenegrin in the next fair at Podgorica, but the local townsmen immediately killed him. Thus from then on even the citizens of the town became involved in the revenge-series. And so on...¹¹⁰

By 1907 the situation became crucial along the Bulgarian frontier zone as well.¹¹¹ Here local traditions were exacerbated by the propaganda¹¹² and paramilitary activity of small states. The equality of citizens meant nothing in these peripheries where local communities and identities were still stronger than the imperial identity that attempted to implement 'unfamiliar' civil rights. *These traditional communities became more susceptible to nationalism if it occurred together with the defence of local interests and traditions.* In a notebook, the Bulgarian consul in Skopje recorded more than 750 cases of violence committed by Serbs and Greek bands in 1906–1907. The list starts with the activity of Georgi Kapitan, who crossed the border with his Serbian *četa* and captured six hostages in two raids, then returned to Skopska Crna Gora, which served as his hinterland.¹¹³ It was a perfect base for operations: while promoting Serbian objectives, at the same time Kapitan could also avenge the previously cited atrocities committed against his host community. Local aspirations and state priorities intertwined, and those taken captive could never be sure whether they were being held for ransom to promote the Serbian cause or would be victims of blood feud.

Even more interestingly, two more Serbian *četas* were reported from the region of Kratovo and Štip in January 1907 in spite of the bad weather conditions and the fact that the location was far away from the Skopska Gora borderland. The Serbian bands often operated far away from their hideouts and hinterlands in distant *kazas* to hinder the activity of authorities and to veil their communication lines. The organization of IMRO was a bit different – for each kaza or sanjak there was a voivode appointed who was responsible for the protection/control of the local population, and their troops did not cross the district boundaries unless it was necessary (cooperation in campaigns, or being chased). These Serbian attacks were of different character compared to the 'usual': in February, Ivan Stajkov kidnapped the

110 vadmezői Führer, Lajos. Néprajzi jegyzetek Montenegróból. *Földrajzi Közlemények* 41, 1913. 366.

111 See details in Chapter III.

112 Георгиев, Георги Н. Българското националноосвободително движение в Македония (1893–1912). Идеология, политика, революция. *Македонски преглед* 40, no. 3 (2017): 7-20. and Georgiev, Georgi N. The Bulgarian national liberation movement in Macedonia (1893–1912) – Ideology, politics, revolution. *Macedonian Review* 40, no. 3 (2017): 21-34.

113 ЦДА, ф. 335к. оп. 1. а.е. 396.

starešinas (chiefs, elders) of Stariprad village and forced the village to declare its loyalty to Serbia by taking on Serbian identity.¹¹⁴ These acts were definitely not connected to any vengeful act, and marked a new type of warfare: the prolongation of the 'season' to winter (prior to St. George's day), something quite unfamiliar in the previous decade.

Changes in national consciousness were not permanent or irreversible: in many cases villages changed their identity quickly, if another *četa* appeared, in order to avoid violence. Even religious and national categories were often mixed within the same village. The intruders usually inquired about the nationality of residents (Serb, Bulgarian, Greek), though priests answered according to religious category (Exarchist, Patriarchist), which did not satisfy the intruders.¹¹⁵ The timing of these raids has more significance than the acts themselves: these events took place in winter, and cannot be explained by simple banditism, the goal of which was to collect food and other means of subsistence. Since the villagers stayed in their dwellings during winter, an attack on them was riskier during this period than in the summer, when potential victims were working in the fields. Therefore, the previously mentioned *četa* groups can be regarded as well-trained, organized and determined units in comparison to a simple band of robbers or mercenaries without deep-rooted nationalistic commitments.¹¹⁶

Some temporal and spatial patterns of *četa* activity

Map 2 from 1907 indicates that in Skopje Sanjak there were four larger *čet*as (over 25 persons) and six smaller Bulgarian ones, two smaller Muslim ones, and two larger and six smaller Serbian ones. Thus, the ethnic pattern of violence (the variety of potential aggressors) was diverse even in such a small area. On the other hand, there was also one *kaza* (administrative sub-unit in Skopje Sanjak) with (officially) no bands at all and one with only one (Muslim) group. The region of Monastir and Vodena showed similar pattern with their high density of bands, while the composition of *čet*as was less diverse in the South, around Drama, Seres and Melnik (all in all 10 groups: seven Bulgarian and three Greek).

114 Ibid. This became a general strategy of Serbian bands. The Bulgarian consul was not alone in collecting data. By 1903 the lack of public security due to the significant decrease in Ottoman power prompted Austro-Hungarian consuls to start keeping statistics on violent activities in their own districts as well.

115 Livianos, D. Stavropoulo. 'Conquering the Souls: Nationalism and Greek Guerilla Warfare in Ottoman Macedonia 1904–1908', *Byzantine and Modern Greek Studies* 23 (1999): 204 and 210–11. See also Balogh, Ádám. *A nacionalizmus szerepe a görög politikai gondolkodásban*. Szeged: SZTE, 2006.

116 In winter food supply was scarce, which may have encouraged bands to undertake risky operations, though finding shelter and covering up tracks was also harder. Simple banditry was more abundant during the summer.

Regarding the duration of their activity in Skopje Sanjak only three of the 22 bands mentioned were active before the 9th month of the year (and all were Serbomans). This means that most of them was connected to the yearly activity of the peasantry and thus with peasants themselves. Those bands that were already active early in May or June should be considered either to be “professionals” or “foreigners” or “urban terrorists” (social layers that were not dependent on cultivating the land), while the increase in number of bands that were active in autumn and winter refers to the increasing role of local peasants (who knew local circumstances well). For example, 10 out of the conscripted 26 Greek bands in Macedonia began their activity before the 9th month of the year, while this was 3/7 among Muslim bands and 11/18 (more than 50%) among bands with Serbian affinities. In the case of Bulgarian groups this was “only” 12/50 (25%), beginning their activity especially early around Drama and Melnik in the close vicinity of the Bulgarian border (it is Sandanski’s homeland), referring to “professionals” independent from agrarian activity, or to “cross-border cooperations”.

Another explanation for the different beginnings of *četa* activity could be the difference in the organization of the bands. The paramilitary troops in the western region (e.g. in Monastir Sanjak) began their activity well before September (17/43, or 40%, a proportion markedly higher than that measured in Skopje Sanjak), usually after St. George’s Day (which is also the beginning of agrarian activity and the collection of tax). Since this region was not limitrophe with Bulgaria or Serbia, these troops stayed in their region for a longer time, and were engaged in consecutive operations with a larger radius of action, which also necessitated improved communication/cooperation with other bands. Due to the large distance from Serbia or Bulgaria, they had to organize themselves to secure supplies by maintaining good relations with the local population. Thus they were much more compelled to rely on local inhabitants than were the Serbian *čet*as in Skopje, which were less dependant on local circumstances because of the proximity of the safe ‘hinterland’. Therefore the latter applied crude force more often to enforce their demands on local communities. These *čet*as operating in the eastern regions were mainly engaged in smaller operations (often not planned in advance, instead exploiting opportunities as they occurred) that lacked the campaign character of the western *čet*as, after which they had the opportunity to retreat behind the border for reinforcements or supplies.

The activity of bands were not randomly organized, but showed a systematic pattern. The bands that we consider ‘permanent’ (either located in the west or in the east) were organised by professionals (including civilian members of revolutionary organizations whose activity was discovered, and who were forced to go

underground), but local village militia also existed. These were organized also by professionals, made up of local volunteers, characterized by a much smaller radius of action, and was considered some kind of reserve or auxiliary force (probably some of these appear on the maps as *autumn četa*). Special units also existed in urban centres, which were responsible for attacks against infrastructure and target persons; there were also professional executioners (hitmen) and a secret police.



Map 2. Disposition and ethnic-political affiliation of cetras in areas falling under the Mürzsteg convention and the beginning and duration of their yearly activity

It is also striking that the map lacks information on *četa* activity in the western fringes of the region, though banditism was not negligible even prior to 1903. The reason for this is that the map only indicates *kazas* involved in the Mürzsteg convention, while 'empty' areas were not under the auspices of the Powers, and thus

bands operating there were not indicated. Such was the situation in the Prizren Sanjak, which we decided to use as a reference point (control) for the Skopje Sanjak governed by the Powers, in order to investigate any difference in the forms of violence and the operation of the bands. The distance from Bulgaria presumed differences in *četa* organization and activity, while the lack of humanitarian intervention and the abundance of Muslim Albanians promised conflicts of a different character. (Our hypothesis was that interethnic/interreligious conflicts – especially concerning Muslim-Christian relations – were more frequent in the western regions, where personal conflicts connected to blood feuds were also prevalent, unlike in the southern or eastern regions where ethnic and personal conflicts were accompanied by tensions of economic character – see *Table 3* above).

All this points to the fact that *četas* were (1) differentiated and (2) some of them were 'professionalized', which allows us to typify them. Under professionalization we mean better organization, continuous activity, organized economic background (additional financial resources as well as expropriation), division of labour (differentiation within the group) and improved social networks (while previously isolation from civil society was dominant in the case of 'traditional banditry').¹¹⁷ These *četas* exceeded the level of bands living from robberies that might display some of the above elements, but not all. To claim that a band was professionalized, it was not necessary for it to have (though not necessarily stable) political commitment.

Professionalized četas were very mobile, and they covered larger distances and areas, unlike bandits or rural militiamen. Professional *četas* were not confined to the seasonal rhythms of brigand life, as they had been when *the frequency of raids followed a yearly cycle*. During spring, the exhausted hard-core of the *četas* gained strength and supplies in the villages of their target/supply areas, and, by wandering from village to village (partly for security reasons, partly in order to gather men for their cause from the local militia, partly to intimidate internal opponents – many villages suffered from internal tensions), they increased their number to between 20 and 40 men. Todor Alexandrov commanded a band of this type in Kratovo *kaza* in 1910.¹¹⁸ The peak of their activity was the late summer, when villagers collected the harvest far from their relatively secure dwellings. Winter attacks were rare: local people referred to snow as the 'white police,' as it was more efficient than the Ottoman authorities or the international gendarmerie operated by the Great Powers between 1903 and 1908.¹¹⁹ *Increased winter activity can be regarded as a peculiarity of četas supported by small states, which were usually larger than other bands* (the relatively larger

117 Brown, *Loyal unto Death*, 124-28.

118 ÖStA HHStA PA, VII/Fasz.434, Heimroth to Eduard Otto, July 30, 1910., No.56/pol., 8.

119 ÖStA HHStA PA, VII/Fasz.434, Heimroth to Pallavicini, February 5, 1911., No.6/pol., 12.

number implies increased dependence on external sources). For example, the *četa* of Ivan Stajkov consisted of 30 men early in February,¹²⁰ which means that it was more than merely the 'hard-core'. (The ratio of big bands showing winter activity was 8/30 or 26% in 1907, while it was 14/80 or 18% in case of small groups).




Figure 1. Differences in the timing of Ottoman and Serbian attacks on Exarchist population based on the consular reports in Skopje (Skopje Sanjak, 1907, monthly distribution)

ЦДДА, ф. 335к. оп. 1 а.е. 396.

Četa types and their origins

Beyond their size and the timing of their activity, other features also make it possible to typify guerrilla groups in Macedonia. In terms of their motives (which are often changing or intermingling), at least three different *četa* types can be discerned. Their *aims* could be *social* (revenge for local injustice), *economic* (from self-sustainment to weakening the economic basis of the enemy)¹²¹ or *political* (promoting national propaganda). *But political results could also be achieved through the first two aims.* The first group is identical to the 'social bandits' of Hobsbawm, including some of the representatives of the *Balkan celebi*, the *hajdut* and the *klepht*. The second group comprised the real *entrepreneurs of violence*. They could be divided into two sub-groups: the first only expropriated wealth produced by others, while the second organized the economy through its interference in the production structure (by promoting and controlling the production of better marketable goods, like opium or tobacco). As regards the third group, the ideologies behind the troops organized to

120 ЦДДА, ф. 335к. оп. 1. а.е. 396.

121 Sometimes bands with a nationalist commitment can be grouped here if they pursued such a tactic.

realize political goals were very diverse, while the *organizational basis* for the *četas* was extending in the second half of the 19th century.¹²²

Following the turn of the century two new general tendencies began to gain ground. The first was that denominational (sectarian) and national categories were mixed and combined in all conceivable ways in these groups – the goals and motifs mentioned above were various and often intermingling or changing. It is not a new phenomenon. Ethnically mixed bands existed even in 1881: during the revolt against the compulsory military service introduced by Austria-Hungary, two out of the four main groups were religiously heterogeneous.¹²³ But even after 1904 we may find ethnically mixed (in other cases simply cooperating) Greek-Muslim *četas* in Southern-Macedonia jointly fighting against Bulgarians.¹²⁴ The difference between the two dates is that the first case can be labelled as social banditry – the group was formed to oppose the ‘oppression’ of the state (though the different cooperating denominations might understand ‘oppression’ to mean different things), while after the turn of the century such motifs were of local or secondary importance. The 1904 case cannot be interpreted as social banditry – it represented guerrilla warfare in the ‘cold war’ of small states. On the other hand, this ‘supranational cooperation’ (mixed band) was still driven by political motives (for ethnically mixed bands with political commitments see also *table 6*),¹²⁵ while in other cases the profit was the main motivating factor. In 1907 in Skopje Sanjak four Serbian attacks were committed by ethnically-religiously mixed groups and this constituted 10% of all raids led by Serbians.¹²⁶

And this was the second symptom. After the turn of the century a new social stratum emerged in Macedonia again, as was the case during the ‘Kirdjali era’: *being a četa member became a lifestyle*. Its members were destitute and therefore radical men (regardless of their religion or nationality) who simply tried to profit from the chaos. The Greeks tried to organize their paramilitary units this way from 1904, hiring men (mercenaries in fact), often regardless of their nationality, who were not devoted to the Greek national movement, but had knowledge of local conditions, and therefore this offered a higher rate of success or effectiveness. (The group leaders were Greek officers with less knowledge of local circumstances, while Cretan volunteers, though

122 Troops *fighting against Ottoman rule* were the first to appear (up to the 1860s). These were followed by irregular armies organized on a sectarian basis: *the Patriarchists and the Exarchists (1870s)*. These were later substituted by groups organized based on nationality. The Bulgarian bands split further after the 1890s, when war broke out between IMRO activists and Verhovists in Macedonia. After 1878 ‘nationalist’ Albanian paramilitary units also appeared in Kosovo Vilayet in addition to mercenary troops and *bashibazouks*.

123 Malcolm, Noel. *Bosnia. A Short History*. London: Papermac, 1996. 139.

124 Yosmaoğlu, *Blood Ties*, 41.

125 A mixed Serbian-Muslim band was formed in Kočani with the approval of the local Ottoman authorities.

126 See: ЦДА, ф. 335к. оп. 1 а.е. 396. A detailed analysis is given in Chapter III.

fierce and accustomed to warfare in the mountains, also lacked local connections).¹²⁷ Thus, besides the irregular troops arriving from abroad (which were fighting to realize national ambitions) and local revolutionary forces (like IMRO), these mercenary bands also created their own armed groups and under the banner of national goals they essentially lived off the terrorized population, as they could be hired by just about anyone to intimidate and kill the local population. These groups would often be balancing banditry, social resistance, freedom fighting, terrorism, but sometimes even functioned as the auxiliary forces of Ottoman authorities (when participating in the maintenance of public order or leading punitive operations).

This behavior has a long tradition in Balkan countries – even among ethnically homogeneous groups. (Ethno-religious heterogeneity is a sign, but not an exclusive characteristic of these groups). The *Hajdut* and *Klepht* movements, which had been active in the Balkans for centuries, can be considered as precursors. *Hajduts* and *klephts* were not purely social bandits as Hobsbawm tried to depict them; they also lived from robbery and the exploitation of the local population. The line between lawlessness and legality was a thin one: if they were hired (and paid) by the central power to maintain order (or to attack another *klepht* band – the easiest way for the Ottomans to get rid of the problem, at least partially), the *klephts* turned into *armatole* (irregular forces) – still living from violence, but now in state service. Thus, contrary to Hobsbawm's claim that banditism is organized against central oppression, in this case (and in many others – see the *uskok* robbers of Dalmatia) *state support also contributed to the persistence of paramilitary activity*.

From the moral aspect, one might expect that state service meant some amelioration regarding their behavior and motivation, but often there was rarely any improvement. For many of them, what mattered was to get the payment, irrespective of who paid. They were merchants of violence and sold their services to whoever was willing to pay. (The pindari troops in India in the 19th century were similar.) This means that they were not always moving along the coordinates of nationalist sentiment, but it is also true that many *armatole* and *klepht* supported Greek independence in their hearts (others for money) and participated in the fight.¹²⁸

Their negation of traditional morals did not preclude some kind of codex of ethics – sometimes it even comprised religious elements (in a distorted form), some of which were still in force in the 20th century. For example, the 14th commandment of the 'brigand code' - analyzed by Koliopoulos - encouraged bandits to offer pious donations for the Church in order to forgive the sins they committed or were about

127 In 1905 87 out of the 255 known Greek Chetniks were Greek subjects, while another 21 arrived from Crete.

128 See Balogh, *A nacionalizmus*, 16.

to commit.¹²⁹ The Macedonian organizations had similar regulations. The main difference is that the Macedonian regulations were not so religion-centric and dealt instead with behavior and relations towards village society, the environs, on which there had not been much emphasis in the earlier 'codes'.

The development of the discussed *četnik* type (and behavior) can be traced back to the era of Ali Tepedelenli, who organized the robbers of the time into policemen to maintain his regional power against the central authorities. Thus the roots of their resistance to central power (even going as far as separatism) might originate from here, as might their willingness to serve the authorities (Ali officially represented the Ottoman government). Thus an intermingling between gendarmerie and robbers was never overcome. Their social origin tied them to local communities, which forced the gendarmerie to apply illegal methods to expel them from a certain area. As each village provided at least one or two robbers (*khersis*), who had their relatives at home, their identity was well known, both to locals and the police. But local people often did not give them up to the authorities, instead paid them (the robbers, not the authorities) to defend the village from other robbers and to harass another community where they did not have relatives. (The betrayal of the robber by a villager might invoke the revenge of his 'peaceful' local relatives.) This all was well known to the police, the *zaptie*, who were unable to break up these invisible ties and networks. Instead of direct confrontation or imprisoning relatives (which might induce revenge, but definitely not induce the restoration of peace), the *zaptie* chose another strategy: they often paid a mass visit to a village suspected to have connections with the robbers, and while they were staying there for weeks they ate up everything, thus also threatening the robbers' supply base. Sooner or later it was the villagers who asked the robbers to move away from their hideout, or suspend their activity in order to get rid of the unpleasant 'visitors'. Such a solution implicitly meant that the policemen had indirect connections to the robbers (some of the *zaptie* were even their relatives or former bandmates or enemies), and that this strange game instead resulted in a stalemate: banditry was never obliterated, just moderated, or it shifted its base to a new location. The aforementioned robber type, the *khersis*, could be an archetype for the social outlaw, but also for the professional merchant of violence.¹³⁰

129 Koliopoulos, Ioannis. S. *Brigands with a Cause: Brigandage and Irredentism in Modern Greece, 1821-1912*. Oxford, Clarendon, 1987. 260-69.

130 St. Clair, S. G. T.-Brophy, Charles. *Residence in Bulgaria. Twelve year study of the Eastern Question in Bulgaria*. London: Chapman and Hall, 1877. 115-122. According to the romantic interpretation the *Balkan çelibi* (in contrast to the *khersis*) was the real (and rare) archetype of the social bandit. Nonetheless, this statement would be challenged by Hobsbawm and by Balkan national historiography, that consider reformed band leaders without deep intellectual knowledge, like Philip Totju and the apostles of freedom (Levski, Botev), but

So, the multi-ethnic or religiously mixed *četas* of the early 20th century – and there are several photographs of these religiously mixed bands in the military archives of the Great Powers (*Photo 1*) – can be characterized as group organized on an entrepreneurial basis: they were ‘merchants of violence’, whose primary source of livelihood was fear. Nonetheless, these *četa* leaders could easily be convinced to change their allegiances. This is what happened to Ivan/Jovan Babunski, a former Bulgarian *četa* leader from the village of Martulica, who from 1907 onwards was considered to be a Serbian agent, trying to intimidate the dwellers of Kriva-Kruša (Veles) as described in a letter captured by the Bulgarian Lieutenant Colonel Nedkov in Skopje.¹³¹

Photo 1. An example of hiring people of different ethnic backgrounds for the national cause: the ethnically and religiously mixed *četa* of the Serbian Lieutenant Gutriković in Kaza Kumanovo in 1908:



Source and copyright: Kriegsarchiv (Wien) AOK-Evidenzbureau, Kt. 3483.¹³²

never Muslims, to be the archetype of the social outlaw. The *çelibi* is often depicted as a magnanimous high-class personality (a gentleman of the woods) who became a socially declassed outlaw because of his conflict with the state authorities. An integral part of the image of the *çelibi* is that he helps the poor and desperate people, and fights against the representatives of central authorities (tax farmers, *chorbadjis*); in this way he buys the trust of the local people, preventing him being betrayed to the authorities. The *çelibi* is often a Muslim hero: he is a robber, like the merchant, but the latter is defended by the capitulations of the Powers, while the former is defended by the woodlands and the local inhabitants. Contrary to this ‘lawful lawless’, the *khersis* does not necessarily belong to the group of social bandits. He may randomly help his relatives or host community in great necessity, if this serves his interests too, but not necessarily.

131 ЦДА, ф. 335к. оп. 1. а.е. 259. л. 109–110.

132 Published by the permission of the Kriegsarchiv in Vienna.

But even bands originally organised to promote national ideas or characterised by real national commitment could be very heterogeneous in their composition and behavior. In a study, Dimitar Tasić analyzed the social base and social function of 'Serbian' bands operating during the Balkan Wars, and he came to the conclusion that irregular troops were characterized by completely different goals, methods and social-ethnic composition. The troops of Pavle Blažarić were composed of experienced *četniks* and border guards. Captain Tankosić (who maintained the *četa* training school in Prokuplje, was a trustee of the Black Hand, and had good personal contacts with Colonel 'Apis') incorporated many Muslims from Bosnia, Metohija and Albanians from Kosovo into his troops. These persons were serving Serbian national goals not because of their commitment to the national cause, but because of personal interest: many were formerly expelled from their homeland, owing to previous conflicts, and they were eager to avenge earlier offences. Of course, this resulted in numerous outrages and atrocities.¹³³ Another troop of 1300 soldiers led by major Vojin Popović was composed of Macedonian Slavs with anti-Muslim sentiments. Contrary to this, the units of Vukosavljević, aiming to occupy the Sanjak of Novipazar (he served here between 1905-1909 as a band leader and, as well as Tankosić, he was a member of Black Hand), were more disciplined, obedient to military leaders and tolerant towards the local population, regardless of racial and religious differences. It is not surprising that they were able to capture the town of Priboj without firing a single gun. Another Serbian *četa* leader, Trbić, settled in Macedonia, but originally was from Austria-Hungary.¹³⁴ His troops were a mixture of Serbophile and Bulgarophile local Macedonian Slavs, in which the cohesive and driving force was the common hatred of Turks and Muslims. Not surprisingly this group also committed several atrocities, including killing six members of the Ottoman gendarmerie without any provocation and massacring 177 Albanians in a

133 As the member of the Black Hand Tankosić feared that the increasing pressure of the Great Powers on small states and on the Ottoman state would hinder the outbreak of hostilities. Thus acting separately he launched an attack on Ottoman outposts in 15 October, 1912, prior to the official declaration of war to produce a *fait accompli*. After the failure of his attack, his troops were driven back as untrustworthy to the second line, but Tankosić was saved from further retorsions thanks to his good relations with Apis. Unfortunately, these troops found their way to influence the moral behaviour of the regular units: they were responsible for most of the arson and violence against local people and prisoners of war. Of course, these methods also meant that they were able to collect weapons from local inhabitants, securing the 'hinterland'. Tasić, Dimitar: Repeating phenomenon. Balkan Wars and Irregulars. In *Les guerres balkaniques (1912-1913). Conflicts, enjeux, mémoires*. Edited by Catherine Horel. Bruxelles et al: Peter Lang, 2014. 25-37.

134 The relatively high proportion of Serbian band leaders originating from Hungary was probably in connection with the dissolution of Military border in 1881. Many had to give up their original livelihood which determined the life and customs of generations, and the loss of their occupation did not mean the immediate disappearance of their traditions. Losing its original *niche*, the next generation tried to find new geographical spaces to practise their skills and traditions.

village, because they shot at the Serbian cavalry (killing one Serbian soldier), after they had previously invited the soldiers into their houses. Even Trbić recognised that these violent and unnecessary outrages were morally untenable and this lowered his troops to the moral level of the 'oppressors' against whom they were fighting. As Trotsky, who was a witness of the war, wrote: "*The četnici were worse than you could possibly imagine. Among them there were some intellectuals, men of ideas, nationalist zealots, but these were isolated individuals. The rest were just thugs, robbers, who had joined the army for the sake of loot.*"¹³⁵ Of course the Serbs could explain the methods of 'pacification' (soon to be called 'Tankosić-methods'), as they claimed that the Ottoman army distributed 63,000 rifles among the Albanians, whose military force counted no more than 16,000 soldiers. The implication was that the remainder of the weapons were used by local inhabitants and bands, and so their impoundment justified the use of violence.¹³⁶

The professionalization of bands (either they followed national goals or were opportunists) is evidenced by their operation: functioning as 'catalysts' these offered training for the local population (for self-defence) instead of being on a constant search for clashes with Ottoman authorities or inimical bands.¹³⁷ The old methods of the Ottomans – to hire these bands for state service or to convince the leader of a band with a huge sum to 'retire' – were not working after the turn of the century.¹³⁸ The original tactics of the bands resembling the old 'brigandage' was seriously criticized in novels: the ever-moving troops shifting their activity from village to village as the Ottoman troops appeared, thus avoiding direct clashes, inflicted huge burdens on the peasants without bringing any closer the day of freedom for the oppressed and bringing no harm to the Ottomans. From the other side, the over-organized structure of the revolutionary movement was criticized sharply, claiming that regulations and constitution plans would not help the population, and that sticking to principles was even dangerous when pragmatism offered more progress.¹³⁹ Theoretical and tactical elements were not unified, and this decreased effectiveness.

135 Trotsky, Leon. *The Balkan Wars, 1912-1913: The War Correspondence of Leon Trotsky*. New York: Pathfinder, 1980. 161-62.

136 Bataković, Dušan, T. *Serbia's Kosovo Drama. A Historical Perspective*. Belgrade: Čigoja, 2012. 76. The Serbian argument fails to mention that it was the Serbs themselves who also distributed weapons among the Albanians in the hope of an anti-Ottoman revolt, which broke out in the spring of 1912, seriously undermining the stability of the state. As the Serbs knew who the main distributors were, it was quite easy for them to identify who received from the rifles and to retrieve the weapons.

137 Brown, *Loyal unto Death*, 128.

138 Apostol vojvode, operating around Vodena-Edessa, was considered an old-fashioned hajduk-klept rather than an ideologically trained leader, but even he decided not to accept the Ottoman offer.

139 Brown, *Loyal unto Death*, 139.

The social background and functions of the revolutionary organizations

As the ambiguous relation discussed above between the members of the villager-kherschis-zaptie triangle indicates, the social acceptance of the phenomenon (band activity) was not unequivocal. Balogh mentions that by the end of the eighteenth century, 10% of Christians (and a third of young men) had been involved in such a movement at least once in their lifetime.¹⁴⁰ This proportion was even higher in Macedonia at the beginning of the twentieth century. A document listed 35,000 supporters of IMRO in 1906 in the Skopje Sanjak alone, constituting more than 10% of the administrative unit's population. Considering that IMRO was an organization that relied mostly on Exarchists (promoting Macedo-Bulgarian or Bulgarian interests),¹⁴¹ one cannot avoid the assumption that all Exarchist households were conscripted as sympathizers of IMRO (compare *Table 2 and Table 4*): only this could explain the high ratio of supporters of IMRO compared to Exarchist families¹⁴² (25 per cent on average, or every head of a family). However, supporting IMRO was still a better choice than to fall victim to a hired band (one without genuine political commitment).

Certain signs of mass appeal as reflected in other sources are evident. In 1896, the membership of the revolutionary organizations was hardly reaching 2000, while it increased to 20,000 by 1903.¹⁴³ By 1913 even the number of *četa* members (fighters) had exceeded this, while thousands of civilians were also members of the organization (so-called *legal members*).¹⁴⁴ The number of bands with Bulgarian sentiments exceeded that of the others (constituting 55% of all groups).¹⁴⁵ In Skopje Sanjak this figure was 50% in 1904, in accordance with the proportion of Exarchists, and it was similar in Macedonia under the control of Powers (48% 'Bulgarian' vs. 47% other).

This all leads us to the conclusion that the numbers indicated in *Table 4* refer primarily to the taxable population (on areas controlled by the IMRO so-called revolutionary tax was levied on the supporters) rather than to real fighters. According to a report from 1906, the 6,000 IMRO supporters in the Skopje *kaza* possessed only 250 rifles (including 190 old Berdans) with 17,000 cartridges and 85

140 See: Balogh, *A nacionalizmus*, 16.

141 See the quotation from Vlahov citing Goce Delchev's memoirs in footnote 88.

142 Shaw, Stanford J. *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey: Vol. 2, Reform, Revolution, and Republic: The Rise of Modern Turkey 1808–1975*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977. 209.

143 *Ottoman Diplomatic Documents*, II. No. 1202. Ottoman documents mention 10,000 *četa* members of *all types and ethnicities* in 1905.

144 Brown, *Loyal unto Death*, 99.

145 *Ottoman Diplomatic Documents*, II. 1617. 28.03.1908.

revolvers with 1,550 bullets (Table 2).¹⁴⁶ Generally only one-tenth of the supporters had rifles, and the highest ratio was measured in Kočani and Štip (12–13 per cent). Here the ammunition-to-weapon ratio was also over 100 (explaining the escalation of violence in 1911–1912) and the ratio of older weapons was extremely high. We may assume that older weapons from the Crimean War were stored at home by peasants (or local militiamen) due to the deterioration in public security, while modern Mannlichers and revolvers had been distributed among active members through smuggling.¹⁴⁷

Table 4. The forces of IMRO and the ethnic distribution of the population in 1906 in Skopje Sanjak

	Skopje	Kumanovo	Egri Palanka	Kratovo	Kočani	Štip	Veles	Total
All members	6,000	3,448	5,280	5,536	4,640	5,028	5,200	35, 132
In Towns	2,500	0	210	156	320	2,381	0	5,567
IMRO Supporters as Percentage of Total Population	8.3%	7.6%	22%	25%	12%	11%	10%	12%
IMRO Supporters among Exarchists	25%	15%	25%	32%	25%	25%	18%	24%
Rifles (Mannlicher and Berdan, Gras)	250	140	311	208	300	345	440	1,994
Old Rifles from the Crimean War	9	28	0	107	200	293	20	657
Pistols	85	40	37	26	42	44	35	309
Bullets	17,300	4,570	22,660	45,000	56,000	55, 000	48,650	249,180
Bullets	1,550	313	1,710	800	1,700	1,760	1,050	8,883
Bullet / Weapon	67	27	73	143	112	86	106	94
Weapons to	4.32	4.87	5.89	5.69	10.78	12.69	8.85	7.55

146 Биярски, Цочо – Ива Бурилкова, eds. *Вътрешната македоно-одринска револуционна организация. (1893-1919). Документи на централните ръководни органи*, Vol. 1. Архивите говорят, 45. Sofia: Universitetsko Izdatelstvo Sv. Kliment Ohridski, 2007. 608–609. No. 209.

147 Although the number of weapons stored at home was large, this does not indicate a greater probability of everyday violence. The number of violent acts committed by non-četa members was very low in Kočani, though high in Štip.

Supporters as a Percentage								
Bombs, Dynamite	122	15	60	125	58	36	0	416
Bulgarian Villages	no data	1	no data	63	56	50	50	over 220
Serbian Villages	11	23	8	1	0	0	8	51
Turkish Villages	20	54	0	2	16	70	40	202
Mixed	S-4, T-9	0	S-3	T-5		T-7	S-2	S-9, T-21
Ethnic Character	Bulgarian-Muslim	Turkish-Serbian	Bulgarian	Bulgarian	Bulgarian-Turkish	Turkish-Bulgarian	Bulgarian-Muslim	
Dominant Character of Violence in 1905	Muslim against Christian	Muslim against Christian	Low Case Number	Christian against Christian	Unknown	Muslim-Christian	Muslim against Muslim; Muslim against Christian	
Income	500	436	250	574	500	770	1,500	4,530

Data calculated from: Биярски, Цочо and Ива Бурилкова, eds. *Вътрешната македоно-одринска револуционна организација. (1893–1919). Документи на централните ръководни органи. Vol. 1. Архивите говорят*, 45 (Sofia: Universitetsko Izdatelstvo Sv. Kliment Ohridski, 2007), 608–609. Nr. 209.

Thus it is worth analyzing both the willingness and forms of participation, as well as the social composition and revenue sources of the revolutionary organizations. The behavior of local people towards the organization cannot be unanimously judged, even when using contemporary official archival sources of non-interested parties. While McGregor, an English consul, reports on the cooperativeness of the local people, not only in paying the revolutionary tax, but in actively supporting the organizations, Biliotti, another English consul (a former *dragoman* with Patriarchist sentiments), wrote about abuses, coercive measures of *četa* members and bitter resentment of local people paying additional tax to the organization alongside state taxes and landlords' share.¹⁴⁸

Historians like Duncan Perry write about a frightened and conservative society, while Hobsbawm argues for the susceptibility of educated but unemployed village youngsters attracted by the towns as key target groups. Artisans were also thought to support the organization partly for economic reasons, while *pečalbari* were also not only susceptible for the ideology, but could also be used as *couriers*. Keith Brown's statistical analysis, based on 10% (375 cases) of the so-called Ilinden Dossier stored in Skopje, reveals that 66% of the organization members applying for a pension from

¹⁴⁸ Brown, *Loyal unto Death*, 33-44.

the Yugoslav state were villagers, a little underrepresented relative to their total share of the population (75%). Among the 92 persons giving their former occupation, 35% were farmers or landless agricultural wage-labourers (*momci*), and 25% were traders or merchants – either itinerant or shopkeepers.

Participation in the activity of IMRO had several levels. The broadest layer was of supporters conscripted in *Table 4*: within their ranks one could find the *civilian (legal) members (legalen člen)* supporting the active *četa members (komitadji)* by fulfilling different tasks. Based on Brown's calculations, approximately 1% of the membership was *blagajnik* or cashier, treasurer. It was a respected position – treasurers usually had some knowledge on future plans of the organization, and thus they were favourite targets for the Ottoman authorities, together with the *secretaries*. The organization had its own documentation and codes; even meetings and trials were documented. Many of the *blagajniks* were earlier *desetars* (leaders of a conspiring 'cell' including 10 persons) or *vojvodas* (military leaders).

The logistics were mainly based on the activity of *jataks*, constituting approximately 2% of members, who were responsible for storing ammunition and providing food and shelter. Though it was originally a despised activity in society, with the claim that "*whoever is not brave enough to steal, but only hides what is stolen, does not deserve to eat*" and their role was evaluated as determined by material self-interest rather than by real commitment,¹⁴⁹ they soon became very important for the new outlaws. They were considered legal members and their conspiratorial activity soon consumed huge amounts of time: they baked bread and washed clothes (the organization had some kind of uniform) at night in order to prevent their activity being seen by curious neighbours or potential spies. Being a *jatak* was more dangerous than being a *courier* – the former permanently risked his house and his livelihood, while the latter received only temporary assignments and was more mobile.

Pečalbari and students were excellent *couriers*: they carried letters in which the instructions for the cells of the organization were laid down, even including data on the next actions and targets, the names of traitors, the movements of Ottoman troops, etc. Organization members who were formerly wandering craftsmen were very useful in establishing networks with distant connections.¹⁵⁰ Mitre Trajkovski could visit Austria-Hungary and Izmir in search of work as a charcoal worker, which later on intertwined with conspiratorial activity. He commuted at least six times between Capari, where he worked as a charcoal worker, and Katerini, where he sold the

149 Brown, *Loyal unto Death*, 132.

150 Pechalba meant the same for artisans and was declassified as peregrination for the intelligentsia.

carried charcoal, before becoming appointed to a *četa*. He admitted that he smuggled Gras rifles to Macedonia underneath the charcoal.¹⁵¹ Ottoman authorities were aware of perspectives that *pečalba* could offer for the organization; therefore in 1898 they suspended this practice even for those who had official documents, because they feared that those who would leave for Bulgaria would return as *četa* members. This regulation also reveals the influence of neighbouring states on the minds of Macedonian population.

As the numbers in the Skopje Sanjak warn us, there had to be many *women* among the *legal members*. Their involvement was rational: sometimes they married an organization member, in which case they automatically became helping hands, if their husband was wounded, imprisoned or simply came under observation.¹⁵² Muslim officials, owing to cultural differences, refrained from molesting even suspicious women, who were exposed to less rough handling than men. Thus they made excellent couriers. Prior to 1903 authorities did not even dare suspect priests. As Trotsky wrote in his memoirs, when *komitadjis* in Old Serbia were armed by the Serbs through the Serbian consulate, the revolvers and cartridges were given to women and priests to distribute. Monasteries and schools functioned as storage and centres of the intelligence service.¹⁵³ The behavior of Muslim regular soldiers was also discerned from that of the irregulars because of their politeness or naivety: women very often carried the clothing of *četa* members, supplies or ammunition belts under their original clothing, which remained untouched by regular Ottoman troops. Nonetheless, the irregular *bashibozuks* got to know these tricks as the high number of raped women testified in 1903 (*Table 1*). The line separating legal members from *četa* fighters was significant, but permeable: sooner or later many of the *legal members* had to give up their original life (including security, family, home and welfare) and to go underground because of their activity.

The revolutionary committees also had their internal *secret police*, which was divided into two branches. The duty of the first branch, the investigative police, was not only to observe foreigners, non-*četa* members and government officials, but to examine the deeds and actions of *četa* members as well. The second branch was called the executive secret service, the task of which was not only to support the leaders in case of an internal crisis, but also to punish activities reported by observers.¹⁵⁴ The revolvers mentioned in the document summarizing the resources of

151 Brown, *Loyal unto Death*, 55.

152 Brown, *Loyal unto Death*, 136.

153 Trotsky, *The Balkan Wars*, 127.

154 ÖStA HHStA, PA, XXXVIII. Konsulate (1848–1918). Kt. 430. Üsküb (1900), No. 212. Pára an Goluchowski, handgeschrieben, Üsküb, September 17, 1900, Statut und Reglement der bulgaro-macedonischen Comités.

IMRO from 1906 (*Table 4*) were used by this branch of secret police (and by military leaders). The proportion of official ‘terrorists’ – as the executioners called themselves – was also around 1-2%. These assignments could be temporary or permanent, depending on the circumstances, the level of trust in each other, etc.¹⁵⁵

The revolutionary organizations tried to build themselves up and behave as a state-within-a-state (the most evident sign of this is taxation), or as an authority satisfying social needs (undertaking social tasks as Muslim *wakfs* lands did). Beyond copying the religious rituals of priests (i.e. during the official oath of allegiance to the organization), the movement also tried to imitate state institutions (holding trials). Literacy (and thereby teachers) played an important role in this (in an illiterate society literacy was bestowed with some sacrality, too). When accepting a new member into the ranks of the organization, an oath was taken which was supervised by priests (representing the sacrality of the act) or by teachers. Thus highly esteemed members of local civil society, who also had a certain reputation in the eyes of the official authorities, were definitely involved in the movement. The fact that a gun played a key role among the symbols of the oath also had symbolic meaning. The gun represented the power, the right of violence, which was exclusively monopolized and practised by government authorities, and it implicitly referred to the demand on equal rights (from 1903 onwards, Christians were not allowed to own guns). The gun as a symbol was to challenge the authority of the Ottoman state.

In a predominantly illiterate society, the role of the verbal oath is not negligible: when in June 1903 the elders of Rakitovo were kidnapped and three were murdered, the remaining five took an oath to recognize the authority of the Exarchate. The oath substituted for a contract – breaking the oath was similar to breaking the law (similar to the Albanian *besa*) – and in these cases the ‘local penal code’ was applied, but only after a trial. No ‘unofficial’ forms of coercion and violence or self-jurisdiction were

155 Ibid. ... *Capitel VIII. Geheime Polizei*

“Art. 34. Jedes Comité besitzt eine geheime Polizei, die aus 2 Abtheilungen besteht: forschende und strafende. Der Director des Comité's wählt unter den Arbeitern einen zum Leiter der Nachforschungscommission, dieser wählt sich dann 3 Hilfsarbeiter, die sich unter einander nicht kennen sollen.

Art. 35. Die geheime Nachforschungspolizei wird beobachten: die Aufführung und die Handlungen der Comité-Mitglieder 2/ die Stimmung und Thätigkeit der türkischen und christlichen Bevölkerung rücksichtlich der ‘Arbeit’. 3/ Massnahmen die gegen ‘dieselbe’ die türkische Verwaltung ergreift 4/ beobachtet und forschet aus alle in der Stadt ankommenden Fremden ohne Unterschied der Nationalität. Alles Gehörte und Geschehene bringen sie durch ihren Leiter dem Comité-Director zur Kenntniss. [...]

Art. 39. Jedes Mitglied der Strafpolizei muss immer mit einem Revolver und mit einem Dolche, im Zeitpunkte der Thätigkeit jedoch mit zwei Revolvern bewaffnet sein.

Art. 40. Die Geheimpolizei muss ganz oder der ausgeloste Theil derselben im Inneren des Kreises auf Befehl des Directors, ausserhalb auf Befehl des Central-Comité's den Nachbar-Comité's zu Hilfe eilen.“

allowed by the organization. During the trials they held, educated teachers served as presidents.¹⁵⁶

In the case of murders – which could be incorporated under the term ‘everyday violence’, but which had a political background – the revolutionary organization was clever enough (1) to share responsibility between executioners, thus pouring courage into them by decreasing their individual responsibility; (2) not to apply local people (their position would be untenable within the community; furthermore, it would target the revenge of Ottoman authorities not against the perpetrators, but against the whole community); (3) to fanaticize young people with no wife and children, bringing unconditional support while decreasing the potential for blackmail of these persons by the authorities through their family ties. Besides professional executioners, there were volunteers as well. The tactics of the organization were very often to link the new members to the organization through a murder (in their terms, the execution of a traitor), and this is why a gun was rarely used: the new members were not always given these “expensive” weapons, not to mention their lack of skill in using them (regular training was organized for new members and village militiamen). And though the revolutionary organization depended heavily on the activity of teachers and priests of the Exarchate (serving often as secretaries, supervisors of the oath or as judges in the trials), it did not refrain from punishing them. Therefore friction between the *četas* and the Exarchate (which had previously functioned as a state-within-a-state) was not rare.

Not only Greek-Ottoman cooperation¹⁵⁷ but also internal treason threatened the efficiency of the organization, which explains the need for internal police. A member of the committee, Marko Ivanov, promised the Ottomans to give information on weapon storage houses and smuggling routes for 500 pounds.¹⁵⁸ Soon 94 Mannlichers, 280kg of dynamite, 260 Lebel revolvers and 14,500 Mannlicher bullets were captured by the Ottoman authorities. At another site, 195kg of dynamite, 860 Mannlichers, 150 Martini-Henrys, 180 Tüfenkchiev revolvers and 7200 Mannlicher bullets was found.¹⁵⁹ Before the outbreak of the Ilinden revolt, many losses, including manpower, were accounted for due to treason. In Ichtepe a barricade fight took place between Bulgarian ‘bandits’ (as Ottoman sources call them), gendarmes and

156 Brown, *Loyal unto Death*, 75.

157 In 1902 Greek authorities arrested 27 ‘Bulgarians’ in Trikala for smuggling weapons from Greece; seven of them admitted they were members of the revolutionary organization. *Ottoman Diplomatic Documents* I. No. 367. 08.06. 1902. Georgi Stefanov and his 28 followers were also captured by official Greek authorities. *Ottoman Diplomatic Documents* I. No. 748. 10.06. 1903.

158 *Ottoman Diplomatic Documents* I. No. 448/451. 03/09.12. 1902.

159 *Ottoman Diplomatic Documents* I. No. 578. 29.03. 1903.

Ottoman soldiers. 23 Bulgarians died, 10 were injured and captured.¹⁶⁰ In Djumabala 50 'Bulgarian' *četa* members were detected, most of them captured, and dum-dum bullets were found in their rifles.¹⁶¹ During the Smardesh incident, the Ottomans set fire to 200 houses, while they estimated the number of *komitadji* residing there at 600 (in order to justify the scope of their coercive measures).

There were also successful agents among foreign citizens (who could also become the targets of IMRO), like Monsieur Bondy.¹⁶² Despite the numerous arrests and the death of leaders¹⁶³ the organization still possessed 25,000kg of dynamite and 2 million bullets, as Mr. Bondy reported from the meeting of the *komitadji* leaders.

So, what did a *komitadji* band look like? We may get information on this even from Ottoman sources. A band arrested after 1908 counted 1573 weapons, 14,500 bullets, and 74 bombs. Among the six leaders were a teacher from Eđri Palanka, a teacher from Istib, a teacher from Kratovo, a teacher from Leskovica, an igumen from a monastery and the school inspector of Istib.¹⁶⁴

Financial sources

Those who were conscripted with the aforementioned document (even if they remained passive towards the cause) had to pay the 'revolutionary tax'. This—in addition to the official tithe that at that time was around 12–15 per cent (without the share of the tax farmer which could put it at 20%) —represented an additional (but not heavy) burden, paid willingly or under coercion.¹⁶⁵ A teacher, Milan Chorbev, was cut into pieces by four very young *četa* members because he advised villagers

160 *Ottoman Diplomatic Documents* I. No. 703. 07.05. 1903.

161 *Ottoman Diplomatic Documents* I. No. 738. 01.06. 1903.

162 *Ottoman Diplomatic Documents* I. No. 738. and No. 710. 12.05.1903.

163 When the Ottoman authorities temporarily managed to behead the organization in 1901 and acquired most of the seals and codes, Ivan Garvanov, the sole possessor of such a seal, enjoyed full authenticity and power, contrary to the messages repeatedly sent to the villagers by Gjorche Petrov and Goce Delchev, other leaders of the organization. The seal gave enough bureaucratic power to Garvanov to control the timing of the Ilinden uprising, contrary to the will of Delchev. This again reveals the role of symbols (like the oath, pistols, etc.)

164 *Ottoman Diplomatic Documents* II. No. 1415.

165 ÖStA HHStA, PA, XXXVIII. Konsulate (1848–1918). Kt. 430. Üsküb (1900), No. 212. Pára an Goluchowski, handgeschrieben, Üsküb, September 17, 1900, Statut und Reglement der bulgaro-macedonischen Comités (ins Deutsche übersetzt) (3 + 14. Beilage, getippt): *Cap. XI: Materielle Mittel der Comités* "Auferlegte Hilfsbeiträge werden zur Einschüchterung oder mit Gewalt von Personen *abverlangt, die wohl helfen können aber nicht wollen*". "Art. 47. Zur Deckung der nöthigen Comité-Auslagen, jedoch hauptsächlich zur Bewaffnung der Arbeiter erhalten die Comités die Mittel 1/ aus den monatlichen Beitragleistungen der Mitglieder, die ihnen im Verhältnisse zu ihrer materiellen Lage bemessen werden; 2/ aus Opfern, die entweder freiwillig oder auferlegt sind. Anmerkung: Freiwillig sind diejenigen Unterstützungen, die sowohl von den Mitgliedern als auch von Personen gegeben werden, die sich nicht entschlossen haben, Arbeiter zu werden, jedoch mit der 'Arbeit' sympathisieren, dieselbe zu fördern wünschen und zu diesem Zwecke gewisse Summe geben..."

not to pay the revolutionary tax.¹⁶⁶ The revolutionary tax increased to 1d by 1903. Though the organization offered a receipt for confiscations or taxes levied, its value did not always match the expropriated value; furthermore, there was no deadline on these receipts.¹⁶⁷ But many locals accepted this, considering it as an 'investment into the future'; many others did so because they felt threatened.

This financial source, though important, was not the sole income for IMRO. In addition to taxation, *ransoms, smuggling, foreign support and regular economic activities* (like the money sent home by the 35,000 Macedonian emigrants in the USA) were among the major sources of revenue. Finance was a continuous concern for the organizations, as indicated by the case of the kidnapped Miss Stone. Sometimes school-age supporters of the organization kidnapped themselves and demanded a high ransom from their wealthy fathers.

Beyond pillaging and 'requisition', another source of income came from *state subsidies*: the Bulgarian consulate in Skopje warned the government that Serbian agents received 300,000 dinars for the Serbianization of the vicinity of Kratovo (this amount is equal to the annual salary of 350 teachers or 150 military lieutenants). These agents had bought weapons (one witness, a major of the international gendarmerie, mentions 200 rapid-fire guns) instead of creating schools, instead of creating schools, buying land or bribing local leaders, and only a small sum was spent on securing the loyalty of local people.¹⁶⁸

The significance (and uniqueness) of this act lies not in the overt¹⁶⁹ state support (this was pretty common, albeit often in a hidden form), nor in its 'peculiar' usage (the ransom paid for Miss Stone was also spent on weapons), but the way these two phenomena were connected: previously, state donations had not been spent on promoting destruction. This was something new. The small states with claims to this territory recognized that *the destruction of existing (infra)structures was more cost-effective and its effect more permanent than establishing churches or schools and buying land*, indicating that *there was a radical shift from soft methods to hard methods*.¹⁷⁰ After the withdrawal of the Powers, the third phase of the Macedonian question was characterized by nearly unlimited violence and coercion.

166 Brown, *Loyal unto Death*, 76.

167 Brown, *Loyal unto Death*, 115.

168 ЦДА, ф. 335к. оп. 1. а.е. 396. л. 5-7.

169 This money did not go through religious or civilian organizations.

170 By the end of 1908, Greek *četa* organizer Colonel Danglis acquired 10,000 guns, with one million rounds of ammunition, and more than 50 Greek military officers worked legally in Macedonia after relinquishing their ranks, while the Bulgarians had already distributed more than 30,000 weapons. See, Balogh, *A nacionalizmus*, 88.

The income sent home by emigrants was also not negligible. Greek emigrants donated 45 million piasters in 1906 to fight against Bulgarian propaganda and to support armed counterstrikes.¹⁷¹

Substantial income also came from organized economic activity. The agreements between Verhovists and IMRO activists, pointing out that peasants should be kept away from the violence and should not be considered as target groups, were driven not only by social sensitivity but also by economic interests. Through the use of its armed forces, IMRO compelled peasants to work the land and often prescribed what to grow in the fields. Surprisingly, this coercive agriculture was economically rational in a certain sense, as IMRO favoured crops with greater added value than that of the wheat traditionally grown in the region. One hectare of land sown with poppy-seed produced between 10 and 15 kilograms of opium (if the plantation was not set on fire by rivals) with an average price of 25 to 30 francs per kilogram, thus producing total revenue of between 300 and 450 francs per hectare. This significantly exceeded the revenue derived from other crops (one hectare of wheat produced about 130–150 francs – yields were slightly over one ton per hectare).¹⁷² By monopolizing trade in opium and tobacco, IMRO was able to create self-sustaining *četas* that were wedged between peasant and trader, expropriating the profits. This was a risky enterprise, as both adversaries and the government tried to hinder this activity, and the mobility of *Četas* decreased when they had to defend the harvest.

Economic oppression and permanent migration generated by political tension led to the desertion of arable lands. By 1912, as a result of the growing violence, only 400,000 hectares of land were under cultivation in Kosovo Vilayet out of a total of 3.2 million acres.¹⁷³

Methods of rule

This sub-chapter leads us to our second key chapter of investigation – violence exercised against local unarmed communities and persons. Kidnapping, ransom, mass theft of animals, blackmailing, threatening letters, bribery, as Ikonov listed *the methods* in 1911 (see *Figure 2* for the distribution of targets *četa*-civilian encounters, in Skopje Sanjak 1907), and the disinterest of Ottoman authorities forced many villages to convert (often temporarily) to a new identity.¹⁷⁴ The village of Kanarevo

171 *Ottoman Diplomatic Documents II*, No. 1700. 14.09. 1908.

172 The total opium harvest in Skopje Sanjak reached 100,000 kg, generating revenue of up to 2.5–3.0 million francs, which of course stemmed not entirely from fields controlled by bands. Strauss, *Großbulgarien*, 52–60.

173 Strauss, *Großbulgarien*, 52–60.

174 ЦДА, ф. 335к. оп. 1. а.е. 205. л. 112-125.

(Kumanovo kaza) decided to become Serboman after the *starešina* was threatened and bribed.¹⁷⁵ Bulgarian priests were arrested in Krastev Dol and in Radibuš by Ottoman authorities, and soon Serbian priests arrived to replace them.¹⁷⁶ Ruginci, Orah and Podarži Kon became Serboman due to violence committed by Bulgarian *četas*.¹⁷⁷ Ottomans accused IMRO activists of dressing in the clothes of Ottoman infantry and *ulemas* and pillaging Macedo-Slav villages in order to push them into the hands of the *četas*.¹⁷⁸ In some cases the conversion of a village was not a sudden act—it took years, and the two parties often continued to live together: this kind of coexistence happened in the case of Stačna, Teovo, Oreše, etc. (Very often, social or economic tensions within the community were the explanation for the situation). Nonetheless, this phenomenon could also serve as a source of recurrent violence. In other cases, settlements changed sides many times: this happened with particular frequency after 1908, and the reestablishment of the constitution and the disarmament of *četas*: see the case of Oreše, Izvor, Rankovski, etc., which became Bulgarian settlements after Serbia temporarily lost Ottoman support, then changed sides again by 1910, when Serbian propaganda became revitalized again (*Table 5*).¹⁷⁹

The instruments cited above served not only to promote forced Serbianization or Bulgarization of the villages, but also provided food and income for the *četa* to sustain its activity, as these units were often operating far from their hinterland. (The identification of Serboman villages in *kazas* distant from the Serbian border may indicate areas of local support for Serbian *četas* – *Table 6*).

Table 5. Settlements accepting the authority of Patriarchate between 1889 and 1908

	Never Exarchist	Became Serboman in 1889–1903	Became Serboman in 1903–1908	Became Bulgarian again after 1908
Skopska Kaza	Banjani*, Gornjani*, Čučer*, Brovec*, Kučevišta*, Kučkovo*	Raženičino, Pakoshevo, Novo Selo, Gorno Orizari, Vizbegovo, Vučedol, Dolno Slivari	Tavor (12), Pobože (15+60)	
Veleška Kaza		Rudnik (45+10**), Bašino selo (34+150), Bogomila, Orahovdol (32+58), Kapinovo (14), Mokreni	Vladilovci (75+2), Smilovci (36), Oreše (73+29), Pomenovo (45), Starigrad (43), Novoselo (28+15), Izvor (44+16), Martinci (39), Stepanci (60), Nikoladin	Oreše, Izvor, Nežilovo, Novoselo, Smilovci,

175 ЦДА, ф. 335к. оп. 1. а.е. 396. л. 5-7.

176 ЦДА, ф. 335к. оп. 1. а.е. 205. л. 112-125.

177 Ibid.

178 *Ottoman Diplomatic Documents* II. No. 1438. 08.12.1906.

179 ЦДА, ф. 335к. оп. 1. а.е. 205. л. 112-125.

		(64), Nežilovo (30+38), Teovo (50+60), Gabrovnik (12+19), Omorani (96+17), Lisiče (19+58)	(46+83),	Pomenovo, Vladilovci, Orahovdol
Kratovska Kaza		Šalkovica (13), Šopsko Rudari (20+75), Kratovo town (340+550 Muslim)	?	
Kumanovska Kaza	Staro Nagorično* (130 households were never exarchist of the 145),	Dumanovci (34+6), Četirci (62)	Karlovcı (15), Koinci (25), Vragoturci (42), Maložino (60), Ramno (67), Arbanaško (42), Dlbočina (40), Dejlovci (62), Žegniane (50), Stepanci (45), Kokino (50), Bajlovci (114), Osiče (15), Ženovino (33), Alinci (48), Breško (12), Svilanci (24), Kanarevo (46), Drenak (82), Orah (85), Ruginci (65), Bukovljani (24), Čelopek (62+15), Dobrača (12+6), Strezovci (40+13), Janinci*, Pelinci*, Beljakovci (52+21), Kučkarevo (10)	
Palanečka Kaza		Staćna (20+12)	Carcorija (75), Dobrovnica (55), Lukje (140), Ogut (125), Podarži kon (116), Metirevo (55), Osiče (50), Baštevo (33), Gaber (102), Dlbočnica (69), Petrilica (305), Ljubinci (24), Radibuš (127), Staćna (32), Gulinci (45), Opošnica (90), Krivi kamen (27), Rankovci (135), Vražograncı (15), Ginovci (75), Milutinci (72)	Ginovci, Radibuš, Milutinci, Osiče, Krastov dol, Lukje (100+40), Ogut, Baštevo***, Carcarija***, Dobrovnica***, Dlbočnica***, Gaber (14+88), Rankovci
Tetovska Kaza		Brezno, Rogačevo, Staro Selo, Vratnica	?	Dolna Lešnica
Gostivarsko Kaza		Zubovci (50+50),	Balil dol (30+50 Muslim), Dobreše (40+110 Muslim), Vrutok (24+45), Pečkovo (17+15), Leunovo (79+38+16 Muslim), Mavrovo (121+31), Nikiforovo (77), Železni Rečani	
Kočanska Kaza			Nivičane (60+8), Gradče (32), Leški (21), Pašadžik (12), Pantalej (14+28)	Nivičina, Gradče, Leški, Pašadžik

* Never Exarchist; mostly refugees from Stara Srbija between 1689 and 1739 in the so-called Skopska Crnagora.

**The first number in brackets represents Patriarchist households, the second Exarchist. Muslims are usually indicated.

*** Patriarchist Bulgarian villages.

ЦДЛА, ф. 335к. оп. 1. а.е. 205. л. 112-125.

Table 6. Location of Serbian četa leaders in 1907 (approximately 170 men)

Skopska Černogoria	Nikola Janković, Angelko Slavković +10 men
Veles	Ivan Martulčanec (Azot) + 10 men, Dušan (Orahovdol) + 10 men
Egri Palanka	Georgi Skopjanče(to) (Kozjak Mts.) + 10 men, Spas Garda (Petralica)
Kumanovo	Jovo Kapitan, Denko Genin, Pop Dičo vojvoda

Kočana	Turkish-Serbian mixed <i>četa</i> led by a Serbian teacher from Kočani, with the approval of the Ottoman <i>kaymakam</i>
Skopje	Petko Kapitan (Staro Nagoričano)
Porečie, Kičevo, Azot	Grigor from Nebregovo with 30 men, Stefan with 10 men, Ivan Dolgač(ot) with 15 men, Pavle from Bač (Albania) with 7-8 men around Dibra
Prilep	Ivan/Jovan Babunski and 15 men, Boško vojvoda from Vir with 10 men

Сайко Трифонов, Величко Георгиев, eds. *История на българите в документи, Vol. II/2. 1878–1912* (Sofia: Просвета, 1996), 290-91.




Figure 2. Types of violence against Exarchist population committed by Serbian bands (Skopje Sanjak, 1907), ЦДА, ф. 335к. оп. 1 а.е. 396.

III. Violence in Skopje Sanjak

Everyday violence

As we have already stated, by the term 'everyday violence' we mean not only personal conflicts, conflicts with an economic background, or tensions triggered by the law of customs (blood feud), but also atrocities that might have a hidden political agenda. In the latter case the victims seem to be innocent civilians, and only a deeper investigation can reveal that they were indirectly involved in political struggles. Nonetheless, the sources are often unable to uncover these hidden motives, and this is another reason why we classify these acts as special forms of 'everyday violence'. This also means that the label 'political murder' is retained for conflicts between armed persons or between armed persons and politicians. In this sense even the murder of a priest or a teacher can be considered as 'everyday violence' whether or

not it involved any political motivation. Nonetheless, the thin line between the categories renders comparisons difficult.

There are some symbolic examples for these difficult-to-classify cases cited by Keith Brown. The four murders listed here had different motivations, perpetrators and victims. In October, 1902 Sofia Trenchova and her mother was found dead, having been stabbed several times. This act could have been perceived as a general form of everyday violence, but the facts behind it and certain symbolic signs suggested it could be considered as a political murder as well: Sofia Trenchova was the mistress of the *müdür*. The fact that her tongue had been torn out had a clear message, namely that she was considered a spy by the murderers, Keith Brown claims.¹⁸⁰

The next one is more clear-cut, as it was not directly linked to the activity of the revolutionary organizations. In 1903 a pregnant woman was shot during the collection of a tax by a tax farmer. She delivered the baby, than both died. The father (who was seriously in debt and could not pay the tax), together with the embalmed child, went from one official institution to the next, seeking justice – to no avail. This second type of murder as listed by Brown symbolized the ignorance and abuses of official authorities, an ignorance which pushed victims into the hands of revolutionary organizations that undertook to avenge the murder, thus taking state functions into their own hands. The case became famous because it offered a splendid opportunity for the organization to advertise its justness and social sensitivity (so from a propaganda aspect it was also a beneficial investment), and thus it could be seen as political act - in spite of the fact that the participants were politically passive.¹⁸¹

The break between the authorities, the *reaya* and the revolutionary organizations went so far that even when there was occasion for local Christians to enrol as policemen, they often hesitated, because those who decided to join the ranks of the gendarmerie were often punished by the revolutionary organizations by death. The same happened to the only volunteer from Lopaticza in January 1903: his throat was cut, and, to make it clear that he was not the victim of some robbery, an inscription was fastened to his coat with the words “the fate of those who serve the Turks”.¹⁸² But even without this message (the revolutionary organization always left behind evidence to justify its acts), it is difficult to treat the murder as ‘everyday violence’ because it was committed against the authorities. It seems that by this time the lack

180 Brown, *Loyal unto Death*, 1.

181 IMRO also had its own narrative of events, emphasizing the heartless behavior of the powers that be and the vulnerability of the victim in order to mobilize the masses on the organization’s side.

182 Brown, *Loyal unto Death*, 2.

of trust of IMRO in the solutions offered by the Ottoman authorities had grown so great that the revolutionary organisation refused any cooperation and considered any positive step of the Ottoman government as a threat challenging the movement's authority. On the other hand the revolutionary organisations often built their members into the ranks of the gendarmerie to get better access to information through these double agents.

The fourth murder did not represent a pure type, either, and deserves our attention on account of the participants: in July 1903, two Patriarchist, but Slavic cattle dealers were killed by a Muslim tax farmer (whose father had recently been killed by a band) and a gendarme. We might think of the economic disagreements or ethnic tensions behind this as well (and thus see it as a form of everyday violence), but what is interesting is the involvement of the official authorities in unofficial actions, such as revenge, which partly explains IMRO's lack of faith in the gendarmerie. (In the second, case, the action was itself official, but the participating tax farmer was a private person, not a state official).

As Keith Brown points out when comparing the differences in forms of violence between the pre-Ilinden stage of the movement and after it, *the evolution of violence went through several stages*.¹⁸³ By 1903 the focus – which had previously been on human rights and justice, trust and solidarity in the communication of the revolutionary organization – began to shift. The bomb attacks in Saloniki in April 1903 stood as a warning that from then on even innocent civilians and foreigners had become targets of this organization,¹⁸⁴ beside the Ottoman authorities, thus crossing the demarcation line between freedom fight and terrorism. IMRO, which was formerly organized based on trust, shifted to terror. The earlier constraints on the usage of deadly force had vanished: originally the movement refrained from attacking civilians not involved in conspiracies, espionage and counterespionage. From 1903 on this had changed: extending the threat to anyone who belonged to the opposing ethno-religious group, regardless of their involvement in revolutionary organizations, meant that the era of *justified violence*¹⁸⁵ was over, and the time for a broader interpretation had come.

The response to this was escalated Ottoman, Albanian and Greek counterinsurgencies and official Ottoman counterstrikes (the destruction of

183 The typization is ours, using the examples given by Brown.

184 There is an evident connection between the Armenian bomb attack against the Ottoman Imperial Bank in 1896 and the Macedonian case (both regarding methods and consequences). This was also a turning point in the history of Armenian resistance (the domination of *h'nchaks* was substituted by that of the *dashnaks*).

185 Meaning attacks on authorities and moderate revenge attacks on civilians (including conflicts stemming from blood feuds).

Smardesh village in April 1903 is a good example of the latter).¹⁸⁶ The Greeks' response – propagating the replacement of 'justified violence' with '*unlimited violence*' – was brutal, but corresponds to the logic of terror. The Greeks promised to kill two Bulgarians (regardless of whether they belonged to the movement or not) for each Patriarchist killed in the countryside.¹⁸⁷ They applied this so consistently – as the raids in SouthMacedonia in 1905-1906 proved – that IMRO was also enforced to apply the same tactics.

But the situation soon became untenable. The next stage began when spontaneous massacres occurred with the involvement of civilians,¹⁸⁸ but without the encouragement of the authorities. After the explosion of the secret IMRO cartridge factory in Monastir, angered local Muslims replied to a Christian insult ending in nine being killed on St. George's Day (also known as the beginning of *četa*-season)¹⁸⁹. This very first case, the model for Istip and Kochani (where the bomb attacks against sacred places also ended in massacres) symbolized the *mass implementation of violence*.¹⁹⁰ The story of the embalmed new-born child had another moral beyond that expressed earlier – it was one of the first times that a woman was shot by a Muslim civilian,¹⁹¹ and *this cultural breakdown* also marked the boundary of an era. By this time events had become uncontrollable – characterized by Balfour as the "balance of criminality".¹⁹² In a large region around the second-largest city of Macedonia, Monastir, in a six-month period from April to October 1902 (prior to the reforms), 43 people were killed, one every four days.¹⁹³ In June 1903 this rose to one every two days. It is understandable why Damian Gruev stated in an assembly of revolutionary organizations, when they decided to launch the Ilinden uprising, that it was "better an end with horrors, than horrors without end".¹⁹⁴

186 Brown, *Loyal unto Death*, 177. *Ottoman Diplomatic Documents* I. No. 748. 10.06. 1903. Hussein Hilmi Pasha, the new *vali*, after the beginning of the reform movement also promised to sanction the atrocities committed by the Ottomans. He managed to capture the perpetrators of the Smardesh incident. *Ottoman Diplomatic Documents* I. No. 775. 17.07.1903.

187 Brown, *Loyal unto Death*, 181-82. When Patriarchist Slav priest Stoyan and his wife were murdered in Brod, eight Greeks immediately killed a Bulgarian teacher. They also used the tactics of 'sharing the sin and responsibility' as it was applied by IMRO. The Greek organization in Thessaloniki was also based on cells of 10 persons, stressing secrecy, obedience and sacrality – emphasizing the same principles and applying the same organizational methods that were used by IMRO.

188 The Greeks killing civilians were *četa* members, *komitadjis*, while the Muslims killing Christian civilians were civilians themselves.

189 Our statistics for Skopje Sanjak in 1907 deny the significance of this date (see Chapter III).

190 The difference between unlimited and *mass violence* is that in the first case the target groups were broadened, while in the latter the circle of perpetrators became extended

191 Brown, *Loyal unto Death*, 180.

192 *Ibid.*, 3.

193 *Ibid.*, 1.

194 Brailsford, *Macedonia*, 116.

While Brown was lucky enough to carry out a statistical analysis combined with prosopographic research for the period 1897-1903 (that functioned as an introduction to our investigations by providing data for comparison), our sources offer only the execution of a quantitative analysis (withouth prosopographic studies) for the next period 1903-1908, characterized by an escalation of violence. In this chapter – beyond trying to grasp this escalation through the number and variety of conflicts – we focus on the role of geography (the differences between peripheral and central zones) and the interethnic character of the conflicts based on Austro-Hungarian consular reports.

The macro-level data of the Ottoman authorities reveals that violence did not decrease during the reforms (1903-1908). Violent crimes flooded the courts. The extraordinary court in Saloniki finished 300 criminal trials, involving 1026 persons, during January 1907. In Monastir, until 2 February 1907, 403 persons were arrested and 127 cases were taken to trial, while in Kosovo up to the middle of February there were 37 trials with 163 defendants. The high number of persons for one case refers to the fact that they were in connection with crimes committed by groups (supposedly of *komitadji* activity). While there were only 356 imprisoned in Monastir in 1900 because of attacks against persons or institutions, by 1907 this increased to 1200. This was 631 and 1954 in Saloniki and 446 and 1265 in Kosovo Vilayet, respectively. The number of those deported was 7372, and 3830 of them were Muslims (over 50%), overrepresenting their proportion of the population. This means that authorities were more focussed on Muslims – probably as a result of the international intervention, rather than because of their violent character.¹⁹⁵ In order to decrease the burden of the central authorities, the government tried to establish local peace tribunals for cases of lower value. (Participants in these were getting paid).

Even after the interference of the Great Powers, the provinces were still crying for relief,¹⁹⁶ as testified to by the Bulgarian Shopov's compilation. Between May 1904 and May 1905, 111 violent cases *committed by četas* were reported within the boundaries of Macedonia, including those that were targeted against the authorities. (These are not covered by the term 'everyday violence', but can be compared to this category). These atrocities claimed an average of seven victims and perpetrators all together (including not only those killed, but also those wounded and captured alive).¹⁹⁷ This high average number of 'participants' reveals (1) that these incidents and conflicts

195 *Ottoman Diplomatic Documents* II. No. 1517. 13.09. 1907. One may argue, of course, that it is not that violence became more widespread, but that the authorities became more efficient at detecting it. But as other sources reveal, 50% of the perpetrators often remained unknown even after the intervention of the Powers.

196 Frantz, 'Zwischen Gewalt,' 134–60.

197 ЦДА, ф. 332к. оп. 1. а.е. 17. л. 544-555.

were not accidental or of personal character, but were planned in advance as a part of a campaign of intimidation and revenge – symbolizing a special type of warfare. (2) The general numbers also reveal that tensions did not decrease compared to the 1902 data in Monastir. Though these numbers refer to a greater area and only political attacks are involved, the 509 murders mean a daily average of 1.4, while the more than 2000 arrested reached 6 daily on average. On the other hand, this general summary does not reveal whether the proximity to borders or distance from central administration had an effect on the escalation of violence, nor does it provide an account of the interethnic character of conflict, contrary to the Austro-Hungarian consular reports.

These statistics cited in the report of Shopov help point out some preferences of groups with different ethnic origins or political commitments and also show their over- or underrepresentation among the dead and those injured, convicted and released. Most of those arrested in Macedonia were Bulgarians (80 per cent, a result of either the enhanced activity of the Bulgarians or the prejudice of the authorities, because their proportion of the population did not exceed 50-60%), though almost two-thirds of them were not imprisoned. Among those who were convicted, Bulgarians were not overrepresented: 20 per cent of arrested Bulgarians were sentenced to several years in prison, representing 79 per cent of all imprisoned, while Bulgarians constituted 80 per cent of those arrested. The proportion of imprisoned Serbs was also around 20 per cent of all Serbs arrested. Among the acquitted, Serbs were overrepresented (80 per cent of arrested Serbs were freed), while the investigation process was the longest in the case of Greeks, due to the fact that they were often not Ottoman but Greek citizens,¹⁹⁸ unlike Bulgar(ian)s, who were mainly recruited from the territory of Macedonia and not from Bulgaria.

According to the data collected by Shopov, Greek *četas* preferred to capture people alive and hold them for ransom, which means that the tactics of Greeks in the struggle for Macedonia reflected old tendencies and were not yet 'upgraded' to the new stage of unlimited violence: 70 per cent of those captured were held by Greeks, while the proportion of atrocities committed by Greek forces was only 27 per cent. This practice was quite rare in the case of Serb and Bulgar offenders, who usually killed their victims (over 80% of known cases). Compared to this, murders constituted only 33 per cent of Greek violence. Altogether 66 per cent of those who died were killed by Bulgarian *četas*, although the latter were involved in 'only' 50 per cent of encounters. The proportion of the victims of Ottoman authorities constituted

198 In 1905, 87 out of the 255 known Greek *četniks* were Greek subjects, which is 33% – quite high compared to Bulgarians, for example – while another 21 arrived from Crete (8%). In the case of 'Bulgarian' teachers in Macedonia, the proportion of indigenous teachers was over 90%.

'only' 17 to 20 per cent of all victims and those who died were underrepresented among them (*Table 7*).

Table 7. Distribution of violent acts between ethnic groups in 1905 throughout Macedonia, according to Shopov

Arrested	Convicted	Acquitted	Still under Investigation	Ethnic Group
1,607 (80%)	313 (20%)	993 (62%)	301 (18%)	Bulgarian
349 (17%)	79 (22%)	99 (28%)	171 (50%)	Greek
52 (3%)	4 (8%)	41 (80%)	7 (13%)	Serb
2,008 (100%)	396 (20%)	1,133 (55%)	479 (25%)	Total
Confrontations	Wounded	Killed	Captured Alive	Adversary, opponent
68 (61%)	6	320 (81%)	65 (16%)	Bulgarian <i>četas</i> (total cases: 391)
30 (27%)	12	93 (33%)	165 (61%)	Greek <i>četas</i> (total cases: 270)
13 (12%)	2	96 (86%)	13 (11%)	Serbian <i>četas</i> (total cases: 111)
111 (average of seven people per confrontation)	20	509 (66%)	243 (31%)	Total: 772
?	122	86	-	Committed by Turkish Authorities

ЦДА, ф. 332к. оп. 1. а.е. 17. л. 544-555.

Another set of statistics, limited to the British zone of the reforms and collected by the British consul in Saloniki, provides even more detailed information on the inter- and intraethnic character of the violence. This data is from the year 1907 (when the Greek-Bulgarian clash in South Macedonia culminated) and is limited to *murders* (the previous source had a broader base that included casualties), but also including cases *committed by četa members against civilians* (which the previous source did not). According to these statistics, the Serbs killed almost 70 persons during the period investigated, but only 10 were *četa* members (15%), the others could be supporters of inimical units, like peasants, legal members of the IMRO or other activists of nation-building, like teachers or priests.¹⁹⁹ (The numbers given in *Table 8* do not represent the total year, as we have data that Greeks killed 334 persons all in all that year, while the table mentions 'only' 230). In another zone, the Italian one (the Sanjak of

¹⁹⁹ Dakin, *The Greek Struggle in Macedonia*, 312.

Monastir and Serfidje, the Kaza of Kastorija), 100 Turks (including soldiers), 511 Bulgarians, 137 Greeks, 17 Serbs, 28 Vlachs, that is, a total of 954 persons were murdered that year. This was in line with their ethnic proportion, and the numbers (comparing them to the aforementioned 1902 data from Monastir) indicate that the situation had not improved.

Table 8. The distribution of victims and perpetrators according to a British consular report from 1907

VICTIMS	PERPETRATORS						
	Bulgarian	Greek - patriarchist	Serbian	Vlach	Muslims	Turkish troops	Total
Bulgarians	120	184	49	11	86	71	521
Greeks	320	17	0	21	12	22	392
Serbs	68	0	1	0	2	25	96
Vlachs	0	23	0	0	1	8	32
Muslims	172	1	16	3	1	0	193
Unclassified	75	5	1	3	26	9	119
<i>Total</i>	<i>755</i>	<i>230</i>	<i>67</i>	<i>38</i>	<i>128</i>	<i>135</i>	<i>1353</i>
%	Bulgarian	Greek patr.	Serbian	Vlach	Muslims	Turkish troops	Total
Bulgarians	15.9	80.0	73.1	28.9	67.2	52.6	38.5
Greeks	42.4	7.4	0.0	55.3	9.4	16.3	29.0
Serbs	9.0	0.0	1.5	0.0	1.6	18.5	7.1
Vlachs	0.0	10.0	0.0	0.0	0.8	5.9	2.4
Muslims	22.8	0.4	23.9	7.9	0.8	0.0	14.3
Unclassified	9.9	2.2	1.5	7.9	20.3	6.7	8.8
<i>Total</i>	<i>100.0</i>	<i>100.0</i>	<i>100.0</i>	<i>100.0</i>	<i>100.0</i>	<i>100.0</i>	<i>100.0</i>
%	Bulgarian	Greek patr.	Serbian	Vlach	Muslims	Turkish troops	Total
Bulgarians	23.0	35.3	9.4	2.1	16.5	13.6	100.0
Greeks	81.6	4.3	0.0	5.4	3.1	5.6	100.0
Serbs	70.8	0.0	1.0	0.0	2.1	26.0	100.0
Vlachs	0.0	71.9	0.0	0.0	3.1	25.0	100.0
Muslims	89.1	0.5	8.3	1.6	0.5	0.0	100.0
Unclassified	63.0	4.2	0.8	2.5	21.8	7.6	100.0
<i>Total</i>	<i>55.8</i>	<i>17.0</i>	<i>5.0</i>	<i>2.8</i>	<i>9.5</i>	<i>10.0</i>	<i>100.0</i>

Dakin, D.: *The Greek Struggle in Macedonia*. 312.

As the data shows, most of the *murders* (55%) were committed by Bulgarians in *Southern Macedonia*, well over their ethnic proportion (Table 8). However, as this 55% did not exceed that of the proportion of exarchists in the whole of Macedonia, we

cannot accuse Bulgarians generally of any 'race-specific inclination' towards violence. 40% of their victims were Greek, Muslim victims constituted only 22% of the total killed by Bulgarians, while 16% of their victims were in fact their fellow countrymen. This is a high figure: in the case of the Greeks, such an intraethnic political showdown constituted only 7.5% of the total, and in the case of the Vlachs, Serbs and Muslims, it was negligible.

We may draw two conclusions: *intragroup rivalry was the greatest among Bulgarians* (as they were the greatest community, the chances of intragroup fault lines were probably the greatest here), while Serbs and Greeks were more unified and tended to articulate violence against other ethnic groups. Furthermore, in the case of political murders, *the proportion of intraethnic showdowns seems to be smaller than in the case of everyday violence (see later), as the latter was ethnically and ideologically less targeted.* (This also means that our theory, namely that other factors like blood feuds and economic disagreements were behind this phenomenon, is confirmed by the different nature of political murders).

Greek violence was targeted at Bulgarians – 80% of victims of Greek political murders were Exarchist or Patriarchist Slav (but none was Serb!). Vlachs directed their violent activities against Greeks and Bulgarians, while Muslims also had problems mainly with Bulgarians: the figure of Bulgarian victims (67%) is higher than the general proportion of Bulgarians in Macedonia (around 40-50%). The violence applied by the Ottoman army in Southern Macedonia shows a more 'balanced' picture, as the distribution of victims is similar to their ethnic proportions. *The army did not discriminate in favour of any ethnic group.*

From the other side – that of the victims – most of the Bulgarians were killed by Greeks (35% of the 521), and Muslims were only 3rd in the rankings with their 16.5%, as the proportion of exarchists killed by their own comrades reached 23%. Beside being divided between groups with different ideological commitments, Bulgarians had to fight on many fronts at the same time, and this limited their chances for success. In the case of Muslims, Greeks or Serbs the situation is much more clear-cut: 70–80% of the victims were killed by Bulgarians, while most of the Vlachs were killed by Greeks.

These numbers are shocking. But the most convincing evidence of the failure of the Ottoman authorities and of international intervention to maintain public order, and of the increasing *anarchy* that ensued after the turn of the century, is presented by the detailed statistics compiled by Austro-Hungarian consuls, listing the victims of the social conflicts (which we analyze on the following pages, comparing them

with those mentioned above).²⁰⁰ Contrary to those discussed above, this source contains conflicts that *cannot be tied unambiguously to the activity of authorities or četas, thus falling under the category of 'everyday violence'*. For example, the list of violent activities in Radovište *kaza* records five political murders among the 20 cases (25%),²⁰¹ and only one victim was a committee member (*Table 9*).²⁰¹

*Table 9. List of violent activities in Radovište kaza (cited in the original language)*²⁰²

11. Mai	Fatima und Tochter Zarifa aus Treskavec	Getötet, Täter unbekannt
27. Mai	Koce aus Podoreš	Vermißt
16. Juni	Demendezi aus Jargerica	getötet, Täter angeblich Comité-Rache
17. Juni	Stojan aus Jargerica	getötet, Täter angeblich Comité-Rache
19. Juni	Avram Jane dessen Frau und Tochter aus Rozbunar	verwundet, Täter 3 unbekannte Mohammedaner
20. Juni	Risto Konstantin aus Radovište	verwundet, dtto
20. Juni	Traman Dimitrija aus Delina	schwer verwundet, Täter angeblich Türken
28. Juni	Kristo Ile aus Vratca	der Tatverdächtig der Mohammedaner Damjan [sic!]
12. Juli	Jovan Velko aus Šipkovic	Vermißt
16. Juli	Angelko Trajan, Jordan Postol, Mike Lazar, Mike, Petre Stojan, Tase Gjorgje: Hirten aus Radovište	von einer mohammedanischen Bande gefesselt und durch Messerstiche getötet
17. Juli	Stojan Niko u. Gam: dtto	dtto.
19. Juli	Trajce Zafir aus Kance	getötet, Täter Rara Ahmed
12. August	Dane Jane und Sohn David, Koce Ilia aus Vrahovica	getötet, Täter mohammed. Comités
18. August	Tašo Georgiev aus Radovište	getötet, Täter unbekannte Comités
21. August	Ilija und Arif aus Vrahovica	getötet, Täter 3 Mohammedaner
25. August	1 unbekanntes Comité-Mitglied bei Gmerdeš	Getötet
3. September	File Risto aus Jargaica	getötet, Täter unbekannt
3. September	Todor Spasov aus Kanče	getötet, Täter Türken aus Promet
3. September	Panče Ilo aus Skoruša	getötet, Täter Türken aus Promet

Im Kaza Radovište: Getötet 23, Verwundet 4, vermißt 2,

200 A typical example from the consular reports is a document written in Skopje in 1905, recording all acts of *everyday violence* that occurred in the sanjak between *May 11 and September 13* of that year.

201 It is interesting on the other hand that some settlements occurred repeatedly on the list (Jargarica 3 times, Vrahovica twice, Radoviste 3 times), referring to murder-series.

201 ÖStA HHStA PA, VII/Fasz.434, Pára to Calice, September 16, 1905., No.86/pol., 12. Sicherheits-verhältnisse im Amtsbezirke in der Zeit von 11. Mai bis 13. September (mit Beilage).

202 Ibid.

Nonetheless, beyond being different, this source also has its limits. Compared to the shorter list (*Table 10*) provided by consul McGregor in April 1903, published by Keith Brown, which offered possibilities to reconstruct the causal relationship between events, this linear enumeration of events lacks any data that would provide internal cohesion. Even the short list of atrocities given by McGregor indicates the ongoing changes in the nature of violence (before Ilinden): the logical links between the murders became much complicated (beyond the level of simple revenge), but still traceable. Behind the published series of murders, three actors and two triggering pretexts could be identified. (1) Among the actors we can find Muslims carrying out individual blood feuds, which resulted in 'multiple' vengeance for the death of their relative, who was involved in the tobacco business. (As tobacco was also important for the revolutionary organization as a revenue source, we may assume some conflict of interest). (2) The revolutionary organization exerting pressure on both Christian and Muslim inhabitants. (3) Local villagers (of Potmol) threatened both by IMRO activists and by vengeful Muslims. Villagers also participated in the killing of Muslims, probably after being won over by the organization. The first pretext of summoning violence (a) is the murder of Rassim, probably with an economic background. The second (b) could be an older offense or insult (to be avenged) as the last link in the chain indicates. It is also possible that the *četa* wanted to enforce the loyalty of villagers by making them accessories to atrocities. We have numerous example for the latter. Inhabitants of recently converted villages were often recruited by Serbian bands to contribute in attacks against Exarchists, and it is doubtful whether they acted willingly.²⁰³

Table 10. Some subsequent cases of murder in 1903

9 April, 1903	Potmol	A Bulgarian and his son were killed by Sugarev's band for refusing to supply them with rifles.
16 April	near Krushevo	Bulgarians killed a Turk named Rassim bey Halil.
18 April	Krushoyani	Rassim's relatives killed a Bulgarian.
20 April	Vyrbyani	Turks from Pressila killed another Bulgarian as revenge for Rassim's death.
22 April	Potmol	A Turkish watchman was killed by Bulgarian villagers who also killed one of the attackers and wounded another some months before.

Dated 1905, two years later, our list of 285 victims from a period of *four months* and from a different region (which is larger than the one in the report by MacGregor,

203 ЦДА, ф. 335к. оп. 1 а.е. 396. л. 82, 26 October 1907.

but smaller than the area in Shopov's summary) looks to be more detailed compared to the report from the same year that contains 772 victims *for the whole of Macedonia*. Cases were reported for each *kaza*, giving the name and religion of perpetrators and victims (see *Table 9*), which makes the list more valuable and informative than Shopov's report. Note that the cases mentioned here took place after the intervention of the Great Powers, and so it also demonstrates the powerlessness of the recently organized international gendarmerie. Though it lacks cohesion, and thus the connection between individual events remains unclear, the list still makes it possible to trace certain phenomena and to observe certain tendencies (the spatial pattern of violence, the role of border areas, the correlation between the ethnicity and religion of perpetrators and victims, etc.), though the cause of conflicts still remain obscure. Although the names of the victims and the perpetrators do not provide unquestionable evidence of their nationality, the sectarian composition can be more or less precisely reconstructed, thereby permitting an investigation into religious or ethnic tensions.²⁰⁴

But this did not represent the peak of the violence by any means. After the failure of international intervention, the number of people killed increased quickly: in 1908 a total of 1080 "*political murders*"²⁰⁵ were committed throughout Macedonia (while there were 1350 dead listed for a *smaller area, including the victims of band attacks on the local population, a year earlier*), claiming among its victims 649 Bulgarians, 185 Greeks, 130 Muslims, 39 Serbs, 36 Vlachs and 40 soldiers, according to the report of Englishman Harry Lamb.²⁰⁶ Compared to their proportion of the entire population, Muslim victims seem to be underrepresented and Bulgarian victims a bit overrepresented. These statistics also reveal that the reinstatement of the constitution in 1908 proved to be more effective than any other previous measure: over the last five months of that same year, only 71 political murders took place, constituting 7% of all murders, while the figure for the first four months of the year was almost 50 per cent.²⁰⁷ One cannot avoid the assumption that the ceasefire among the bands in 1908–1909, a consequence of the Young Turks' rise to power, contributed to the stabilization of the situation to a greater degree than did the constitution or the parliamentary elections.

204 Ibid.

205 *Ottoman Diplomatic Documents* II. No. 1642. 05.06.1908. There were 1133 murders within 10 months and 10,000 over the previous ten years, according to Ottoman sources.

206 Balogh, *A nacionalizmus*, 87. This work cites *British Documents on the Origins of the War, 1898–1914. Vol. 5. The near East: The Macedonian problem and the annexation of Bosnia 1903–9*, edited by George Peabody Gooch and Harold Temperley. London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1926. 246, 289 and 293.

207 Balogh, *A nacionalizmus*, 87.

Comparing the Bulgarian (Shopov's) and the British sources, one may arrive at the following conclusions: (1) that violent acts committed by *četas* became more frequent in a short period between 1905 and 1908 in Macedonia (772 killed and injured compared to 1,080 killed); (2) that Austro-Hungarian documents are more detailed and therefore more suitable for conducting further analysis (as they include categories of victims of everyday violence not mentioned in the former sources); and (3) that *everyday violence* (or acts "not reported as political murders") was apparently as frequent as *political violence*. Just to compare the two types of violence: during the first four months of 1908, 450 'political murders' were carried out by *četas* throughout the whole of Macedonia, while in the first four months of 1905 197 people were killed in *everyday violence* within the much smaller area of the sanjak under inspection.

In some parts of the Sanjak of Skopje in 1905, the average number of victims per attack exceeded four or five (likewise in Shopov's Bulgarian statistics reporting *četa* involvement, where seven victims per attack were counted), which makes it evident that in these cases the source of the violence was not simply personal antagonisms or economic conflicts but rather ideological or intergroup tensions. The names and occupations in *Table 6* reveal that many of the victims (especially the four women) can hardly be identified as members of paramilitary units (their activity may have been confined to providing information or supplying troops as *legal members*, or to espionage) and that in many cases they were victims of blood feuds motivated by rivalry between communities, or were victims of punitive actions or intimidation on the part of *četas*.²⁰⁸

The fearless early use of coercion and violence against civilians and activists is clearly confirmed by a document entitled '*Reglement für die Bulgarisch-Adrianopeler Revolutionären Comités*',²⁰⁹ dating from the year 1900. In addition to the spies and Ottoman bureaucrats who impeded the activity of the revolutionaries, both *četa* members and non-*četa* members were kept under surveillance by the secret police. Any retorsion against the non-*četa* members could be interpreted and labelled as 'everyday violence',²¹⁰ even the punishment of spies - if the signs pointing to the revolutionary organizations were not recorded or were neglected. What made the situation more complicated was that not only activists, but even members of the civil

208 Austrian consular documents clearly indicated if the victim was a *četa* member, though of course could not accurately detail the background of all victims. Furthermore, *četa* activities can be avenged on the peaceful population as well, and thus the classification of these acts as 'everyday violence' is not unequivocal. In many cases the low clearance rate hindered the objective judgment of the situation.

209 ÖStA HHStA, PA, XXXVIII. Konsulate (1848–1918). Kt. 430. Üsküb (1900), No. 212. Pára an Goluchowski, handgeschrieben, Üsküb, September 17, 1900, Statut und Reglement der bulgaro-macedonischen Comités.

210 As legal members were often not known to the diplomats, they did not consider these murders to be political in nature.

population were allowed to be killed, if they threatened the goals of the committees and disregarded first warnings and fines. The punishment was extended to Bulgarians, whether living in Bulgaria or abroad, if they engaged in activities serving to exacerbate discontent among revolutionaries. Even those were sanctioned who had acted under pressure, or who were forced to commit violence or who were tortured by enemies of the committee. Mentioning the name of a committee member to the authorities or in public for the second time also entailed a death sentence.²¹¹ These punitive measures could also have been behind the escalation of everyday violence, as very often the community did not dare inform the authorities about murder(ers), while members of the internal police were allowed to kill 'civilians', not only *komitadjis* (as pointed out in the regulations).

Very often, when Ottoman authorities did not have direct evidence of membership or supporting activities, they simply beat the suspected member up heavily in order to get him to break his silence. In most cases the suspect remained silent even during the beatings, for fear of breaking the oath and bringing the revenge of the organization. *This meant that Ottoman authorities were unable to distinguish between people who remained silent because they were innocent and lacked any knowledge of illegal activities from those who were involved in the activity of the organization.* The silence of band members had two consequences: the Ottomans changed tactics and simply beat up everyone - whether innocent or not - who remained silent in order to limit their activity for a few months. This put double

211 Ibid. *Capitel IX. Strafen*

“Art. 41. Mitglieder und Arbeiter, die sich in etwas vergangen haben, begegnen folgenden Strafen:

1/ Wenn die Übertretung leicht ist, z.B. Schwäche bei irgend einem Gespräche, Unregelmässigkeit in der Zahlung der Beiträge etc., macht dem Betreffenden der Leiter eine Ausstellung, falls sich dieselbe Übertretung wiederholt, wird sie mit einer Geldstrafe in Gemässheit der Vermögensverhältnisse bestraft, falls sich der Schuldige auch dann nicht bessert und gefährlich für die „Arbeit“ wird, ist die Strafe der Tod.

2/ ist das Vergehen der 'Arbeit' verderblich, namentlich falls der Übertreter zu Grunde zu gehen riskiert und die 'Arbeit' in Gefahr bringt, wird er mit dem Tode auch dann bestraft, wenn die Übertretung *eine unfreiwillige* ist

3/ falls jemand die Ausführung einer vom Vorgesetzten erhaltenen Befehles verweigert, erhält er für das erste Mal eine Rüge, falls sich dasselbe wiederholt, wird er mit dem Tode bestraft

4/ falls jemand vorsätzlich ein Geheimnis verräth oder falls er durch eine nicht gewissenhafte Ausführung einer ihm übertragenen Aufgabe die 'Arbeit' der Gefahr aussetzt, wird er mit dem Tode bestraft.

Art. 42. Gegen diejenigen, die die 'Arbeit' schädigen und nicht Comité-Mitglieder sind, werden folgende Strafen vorgesehen:

1/ falls jemand die Existenz der Comités bespricht und dieselbe ruchbar macht, die Namen der revolutionären Arbeiten bekannt macht, dem wird vorerst nahegelegt, dass ein solches Benehmen nichtpatriotisch und mit Gefahrverbunden ist, falls er nicht begreift, wird er mit dem Tode bestraft

2/ Wer absichtlich gegen die 'Arbeit' Drohungen ausstosst, mag er Bulgare sein oder nicht, wird mit dem Tode bestraft.

Art 43. Der Todesstrafe verfallen ferner noch: Spione und jene Regierungsbeamte, die sich in der Verfolgung gegen die 'Arbeit' au...chnen [unlesbar: wahrscheinlich 'ausgezeichnet'] haben, jene Bulgaren, mögen sie inländisch oder ausländisch sein, die es versuchen Uneinigkeit und Spaltung in die Comités zu säen, die den Vollzug der Befehle der Vorgesetzten verweigern und jene Comité-Mitglieder, die [ein Wort fehlt] bei Proclamierung des Aufstandes sich weidern, zu den Waffen zu greifen.“

pressure on the local population: even if they did not know anything they were beaten up, so *neutrality remained an inadequate response for civilians* in this case. If everyone is beaten up, not only band members, why not join them and at least be defended from one side?²¹² The abandonment of neutrality as a strategy only further increased tendencies towards escalation.

Neither is it surprising that communist activists and ideologists visiting the Balkans during the 'struggle of Macedonia', like Trotsky, implemented these methods effectively in organizing the secret police in their homeland. Even the terms used, such as '*Arbeit*' (the Cause, the Work), reappear in these Soviet documents.

An examination of data (correlation) shows that neither the high concentration of IMRO weapons, nor the ethnic heterogeneity of districts always resulted in an escalation of violent activities. *The activity of IMRO cannot alone explain all forms of 'everyday violence'*: in Kočani, which was well supplied with ammunition, everyday violence was rare until 1910, although here Albanians and Muslims also lived together with Bulgarians. The extent of violence was also relatively low in Veles, even though IMRO had plenty of bullets and weapons and half of the district was Turkish. In Kriva Palanka and in Kratovo, the high number of victims measured against the total population (*Table 11*) at first glance seems to be due to the fact that an extremely high 22 per cent of the population supported IMRO (*Table 4*). However, the percentage of sympathizers supplied with weapons was quite low here (only five per cent). Furthermore, both territories were mainly Exarchist in character, and therefore neither interreligious tensions nor clashes with the Turkish authorities can explain the spread of violence here (the latter conflict type was anyway excluded from the term 'everyday violence').²¹³

Table 11. Types of violent activity and the territorial and religious distribution of victims in Skopje Sanjak between May 11 and September 13, 1905²¹⁴

Kaza	Attacks	Killed	Injured	Missing	Christian victims	Muslim victims	Unknown	Total	Victims per 1,000 Inhabitants
Skopje*	8 (average)	41	8	2	30 (2 f)	19 (4 f, 1 c)	3 (1 f)	52 (7 f, 1 c)	0.71

212 After his recovery the suspected person often became a komitadji.

213 The high number of weapons can be explained by the infiltration of Serbian irregulars into these borderland districts from neighbouring Serbia. Since the clearance rate was quite low in borderland areas, perpetrators could be foreigners serving in irregular units. The clearance rate was lowest in peripheral areas, where the violence seemed to be the worst (Kriva Palanka, Kratovo). Thus in these two kazas the violence can be explained by interethnic tensions fuelled by external factors.

214 ÖStA HHStA PA, VII/Fasz. 434, Pára to Calice, September 16, 1905., No.86/pol., 12.

	of 5 killed)								
Kumanovo*	9 (average of 4 killed)	36	9	4	21 (1 f)	12	16	49 (1 f)	1.07
Kriva Palanka	24	24	9	5	15 (4 f)	-	24	38	1.55
Kratovo	13	13	5	4	9	3	10	22	0.97
Kočani	3	3	1	1	4	1	-	5	0.13
Malesš	3	3	5	2	3	2	5	10	0.37
Radovište	23	23	4	2	25 (2 f)	3 (2 f)	1	29	1.57
Štip*	11 (average of 4 killed)	42	11	10	44	13 (1 f)	6	63	1.37
Veles	12	12	1	5	8	5	5	18	0.33
Total	106	197	53	35	159 (9 f)	58 (7 f, 1 c)	70 (1 f)	287 (17 f, 1 c)	0.82

f = females; c = children, *Extremely high casualty/attack refer to political background.

Table 12. The religious and territorial distribution of perpetrators committing murders between May 11 and September 13, 1905 (only known perpetrators included)²¹⁵

Kaza	Christians		Christians Altogether	Muslims		Muslims Altogether	Unknown Cases	Total
	Against Christians	Against Muslims		Against Christians	Against Muslims			
Skopje	5	3	8	8	3	11	26	45
Kumanovo	3	2	5	10	3	13	12	30
Kriva Palanka	2	-	2	1	-	1	7	10
Kratovo	4	-	4	-	-	1	9 + 1 ²¹⁶	14
Radovište	2	1	3	9	1	10	6	19
Štip	6	1	7	13	1	14	29	50
Veles	2	1	3	2	3	5	3	11
Total	27 (14%)	7 (4%)	34	43 (22%)	11 (6%)	55	101 (53%)	189

As we pointed out earlier, Austrian consular sources offer possibilities for deeper investigation into the *ethno-religious and geographical characteristics of violence* (cases committed by soldiers or police are not included). Most of the victims (including deaths, injuries and missing) were Christians (55 per cent) (Table 11–12). The

²¹⁵ Ibid.

²¹⁶ Muslim attackers and one unknown victim.

proportion of Muslims was 20 per cent, while 25 per cent remained unknown. Compared to their proportion of the entire population of the sanjak (40 per cent), Muslim victims were somewhat underrepresented (*Table 2*).

With regard to the perpetrators, these ratios are not more than estimates, because more than 50 per cent of cases remained unresolved. This also demonstrates the low effectiveness of the imperial and international authorities. Based on known cases, *Muslims mainly attacked Christians* (22 per cent of the total, and four times more frequent than Muslim attacks on Muslims). This was the largest share of all types of intercommunal conflicts and supports the general thesis to be found in the literature. On the other hand the proportion of Christian perpetrators committing violent crimes against Muslims was only 4 per cent of the total (*Table 12*). Attacks within the Muslim community ranged up to 6 per cent of the total, while violence between Christians constituted more than 14 per cent of the total in Skopje Sanjak – similar to the value in the report of Lamb on South Macedonia (this was a greater percentage value than that for Christian crimes against Muslims!). One may arrive at the conclusion that the *Exarchist-Patriarchist rivalry or internal showdowns were more important here* (especially considering the relatively small proportion of Patriarchists in the territory) *than the hostility of Christians towards Muslims, and that violence within the Muslim community was more frequent than Christian violence toward Muslim communities.*

The *spatial pattern of violence* can be investigated too: in Štip *kaza* Christians primarily attacked Christians, while Muslims in Štip, Kumanovo and in Radovište mainly attacked Christians. These phenomena were not connected to ethnic predominance: in Kumanovo, Muslims composed only 30 per cent of the population, while in Štip they constituted the majority. In the vicinity of Kriva Palanka and Kratovo,²¹⁷ all known Christian attacks were targeted at other Christian communities. This may be explained by the fact that though these *kazas* were ethnically homogenous, the national conflict between Bulgars and Serboman troops was fierce (one should not forget that 50 per cent of cases were unresolved, and therefore the numbers have limited statistical relevance).

The spatial distribution of *victims and perpetrators* (*Table 13–14*) shows that the largest *absolute numbers* of victims were observable in Skopje, Štip and Kumanovo *kazas*. Nevertheless, these absolute numbers are not representative, as these *kazas* had larger populations. The *proportion of victims measured against the total population* is more representative. With this in mind, victims of violent activities were

217 The majority of the population in Kriva Palanka and Kratovo was Christian (81.6–90.7 per cent), although these *kazas* were small in terms of their total population.

overrepresented in Kumanovo, Kriva Palanka, Kratovo, and especially in Radovište and Štip *kazas*. These territorial units were located in the mountainous periphery, far away from the administrative centre and the Vardar axis (which served as the main line of communication with adjacent areas).

Table 13. The proportion of perpetrators and victims compared to the population in the sanjak (taken to be 100 per cent) in 1905 (in order to examine underrepresentation and overrepresentation)²¹⁸

	Skopje	Kumanovo	Kriva Palanka	Kratovo	Radovište	Štip (Istib)	Veles (Köprülü)
Population (%)	21	13	7	6	5	13	15
Victims (%)	18	17	13	8	10	22	6
Perpetrators (%)	24	16	5	7	10	26	6

Kočani and Maleš were omitted due to a small number of cases.

Table 14. Spatial and religious differences in violence in 1905, based on a comparison of victims and perpetrators. A coloured background indicates overrepresentation (>1)

Kaza	Christian Victims/ Christian Population	Muslim Victims/ Muslim Population	Christian Perpetrators/ Christian Population	Muslim Perpetrators/ Muslim Population	Distance from Centre ²¹⁹	Distance from State Border
Skopje	1.35	0.69	0.41	0.46	1	2
Kumanovo	0.61	0.89	0.24	1.58	2	2
Radovište	2.09	0.18	0.38	0.93	4	3
Štip	1.65	0.37	0.33	0.50	3	4
Veles	0.70	0.78	0.43	1.28	2	5

*Kriva Palanka and Kratovo were omitted due to the large proportion of unknown delinquents; Kočani and Maleš were omitted due to small case numbers.

The same conclusions can be made on the bases of the data on *perpetrators*. Measured against the entire population, perpetrators were overrepresented in Skopje, Radovište and Štip, nearly the same *kazas* in which the ratio of victims compared to the population was the largest. In the latter two *kazas*, the proportion of perpetrators and victims was twice as high as the proportion of the population of the *kaza* compared to the total population of Skopje Sanjak (Table 13). This is not surprising, as the conscription of 1903 tells us that the proportion of Muslims was quite high in these places (see the map of Kančov or the map published in the

218 Based on ÖStA HHStA PA, VII/Fasz.434, Pára to Calice, September 16, 1905., No.86/pol., 12.

219 Distance from the centre or from the border was measured using *graph theory* and based on the number of nodes (local centres) that had to be passed in order to reach the territory in question.

Carnegie Report).²²⁰ Based on the absolute numbers of perpetrators and victims, these attacks were the bloodiest, reaching an average of between four and five deaths per attack. Christian victims measured against the Christian population were overrepresented in Skopje, Radovište and Štip kazas, but this does not mean that Christian victims²²¹ were killed solely by Muslims (see *Table 12 and 14*); meanwhile, Muslim perpetrators compared to Muslim population were overrepresented in Kumanovo, Radovište and Veles. Muslim victims and Christian perpetrators were not overrepresented anywhere.

Table 15. Correlation table between variables related to violence in 1905 (only those who are known to have committed crimes are included)

Proportion of Christians vs. Proportion of Christian Victims*	-0.75	Proportion of Muslim Perpetrators vs. Distance from Administrative Centre	-0.47
Proportion of Christians vs. Proportion of Christian Perpetrators*	0.41	Percentage of Unknown Cases vs. Distance from Administrative Centre	0.36
Proportion of Christians vs. Proportion of Muslim Victims*	-0.42	Percentage of Unknown Cases vs. Distance from Border	-0.55
Proportion of Christians vs. Proportion of Muslim Criminals*	-0.31	Proportion of Muslim Criminals vs. Distance from Borders	0.55
Percentage of Christian Victims vs. Percentage of Christians Perpetrators	-0.78	Proportion of Muslim Victims vs. Distance from Borders	0.40
Proportion of Muslim Victims vs. Proportion of Muslim Perpetrators	0.33	Percentage of Muslim Victims vs. Distance from Centre	-0.76
Percentage of Christian Victims vs Proportion of Muslim Perpetrators	0.29	Percentage of Muslim Perpetrators vs. Percentage of Christian Perpetrators	0.19

*Substituting Christians with Muslims, the strength of correlation does not change. Significant relationships are marked in bold letters.

Contrary to some well-distinguished territorial patterns, *violence* in the sanjak (as a total) was *characterized mainly by weak correlations, and thus general features were overshadowed by local patterns* (strengthening the thesis of Petrungaro and Reclus on geographical circumstances influencing social structure). Although a significant but reverse correlation was measured between the proportion of Christian victims and the proportion of Christian perpetrators ($k = -0.78$),²²² other relations did not show

220 Among the interior *kazas*, Skopje, Radovište and Štip had Muslim majorities (52.8–56.6 per cent), while in Kumanovo and Veles Christians constituted the majority (63.4–70.3 per cent).

221 Most of the victims here were also Christians.

222 Meaning that where the proportion of Christian perpetrators is great, the proportion of Christian victims is low, and where the proportion of Christian victims is great, the proportion of Christian perpetrators is low.

such a strong correlation due to the previously mentioned ethnic heterogeneity and due to the diversity of conflict types mentioned earlier (*Table 15*).²²³

Since perpetrators were mainly Muslims, both in *kazas* with a Muslim majority (Štip) and with a Muslim minority (Veles), while victims were dominantly Christians in both cases, the *pattern of violence at the kaza level was not determined solely by the religious character of the population, but also by other factors (distance from borders, violence among those of the same religion)*. Violence in central territories was *relatively*²²⁴ rare (despite the higher population density), while it was more frequent in peripheral *kazas* along the Bulgarian and Serbian borders. We may assume that Christian perpetrators were overrepresented along the Bulgarian border and in Slavic-speaking territories, while Muslim perpetrators were more frequent in the Kumanovo, Veles and Radovište *kazas* along the Muslim-dominated Vardar axis. This is confirmed by the correlation table: as the distance measured from the centres grew, the proportion of Muslim perpetrators decreased ($r = -0.8$). The *clearance rate* also draws attention: a general tendency was observable for police to be the most inefficient along the easily penetrable Bulgarian border. Unresolved cases ranged from 60 per cent (Maleš) up to 100 per cent (Kočani!) in the peripheries.²²⁵

Spatial differences in violence and the driving factors of it were collected to summarize our analysis in *Table 16*.




Figure 3. Spatial distribution of Serbian attacks on exarchist population in 1907, Sanjak of Skopje
ЦДЛ, ф. 335к. ор. 1 а.е. 396.


223 The correlation coefficient between the Christian population (percentage) and Christian perpetrators is also high, though it remained under 0.5. Clashes between Christians elevated this number, while Christian-Muslim clashes tended to decrease it. The value of the coefficient demonstrates that conflict of both types was abundant in the area. There is no close relation between the proportion of Muslim victims and Christian perpetrators or between Muslim victims and Muslim perpetrators at a sanjak level as a result of the same factors, since conflicts may occur in Muslim-Muslim relations as well as in Muslim-Christian relations.

224 Measured relative to the population.


225 While in the case of Kumanovo, Radovište and Veles this was only between 27.2–40.1 per cent.

Table 16. Summary table: characteristics of wave of violence in 1905, Sanjak of Skopje (May 11–September 13, 1905)

	Skopje	Kumanovo	Kriva Palanka	Kratovo	Kočani	Maš (Osmanie)	Radovište	Štip	Veles
Distant from Centre (x), Near Borders (y)		y	xy	xy	xy	xy	x	x	
Proportion of Unresolved Cases is Significant	x		x	x	x	x		x	
Proportion of Muslim Population is Significant	xx				xx	x	xx	xx	x
Proportion of Victims Compared to Population is Significant		x	x				x	x	
Proportion of Perpetrators Compared to Population is Significant	x						x	x	
Muslim-Christian Conflict	x	x					x	x	
Christian-Christian Conflict	x	x	x	x				x	
Muslim-Muslim Conflict	x	x							x
Majority of Known Perpetrators is Muslim		x					x	x	x
Majority of Known Perpetrators is Christian				x					
Christian Victims are Overrepresented	x						x	x	
Muslim Victims are Overrepresented		x							



Map 3. Kaza-level map of the religious distribution of victims and perpetrators in the Sanjak of Skopje; cartography by Zsolt Bottlik.



Map 4. An ethnically mixed area around Skopje and Kumanovo in 1912. Map by Hasluck and Schulze-Jena in 1927. No indication is given for settlement size. Map from the work of Wilkinson, H. R. *Maps and Politics. A review of the ethnographic cartography of Macedonia.* Liverpool Univ. Press, 1951. 251. Cartography by Zsolt Bottlik.



Map 5. Macedonian areas involved and omitted from the reforms

The practice of destabilization²²⁶ – other forms of violence

The main goal of this chapter is to highlight the differences in the character of 'everyday violence' and violence driven by political goals. Another aim is to verify (or challenge) some specific features of *çeta* activity mentioned earlier, and the third aim is to trace ethnic or cultural differences and patterns in attacks not labelled as cases of 'everyday violence'. In order to analyze these the reports of the Bulgarian

²²⁶ We try to avoid the usage of word *terror*, because the extension or projection of the recent meaning of this term into the past is ahistoric. The word *terror* was used limitedly by IMRO activists retaining this term for the activity of the internal police that punished 'deviant' revolutioners and the enemies of the 'revolution' (like in the French revolution of 1789). The term 'terror(ism)' did not even occur regarding the Serbian attacks on Exarchist civilians, though nowadays we would classify these as terrorist events.

consulate from 1907 – a year before the withdrawal of Powers from the reform movement – were selected and these underwent both a prosopographic and statistical analysis. The first method was used to identify general and specific features through numerous case studies – in order to make our conclusions comparable with the research on the Prizren Sanjak, where problems were analyzed in the same manner. The second method (quantitative analysis) was chosen to compare the features (frequency, geographical scope, etc.) of violence with the ‘everyday violence’.

In short, the formerly mentioned hypotheses, assumptions or logical constructions, as well as the relevance of statements derived from other works are tested here in this chapter.

Encounters between armed groups and civilians

As this source was collected by one of the concerning parties, the Bulgarians, it cannot be considered impartial: Bulgarian actions against other people were not conscripted, therefore a numeric analysis on proportions could not be conducted. However, it still provided substantial material for other purposes (measuring četa activity, timing, participants, targets, etc.). The simple description of the cases would assume that many of these conflicts could be grouped into ‘everyday violence’ as well, but the number of perpetrators/case and the timing (often night) refers to the fact that these were thoroughly planned mass-actions, thus cannot be considered as ‘everyday violence’, but rather as politically motivated actions.

One of the first reports reveals the changes in tactical elements of Serbian bands: a congress of Serbian committees²²⁷ agreed that beside maintaining former practices threatening letters should be delivered to all reluctant communities. Together with these letters the villagers were to receive a pre-written *arzahan*, a testimony, in which the villagers pointed out their deliberate willingness to leave the Exarchate for the Patriarchate. These letters had to be delivered to the Ottoman authorities to announce the change officially and to prove the deliberateness of their decision.²²⁸ In the earlier practice, threatening letters usually demanded money or food. This change implies a substantial shift in četa goals and tools and also implied that the supply of četa was secured somehow by other means. As the same booklet of reports also mentions the 300 000 dinars as „credit” from the Serbian state and 200

227 Like the Bulgarians, the Serbs also usually held meetings to define what tactics to follow that year.

228 ЦДА, ф. 335к. оп. 1 а.е. 396. л. 71 (old page – new page 8), 26 March 1907.

quickfiring guns deposited in a village near the borders from the same year, it means that these subsistence problems had been overcome by that time.²²⁹

Such a threatening letter was written to the community of Kriva Krusha in Veles, which immediately forwarded it to the Bulgarian metropolite in Veles to inform the Bulgarian side. The document threatened with burning up the houses and killing the inhabitants.²³⁰ One of the *četas* specified for these acts was led by Ceno Markov, who was formerly with the Bulgarians, but then became a Serbian vojvoda.²³¹ In a threatening letter to the former friends and proteges, he warns that 50 Mannlichers would open fire on the villagers unless the settlement turns to be Serbian, and it is futile to trust in the Ottoman army to hinder this.²³² This was not an unique case. Other documents also mentions the mass-practice of forced *arzahan*.²³³

The same Markov was also one of those, who also applied new strategies in *četa* survival. Wandering from village to village in Subotsko in winter, he finally reached Banjane in Skopsko, where his troops were fed by the local monastery.²³⁴ The activity of Serbian paramilitary troops in winter increased in parallel to the abundance of threatening letters: on 20 December 1906 three Bulgarians were kidnapped, on 24 December further four were kidnapped by the *četa* of Georgi Kapitan, on 25 another one was taken as hostage, but this time the victim was not a village *starešina*, but a person accused simply of pro-Bulgarian sentiments. In January a Serbian *četa* in Mlado Nagorichano burnt up a house,²³⁵ another village, Kanarevo (Kumanovo) soon declared itself Serbian.

The frequent raids continued in spring as well. On 1 March a Serbian *četa* including 4-6 soldiers went from Vranja to Subotsko terrorizing Muslims as well.²³⁶ 20 or more Ottomans were insulted around Kratovo.²³⁷ On 10 March a Serbian *četa* of 25 men led by Ivan Martulčanec entered into Veles kaza and kidnapped 3 persons. The hostages were usually held in Serboman villages (Orahov dol, Kanarevo),²³⁸ and this confirms the cooperation between civilians and paramilitary units. On 20 March an armed mass attacked a Bulgarian village in Skopsko. The Bulgarians suspected that the attackers came from a Serboman village and were encouraged by a well-known Serboman priest to take revenge for an insult on the Serboman Rudnik

229 ЦДА, ф. 335к. оп. 1 а.е. 396. л. 66-67, report No. 500.

230 ЦДА, ф. 335к. оп. 1 а.е. 396. л. 72, 27 March 1907.

231 ЦДА, ф. 335к. оп. 1 а.е. 396. л. 72, 22 March 1907.

232 Ibid.

233 ЦДА, ф. 335к. оп. 1 а.е. 396. л. 66-67, report No. 500.

234 ЦДА, ф. 335к. оп. 1 а.е. 396. л. 71, 26 March 1907.

235 ЦДА, ф. 335к. оп. 1 а.е. 396. л. 66. report No. 186 and No. 78.

236 ЦДА, ф. 335к. оп. 1 а.е. 396. л. 68. No. 637.

237 ЦДА, ф. 335к. оп. 1 а.е. 396. л. 66-67. report No. 500.

238 ЦДА, ф. 335к. оп. 1 а.е. 396. л. 69.

settlement. The attack resulted 1 Bulgarian dead and 1 wounded. Among the lines of attackers Turks were also discovered,²³⁹ which confirms the assumption, that mutual hatred against a third group or personal differences could also be motivating factors. On the first day of April a Serbian *četa* set 2 houses on fire in the Bulgarian village Izvor (Veles), while kidnapping 16 persons. Later they were set free when they signed the *arzohan*, in which they denied being Exarchists any more, and delivered the letter to the Ottoman authorities.²⁴⁰ Two days later a Serbian *četa* attacked Vladilovci village kidnapping the teacher forcing him to announce the return of the village to the Patriarchate. The 5 more captured hostages were not released until the *arzahan* had been signed.²⁴¹

At the end of May a Serbian *četa* ranging to 20 men led by the formerly Bulgarian *vojvoda*, Andrey, attacked 2 Bulgarian villages in Veleshko. But incidentally, in one of the villages Dacho, a Bulgarian *četa* leader happened to stay with his 4 men (we do not know whether he was the original target of the Serbs or not), who repelled the attack and even sent reinforcements to the other village. The clash resulted in 1 dead and 2 wounded from the lines of the paramilitary troops.²⁴² On 31 May the same happened. A Bulgarian village was attacked by a Serbian *četa* unit, but a strong Bulgarian force was deployed there. The encounter resulted in 6 deaths. Despite the Bulgarian presence, the Serbs set fire to 2 houses and kidnapped 2 *starešinas* and threatened them to be killed unless they would refrain from supporting Bulgarian *četars* and deny the authority of the Exarchate.²⁴³ On 14 May another Serbian *četa* attacked a Bulgarian village in Skopsko. The peculiarity of the situation was that 3 *četa* members came from the neighboring Serboman village,²⁴⁴ which highlights the civilian participation in these raids – which was probably triggered by personal tensions or economic interests or was simply driven by a revenge for an earlier insult or atrocity.

The summer was also characterized by violent band activity. On 6 June, 1907 a Serbian paramilitary unit attacked a village in Veleshko and forced it to accept the Patriarchate. The *mukhtar* had to stamp the official letter and send it to the Serbian school director in Veles, who was one of the coordinator and organizer of band activity then.²⁴⁵ On 1 June, a Serbian *četa* of 20 and some 50-60 local Serboman Patriarchists joining them attacked Poddarzhki Kon, a village claiming itself Bulgarian

239 ЦДА, ф. 335к. оп. 1 а.е. 396. л. 71 (8), 26 March 1907.

240 ЦДА, ф. 335к. оп. 1 а.е. 396. л. 73, 6 April 1907.

241 Ibid.

242 ЦДА, ф. 335к. оп. 1 а.е. 396. л. 74, 27 May 1907, report No. 1414.

243 Ibid.

244 Ibid.

245 ЦДА, ф. 335к. оп. 1 а.е. 396. л. 76, 14 June 1907.

and forced the village leaders to accept the authority of the Patriarchate and declare themselves Serbian. The attackers took a youngster as a hostage.²⁴⁶ Also in June, a Serbian *četa* including 3 Turkish members attacked 2 villages forcing them to convert to the Patriarchate.²⁴⁷ On 15 June, in the evening, a *četa* composed of 6 Serbomans from the neighboring village and 3 unknown attacked a priest, his brother, sons and their workers working on the fields in Skopsko. The priest managed to escape on a horse.²⁴⁸ On 14 June again in the evening a Serbian *četa* of 30 attacked a Bulgarian village in Kratovsko and shot on the local teacher, Simeon Stefanov, who was injured, but managed to escape. During the clash the *četa* killed a girl and another was wounded. It was neither the *askeri*, nor the gendarmerie, but a Bulgarian *četa* (more likely the local militiamen organized by the IMRO warriors) arriving from the neighboring village that reacted quickly, but was unable to capture the Serbs.²⁴⁹ On 26 June a Serbian *četa* arriving to Skopska Crna Gora reached village Kaplan. When the Serbs fell asleep a Turkish band member stole some weapons from them and fled.²⁵⁰ On 27 June a Serbian *četa* attacked a Bulgarian village in Palanechko, kidnapping 4 *starešinas* and *prvenci* and forcing them to declare the village Serbian or else they would be killed and the village burnt down. In order to defend themselves and the village leaders from further harassment the villagers went to the town and gave an *arzahan* to the *kaymakam*, that they would accept the authority of the Patriarchate.²⁵¹ An even larger *četa* of 60 men – composed of *četniks* and local Patriarchists – reached the Giljan kaza on their way to shift their activity to Tetovsko and Gostivarsko. There they met a local *četa* and an *askeri* detachment and the battle resulted in 6 dead *četniks* and 6 dead Serboman villagers.²⁵² As we have already seen, inter-*četa* clashes were rarely mentioned, *četnas* usually carried out raids on local population instead of engaging into battle with another *četa*. Clashes between the official army and *četnas* were not rare (as testified by the casualty lists), but in this booklet this was the sole case, when the Ottoman official forces intervened – partly because the band activity exceeded the local level and began to grow into regional level. (The authorities of the neighboring kazas tried to hinder the movement of *četnas* between kazas). In other words, the source contains selected cases, where the attacks on local population are overrepresented, thus it is not reliable enough to carry out a thorough statistical analysis. It is also worth mentioning that the bands had enough

246 Ibid.

247 ЦДА, ф. 335к. оп. 1 а.е. 396. л. 76, 8 June 1907.

248 ЦДА, ф. 335к. оп. 1 а.е. 396. л. 76, 18 June 1907.

249 ЦДА, ф. 335к. оп. 1 а.е. 396. л. 77, 20 June 1907, report No. 586.

250 ЦДА, ф. 335к. оп. 1 а.е. 396. л. 77, 28 June 1907.

251 ЦДА, ф. 335к. оп. 1 а.е. 396. л. 77, 3 July 1907.

252 ЦДА, ф. 335к. оп. 1 а.е. 396. л. 78, 3 July 1907.

weapons allocated in the villages to arm 30-60 villagers as supporters. The formerly mentioned Serbian *četa* had arrived from Serbia, led by a captain and 2 other army officers and a sergeant. Their supposed route was indicated on an official Austrian military map found at the battlefield, where the Serboman settlements to visit were also indicated.²⁵³ On 9 August, 1907 a Serbian *četa* of 12 persons arrived to Tetovsko and gave 10 days to a village to surrender and return to the Patriarchate.²⁵⁴ 5 days earlier another Serbian *četa* from Staro Nagorichano (Kumanovo) led by Petko *vojvoda* took 2 hostages from a village in Skopsko to force the villagers to return to the Patriarchate. They were given 1 day to think it over.²⁵⁵ This was another – not rare – case when a Serbian *četa* crossed the administrative boundary of a kaza. On 13 August, the same Petko *vojvoda* repeated the act against another village.²⁵⁶ Even more serious incident took place on 19 August, when a Serbian *četa* kidnapped 9 villagers from a village in Kratovsko and further 8 inhabitants of Kratovo town, who were on their way or were working on the fields. One of them was killed because he resisted. Among their lines was a rich urban dweller for whom ransom was asked.²⁵⁷ (Ransom was getting rarer and rarer – the mentioned 9 hostages were kidnapped to force the settlement to return to the Patriarchate and become Serboman).

On 25 August a Serbian *četa* attacked a *han* (called Chifte Hanove) near the *karakol* (the police station!) wounding 10 Bulgarians and kidnapping many. And the attackers were able to disappear after they had engaged in fight with the police!²⁵⁸ This reveals that the extent of „neutral“ territories were shrinking indeed and that the authorities were unable to chase the bandits who were getting more and more fearless and audacious.

The end of summer did not mean a decrease in band activity. On 9 September 1907 in the Bulgarian Mlado Nagorichano a peasant, Trajko Stefanov and his wife was killed by a Serbian *četa*.²⁵⁹ A day earlier a family in Kumanovo kaza was threatened and forced to become Serboman after a family member had been killed.²⁶⁰ On 6 September the victim was a Bulgarian village in Skopsko.²⁶¹ In October a Serbian *četa* of 15 men burnt 3 watermills around Veles and sacked 150 goats. In this case the warfare showed evident signs of its economic character. This was especially frequent after harvest. The destruction of mills forced the villagers to transport their

253 ЦДА, ф. 335к. оп. 1 а.е. 396. л. 78, 13 July 1907.

254 ЦДА, ф. 335к. оп. 1 а.е. 396. л. 80, 13 August 1907.

255 ЦДА, ф. 335к. оп. 1 а.е. 396. л. 80, 20 August 1907.

256 ЦДА, ф. 335к. оп. 1 а.е. 396. л. 80, 13 August 1907.

257 ЦДА, ф. 335к. оп. 1 а.е. 396. л. 80, 19 August 1907.

258 ЦДА, ф. 335к. оп. 1 а.е. 396. л. 81, 5 September 1907.

259 ЦДА, ф. 335к. оп. 1 а.е. 396. л. 81, 9 September 1907.

260 ЦДА, ф. 335к. оп. 1 а.е. 396. л. 81, 8 September 1907.

261 ЦДА, ф. 335к. оп. 1 а.е. 396. л. 6 September 1907.

wheat to larger distances, and this made them more vulnerable. Supplying the *četa*, while destroying the enemies' economic infrastructure (the loss of mills was also harmful for IMRO activists as these also processed their food) was another sign of 'total warfare' similarly to the involvement of local people to connive at a crime and targetting civilians. The attackers shot on the 2 shepherd, who managed to escape. Though there was a military unit deployed around Solje settlement, the army pursued the attackers only the following day.²⁶² On 23 October, village Gradec in Palanechko received a threatening letter written by *vojvoda* Kochanski, a former Bulgarian *četnik* to return to the Patriarchate.²⁶³ On 4 October the 9 Bulgarian kidnapped from Kratovo and further 5 from „Chifte Hanove” were found dead near the Serbian border (this evidenced the direction of communication lines and way of retreat of Serbian *četas*, as Kratovo kaza was not limitrophe with Serbia). Further 2 Bulgarians from Skopje kaza were also found to be dead.²⁶⁴ On 26 October a Serbian *četa* of 100 men (remember what we told about extreme *četa* size in autumn and winter!) attacked again the mentioned Gradec in Palanechko. 11 houses and the granaries were burnt²⁶⁵ in order to weaken the economic position of the settlement for the winter. The tactics to famish the villages and thus forcing them to convert was not rare. Though many shots were fired, no one died. The attacking force contained a contingent of 20-25 villagers from the recently Serbianized villages and 2 Albanians and a Gypsy was also among their lines. (The Serbian tactics probably included the principle of generating and exacerbating antagonistic tensions between settlements, making their future return to Exarchism more difficult. It is also possible that the neighboring villages wanted to take revenge for older insults. What seems to be impossible is the probability that they participated in the attack because of deep nationalistic commitment). The word '*zaloveni*' in connection with them makes the impression (at least through Bulgarian glasses) that they did not participate in the attack deliberately, but acted under pressure. Some participants later stressed (the Gypsy and the Albanians) that they received an order (from whom it remained unknown as the report used passive voice) to set fire to Bulgarian villages.²⁶⁶ Actions against private property (like houses) also became more violent as winter was closing in. This must have been another tactical element. Economic benefits were motivating factors for villagers to participate in the raids. (In the first week of January in 1907 50

262 ЦДА, ф. 335к. оп. 1 а.е. 396. л. 81, 4 October 1907.

263 ЦДА, ф. 335к. оп. 1 а.е. 396. л. 81, 23 October 1907.

264 ЦДА, ф. 335к. оп. 1 а.е. 396. л. 82, 4 October 1907.

265 ЦДА, ф. 335к. оп. 1 а.е. 396. л. 82, 26 October 1907.

266 Ibid.

Serbs, including Serboman villagers attacked Kanarevo and stole many sheep.)²⁶⁷ On 27, October a Serbian *četa* in Kratovsko burnt down 15 houses and killed 7-8 persons in Stracin. According to the survivors, the number of attackers reached 500, mostly from the neighboring Serbianized villages. A part of this group was attacking the telegraph station and the *karakol* in order to prevent the gendarmerie to bring help. Finally the cavalry from Kumanovo (another kaza!) had to intervene.²⁶⁸ This case not only enlightens that violence escalated so much that local forces were not any more able to control the situation (not even if they really wanted to do so), but also draws the attention to the fact that these autumn raids showed the character of a well-planned attack rather than a simple plundering. The harmonization of parallel attacks, the detachment of small forces with separate goals also implies that among the *četa* members active of former professional soldiers had to be found. On 11 October 8 Bulgarians from the town Skopje were attacked by Serbians during on their way home (2 hours walk from the town). In the middle of November a Serbian *četa* burnt the granary of the local leader in Palanechko. Three of his relatives were injured in the attack.²⁶⁹ On 24 November the poor village of Gradec in Palanechko was once again attacked at night.

So, this is 43 incidents within a year, with at least 160 known victims (including more than 50 deaths, many injuries, missing and hostages), which reveals the failure of the international gendarmerie and the 'humanitarian intervention' of the powers. This is averagely 4 persons per attack, still high to be labelled simply as 'everyday conflicts'.²⁷⁰ Even if we extrapolate this average value to cases where numbers were not given, the number of victims would equal to 250 for the whole sanjak, while the Austrian consular report mentioned more than this as victims of 'everyday violence' for a shorter period of 6 months. Even if we add the supposed number of intranational showdowns and Ottoman punitive actions (cca. 130 victims) both committed by the army and by paramilitary units, the number of victims and cases would still not exceed the number victims of everyday violence for the whole year! In other words: everyday violence was as serious as political violence, if not more! This confirms our assumption on the existence of „Gewaltmarkt“ and „Gewaltgemeinschaften“.

From among the 43 attacks 41 targeted Exarchists, and only two against Muslims. The number of the raids against Muslims might be larger, but the Bulgarian

267 ЦДА, ф. 335к. оп. 1 а.е. 396. л. 124, 5 January 1907.

268 ЦДА, ф. 335к. оп. 1 а.е. 396. л. 82, 29 October 1907.

269 ЦДА, ф. 335к. оп. 1 а.е. 396. 12 October 1907.

270 In the case of Austrian consular reports we met the same high number for some kazas (which made us challenging these records as examples on everyday violence), but not for the whole sanjak.

consulate did not feel these important enough to count. (We are prior to the Young Turk revolution, thus a supposed cooperation between Ottomans and Serbs could not explain the low number of attacks against Muslims). Though the reports are not consistent in giving all details, in 16 cases (33%) we have knowledge on the number of attackers, which is rated averagely to 40 persons. In 5 cases the number of raiders was under 20, in other words, *two-thirds of the attacks were committed by large groups!* Comparing these numbers to those given in *Table 6*, one may come to the conclusion that the *četa* sizes given there (10-15 prs) refer only to the bare core of the Serbian *četas*.

As for the seasonal distribution of attacks we have knowledge on 20 Serbian attacks in the winter-autumn period, which is almost 50% of recorded cases. In three cases the attackers numbered more than 50 in winter and autumn (in 16 cases their number remained unknown). So not any of the seasons seems to be overrepresented regarding band size and case occurrences. This means that winter was not underrepresented in our dataset. What is more interesting is that also 20 Muslim attacks on Exarchists were recorded in winter, while this number was smaller in other periods. This is probably because in winter the mountain passes were usually not easily trespassable, so Muslims did not have to fear of repressions, because band members could not cross the border to punish Ottoman raids, while during the summer the continuous Serbian and Bulgarian reinforcements made Ottoman enterprises more risky.

Among the perpetrators Serboman local inhabitants were mentioned 6 times (15%). 4 times Turks and Albanians were mentioned as contributors (10%). At least 5 of the attacks (10%) were committed by former Bulgarian *vojvodas*, who changed sides. (Two of the 5 mentioned leaders were formerly Bulgarian agents). Night attacks were mentioned at least 8 times (this is the only timing mentioned in the texts: '*vecher(ya)ta*', beside '*sutrinta*', in the morning). Kidnapping was mentioned 15 times (33%), murders, injuries were mentioned 13 times (30% including those cases when not villagers, but *četa* members were the victims). 76 persons were taken as hostages out of the mentioned 160 mentioned in the casualty list (appr. 50%), but ransom was mentioned only in 2 cases. More than 50 were killed (33%) among whom at least 15 (33%) were *četa* members or local *četa* supporters. The destruction of economic infrastructure and the requisition of animals was mentioned 5 times (all during the autumn and the winter),²⁷¹ houses burnt were mentioned in 5 cases. Raids

271 It does not mean that this was confined only to these seasons, rather that it was important to note there, because due to the decreased accessibility to food its importance was growing.

In Albania a similar attitude was practised by Essad Pasha Toptani, who wanted to monopolize information and supplier routes, therefore he usually attacked economic infrastructure and telegraph stations that were not

against property altogether made up to 25% (in 10 cases harms remained unknown). The violence targetted leaders 8 times, (20%), forcing secession from the Exarchate was mentioned in 14 cases (or 33%). The other goals, ransom (2), smuggling, ruining economic infrastructure (5) were underrepresented compared to this (and in 21 cases the reasons were not specified).²⁷² The territorial distribution of attacks was diverse, but quite even: Kumanovo kaza was mentioned 10 times (25%), Palanka and Skopje kaza was mentioned 6 times (13-13%), Stip only twice, Kratovo 4 times, Veles 7 times (15%). The distant Tetovo and Gilan was mentioned altogether 3 times, the state border twice.

Reading these cases the impression of the authors is that many of the former assumptions and statements based on different source types can be statistically verified.

1. Attacks often took place at night, thus were planned, intentional conflicts.
2. Mixed *četas* were not unique, which also means that attacks were not only ethnically driven, or that common hatred against a third community could temporarily unify the competing inimical parties.
3. Very often local people accompanied the attacking party, which implies coercion or strong interest (like personal or economic conflict) in participation beyond ethnic hatred.
4. Priests and teachers were not only targets but main organizers of not only 'revolutionary', but military activity, with direct links to the *četas*.
5. Many of the *četa* leaders changed sides, this also implies that beyond the struggle for national liberation other personal motives have to be taken into consideration.
6. The reason for kidnapping well-known persons of a community was not always driven by financial purposes. Hostages were rarely held for ransom after 1907. Taking hostages was to enforce changes in the national commitment of local communities.
7. Sometimes the attackers were pursued by militiamen. This means that the organization of self-defence through local militia and armed *četniks* was progressing by that time. This also refers to the escalation of violence and the impotence of central power to react immediately and restore order by punishing the perpetrators. These clashes between *četas* rarely took place in

under his control. In the Macedonian case we cannot state that this (monopolization of information) was behind the acts, but it can also be a possible explanation beyond ruining the enemies' communication lines or deceiving the authorities by deterring its attention.

²⁷² Of course the number of these could be higher, but it were not mentioned if their realization did not invoke violence.

the woods or in open fields and these were usually unintentional. Clashes between *četas* mainly took place in villages and for the villages, and the original intention was usually to enforce a *četa*-civilian encounter, which coincidentally failed due to the circumstances.

8. The army was usually in 1-2 days delay considering its reaction time. The clashes between the army and paramilitary troops were outnumbered by encounters of different type. The hesitation, bureaucratism, the lack of own initiatives and the lack of will was another factor that promoted the escalation of violence and urged for self-defense.
9. Officials were also reluctant to investigate cases or pursuit perpetrators, sometimes they even cooperated with one of the parties.²⁷³
10. Ruining the economic infrastructure was also part of the plan. This was usually targeted against rich and influential village leaders to convince them that resistance is futile. This stem usually preceded kidnapping.
11. Destructive actions to supply a *četa* with food were also not rare.

This Bulgarian dossier also contains the abuses of Turks committed against Exarchists/Bulgarians, including the unofficial repressive manoeuvres of the *askeri* and the paramilitary activity of redif *bashibozuks* wearing uniform and also of the local bands. Beyond the acts of reprisals and repressions the results of the official jurisdiction (either just or unjust) were also recorded in the booklet.

In 30 December 1906 the Ottoman authorities imprisoned 11 persons accused of being *yataks* in Kumanovo kaza.²⁷⁴ In January an Ottoman patrol searching for weapons and bombs harassed local people.²⁷⁵ On 8 January 24 people were arrested and 6 were condemned to 5-15 years.²⁷⁶ In February *torbesh bashibozuks* attacked a village in Skopsko together with some soldiers, but the action was not considered as official military operation, rather as an abuse.²⁷⁷ A month later soldiers burnt down 18 Bulgarian houses.²⁷⁸ That month 13 Bulgarians from Skopsko were arrested and 11 more from other places.²⁷⁹ In early March a Turkish patrol wanted to capture a shepherd, who managed to escape. The same event was repeated 3 days later.²⁸⁰ A clash in April resulted in 7 dead and 2 injured, the attackers wore Ottoman uniforms,

273 See the case of Jusuf *çauş*.

274 ЦДА, ф. 335к. оп. 1 а.е. 396. л. 121.

275 ЦДА, ф. 335к. оп. 1 а.е. 396. л. 124, 29 January 1907.

276 ЦДА, ф. 335к. оп. 1 а.е. 396. л. 127, 8 January 1907.

277 ЦДА, ф. 335к. оп. 1 а.е. 396. л. 127, 15 February 1907.

278 ЦДА, ф. 335к. оп. 1 а.е. 396. л. 127, 26 March 1907.

279 ЦДА, ф. 335к. оп. 1 а.е. 396. л. 129, 23 March 1907

280 ЦДА, ф. 335к. оп. 1 а.е. 396. л. 129, 8 and 11 March 1907.

but the circumstances did not refer to official Ottoman action.²⁸¹ After a discussion the representatives of the Powers agreed to arrest 5 of these soldiers of whom 4 was soon captured, but neither showed regret for their illegal acts. The documents also described that from the 24 Bulgarians mentioned earlier 11 were condemned to 3-4 years imprisonment and 11 was released, but by August further 37 Bulgarians were under trial.²⁸² In October an Ottoman *četa* of 30 men led by Kara Mustafa plundered the villages around Istib (which was an ethnically mixed region) twice and from October to December we have further 20 cases of Muslim attacks on Christians, highly outnumbering the violent acts committed by Serbs (12). It seems that winter tours were rather characteristic for Muslims in this region.

The number of Muslim attacks were also over 40 a year. Thus repressions - that are not classified into the group of 'everyday violence' - targeting Exarchist population were almost evenly divided between Serbs-Serbomans and Muslims. If we suppose a similar number of attacks initiated by IMRO and *vrhovists*, this means more than 150 violent acts in a year! However, from the number of Muslim repressions one has to subtract the number of trials and other juridical cases ranging to 5. Five more case were committed by perpetrators wearing uniforms, but some of these were official Ottoman patrols or measures punishing former attacks. At least 7 attacks were committed by Ottoman *četnas*, 8 by Albanian bands and *torbesh bashibozuks* (all in winter - 20% of all encounters). Beside the more than 80 captured, arrested or imprisoned Bulgarian persons mentioned in the reports at least 38 Exarchist victims were exposed to violence. This is altogether similar to the value committed by Serbian *četnas*, but the distribution between different categories is not the same. The number of victims of violent acts is smaller, than in the case of Serbian attacks. The Muslim activity was definitely greater in winter compared to the Serbian. The Bulgarian authorities were successful in identifying the perpetrators' community: only 5 unknown cases were recorded (5%), which is a definitely greater clearance rate, than in the Austrian consular reports in case of 'everyday violence'.

Table 17. The target groups of violent activities in Skopje sanjak in 1907 based on 43 identified cases

Target groups	cases (43)	%
hostages for conversion	15	35
kidnapping for ransom	2	5
destruction of economic infrastructure (granary, mills)	3	7
animals	2	5

281 ЦДА, ф. 335к. оп. 1 а.е. 396. 27 April 1907.

282 ЦДА, ф. 335к. оп. 1 а.е. 396. а. 136, 4 and 24 August 1907.

destruction of houses	6	14
attacks resulting in injury or deaths	12	28
fight against authorities	4	9
attacks against local leaders	8	20
involvement of Bulgarian četa	3	7
involvement of Ottoman forces	4	9
more than one group involved	11	26

Encounters between armed groups and regular military forces in Skopje Sanjak

The previous cases highlighted the features of *četa* civilian encounters. But a report from the head of the Macedonian provinces, Hilmi Pasha also reveals the heavy losses in clashes between *četas* and Ottoman forces. Nevertheless, the Ottoman statistics should be handled with care as this table depicts a picture that suggests Ottoman authorities were successful, because the number of killed *četniks* highly exceeded that of the losses of the army. One thing is for sure: most of the encounters in 1906 (56%, similar to the ethnic proportion of Exarchists) took place between Ottoman forces and Bulgarian bands, and these encounters usually resulted in a fierce fight as losses/clashes testify it. Within the next 3 months in 1907 18 clashes took place in Macedonia regarding Ottoman-Bulgarian relation, while it was only 2 in the case of Serbian-Ottoman relation. Bulgarian and Serbian losses seem to be realistic, if we consider that encounters between *četas* and civilians showed similar averages. But Ottoman losses seem to be underestimated (*Table 18*).


Table 18. The results of Ottoman military confrontation with Bulgarian, Serbian and Greek paramilitary units

from 1 March 1906 to 1 March 1907	Killed	Wounded	Other	Clashes	Losses/clash
Clash with Bulgarian forces					
<i>četniks</i>	240	13	21	56	5
soldiers	48	56			2
Clash with Greek forces					
<i>četniks</i>	181	18	64	34	7,7
soldiers	19	28			1,5
Clash with Serbian forces					
<i>četniks</i>	39	3		11	4
soldiers	7	13			2

from 1 March 1906 to 1 July 1907	Killed	Wounded	Other	Clashes	Losses/clash
Bulgarian <i>četniks</i>	291	13	24	74	4.5

Askeri	28	39			
Serbian četniks	47	3	6	13	4.3
Askeri	8	14			

ЦДА, ф. 335к. оп. 1 а.е. 396.



Parts from a letter of intimidation

IV. Conflict types in Prizren Sanjak

General tendencies

As we mentioned earlier, we selected another area with a peripheral location to use as a control for our results in order to investigate whether these could be extended or not. As the administrative boundaries drawn by the government after the vilayet reforms of 1864 and 1878 were to incorporate heterogeneous areas, instead of creating homogeneous districts that could serve as hotbeds of future separatism, it is not surprising that both the original features and ultimately the results displayed great differences compared to those observed in Skopje Sanjak.

Our methodology was also different here. While the previous chapter applied a statistical approach with comparative regional analysis, here we used case studies to illustrate the different conflict types and the roles of actors. In this chapter we first outline the general evolution of tendencies in Kosovo, and then we focus on the different conflicts.

Unlike in Macedonia *violence was quite unilateral in Kosovo*. Most of the perpetrators were Muslims. It did not mean that Orthodox Serbs remained passive,

but they developed other tools and strategies, like cultural offensive, cooperation with the authorities, etc. The lack of multiplayer-character of the conflict and the evident preferences of the Ottoman government, which did not support Serbian armed bands unlike in Macedonia (this compelled local Serbs pay huge sums for their security as an alternative strategy), limited *četa*-policy and thus certain forms of violence. But on the other hand, the direct influence of Powers was of greater significance, causing more calamities than in Macedonia.

Though the presence of an overwhelming majority of Albanians around Prizren (*Table 19*) simplified the ethnic pattern of violence, but not the frequency of violence itself. Furthermore, despite the more transparent situation, violence was not so ethnicized as Serbian historiography claimed. It is true that the customary law of Albanians and their reservations about urban dwellers and central authorities, together with the Christians in minority, all made them prone to excessive violence (which was integral part of their culture), but this often showed old, traditional patterns beyond the evident Muslim-Christian tensions. And even cases grouped in the latter type can often be interpreted as a manifestation of traditional (economic) conflicts, not events driven purely by ethnic tensions, as it is shown later.

As for the frequency of violence, the 136 and 281 attacks in Kosovo against Serbian population in 1904 and 1905 respectively seems to be low compared to the 106 cases of 'everyday violence' within *half* a year and the 80 *četa*-civilian encounters in Skopje Sanjak. But the situation was somewhat different, if we consider proportions: the overall frequency of violence per 1000 person was between 0.33-1.33 (averagely 0.85), while this was 0.25 and 0.50 in Kosovo.

Furthermore, one should also not forget that the former absolute numbers neither contained Serbian attacks against Muslims (Serbian sources are silent regarding these cases), nor the clashes between local Muslims and Ottoman authorities, which were not rare here – unlike in Skopje. These would increase absolute numbers and rates too. On the other hand the number of violent cases should be reduced in Skopje, if we want a real comparison, because the latter included almost all type of incidents.


So, after narrowing our sources to attacks committed against Slavic population in both areas, the 136 and 281 attacks (if we accept the reliability of Serbian data) do not seem to be low any more, as the 207 000 Slavs constituted only 33% of the population. It is 0.65 and 1.35 cases per 1000 Slavs. In Skopje Sanjak the 40 Ottoman and 43 Serbian assaults on 173 000 Exarchists gave averagely 0.5 *četa* attacks per 1000 person, plus the 43 identified Muslim attacks in connection with 'everiday

violence'²⁸³ puts it altogether 0.75 cases per 1000 persons in 1907. Thus, the value in Kosovo was not smaller at all if proportions are considered.

Table 19. The ethnic composition of the population in Prizren Sanjak

sanjak and kaza		Albanian		Slav			Aromun	Ottoman	emigrants from BiH, Serbia and Bulgaria	Gypsies	Total
		Muslim	Catholic	Exarchist (Bulgarian)	patriarchist	Muslim					
Prizren	Kalkandelen	37,602		17,232	8922	1932	30	16170		780	82,668
	Prizren	71,118	1340		13,628		650		4500	3000	94,236
	Ljuma	17,700									17,700
Total		126,420	1340	17,232	22,550		680	16,170		3780	194,604
Prizren	Kalkandelen	45.5	0.0	20.8	10.8	2.3	0.0	19.6	0.0	0.9	100.0
	Prizren	75.5	1.4	0.0	14.5	0.0	0.7	0.0	4.8	3.2	100.0
	Ljuma	100.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	100.0
Total		65.0	0.7	8.9	11.6	0.0	0.3	8.3	0.0	1.9	100.0

ÖStA HHStA, PA, Liasse XXV, 272. 1896-1902.



Map 6. The mixed ethnic structure around Dečani in 1840.
(Redrawn by Zsolt Bottlik, after Müller)

Traditional (not interethnic) conflicts had their own characteristics. Though the use of violence as coercive power became more and more common during the century, armed conflicts did not always go hand in hand with bloodshed and massacre, even in areas with an Albanian majority (which, owing to prevailing

283 Other forms are excluded just to obtain comparable data for the two regions.

stereotypes, were often accused of excessive violence). Baron Nopcsa listed 4 cases at the turn of 1906 where he witnessed more than 10 shots but no deaths occurred. In contrast, when the action took place at night or the victim was encircled, the results were more serious. This also limited the target groups: the head of the family or children were the main victims. The behaviour patterns differed from the continent, as on the peninsula not even sacral spaces were free of violence: in the Christian church of Dusmana an altercation at Easter resulted in ten people being killed and two wounded (but one may think of the bomb attack against the mosque in Istip in 1911), even though hospitality to guests (*proxenia*) was usually considered seriously. Even a murderer under a blood feud could get accommodation at the victim's relatives without being harmed. Women and the unarmed were never targeted (of course they could be accidental victims of violence). Therefore it is not surprising that many put the armed mortality rate of Albanian males at 30-50% (like Barbarich), though Nopcsa estimated it even in 'barbarian North Albania' to at only 20% (it was 21% in Oroshi but 40% in Toplana).²⁸⁴

Even extreme nationalists like Bataković accepted that the conflict in Kosovo was not merely ethnic but was also rooted in economic affairs and the difference in legal status. The Albanians infiltrating into the region after the Serbian *seoba* were not just Muslims of religion, but also earned their living from husbandry, while the peasants cultivating arable land were predominantly Orthodox. As the newcomers had numerous privileges – among them the right to possess weapons²⁸⁵– it is evident that in the growing conflict concerning land use the Muslims had better positions both in the fields and in the courts. Observers often told of the distortion of old customs relating to livelihood: while prior to the turn of the century only 4-5 Albanians accompanied 1000 sheep on their way to the pastures, by 1902 this grew to 40-50 (partly the result of weaker public security and partly a reason for it). They were not just shepherds any more, but rather a band allied for the plundering and sacking of the local population under the pretext of guarding sheep. Another problem stemmed from the existence of *čiftlik*-system and the lack of control over landlords. In 1910-11 Serbian authorities recorded 55 agrarian abuses (taxes increased unilaterally, lands confiscated, etc.) against Orthodox population and against the written laws.²⁸⁶

On the other hand, these traditional patterns determining the early conflicts also began to change and become ethnicized. The nationalized conflicts first appeared

284 See the local proverb: 'In Toplana men are killed as swine are in other places.' See details in: Nopcsa, Ferenc. *A legsötétebb Európa*. Budapest, 1911.

285 Bataković, *Serbia's Kosovo Drama*, 49-50.

286 Милић Ф. Петровић (ed.). *Документи о Рашкој области (1900-1912)*. Београд: Архив Србије, 1995. No.246-247.

within a traditional guise, but in a changing framework, like in the form of an extension of the blood feud against the Slavs. Margaret Hasluck claims that if a Slav killed an Albanian, *any Albanian* was allowed to punish him regardless of faith and tribal origin. And though Ghegs disliked Tosks, they immediately punished the Slavs if a Tosk was killed. (Naturally, the revenge should be meted out on the victim's close family, and, unlike the Ghegs, the Tosks themselves did not exceed this level). Christian and Muslim Albanians began to work together – not because of hatred of the Slavs (sometimes they fought against each other with the same vehemence), but in order to defend their privileged positions. Thus here a *class struggle became amalgamated with racial tensions*.

The change was in connection with the loss of old privileges like the exclusive right to possess weapons or serve as gendarmes (before the Mürzsteg reforms of 1903, 50% of the gendarmes in Salonika vilayet were Tosk Albanians, 25% were Muslims of non-Albanian origin, and 25% were Gheg-Albanian highlanders),²⁸⁷ which also meant that the unpunished pillaging and extortion of Christians for ransom was over.²⁸⁸ (In 1902, while mentioning the abuses of the gendarmerie, Biliotti wrote that, Gheg colonels on the pretext of defending villagers from Greek paramilitary troops forced villagers to hire Gheg policemen who were fierce enough to impose a threat on the local population instead of on the expelled Greeks. This was a survival strategy typical of mountain tribes). On the one hand, these changes forced Albanians to find new sources of income, leading to the growing participation of these Muslim groups in the smuggling of weapons, which was an inadequate response to this challenge, further decreasing their power over the Christian minority. On the other hand, the changes also triggered nationalization.

Before 1878, Slavs had only palette of social strategies with which to tackle the new problem: complete subjection to the new landlords (as reaya), expatriation or Islamization (from superficial mimicry to complete assimilation). There were examples of each. The local landlords, the Djinolli (Djinić), succeeded in making their land inheritable and transferable, and thus here the *timar* system was substituted by the *çiftlik*, which resulted in stronger control of landlords over their subjects.²⁸⁹ The situation for the Slavs was further worsened by the conflicts between the local elite and the central government, and the disputes between lowland Albanians and Catholic Albanian highlanders. Orthodox groups opting for Islamisation kept many

287 Brown, *Loyal unto Death*, 161.

288 The Bulgarians did not usually object to paying tax to one Albanian patron for their safety, but refused to do so when a second and a third 'protector' appeared, also seeking a 'business opportunity'. And this became very frequent after the traditional forms of coexistence were replaced by unleashed, unfettered violence.

289 Bataković, *Serbia's Kosovo Drama*, 53-54.

of their former customs, like celebrating the *slava and Easter* and kept their family names (Dokić, Stepanović, Stojković, Ljukić). Often only physically mobile groups (males) converted to Islam; their wives remained Christians and practised their religion at home.

All in all, these changes resulted in the transformation of the ethno-religious structure.²⁹⁰ Though there were 318 thousand Slavic speakers in the Sanjak of Novi Pazar and 161 thousand Albanians, as 70 thousand of the Slavs were Muslim, the number of Orthodox was only 250 thousand, while the total number of Muslims was 240 thousand. Unlike in the Skopje Sanjak, migration and problems related to it remained acute in Kosovo Polje. While around Prokuplje there were 2031 Orthodox and 3054 Muslim-Albanian households in 1877, after 1878 64 villages were abandoned by their inhabitants, creating a strong pull factor for those Orthodox, who were prone to leave Kosovo for Serbia. Between 1870 and 1890, at least 50 thousand Muslims arrived in Kosovo from Serbia and Bosnia²⁹¹ (while 15,000 Orthodox left the Ipek and further 25,000 left the Priština region in 1879), and so the ethno-religious proportions (60:40 in 1830 or 114 thousand Muslims vs. 84 thousand Orthodox) changed to 70:30 (in the 1890s there were 246 thousand Muslims and 95 thousand Orthodox, while Serbian was spoken by 152 thousand).²⁹² The *muhadjirs*, losing their home became one of the most fanatic groups, and this exacerbated tensions. In 1899 Dionisije Petrović, archbishop of Prizren, put the number of Orthodox households in Raška and Kosovo at only 11,300, while estimated the number of those who left over 50,000. Even official Russian sources (diplomats) wrote of 250 families expatriated from Kosovo every year, which is over 20% of the population for the ten-year period as a whole.²⁹³ The situation was not better in Novibazar under Austro-Hungarian occupation at the turn of the century,²⁹⁴ which foreshadowed the failure of foreign intervention. In Novi Varosh more than 50 Orthodox houses became empty within 2 years. Another document from the same year (1900) mentions 240 repatriated persons within 5 months. A year later further 33 Serbian refugees were recorded by Serbian authorities.²⁹⁵ As Ottoman authorities tried to hinder this process which was

290 According to Hilferding, in 1858 in Ipek there were 4000 Muslim taxpayers and only 800 Christians, in 1844 in Priština there were 1200 Muslim males and 300 Christians, in Prizren there were 3000 Muslims and 1000 Christians, and in Vučitrn 400 Muslim households and 200 Christian households were listed. Bataković, *Serbia's Kosovo Drama*, 57.

291 Jagodić, Miloš. 'The Emigration of Muslims from the New Serbian Regions 1877/1878.' *Balkanologie* 2, no. 2 (1998).

292 See Malcolm, Noel. *Kosovo: A Short History*. London: Macmillan, 1998

293 This data can be challenged, as the Ottoman authorities – referring to the insecure situation – did not provide an escort for the diplomats, and thus they were unable to collect reliable data.

294 Serbs even mention abuses in Novi Pazar Sanjak (Plevlje) committed by Austro-Hungarian authorities. *Документи о Рашкој области*, No.98. 18.08.1906.

295 *Документи о Рашкој области*, No.1. 16/29.04. 1900; No.2. 2/15.05. 1900; No.4. 04.18.1901.

harmful from economic aspects (Orthodox were both paying taxes to the state and cultivating lands for Muslim landlords), while searching for the refugees²⁹⁶ clashes between Serbian *graničari* and Ottoman *askeri* became unavoidable. The loss of workforce forced *begs* to increase pressure on peasants, which induced a vicious circle, a positive (unstabilizing) feedback.

The Slavs of the Ljuma region first became Islamized, then lost their language as they married Muslim Albanian girls. By 1900 the whole region was considered Albanian. Albanization was also observed in Opolje and Orahovac by the Serbian consul, Branislav Nusić.²⁹⁷ The refugees from Bosnia also increased the number of Muslims; in some districts the proportion of muhadjirs reached 25% of the total population (Gjilan).²⁹⁸ Ten years after their arrival many began to speak Albanian. The assimilation also progressed among vlachs (the Serbianized vlachs were called *mijaks*, while the Albanized vlachs in Ljuma were called *kula*-builders); in 1907 the Serb metropolite closed down the Greek school at Lipljan as only 9 vlach families were living there.

Thus, although the conflict in Kosovo did not start *ab ovo* as an ethnic conflict, later it turned into one, owing (1) to the simplifying approach of modern nationalisms and (2) to the reinterpretation and nationalization of old customs. Contemporary diplomats acknowledged that Muslims claimed themselves to be superior and oppressed Christian Slavs (so this is not just a construction of modern Serbian historiography),²⁹⁹ but on the other hand this was the consequence of existing social structures, as Orthodox were *reaya* – subjected and inferior before 1856. As the fault line between oppressor and oppressed here coincided with the religious and linguistic fractures (like in Bosnia, which was not so evident elsewhere), it was easy to transfer the socio-economic tensions to the level of ethnicity and religion.³⁰⁰

And of course the old elite was susceptible to violence if it felt its power and privileges challenged, especially if this happened due to external interference. (The similar attempts of the central authorities were also not tolerated). Such was the case after the establishment of the Serbian consulate in Priština in 1889, culminating in a wave of violence and the fleeing of 700 Serbs.³⁰¹ As the year of its opening was symbolic, because it coincided the 500th anniversary of the battle at Kosovo Polje, Muslims - having felt their legitimacy over Kosovo offended – reacted with anger. And though the original terrain for Serbian aspirations was Bosnia, until its Austro-

296 *Документи о Рашкој области*, No.5. 18.04. 1901.

297 We do not deny the possibility of this phenomena, but the Serbian numbers seem to be exaggerated.

298 *Osmanli Arşiv Belgelerinde*, 332-34.

299 Bataković, *Serbia's Kosovo Drama*, 65.

300 *Savremenici o Kosovu i Metohiji, 1852-1912*. Beograd: Narodna knjiga, 1987, 247-48.

301 Bataković, *Serbia's Kosovo Drama*, 66.

Hungarian occupation in 1878, by 1889 Serbian propaganda made remarkable progress in Kosovo Polje. The map of Gopčević from the same year – that indicated Serbs everywhere in Kosovo and Macedonia, even in Muslim regions – revealed that Serbian pretensions went beyond the demand of peaceful development of Orthodox communities.

Beyond firm ideology,³⁰² two basic conditions had to be fulfilled to achieve success in the fight for supremacy: (1) a strong middle class of craftsmen and merchants ready to assist (even financially) the new ideology (in this Bulgaria was stronger than Serbia), and (2) the institutionalization of ideology through the contribution of the state (in this Serbia showed better performance, thanks to an early start). The first Serbian school was established in Prizren in 1836, in order to challenge Greek cultural domination. The establishment of schools generated enormous disputes with the Patriarchate. Teachers arriving from Serbia were mistreated and repelled: Nikola Musulin was excommunicated in 1859, because the patriarchate feared the decrease of its own influence. Garašanin soon sent two new teachers in 1866 and by 1873 the number of Serb schools in Ottoman territory increased to 61.³⁰³ Apart from schools and churches that were considered solid outposts of the state, able to control the '*Raum und Boden*', (but which were at the same time most exposed to physical intimidation), a network of background institutions responsible for securing optimal conditions for national propaganda also had to be created. This included the establishment of the Serb cultural commission in Belgrade in 1868, and the foundation of Društvo Svetog Save in 1886 to coordinate cultural activities. The foundation of a seminary for priests in Prizren in 1871 was also a part of this campaign. Thus the Serbian state gradually took over tasks from the Church. After the death of the Greek metropolite of Prizren, there was a change in Church policy too: the Serbian Nićifor (1901-11) promoted the establishment of Serbian schools, while the Ottomans responded by forbidding the establishment of another Serbian consulate in Prizren.

The new consulate in Priština was to crown the efforts of the last 30 years: its main goal was to spread national propaganda; another aim was to disseminate unfavourable stereotypes of Albanians in order to inhibit rapprochement between

302 Although Serbian scholars and politicians (Karadžić, Garašanin, Ristić) had already written their idealistic and ideological works and disseminated them both locally and in the West by the time Bulgaria became independent, these works focused mainly on Bosnia-Herzegovina, and thus the redirection of aims and instruments toward Macedonia required time and a Great Power to support this. (Gopčević's famous work, in which he Serbianized the Macedonian Slavic population, was published in 1889, in the very year when the Austro-Hungarian-Serbian alliance – allowing the reorientation of Serbian foreign policy on Macedonia – was renewed).

303 Malcom, *Kosovo*, 188.

local Slav and Albanian communities.³⁰⁴ It is not surprising that anti-Serb tensions culminated in murder of Serbian consul Luka Marinković (who symbolized Serbia's increasing involvement in the province's affairs) – a case the Ottoman authorities were unable to solve.³⁰⁵ The Russian consul Lisevich wrote that the goal of the local Muslims in Kosovo was to get rid of all Christians, and from the 1870s onwards they could rely on the tacit support of the Ottoman government, which decided to create a Muslim zone separating Serbia from Montenegro.³⁰⁶ (This is why the *muhadjirs* from Bosnia were settled in Kosovo Polje). This plan was approved (but not elaborated) by Austria-Hungary, which also wanted a stable basis that separated Montenegro from Serbia, thus preventing their unification once and for all.

As the above outlined prove, the direct influence of Powers was of great significance causing more calamities than in Macedonia. While Power policy in Macedonia targeted the central government and was aimed at gaining influence over peace-keeping units, thus the direction of their intervention was more or less in parallel to the authorities' goals; in Kosovo the influence of Powers targeted local communities, which caused more problem for the Ottoman government which had to fight alone to restore order.

As it would be very unwise and partial to draw up the history of the region without taking an outlook to the Serbian concept, we try to compare the different interpretations of events. While the local Muslims considered the struggle as 'class fight' between the ruler class and the deprived rayah (supported by foreigners), the Serbs emphasized the ethnic character of the conflict.³⁰⁷ But even contemporaries denied the ethnic character of the violence. "Those of Debar kill to rob, those of Djakovica kill from sheer fanaticism, those of Prizren kill for their evil instincts, and

304 The involvement of the state in these affairs progressed through several stages, as Schmitt demonstrates using the example of Serbian activity in Kosovo Vilayet. Schmitt, *Kosovo*, 160–65.

305 Gawrych, George. *The Crescent and the Eagle: Ottoman Rule, Islam and the Albanians, 1874-1913*. London: Tauris, 2006. 124.

306 The government was aware that the traditional fault lines began to fade and new began to evolve. The intensifying relations between the Catholic Albanians and the Serbs culminated in the Malissors' refusal to take up arms against the Montenegrins in 1862. As a consequence of the vilayet reforms, the state began to organize regions of differing ethno-religious character into one administrative unit to prevent the further nationalization of the area. On the other hand such alliances as mentioned above, were still not considered solid: the Serbian consuls regularly complained about the aggressive behaviour of Catholic *fandi* against local Orthodox people. Bataković, *Serbia's Kosovo Drama*, 66. Any strict reaction from the side of the authorities against the traditional privileges of local Albanians might have two outcomes: attack against Orthodox or cooperation with them. This factor of uncertainty made the situation much complicated as decades ago, when the central authorities usually supported the local Muslims. And this was largely the result of the change in state policy towards the Christians, which can be traced back to the Powers' pressure.

307 Even nowadays: the translation of Bataković's work (The Kosovo Chronicles) never fails to use the *epitheton ornans* 'ethnic Albanians', when mentioning Albanians.

those of Tetovo kill to try out their carbines.”³⁰⁸ Albanians were accused of participating in the first Armenian massacre and their behavior towards Serbs was often compared to the Kurd-Armenian relation.³⁰⁹ The Serbs in Kosovo were unsatisfied with their situation. Their discontent grew when Kosovo was omitted from the reform movement and when *četa* tactics, which worked in Macedonia failed in Kosovo. Being outnumbered by Muslims and Albanians, their opponents, who were at the same time still more useful for the Ottoman government, than the Bulgarians in Macedonia (as perceived even by western observers), therefore the chances for punitive actions against them were limited, the local Serbs were divided regarding tactics.

But not even Serbs of Serbia were unified in this question then. Before 1903 Serbian rulers supported the policy of Austria-Hungary, which partly relied on the protection of the interest of Catholic Albanians. The so-called *fandi*,³¹⁰ settling on the lands abandoned by Serb peasants after the austrian occupation of Novipazar became the main bearers of Austro-Hungarian propaganda among their compatriots of Muslim faith. Scientific researchers, like Theodor Ippen tried to underline the common roots of Muslims in Bosnia and Novi Bazar.³¹¹ A group of tribal and feudal leaders, headed by Haxhi Mulla Zeka, and Riza Bey Kryeziu of Djakovica, openly recommended closer relations with the Dual Monarchy. The idea of Albanian penetration elaborated by Ludwig von Thallóczy was based on sending the most talented consuls to the region, like Rappaport. According to a Russian paper *Novoe Vremja*, the Dual Monarchy spent yearly 5-6 million francs on Albanian schools, propaganda and the payment of Albanian leaders. The list of confidentials of Austria-Hungary contained numerous well-know persons, like (friar Palić, consul Prohaska, Prenk Bib Doda, Ismail Kemali, Vrioni, Osman Nuri and even Jovan

308 Gaulis, Georges. *La ruine d'une Empire, Abdul-Hamid ses amis et ses peuples*, Paris, 1913. details 325-56; Though the quotation was cited by Bataković, this does not sound so 'ethnicized'.

309 A large number of Albanians, especially those from Djakovica, took part in the Armenian massacre; see V. Berard, Victor. *La politique du sultan*. Paris, 1897; <https://archive.org/details/lapolitiquedusu00brgoog>, for Albanian agitation: B. Perunicic, *Pisma srpskih konzula iz Pristine 1890-1900*, pp. 198. Berard, Victor. *La Turquie et l'hellénisme contemporain; par Victor Bérard. La Macédoine: Hellènes. Bulgares. Valaques. Albanais. Autrichiens. Serbs*. Paris: F. Alcan, 1911. Berard, Victor. *La Macédoine*. Calmann-Lévy, 1897. 101-125; 138-39. <http://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/bpt6k2100468/f2.double>

310 As Bataković cites a contemporary observer: „the *Fandi* came from that savage Malissia and settled more than 300 houses during the past 20 years, arriving naked and barefoot, while today most of them are wealthy men.” Bataković, Dušan, T. *The Kosovo Chronicles*. Beograd: LATO, 1992. http://www.kosovo.net/history/kosovo_chronicles/default.htm

311 Ippen, Theodor. *Novi Pazar und Kosovo (Das Alte Rascien)*, Wien: Alfred Hölder, 1892; http://www.albanianhistory.net/1892_Ippen/index.html; Ippen, Theodor. 'Das Religiöse Protektorat Österreich-Ungarns in der Türkei.' *Die Kultur*, 3 (1901-1902): 298-310;

Cvijić).³¹² The creation of the League of Peje was also supported by Austria-Hungary as a counterweight to Serbian propaganda.

As most of the Serbian governments were pro-Austrian (together with King Milan), it is not surprising that Stojan Novaković's proposal to supply Serbs in Kosovo with guns to defend themselves against harassment in 1896 was not approved. Thus he asked for diplomatic intervention and proposed to form a mixed Turkish-Serbian investigating committee.¹ The investigation committee led by the sultan's adjutant, General Saadedin Pasha at the beginning of August 1897 found nothing serious. The attempt to request the intermediation of the Powers' ambassadors in Constantinople was thwarted by Count Goluchowski, stating that Russia would hinder any action favourable for Serbia because of the pro-Austrian sentiments of King Milan.

When in 1896, pressured by the Great Powers, the Sultan announced a program of reforms, proposing equality for Muslims and Christians under the law, and the introduction of Christians to administrative bodies, this was challenged by local warlords, who felt their privileged positions and supremacy challenged again. Haxhi Mula Zeka of Peć requested for the reforms not to be implemented in Old Serbia, referring to the external, Serbian threat manifesting their propaganda.³¹³ Their strength is evidenced by the fact that the Sultan finally refrained from executing the reforms. The question was not even raised in Hague during the Peace Conference in 1899, though the Serbs published a book on Albanian atrocities (*Prepiska o Arbanaskim nasiljima u Staroj Srbiji 1898-1899*). In this – according to Stojan Novaković –, more than 400 atrocities were recorded within six months in 1898, which is similar to our aggregated data for Skopje Sanjak in 1905/1907.³¹⁴

Though the joint support from both Austria-Hungary and the central government encouraged the local Albanians, but from the side of the Ottoman government certain tendencies of reservation towards the Austrian benevolence also began to gain space.³¹⁵ The *vali* of Kosovo, Hafiz Pasha, attributed all Albanian unrest in Metohia (especially in Prizren 1899, subsequently in Skopje), to operations carried out by

312 ÖStA HHStA PA I Allgemeines, 9 Personalia, Kt. 766. Without deeper examination one can not make conclusions regarding the character of their tasks.

313 They were partly right as the proposition of Novaković proved.

314 *Prepiska o arbanaskim nasiljima u staroj srbiji, 1898-1899. / Documents diplomatiques. Correspondance concernant les actes de violence et de brigandage des Albanais dans le Vieille Serbie (Vilayet de Kosovo). 1898-1899.* Beograd: Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, 1899. 145.

315 Austria-Hungary often gave fake information in order to influence the relation between the parties. Regarding the conference of the Serbian and Bulgarian rulers at Niš, Austro-Hungarian agents spread the rumour that it was secretly being held at Priština. Among the Albanians a widespread conviction existed that a joint military intervention of the two countries was being prepared. The *besa* was hastily given and a conference on joint defense began. Bataković, Dušan, T. *The Kosovo Chronicles*.

Austro-Hungarian intelligence services. Their purpose, he believed, was to cause widespread unrest to provide Austria-Hungary with a pretext to occupy the Kosovo vilayet.

On the other hand according to the reports of the Serbian consul in Priština, the Ottoman government even gave tacit support to atrocities committed against Serbs³¹⁶ (similarly to the situation in East Macedonia). By 1900 anarchy reached such dimensions that the Porte was compelled to send new military contingents. Brigadier General Shemsi Pasha was sent to Kosovo to consolidate government authority and collect arms. Being impartial (he defended local Serbs also) he almost reached success, but the consequences of an old story ruined everything and also led to the increasing involvement of Powers, which complicated the situation further.

The case was the following. After the failure of the diplomatic mission with the Porte to protect Serbian inhabitants, the government of Vladan Djordjević began, in 1899, the secret delivery of guns to Serbs inhabiting the northern regions of the Kosovo vilayet – as advised by Novaković earlier. As Austria-Hungary supported local Albanians soon a conflict evolved in the summer of 1901 in Ibarski Kolašin, which was then the target area of Serbian weapon-supplies.³¹⁷ Under the leadership of Isa Boletini, Albanians and Turks searched the villages and forced the people to surrender their arms. From January to August alone, around 600 persons fled to Serbia – wrote Bataković. Finally Russia intervened and the requisition campaign was over. But the interference of a new Power into their internal policy angered not only local Albanians, but Austria-Hungary as well. Thus when Adem Zaimi killed Haxi Mula Zeka in Peć for tribal dissensions, at the beginning of 1902, Austro-Hungarian consuls suspected that it was in fact a Serbian conspiracy.³¹⁸

When King Aleksandar Obrenović took a Russophil course in foreign policy, to calm tempers in the country, a new Serbian diplomatic offensive aimed at settling the debated question both through official and unofficial steps was initiated. In order to stop violence a group of Albanian notables from Djakovica was invited to Belgrade, among whom was the new leader in Peć, Mehmed Zaimi. They were given money

316 During the Kolašin-affair discussed below an Albanian band of 600 men, with the support of 50 Ottoman soldiers, destroyed 45 out of the 60 houses in a village when searching for weapons and Serbian propagandists. But in this case authorities could refer to the law and argue that Orthodox committed crime by possessing weapons which was usually forbidden for Christians. *Correspondence Respecting the Affairs of Southeast Europe*. Turkey, No. 1. 1903. London, 1904. 45, 88-89, 102. Cited by Bataković, *Serbia's Kosovo Drama*, 73.

317 Bataković, Dušan T. 'Istraga oruzja u Ibarskom Kolasinu 1901.' *Kosovsko-Metohijski zbornik SANU* 1 (1990) 269-84.

318 Stojančević, Vladimir. 'Austrougarsko-srpski sukob u Kosovskom vilajetu na početku XX veka.' In *Jugoslovenski narodi pred prvi svetski rat*, edited by Vaša Bogdanov and Vaša Čubrilović. Beograd: Izdat. Ustanova Nauč. Delo, 1967. 865.

and arms, if they helped bring an end to violence. This story is very important from our perspective, because one of our case study - the visit of Adem Zaimi in Belgrade - had similar character, with the minor difference, that Zaimi was tricked by a Serbian officer who played the role of the king.

The Serbian government officially raised the issue of protecting Serbs in 1902, and in August the following demands were delivered to the Porte: regular and for all equal application of law and an end to the policy of encouraging Albanians. Propositions along this line were for either disarmament of the ethnic Albanians or allowance for the Serbs to carry guns; for reinforcement of Turkish garrisons wherever there were Serbian-Albanian inhabitants admixed; removal of corrupt Turkish officials; implementation of administrative and judicial reforms with larger Serbian participation in the administration and judiciary; implementation of agrarian reform. Russia supported Serbia since none of the bases were touched regarding the status quo established with Austria-Hungary in 1897.³¹⁹

These demands were very similar to those of implemented in Macedonia after the Mürzsteg agreement! To hinder the intervention of the Great Powers, especially Austria-Hungary and Russia, which had the right to protect Christians in the Ottoman Empire under article 23 of the Berlin Congress, the sultan announced reforms in November 1902. The reform action of Turkey, headed by Hussein Hilmi Pasha as general inspector, anticipated a more rigorous application of the law, regulation of agrarian duties, dismissal of corrupt officials and the enlisting of Serbs in the Turkish gendarme. Military authorities undertook to capture the most wanted criminals.

But this process was thwarted by the murder of the Russian consul and later by the Ilinden uprising in Macedonia (1903) and the course of events failed the to secure the Serbian interests in Kosovo.

Following the Kolašin affair, Russia opened a consulate in Mitrovica partly to check Austria-Hungary's actions.³²⁰ Though Isa Boletini was removed by authorities under the pretext of paying a visit to Constantinople, the admission of Orthodox into the lines of gendarmerie, which was formerly monopolized by *fandi* and Muslims, angered local warlords. At the beginning of 1903, a large assembly of tribal chiefs was held near Djakovica. Albanians blamed the Serbs for all the reforms (another fact that underlines their 'traditional view') and they decided to execute countermeasures. In the Peć nahije ten people were killed within a few weeks. Following another meeting in Drenica, Albanians revolted against the reforms and

319 Ђоровић, Владимир. *Историја српског народа*. VI/1. Београд: Ars Libri, 1997. 323-24.

<https://www.rastko.rs/rastko-bl/istorija/corovic/istorija/index.html>

320 Serbian historiography puts emphasis mainly on this argument.

first turned against the 'weakest', the Serbs. Rebels raided Vučitrn on March 29, disarmed the Serbs in the gendarmerie and set off to Mitrovica to remove Consul G. S. Shtcherbin from the town.⁸ Though official Ottoman forces supported by artillery fire routed the 2000 Albanians, the next day a Turkish corporal, an Albanian, shot the Russian consul, while the latter was visiting the outskirts of town.

As a result, the Prizren Sanjak was not put under the auspices of the Great Powers in 1903. The statement that the omission of Kosovo from the Mürzsteg reforms was purely the result of Austrian machinations is partly flawed, because it was Isa Boletini's man, who then killed the Russian consul. And we know that he was also given financial support from Serbia. And it is also true that his opposition came from his thinking in tribal and traditional class categories and not from nationalism: though Albanians did not like Russians, who were protectors of Orthodox subjects, Boletini himself did not hate Christians, but simply wanted to preserve his privileges. During the revolt of 1899 it was he who defended the Christians of Mitrovitsa – living in the area he ruled – from atrocities, while in 1901 he led the punishing actions in Ibarski Kolašin to collect the weapons distributed to Christians. Furthermore, because of the Dečani problem (discussed in detail later), not even the Serbs did sympathize with the Russians then, and so the murder was not against their interests. *Local interests could overwrite government or power politics.*

Anyway, the Dečani question offered a good example (1) of the unconsolidated self-consciousness of local people, (2) of violence treated as a marketable product, and (3) of the diversity of fault lines within society (which cannot simply be described in ethno-religious terms). Similarly to the case of Mavrovo, the Orthodox monastery of Dečani was defended by volunteer or paid Albanians living in the surroundings, until it was attacked by highlander tribes several times before 1902. The Serbs then decided to call in Russian monks, thinking that no one would dare offend a subject of a Great Power. But soon the local population began to claim they were Russian, resulting in the disapproval both of the Serbian state (and church) and of the Ottoman Empire. The former feared the de-Serbianization of the recently Serbianized Orthodox peasants, while the latter accused the monks of espionage.³²¹ The arrival of the Russian consul was a culmination point:³²² Austria-Hungary, a part of the Serbians, the Ottoman central power and local Albanians all disapproved his presence. The instigator could be anyone.

³²¹ Malcolm, *Kosovo*, 235.

³²² And it was just one of the numerous steps of the Russian diplomatic offensive in 1902-1904, which included a treaty with Bulgaria in case of a Romanian attack (1902) and an alliance between Serbia and Bulgaria (1903-1904).

Expecting war in the Far East, Russia did not intervene and was satisfied with the maintenance of the status quo in the Balkans. Therefore it accepted the principles laid down in Mürzsteg and withdrew from Kosovo. Austria's positions were again strengthened.³²³ But after the Serbian political turn in 1903, Austria-Hungary's position were again endangered, thus enforced the exclusion of the Northwest parts of the Kosovo vilayet (Kosovo and Metohia) from the reform action.³²⁴

As the Prizren Sanjak was omitted from the Mürzsteg reforms, these events all forced official Serbian policy to reconsider its goals and (r)enumerate the possibilities. When recounting the tactics of local and Serbian nationalists, vice-consul Rakić in 1905 wrote that local Serbs tended to exaggerate their losses in order to get as much money and weapons from Serbia as possible. While newspapers wrote about violence day after day, Rakić had knowledge of 25 cases within the space of five months. So the 400 cases mentioned in 1899, cited by the recently deceased leading Serbian historian Bataković seems to be an exaggeration. (This highlights the fact that even contemporary sources had to be treated with certain reservations). Rakić himself approved the decision of the Serbian government (!) that in order to secure Serbian villages from harassment Albanian troops has to be hired and paid (in Dečani, for example).³²⁵ This was indoctrinated by appealing to the following hopes: each outcome of the events would only weaken the Albanian element and not the Orthodox one. Those settlements which made this crucial step – which implied huge costs, and was risky, because it did not always work, as the examples of Jolovce and Dečani proved – later showed reluctance to support the central government when it tried to re-establish its power. This phenomenon was indirectly advantageous for the Serbian state as well, because this strategy slowly eroded faith in the credibility of the central government and in its ability to represent its interests. Mavrovo village (Tetovo kaza, 140 houses, mixed Patriarchist-Exarchist), for example, paid seven Albanians (beyond regular taxes) to maintain order; that it is to say, *the village took over state tasks and functions by outsourcing it. This was a step towards self-governance*, though not a cheap one, which decreased the asymmetric dependency of villages on the central power. The salary of the guards was 6-20 Turkish liras (14,000 piastres in total). The expenses stemming from different abuses practised by the landlords were also a burden on society for which neither the state nor the guards could offer a solution, and this enhanced the resentment of rural

323 Ђоровић, Владимир. *Борба за независност Балкана*. Београд, 1937. (Delfi, 2001), 123-25. Count Goluchowski even elaborated a plan to divide Turkish lands in Europe by creating a large Romania a large Bulgaria, a weak Montenegro, a small Serbia and a free Albania.

324 Peruničić, Branko. *Zulumi ago i begova u kosovskom vilajetu*. Београд: Нова Книга, 1989. 306-12.

325 According to Brailsford, each Slav had to choose a Muslim patron or protector to avoid any harassment, establishing some kind of feudal hierarchy again. Brailsford, *Macedonia*, 275-76.

population towards the urban administrative centres where both the government authorities and the landlord seated (the urban-rural dichotomy was a real problem, as our analysis below proves).³²⁶

But this survival strategy did not work at all in some localities. Albanian chiefs forbade their compatriots to protect the Serbs around Peć and this resulted in 38 murdered and five wounded in 1905. Turkish authorities forbade the Serbs and Albanians to visit consul Spalajković and talk to him.³²⁷ Jolovce village paid 1500 piastres to a band to avoid harassment,³²⁸ but this did not mean that they defended the village from other bands which would soon sack the village.

During 1904, from Kosovo 108 persons fled to Serbia (small number compared to the 600 mentioned during the Kolašin-affair). In 1904, of 136 different crimes noted, 46 ended with murder, in 1905, 281 cases of oppression were recorded in Kosovo and Metohija, and 65 Serbs were killed.³²⁹ Thus Serbian cultural propaganda in Prizren, offensive by any standard, was substituted by military means and measures. Under the private initiative of several wealthy citizens of Belgrade who organized the first company, comprised of patriot volunteers and refugees from Old Serbia and Macedonia, to fight Bulgarian *komitadjis* in Macedonia in 1902,³³⁰ *četnik* action came under the wing of the state gained further swing in 1904 – wrote Bataković. But what was relatively successful in Macedonia did not work in Kosovo, where Albanians had greater proportion and were better organized. While in Macedonia Serbian *četas* were tolerated by the Ottoman authorities in their fight against Bulgarians, in Kosovo this multiplayer situation was missing and Ottomans did not tolerate attacks against Muslims. Not even quarrelling Albanian groups could be divided and played off against each other. When the question of Serbian armament arose the feuding Albanian tribes immediately expressed solidarity with each other. When a *četnik* detachment was passing through Metohia on its way to Macedonia, in 1905, it was discovered and killed in the village Velika Hoca, the home-town of its leader Lazar Kujundžić. At the demand of Albanian tribes, the houses assisting the *komitadjis* were burned in retribution.³³¹ In summer 1907, another Serbian company passed through

326 Георгиев, Величко, Стайко, Трифонов (eds.). *История на българите в документи*. Том 1. 1878-1912. Част втора. I/2. 82. and ЦДА, ф. 321, оп. 1. а.е. 1616. л. 2-13.

327 Peruničić, Branko. *Svedočanstvo o Kosovu 1901-1913*. Beograd: Naučna knj, 1988. 227-228.

328 Frantz, Anne Eva. *Gewalt und Koexistenz. Muslime und Christen im spatomanischen Kosovo (1870-1913)*. München: De Gruyter-Oldenbourg, 2016. 75.

329 Peruničić, *Svedočanstvo o Kosovu 1901-1913*, 227-228. But in Skopje Sanjak more than 100 cases were mentioned as 'everyday violence' with more than 200 deaths within 6 months in 1905, not to mention the *četa*-civilian encounters (Chapter III).

330 Vucinich, Wayne. *Serbia between East and West: The Events of 1903-1908*. Stanford Univ. Press, 1954. 131-32.

331 Ракић, Милан. *Конзулска писма, 1905-1911*. Београд: Просвета, 1985. 41-46, 304-13.

Kosovo and was received by the locals of the Pasjane village. It was soon discovered, and was destroyed.

Milan Rakić vice-consul soon recognized that *četa* tactics and recruiting members from Serbia (offered by radical consul Spaljković) had no positive effect; in 1907, he advised to return to placing Albanian guards over Serbian villages.³³² Most of the local Serbs were of the opinion, in Kosovo Polje such a policy had no real chances (the Muslim villagers constituting the majority of population were armed unlike the masses Macedonian Exarchists). This also reveals that not only different policies had to be adopted in different localities, but even local communities were divided in the question which tactics should be followed.

The policy of supporting schools also continued, but now it led to Bulgarian-Serbian antagonism in Macedonia and to rivalry between local Serbs of Kosovo and Orthodox students from elsewhere (not to mention the persisting conflicts between the Serbian state and the Church regarding predominance). Despite the existence of the organizational background, the Serbian presence was relatively insignificant in Macedonia prior to 1903 (unlike in Kosovo). But the dynamic increase of Serbian schools between 1896 and 1901 there alarmed the Bulgarians, and the number of teachers in Bulgarian schools also doubled between 1901 and 1910 (*Table 20*), which also reflects changes in their support policy.

The Serbian tactics regarding schools were different from the Bulgarian ones: the Bulgarian state refrained from directly imposing its own agents on the Macedonian Bulgars.³³³ The Serbs could not do this, because the low number of Kosovar Serbs made it difficult to reproduce their own intelligentsia. Therefore, they used teachers trained in Serbia, which was another factor that could trigger tensions in local communities. Another method was to supplant non-indigenous Orthodox students from religious schools, the so-called 'Bogoslovie', in order to secure the training and reproduction of local elite. The Serbian methods are probably best illustrated with

332 Ракић, *Конзулска писма*, 94-106

333 The Bulgarian state refrained from directly imposing its own people on the Macedonian Bulgars: the influence of the Bulgarian state over school affairs prior to the Ilinden Uprising was realized through Macedonian-born Slavic teachers educated in Bulgaria (who were influenced by Bulgarian propaganda). This strategy could enhance the confidence of local society in the Bulgarian state, while the Bulgarophile Macedonians were able to (re)create their own intelligentsia. Out of a total of 1,239 professors and teachers in the Bulgarian schools of Macedonia in 1902, 1,220 were native Macedonians, and, in addition to the 15 Bulgarian-born Bulgars teaching in Macedonia, there were 450 Macedonian Bulgars teaching in the schools of liberated Bulgaria. Tsanoff, Radoslav Andrei. 'Bulgaria's case.' *The Journal of Race Development* 8, no. 3 (1918): No. 3. 296-317. The numbers also reflect the key role of the Macedonian-born population in Bulgarian political life. A Macedonian, General Bojadzhiev, was Bulgarian Minister of War during the campaign of 1915, while Nikola Genadiev, who was a minister in the Radoslavov cabinet in 1913, was also of Macedonian origin. Andrey Lyapchev, who served as minister several times prior to 1914 and as prime minister after 1918, was also born in Macedonia.

the case of the Eastern Orthodox secondary grammar school in Prizren at the turn of the century (discussed later). In other places (Visoki Dečani) conflicts even resulted in the cancellation of several school years as the result of constant fighting between pro-Bulgarian and pro-Serbian factions and during which the reciprocal intimidation of Serboman and Bulgarian Orthodox priests continued until the arrival of a ‘neutral’ clergyman (Joakinije Marković, also see later) sympathizing with Austria-Hungary.³³⁴

Table 20. The result of “peaceful” propaganda: schools in Macedonia in 1896 / 1901 / 1910

	Schools	Schools	Schools	Teachers	Teachers	Teachers	Students	Students	Students
Bulgarian	843	785	1359	1306	1220	2203	43,432	40,000	78,519
Serbian	77	178		118	321	2873	7200		
Greek		924			1400			57,500	

Schurman, Jacob Gould. *The Balkan Wars: 1912–1913* (London: Humphrey Milford, 1914) see: www.gutenberg.org/etext/11676 1914, and Misheff, Dimitar. *The truth about Macedonia* (Berne: Pochon-Jent, 1917), http://www.promacedonia.org/en/pdf/mischeff_the_truth_about_macedonia_1917.pdf

Violence ceased intermittently in 1907 when Austria-Hungary aimed to expand the reform action to the Preševo and Gnjilane districts due to its interest in the Sanjak Railway question. But the rumours of the Austro-Hungarian army arriving in Kosovo brought several thousand ethnic Albanians together in Ferizović simultaneous to the breaking out of the Young Turk Revolution.

During the constitutional regime, the political attitude of the Serbs in Kosovo differed somewhat from that of their Macedonian compatriots, which also highlights *the regionally diverse, multi-faceted political practices*.³³⁵ The Young Turk movement was not welcomed in Kosovo, neither by the Serbs nor by their opponents, the traditionalist (or liberal)³³⁶ Albanians (unlike in Macedonia, where the Serb parties agreed to cooperate with the CUP). For Kosovar Serbs, not even a reformed and well organized Ottoman Empire could offer a viable perspective; indeed, it merely threatened to destroy previous achievements. (Unlike in Macedonia, in Kosovo Polje the Serbian influence was already dominant among the Orthodox.) On the other hand, representations of traditional power were respected by local Serbs: it was the same Rakić who organized a feast to celebrate the arrival of the Sultan to Kosovo

334 ÖStA HHStA PA, XXXVIII/ Kt. 399. Prizren (1899–1900). Accounts of similar conflicts can be read in the dissertation of Frantz, ‘Zwischen Gewalt’, 161–178, and Lory, ‘Schools for the Destruction of Society’, 45–63. For the role of Church see Bozeva-Abazi, Katrin. *The Shaping of Bulgarian and Serbian National Identities 1800–1900*. Skopje: Institute for National History, 2007. 143–92.

335 See details of the cooperation between Ottomans and Serbs after 1908 in the next chapter. We emphasize that there is no universally valid recipe or formula for success. Achieving the same goal might require different political instruments in different regions.

336 For the recruitment basis of MPs, see next chapter!

Polje in 1911, in which the Serbian community participated also.³³⁷ This was a politically sensitive question because of the participants and the site itself (no sultans paid an official visit to Kosovo Polje after the decisive battle of 1389 that ruined Serbian statehood). In short, *the Serbs in Kosovo tried to exacerbate the tensions between the traditionalists and the CUP*, turning conservative rural Albanians (their enemies!) against the central government (even supplying them with weapons), while at the same time showing loyalty and respect towards the sultan (who was also the opponent of the CUP in power). This was classic 'divide et impera' policy.

But did not work. Beside the traditional and ethnicized conflicts, new conflict types - tensions with political background - occurred complicating the situation further. Neither the visit of the new Sultan Mahmud V could bring appeasement, but rather exarbadated tensions despite the general amnesty, because his visit had symbolic meaning in the eyes of the local Albanian and Serbian community from different perspectives. Soon another wave of violence began against the Serbs, instead of stabilizing the situation. (This refers to the persistence of 'old reflexes' among the Muslims). Since July to November 1911 more than 400 incidents including 128 robberies, 35 arsons, 41 banditries, 53 abductions, 30 blackmails, 19 examples of frightening, 35 murders, 37 attempts to murder, 58 armed assaults upon property, 27 examples of fights and armed abuse, 13 attempts of forced conversions and 18 examples of serious injuries were recorded in Old Serbia. These absolute numbers were even higher than those measured in Macedonia in 1907 including both 'everyday violence' and paramilitary attacks on civil population. (On the other hand by this time the Macedonian violence wave had even exceeded this stage: here the number of victims of one single case could exceed hundreds. In 1911 Stip after a bomb attack of the IMRO against a mosque - a new element in the tactics, up to then attacking sacred spaces was Muslim speciality - hundreds were injured by the Muslim revenge. A similar case occurred in Kočani in 1912. There were more than 500 political murders in Macedonia in the first 6 months of 1912).³³⁸ The culmination of problems was also observable in the number of selected-published documents: while there were 78 documents dealing with abuses and problems in Raška between 1902 and 1906 (5 years), there were 67 cases for 1910-1911.³³⁹

After this short introduction to the complicated situation and the key factors and features (the involvement of the Great Powers, the political impact of neighbouring states, the multifaceted background of local conflicts, dynamic fault lines, temporary

337 The Sultan was serenaded by the choir of the Serbian Orthodox seminary. Zürcher, Jan Erik. *The Young Turk Legacy and Nation Building from the Ottoman Empire to Atatürk's Turkey*. I.B. Tauris, 2010. 33.

338 Palaret, Michael. *Macedonia: A Voyage through History*. Vol. 2. Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2015. 172.

339 *Документи о Рашкој области*.

correspondence in the interests of different groups, different tools to reach the same goals, etc.), we sketch some of the most typical conflict types through case studies and illustrate the reactions to handle these problems.

Traditional banditry – weakening central power

As we have stressed, the old unethnized forms of violence, such as banditry, also prevailed in Prizren alongside ethnized conflicts. The possession of firearms is usually considered as a sign of the weakness of the executive power of the state, especially if this appears among population groups that are not entitled to their own weapons. In Kosovo not only the Catholic Albanians serving as local militiamen (the so-called *fandi*) but even Orthodox inhabitants managed to acquire firearms, albeit *illegally*, and therefore they kept them at home (they refrained from appearing with weapons in public spaces, because it would trigger Muslim outrages against them). Possessing weapons implied the possibility of self-jurisdiction. Though it is hard to establish whether this phenomenon was the reason for or the consequence of the weakness of the central power, it definitely meant that the execution of the already slow legal process, characterized as it was by abuses and corruption, was passed on to the local population.

Albanian privileges (they argued that weapons are needed to hinder harassment from the Montenegrin side, but it is rather the consequence of their traditions which considered weaponless adult males to be 'women' and not equal members of the community) became a problem even prior to the unifying and centralizing attempts of the Tanzimat. The practices of the blood feud and of transhumance husbandry also rationalized the possession of weapons. (Economic migration itself enhanced the possibility of a conflict between different social groups). Sometimes it was civilian migrants without clear political commitments (besides those who were members of nationalist organizations) who smuggled weapons because of the increasing demand. Most of the smugglers were not Albanian of origin, but *torbesh* or *goran*, so Slavs from Dibra or Gorna Reka, who became Islamized, were thus allowed to possess weapons. Their dual or fluid identity also explains why they sold weapons without clear preference, i.e. without favouring any of the competing ethno-religious groups, while their language allowed them to communicate with inhabitants of distant lands.³⁴⁰ This is how the robbers of Drenica (approximately 200 men) were

³⁴⁰ The network of smugglers made the (at first sight rather strange) Albanian-Bulgarian cooperation in the autumn of 1913 more comprehensible and reasonable.

equipped. They activated themselves during spring (when the peasants began their yearly work in the fields) or in autumn (when peasants travelled to urban markets to sell their products), and specialized in small groups of weaponless peasants (who were usually Orthodox Slavs), because they were the least protected social group (foreign travellers or vlach merchants could usually pay for their personal security). And even when the Orthodox peasants took arms with themselves illegally, this merely served as a good pretext to punish them without fear of government reprisals.

Thus, though the target group could be well defined in ethnic and religious terms, these attacks did not in fact have any real ethnic character. This group of bandits was politically inactive in an ethno-religious sense: they supported the traditionalist line because they wanted to preserve their privileged situation. When after the 1870s they positioned themselves at odds with the Ottoman government, they did so because the government wanted to strengthen the state's authority over Drenica. Banditry as a phenomenon is not bound to ethnicity: the Serbs in Peje were also robbers (Orthodox communities possessing land and with tax exemptions also existed), as were the Albanians in Drenica.

Banditism vs. the state authorities

The following outrages did not belong to the group of everyday violence, but were still typical. Muslim rebel bands attacked not only local peasantry, but also launched attacks against the gendarmerie led by international officers,³⁴¹ whom they simply considered intruders. This special form of violence was not targeted at the officers themselves (because this might have diplomatic consequences or might bring security measures that would render impossible the further 'economic' activity of the *četa*), but against local Christians serving as privates in the gendarmerie, in order to discourage them from participation in peace-keeping forces.³⁴²

While the aforementioned conflicts can be considered as acts with a political background, the following one cannot. It rather illustrates the limits of coercive measures against banditism (many dozens of soldiers were mobilized to capture a single evil-doer), while the subsequent case represents possibilities for peaceful solutions.

Prior to 1908, most of the problems were caused by the tribes living in the mountains, where the existence of blood feuds generated numerous secondary

341 ÖStA HHStA PA, VII/Fasz.434, Rappaport to Calice, August 12, 1906., No.75/pol., 4. (Komitadschis Congress in Küstendil) and Rappaport to Pallavicini, November 28, 1906., No.94/pol., 8.

342 ÖStA HHStA PA, VII/Fasz.434, Pára to Calice, August 15, 1902. No.92/res, 3.

conflicts. Before Ilinden a typical conflict was the blood feud of Ipek. On 1 March, the son of the local strongman, Mustafa Aziz bey, was murdered in the bazaar. The killer came from the Albanian Rugova tribe, and was hired by another Rugovan, Ibrahim Mehmet Redj, famous for his violent personality. The killer, pursued by the army and the gendarmerie, managed to escape to the *kula* of Ibrahim. The soldiers warned the host to surrender the murderer (according to imperial law), which he refused to do (referring to the customary law of hospitality, the *kanun*). The soldiers then warned him that they would not refrain from the use of violence (negotiation was useless, if the perpetrators decided to follow the *kanun*). The leader of the town, Suleyman pasha, decided to capture Redj, who was accused of many other violent abuses. Redj was given four hours to surrender, after which the *kula* would be besieged by cannons (!). Redj's men immediately opened fire on the gendarmerie, killing four men and wounding a further three – he decided to break through the blockade before the cannons arrived. Then Suleyman pasha ordered the cavalry to control the roads leading to the Rugovan area, but soon they were attacked by seven Rugovans from the woods, who tried to give support to their compatriots (not because they respected Redj, but because they considered the insult to be an offense against the whole tribe) by infiltrating into the town, which had been left defenceless. (Breaking through the cordon around the *kula* would have meant evident support for Redj, rendering them accessories to the crime). But the cavalry repelled the attack. Meanwhile the soldiers ruined the *kula*, using the cannons, then set it on fire. But the defenders still continued firing, killing more people. Only after the 19th cannon shot did Redj surrender, by which time his compatriots, the murderer, a 3-year old boy and another male from the Rugova tribe, were already dead. But after such events not even the soldiers kept to the law: Redj was shot by a soldier, and his body then mutilated by the others – thereby invoking the blood feud of the Rugova tribe on their heads. Therefore Suleyman bey, fearing the revenge of the Rugovans, asked military headquarters to send more troops to the region.³⁴³

The state treatment of banditism – a successful solution?

On the eve of the turn of the century, the authorities in Prizren and Ipek were unable to stop the rebel bands in the towns, and the numerous blood feuds resulting from their activity, which generated a vicious circle. These bands were organised from *ad hoc* groups assembling to protest against the officials representing the central

343 ÖStA HHStA VII/ Fasz. 433, Muthsam to Calice, Prizren, 7 March 1901, No. 13.

government (who either violated some customary law in order to enforce imperial law, or were simply corrupt and rapacious). Thus the government was also responsible for their formation – but only indirectly. The authorities, unable to put down the revolts, decided to legitimize them by appointing their leaders (Hadji Zeka in Ipek, Halil pasha and Zeynel bey) to be officers of the gendarmerie. In effect this meant that they received a salary, in return for which they had only one task – to tame their men. It was evident to all that this was some kind of bribery, showing the weakness of the central powers³⁴⁴ – in fact it was a regular subsidy paid by the state (and taxpayers) to paramilitary troops for the maintenance of public order, of which the central powers were then incapable. It was another example of the *outsourcing of state tasks*, but *here it was a central initiative*, unlike in the case of Mavrovo (Tetovo kaza), where it was a private initiative, or in the case of Dečani, where it was the church, a non-government organization, which paid for peace to be maintained.

But by 1900 all these proved to be inefficient, and thus the new *mutesharif* of Prizren proposed a new solution: he convinced the leaders of the Albanian community to organize an advisory board that would undertake to decrease the number of blood feuds. The Albanian leaders gave a traditional oath (*besa*) to the Ottoman leader to fulfil their task.³⁴⁵ Soon this new semi-official organization settled 15 blood feuds by intermediating between the rival groups. What is more interesting is the application of old customary law – which was accepted by the authorities! In the case of murder it was this committee that visited the site with the local police and settled the problem (identifying the perpetrator and negotiating recompensation instead of continuing the blood feud), neglecting official law. The activity of the commission was so successful that it was extended to the whole territory of the Sanjak.³⁴⁶

But soon the central government ordered *Djermal bey* to suspend the activity of this organization, even though it had by then successfully concluded 700 cases within a year. The rumours quickly spread and murders began again. The Albanian leaders neglected their former oaths given to the commission, while the commission completely lost its former authority and respect. (It is very interesting that though state authorities had lost their executive power by then in practice, their authority did not vanish completely, as they were still able to legitimize the activity of locally organized commissions. In other words, governing Albanians was possible by

344 ÖStA HHStA XXXVIII/ Kt. 399/1, Rappaport to Goluchowski, Prizren, 15. Juni 1899, No. 118; i.e. Rappaport to Goluchowski, Prizren, 10. August 1899, No. 146, 9.

345 Schütz István: 'Az albán szokásjog. Lekë Dukagjini zsinórmércéje.' *Limes*, no. 2-3. (2000): 193.

346 ÖStA HHStA XXXVIII/ Kt. 399/2, Muthsam an Goluchowski, Prizren, 27 Mai 1900, No. 75; i.e. Muthsam an Goluchowski, Prizren, 14. Juni 1900, No. 88; i.e. Muthsam an Goluchowski, Prizren, 10. Juli 1900, No. 97.

inserting a hierarchical level between the local and governmental levels, in which executing power was practised by locals, based on local customary law, but bearing the authorization of central power.)

Furthermore, the central government ordered the *mutesharif* to avoid violence, but, if necessary, to use the first-order nizam troops (instead of the gendarmerie). Djemal immediately sent a telegram to the Porte, stating that both conditions would just weaken the power of the civil government in the eyes of the local Albanians, but received the answer that it was the sultan's personal decision to avoid the establishment of such committees that could challenge the sultan's authority, and forbade everyone to organize authorities based on besa (oath).³⁴⁷

Due to these circumstances, *Djemal bey* resigned at the end of 1900 and soon mountain robber tribes swept across the villages of the plains – something completely unusual in winter, as acknowledged even by contemporary witnesses. The army had to be deployed to hinder the sorties. As urban policemen did not get their salaries for months, they also accompanied the robbers, leaving the town of Ipek completely defenceless, while offering a good opportunity for the Rugova and Šala tribes to settle their conflicts violently, using the town as their 'arena'.³⁴⁸

The local gendarmerie was omitted from the maintenance of order as being untrustworthy and inefficient, only to be substituted by army units that lacked training and knowledge of local customs, society and the surrounding terrain. This meant, first, that the idea of maintaining order by involving both parties using customary law slowly vanished once and for all, and, second, that those who earned their living from banditism were forced to obtain better firearms in order to execute successful raids. And as these were more expensive, their acquisition invoked more violence or illegal activities: raids became targeted at military stockhouses to acquire weapons, and smuggling became more intensive. As a result of this policy, while at the turn of the century it had been enough to send a battalion of nizams to maintain order, ten years later whole divisions were needed to disarm the population.³⁴⁹

In addition to the rivalry of the small states, the closeness of Austria-Hungary and the strong influence of Russia (as official protector of the Orthodox population) also contributed to the spread of violence. In the forthcoming paragraphs we publish some unknown conflicts that were generated indirectly or directly by the opposition of these two Great Powers.

347 ÖStA HHStA XXXVIII/ Kt. 399/2, Muthsam an Goluchowski, Prizren, 1. November 1900. No. 149.

348 ÖStA HHStA XXXVIII/ Kt. 399/2, Muthsam an Goluchowski, Prizren, 20. November 1900. No. 155.

349 Csaplár-Degovics, Krisztián. Csaplár-Degovics, Krisztián. *Az albán nemzetévalás kezdetei (1878-1913). A Rilindja és az államalapítás korszaka*. Budapest: ELTE BTK, 2010. 211-221.

Violence as an alternative source of income for Ottoman state officials

As Austria-Hungary was the official protector of the Catholics of the Ottoman Empire, Ottoman officials usually did not interfere in cases in which Catholics were concerned, leaving jurisdiction to the Great Power.³⁵⁰ This ignorance of the central authorities (which were nearer and still better informed, than burdened Austro-Hungarian officials reacting slower) did not enhance public security. In 1901, Adem Zaimi, a Muslim Albanian officer of the gendarmerie unsatisfied with his salary, wanted to exploit this situation by kidnapping Lol Kuka, a well-known Albanian Catholic merchant from Shkodra. Then he blackmailed not his family or the Ottoman authorities, but rather Austria-Hungary, supposing that if the latter refused the deal, the authority of the dual state would be ruined forever. (The case is very edifying for modern times...). What is more interesting, he did not ask for ransom, but - in return for handing Lol Kuka over - he asked the Austro-Hungarian consulate to intermeditate at the local Ottoman authorities to promote him to the higher ranks.³⁵¹

This case is all the more interesting because it reveals that Austria-Hungary was considered more powerful and efficient (even within the boundaries of the Empire) by local actors than the imperial authorities.³⁵² Furthermore, it highlights the lack of trustworthiness of state authorities like the gendarmerie. The later detailed curriculum of Zaimi will also highlight that enlistment to the ranks of the gendarmerie was not based on moral principles or personal aptitude, but indicates the custom that the officers' posts functioned as 'fiefdoms' ('state sinecures')³⁵³ donated to restless or politically trustworthy Muslim lords (to make them obligated or to control their activity). The great Albanian landlords, the *beys*, even needed and demanded this kind of money in order to pay their personal troops, thus maintaining law and order (including the stability of social relations and structures). Insufficient financing meant losing their authority over their men and this implied losing control over violence.

350 Deusch, Engelbert. *Das k.(u.)k. Kultusprotektorat im albanischen Siedlungsgebiet*. Wien-Köln-Weimar: Böhlau, 2009. Benna, Anna Hedwig. 'Studien zum Kultusprotektorat Österreich-Ungarns in Albanien im Zeitalter des Imperialismus (1888-1918).' *Mitteilungen des Österreichischen Staatsarchives* 7 (1954): 13-46.; Csaplár-Degovics, *Az albán nemzettévalás kezdetei*, 119-120.

351 ÖStA HHStA VII/ Fasz. 433, Pára to Braun, Üsküb, 16. December 1901, No. 165; i.e. Pára to Braun, Üsküb, 6. January 1902, No. 2.

352 Csaplár-Degovics, Krisztián. 'Österreichisch-ungarische Interessendurchsetzung im Kaza von Tirana.' *Südost-Forschungen* 71 (2012): 129-82.

353 Similar to the earlier prebendary system of timar estates - in the 1900s old fiefdoms were transformed into cash.

Conflicts indirectly generated by the competition between the Powers

Though the previous case could also have been classified in this group, the case of the Orthodox priest, Joakinije Marković fits here better, and is even more interesting, because he turned to the Austro-Hungarian authorities as being the Orthodox archimandrite of Visoki Dečani monastery! Joakinije was born in Perjašica, Croatia, in 1845 and served in Niš until 1880, where he had conflicts with his superiors (he was claimed to be the opponent of radicals and liberals). After he had been pensioned, he secretly offered his services to the embassy of Austria-Hungary in Belgrade. In return he asked for an ecclesiastic position. He served in Bosnia in the 1890s, but soon was dismissed. He appeared in 1898 in Sveta Trojica, then served as igumen in Visoki Dečani.³⁵⁴ This monastery was one of the main propaganda centres of Serbia, but it was located at the western fringe of the Kosovo Vilayet, surrounded by Muslim Albanian villages. Marković asked for support at the local Austro-Hungarian consulate, as the Serbian government was reluctant to give financial aid because the press accused him of being an agent of Austria-Hungary and of not promoting the idea of Greater Serbia wholeheartedly. Though he refuted the accusations, these left him with no other choice other than really to turn to Austria-Hungary in 1899.³⁵⁵ This was a great chance for Austria-Hungary to have a secret agent within the walls of a Serbian propaganda centre.

But the real reason for his decision was to be found not in these accusations, but rather in the fact that the existence of this Serbian outpost angered local Muslims, who often tried to attack the monastery, from which the Muslim landlords, as the patrons of all (even Christian) local sanctuaries, tried to save the monks (regardless of whether they promoted the Serbian cause or not) if they paid enough money. (This also enlightens us that the problem was more than an ethnic conflict between the Serbs and Albanians, or a conflict between the triangle of the local authorities, Ottoman state power and the Serbian state, or a rivalry between landlords (*beys*) and their subjected 'vassals' for income and authority).

In the 1890s, these attacks became more frequent, and thus diverting them would also cost more money. The monks were unable to finance these costs from their own income any more, and asked for a loan from the local Albanian landlords at 12-15% yearly interest. The dues grown so high by 1899 that they were unable to finance the

354 ÖStA HHStA XXXVIII/ Kt. 399/1, the life of Joakinije Marković.

355 "Da se nebi i dalje na mene ovakim ljugama naprasno Srpstvo bocalo, to sam se odlučno rešio, da se stavim na raspoloženje i vernu sluzbu Vam – odnosno Wisokoj Vladi Austro-ugarska Monarhije – i u onoliko u koliko do mene stajalo bude i u koliko mi se – ma u kokbim poslovima bilo zapovedalo bude – svakad ću joj ma usluzi veran biti i raditi na njenoj slvozi – koliko do mene stajalo bude. Molim Was zadržite ovu moju ponudu u tajnosti ..." ÖStA HHStA XXXVIII/ Kt. 399/1, Rappaport to Goluchowski, Prizren, 5. February 1899, No. 39.

debt any more; Belgrade refused to help Marković, arguing that his propagandistic activity was unsatisfactory, and that Serbia did not want to “finance Muslim landlords” – their potential enemies. (This did not bother the monks, when they paid for their safety.) Finally the Austro-Hungarian consul intervened and “asked” Marković to send regular reports which would be paid for according to their information content. The situation was paradox: the money received from the espionage was spent on the maintenance of the monastery, thus Marković spied for Austria partly to promote Serbian goals, while Austria-Hungary financed Albanian warlords through the dues of a Serbian propaganda centre.³⁵⁶

The story became even stranger after the turn of the century, and revealed other reasons for internal debates among the monks. On St. George’s Day, 1904, the Muslims of the Rugova tribe opened fire on the Visoki Dečani monastery, and though nobody was harmed, the soldiers garrisoned in the surrounding buildings were unable to catch anyone. The Ottoman authorities soon sent a report to the Austrian consulate stating that it was the radical Serbs of Ipek who hired the Albanians to attack the Russian monks of Dečani (!), as the Serbs (who originally invited the Orthodox Russians) were fed up with their activity.³⁵⁷

Russia paid huge sums for the maintenance of Orthodox monasteries and sanctuaries and in return Russian monks appeared in those places as treasurers responsible for financial affairs. The Serbs tolerated them at first, because they needed the financial resources and thought that the presence of Russian subjects would defend them from Ottoman harassment. But the activity of the Russians divided the Serbs. In Ipek the tension between the pro-Serbian minority calling itself *Gušteri* (including igumen Miron, the local teacher, and some merchants) and the pro-Russian majority named *Kurdjoni*, began to grow as the Russians of Visoki Dečani started to build up their network and to put trustworthy informers in important places (like Jovan Gerić in Prizren and Luka Garikolović in Mitrovitsa). The pro-Serbian party revolted against this practice in 1904 and hired Albanians to attack Visoki Dečani. Serbians and official Serbia tried to do everything to get rid of Kiril *igumen* and Arsenije in Dečani.³⁵⁸ They refused Russian patronage, claiming that the presence of Russians did not make life more tolerable. Knowing all this, the successful murder of the Russian consul in Mitrovitsa just on the eve of international intervention is worth reconsidering – was there an instigator behind this act? (Isa Boletini – whose men were accused of committing the murder - regularly received money as subsidy from Serbia up to the 1910s). The murder had far-reaching political

356 ÖStA HHStA XXXVIII/ Kt. 399/1, Rappaport to Goluchowski, Prizren, 21. September 1899, No. 177.

357 ÖStA HHStA VII/ Fasz. 433, Zambaur to Calice, Mitroviza, 11. Mai 1904, No. 27.

358 ÖStA HHStA VII/ Fasz. 433, Zambaur to Calice, Mitroviza, 1. Mai 1905, No. 107.

consequences, because the Kosovo vilayet was omitted from the Mürzsteg reform, partly due to this act. The Austrians did not want to include the vilayet in the process from the beginning, because international oversight could only ruin their positions, while the Russians felt themselves insulted because of the murder – and their withdrawal left plenty of space for the Serbian agents to fill.³⁵⁹

The case of the Bogoslovie in Prizren (1899-1900)

The above testifies that not only armed bands but also the propaganda and ideologies of neighbouring states battled with one another, sometimes turning local rivalries into a diplomatic question, sometimes overwriting original fault lines making temporary allies of former enemies.³⁶⁰ As Eastern Orthodox priests and village teachers had the greatest influence on shaping the identity of illiterate villagers and were able to disseminate this message most efficiently,³⁶¹ and therefore the village usually followed the national identity pattern(s) that priests and teachers represented or were forced to represent,³⁶² it is not surprising that these symbolic personalities not only became propagators of national ideology but also became targets.

Conflicts within the Orthodox Church(es) were not limited to the monasteries: schools were also the targets of national propaganda, thus becoming scenes of everyday violence even without the contribution of paramilitary troops. Schools maintained by the Church, the so-called *bogoslovies* ('God's word'), were by this time to serve the process of nation-building rather than religious piety. As village priests played an important role in determining the self-identification of their community, if the national propaganda became able to gain influence over these religious schools, it could successfully influence the minds of hundreds of future priests, and through them thousands of villagers. (When the village teacher, educated in a neighbouring state, and the village priest followed or advertised a different national propaganda – or simply pursued different tactics – it generated conflict and divided the community, sometimes ending in internal showdowns).

By 1900 the Bogoslovie in Prizren fell into the hands of priests supporting Serbian propaganda, who took care not to let any priests, teachers or students advertising

359 For the Serbian version of the story see: Bataković, Dušan T. *Dečansko pitanje*. Beograd: Čigoja, 2007.

360 One of the methods included ethnic mapping by Belić, Gopčević and Cvijić on the Serbian side. By this time ethnic mapping had definitely become a political instrument that was often very distant from reality.

361 When conquering Macedonia in 1913, Serbs imprisoned nine out of ten teachers. *История на македонскиот народ*. Ред. Михайло Апостолски. Vol. 4. Скопље: Институт за Национална Историю, 2000. 73.

362 Bozeva-Abazi, *The Shaping of Bulgarian and Serbian National Identities*, 41–88. and 120–23.

Bulgarian national ideas enter the walls of the institution. As there were hardly any possibilities for young Orthodox people to train themselves within the boundaries of the Kosovo vilayet, the distribution of the few existing grants was a permanent source of conflict: the applicants usually accused each other of serving foreign propaganda (whether or not this was true). A larger conflict evolved at the end of 1899, when the school began to focus on local Macedonian applicants in order to promote the Serbianization of the region, while the traditional schooling district of the institution included Montenegro and Eastern Bosnia as well. In Montenegro only the relatives of the *vladika* and the tribal leaders had a chance to study within the country, while those who did not originate from influential circles had to train themselves abroad. And although Orthodox students from Bosnia had the opportunity to educate themselves in Bosnia under the aegis of Austria-Hungary, many refused to do so because of their political convictions. It is not surprising that the changing tactics of the Prizren school, which threatened to deprive them of their traditional place of education, angered these groups, which officially protested at the Serbian consulate in Skopje.³⁶³

Those who had already been enrolled supported the demands of their compatriot applicants. As a reprisal, leader of the school wanted to dismiss twelve of the protesting students, and the metropolite of Prizren, Dionysie Petrović, confirmed this as the leader of the organization responsible for the maintenance of the school. The response of the students was broadened resistance – the number of protesting students suddenly increased to 90. When they were also threatened with exclusion by *igumen* Makaria, they attacked the priest with knife and firearms. The metropolite asked for the participation of the gendarmerie, thus involving state authorities in the settlement of the question. Education was suspended, but the students again warned Makaria to secure the same rights for the applicants. The *igumen* then left the school and asked for instructions from the metropolite.³⁶⁴

Finally, at the end of November 1899, he warned the students to give up the strike and continue their studies or else they would be dismissed as the former 12 students had been. 80 of the protesting students left the college and immediately turned to local Russian and Serbian institutions and to the bishop of Üsküp, Firmilian, to ask for their opinion of the case.³⁶⁵

As only 90 students remained within the walls of the school, on 6 December 1899 metropolite Dionysie Petrović ordered the remainder of the students to be shared between the monasteries of Sveti Petar, Sveta Trojica, Sveti Marko, Sveta Bogorodica

363 ÖStA HHStA XXXVIII/ Kt. 399/1, Rappaport to Goluchowski, Prizren, 24. October 1899, No. 206.

364 ÖStA HHStA XXXVIII/ Kt. 399/1, Muthsam to Goluchowski, Prizren, 26. November 1899, No. 235.

365 ÖStA HHStA XXXVIII/ Kt. 399/1, Muthsam to Goluchowski, Prizren, 30. November 1899, No. 237.

and Visoki Dečani until the “teacher question [!] is settled”. The temporary closure of the school created unrest among the local Serbian population, which tried to restrict it by force. The closure was later explained by a delay of four months in the subsidy given by Russia, because of which a loan of 150,000 piasters had to be requested.³⁶⁶ Finally, at least based on Austro-Hungarian consular reports, only seven students were dismissed (the ones who attacked their teachers with weapons) – though even they were offered new fellowships in Bosnia.³⁶⁷

As the withheld Russian support arrived, the teaching began again in January 1900. Students were called back from the neighbouring monasteries. The metropolite dismissed most of the old teachers, and only two of them remained at the school: Apostol Filipović from Gjilan and Trifun Dimitrijević from Djakova. Both received their degree in Belgrade. Stefan M. Dimitrijević became the new director, while Milan Šiljak, Sava Rabranović, Mitar Trifkovič and Damiani Isailović arrived as new teachers. Most of them were from Kosovo Vilayet and finished their studies in Belgrade and Moscow. This common experience bound them together, and, in addition, all were trustworthy agents of Serbian nation-building.³⁶⁸ Thus the transformation of the school into an outpost of Serbian national propaganda was finally carried out through a change of tactics, using new teachers devoted to the Serbian national cause (instead of the selection of students). The new director also allowed three Bosnian Serbs, Ilija Marcetić, Radomir Blažić and Christo Bjelatić, to attend the school in order to keep up appearances (the number of total students was around 140).³⁶⁹

Protests against the opening of new consulates and trade agencies

Some of the violent acts were in fact targeted to decrease the interference of small states as manifested in the establishment of schools, diplomatic agencies and trading posts, but the tactics of blaming local Christians for this, and turning against them, resulted in just the opposite: the enhancement of the small state’s activity. The mentioned activities were considered to be an offense by local Muslims. Those who built new buildings or were likely to hand over existing infrastructure for such

366 ÖStA HHStA XXXVIII/ Kt. 399/1, Muthsam to Goluchowski, Prizren, 10. Dezember 1899, No. 242.

367 Ilija Marčetić, Milan Latinovac, Radomir Blažić, Nicola Rožič, Jefta Jaksipovič, Stefan Antonijevič és Manolo Mrvič. ÖStA HHStA XXXVIII/ Kt. 399/2, Muthsam to Goluchowski, Prizren, 16. January 1900, No. 9.

368 ÖStA HHStA XXXVIII/ Kt. 399/2, Muthsam to Goluchowski, Prizren, 16. January 1900, No. 10.

369 ÖStA HHStA XXXVIII/ Kt. 399/2, Muthsam to Goluchowski, Prizren, 23. Dezember 1900, No. 164.

purposes were threatened with death.³⁷⁰ Similarly to the case in 1889 in Prizren, in 1900 the Serbian consul Jovan Mihajlović, his wife and his secretary (Dragačević) hosted two Serbian scientists (the famous Jovan Cvijić and Svetozar Tomić), who were supposed to promote the nationalist goals of Serbia through their work. On 27 September hundreds of Albanians gathered to expel the aliens from the town, who finally left only when escorted by the authorities.³⁷¹ It might be surprising that one may find even Cvijić on the special beneficiary list³⁷² of Austria-Hungary. This could happen not because he was spying for the Dual State, but because with a Serbian passport he could not have survived an Albanian trip.

Actions against sacred places during Christian festivals

Some of the incidents in the Prizren and Prishtina Sanjak were evidently anti-Christian in character, especially those that were targeted at churches when these were visited by large numbers of people (during feasts). Though these outrages regularly started as simple mass demonstrations against central state reforms in the countryside, after the end of the demonstrations the armed (Muslim) mass did not disband, and instead penetrated into the towns (the seats of the central authorities), attacking Orthodox churches or other sacred, holy spaces.³⁷³ The reason was that the government policy on equal citizenship and centralization threatened the privileges of certain rural Muslim communities, and they were convinced that the changing situation was the Christians' fault.

In 1904 the Muslim Albanians of Sjenica and Mitrovica chose St. George's Day (very important not only for tax collectors, but also as the beginning of the *četa* and agricultural season) to attack Christians. On the very day the members of the Rugova *fis* also attacked the church of the patriarchate in Ipek, shooting at Christian soldiers/gendarmes (this was after Mürzsteg, and thus the intimidation of Christian soldiers – who were a new and uncommon phenomenon – could also be a motivating factor), then retreated to the hills without being punished or pursued.³⁷⁴

370 ÖStA HHStA XXXVIII/ Kt. 399/2, Rappaport to Goluchowski, Prizren, 10. August 1899, No. 146; i.e. Muthsam an Goluchowski, Prizren, 13. March 1900, No. 36.

371 ÖStA HHStA XXXVIII/ Kt. 399/2, Telegram of Muthsam, Prizren, 23. September 1900, No. 22; i.e. Muthsam to Goluchowski, Prizren, 27. September 1900, No. 132.

372 A list containing the names of those who received financial support from Austria-Hungary for certain services.

373 These waves of violence were rarely directed overtly against the authorities, but there were also examples of the expulsion of state bureaucrats.

374 ÖStA HHStA VII/ Fasz. 433, Zambaur to Calice, Mitrovica, 11. Mai 1904, No. 27.

Another example: the Albanians of Drenica and Lauša organized a protest meeting near the Klina stream (25km south of Mitrovitsa) to march on the town of Vučitrn, thus protesting against Mürzsteg reforms. Until 3pm everything was peaceful, but then they spotted a funeral ceremony in a nearby Orthodox church, and soon the rumour spread that ammunition and weapons were hidden in the church. Haydar aga and Ibrahim Madjur from Ipek with 200 armed men penetrated this sacred place, frightening the participants of the funeral ceremony. The Albanians began to open the coffin to search for weapons, while the priest, Hadji Dapche Furtunich and his son Zhivko tried to deflect them. Then the Albanians beat up Zhivko, and though Haydar aga ordered them to spare his life, his men sacked the parsonage, where they found Zhivko's Martini rifle, jewels and some money. Zhivko was kidnapped (on the pretext that he had an illegal weapon), but soon released. The authorities refused to investigate the case.³⁷⁵

The Albanian village vs. the town

The opposition of traditional and modern cultural patterns and the distrust towards the attempts of the central authorities to transform the customs of the countryside manifested itself not only in the form of a traditional (not yet ethnicized) Muslim-Christian conflict, but also as a rural-urban opposition. In rural Kosovo, religion remained the basis of identification. Though Muslim Albanians had knowledge of the nation-building efforts of Montenegro and Serbia, and had even heard about Albanian nation-building attempts, for them these were of secondary importance. This introverted traditional society still considered the Orthodox *reaya*, and later (as the central power gradually alienated them through its reform plans) urban dwellers, as an inferior race. They usually practised the collection of protection money, which was a good source of secondary income and also a common practice to mitigate the presence of uncontrolled violence, but rarely an effective one.

The local population refused centralization and stuck to their traditions (including removing - or even killing - Ottoman officials, as happened in 1875 and in 1904, as well as the possession of firearms, the preference for customary law against official law, etc.). They refused to participate in the official censuses (fearing taxation) and in recruitment. (Many claimed then that they were indeed Christians and exempt from military service. The *fandi* - Catholic Albanian militiamen - refused military service and served as a *bashibozuk* free corps in wars led by their own officers). The fact that Ottoman officials were very often forced to leave their

375 ÖStA HHStA VII/ Fasz. 433, Pára to Calice, Üsküb, 4. April 1903, No. 81.

positions reflected the lack of prestige of the state, just as did the failures of punitive actions. (The campaign led by Hasan pasha in 1880 was unable to identify and catch the murderers of the *kaimakam* in 1875). The *possession of weapons, formerly supported by government authorities when state power was too weak to maintain order in the frontier zone, by the turn of the century became a factor hindering consolidation.*

These rural dwellers were unable overcome their traditional views on identity defined by purely religious thinking, while other groups of the population had already classified themselves according to a different system of reference. For them the 'true believers' were the rural Muslims - including those who spoke a Slavic dialect.³⁷⁶ So these conflicts took place not between ethnicities, and neither can they be interpreted as an opposition *within* a paradigm – these were conflicts *between* cultures, paradigms and reference systems. The phenomenon of religion still being able to overwrite linguistic differences was recognized by Austro-Hungarian diplomacy and even appeared in the practice of Austrian ethnic mapping.³⁷⁷ These rural inhabitants were alienated by the Ottoman administration, but they always revolted as 'true Muslims', loyal to the Sultan, insisting on their traditional privileges and not as a class or a nation or as peripherized population with a regional identity. It is also interesting that urban areas usually functioned as the spaces for their protest – probably because protests indirectly targeted Ottoman central power. It is also possible that the limitations on market days were to limit the number of possible conflicts (with the exception of Ferizaj with a railway connection, there was only one market day a week in each of the larger settlements). On the other hand this meant that merchants were forced to wander to cover all the area and on every weekday to earn enough – and this was not without risk.

Villagers marching into the towns took violence with them in their rucksacks. This violence – whether it managed to reach central authorities or it was diverted by raffish bureaucrats – usually reached the Orthodox (and their symbolic spaces) at some stage despite the original (not ethnically-driven) motives and goals of the protest. If the demonstration lasted for days, the protesting Muslim Albanians occupied Orthodox houses and accommodated themselves there without paying. Very often they sacked the town, stole the tax collected from them earlier, or kidnapped the representatives of local elite (and held them for ransom). If the family refused to pay, the kidnappee was moved from the town to the periphery, and was sometimes mutilated.³⁷⁸ The same happened to the merchant Vasil Šiotič.³⁷⁹ This was

376 ÖStA HHStA XXXVIII/ Kt. 399/1, Rappaport to Goluchowski, Prizren, 19. October 1899, No. 198, 2-5.

377 See: Demeter, Gábor – Zsolt Bottlik – Krisztián Csaplár-Degovics. *The Role of Ethnic Mapping.*

378 ÖStA HHStA XXXVIII/ Kt. 399/2, Muthsam to Goluchowski, Prizren, 19. Juli 1900, No. 106.

the most frequent form of urban terror prior to the bomb attacks of the 'judgment days' in 1911-12. By 1905 these rural marches became widespread, exerting political pressure on the government; more and more often political demands were also formulated.³⁸⁰ So did the frequency of violent acts grow – the authorities had no chance of handling this after the prohibition of Djemal's method.³⁸¹

Here is an example of this phenomenon. On 4 September 1901 a young Muslim Albanian from Djakova, Bajram Zup, murdered the Serbian Andrija in Üsküp. After a feast celebrating the sultan, Bajram went to a coffee house located in front of the Serbian school. There he heard Andrija celebrate Serbia and the Serbian ruler ("*žiliva Srbija, živio srpski kralj*"). Then Bajram (who must have known some Serbian) insisted on celebrating the Sultan too, for which Andrija replied by shouting "*živio krst*" ('hurrah for the cross'). The Albanian then went out for a moment, returning with a gun (where did he get it so quickly, as it is evident that he did not take it into the coffee house?) and shot Andrija – as testified to by 10 (!) Serbian witnesses (the Albanian must have been a daredevil). Then he left the place unharmed. The Serbian Sava from Ferizaj was also wounded when he tried to intervene.³⁸²

Another typical phenomenon was the harassment of the Orthodox population by Catholic Albanian policemen. To take revenge for this, Orthodox men of the reformed gendarmerie began to harass Catholic Albanians in those places where the traditionally Catholic police (*fandi*) had been removed as a consequence of the reforms. The Catholic priests soon objected to the Ottoman authorities and to the Austrian consulates, and asked for the return of Catholic Albanian policemen.³⁸³ The Powers recognised that reforms could only work if the policemen of a certain religion only patrolled in districts where the religious composition of the population was the same. Ethnically mixed patrols proved ineffective.

Conflicts stemming from border positions

The social role of firearms in traditionalist peripheries made conflicts stemming from border positions one of the prevailing types of problem in the Prizren sanjak, though not in its classical sense: despite the growing ethno-religious tensions culminating in raids and border clashes, there were also examples of deep-rooted cross-border

379 ÖStA HHStA XXXVIII/ Kt. 399/1, Rappaport to Goluchowski, Prizren, 19. October 1899, No. 204 and 24. October 1899, No. 211; Kt. 399/2, Muthsam to Goluchowski, Prizren, 1. April 1900, No. 49 and 5. Juli 1900, No. 95.

380 ÖStA HHStA VII/ Fasz. 433, Pára to Calice, Üsküb, 4. April 1903, No. 81.res.

381 ÖStA HHStA VII/ Fasz. 433, Zambaur to Calice, Mitrovica, 1. Mai 1905, No. 10.

382 ÖStA HHStA VII/ Fasz. 433, Pára to Calice, Üsküb, 4. September 1901, No. 114.

383 ÖStA HHStA VII/ Fasz. 433, Zambaur to Calice, Mitrovica, 28. Mai 1904, No. 30.

cooperations driven by economic interests. The peculiarity of the situation here (unlike in the Skopje Sanjak) was that economic interests were able to prevail over ethno-religious tensions – which in the long run proved to be detrimental to one of the cooperating parties.

The role of weapons has already been analyzed with regard to conflict types classified as banditry. Based on Nopcsa's account we also estimated its role in traditional societies. But weapons also played a central role for the different revolutionary groups with separatist tendencies: 270 out of the 375 of IMRO activists analyzed by Brown mention guns, ammunitions or bombs (70%).³⁸⁴ After 1903 the Ottoman authorities made great efforts to collect weapons possessed by Christians (sometimes reallocating these to Muslims or Greeks), combined with a tactical amnesty for those who willingly handed them in (they were listed and later kept under observation as potential *četa* members). But in 1903 only 1886 rifles, 227 revolvers (the military leaders and the IMRO internal police used them, as well as teachers and agitators) and some 54,000 cartridges were collected, alongside 369kg of dynamite and 183 hand grenades (these were developed together with *Armenian dashnyaks* and soon became part of the weaponry of the regular infantry), or, in other words, only 5% of stocks estimated by McGregor at 40,000 guns in October 1903.³⁸⁵

The diversity of weapons collected reveals the (various) channels of IMRO to acquire them: 1400 of the weapons collected were (obsolete) Russian Krinka used in Bulgaria, 120 were Gras used in Greece, 92 were Martinis used by the imperial army and 41 were Mannlichers, also from Bulgaria. The latter were considered modern, and probably reached Macedonia through Boris Sarafov, who was military officer in Bulgaria. One of the persons investigated by Brown, Iljo Lokardev from the village of Setino, alone transferred 350 rifles from Bulgaria to Macedonia – as ordered by Sarafov.³⁸⁶ 25% of the persons analyzed (originating from South Macedonia) were involved in smuggling weapons (Gras), hidden in charcoal, from Katerini to Capari, where the weapons were handed over to the local teacher Simon Trajkov.³⁸⁷ However, the Gras rifles were old and no match for the official Ottoman weaponry. The Turk authorities had some knowledge of this activity:³⁸⁸ after the *attentat* in

384 Brown, *Loyal unto Death*, 145.

385 We have detailed data from Skopje in 1906, when 3000 firearms and 410 bombs were conscribed by the IMRO activists themselves. As Macedonia was composed of at least 10 sanjaks, multiplying this data by 10 makes McGregor's estimation seem realistic. Биярски, Цочо and ИваБурилкова, eds., *Вътрешната македоно-одринска револуционна организация. (1893–1919). Документи на централните ръководни органи. Vol. 1. Архивите говорят*, 45. Sofia: Universitetsko Izdatelstvo Sv. Kliment Ohridski, 2007. 608–609. No. 209.

386 Brown, *Loyal unto Death*, 148.

387 Brown, *Loyal unto Death*, 151.

388 *Ottoman Diplomatic Documents* I. No. 345. 0.4.09.1912. The Greek authorities from Trikala warned the Ottoman authorities that 10 new Gras rifles and 21 bayonets and 1890 bullets had been smuggled by Bulgarian bands.

Salonika in 1903, Ottoman troops besieged Capari village, immediately killing 13 men who were trying to hide the weapons. But this did not mean the end of this trade route: in February 1907 Greek paramilitary troops killed fifteen charcoal burners in Katerini, perhaps to cut off the supply line of non-Greek bands. In 1902 the Bulgarians wanted to smuggle 600 rifles of the Carnica system to the bands.³⁸⁹ Official Bulgarian authorities were generally lenient towards smuggling and recruitment.³⁹⁰

Though the Albanians were considered enemies by the revolutionary organizations – not because they were Muslims, but rather because they were monopolizing the *zaptie* and gendarmerie positions, and under the pretext of pursuing illegal practices they became involved in numerous outrages and abuses – they were also involved in supplying IMRO. Among the 594 political prisoners granted an amnesty in March 1903, there were also 18 Muslims arrested for selling firearms to the Christians.³⁹¹ They were able to acquire better weapons than those provided by the Bulgarians or Greeks (which were heavier and less accurate than the Martinis used by Ottoman forces). Even soldiers were involved in smuggling. This was a widespread phenomenon: even Ludwig von Thallóczy, a leading diplomat and historian of Austria-Hungary, mentions such purchases *en masse*. The unpaid Muslim soldiers of Plevlje sold more than 25 thousand weapons to the Montenegrins (non-believers and their future enemies) just before the outbreak of hostilities in 1912.³⁹² The Macedonian Dimitar Boyadzhiev from Monastir persuaded an Ottoman soldier to bring him army rifles and promised 600 piastres for each (a Greek rifle was about 400 piastres, while old Werndl rifles could be bought for less than 50 piastres). Weapons from the Martini replica factory in Tetovo could be obtained for as little as 150 piastres from reservists, Brown writes.³⁹³ (The USA sold tens of thousands of Martinis to the Ottoman state in the 1870s, but at the turn of the century these were just exchanged for German Mausers. Martinis then became the weapon of the reservists, the *redifs*.) A good Martini, not a replica – a mark of authority and power –

389 *Ottoman Diplomatic Documents* I. No. 356. 18.04.1902.

390 *Ottoman Diplomatic Documents* I. No. 416. 13.10.1902.

391 Brown, *Loyal unto Death*, 153. After the first successful bargain was done, activists no longer had reason to fear, because this bargain discredited and compromised the vendor too – Albanians or Ottoman foot soldiers rarely betrayed their business partners to the authorities, as they would have suffered imprisonment themselves.

392 As witnesses from the starving Turkish troops retreating to Bosnia early in November 1912 (numbering 1300 men) reported. *Országos Széchenyi Könyvtár (Budapest)*, Kézirattár, Fol. Hung. 1677, Néhai Dr. Thallóczy Lajos osztályfőnök hátrahagyott iratai sztenographált részének átírása, Bosniaca, VIII/6. 395. [The diary of Ludwig von Thallóczy Sektionschef], cited hereinafter as Thallóczy.

393 Brown, *Loyal unto Death*, 153.

cost 1500 piastres if sold illegally, equivalent to the gross six-month wage of a charcoal-burner or village farmer, or to the price of 4-6 cattle.

What was the benefit for Albanians or foot soldiers in this risky transaction? Cash. Ottoman authorities lacked money, and even military salaries were regularly delayed by several months (see the quotation from Thallóczy).

Beside the numerous individual initiatives, the organized selling and smuggling of weapons also became part of the strategy of small states. The Montenegrin authorities permanently fuelled banditism along the border through selling weapons illegally, thus sharpening local tensions in order to tie down as many of the regular Ottoman forces as possible with local calamities like chasing bandits. Smuggling weapons to the Orthodox population could only be successful because the Albanian tribes of the border mountains had a vested interest in this business, as they also obtained their share from the ammunition and weapons. The consequences of this were (1) the increasing number of available weapons in civilian hands, which did not increase public security, and (2) the formation of a supranational smuggling network directed from Belgrade and Cetinje. It was these actions that made it possible for Bajram Curri and Isa Boletini to increase their local power to authority on a regional scale – as reported by Austrian consuls.³⁹⁴ In contrast, the Greeks pursued a different strategy, with Greek authorities trying to cooperate with the Ottomans in order to hinder the smuggling of Greek weapons to Macedo-Bulgarian bands. In 1902 they arrested 27 'Bulgarians' in Trikala and seven of them admitted that they were members of the revolutionary organization.³⁹⁵

The cooperation of Albanian leaders and the Montenegrin authorities was so fruitful, Albanian beys were even hosted by Serbian or Montenegrin authorities after their temporary failures - without having to fear extradition to the Empire.³⁹⁶ Through arming and financing Muslim groups (and not only Slavs), the South Slav states were gradually able to divert the Albanians' attention from fighting against local Christian dwellers towards rebellion against the Ottoman authorities. This could happen due to the previously mentioned traditionalism of the rural masses, which manifested itself in opposing those governmental attempts that were targeted to deprive these communities of their old, local privileges. During the Young Turks' rule in 1911, even bands composed of Serbs fighting for their co-religionists and

394 ÖStA HHStA VII/ Fasz. 433, 1897-1905 (pallium); ÖStA HHStA XXXVIII/ Kt. 399/1, Rappaport to Goluchowski, Prizren, 18. Mai 1899, No. 101. They participated in smuggling and also in the purchase of weapons.

395 *Ottoman Diplomatic Documents* I. No. 367. 08.06. 1902.

396 Among the 3,000 ethnic Albanians hiding in Montenegro were leaders from Old Serbia, Isa Boljetinac and Suleyman Batusa. A memorandum (*Red Book*) was sent from Cetinje to the Great Powers and the Young Turks demanding recognition of the Albanian nation and autonomous Albania. Bataković, *The Kosovo Chronicles*

conservative Albanians fighting against the constitutional regime (which was preparing for the abolition of traditional Albanian privileges and customary law, even though the CUP had previously managed to mobilize these masses on its side by promising to preserve these traditional customs) crossed the borders of the Empire to fight jointly! Though their aims were radically different, their enemies were – temporarily – common. This phenomenon was also reported by official diplomats.³⁹⁷

The weapon supply became regular by 1911 - Isa Boletini not only smuggled but also received a huge amount of weapons³⁹⁸ - which pushed the peripheries into the stage of permanent revolt, fitting the Serbian concept which focused on the immense destabilization of the Empire at any cost – even by supporting their enemies, the Albanian landlords (who later turned against them and fired on Serbian troops with Serbian weapons). The organizer of these transports arriving from Serbia was probably Petar Kostić, the secretary of the metropolite of Prizren. Thus the involvement of the Church became also evident; this was even recognized by the Ottoman authorities.³⁹⁹ Among the 'local agents' of Kostić were many priests, who served as mediators between the Albanian bajraktars and the secretary. These clergymen even participated in the transportation of weapons (in Dibra for example), arriving from Serbian military depots in Vranje and Kragujevac. Weapons given to Albanian rebels were stored in the monasteries.⁴⁰⁰ As Kostić constantly informed the Serbian authorities about his activity, it was easy to trace the route of that weapons; this is why the repossession of these in 1912, during the Balkan Wars, was so successful (nonetheless, the aggressive behavior of Serbian troops participating in the 'pacification' of occupied areas could be also convincing).⁴⁰¹ On the other hand, the joint participation of the inhabitants of Dibra in the smuggling of weapons explains the ameliorating relationship and the willingness to cooperate between Albanian and Slavic leaders (see the Albanian-Macedonian revolt in the autumn of 1913 against the Serbs).⁴⁰²

397 ÖStA HHStA VII/ Fasz. 433, Tahy to Goluchowsky, Mitroviza, 24. March 1911, No. 6 and 29. April 1911, No. 10.

398 On the connections between smugglers and their direct effect on the war see: Kriegsarchiv, MKFF, Kt. 193., Gellinek to Conrad, Belgrad, 2. December 1912, B.No.1600 res. 1.o. In fall 1911, Boljetinac requested arms from Serbia, and the Montenegrin government proposed to Belgrade to aid the insurrection, before another power benefited from it. Fearing that Austria-Hungary would introduce the army to restore order in the Kosovo vilayet, the Serbian Prime Minister Milovanović refrained from official support.

399 *Ottoman Diplomatic Documents* I. No. 718. 18-19.05.1903. The metropolitan of Dibra was arrested, because in his escort compromising letters and smuggled weapons were found.

400 *Ottoman Diplomatic Documents* II. No. 1878. 12.01.1912.

401 ÖStA HHStA, XXXVIII/ Kt. 405, Prochaska to Bertchtold, Prizren, 27. August 1912, No. 86. This knowledge probably urged his fate during the Balkan Wars (see the Prohaska-affair).

402 Георгиев, 'Спомени на Евгим Янкулов', 119–129; Георгиев, 'Бежанският въпрос', 39–67.

Yet we can trace the origin of weapons even further back. In 1902 the Austrians proposed to sell 20,000 old Werndl rifles to the Serbs – asking only 6 francs for each (Werndl rifles were at the time in the system only in Austria, and thus the place of origin seems to be evident).⁴⁰³ Based on their price these must have been completely obsolete, thus unsuitable for any regular army, and so it was evident that the weapons would be handed over to irregular bands, like the Bulgarian band of Stanchev.⁴⁰⁴ Another Ottoman diplomatic report warns that smugglers with Austro-Hungarian citizenship tried to send ammunition to IMRO through legally operating economic enterprises.⁴⁰⁵ Even the Albanophile diplomat Thallóczy admitted – through his agent, the Albanian Zurani – that weapons were smuggled into Albania from Austria-Hungary with the knowledge of Austrian authorities in 1912-13.⁴⁰⁶

Thus it is not surprising that by the beginning of 1912 public security collapsed. The war with Italy and the internal debates within the CUP ruined the communication between local *müdirs*, *beys* and *bajraktars* on the one side (more embedded in the host society) and high-ranking *kajmakams* on the other (who were usually considered by local people as a 'corpus separatum' or outsiders representing the government). Thanks to its numerous modern (repeater) guns, the Drenica region became fully autonomous: their Albanian inhabitants sacked the Priština Sanjak, usually targeting Orthodox (Serb) villagers, collecting the harvest, animals, and clothes. The complaints were either ignored or the central government lacked the power to intervene. Not only *beys* but even smaller bandits became untouchable. The central power retreated to the towns, but even here the population began to arm itself for the sake of its own safety. Roads between the towns were controlled by Albanian bands turning into permanently active paramilitary troops, who even clashed with other bands if those entered their territory. This meant that the supplies sent to towns began to decrease – private trade declined, and only those supplies managed to make it that were escorted by the army, the activity of which soon became limited to this task instead of the reinstatement of order – so wrote the Austrian ambassador, Pallavicini.⁴⁰⁷ The rural region became emptied, while besieged towns were not able to provide food and shelter for immigrants, who acted as further destabilizing factors in urban areas. Society had to find alternative ways to survive without the help of the state.

403 *Ottoman Diplomatic Documents* I. No. 357 25.04. 1902.

404 *Ottoman Diplomatic Documents* I. 450. 06.12.1902.

405 *Ottoman Diplomatic Documents* I. No. 717. Usko Santori cement factory owner, former k.u.k. officer forwarded ammunition and letters to the IMRO hidden in sacks of cement.

406 Thallóczy, IX/1. 544–45.

407 ÖStA HHStA VII/ Fasz. 433, Tahy to Pallavicini, Mitroviza, 3. January 1912, No. 2.

V. Local strategies of coexistence and survival, the politics of neighbouring states and the attempts of the Ottoman government and Great Powers to restore peace

As the present study does not aim to analyse *all* the social fault lines within the nationalities of the Sanjak of Skopje, in the following we will discuss the behaviour of only four communities. The first is the activity of the Young Turks in power, the second is the strategy of Serb communities as minorities in the sanjak, the third is the support policy of Bulgaria toward Macedonia (and against Serbia) and the fourth is the response of local (mainly exarchist) communities to the socio-economic developments in Macedonia.⁴⁰⁸ In doing this we apply the technique of zooming gradually from the macroeconomic situation, macrosocial strategies and government-level responses towards microsocial strategies at a community and individual level.

Scratching the surface: exit strategies – symptoms of economic breakdown or of collapsing public security?

Emigration as a social strategy, as a response to the deteriorating circumstances was partly driven by the wave of violence and partly by the shortage of incomes. According to the selected sources of Austro-Hungarian archival documents, the political situation in Kosovo vilayet, despite the escalation of violence, was only secondary as a driving force: the economic situation had a greater effect on migration processes. The latent economic problems were also key factors in the timing of the Ilinden uprising earlier in 1903 (see below). Economic and political problems were inseparable, as we pointed out, but the Ottoman state tried to find solutions only for the latter, which might explain its ultimate failure.

The USA became a target destination for inhabitants of Kosovo vilayet only after 1906; prior to this most of the early migrants traditionally moved to other regions of the Ottoman Empire as seasonal workers or to neighbouring states (*pečalbari*), where they were often infected by or fell victim to nationalist agitation (see later).⁴⁰⁹ The

408 On Young Turk–Macedonian relations between 1908 and 1912 see Hacısalıhoğlu, Mehmet. *Die Jungtürken und die Mazedonische Frage (1890-1918)*. München: Oldenbourg, 2003, 184-187, 214-224, 240-245, 309-317, 366-372.

409 On the former, see the articles of Stoytcheva, Stanislava. On the *pečalbari* see Calic, or the numerous complaints of the Bulgarian consul concerning the (often forcible) Serbianization of Macedo-Bulgarian employees working in Serbia. Stoytcheva Stanislava. 'Season Work Migration as a Factor in the Development of the Bulgarian Population in Prespa and Bitola in the Early Twentieth Century', *Macedonian Review* 30, no. 4 (2007): 47-76. (in Bulgarian); Stoytcheva, Stanislava. 'The Bulgarian Family in Macedonia Between Two Centuries: Aspects of the Crisis (1897-1902)'. In: *Proceedings of the Bulgarian Historical Society*. IHS-BAS, Vol. 41,

emergence of the USA as a new, *overseas* destination for the inhabitants of a *landlocked* country clearly indicates the desperate situation of inhabitants.⁴¹⁰ Most of the emigrants were Catholic or Orthodox men from the uneducated lower classes. Hardly any of them had a qualification (e.g. as a tailor or stonemason). Most of them were agricultural labourers working for daily wages and in almost constant motion for years. As employment possibilities shrank, many decided to settle overseas to earn their 'two dollars a day',⁴¹¹ which was quite a lot compared to their earnings (around two francs a day) in the Ottoman Empire. Another tendency was that expatriates came mainly from administrative centres where agencies for emigration also operated (Skopje, Tetovo, Lipljan), or from settlements along railway lines. On the one hand these areas also suffered from relative overpopulation (population density was not the highest, but still high compared to the sustainable capacity of the region). On the other hand these were often contact zones of nationalities, where violence was more frequent. Thus the different motives for emigration are often inseparable: both circumstances contributed to the phenomenon. Economic decline – the high proportion of uncultivated land – can be interpreted either as cause, or as a consequence. But the tendency that it was mainly men who left their place of living clearly tells us their emigration should be considered temporary, not permanent, and was mainly inspired by employment. From Kosovo vilayet, emigrants left Europe from Fiume (Rijeka) and Hamburg (which is why Austrian sources provide information on this topic). The procedure cost around 500 francs (equal almost to the yearly wage of an untrained industrial worker or a day labourer in agriculture).⁴¹²

This social strategy – including forced and unforced migration – had long-term economic and ethnic consequences. The shortage of manpower resulted in the escalation of violence, as no one was able to defend the households left without adult men. The originally cheap Macedonian labour wages (in Bulgaria it was more than two francs a day in agriculture) were also increasing, which endangered the profitability of large, market-oriented *čiftlik* estates. These were partly based on the cheap labour force and partly on the high retail price of wheat prior to 1873/78. But after Argentina, Russia and the USA appeared in Western markets as wheat exporters, prices began to fall. The landlords tried to exert pressure on the producers to earn a profit, but on the one hand this generated *četa* activity and on the other it led to the mass migration described above. Finally, many landowners were forced to

in print; Calic, Marie-Janine. *Sozialgeschichte Serbiens*. München: Oldenbourg, 1994. 180-182; ИЛДА, ф. 315к. оп.2. а.е.10. л. 7.

410 For Greeks it had been an obvious destination for decades.

411 ÖStA HHStA PA, VII/Fasz.434, Lukes to Pallavicini, 20.02. 1909., No.19/pol, 8.

412 Ibid.

sell the land to the peasants, but these often lacked real purchasing power, and needed credit to purchase land. This amount of money could be provided by private persons (this often meant usury, and thus indebtedness) or could be obtained from the agents of small states using money as an instrument for nationalistic propaganda. As the case of Pusta Bresnica shows (as discussed later),⁴¹³ tenants tended to buy the landowners' land using foreign loans, and in turn they offered their loyalty to the small states allocating credit also for this purpose (beyond creating schools and building churches).

In order to halt the aforementioned unfavourable phenomena, the officials and landlords of Kriva Palanka made several efforts to bring Muslim Albanian settlers from the western part of the vilayet to replace the emigrants. This also explains the presence of Muslim Albanians in Kočani. Unfortunately, this decision weakened public security even further by imposing new cultural patterns (the abundance of customary law with new types of conflict) on an 'accommodated' society. The Bulgarian state officially objected to the settling of *muhadjirs* on territory inhabited by Slavs,⁴¹⁴ while according to Bulgarian sources the number of those Slavs leaving Macedonia for Bulgaria increased to 20-30,000.⁴¹⁵ Their property was often distributed among the newcomers. Emphasizing the misery of refugees was a good technique either to draw the attention of the Great Powers in order to enforce intervention or to justify Bulgarian interference in the course of events. It is not surprising that in 1895 the Bulgarian Nachovich claimed that there happened to be 65,000 Macedonian refugees in Bulgaria in addition to those who had acquired citizenship.⁴¹⁶

It is also important to emphasize that in the process of discouraging peasants who finally decided to emigrate, not only economic processes played a decisive role, but also the frequent harassment of agitators and bands, who pillaged this region, and intimidated landlords, as well.⁴¹⁷ Their activity was focused on recruiting from among the peasants and destroying the harvest, thus weakening the economic basis of the Ottoman ruling class.⁴¹⁸ Nevertheless, these raids also ruined the economic basis of peasantry as on *čiftlik* estates, because the crop was usually shared 50-50% between the tenant and landlord.

413 ЦДА, ф. 335к. оп. 1. а.е. 402. л. 8-10.

414 *Ottoman Diplomatic Documents*, II No. 1808. 23.06.1910.

415 *Ottoman Diplomatic Documents*, II No. 1829. 04.09. 1910.

416 *Ottoman Diplomatic Documents*, I. No. 161. 10.07. 1895.

417 *Diplomatische Aktenstücke*, 166-174. No. 160. 29. 04. 1906.

418 ÖStA HHStA PA, VII/Fasz.434, Pára to Styreca, 31.05.1905., No.55/pol, 7. and Rappaport to Calice, 27.06.1906., No.61/pol., 12.

The macroeconomic situation before 1903 and attempts at reform

It became evident by the turn of the century that Macedonia was unable to supply more people at the given technological level without dramatic (positive) changes in its internal (socio-economic) structure. The obsolete economic structure of the region is marked by the fact that in the Kosovo vilayet 50% of the central income still came from the tithe, while in the more industrialized Saloniki vilayet and Monastir this was 25-30%.⁴¹⁹ Similar values were typical in Bulgaria – but prior to 1878! Grain exports were stagnating, while crop imports grew from zero to 30 thousand tons yearly between 1895 and 1905.⁴²⁰ While in the 1850s 20-25% of the crop per household was exported, this figure fell back to 5% in 1900. Compared to the significance of land revenues, that were increasing, crop production was stagnating, and the price index was also decreasing (*Table 21*). As the number of agricultural workers was decreasing, too (at this time Macedonia was in a phase of reindustrialisation, and silk exports were increasing compared to crops), these unfavourable conditions for the budget could only be balanced by the increase of per capita tithe revenues. This 70% increase in the per capita tax burden within 10 years was the main reason for the increase in central revenues (and not prices or yield), but this overtaxation also contributed to the outbreak of the Ilinden uprising.⁴²¹ The per capita tithe was similar to that in North Bulgaria prior to 1878 (including a tax rate of over 12%), but the circumstances were different: the peasants of Macedonia were living mostly in *čiftliks* and had to face other obligations toward the landlord, while North Bulgaria was dominated by free estates in a period of a crop boom.

Table 21. Central income from tithe in Macedonia between 1890 and 1903

Year	Tax income in million piastres	Rural population in million	Tithe per capita in piastres	Crop price index	Tax burden index	Crop production in million tons	Crop production per rural person in tons	Index of tax burden per capita
1888-1890	41.5	2.04	20	100	100	1.1	0.5	100
1901-	58.3	1.7	34	85	200	1	0.6	170

419 *Diplomatische Aktenstücke*, calculated based on 166-174. No. 160. 29.04.1906.

420 Akarli, Ahmet. 'Growth and retardation in Ottoman Macedonia 1880-1910.' In: *The Mediterranean Response to Globalisation before 1950*, edited by Şevket Pamuk – Jeffrey G. Williamson. London: Routledge, 2000. 121.

421 The Ilinden uprising was considered a 'Bulgarian' uprising by Austrian diplomats. Austrian diplomats wrote about Bulgarian agitation and provocation, blaming it for the failure of the reform plans handed in prior to the uprising, as a response to the Ottoman initiative at the end of 1902. The 1903 plans to reform Macedonia (together with the unrealized Ottoman initiative) urged IMRO and the Bulgarians (as they considered the reform plans insufficient) to intervene prematurely. *Diplomatische Aktenstücke*, 14. No. 12. 01.09. 1903.

1903								
------	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--

Akarli, A.: 'Growth and retardation in Ottoman Macedonia 1880-1910.' In: *The Mediterranean Response to Globalisation before 1950*, edited by Pamuk, Sevket - Williamson, J.G. London: Routledge, 2000. 121.

To have a better understanding of the economic conditions dominating the region after 1908 (and thus of their consequences for society), we have to go back in time to analyze the attempts at the reorganization of Macedonia after the Ilinden uprising. Beyond the restoration of public order (which was quite unsuccessful, as shown in previous sections), other efforts of the international mission in 1903-1907 are also worth an analysis, as it originally planned more than a simple reorganisation of the gendarmerie. The official stance of Austria-Hungary and Russia as supervising Powers was that their mission was to promote self-governance, to establish modern administration, and to implement a new taxation system, in order to restore the economic viability of the European provinces – based on the Cretan experience (1867-1897). The introduction of a modern taxation system was openly targeted to relieve the population of a heavy tax burden (over 15-20% of incomes,⁴²² while this was under 10% in the neighbouring Bulgaria, representing another pull factor).

The problem with this was that, despite the higher tax rate in Macedonia, central incomes were not higher than in Bulgaria. Per capita taxes in Macedonia did not exceed the Bulgarian levels of thirty years earlier (in 1866 it was 27 piasters per person, and in 1867 it was 34 piastres) – not even during the era of increasing tax pressure (1880-1903). The basic problem was that (1) the Bulgarian figure was calculated during the grain prosperity characterized by high wheat prices, thus - supposing the same yields/ha in the two regions - the tax in Bulgaria was also proportionally lower relative to income (while peasant incomes were higher). (2) Furthermore, the Bulgarian tax rate decreased after 1878, while it increased in Macedonia. It is not surprising that the social structure of Bulgaria was so attractive to Macedonian Slavs. (3) As the population of the two regions was nearly the same (2 million) the Ottoman central income from Macedonia in the 1900s did not even exceed the Bulgarian values of the 1870s! This not only suggests the lack of progress, but – as yields/ha were the same, while in Macedonia grain prices decreased – it meant that in order to produce this same amount of state revenue a higher tithe rate had to be adopted. And when the need for higher central income met with the goal of the Powers to decrease burdens and stop pauperization (and to stop increased migration also serving as a source of urban banditism), this generated antagonism.

⁴²² *Diplomatische Aktenstücke*, 119-120. 27.09.1905.

Furthermore, the activity of the Powers also implied huge costs. According to the Powers the spread of violence was partly the result of the abundance of Albanian paramilitary troops that participated in sanctioning the Ilinden uprising.⁴²³ These *çetas* persisted and later also acted as auxiliary troops for the Ottoman authorities when the latter were unable or unwilling to intervene in the course of events. Therefore the Powers insisted that the proportion of Christians in the gendarmerie should be set in line with their proportion of the population, instead of the general 20% prescribed by the original Ottoman plans. Considering that in Edirne vilayet only 10% of the gendarmerie was Christian at the end of the 1890s, this step was to enhance the security of local people.⁴²⁴

The involvement of local people in *gardes champetres* (*militia*) was a new and welcomed element, but one that failed, for several reasons. The successful application of ethnically mixed troops was hindered by the low number of international supervising officers. The increase in their numbers was challenged by the Ottoman authorities, claiming a lack of financial sources, which was true. The critical situation is best illustrated by the fact that the governor of the provinces, Huseyn Hilmi pasha, often asked the Allatinis, the owners of the greatest milling company in Salonica, to continue providing bread supplies to the army without getting paid for months because of the financial situation. The government even asked for new loans from the Allatinis to settle earlier debts.⁴²⁵

After the first failures in using ethnically mixed gendarme troops, the Powers decided to organize ethno-religiously homogeneous troops. But it seemed to be a mistake to apply the principle of nationality: this generated discontent among the local population, who – together with the small states – expected that the next step would be the reorganization of reformed vilayets according to the principle of nationality, which implicitly meant dismemberment rather than autonomy. This assumption enhanced *çeta* activity: both the Ottoman Turks (besides the existing but least ethnicized Albanian bands) and Greeks formed their own paramilitary troops to represent their interests.⁴²⁶ These regarded international officers and Christian gendarmes as foreign intruders who were working for the destabilization of the Empire rather than re-establishing law and order. These bands with different aims were successfully unified by the CUP, which learned much from the tactics of

423 *Diplomatische Aktenstücke*, 9. No. 5. 04.02.1903. Calice to Goluchowski.

424 *История на българите в документи* I/2. 35. és 38

425 See: Yosmaoğlu, *Blood Ties...*

426 Autonomy was refused by both groups – the Greeks were propagating the dismemberment with a favourable outcome for the Hellenes, while local Muslims were sticking to the present administrative borders which were unfavourable to national groups.

IMRO.⁴²⁷ On the other hand, the IMRO groups' stance was that no matter whether these troops were preparing for dismemberment or strengthening central power, both were detrimental to the interests of local people. The gendarmerie had no real legitimacy and social support, which is not surprising, knowing that persons like Adem Zaimi (who kidnapped merchants) were among their ranks as officers (he was appointed after committing a political murder!).

Unfortunately, not only would the reform of the gendarmerie fail, but so too would the introduction of a new taxation system, for a number of reasons. The numbers of the gendarmerie never exceeded 80% of those proposed (*Table 22*), just as the amount of taxes collected never exceeded 75-80% of the original plans,⁴²⁸ and the number of policemen was not higher than in territories with a traditional gendarmerie. Even diplomats were short-sighted or ill-informed. Contrary to the consular statistics analyzed in Chapter III, official reports in 1905 wrote of successes. The then military attaché of Austria-Hungary, Giesl, reported to Calice, ambassador at Constantinople, that Bulgarian bands had calmed down, including IMRO and the Tsonchevists. Although he mentioned a clash between Serbian and Bulgarian bands (Petralica in Egri Palanka, 13 June, and Belan in Kumanovo, 17 June), this was put down by official Ottoman forces. The Bulgarian border was silent, he wrote (no trespassing of foreign agitators or troops was observed). Giesl had seemingly no knowledge either of other Austrian statistics on everyday violence or of the conscription of IMRO weapons from 1906. These are good examples of the limited interaction between the different organizations of Austria-Hungary. Since military attachés were subordinated to Conrad von Hötzendorf, they relied on different information sources and thus were not aware of all events.⁴²⁹

Table 22. Theoretical and real numbers of the gendarmerie in reformed and intact areas

Reformed gendarmerie	Theoretical numbers					Real numbers				
	officer	1st class	2nd class (local)	mounted	total	officer	1st class	2nd class (local)	mounted	total
sanjak										
Saloniki	46	1121	186	195	1502	40	781	141	173	1095
Seres	14	374	34	79	487	15	292	33	70	395

427 Hacisalihoğlu, *Die Jungtürken*

428 *Diplomatische Aktenstücke*, 152-154. 28.02.1906. No. 153.

429 It is also possible that these optimistic reports were to calm down public opinion and the diplomatic corps (the British wanted to intervene in Macedonia from 1906, claiming that the activity of the Powers was a complete failure). Both Benjámín Kállay, Joint Minister of Finances and Gustav von Kalnoky, Joint Minister of Foreign Affairs, mentioned previously: "... the only problem with our diplomats in the Balkans is that they always report what I want to hear"; "Austrian agents are not driven by ideologies or the wholehearted support of the empire; most of them are driven by the desire to live a safe, calm life and be promoted as soon as possible." See Kállay, Béni. *A szerb felkelés története, 1807-1810*. Vol. 2. Edited by Thallóczy Lajos. Budapest, MTA, 1909. (Appendix: Kállay Béni utazásai Szerbiában és Boszniában), 258.

Drama	10	154	65	42	261	9	123	49	45	217
Monastir-Kastoria	31	811	73	147	1031	27	612	84	138	834
Skopje	32	800	157	87	1044	24	540	153	77	770
Total	133	260	515	550	4235	115	2348	460	503	3311

Traditional gendarmerie	Theoretical numbers				Real numbers			
	kaza	officer	infantry	mounted	total	officer	infantry	mounted
Gürüd	11	242	64	306	10	230	58	288
Elbassan	8	201	32	233	10	197	32	229
Dibra	11	247	28	275	15	227	27	251
Serfidje	23	475	98	573	23	441	93	534
Pristina	23	509	73	582	23	488	73	561
Sjenica	11	231	73	304	10	226	72	298
Ipek	14	309	44	353	10	284	43	327
Prizren	17	354	54	408	15	337	51	388
Total	118	2568	466	3034	116	2427	449	2876

As the part of the reforms, the new tax system was based on fixed amounts, replacing the *iltizam* system. 1 *dönüm* of land in Skopje sanjak (750-900m²) was charged 1.5-8 piastres yearly for 5 years.⁴³⁰ According to this newly introduced system, the average tithe in Monastir kaza fell from 3.4 million piastres in 1899-1904 to 2.4 million piastres (collected with 87% effectiveness); in Skopje and Saloniki kazas it remained 1.3 million piastres in each, collected with 75% efficiency. Contrary to these efforts, in 1905-1906 more than 2500 men left Monastir kaza, while in the previous year only 1000 had done so: these numbers indicated persistent instability.

One may come to the conclusion that the burdens of the peasantry were decreasing from 34 piastres per capita to 13-21 piastres. But the vilayet budgets made it clear that the situation was not becoming easier: together with the arrears collected, the tithe reached 20-28 piastres per capita. This means that *per capita tax revenues were still not lower than in Bulgaria* (which was overtaxed under favourable external circumstances with peaking grain prices, while in Macedonia 30 years later prices were declining). Macedonia remained overburdened (*Table 23*). Furthermore, while the yearly total income in the three vilayets of Macedonia was as high as 190 million piastres in 1905/1906, expenditure was even greater, rated between 253 and 267 million, resulting in huge deficits.⁴³¹ *While earlier the centre was able to finance its needs from the incomes of the periphery* (that was the main cause of protests in Bulgaria prior

430 *Diplomatische Aktenstücke*, 119-120. 27.09. 1905.

431 *Ottoman Diplomatic Documents*, II. No. 1193. 03.03. 1905.

to 1878 – 60% of provincial income was not spent within the boundaries of the provinces),⁴³² after the turn of the century it was the periphery sucking money from the central government. The deficit was due to high military expenses, which constituted 50% of the spending,⁴³³ while the share of civil expenditures reached only 31%.

Table 23. Tithe and total income in millions of piastres in Macedonia

	Income from tithe in 1903/4	Income from tithe in 1906	Income from tithe per person, per family	Income from arrears (1903)	Income from arrears (1905)
Monastir	12.3	11.1	13 and 78 piastres	7	4.3
Kosovo	23.4	22.3	21 and 120 piastres	5.3	4.3
Saloniki	21	20.3	21 and 120 piastres	3	2.9

Expenses, 1905/1906, millions of piastres	Civil expenses	Military expenses	Affectation	Total
Saloniki	33.3	50.2	26	109.5
Kosovo	27.1	55.6	1,6	84.3
Monastir	24	42	7.8	74
Total	84.5	148	35.4	268
<i>Total for previous year</i>	74.5	143	36	254

Income, 1905/1906 millions of piastres	Tax	Tax arrears collected	Total	Population and tax per capita and per family (6 persons)
Saloniki	70	7.8	77.9	1.1 million: 63 piastres, 350 piastres
Kosovo	49	7.9	56.9	1 million: 50 piastres, 300 piastres
Monastir	42	8.4	50.8	0.95 million: 44 piastres, 250 piastres
Total	161.4	24.2	185.6	50 piastres, 300 piastres

Collected and calculated from: *Diplomatische Aktenstücke*, 166-174. Nr. 160. 29.04.1906.

Prevailing agrarian (social) problems after 1903

Economic conditions did not seem to improve after 1903. As the account of Boris Nedkov in 1904 reveals, although the tithe remained 12%, in Macedonia other

432 On the other hand, this meant social care and education were financed by the Church, which managed to give cohesion to society.

433 In another frontier region, Deir-es-Zor, 1500 piastres per capita was calculated for a soldier and 4000 piastres for a gerdarme. The latter value is much higher than that measured in the consolidated Bulgaria in 1859. The gendarmerie incurred higher costs in frontier zones.

contributions had to be paid by peasants over and above those that were customary in Bulgaria:⁴³⁴ while the military exemption tax was 37 *grosh* (*piastres*) per family in 1896, it increased to 60-110 *grosh* by 1910 and school tax increased from 1.5% to 6%.⁴³⁵ Furthermore, most of the peasants were tenants on *čiftlik*, and so any crop produced was halved (after paying the tithe and subtracting the seeds) between producer and landowner. Christians remained in a minority in the local governments. The existence of tax farming was another shock for local tenants: in Küçük Sejmen (Silivri) the right of collecting the state tithe was sold for 50 thousand *piastres* in 1910 (the extent of the land was 5000 *kile* sown crops equalling 500 hectares), but the tax farmer collected 70 thousand (+40%), which gives a tax rate nearing 18-20% instead of 12%!⁴³⁶ Of course this would not have been a problem at all if production had increased. But it did not. As *Table 24* confirms, in most cases the production rate measured relative to seeds sown did not exceed 6:1, referring to 1.2 tons of wheat/ha, which was not higher than in the 1870s (*Table 24*). Together with the low wheat prices compared to other products, the output per hectare remained around 200 francs, which is why IMRO and thousands of peasants themselves turned to more profitable cultures like poppy (opium) and tobacco. The latter produced an income exceeding 1000 francs/ha (*Table 25*). Even smallholders could make profit from this activity, though it was labour-intensive and the lack of public security had a deteriorating effect on yields.

Table 24. Incomes, peasant productivity and tithe revenues in the village of Küçük Sejmen in Thrace (Silivri okolie), 1912

Total land in sown <i>kile</i> *	Fallow land or pasture	Peasant	Sown wheat in <i>kile</i>	Price of sown crop in <i>grosh</i>	harvest in <i>kile</i>	Production rate	Value of crop harvest in <i>grosh</i> , output per ha (francs)	Tithe in <i>kile</i>	Tithe in <i>grosh</i>	Tax as % of crop	Unit price of 1 <i>kile</i> (20-25 kg)
30	4	Stavri Nikolov and 7 children	11	330	100	1:9	2600 (350)	19	488	18	26
120	15+45	Ivan Trendafilov	28	952	150	1:5.5	4500 (225)	19	562	12.5	30
30	4	Todor Dimitrov	14	476	75	1:5 (1 t/ha)	2325 (230)	10	290	12.5	31
40	18	Petko Tanev (kmet,	18	648	120	1:7	3120 (250)	15	390	12,5	26

434 Like road construction tax was 16 *piastres* or 4 days *corvée* yearly.

435 *История на българите в документи*, I/2. 94. ЦДА, ф. 321, оп. 1. а.е. 1984. л. 150–168.

436 Разбойников, А. 'Чифтлицы и чифтлигари в Тракия преди и след 1878г.' In *Известия на Института за История* 9 (1960): 176–177. This equals at least 500 tons of wheat, multiplied by 150 francs/ton unit price, equalling 75 thousand francs in total. Thus the 70 thousand *piastres* equalling 14 thousand francs make for a tax rate 20% on this as cultivated by tenants.

		mukhtar)								
--	--	----------	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--

Based on Разбойников, А. 'Чифтлици и чифтлигари в Тракия преди и след 1878г.' In *Известия на Института за История* 9 (1960): 175-176.

*assuming 1 kile sown crop (25 kg) for 1.5 dönüm (1400-1500 m²), a land of 30 kile sown crops equals nearly 4.5 hectares.

Table 25. Income from tobacco around 1910.

Region	Settlements	Peasants (1000)	Land in 1000 dönüm	Yield in 1000 tons	Value in 1000 francs	Land (dönüm) per peasant	Yield / peasant in tons	Income per peasant (franc)
Kavala-Nevrokop region	425	36.7	128.45	15	19909	3.5	0.40	542.5*
Xanthi-Deridere region	492	28.6	134.42	6,8	10350	4.7	0.23	361.9

1 dönüm is about 0,1 ha. *Data calculated from Strauss, *Großbulgarien*, 64-66.

The data of Bulgarian school inspector Vasil Kanchov highlights that the average income of a family (though using various resources, this reflected a strategy adapted to the local social and geographical circumstances) without animals or grapes varied between 1000 and 3000 grosh/family, and displayed a regional diversity (Table 26). By comparison, in the *çiftlik* of Küçük Seymen 2500–3000 piastres were calculated for units of 4–6 ha in 1910.

Table 26. The regional distribution of the value and composition of rural incomes in Macedonia, 1890s

1890	Sown grains in uvrat,	Grain output in oke	Sown tobacco, poppy, cotton in uvrat,	Tobacco, poppy, cotton output	Population	Grain output (oke/uvrat)	Other output	Grain oke / prs.	Other product oke/ prs.	Income / family in piastres
Seres kaza + Nigrita	325,600	33,000,000	30,000	1,200,000	88,000	101	40	375	13.6	2796
Zikhna kaza	55,000	7,100,000	470,000	1,650,000	32,600	129	3.5	218	50.6	2991
Demirhisar kaza	100,000	8,400,000	12,000		50,000	84		168	0	1028
Petrich kaza	116,000	12,000,000	11,000	606,000	39,000	103	55	307	15.5	2043
Melnik kaza	52,000	6,300,000	3000	86,000	26,000	121	28	242	3.3	1965
G. Dzhumaja kaza	80,000	8,200,000	18,000	550,000	29,000	102	30	282	19	1983
Nevrokop kaza	200,000	23,000,000	7000	550,000	76,300	115	78	301	7.2	1723

Based on Kanchov, Vasil. *Makedonija. Patopisi*. Sofia, 2000.

1890	Horse, oxen	Sheep, goat, pig	Animal / capita	Animal / capita	Wool in oke	Vineyards in uvrat	Grape in oke	Grape (oke/dönüm)	Grape / capita (oke)
Seres kaza + Nigrita	180,000	380,000	2.05	4.32	180,000	25,000	12,500,000	500	142
Zikhna kaza	12,000	153,000	0.37	4.69		6880	4,000,000	581	123
Demirhisar kaza	14,000	194,000	0.28	3.88		6500	3,000,000	462	60

Petrich kaza	25,000	116,800	0.64	3.00		1200	480,000	400	12
Melnik kaza	8700	81,000	0.33	3.12	30,000	13,600	5,440,000	400	209
G. Dzhumaja kaza	30,000	123,000	1.03	4.24					0
Nevrokop kaza	3800	186,000	0.05	2.44					0

1 kg grape is 0.1 franc or 0.5 *grosh*. 1 oke of tobacco = 6–10 *grosh*. 1 uvrat here = 1000 m² = 1 dönüm.

Beyond these legal practices, illegal burdens also overloaded the peasantry in Macedonia. In Mavrovo (Tetovo *kaza*), when landlords collected the 12% tithe on hay *in cash*, they calculated using a price of 20 *paras*/oke instead of the real market price (6-7 *paras*).⁴³⁷ This way the 12% tithe was in fact 30%. In Novo Selo (Štip), the 10 households had only 30 hectares of cultivated land, while the landlord had 40 hectares. Both the state and the landlord taxed the population (the so-called *gospodarlik*), and the tax per household was 700 piastres. Assuming three hectares of sown land per household (supposing no fallow land), this gives three tons of wheat yearly with a total of 450 francs of income (2250 piastres). This means that the tax rate was over 25% here as well.⁴³⁸

Another abuse was the use of coercion against the smallholders to sell their land if they were unable to pay interest on loans (usually usury). Though the market price of one hectare was 10 Liras, Spas Iliev was forced to sell his four hectares in Mlado Nagoričano (Kumanovo) because of his debt of 6 Liras; Trayko Stoyanov also had to sell his land of 5 hectares because of a 12-Lira debit. The land was bought by Muslims, but the difference between the debt and the income from selling the land was not paid. With the exception of 1878, land was never sold so cheaply! Since the peasants did not want to pay the illegally increased *beglik* tax (animal tithe), a landlord, Jusuf bey, hired out the whole pasture used by the Christian community for *muhadjir* refugees. In the village of Kumaničevo, according to official Muslim records, not a single *čiftlik* had existed, but a bey from Nevrokop played the role of the local landlord, collecting 25% of the harvest, and the local peasantry had no idea that this duty on them was charged illegally.⁴³⁹

These economic problems remained unsolved during this period, and contributed to the decline of general trust. This misery encouraged migration for work, known as *gurbetčijstvo*, *pečalbarstvo*. With his family of 10, Apostol Georgiev paid 300 *grosh* of tithe on his 1.5 hectares of land (a tax equal to 20-25% of the land revenue),⁴⁴⁰ plus 60 *grosh harač* (military poll tax); his brother paid the same amount, plus 60 *grosh vergi*

437 *История на българите в документи*, I/2. 80–81. and ЦДА, ф. 321, оп. 1. а.е. 1616. л. 2–13.

438 *Ibid.*

439 *История на българите в документи*, I/2. I/2. 88.

440 1.5 ha = 1500-2000 kg wheat = 1350 *piastres* (300 francs).

(income or property tax) and 65 grosh *beglik* on the 10 goats, which brings the tax rate to 35%. Certainly the remainder of the crop was not enough to feed ten persons. The yearly wheat consumption of a person ranged between 200 and 250kg, and so for 10 persons at least 2.5 tons of crop was needed, while a maximum of two tons were produced on such a small parcel, worth 300-400 francs. This wheat income equalled the yearly 70-100 silver Lira *surplus* that Macedonian emigrants sent home from America.

So, beyond the religious and ethnic diversity of the area, the economic situation was another reason why the Macedonian question could not be solved by peaceful propaganda transmitted by religion or education: the population was looking for alternatives which would solve their everyday social and economic problems, and was ready to exploit its fluid and amorphous national consciousness in order to secure its material interests. On the other hand, the illiterate rural population did not have time to contemplate nationhood; only coercion or pragmatic interests yielded results from them.

The response to the challenge I: The central government and local society

Tactical elements of *çeta* origin in the activity of the CUP

After the failure of the Powers (1903-1908), the Young Turk (CUP, Committee of Union and Progress) revolution tried to resolve the problems. The Ottomans also adopted the methods of revolutionary organizations: in 1908 military officers committed to the CUP decided to organize 'Ottoman national bands' on the model of the Greek, Bulgarian and Serb bands, with similar rhetoric and agenda, partly to gain popularity among the villagers and partly to cope with the problem that most of the levied soldiers would not agree to their ultimate goal (constitutionalism).⁴⁴¹ When the revolution began, adjutant-Major Niyazi Bey, who commanded a battalion in his native town, Resen, could only count on nine of his soldiers: it is not surprising, then, that he started preparations to form a guerrilla band. When the rebel group began its march to the hills, it was composed mainly of civilians or agents of the CUP: many of the 160 volunteers thought that they were chasing a Bulgarian band (deception and bluff was also one of their favourite tactics) and did not know anything about the

⁴⁴¹ Young Turk officers did not trust their own troops enough to involve them in the insurrection. The average soldier was loyal to the Sultan. Enver Bey, for example, travelled in disguise and tried to avoid contact with troops or gendarmes. He did not take any troops with him and raised a volunteer force in the Turkish-speaking villages of the Tikvesh region.

real goals. At first sight these events refer to a spontaneous act as Ramsaur believed, but other circumstances confirmed that the CUP in fact implemented the conspiratorial experience of IMRO.⁴⁴² Niyazi's decision to move to the mountains instead of engaging in urban guerrilla warfare was encouraged by the fact that he was an Albanian of origin and a member of a landowner family, and so had good connections with the neighbouring Albanian villages. The rural support might be surprising, because the CUP comprised about 2,000 members in all of Rumelia at the time, nearly all of them urban, and, according to Enver (the other leader of the insurrection), the CUP had no foothold in the villages. On the other hand, few of the large landowners who lived in the town and were CUP members, remained very influential in 'their' villages, and their *traditional influence* mobilized the villagers.

So, the revolution seems to be a movement organized from above, relying on classes that only partly shared the leaders' aims. The CUP leaders were modernists and constitutionalists, while their supporters were traditionalists. How could these officers mobilize the support of the villagers? Abstract rhetoric on constitutionalism would not have worked. Instead they appealed to villagers' discontent at a government that imposed heavy tax rates, but did not deliver either services (i.e. roads, schools; they were using IMRO's rhetoric)⁴⁴³ or protection from the armed bands. Niyazi managed to get the approval of the head of the Topulli clan, claiming that his revolutionary troops were 'patriotic Ottoman groups'. The rebels constantly emphasized that the country was in danger and that foreign (Christian) control would mean the end for the Muslim 'majority' in Macedonia and that the government would do nothing to hinder this.

The religious aspect was as important as the ethnic one: when Niyazi sent his first soldiers into the villages, he ordered them to recite prayers. Later the rebel officers tried to reassure the Macedo-Bulgarian population that the movement was not aimed against them, and called upon Bulgarian bands to join them, but his initial success was partly due to the supposed action against the 'infidel' bands.

So, the tactics and behavior of the CUP really resembles IMRO, with some exceptions (like the composition of the leadership, dominated by the urban elite and its success). The interlocking of imperial and illegal networks (or, from other aspect, the different survival strategies of members of the same family) was also observable:

442 Ramsaur stated that the Young Turk uprising developed spontaneously in several places at the same time and that the central committee of the CUP in Salonica had not masterminded it. But Hanioglu pointed out that as early as mid-June instructions had been sent to CUP branches to prepare for insurrection and that officers were given permission to form bands (*çete*). Enver Bey in his memoirs wrote that he was provided with instructions, money, and texts for proclamations. See: Zürcher, *The Young Turk Legacy*.

443 As this appeared in the rhetoric of both parties, this confirms that this was a real problem for all inhabitants of the region.

the CUP leader Enver pasha's brother-in-law, Nazim bey, was the leader of the authorities investigating into the CUP (he was even wounded in 1908, prior to the revolution).⁴⁴⁴ The CUP also had its own executioners and was able to react quickly to avoid the emergence of other movements with different aims that could threaten its success: Atif [Kamçıl] eliminated a very dangerous opponent of the Young Turks, Şemsi Pasha, who could have mobilized Albanians against them.⁴⁴⁵ His successor (Tatar Osman Pasha) was kidnapped by another troop led by Adjutant-Major Eyüp Sabri, supported by Albanians. The CUP had a broad and well-organized network by that time: agents even worked successfully among the ranks of the reservists sent from Aydin to Macedonia as reinforcement to put down the revolt.

It is also interesting how the independent movement of the Albanians, beginning on 5 July (two days after Niyazi had escaped to the hills) and working for completely different aims, was treated and misled. The gathering at Firzovik, as Zürcher writes, was a spontaneous affair, triggered by rumours that the Austrian army was coming to the South. As some railway engineers did appear in the settlement to mark a proposed Austrian railway line, their presence gave credence to the rumours. Soon the number of those gathered increased from 3000 to 20,000, led by Nexip Draga and Bajram Curri. Ottoman officers led by Galip Bey were sent by the government to persuade the demonstrators to disband and return home, but as Galip Bey was an active member of the CUP, he managed to convince the gathering to take an oath (*besa*) to the constitution, arguing that only a constitutional regime could avert the danger of foreign intervention. In his rhetoric he promised the implementation of *sharia*, the abolition of compulsory recruitment, the reinstatement of the right to bear arms, in short, a return to the era before Hamidian centralization.⁴⁴⁶ Niyazi also managed to force local clans to declare a truce in their blood feuds in order to unite their forces – so they usually relied on old traditions while promoting the establishment of a new system.

444 Ramsaur, Aksin or Feroz Ahmad attribute the revolutionaries' decision to start an open rebellion in June 1908 primarily to the fact that the Porte was getting very close to discovering the CUP underground network (similar to the reasons for the Ilinden uprising in 1903!). The news from the Reval meeting was of secondary importance. The activity of the imperial spy network was increasing and they managed to infiltrate the Macedonian army through the system of regimental chaplains (*alay müftüsü*). Ahmed Bedevi Kuran sees the increased activities of the Bulgarian, Serb and Greek bands as the main factor that made the CUP (and illegal activity) attractive to officers of the Third Army. He says that it was the Reval meeting that forced them to increase their activities. More recent authors, Aykut Kansu, Şükrü Hanioglu and Gawrych, all seem to agree that the rebellion was originally scheduled for a later date. Zürcher, *The Young Turk Legacy*.

445 The volunteer officers (executioners) were organized as a separate unit and continued to do dirty work after the revolution. During the Balkan War, they were charged with setting up an independent Muslim republic in Western Thrace.

446 Malcolm, *Kosovo*, 238.

One of the remarkable changes of these times was that the pre-existing *national character* of the movements had after 1908 become by far the most dominant source of conflict (alongside economic and social problems). Though the *denominational identity* in some cases still manifested itself in both the Christian and the Muslim communities (e.g. after an attack on a shrine, or following the funeral of a prominent leader of the irregular troops),⁴⁴⁷ it was more common that the *consular reports discussed the received information from an ethnic approach* (Bulgarian, Serbian, Albanian).⁴⁴⁸ The national character of movements increased in the Kosovo vilayet, too, where previously traditional forms of ethno-religious conflicts had dominated. The CUP functioned as a Trojan horse for traditionalist communities, transforming them while promising a return to old times. As the bulk of Albanians were still conservative in their views (regardless of the growing ethnicization among their ranks), they could be mobilized only for goals, that were carefully designated and planned by the Young Turks. Such were the obscure demands of the constitution (under which most Albanians still understood merely the assurance of their privileges, rather than legal equality or civil rights) or the protest against the penetration of the Powers – as these were recognized by the representatives of Austria-Hungary. The by-product of the instrumentalization of these Albanian mass gatherings was usually violence, where the gathered groups of different origins tried to settle old scores as well.⁴⁴⁹

CUP policy towards national minorities

In the light of the above, is not surprising that Albanians were overrepresented in the new Parliament (almost half of the deputies from the Balkans were Albanians), but it is also worth mentioning that parliamentary deputies after the elections of 1908 were predominantly independent and liberals, and not CUP members. (Hamidian conservatives had only one mandate – as most of the Albanians refused the centralization efforts of Abdülhamid, this is not surprising). If we accept that parliamentary elections more or less reflected the real political balance of power (which often had nothing to do with real ethnic proportions) then we have to point out that the Young Turks' power in the Balkans remained fragile and unconsolidated: only 22% of the deputies were members of the CUP and they could

447 ÖStA HHStA PA, VII/Fasz.434, Adamkiewicz to Pallavicini, 27.11.1909, No.83/pol, 6 and Heimroth to Eduard Otto, 14.10.1910, No.73/pol, 8.

448 On Ottoman reform movements and violent responses see: Frantz, 'Zwischen Gewalt,' 350-369.

449 ÖStA HHStA VII/ Fasz. 433, Zambaur to Pallavicini, Mitrovica, 20. Juli, 1908, No. 45.

achieve a majority only together with the Liberals (33%).⁴⁵⁰ Any split between these factions could result in the collapse of this unstable situation. On the other hand, 16-16% of deputies were Greeks and Turks, revealing the ethnic preferences of the CUP leadership, while Bulgarians had only 10%, clearly indicating both the low rate of acceptance of the CUP among Exarchists and the distrust of the CUP towards Macedo-Bulgarians. This warns that the ceasefire concluded between IMRO and other groups in 1908 was more a freezing of the conflict rather than a final settlement of disputes (Table 25). 60% of Young Turk deputies were ethnic Turks, while liberals and independents were dominated by ethnic Albanians (56-56% respectively). Albanians and Greeks were equally divided between liberals and independents, while Turkish deputies were CUP members (75%) or liberals (25%) (Table 27).

Beyond the evident ethnic pattern the support of CUP showed regional characteristics as well. The CUP had strong positions only in the Saloniki Vilayet, where six of the 13 deputies were CUP members, i.e. six of the ten Macedonian CUP deputies was elected in the southern (most developed) region. Among the 15 deputies of Monastir Vilayet, only two were CUP members, compared to the five liberals and seven independents, while in Kosovo Vilayet the CUP won only one mandate out of 17. The regional distribution of the liberals was more balanced: four mandates from Saloniki, five from Bitola, and seven from Kosovo.

Table 27. The ethnic background of the political palette in Macedonia after the elections of 1908 – the capacity of the national groups to assert their individual political interests

MP*	Turk	Greek	Bulgarian	Jew	Vlach	Albanian	Serbian	Total	%
Young Turk	6		1	1		2		10	22
Liberal	2	4				9	1	16	33
Socialist			2					2	5
Independent		3	1		1	9	2	16	33
Total	8	7	4	1	1	21	3	45	100
%	16	16	10	2	2	48	7	100	

+1 conservative Albanian.

MP*	Turk	Greek	Bulgarian	Jew	Vlach	Albanian	Serbian	Total
Young Turk	xxxxxb		a	x		ab		10
Liberal	xx	xxaa				aaabbbbbb	b	16
Socialist			xx					2
Conservative						a		1
Independent		xaa	b		a	aaabbbbbb	ab	16
Total	8	7	4	1	1	21	3	45

a: Monastir vilayet; b: Kosovo vilayet; x: Saloniki vilayet

Based on: Hacısalioğlu, *Die Jungtürken*, 253–56.

450 Data from: Hacısalioğlu, *Die Jungtürken*, 253–56.

As a consequence of the revolution, the leadership in charge of the vilayets was transformed. While old and experienced bureaucrats were (re)placed in distant parts of the Empire, in the first few months following the 1908 Young Turk revolution this south-eastern part of Kosovo vilayet remained relatively calm. What made this possible was not so much the talent and aptitude of the new Young Turk officials as the merits of Pasha Hadi, the energetic new governor.⁴⁵¹ In the Skopje sanjak he maintained peace by creating his own local intelligence network. He aimed to collect compromising information on all potential members of the opposition (clerics, clerks, teachers, journalists, *çeta* leaders, national clubs, etc.). When minor incidents occurred, he used this information to arrest those people and thus to prevent major demonstrations (either against the state or against another community).⁴⁵² However, as he made no attempt to solve real problems, like reducing social tensions and discussing neglected but relevant political and economic issues, he had no chance of preventing the eventual collapse of state power in the region.

This policy was not very constructive. The CUP also tried to create a supranational organization of its supporters, and, when this failed, it was keen to reach an alliance with some of the nationalist groups. As this also proved futile in the long run, the CUP returned to the old practice of 'divide and rule'.

After the victory of the CUP, in 1909 four national clubs were allowed to operate in Skopje: the Serb, the Bulgarian, the Young Turk and the Albanian.⁴⁵³ The first two represented the radical nationalism of the neighbouring states; the latter two were closely related, due to personal connections and overlaps. During the autumn of 1909, the leadership of the vilayet attempted to create a civil supranational 'Ottoman Club' that would incorporate anybody willing to cooperate with the CUP regardless of their ethno-religious ties, and thus the club could serve as a means of communication between the CUP and radical national associations. The goal was to demonstrate and promote the possibilities of rapprochement between the nationalities and central authorities; furthermore, it could serve as a means of hindering propaganda against the government.⁴⁵⁴ Although among Macedo-Bulgarians IMRO and the Verhovists had an overwhelming majority in the countryside,⁴⁵⁵ many of the urbanised Bulgarians in Skopje tended to cooperate with

451 ÖStA HHStA PA, VII/Fasz.434, Lukes to Pallavicini, 05.10.1908, No.69/pol, 24.

452 ÖStA HHStA PA, VII/Fasz.434, Adamkiewicz to Eduard Otto, 30.5.1909, No.44/pol, 8 and Adamkiewicz to Pallavicini, 14.01.1910, No.3/pol, 6.

453 For the history of clubs and their relations with one another, see Hacısalihoglu, *Die Jungtürken*, 213-47.

454 ÖStA HHStA PA, VII/Fasz. 434, Adamkiewicz to Pallavicini, 09.07.1909., No.49/pol., 8 (Beilage, 5).

455 ÖStA HHStA PA, VII/Fasz.434, Adamkiewicz to Pallavicini, 05.05.1909., No.40/pol., 12.

the central power.⁴⁵⁶ Beyond this plan was the idea that the key element to restoring security and tolerance in the region was an appeasement with the most radical organisations (Serbs, Bulgarians), while the aspirations of peaceful minorities could be neglected,⁴⁵⁷ since only the organisations of these two radical nationalities were able to exert pressure both on irregular troops and on peaceful organisations.⁴⁵⁸ The legal framework for creating an Ottoman Club was the so-called 'Ottoman Law' that pointed out that the empire was constituted only of the Ottoman nation (in which every subject or citizen of the state was incorporated), and therefore only Ottoman associations and clubs could be regarded as legal. Clubs organised on a national basis were soon considered illegal and prohibited.⁴⁵⁹

But the efforts to organise a supranational Ottoman club remained futile. Christian national clubs neither wanted to appease with each other, nor agreed to be organised in a supranational organisation. Negotiations were delayed by the lack of real local respect for the CUP. The lack of trust increased further from 1909, when the central government was – unlike during the period of supervision by the Powers – unable to pay its officials and the gendarmerie in the countryside in time. This resulted in the loss not only of efficiency, but also of influence. Central power nearly drifted on the brink of collapse in local centres.⁴⁶⁰ The CUP had to change its tactics to gain success in stabilizing public order.

In order to keep conflicts within certain boundaries, the CUP tried to persuade local Serbs and tolerant urban Bulgarian associations to cooperate with each other against IMRO and the Verhovists.⁴⁶¹ But this also failed. Then it tried to focus only on Serbs, to sharpen antagonism between Serbs and Bulgarians (detailed in another chapter, told from the Serbian point of view). This was successful, but not enough.

Then, in the late spring of 1909, the radicals of the Young Turk leadership shifted their focus of interest to Muslim policy, inasmuch as they became more open towards fanatical religious urban groups. They initiated secret negotiations with the local denominational leaders in secluded mosques. The Young Turks' idea was to create a secret Muslim organization modelled on IMRO, with its own regulations, which could organize trustworthy and able Muslim men into combat teams after the Christian fashion. They planned to store the necessary weapons in the mosques. With

456 ÖStA HHStA PA, VII/Fasz.434, Rappaport to Calice (from Üsküb), 04.28.1906., No.36/pol., 10. és 1906.6.27., No.61/pol., 12; Ibid. Ranzi to Calice (from Monastir), 28.06. 1906., No.28., 5.

457 ÖStA HHStA PA, VII/Fasz.434, Lukes to Pallavicini, 26.03.1909., No.33. pol., 8.

458 ÖStA HHStA PA, VII/Fasz.434, Adamkiewicz to Pallavicini, 05.05.1909., No.40/pol., 12.

459 Krause, Albert Gottfried: *Das Problem der albanischen Unabhängigkeit in den Jahren 1908–14*. Wien, 1970, 60–61.

460 ÖStA HHStA PA, VII/Fasz.434, Lukes to Pallavicini, 20.02.1909, No.19/pol, 8.

461 ÖStA HHStA PA, VII/Fasz.434, Adamkiewicz to Pallavicini, 05.05.1909, No.40/pol, 12. and ibid. Adamkiewicz to Eduard Otto, 05.30.1909, No. 44/pol, 8.

this step the Young Turks wished to win the allegiance of the fanatical Muslim communities, to suppress the moderates within the party, and to prepare for an open armed conflict in the vilayet, which, for many members, now seemed unavoidable.⁴⁶²

The demands of rural Muslim landowners also needed to be tackled, however. Restlessness was primarily on the increase in the Serbian and Bulgarian border *kazas*, as these areas were virtually ruled by irregular Verhovist troops or by IMRO, where the tension between Muslims and Christians escalated the most.⁴⁶³ The leaders of Skopje sanjak understood that the peripheral kazas had slipped out of their control, and from the spring of 1909 they started to distribute weapons to the Muslims from army warehouses. This happened after the Ottoman beys of the countryside had threatened the military leaders that unless they armed the Muslims, the beys would call up the Albanians and hire them to break into and rob the warehouses.⁴⁶⁴ The distribution of weapons from military storage did not remain a secret – the Bulgarian government officially repeatedly objected to these attempts, which the Turks refused to admit.⁴⁶⁵

The opening towards fanatical Muslims and the arming of Muslims along the border is interesting, since, in 1908, thanks to the provisory armistice between the CUP government and IMRO, the safety of Muslims seemed to be less under threat than in earlier periods. Even the annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina did not have a decisive impact on the security of Macedonian Muslims. Muslims were convinced (such as some autonomist Macedo-Slavs were) that an Austrian annexation was still a better solution than a Serbian one. Muslims in Skopje even hoped that the annexation would create a wave of emigration among Bosnian Muslims, and new settlers in the Sanjak of Skopje could change the religious proportions in favour of the Muslims.⁴⁶⁶ Beyond their lack of training, these hopes can also explain the hesitation and passivity of regular soldiers to hinder the outrages and pogroms in Štip in 1911.

The CUP did not elaborate a new policy towards the Albanians in the Sanjak of Skopje: Albanian national clubs were considered merely as attachments or branches of the Young Turkish clubs. The CUP continued its policy of assimilation based on common religion by refusing Albanian cultural demands like the Latinized alphabet in 1908.⁴⁶⁷ But, unlike in Prizren Sanjak, serious conflicts between Albanians and

462 ÖStA HHStA PA, VII/Fasz.434, Adamkiewicz to Eduard Otto, 30.05.1909, No. 44/pol, 8.

463 Ibid. and Adamkiewicz to Pallavicini, 07.03.1910, No.15/pol, 5.

464 ÖStA HHStA PA, VII/Fasz.434, Lukes to Pallavicini, 26.03.1909, No.33. pol, 8; Heimroth to Pallavicini, 04.11.1910, No. 80/pol, 3.

465 ЦДА, ф. 331к. оп. 1. а.е. 351. л. 2-3.

466 ÖStA HHStA PA, VII/Fasz.434, Lukes to Pallavicini, 20.02.1909., No.19/pol, 8. and 26.03.1909., No.33/pol, 8.

467 ÖStA HHStA PA, VII/Fasz.434, Adamkiewicz to Pallavicini, 05.05.1909., No.40/pol, 12.

Young Turks did not emerge in Skopje Sanjak.⁴⁶⁸ And, unlike in Tetovo, Gostivar, Prizren and other regions where a violent religious (Catholic/Orthodox vs. Muslim) conflict evolved even among Albanians (alongside conflicts with nationalities) that had to be tackled, in the Skopje Sanjak no major fault lines emerged within Albanian society.⁴⁶⁹

CUP policy towards the Orthodox Church

The CUP administration of the sanjak was totally powerless⁴⁷⁰ in the debate over the school question. Between 1903 and 1908 many settlements decided to join the Exarchate in Southern Macedonia. How did this shift from the jurisdiction of the Patriarchate to that of the Exarchate take place? Very often local teachers decided to teach Slavic without the knowledge of the metropolitans of the Patriarchate – simply because Greek grammar based on *katharevusa* was unfamiliar for them (many Greeks spoke *dimotiki* dialect), not to mention the illiterate masses. Patriarchist communities sometimes demanded Slavic-speaking teachers – they did not consider this as separatism (they were still thinking in ethnoreligious categories), but the Greek extremists did think it so. Local Slavs often refused the inauguration of teachers appointed by the Patriarchate because of threats from ‘Bulgarian’ bands. In this case the metropolitan’s threat of involving the local Ottoman authorities only escalated the conflict: local people immediately turned to the authorities too, which were unable to decide. The whole process resulted in a mutual decline of trust, respect and authority, while villagers would ultimately turn to the Bulgarian bands because of the impotence of the state and ecclesiastical authorities, who were unable to defend them from the outrages of the *četas*. The Exarchy also changed its policy, and from 1901 on it promised native speaker language teachers for settlements seceding from the Patriarchate.

As the owner of the buildings (new schools and churches were not allowed to be opened, owing to a former agreement on the status quo), the Patriarchate responded by closing down schools and churches and inviting Greek bands to the contested zones. In addition to these conversions, which violated the status quo, abuses were also numerous. Exarchist priests around Prizren reported that, on 31 October 1909 in Kraklinno (Bitolska), the Greek vladika Vasilios closed down the Bulgarian church, even though it had been consecrated by the exarchist Gennadiy in 1878, and the

468 ÖStA HHStA PA, VII/Fasz.434, Adamkiewicz to Pallavicini, 07.03.1910., No.15/pol, 5. and 05.05. 1909., No.40/pol, 12.

469 ÖStA HHStA PA, VII/Fasz.434, Adamkiewicz to Pallavicini, 09.07.1909., No.49/pol, 8.

470 ÖStA HHStA PA, VII/Fasz.434, Lukes to Pallavicini, 20.02.1909., No.19/pol, 8.

founding *firman* had given the church to the local exarchist community (in 1910 the village had 53-57 exarchist households and 7 Greek households, see *Table 28*). The village seceded from the Patriarchate in 1904, but the church was used by patriarchists until the intervention of Havzi pasha. Although the church was given to exarchists in 1908, one year later villagers complained once more of patriarchists using the church and expelling exarchists.

Table 28. The religious (ethnic) composition of some villages where atrocities (mentioned in the text) took place

Bitola kaza	Exarchist households	Patriarchist households	Exarchist nufuz	Patriarchist nufuz
Kraklinno	53	7	354	61
Dihovo	54	15	394	111
Kopadurishta	44	20	336	235

ЦДЛ, ф. 331к оп. 1. а.е. 309. л. 29.

In Dihovo four exarchists were killed by an *andartis četa* in 1909 because the six Greek households demanded the right to use the local church. Despite considerable Hellenic pressure, the number of Grecophile households rose only to 15 by 1910 (when conscription took place), while there were still over 50 exarchist households.⁴⁷¹ Dihovo was not just a simple village, but a significant rural industrial centre and an excellent example of *ethnic conflicts induced by economic activity*.⁴⁷² Deconcentration of the textile industry was very characteristic of Macedonia at the time, and the village of Dihovo sold 340 000 metres of aba cloth to the Ottoman army as early as in 1883. 120-250 local and commuting women and children worked for the factory of Bogo Anesti, resident in Monastir, who wanted to penetrate the Bulgarian and Serbian markets. The engines came from Samokov, while the capital was from Saloniki and Skopje merchants, which meant the involvement of circles with different political backgrounds. By 1910 four factories operated in the village, each with 250 workers⁴⁷³ (most of them not local residents). Both the method of capital concentration, the form of ownership and the ethno-religious composition of the workers would foreshadow future conflicts.

⁴⁷¹ Ibid.

⁴⁷² Compare this to the situation in Kosovo in the first half of the 19th century, which was more of a land use and social conflict that was later ethnicized. Even extreme nationalists accepted that the conflict in Kosovo was not merely ethnic. Bataković, *Serbia's Kosovo Drama*, 49-50. Economic interests were also capable of diminishing ethnic differences, as the cooperation in the smuggling of firearms proved.

⁴⁷³ See: Gounaris, Basil K. *Steam over Macedonia 1870-1912: Socio-economic Change and the Railway Factor*. New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1993.

Table 29. The situation of exarchist households in Southern Macedonia before the reforms (1909)

	Jenidje-Vardar kaza (households)	Exarchists	Patriarchists	Patriarchist Slav	Turk	Gypsy	Vlach	
čiftlik	Apostol	50	30					church and school in Greek hands, Exarchists study at home
čiftlik	Alariya	12	4					twice burnt by Greeks, church closed
	Karich-Kariotina	14		12	12	9		Greek church and school
	Kadiyno-Suyutil	55						
čiftlik	Sveti Georgi	20						Exarchist from 1903 on
partly čiftlik	Sarbegovo	32			27			church closed
čiftlik	Mandalevo	15					17	church closed
	Babyan	26					20	church closed, school just opened
čiftlik	Sarikad-Vadrishta	90			10			2 churches closed, 1 school open one closed
čiftlik	Vehtipazar-Eskidje	30						church closed, school just opened
čiftlik	Krushare-Armutich	55						seceded in 1903-ban, church closed, school opens now
	Kornishor	90						seceded in 1903-ban, church closed, school opens now
	Radomir	48						first school opens
mainly čiftlik	Pilurik	31						church closed
	Damjan	16						school opened 2 years ago
čiftlik	Litovoja	30						school closed
čiftlik	Livadishta-Suyabakadji	26						joint use of church
čiftlik	Konikovo	13						seceded 20 years ago
	Grubevci	40	1					seceded 20 years ago
čiftlik	Girakarci							seceded 14 years ago
čiftlik	Livanovon	20					6	church open
partly čiftlik	Toshilovo	40						exarchist teacher is the same as earlier during Patriarchist rule
partly čiftlik	Tumba	85						seceded 18 years ago, school established then
Bulgarians in čiftliks	Babakovo-Babaköy	50			20			seceded 15 years ago
	Orizari	50	10	12				
čiftlik	Valgat	24						seceded 10 years ago school, church

Извори за българската етнография, 77-87.

Despite the numerous conversions and reversions between the Patriarchate and the Exarchate, official Ottoman policy after 1903 was to refuse to acknowledge any change⁴⁷⁴ – in order to mitigate the pressure of guerrilla groups on church officials. But this did not work, as the above examples prove – sometimes bands were hired even by the Church to carry out their decisions, as state authorities were reluctant to accept the changes. In numerous cases, secessions from the Patriarchate were punished by closing down the church (new churches were not allowed to be built without state consent), and this gave space for the spread of exarchist schools. In many villages in South Macedonia with no active church, these new schools became the only flag-bearers of national ideology in the first decade of the century (*Table 29*). Though closing down churches made funerals and baptisms difficult, it was not able to discourage people in all cases.

Since the religious issues were intertwined with conflicts between nationalities, the Ottoman administration gave up its former stance, and tried to regulate disputes over schools and churches through the law on religion, as issued on 15 June 1910.⁴⁷⁵ The law regulated the redistribution of patriarchist and exarchist ecclesiastic property and schools based on the number of local supporters and proselytes. With this step, the government hoped to increase public security and trust in the government and also to diminish the rivalry and atrocities caused by the fact that since the beginning of the 20th century many villages had converted to the Exarchate but ecclesiastic property remained in the hands of the patriarchist clergy.⁴⁷⁶ According to the 3rd article of the new law, the local church belonged to the community that built it, provided its proportion of the population did not fall below 33%. If the proportion decreased below 33% the church and the school had to be handed over the community in the majority, the other community had the right to erect a new sanctuary. According to the 4th article, in settlements with more than one church, churches had to be divided between communities, unless the proportion of the smaller one decreased below 33%. If any community converted to a new religion after the enforcement of this law, they had the right to erect a new building for religious worship, but at their own cost.⁴⁷⁷

474 Yosmaoğlu, *Blood Ties*,

475 Similar problems occurred in royal Yugoslavia. See: Bíró László. *A jugoszláv állam 1918-1939*. Budapest: MTA TTI, 2010. 71-84.

476 ЦДА, ф. 331к. оп. 1. а.е. 309. л. 22-26. л. 76.

477 See the intentions of the Bulgarian population of Čair mahala in Skopje and their problem below. ЦДА, ф. 335к. оп. 1. а.е. 402. л. 16., 10.06.1911., and also а.е. 354. on the establishment of the church under the patronage of tv. Constantine and St. Helen in 1907.

The content of this law draws our attention on two points. First of all, with the ratios mentioned in the text, it is possible to describe ethnic/denominational proportions in the Macedonian countryside within villages and thus to compare these with the settlement-level ethnic map of the Bitola vilayet from 1899/1901 – before enforcing the law, a committee visited the settlements and registered the households based on religion (*Table 30*).⁴⁷⁸

Secondly, thanks to this new conscription, investigations could be carried out regarding former (and forthcoming) abuses, which had usually been ignored by the central government of the sanjak. Religious communities in a minority often complained about reprisals coming from the majority. In a Macedo-Bulgarian letter written to Ali Riza, President of the Parliament, it turns out that, prior to these reforms, in the last six-seven years priests assigned to other religious communities had refused to baptize the children of 'infidels' or 'secessionists' or to bury their dead. The behavior of these priests challenged "*the most sacred right of human beings – pleading for and praising God according to our own customs*".⁴⁷⁹

Unfortunately, scrupulous situations also recurred *after* the initiation of reforms, especially in territories where Exarchists remained in the minority. Very often, Exarchist communities were unable to get rid of Grecophile priests (in Southern Macedonia),⁴⁸⁰ or the majority did not acquire the right to operate the school, despite the law (Armenohori). In some cases Greeks would rather close these institutions than hand them over to Exarchist communities (Gorničevo, Krushare-Armutich, Kornishor, Pilurik, Sarbegovo and Mandalevo) (see *Tables 30-33*).⁴⁸¹ In Southern Macedonia some *çiftliks* were burnt twice by Greeks (Alariya). Now the law made it possible to open an Exarchist school based on the ethno-religious proportions. This sometimes resulted in strange outcomes: in the Exarchist Toshilovo the same teacher was appointed as under the Patriarchists (this could be explained either by the scarcity of teachers who undertook to teach in conflict zones, or more likely he was a widely-accepted teacher who had previously taught in a Slavic language).

As positive measures were unable to resolve the school problem, the government finally applied strict regulations and forbade foreigners from being schoolteachers in order to decrease foreign propaganda. This was primarily unfavourable for Serbs, because of their smaller proportions in Macedonia,⁴⁸² while 90% of the teachers teaching in Exarchist schools were of local origin.

478 Conscriptions for contested southern Macedonian areas: ЦДА, ф. 331к. оп. 1. а.е. 309. л. 23. 28-31.

479 ЦДА, ф. 312к. оп. 2. а.е. 10. л. 31. 07.11.1909.

480 ЦДА, ф. 331к. оп. 1. а.е. 309. л. 30.

481 Ibid. л. 31.

482 *Ottoman Diplomatic Documents*, II. No. 1840. 21.10.1910.

Table 30. Religious (ethnic) distribution of population in the villages of Kostursko that seceded from the Patriarchate after 1903, prior to the redistribution of ecclesiastic property in 1910.

Situation in 15.05.1910	Exarchist households	Patriarchist households	Muslim households	Total population	Year of secession from patriarchate	Number of churches	Number of schools
Nestine	32	18	20	420	1910	3	1 (Bulgarian)
Gorjanci	161	170	175	2645	1909	2	2
Gusilovo	44	8	0	295	1909	1	1
Kumaničevo	86	24	42	755	1908	3	1
Starigiani	38	20	0	455	1903	2	1
Sničani	58	23	0	420	1903	2	1
Mogila	15	7	0	115	1903	2	no school
G. Nestram	79	91	0	970	1908	3	1
D. Nestram	70	150		1320		2	2
Seligošte	24	14	120	831	1909	1	1
Rabigošte	12	5	0	97	1909	1	1 exarchist
Kalebušta	2	58	0	402	1910	2	1 not Bulgarian
Čuka	3	22	166	1909		1	1 not Bulgarian
Breznica	110	10	655			1	1
Želevo	110	110	?	1406		2 (1 exarchist)	2

ЦДА, ф. 331к оп. 1. а.е. 309. л. 74-75 and л. 35-38. (bold letters indicate settlements with details of situation after the enforcement of new law, see below)

Table 31. Disputed churches in Kay(a)larsko

Paleor (Paleohori?)	90 Christians	50 Muslims	Exarchist majority with divided school
Embore	200 Exarchist houses, 20 Patriarchist	40 Muslim households	4 churches, 2 larger, and the one outside the village is Patriarchist
Lipinci (Hassanköj)	65 Exarchist households, 6 Patriarchist, everybody visits the same church, the priest is Greek, village seceded from the Patriarchate 2 years ago, the government hinders the establishment of a school due to the fear of violence and propaganda		
Dorutovo	40-50 houses, all Exarchists except the priest, who remains in charge after the reforms		

ЦДА, ф. 331к оп. 1. а.е. 309. л. 30.

Table 32. Distribution of ecclesiastic and educational properties in Kostursko after the implementation of the new law in 1910

Disputed settlements in Kostursko	
Gorjeni	the bigger church outside the village becomes Bulgarian ⁴⁸³ property, the Grecoman majority possesses the main church in the centre of the settlement and the small one outside the village
Dolno Kumaničevo	problem remains unresolved: there is a bigger church in the village and a smaller outside the village, but there are only 3 Greek households
Gorno Kumaničevo	the church becomes exarchist property; there are no Greek households
Olissa	15 Greek households; one church becomes exarchist
Konomladi	the great church of the village becomes Bulgarian property; the 4 households with 6 Greek <i>nufuz</i> use the chapel in the cemetery
Pozdiviša	the village church becomes Bulgarian property; the 2 Grecoman households uses the chapel in the cemetery
Breznica	the old church belongs to the Bulgarians; the 11 Greek households with 74 <i>nufuz</i> may erect a new building
Želevo	the newer church belongs to the Bulgarians and one school also
Staričani	Bulgarians, constituting the majority, get the larger church, while Greeks get the smaller one outside the village
Ezerec	the church is given to the Bulgarians; the Greeks have to build a new one
Sničani	the large church belongs to the Bulgarians; the Greeks are allowed to build a new church
Čuka	the Greek majority gets the church, the 2 exarchist household may build a new one
G. Nestram	the large church is given to the Bulgarians, the Greek possess the small one outside the village
D. Nestram	the church remains Greek; Bulgarians may establish a new one

ЦДДА, ф. 331к оп. 1. а.е. 309. л. 28.

Table 33. The religious distribution of the population in Lerinsko, and the distribution of ecclesiastic property after the reforms of 1910

	Exarchist	Patriarchist households	
Lerin town	180	555	the church and the school are Greek; the Bulgarians may erect a new one
Nered	248	93	
Armenohori	54	40	school and church remains Greek
Gorničevo	174	9	small church is given to the Bulgarians, and the larger one is Greek; the school is closed down
Sorovič	57	62	school and chapel in the cemetery are Greek; the

483 Bulgarian documents use the terms 'exarchist' and 'Bulgarian' as synonyms, while Austro-Hungarian documents did not always do the same.

			Bulgarians may establish a new one
Baç	40	16	the school and the church are given to the Greeks
Srebreno	45	55	the school and the church are Greek

ЦДА, ф. 331к оп. 1. а.е. 309. л. 31. Contrary to its exarchist character, Bač in Albania was the homeland of the Serboman *četa* leader Pavle (Table 6).

The fight was fierce not only between Patriarchists and Exarchists, but even within Exarchist circles: as the metropolite was elected by the Eparchial Council, consisting of the town's elders, even the urban population (artisans) could raise their voices on ecclesiastic questions, and many supported the return of the separatist (autonomist) Theodosios, former Metropolitan of Skopje, a comrade of the autonomist Pop-Arsov.

The government also had moderate success in decreasing Christian-Muslim tensions in Prizren. Though the Ljuma region became completely Islamized, conversion to Islam as a strategy was rare from the second half of the 19th century. It threatened mainly the Orthodox, and functioned as a social strategy to avoid harassment from local (Albanian) Muslims. Better-organized Catholics, often living in clans or in tribes and supported by Austria, had a better chance of resisting Islamization *in situ*, while Orthodox people usually fled to Serbia or Montenegro.⁴⁸⁴ Conversion was sometimes chosen because it meant escape from the authorities (those who abandoned their original roots were exposed to heavy punishment from their original community): a young Serbian male decided to convert to Islam because he had killed an Orthodox person called Sava from the village of Istok, and this way he hoped to avoid the punishment. In another example (1905), an Orthodox Serbian woman from Ipek left his husband and three children to marry an Albanian man.⁴⁸⁵

The *četa* problem reloaded

The dethronement of the sultan shocked the traditionalist Albanians and they turned away from the CUP. Young Turks had no understanding for their special rights and autonomist desires, while they usually exploited the discontent among Albanian factions, when the interests of the central government were threatened – for example against the introduction of Latin Alphabet during the congress of Dibra.⁴⁸⁶ Referring

484 ÖStA HHStA VII/ Fasz. 433, Winter to Calice, Prizren, 8. November 1896, No. 171.

485 ÖStA HHStA VII/ Fasz. 433, Zambaur to Calice, Mitroviza, 1. Mai 1905, No. 10.

486 At the anniversary of the Revolution in 1909 (July), the ethnic Albanians held a congress in Debar, where the demand for introducing military obligation was rejected, and the issue of creating a separate autonomous region encircling all territories on which ethnic Albanians lived was brought up.

to external threats - the introduction of Latin Alphabet would increase the influence of Austria-Hungary and Italy, and was considered as an inimical step against the 'Ottoman thought' - was always a good tool to evade the opposing factions. But the other Albanian demands expressed in Dibra, like the abolition of recruitment and the administrative unification of Albanian areas were refused and neither *sharia* was implemented.

The first conflicts in Metohia arose in 1909 when the Turkish authorities attempted to execute a list of the population for conscription and the collection of taxes. The followers of the exiled Kryeziu and Isa Boletini (formerly the leader of the sultan's Albanian guardsmen) revolted against the central government. *Četas* – now Muslims – were soon marching against district centres.

The government sent Djavid pasha against them, who, having formerly been defeated by Albanian troops, considered his punitive operation an act of personal revenge. In 1909, commanding 5000 men, he collected the tax arrears for the last two years from everyone, destroyed 60 fortified *kula*, but he was unable to pacify Kosovo and soon was forced to retreat as in 1910 another revolt against levied taxes began.⁴⁸⁷ Gjilan was occupied by Idris Seferi, Mitrovitsa by Isa Boletini, even the Albanians of the Skopska Crna Gora revolted, but, despite their cooperation with the Kosovars, they were twice defeated by Torghut Shefket pasha and his 16,000 troops.

In order to maintain peace, the authorities had also taken steps against the broadening activity of irregular troops. At the end of 1909 the parliament in Istanbul passed a general law to abolish all irregular troops within the boundaries of the Empire. According to the law it was forbidden to set up irregular troops or to keep weapons at home. If caught, *četa* leaders were to be executed, and *četa* members to be imprisoned. The law also declared the right for the authorities to arrest the wives and the children of *četa* members.⁴⁸⁸ (These instructions were also implemented by the Serbs in 1913 after they occupied Northern Macedonia).

This measure also meant that the ceasefire between the government (that had lost its social basis in North Macedonia) and the Bulgarophile *četas* was over. The central government had no other choice in 1910 than to "solve" the problems and to collect the weapons with the help of the Imperial Army. There were many reasons for this: contrary to the military reforms of the CUP that encouraged Christians to serve in the military forces, the army still remained predominantly Muslim in character. Therefore the army was considered loyal, while the gendarmerie – much of it

487 Malcolm, *Kosovo*, 241.

488 ÖStA HHStA PA, VII/Fasz.434, Lukes to Pallavicini, 26.03.1909, No.33.pol, 8.

Christian – was not.⁴⁸⁹ The army was ordered to use force if necessary in order to disarm the civil population. The government also expected the imperial troops to collect the levied taxes of that year once again, to abolish all the (illegally operating) national clubs and societies in the three Macedonian vilayets (by arresting people, destroying buildings, burning printed products) and to temper the extremely high rate of social violence in the countryside. The second target of the military operation was to prevent a new general Albanian revolt, among other things by recruiting soldiers from the Muslim population.⁴⁹⁰

The Imperial army of Torghut Pasha, more than 50,000 men with heavy artillery, obeyed the order with the greatest possible violence as it marched from the occupied Prizren to Shkodra.⁴⁹¹ Besides collecting the weapons, the pasha wanted to terrorise the local Christian villagers. The method of the army was simple: the military troops surrounded a village, opened fire with the cannons, brutally beat up the terrified inhabitants and carried off the handcuffed men. After these outrages, the frightened villagers handed over their weapons without resistance. The military forces intended to carry out the operation in those months when the activity of *çetas* was low, and so these would be unable either to encourage or to intimidate the population to resist or to flee, and Ottoman military forces did not have to confront paramilitary troops.⁴⁹²

Carrying out this military plan proved harder in the border *kazas*, because the news of the disarmament reached this region faster than it reached the regular troops. Those living along the border managed to hide their weapons, or they escaped to Bulgaria, smuggling their weapons with them.⁴⁹³ The Christian inhabitants of the central kazas and church dignitaries protested to the authorities and the foreign consulates about the disarmament plan. They appealed to the fact that without their weapons they would be at the mercy of the Muslims and would not be able to defend their villages against irregular Muslim or Christian troops. Their need for weapons – as they argued, because of the incapacity of the central government to defend the countryside from intruders or from restless local elements – was all disputable, as very often these weapons were used not to resist, but to promote the activity of rebels. Whatever the truth about weapons kept at home was, this situation posed a threat to the central government, and therefore the authorities

489 *Ottoman Diplomatic Documents*, II. No. 1650. 13.06.1908. The strengthening of the local militia was not an option, as it would only have strengthened banditry, according to the official Ottoman stance.

490 Nika, Nevila. *Përmbledhje dokumentesh mbi kryengritjet shqiptare (1910–1912)*. Prishtinë 2003; Bartl, Peter. *Albanien*. Regensburg: Pustet, 1995, 125.

491 The action was repeated in 1911. The fear of another action was one reason for the revolt of Hasan Prishtina in 1912. On the revolt in 1911, see Gjermëni, Sokol. *Kryengritja shqiptare e vitit 1911*. Tiranë: TOENA, 2011.

492 ÖStA HHStA PA, VII/Fasz.434, Heimroth to Eduard Otto, 30.07.1910., No.56/pol, 8.

493 ÖStA HHStA PA, VII/Fasz.434, Heimroth to Eduard Otto, 14.10.1910, No.73/pol, 8.

ignored the complaints. What is more, purely on account of their complaining, most of the complainants risked the revenge either of the authorities or of the paramilitary troops. The Bulgarian Pop Vane Zafirov from Orašje (kaza Kumanovo) was brutally executed by Hristo Lazarev, a *četa* leader from Bulgaria on 9 July 1910 for exactly this reason. A Bulgarian peasant from Živina (kaza Skopje), Stojce Čaparanski, had more luck: though he was sentenced to death by the *müdir* of Konjari, he managed to flee abroad.⁴⁹⁴

The success of the disarmament plan seemed doubtful, however, even to contemporary witnesses. Official statistics on collected weapons were created only at vilayet level. Approximately 150,000 pieces were collected in Kosovo vilayet by September 1910 and a further 50 thousand were planned to be collected, but sabres are also included in these numbers. Half of the collected weapons came from Albanians, half from Slavs. On the one hand, according to the Austro-Hungarian consul of Skopje, a remarkable proportion of the weapons collected was useless and old. On the other hand, the inhabitants were able to rearm themselves again at any time by smuggling weapons, since the borderland has already slipped out of control of the Ottoman authorities.⁴⁹⁵ The former enemy of the Albanians, Montenegro, came into sharp focus: the Montenegrins rearmed the Albanians, but at the same time tried to sharpen the tensions between them.

The Bulgarian state considered this disarmament of the local population to be the armament of Muslims.⁴⁹⁶ Rumours floated that the collected weapons were distributed among Muslim population. Mahmud Şevket Pasha refuted these statements and responded to the intervention of the Bulgarian state, stating that those to whom the weapons were allotted were indeed soldiers of the reserve class (*redif*), who were enrolled against the *četas*. But the Bulgarian government had information from many localities that the distributed weapons – no matter whether they came from military storage or were collected from local people – remained in the hands of the Muslim village leaders (*mukhtar*), and that weapons were not handed into military storage after the operation was over.⁴⁹⁷

Community-level response to the changes II: the strategy of the Serbs in Macedonia

494 ÖStA HHStA PA, VII/Fasz.434, Heimroth to Eduard Otto, 30.07.1910, No.56/pol, 8.

495 ÖStA HHStA PA, VII/Fasz.434, Heimroth to Eduard Otto, 15.08.1910, No.57/pol, 4.

496 Related to the Bulgarian policy on Macedonia see: Bozeva-Abazi, *The Shaping of Bulgarian and Serbian National Identities*, 90.

497 ЦДА, ф. 331к. оп. 1. а.е. 351. л. 2-3.

It is noteworthy that the only minority in the Skopje sanjak that did not object to the disarmament was the Serb one. According to the Austro-Hungarian consul in Skopje, the Serbs had two reasons for doing this: they wanted to enjoy advantages on religious and educational issues in return for their cooperation, and the government in Belgrade did not want to create unnecessary conflicts with the Ottoman Empire. Secondly, it is also noteworthy that – via band leaders arriving from Serbia (like Skopjance) – Belgrade pointed out that Serbia was ready to supply new weapons whenever the loyal population needed it.⁴⁹⁸ Belgrade refrained from a wholehearted support of the Albanian uprising, as a cooperation of Albanian tribes was against its interests. The Serbian government was rather interested in exacerbating tensions among them. Belgrade after the Young Turk revolution turned to the Ottomans – as instructions sent to Macedonian schoolmasters and the meeting between the leaders of the Narodna Odbrana and the Young Turks testify.⁴⁹⁹ (Meetings also took place between the officers of the Serbian Foreign Ministry and the Bulgarians as well. In those years full of calamities, every party tried to position itself.)

The *Serbian Democratic League* led by Bogdan Radenković and the new paper of the Serbians, the *Vardar*, urged for the decrees of the constitution to be applied upon ethnic Albanians as well, who recognized the new regime, but displayed no readiness to support the law and continued their raids on local Serbs in Kosovo. Albanians spoke in a threatening voice that they would never allow the infidels to enjoy the same rights as the Muslims, but a certain repprochement after the annexation of Bosnia also took place, when Bajram Curri felt his positions weakened by the Austrian penetration.⁵⁰⁰ The promises made to the Albanians for their support of the *coup d'état* of the CUP (so that they could keep their privileges) and constitutionalism promised to the Serbs was contradictory and left the Young Turks in a dangerous, unstable and unresolved situation.

In order to articulate common goals and harmonize the existing particular regional policies of different Serbian communities a large assembly of Ottoman Serbs was held in Skopje on the Visitation of the Virgin in 1909 with 78 delegates present (44 from Old Serbia and 34 from Macedonia). As the Serbs were represented only by Sava Stojanović (Priština), Aleksandar Parlić (Skopje) and Dr. Janicije Dimitrijević (Bitola) in the Ottoman Parliament an organization to represent Serbian interests became essential. Thus the *Organization of the Serbian People in the Ottoman Empire* was established. However, this did not mean that local (often contradictory) policies

498 ÖStA HHStA PA, VII/Fasz.434, Heimroth to Eduard Otto, 30.07.1910., No.56/pol, 8.

499 Malcolm, *Kosovo*, 243.

500 Some years before he also offered his services to the Serbian government, but it refused than.

ceased to exist, because the circumstances for the Serbs were quite different in Kosovo and Skopje.

The local policy of the Serbian community in the Sanjak of Skopje was basically determined by three conditions.⁵⁰¹ 1. Within the boundaries of the sanjak, the Serbians belonged to the smaller nationalities (they made up only 5.5% of the entire population, and 9.6% of the Christian inhabitants).⁵⁰² 2. The most significant opponent of Serbian national propaganda was the Bulgarian national movement. 3. Considering the fact that the greatest problems for both the Young Turks and the Serbs were generated by the Bulgarians, the Serbian politicians and the CUP government became natural allies and had to come to an understanding. The early initiatives to form Bulgarian and Serbian bands fighting jointly has vanished by then.⁵⁰³ The front lines between the bands with nationalistic affiliation were not rigid: after the refusal of Serbia to cooperate, the Bulgarian *četa* leaders wanted to reach an agreement with the Greeks in order to avoid further isolation.⁵⁰⁴

The greatest challenge for the new Young Turk leadership in the sanjak of Skopje was undoubtedly how to handle the Bulgarian and Serbian conflict. Based on the political aspirations that the two nations nurtured against the Empire, to moderate the hostility between them or to make compromises that could be acceptable for all parties were simply not realistic options.⁵⁰⁵

In the beginning the policy of the CUP was based on the rule of law, without any distinct preference of the competing parties. (It began to change – of necessity – only after the Albanian rebellion). But good will was not enough when competing parties both referred to laws and historical traditions – as the following events testify. In their letter from November 1909, Bulgarian monks in the neighbourhood of Prilep complained about the violent expropriation of two monasteries (in Slepče and Zrze) by Serbian villagers in 1906. After the coup d'état of the CUP, the state gave the two monasteries back to the Exarchate. But since the Serbs expropriated the property and land of these monasteries, and the surrounding villages (Dabnica and Nebregovo)

501 On the question of the ethnic and identity policies of the Balkan states, see Clewing, Konrad. 'Nationalstaaten im multiethnischen Raum: Ethno- und Identitätspolitik.' In *Geschichte Südosteuropas. Vom Mittelalter bis zur Gegenwart*, edited by Konrad Clewing - Oliver Jens Schmitt. Regensburg, 2011. 538-42.

502 ÖStA HHStA 19. Nachlässe, Nachlaß August Kral, Kt.2, 'Statistische Tabelle der Nationalitäts- und Religions-Verhältnisse im Vilajet Kossovo (1903)'. On the Macedonian activity of Serbian consuls, see: Frantz, 'Zwischen Gewalt', 366-367.

503 *Ottoman Diplomatic Documents*, I. No. 315. 24.02.1902. Prior to the Gorna Dzhumaya uprising, Boris Sarafov met Svetozar Simić, a leader of the department of the Serbian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, responsible for propaganda.

504 *Ottoman Diplomatic Documents*, II. No. 1821. 18.09.1910. The Bulgarians promised to support Greek bands against Vlach *četas*, if the Greeks supported Bulgarian *četas* against Serb bands.

505 ÖStA HHStA PA, VII/Fasz.434, Adamkiewicz to Eduard Otto, 30.05.1909, No.44/pol, 8.

were opposed to becoming Exarchist and to supporting the monasteries with food,⁵⁰⁶ the clergy had to ask for help from the Bulgarian state (for 100 Turkish lira = 2000 francs). The money was used to hire Albanians to collect the harvest from lands that once belonged to the monasteries, then under cultivation by Serbian peasants. As a response, the Serbs also asked for armed assistance and resisted. The authorities of the sanjak and vilayet were unwilling to interfere in the debate.⁵⁰⁷

The case of the two monasteries is interesting because the contemporary Serbian interpretation of events is completely different, and this highlights the danger of using a narrow base of sources. Based on the articles published in *Carigradski Glasnik*, Volarić wrote that “in February 1909 Ottoman Serbs from Prilep defended two Serbian monasteries from Bulgarian bands, and on this occasion sent a letter to Ottoman authorities, including the Parliament, in which they demanded the defense of their rights.”⁵⁰⁸ The Serbian interpretation of events is given in the following quotation.

“The Ottoman Serbs from Prilep and its surroundings gathered today at the national assembly to protest that the Bulgarian attacks on Serbian property not be tolerated. They protest because Ottoman authorities protect Bulgarians and therefore cause damage to the Serbian nation and its property. They express their dissatisfaction that the Ottoman authorities allowed the Bulgarians entrance into distinctly Serbian monasteries: Zrze and Slepče; and not only that they allowed it, but that the gendarmerie offered it for the sake of the peace and order. Zrze and Slepče are villages inhabited by Ottoman Serbs and their monasteries are financed by entirely Serbian villages, which also provided them with estates... There are no Bulgarian villages nearby these monasteries; therefore Bulgarians have no legitimate right to claim them... Ottoman authorities treat Serbdom unjustly ... For example, while Greeks and Bulgarians have bells on the churches, to Serbs this is strictly forbidden, and the police even comes to take the bells down, as was the case here in Prilep.”⁵⁰⁹

506 The Serboman Grigor's band came from Nebregovo, mentioned earlier, *Table 6*.

507 ЦДА, ф. 313к. оп.2. а.е. 10. л. 31.

508 See Volarić, 'Between the Ottoman and Serbian State', 571.

509 “Срби Османлије из Прилепа и околине, скупљени данас на народном збору, протестују што се дозвољава, да Бугари насрћу на њихову имовину. Протестирају што се од стране власти Бугари протежирају на штету српског народа и његове имовине. Изјављују своје негодовање што су државне власти допустиле да Бугари уђу у чисто српске манастире Зрзе и Слечче, па не само што су их пустиле, већ су им и жандарме, ради веће сигурности, дале. Зрзе и Слечче села су насељена Србима Османлијама и манастири њихови издржавани су од села чисто српских, која су им и непокретна имања поклањала, те Бугари никаква права на њих немају, нити ће моћи имати, пошто је у нашој отаџбини завладао ред и поредак. Бугарских села нема у околини оних манастира и толико је од њих далеко, те никаквог законског ослоња не могу имати, да својину манастира себи претежавају, пошто ту немају свога елемента... Српски народ налази се ожалашћен, кад и му у времену слободе и једнакости власти неправду чине и од других га народности одвајају, као на пр. Док Бугари и Грци по црквама могу слободно звона подизати, докле се Србима и њиховим црквама забрањује да им силом чак полиција скида звона, као што је случај овде у Прилепу био.” ‘Насртај на српске манастире’ (The attack on Serbian monasteries), *Carigradski Glasnik*, no. 7, 1909, 1. Quoted by Volarić, 'Between the Ottoman and Serbian State', 571.

The Serbs were convinced that Ottoman authorities generally supported Bulgarian claims, while the Bulgarians claimed that their use of coercion was the result of negligence on the part of the Ottoman authorities and the Serbian resistance, who refused to accept the official decision. Both were unsatisfied with the behavior of official authorities – something even worse from the aspect of central government than satisfying one or other of the parties. The Bulgarian sources wrote about the expropriation of church property, while the Serbs argued that villagers offered to supply the monastery because it was Patriarchist, and retained the right to withdraw these benefits if circumstances changed. The Serbian story focused on the present situation, using ethnic arguments, while the Bulgarian party went back to 1906 (when Serboman villagers expelled the exarchist priest) in listing injustices and appealing to the law.

The situation was similar in another case.

The Ottoman Serbs from Prizren and its surroundings legitimately demand the return of the monastery in Treskavac, because it is situated in the middle of the Serbian population, which has also maintained and financed it. Bulgarians violently took the monastery – with the help of their bandit troops – and now it is illegitimately in their possession.⁵¹⁰

These decisions – giving a monastery to a community which was scarcely represented in the neighbourhood, thus restituting the original situation according to law – were only likely to increase tensions, while neglecting the law would have raised objections from the other party.

Tighter cooperation between local Serbs and Young Turks began during the elections of 1908.⁵¹¹ The Ottoman leadership of the sanjak employed a peaceful tone with local Serbs, although this tolerance did not mean the acceptance of Serbian demands – sometimes Serbian leaders were also arrested, as everyone else was, if the situation made it necessary.⁵¹² Very often the central power remained neutral in Serbo-Bulgarian conflicts, or tended to support Serb claims on religious or educational issues even contrary to the spirit of laws.

Beyond their tacit support Turkish authorities often collaborated with Serbian *četas* (as they presented less danger to the Ottoman state), and never initiated attacks on Serbian paramilitary troops – pointed out the Bulgarian consul Ikonomov in his

510 “Срби Османлије из Призрена и околине с правом траже, да им се преда манастир Трескавац, јер се налази у средини српског живља који је тај манастир за толико стотина година чувао и издржавао. Бугари насилним путем ‘помоћу њихових разбојничких чета овај су манастир отели и данас га незаконито пригежавају.’ ‘Насртај на српске манастире’ (The attack on Serbian monasteries), *Carigradski Glasnik*, no. 7, 1909, 1. Quoted by Volarić, ‘Between the Ottoman and Serbian State’, 572.

511 ÖStA HHStA PA, VII/Fasz.434, Lukes to Pallavicini, 05.10.1908., No.69/pol, 24.

512 ÖStA HHStA PA, VII/Fasz.434, Adamkiewicz to Eduard Otto, 30.05.1909. No.44/pol, 8.

account. Major Janusewski, an Austro-Hungarian officer in Skopje – and probably rather more impartial – also admitted to the Bulgarians that Turks seemed to favour Serbs over Bulgars. It was also Ikonov who reasoned this when he gave a detailed account of Mahmud Şefket pasha's opinion, expressed in February 1908. According to the pasha, only the Bulgarians (here the pasha meant the official Bulgaria) were responsible for the worsening of the situation in Macedonia: Bulgarians think that the case of Macedonia is similar to that of Eastern Rumelia, but they are wrong, as the Macedonian question is an European diplomatic question.⁵¹³ The opinion expressed Turkish fears that, after the withdrawal of the Powers from the provinces, a similar and quick process would take place in Macedonia as happened in Eastern Rumelia.

In return for their ignorance or negligence, Young Turks expected Serbian solidarity concerning the anti-Bulgarian measures initiated by the state.⁵¹⁴ This was characteristic of the whole Kosovo vilayet, not only of the Sanjak of Skopje.⁵¹⁵ A Young Turk–Serbian cooperation also existed on restricting Albanian cultural demands, especially in the western and northern regions of the vilayet, where the proportion of Albanian population was greater.⁵¹⁶

In the Sanjak of Skopje, two parties were responsible for the local representation of Serbian interests: the Serbian National Club and the Constitutional Party (Club).⁵¹⁷ The differences between the views of the two organisations were not significant (the latter was more open towards the Ottoman government); the rivalry between them was based on the competition for financial sources. The debate on the distribution of financial support arriving from Serbia also resulted in the division and opposition of villages. The two parties in Skopje and Kumanovo established local organizations and a *skupština*, the common body of the Serbs in this sanjak. Based on Austro-Hungarian archival sources, it seems that, contrary to their internal debates, the Serbian political organizations represented the Serb interests unanimously and unambiguously.⁵¹⁸

The leaders of the local Serbian communities did not increase their aspirations; their aim was to secure the results already gained through a peaceful coexistence with the CUP. Young Turks did not hinder the work of the *skupština* in the

513 ЦДДА, ф. 335к. оп. 1. а.е. 205. л. 112-125.

514 ÖStA HHStA PA, VII/Fasz.434, Adamkiewicz to Pallavicini, 05.05.1909., No.40/pol, 12.

515 "Gegenwärtig sind sie [die Jungtürken] jedoch bestrebt, speziell die Serben im Vilajet von Kossova, ohne dem eigenen Programme in irgend welcher Weise Abbruch zu tun, nach Möglichkeit zu befriedigen." ÖStA HHStA PA, VII/Fasz.434, Adamkiewicz to Eduard Otto, 30.15.1909., No.44/pol, 8.

516 ÖStA HHStA PA, VII/Fasz.434, Adamkiewicz to Eduard Otto, 11.11.1909., No.78/pol, 6.

517 On the activity of the Constitutional Club, see: Hacısalihoglu, *Die Jungtürken*, 237.

518 ÖStA HHStA PA, VII/Fasz.434, Lukes to Pallavicini, 20.02.1909., No.19/pol, 8 and 26.03.1909., No.33/pol, 8.

beginning. But the recognition of the Serbian national community and cultural rights were still missing from the relationship.⁵¹⁹ Another Serbian desire was to appoint a Serbian metropolite to the Debar-Veles diocese and to get official governmental support for Serbian propaganda.⁵²⁰ So, local Serbian policy was also able to show its peaceful side to the new Ottoman government, but it did not resign or refrain from the use of 'less peaceful non-parliamentary methods'.⁵²¹

While political relations between the Young Turks and the Serbians were moderate and relatively consolidated, the debate on churches and schools produced more conflicts between Serbians and Bulgarians. The ecclesiastical conflict reached a new level in 1902, when a Serbian episcopate was established in the city of Skopje. The struggle between patriarchists and exarchists for positions, institutions and hearts and minds had been going on for years, but the arrival of the new Serbian metropolite changed the situation and exacerbated the conflict,⁵²² because a *diocese* had to be detached from the Bulgarian episcopate, the churches and schools had to be redistributed, and the scope of his activity had to be clarified.⁵²³ This was very important, as national propaganda only reached as far as the organisation of the national Church did. Debate was raging about the rights over the 14 churches to be detached and on the right of the Serbian metropolite to establish new churches. The solution of the problem was hindered by the leaders of the vilayet as well: although they set up a committee to handle the question, but all the members of the committee were Exarchists (Bulgarians), who opposed the Serbian wishes, not to mention the hesitation of the local population that refused to be attached to a Serbian diocese.

The same factors generated conflict on educational questions and schools, as these determined the national identity of the local communities.⁵²⁴ When the Serbian metropolite wanted to increase his influence over churches, he also wanted to extend it over schools. The Serbian metropolite wished to establish 28 new schools with the support of the province leadership in those kazas that witnessed the most bitter and bloodiest fights between the Bulgarian and Serbian national propagandists (Kriva Palanka, Kumanovo, and in other territories of the vilayet: Tetovo, Gostivar).⁵²⁵

519 ÖStA HHStA PA, VII/Fasz.434, Adamkiewicz to Pallavicini, 05.05.1909., No.40/pol, 12.

520 ÖStA HHStA PA, VII/Fasz.434, Adamkiewicz to Pallavicini, 05.05.1909., No.40/pol, 12.

521 Ibid. and Adamkiewicz to Eduard Otto, 30.05.1909., No.44/pol, 8.

522 Another source of conflict was the vacancy of the metropolite's stallum in Skopje, as the rival Church always tried to hinder the elections. ÖStA HHStA PA, VII/Fasz.434, Adamkiewicz to Pallavicini, 07.03.1910., No.15/pol, 5.

523 ÖStA HHStA PA, VII/Fasz.434, Lukes to Pallavicini, 11.12.1908, No.88/pol, 24.

524 ÖStA HHStA PA, VII/Fasz.434, Lukes to Pallavicini, 26.03.1909., No.33/pol, 8.

525 Documents related to the opening of the new schools: ÖStA HHStA PA, VII/Fasz.434, Lukes to Pallavicini, 11.12.1908, No.88/pol, 24.

Another peculiarity of the situation is that, beyond the antagonism with the Bulgarians, the Serbian metropolite in Skopje also had conflicts with Belgrade and with one of the Serbian parties concerning authority over schools. This was a regular rather than unique phenomenon, as the quotation below on the situation of Prizren in 1903 confirms. The rivalry between the Serbian state and Orthodox Church over finances and souls (over supremacy) hindered efficient work in the early years. According to the Russian consul:

Serbia here conducts propaganda and spends 100,000 Francs per year to obtain the love of the populace (*narod*). However, ... rather than acting for the interests of the community, it only creates intrigues and damage... First of all, it is reckless to support consul Avramović, whom people loathe, and the silly metropolitan (*vladika*) Nićifor... In Peć, the metropolitan's regent, Obrad the priest, defended Albanian criminals to the Ottoman authorities, and, as a result, people in Peć no longer invite him to their homes... However, Nićifor does not care. In Prizren he does not recognize the municipality, and he does not engage with national work...⁵²⁶

In the case of Skopje this ended in a compromise, and the Serbian Minister of Education agreed to give back schools financed by the Serbian state to the Church. This meant the implicit recognition that the Serbian state had neither enough financial assets nor enough experience in tackling local questions, not to mention the often weak confidence of the local population in the Serbian government, which often tried to impose its ideas regardless of local interests. It also meant that teachers were also replaced, and the system of requirements became standardised once again. This enlightens two facts: (1), the Serbian consulate was unable to maintain the school system, and (2), since 1909 the Ottoman government had hindered the establishment of national clubs, and many public activities were able to survive only under the aegis of the Church.⁵²⁷ The conflict with the Constitutional Party was caused by the latter's appeasement policy, which was rejected by the Serbian metropolite who supported the national club only. Villages under the dominance of the Constitutional Party were threatened with the closure of local schools.⁵²⁸

As well as political and cultural demands, politicians also tried to use economic instruments to improve Serbian positions by increasing the number of real estates in Serb hands. They decided to buy back lands formerly sold to Muslim owners, or

526 Volarić (575-76.) cites Višnjakov, Jaroslav Valerijanovič. 'Македонски покрет и преврат у Србији 29. маја 1903.' *Tokovi istorije* 3, (2010): 19.

527 ÖStA HHStA PA, VII/Fasz.434, Adamkiewicz to Pallavicini, 07.03.1910., No.15/pol, 5.

528 ÖStA HHStA PA, VII/Fasz.434, Lukes to Pallavicini, 26.03.1909., No.33/pol, 7.

lands of expelled Bulgarians, who could then never return. The financial support needed was given by the Serbian bank, Zadruga, that decided to establish 10 branch offices of savings banks in the Sanjak of Skopje. But as the approval of local Turkish authorities was missing, therefore the action was delayed.⁵²⁹

As it can be seen, the activity of Serbian government bodies was not always fruitful, nor did it enjoy the consent of the local inhabitants. According to Volarić, the effectiveness of institutions established to promote propaganda were often inadequate. For instance, the four consulates in Priština, Salonika, Bitola, and Skopje barely communicated with each other, according to Branislav Nušić (1894). The Serbian administration in the Ottoman Empire suffered from sluggishness and ineffectiveness in the early phases.⁵³⁰ Tacit Ottoman support and finally the shift of support policy from creation to destruction after 1907 increased the rate of success.

But the conciliatory and moderate Serbian policy towards the Young Turks was by no means accidental. After 1908, due to their relatively small proportion and to fruitful Bulgarian denominational and national propaganda, the position of the Serbian minority had significantly weakened in Skopje sanjak. The most obvious sign of this trend was that many Pravoslav inhabitants and villages considered 'Serbian' in the eyes of active members of the Serbian national movement became 'Bulgarian' (again) (*Table 5*). According to Austro-Hungarian consular reports from 1909 on, the Serbian Voivodes in the sanjak and their irregular troops committed more and more retributive murders in order to put an end to this tendency. The number of Serbian attacks against the 'Bulgarisierte Serben' increased, particularly in the Kriva Palanka, Kumanovo and Veles kazas. These attacks naturally triggered counterattacks by IMRO.⁵³¹

Unlike the other sanjaks of Kosovo vilayet (like in Prizren), in the Sanjak of Skopje Serb politicians tried to improve their positions against the Bulgarians by means of the Albanian question.⁵³² Since the CUP was reluctant to satisfy the wishes of local Serbs, they tried to sharpen the tensions between Albanians and the CUP in this sanjak. It is noteworthy that Albanian national clubs were often also the

529 Ibid. 8. For background on the activity of Zadruga Bank, see Mishkova, Diana. 'The Nation as *Zadruga*: remapping Nation-Building in Nineteenth-Century Southeast Europe.' In: *Disrupting and Reshaping. Early Stages of Nation-Building in the Balkans*, edited by Marco Dogo and Guido Franzinetti. Ravenna: Longo, 2002. 103-115. and Bíró, László. 'A zadrugák felbomlásáról.' *Világtörténet* 22, no 3-4. (2000): 51-60.

530 Volarić, 'Between the Ottoman and Serbian State', 575.

531 ÖStA HHStA PA, VII/Fasz.434, Adamkiewicz to Eduard Otto, 30.05.1909, No.44/pol, 8. On the antecedents of Ottoman-Serbian cooperation after 1908, see: Marinković, Mirjana. 'The Shaping of the Modern Serbian Nation and of its State under the Ottoman Rule.' In *Disrupting and Reshaping. Early Stages of Nation-Building in the Balkans*, 37-45.

532 ÖStA HHStA PA, VII/Fasz.434, Adamkiewicz to Eduard Otto, 30.05.1909., No.44/pol, 8 and ibid. Adamkiewicz to Pallavicini, 07.03.1910.No.15/pol, 5.

organisational and supporting basis of the CUP, and the loss of Albanian sympathy could easily mean the shrinking of the social groups supporting the CUP. The worsening of the Albanian-Young Turk relationship was advantageous for the Serbs, as they thought the CUP had to rely upon them after losing the alliance of Muslim Albanians. The Serbs counted on the improvement of their negotiating positions through the escalation of Albanian-CUP tensions. This is why the local Serb newspaper, *Vardar*, referred to Albanians as 'brethren' in March 1909, and supported their wish to implement the Latin alphabet,⁵³³ while earlier a different stance was observable. The gradual turn was accelerated after the deposition of Abdulhamid II in April 1909, when the activities of many Serbian societies were forbidden, lands were confiscated from churches and monasteries, the work of schools and religious committees was hindered. Local Serbs turned against the CUP, but at the same time they were weak alone, they searched for new allies. This also coincided with the changing tactics of Belgrade that tried to deepen the tensions between Albanians and the government.

It seems that official Serbia also tended to accept the regional interests of Serbs in Macedonia and did not want to pursue a policy without or against the will of local Serbs. The *skupština* in Belgrade decided to pay compensation to the former Muslim landowners. This friendly act brought a positive response among the Muslims in the Sanjak of Skopje, providing a sphere to manoeuvre for local Serbian politicians.⁵³⁴ Nevertheless, these 'soft methods' were rare.

As for 'tough' methods, it was primarily the Belgrade government that played an active role.⁵³⁵ First, the number of band leaders arriving in the Sanjak of Skopje increased (in winter 1909, this meant 28 bands – compare it to *Table 6*); second, the Serbian government wanted to improve the armaments of irregular troops. One of the main target locations for the rifles, revolvers, explosives and ammunition arriving from Serbia was the Preševo-Gjilan-Kumanovo triangle, where the primary objective of Nikola Pašić's government was to arm the Serbian population so they could defend themselves against Muslim attacks.⁵³⁶ According to the Austro-Hungarian consulate in Skopje, it was the local Serbian consul's responsibility to organise the transportation and distribution of weapons and to direct the operation of the irregular troops. In order to make illegal weapon transportations more flexible,

533 ÖStA HHStA PA, VII/Fasz.434, Lukes to Pallavicini, 26.03.1909., No.33/pol, 8.

534 Details are in the *Vardar* newspaper, early spring 1919. ÖStA HHStA PA, VII/Fasz.434, Lukes to Pallavicini, 26.03.1909., No.33/pol, 8.

535 ÖStA HHStA PA, VII/Fasz.434, Lukes to Pallavicini, 20.02.1909, No.19/pol, 8.

536 Documents related to weapon-smuggling: ÖStA HHStA PA, VII/Fasz.434, Heimroth to Eduard Otto, 15.08.1910, No.57/pol, 4.

some Muslim officers from the police were bribed as well.⁵³⁷ Bulgarian villages also received weapons transportations and ammunitions from Bulgaria with the help of the Church and consulates.⁵³⁸ In Bulgarian villages local teachers (and priests and perhaps monks)⁵³⁹ were responsible for the storage and distribution of weapons,⁵⁴⁰ which confirms the significant role they played in the achievement of national goals.

The realisation of 'moderate' Serb national aspirations (the maintenance of the status quo in the Skopje Sanjak as regards Ottoman-Serb relations and Bulgarian-Serbian ethnic proportions) was promoted by the fact that the local Bulgarian population also had to confront factional in-fighting between the different wings of IMRO (leftists-autonomists and Verhovists). The Ottoman authorities were also burdened and engaged by Orthodox assaults on *Pomak* villages along the border, and this also provided the Serbs with greater room for manoeuvre.⁵⁴¹

Strategies of intimidation and strategies of survival

Despite their relatively low number in Macedonia, the continuous foreign support and the energetic activity of Belgrade's local agents made the Serbian factor nonnegligible in the region. The increase in the number of 'players' left Macedonian Slavs in a desperate situation as the following report by Simić (a leading official at the Foreign Ministry) testified.⁵⁴² This also gives an insight to political intentions of *the Serbian government* and the fears of the local Slavic (not Serbianized) population in Macedonia. "*The Macedonians have been afraid that the Bulgarians and we agreed to divide them... They would like to make an agreement with us, but such as to sacrifice nothing of what they call their autonomy. They have come to see more and more that there are obstacles before them, which they cannot fight successfully, and as a consequence of this they gradually lose their importance as an authoritative factor in the development of the Macedonian*

537 A so-called Ibrahim efendi in the sanjak of Skopje was named. ÖStA HHStA PA, VII/Fasz.434, Heimroth Eduard Otto, 14.10.1910., No.73/pol, 8.

538 ÖStA HHStA PA, VII/Fasz.434, Lukes to Pallavicini, 20.02.1909., No.19/pol, 8 and *ibid.* Rappaport to Pallavicini, 05.02.1908., No.9/pol, 12.

539 Data from the sanjak of Prizren, 1910. ÖStA HHStA PA, XXXVIII/Kt.405, Prochaska to Berchtold, 27.08.1912., No.86.

540 ÖStA HHStA PA, VII/Fasz.434, Heimroth to Eduard Otto, 30.07.1910., No.56/pol, 8 and *ibid.* 14.10.1910., No.73/pol, 8. Similar to Serbian villages as we discussed earlier.

541 ÖStA HHStA PA, VII/Fasz.434, Lukes to Pallavicini, 20.02.1909., No.19/pol, 8; *ibid.* Adamkiewicz to Pallavicini, 05.05.1909., No.40/pol, 12; *ibid.* Heimroth to Pallavicini, 04.11.1910., No.80/pol, 3 and *ibid.* Heimroth to Eduard Otto, 14.10.1910., No.73/pol, 8.

542 *Ottoman Diplomatic Documents* I. No. 313. 07.02.1902. Janko Atanasov, a retired Bulgarian colonel, visited the department leader of the Serbian Foreign Ministry responsible for propaganda activities in 1902, suggesting cooperation. The quotation represents the reflections of the Serbian official.

question. This is what hurts them immensely. They are divided among themselves, just as before... The people, craving for freedom, would like to shake off their yoke... but their distrust both of their competing leaders and Bulgaria prevent them. Under the influence of the news about the Imperial Alliance a mood has been created in which they would like to be freed from their yoke at any cost, even if they were compelled to come under Bulgaria and Serbia. And if these two did not help them, they would gladly accept Austrian occupation, as well...⁵⁴³ The bilateral external pressure forced many Macedonians to abandon the idea of independence or autonomy within the Ottoman Empire, because they considered any territorial division (and Serbian-Bulgarian rivalry threatened with this outcome) even more harmful, than the incorporation of the region into one of the small states (even it would be Serbia and not Bulgaria). Even an Austrian occupation was considered less harmful by the local groups, than dismemberment.

From 1906/1907 on, Serb(ian)s changed tactics and *abandoned defensive* to hinder the further 'Bulgarization' of the 'Serbs'. Their offensive policy is testified not only by Bulgarian, but also by Austro-Hungarian consuls.⁵⁴⁴ One of the tactics was for Serbian *vojvodas* to visit those villages where the male population was working far away from their homeland (cases observed in Kriva Palanka, Kumanovo and Skopje *kaza*) to exert pressure on local inhabitants (female, old and children). According to the Bulgarian ambassador in Belgrade, the following settlements were the most exposed to such violent Serbian propaganda: Orlanci in Kumanovo kaza, Bigor-Dolenci, Gorno Dolenci, and Dvorci from the region of Kičevo. In addition to the presence of Serbian *četars*, another problem was caused by the harassment of those on *pečalbarstvo*: Macedonians working in Belgrade or in Pirot. These migrating Macedo-Slavs were threatened with the confiscation of their earnings or with the impediment of their free return to their homeland unless they claimed themselves to be Serbs (not to mention the constant threat of irregular troops invading their homeland). These workers were often compelled to ask for a written oath from their community in which the whole family or community declared its loyalty to Serbdom. Mihail Georgiev asked for such a document from his brother in Dvorci.⁵⁴⁵ From the village of Orlanci more than 100 men were working in Belgrade by 1909. The Serbian government offered 3000 levas for their consent to open a Serbian school in Orlanci,

543 Simić, representative of the Kingdom of Serbia in Bulgaria, to Jovan Jovanovich-Pizon, head of the consular department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Belgrade. On the occasion of the visit of Damian Gruev. From 'Arhiv SFR Jugoslavije (Belgrade) – Fond Jovan Jovanovic-Pizon, 80 (1905)'.

544 Sources for this: ÖStA HHStA PA, VII/Fasz.434, Adamkiewicz to Pallavicini, 05.05.1909., No.40/pol, 12.

545 ЦДА, ф. 315к. оп. 2. а.е. 10. л. 7.

and thus managed to get 68 supporters out of the 100.⁵⁴⁶ This clearly displays the success rate of tough Serbian propaganda (68%).

Neither did violence decrease against the thin but influential class of the intelligentsia: alongside with simple labourers, priests and teachers, its members remained primary targets after 1908. In the spring of 1909 a Bulgarian teacher, Alexander Mankov, was murdered in a Serbian raid (Rahovdol village, Veles kaza), and Alexandar, the Serbian teacher of Kozle (Skopje kaza, Zeleniko nahije), was also killed by Bulgarians in Novoselo. The Bulgarian Mane Miklarov, priest of Štip, was killed because he became a propagator of Serbian national ideas, while the sin of priest Aršov from Radibuš (kaza Kriva Palanka) was that he wanted to become Bulgarian. Even leaders of monasteries were convinced or bribed to change sides. The *igumen* of the ortodox monastery in Stalkovce, who earlier had some disagreement with local Bulgarian *starešinas*, was offered a huge sum to claim to be Serbian. These methods were not specific or confined to the Sanjak of Skopje; the same events and methods occurred elsewhere.

When writing about societies of violence based on the Gewaltmarkt (marketized violence), we have encountered many individual survival strategies, some of them dramatic, some resulting in rather comic outcomes, like the following ones. (1) The story of Adem Zaimi (the Ottoman police officer who kidnapped Lol Kuka⁵⁴⁷ and who murdered Haxhi Molla Zeka)⁵⁴⁸ and Alexa Bogosavljević is only indirectly related to violence.⁵⁴⁹ For the reader's further edification we share the story as it appeared on the pages of the Austro-Hungarian consular reports – leaving the interpretation to the reader. (One of the morals of this story is that the Balkans is the place where everything can happen. The naivety of experienced perpetrators of violence is amazing, and reveals that they lived in a society which hardly had any knowledge of how things work even in their close surroundings. Those leaders of the local community who moved safely within their accustomed circles became easily deceivable victims in a different environment.)⁵⁵⁰

Alexa Bogosavljević, a Serb born in Austria-Hungary, was an adventurer. He was a student of the military academy in Wiener Neustadt, from where he was dismissed.

546 Ibid.

547 ÖStA HHStA VII/ Fasz. 433, Pára to Braun, Üsküb, 16. December 1901, No. 165; i.e. Pára to Braun, Üsküb, 6. January 1902, No. 2.

548 Haxhi Mulla Zeka (1832-1902): an Albanian politician in Ipek, leader of the conservative-nationalist League of Peje (1899-1902), which planned an all-Albanian alliance modelled on the Prizren League – against the Ottoman Empire. He was murdered by Adem Zaimi, who was secretly encouraged by the Ottoman authorities.

549 The story came to light in connection with the murder of Zeka.

550 ÖStA HHStA VII/ Kt. 434, Pára to Calice, Üsküb, 17 April 1902, No. 46, appendix (the report of consul Bohumil Pára is also included, 17 April 1902, No. 72, p. 5)

Then he went to Serbia during the Serb-Bulgarian war in 1885 and served as an army officer. Later he served at the state border, which enabled him to meet many Albanian leaders. He spread the rumour about himself that he was an expert of Albanian relations and that he had improved relations between the two nations with his writings in Old Serbia (he was the editor of the Serbian-Albanian paper 'Bratimstvo' – brotherhood). He was decorated with many Austrian and Italian medals and claimed that he received them for his services. He also wore the barrel of a rifle and claimed that all his medals had been achieved with that very rifle.

As he was a very conspicuous phenomenon, he was soon 'discovered' by consul Kurtović, who earlier knew him from Niš. Kurtović was surprised at his decorations and when he asked the leaders of his military units, he received the answer that Bogosavljević was a well-known swindler in Serbia, but he was allowed to wear the medals and decorations because this made a good impression on the Albanians. Once, when his colonel questioned his right to wear these decorations, Bogosavljević attacked him through the press, and therefore no one wanted to press the question any further.

As he could not count on too much success with his behavior, he soon left the army. Once Bogosavljević received news that a Montenegrin priest has been searching for 17 years for his lost son, he soon came up with the plan that he would play the role of the lost boy. He managed to play the role well until he seduced his new 'sister', the wife of a teacher at Šabac, and even his 'mother'. So he had to leave the house in a great hurry and escaped to Constantinople, where he continued his swindles. He claimed to be pretender to the Bosnian (!) throne and thus managed to receive huge sums from a widow. But a few years later he returned to Serbia, where he became a tobacco inspector at Prokuplje. From here he renewed his connections with the Albanians and got in touch with the young Adem Zaimi, who became his foster brother. Later he became the leader of the fire brigade in Belgrade, but by this time he had such bad reputation, he was unable to fit into Belgrade high society. Then he decided to renew his relationship with Adem Zaimi, whom he told that he had connections to the royal palace and to political circles and he promised Zaimi an audience if he visited Belgrade – an empty promise, as the Albanian had never left his homeland. But on 1 September 1901 Adem Zaimi committed a murder driven by political motives in the *konak* (governmental palace) of Ipek and soon had to escape.⁵⁵¹ Remembering Bogosavljević's tales, which he thought were realistic, he chose Serbia as his shelter. He started to demand the promised royal audience from Bogosavljević, who put himself in great trouble with his lies. But soon he pulled

⁵⁵¹ It was not the Zeka murder, it happened a year later!

himself together and organized a comedy for his visitor. He convinced a professor to lend him hundreds of francs for “national purposes” that had to be kept in secret. With this money he borrowed a carriage and drove through the town – with the secret thought that the urban leaders might think that a guest of high rank had arrived and would be eager to give the stranger an official audience. As neither were the leading classes of Belgrade society prone to take Albanians seriously, nor had the latter abandoned their plan to have an audience, Bogosavljević continued his comedy. He said that the king could not give an official audience in the Royal Court to somebody accused of murder, because it would draw the attention of foreign ministers and the Ottoman government to the fact that Zaimi was in Serbia, and would discredit Serbia, while the publicity would hinder Zaimi’s secret return to his homeland. But the king promised to meet the Albanian in a private house instead. The ‘king’ of Serbia soon met Zaimi – wearing a decorated fireman’s uniform. At the end of the audience the ‘king’ ordered Bogosavljević to donate watches and rifles to the Albanians.

The lies of Bogosavljević were thus not revealed (lies had serious consequences in Albanian society), but the story was not over yet. The presence of Zaimi in Serbia was unpleasant for the Ottoman ambassador, Fettah Bey, who called for Zaimi and drew his attention to his conspicuous behavior. He promised him he would be appointed to the rank of lieutenant if travelled to Constantinople and gives assurances about his loyalty. This way Zaimi soon returned to Turkey with an amnesty. But this brought no relief for Bogosavljević, as in the hotel everybody was convinced that it really was the king who had visited them, and Bogosavljević had promised 1000 francs to the owner to secure the meeting. Of course he ‘forgot’ to pay, and so the hotel owner went to the Royal Court, where he recognized that he had been tricked, and the Court also learned of the abusive deception, which became very inconvenient for the king as well. And the story was still not over. Bogosavljević promised to give weapons to the Albanians, but – in order to avoid problems at the border – he proposed to send the rifles later. And the Albanians did not forget the weapons. When they warned Bogosavljević that they had crossed the border and were still waiting for the transport, the Serbian had to step into action once again. He managed to steal 15 rifles from the stocks of the fire station, but he was discovered and arrested. And though he claimed to act for patriotic purposes – telling only selected parts of the story outlined above – he was condemned to one year of imprisonment, though he was soon offered an amnesty.

The story was told by consul Kurtović to the Austrian authorities, because Adem Zaimi visited him demanding the promised watches and rifles. Kurtović wrote to

Belgrade, where no one knew about the promise. Thus were Bogosavljević's machinations revealed, making the Serbian court look ridiculous.⁵⁵²

552 ÖStA HHStA, Ministerium des Äußeren, VII. Gesandtschafts- und Konsulatsarchiv; (IV. Politisches Archiv, Jüngere Serie; Albanien).

Botschaftsarchiv Konstantinopel, Fasz. 434.: Albanien – politisch: Üsküb (1899-1913) A4m

- Pára an Heinrich Freiherr Calice, Üsküb, getippt, 17.04.1902., p. 1., No. 46., Verkehr des gewesenen Redacteurs des Belgrader serbisch-albanesischen Blattes 'Bratimstvo' Alexa Bogosavljević mit dem Mörder des Ipeker Notablen Hadži Mula Zeku, Adem Zaim:

- Beilag: Abschrift eines Berichtes des k. und k. Consuls Bohumils Pára an Seine Exz. Den Herrn Minister des Aeussern de dato Uesküb, 17. April 1902 No. 72. pp.5:

„Anlässlich eines Besuches, den ich am 15. dieses Monates dem hiesigen serbischen General-Consul Herrn Kurtović machte, brachte derselbe das Gespräch plötzlich auf Adem Zaim, den bekannten Mörder des Hadži Mula Zeko [sic!], und erzählte mir über dessen vormaligen Belgrader Aufenthalt folgende romanhafte Geschichte, die ich nachstehend Euerer Excellenz zu unterbreiten die Ehre habe:

“Ein gewisser Alexo Bogosavljević, ein leichtsinniger Abenteuer, der als österreichischer Serbe auch eine Zeit lang Zögling der Wiener Neustädter Akademie gewesen, dann aber ausgeschlossen worden war, kam zur Zeit des serbisch-bulgarischen Krieges nach Serbien und diente als Officier. Später wurde er zum Grenzdienst verwendet.

So wurde er mit verschiedenen Arnautenführern bekannt, und rühmte sich, ein genauer Kenner der albanesischen Verhältnisse zu sein und in Wort und Schrift sehr viel für das gute Einvernehmen der beiden Volksstämme in Altserbien getan zu haben. Er trug ein gebogenes Stück Gewehr auf der Brust, auf dem österreichische, italienische und andere Decorationen dutzendweise baumelten und behauptete, alle jene Ehrenzeichen mit diesem Gewehr errungen zu haben.

Damals fiel er Herrn Kurtović, der ihn zufälligerweise in Nisch traf, auf; als er sich beim vorgesetzten Obersten über den Ursprung dieses Medaillenreichtums erkundigte, antwortete ihm dieser, Bogosavljević sei ein landbekannter Schwindler, lasse sich aber seinen Ordenschmuck nicht verbieten, da er nur so den Albanern imponieren könne. Tatsächlich hatte eine Frage des Obersten nach diesbezüglichen Legitimationen keinen weiteren Erfolg als heftige publicistische Angriffe des Bogosavljević.

Da aber sein Weizen nicht sonderlich blühte, gieng er bald wieder auf Abenteuer aus. Zunächst hörte er von einem Popen in Montenegro der seinen vor 17 Jahren verschollenen Sohn suche. Um diesen betrübten Vater zu trösten, gieng Bogosavljević zu ihm und stellte sich als der geraubte Sohn vor. Nachdem er einige Zeit dort Gast gewesen war, begab er sich zu seiner neu erworbenen Schwester, die mit einem Lehrer in Schabatz verheiretet ist, musste, aber schliesslich – angeblich wegen mehr als geschwistlicher Beziehungen zur Frau des Gastgebers – das Haus verlassen und wandte sich nach Constantinopel. Dort setzte er seine Schwindeleien fort, entlockte unter anderm als Prätendent auf den zu errichtenden bosnischen Thron einer Witwe bedeutende Geldsummen, tauchte aber nach einigen Jahren wieder in Serbien auf, wo er schliesslich eine kleine Beamtenstelle bei der Tabak-Regie in Prokuplje erhielt.

Von dort knüpfte er seine Beziehungen zu den im Grenzgebiete wohnhaften Albanesen wieder an und schloss mit dem jungen Adem Zaim Blutsbrüderschaft.

Er kam dann auf andere Posten und wurde endlich Leiter der Belgrader Feuerwehr, in welcher Stellung es ihm aber nicht gelingen wollte, eine Rolle zu spielen, da er – im schlechten Sinne – stadtbekannt war.

So kam er auf den Gedanken, sich wieder mit Adem Zaim in Verbindung zu setzen, prahlte diesem gegenüber mit seinen hohen Verbindungen, bei Hofe wie in der Politik und stellte Adem Zaim eine Audienz beim König in Aussicht, ohne daran zu denken, dass er so rasch beim Wort genommen würde.

Nun hatte eben Adem Zaim am 1. September 1900 im Konak von Ipek einen Mord verübt, der ihn zur Flucht zwang. Er wählte zu seiner Zufluchtstätte Serbien, kam mit drei Begleitern nach Belgrad und verlangte von Bogosavljević die Erwirkung einer Audienz beim König. Der Prätendent im Feuerwehrrock war in peinlicher Verlegenheit. Aber kein Fremdling im Schwindel, ersann er eine unglaubliche Komödie. Er liess von einem ihm befreundeten Professor einige hundert Franken für den nationalen Zweck aus, fuhr im Fiaker mit der albanesischen Gesandtschaft in der Stadt herum und suchte auf jede Weise die Aufmerksamkeit auf sich zu lenken, erregte aber nur allgemeine Heiterkeit. Da die leitenden Kreise sein Treiben nicht beachteten und die Albanesen auf der Audienz bestanden, sagte er ihnen schliesslich, der König könne sie nicht im Palais empfangen, da die fremden Minister dies gleich nach Constantinopel melden würden und Adem dann nicht mehr in die Türkei zurückkehren dürfte. Darum werde er abends in einem Privathause mit ihnen zusammentreffen. Dort empfing sie einer seiner Spiessgesellen als „König“ in einer phantasievoll

(2) There were individual decisions with even more dramatic consequences. Very often family members turned against each other when they decided to adhere to a different national identity. The influence of national ideas was so strong that personal decisions were able to destroy traditional family structures. Here is an example.

The father of Theodosi Mihajlov, Mihail Krlev, a tailor in Kumanovo, was imprisoned due to his revolutionary and other wrongful (not political) activity, and was freed with an amnesty in 1908. In order to restart his life and to educate his son, he asked for material and financial support from the Bulgarian community in Kumanovo, but he was refused. After the refusal, he turned to the Serbomans in the same town, who gave him 10-15 Turkish lira (300 francs), and also some tasks to promote Serbian propaganda. He accepted the conditions and soon he became totally Serbianized. He decided that his son, who was studying in a Bulgarian school, had to continue his studies at the Teacher Training College in Belgrade. Later, at a *četnik* meeting, he was advised to send his son to military school in Belgrade to become a non-commissioned officer. His son refused to do so, and he asked for help from the Bulgarian consul in Belgrade, who promised him immunity and Bulgarian higher education at the Teacher Training College in Kjustendil, if he gave him a full account of his father's activities. According to the account of the son, the father was agitating

geschmückten, ordenbesäten Feuerwehr-Uniform, zeigte sich über ihre Verhältnisse genau informiert und befahl schliesslich dem Bogosavljević, ihnen goldenen Uhren und Gewehre zu geben.

Dem türkischen Gesandten Fettah Bey wurde die Anwesenheit der Albanesen unbequem, über ihre Bedeutung getäuscht und fürchtend, sie könnten trotz der officiellen Dementis verschiedene Fäden anspinnen, liess er Adem Zaim zu sich rufen, stellte ihm die Gefahren vor, in die er sich durch so verdachterregendes Vorgehen begeben, und versprach ihm den Hauptmannsrank in der Gendarmerie, wenn er nach Constantinopel gehe, um dort jenen Zweifel über seine Treue und Loyalität zu zerstreuen. So geschah es, dass Adem bald darauf mit Amnestie und Officiersrang aus Constantinopel in seine Heimat zurückkehrte.

In Belgrad hatte diese Episode zwei Nachspiele. Bogosavljević hatte in einem Hotel auf den Namen des Königs für seine albanesischen Freunde mit dem Bemerkten ein Diner bestellt, von demselben dürfe niemand etwas wissen. Da er aber mit der Zahlung der an 1000 Francs betragenden Rechnung den Wirt stets vertröstete, wandte sich dieser endlich an das Hofmeisteramt, wo er jedoch zu seiner Enttäuschung erfahren sollte, dass er von Bogosavljević hintergangen wurde.

Mittlerweile hatte aber der politische Feuerwehrmann noch eine unerquickliche Affaire. Er hatte den Albanesen die Gewehre erst nachzusenden versprochen, damit Unannehmlichkeiten an der Grenze vermieden würden. Tatsächlich entwendete er 15 Gewehre aus dem Depot der Feuerwehr, wurde aber dieses Diebstahls überwisnen und obwohl er sein Vorgehen als patriotische Pflicht darstellte, zu einem Jahr Gefängnis verurteilt, welche Strafe er in Požaverac antrat; er wurde eben dieser Tage begnadigt."

Diese Daten, schloss Herr Kurtović, habe ich in den letzten Wochen mühsam zusammengetragen, da es mir darum zu tun war, das grundlose Gerücht von einer seinerzeitigen Audienz des Adem Zaim beim König aufzuklären. Adem Zaim, der hier gefangen ist, wendete sich obendrein noch an mich wegen angeblich ihm damals versprochenen Uhren und Ringen. Von Belgrad wurde mir aber mitgeteilt, dass man Adem nie etwas versprochen habe.

Diese sonderbare Geschichte, unzweifelhaft vom Herrn Kurtović auf Grund der ihm über seine an das Ministerium gerichteten Anfrage zugekommenen Instructionen [...] zusammengereimt, lässt schliessen, wie gerne man in Belgrad die seinerzeit dem wegen eines Mordes geflüchteten Adem Zaim gewährte Audienz ableugnen möchte.

in Pirot and Niš against Bulgarians, and forced or convinced Macedonian peasants searching for a job to claim themselves as Serbs, and sent them back to Orlanci and Orahovac (Kičevo) to agitate against Bulgaria. The father also eliminated Bulgarian agents, and informed Serbian police about private individuals who were in correspondence with Bulgarians. For his activity he received a monthly 80-100 francs (equals to the monthly salary of a teacher at a secondary school). In this case both the necessity of subsistence, and revenge against the former community (the Bulgarians) that refused to help, were motivating factors.⁵⁵³

The conflict in which son turned against father is an individual adaptive strategy of survival. But not only individual strategies existed; strategies of survival were adapted at the community level as well.

(1) Pusta-Bresnica was a small village located south-west of Skopje, five hours' walk from the sanjak centre, on the right bank of the Vardar River, in a mountainous area.⁵⁵⁴ In this ethnically heterogeneous area, this Bulgarian settlement was surrounded by the Albanian-populated Sveta Petka, the Serbophile Zdunje, and the mixed Bulgarian-Turkish Jablica. The inhabitants of Pusta Bresnica were working on the *čiflik* of Ahmad bey, who had not visited his tenants for 15-20 years, leaving two *kehajas* to arrange issues concerning the land and the tenants. Villagers were ordered to give them accommodation and food, but *kehajas* had no juridical power over the village.⁵⁵⁵ The inhabitants of the settlement had no land property until the bey offered them to buy his fields for 6000 Turkish lira (partly because of the problems discussed in Chapter 5), which was bargained down by the villagers to 4200 liras, to be paid in three parts. Villagers sold their draft animals and cut-down wood to pay the price, but they were unable to settle the last 1000 liras (20 thousand francs). Villagers thought that the yearly tax was included in the price, but the bey refused to accept this condition. Therefore the peasants asked for help from the Bulgarian state through the Bulgarian metropolite in Skopje. In their petition, the villagers argued that Pusta Bresnica is the only Bulgarian village in the neighbourhood, surrounded by settlements inhabited by other nations. The villagers emphasized the favourable geographical location of the settlement, as it was situated half-way between Kičevo

553 ЦДДА, ф. 315к. оп. 2. а.е. 10. л. 21.

554 The data source is an application of Pusta-Bresnica to the Bulgarian government from 1908-1909. ЦДДА, ф. 335к. оп. 1. а.е. 402. л. 8-10.

555 When a teacher arrived at the village, sent by the Serbian metropolite, the *kehajas* let him work after they had been bribed. But the bey learned of the situation and forbid him to teach. This case testifies to the drawbacks of a feudal hierarchy for the local community – the villagers were able to influence and bribe only the *kehajas*, but not the bey, with whom they had no direct contact. The *kehajas* were to obey the bey, the peasants the *kehajas*, and therefore the ambitions of the peasants were not realized. From a rhetorical aspect it is also interesting that the school-question later appeared in the document again, but this time to prove the determination of villagers in the face of Serbian propaganda.

(Poreč) and Skopje, cutting the lines of communication between these two centres of Serbian agitation. On the other hand, this meant that the settlement was under constant siege from Serb propaganda.⁵⁵⁶ A few decades earlier, identity and ethnic differences had no significance here – at least not for the bey, and not from an agricultural perspective – but due to the growing propaganda the importance of differences increased, and commitment to any national identity also presented threats. But villagers thought that time had come to profit from their national identity beyond the many inconveniences it had caused. Emphasizing its loyalty to Bulgaria the village wanted a reward to make up for its former miseries: the population required land and a school to become self-sufficient and educated, and thus villagers applied for the financial support of the Bulgarian state for the missing 1000 liras. *“There is a state where patriotism is still alive, and it would be the sign of governmental wisdom to send the sum to the metropolite.”*⁵⁵⁷ In their application they drew the attention to the activity of the Serbian metropolite in Skopje, who tried to open a Serbian school in the village, but local people had thus far resisted:⁵⁵⁸ *“...Our village is a granite cliff on which Serbian propaganda always broke its neck up to now... the local people have always defended their Bulgarian identity, although it has created only drawbacks and disadvantages for them”*.⁵⁵⁹ But, on 6 February 1909, Sofia refused to give financial aid, citing the law.⁵⁶⁰ This created a very unfavourable situation for the community, which had already begun the transaction and paid two-thirds of the total sum for the land.

The question is why the Bulgarian government decided not to support the village. Was the reason that the settlement stood alone, isolated, surrounded by villages of different ethnicity and the government considered it hopeless and not cost-effective to support such a community? Was the main problem that Pusta Bresnica was located in the conflict zone, where the influence of Serbia and Bulgaria was nearly equal? Did the Bulgarian state refrain from supporting insignificant localities on the right bank of the Vardar? Was such support focused mainly on the towns? Did the Bulgarian government suspend its support after the revolution of the CUP? Was it not worth undertaking economic investments in a conflict zone? Or was the sum simply too high?

556 This was also a rhetorical exaggeration; as to the significance of the location, the opposite was true (see *Map 7*).

557 ЦДА, ф. 335к. оп. 1. а.е. 402. л. 8-10.

558 It was the bey who refused the establishment of the school, and not the villagers. The villagers used this argument once against the bey, and once against the Serbs in a very clever way, which confirms our suspicion that the petition was written not by local people, but by a literate person (a cleric) who had studied rhetoric.

559 ЦДА, ф. 335к. оп. 1. а.е. 402. л. 8-9.

560 ЦДА, ф. 335к. оп. 1. а.е. 402. л. 15. 06.02.1909.

Perhaps all such considerations are realistic, perhaps not. In 1907, when the church of the distant Gostivar was violently taken away from the Bulgarian community, the Bulgarian government raised an objection, showing that it was indeed deeply concerned by events taken place on the other side of the Vardar.⁵⁶¹ Had Pusta Bresnica been located in the safe zone of Bulgarian influence, it should have been more reasonable *not* to support it. Settlements located in the safe zone and situated in the 'contested zone' had the same likelihood of receiving support. The school of Gradec and Gorno Vodno on the right bank of the Vardar River received 350 levas from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on 9 April 1908, while Smilovci on the left bank was granted 600 levas on 13 November 1908, through the National Bank.⁵⁶² Of course we do not know whether these sums were actually spent on educational purposes or simply covered the transportation and distribution of weapons. Nevertheless, the 20 thousand levas mentioned in the case of Pusta Bresnica seemed high, but just one year before the Bulgarian metropolite in Skopje received a similarly huge amount of money (6-7 thousand levas) for educational purposes – true, there were more pupils there than in Pusta Bresnica.⁵⁶³ Was the reason for the refusal that Sofia supported mainly ideological goals (churches, schools) or propaganda activity and buying land was not among its supported activities? Maybe. But the villagers of Pusta Bresnica asked for the money to buy land *and* establish a school. Or did the ambivalent rhetorical exaggerations of the application (the school question, the insignificance of the location) became too obvious for the Bulgarian officials reading the document? Pusta Bresnica was located on the top of a mountain ridge, and could not effectively disturb the connection between the Serbs of Skopje and Poreč, as villagers had originally claimed.


Pusta Bresnica was a small village, and sometimes not even urban communities were lucky enough to be supported with such a huge sum. In Skopje the Bulgarian metropolite also had to give a thorough explanation as to why he asked for the financial support of the Bulgarian state when he wanted to establish a new church in Čair Mahala, a precinct of Skopje (2). Although the Sultan signed a *firman* which allowed the Bulgarian community to build a new exarchist church, he did not allot financial support, and until 1911 the required sum had not been collected from local supporters. The metropolite's first main argument was that the church would be located in the outskirts of the city, and therefore many villagers entering the town would use it and thus would become influenced by Bulgarian ideology. He astutely mentioned that the Serbs had offered financial aid, but the community had refused

561 ЦДА, ф. 335к. оп. 1. а.е. 355. (1907)

562 ЦДА, ф. 335к. оп. 1. а.е. 402. л. 5., л. 7., 04.09.1908., 13.11.1908.

563 ЦДА, ф. 335к. оп. 1. а.е. 352. (1907)

(that is some form of blackmail of the state, while emphasizing the loyalty of the population). And the last reason: if the church in the outskirts remained unfinished, the population would visit the church in Tophane Mahala, which is exposed to Serbian propaganda - since the other exarchist church in the city centre is far away from Čair Mahala.⁵⁶⁴ This case also enlightens us about the tactics that local communities used.



Map 7. The geographic location of Pusta Breznica and its surroundings on the 3rd military mapping survey of Austria-Hungary (originally 1:200 000, cca. 1910)
<http://lazarus.elte.hu/hun/digkonyv/topo/3felmeres.htm>

It is also possible that the answer is to be found elsewhere. Similarly to Serbia, the Bulgarian government became aware of the fact that *it was easier to destroy than to create*. Churches, schools and land needed large levels of investment, and this was a very risky enterprise due to the spread of violence. Cultivation of land – compared to schools and churches – could not contribute to the deepening of Bulgarophile sentiments in the countryside in the long run. These cultural and infrastructural

⁵⁶⁴ ЦДА, ф. 335к. оп. 1. а.е. 402. л. 16., 10.06.1911.

investments had small rates of return, and efforts could easily be annihilated or ruined by violent acts. Therefore *construction was not considered cost-effective when financial sources were limited, unlike destruction, which was cheaper, while fear could be as strong motivation as national enthusiasm*. This recognition from 1908 on led to the escalation of violence and the unlimited intervention of paramilitary troops. The revolution of the CUP, and soon the disappointment of the policy of the Young Turks as analysed above, created a boom for destruction. When in 1907 Serb bands around Štip and Kočani received 300,000 francs to promote the Serbianization of villagers, this sum was, as we have already mentioned, not spent on purchasing land or erecting schools, but rather on bribing or intimidating influential local people, and on purchasing guns.⁵⁶⁵ If the loyalty of a village could be bought for 20 thousand francs/leva⁵⁶⁶ (equal to the yearly grain income of 20-30 peasants with 5 hectares of arable land, or to the salary of 20 officials, or to the annual pay of 6 lieutenants), then the Serbs could buy only 15 villages from the mentioned sum, which would not be decisive for power relations. Instead, the Serbs decided to create self-supporting *četas* (buying weapons, kidnapping people, requisitioning sheep, etc.) by relying on the financial aid of the Serbian state. Under these circumstances it would have been futile for the Bulgarian government to maintain the old-fashioned support system.

VI. Epilogue

During 1911, the internal crisis of the Ottoman Empire deepened further.⁵⁶⁷ The reports of the Austro-Hungarian consuls focused almost only on violent acts. In May 1912, at least 4 Serbian *četas* arrived in the territory of the Sanjak of Skopje from Vranje.⁵⁶⁸ Irregular Bulgarian troops enhanced their activities against state property and officials, paralyzing communication lines and infrastructure (post offices, banks, railways, etc.).⁵⁶⁹ State officials were unable to defend themselves; military forces were also under constant harassment. The authorities were so demoralised (partly because of not being paid for months), that bands could appear in the centre of towns, with weapons, even in daylight. At night local inhabitants refrained from

565 ИЛДА, ф. 335. оп. 1. а.е. 396. л. 5-6.

566 The sum that Pusta Breznica asked for.

567 *Ottoman Diplomatic Documents*, II No. 1829. 04.09. 1910. The Bulgarian sources put the number of Macedonian refugees in Bulgaria at 20-30,000.

568 The aforementioned Ivan Babunski (*Table 6*) and his 14 men were around Veles, Stojčo vojvoda was Skopska Crna Gora, Todor Alganski - formerly teacher in Kumanovo – “visited” his hometown, while the *četa* of Boško vojvoda turned against Prilep. ИЛДА, ф. 331к. оп. 1. а.е. 367. л. 6.

569 ÖStA HHStA PA, VII/Fasz.434, Heimroth to Franz Kolossa, 04.06.1911., No.26/pol, 2.

staying on the streets; only the gendarmerie and military troops were in patrol, often clashing with infiltrating paramilitary units.⁵⁷⁰

The Serb political groups - unlike *četa* members - tried to maintain good relations with the authorities,⁵⁷¹ while Serbian bands were engaging in ethnic cleansing along the border, targeting Bulgarian priests. Assaults became more and more brutal. A *četa* with more than a hundred members expelled Exarchist/Bulgarian monks from Karpina monastery.⁵⁷² Contrary to the fact that Serbian-Bulgarian negotiations on diplomatic cooperation and a military alliance (the Balkan League) were rumoured,⁵⁷³ along the border a state of *bellum omnium contra omnes* was about to evolve: Bulgarian, Serbian and Ottoman bands and military forces were fighting against each other, destroying harvests, pillaging villages considered as hideouts,⁵⁷⁴ and intimidating the local population considered to be a reserve for Bulgarian troops.⁵⁷⁵

The population was deprived, demoralised – villagers gave up registering complaints about evil-doers to the authorities, because they feared immediate punishment, and the violence that raged across the land had also paralyzed the courage of the authorities.⁵⁷⁶ Even the Bulgarian government had officially declared as early as January 1912 that it was *unable* to hinder the activity of Bulgarian bands any more.⁵⁷⁷ Grown men would rather become *četa* members and pursue everyday violence rather than suffer from it while cultivating land. This general tendency was catalyzed by the disarmament operation of the military forces in the previous years: if villagers wanted to defend themselves, they had to join a band, since there were no weapons at home any more, and as smuggling was controlled by bands of different commitment, bypassing them became impossible. Staying neutral was not a choice any more, insecurity, destruction became general.

Another type of reaction was that of the Albanians, unleashing a revolt in each year after 1910. Their activity became more and more ethnicized, and by the end of 1911 it evolved into a national movement, irrespective of denominational differences among Albanians. The major cohesive force of these multi-religious groups was the

570 ÖStA HHStA PA, VII/Fasz.434, Heimroth to Pallavicini, 22.11.1911., No.58/pol, 4.

571 "Die Serben aber zeigten den Türken gegenüber [...] viel Rücksicht und Zurückhaltung – ich möchte fast sagen Freundschaft." ÖStA HHStA PA, VII/Fasz.434, Heimroth to Pallavicini, 05.02.1911., No.6/pol, 12.

572 ÖStA HHStA PA, VII/Fasz.434, Heimroth to Pallavicini, 05.02.1911, No.6/pol, 12.

573 Austrian consuls also came to know this (but not the conditions of cooperation): ÖStA HHStA PA, VII/Fasz.434, Heimroth to Pallavicini, 05.02.1911., No.6/pol, 12.

574 ÖStA HHStA PA, VII/Fasz.434, Heimroth to Pallavicini, 28.07.1912, No.52/pol, 6.

575 ÖStA HHStA PA, VII/Fasz.434, Heimroth to Pallavicini, 22.12.1911, No.58/pol, 4.

576 ÖStA HHStA PA, VII/Fasz.434, Heimroth to Pallavicini, 22.12.1911, No.58/pol, 4.

577 ЦДА, ф. 331к. оп. 1. 371. л. 1. The Bulgarian government could not have limited the activity of the bands in order not to give any space for Serbian agitation among the intimidated population. Furthermore, Bulgarian *četas* were preparing the area for the invasion of the Bulgarian army, since the government had decided to wage war against the Turks when the time came.

cultural demand for the educational and official emancipation of the Albanian language and the demand for territorial autonomy.

The *vali*, Hadi pasha, personally visited the main centre of the crisis, leading a loyal army to punish atrocities. He did not make any distinction between Christians and Muslims. As a result of a conflict in January 1911 in Štip kaza, 76 Bulgarians were punished: 6 were condemned to death, and many were sentenced to lifetime imprisonment.⁵⁷⁸ But violent methods, executions and arrests could no longer bring relief. By the end of 1911 the situation has worsened in some kazas so much that even the *vali* did not dare enter (Kratovo, Štip, Veles).⁵⁷⁹ The units of the gendarmerie and military forces were in constant motion, but were unable to engage in battle with the guerrillas. Minor weapon storage sites were eliminated, some assaults were hindered, but troops were unable to pacify the territory.⁵⁸⁰ Due to the pressure, the reliability of officers and the morale of enrolled privates was brought into question. The demoralization of Ottoman forces is indicated by the fact that between June and December 1911 Bulgaria gave shelter to more than 20 soldiers deserting the army. Not only Macedo-Bulgarians, but also Anatolian Christians (2), Rumelian (6) and even Anatolian Muslims crossed the border.⁵⁸¹ The leaders of the sanjak and vilayet gave up their last forlorn hope of settle these questions when the most reliable *nizam* units of the province were sent to Jemen to put down the rebellion there.⁵⁸² The massive agony of the central power was interrupted by the outbreak of the Balkan Wars.

The central government also failed to resolve the Albanian question, which was growing more and more acute. As the government lost the sympathy of Albanians it also lost an instrument that could be used and turned against Bulgarian and Serbian bands, while at the same time it had to engage in a struggle on two fronts. The old policy of 'divide and rule' did not work any more. In 1911, the Catholic and the Muslim Albanians finally unified their forces thanks to Terentio Tocci, an Italo-Albanian lawyer and the Montenegrin weapon supplies. This was another step towards creating a language-based nation. Though the 13 points articulated by Ismail Qemali in Montenegro were still quite conservative – they included the reinstallation

578 ÖStA HHStA PA, VII/Fasz.434, Heimroth to Pallavicini, 05.02.1911, No.6/pol, 12.

579 ÖStA HHStA PA, VII/Fasz.434, Heimroth to Pallavicini, 22.12.1911, No.58/pol, 4.

580 ÖStA HHStA PA, VII/Fasz.434, Heimroth to Franz Kolossa, 04.06.1911., No.26/pol, 2.

581 The massive scale of desertion is revealed by the fact that the Bulgarian government even had to create a new type of registration sheet for this purpose to quicken the pace of administration. ЦДА, ф. 335к. оп. 1. а.е. 435.

Deserters were mainly privates of 18-26 years. In this archival unit, only one Bulgarian soldier, Shakir Shabanov, a Muslim originally from Radomir, deserted to Turkey.

582 ÖStA HHStA PA, VII/Fasz.434, Heimroth to Pallavicini, 22.12.1911., No.58/pol, 4.

of the Sultan's power, application of the *shariat* and the Dukagjini *kanun*⁵⁸³ – modern elements also appeared of which also Muslims approved (Albanian schools, the Latin alphabet, the administrative unification of Albanian territories).⁵⁸⁴

The officials in Shkodra first managed to convince the Muslims that the rebellion was against the sultan's rule (as Montenegrin weapons were involved, this could be partly verified); furthermore, they promised to fulfil some of the demands in order to divide the forces of the rebels. The Kosovars gained nothing but the sultan's mercy – the privileges given to highlanders were not extended to the area of Kosovo – but they remained silent, being aware that the neighbouring small states were interested in a general uprising, which would give them a good pretext to occupy the Ottoman areas. Though the Young Turks withdrew the pension of Isa Boletini (who, thereby losing the financial resources that were needed to maintain his private army, was threatened by losing his authority, and was forced to rely on external, Serbian sources), they were unable to win over any of the Albanian leaders to the Young Turk cause. Traditionalist leaders Isa Boletini (now financed by Serbs), Riza bey Kryezhiu, Bajram Curri and even Hasan Bey Berisha-Prishtina⁵⁸⁵ all agreed in their joint communication that the policy of the CUP had failed. The Albanians, albeit for different reasons, decided to unify these forces against the Young Turks.

Though the Albanians knew what they were fighting against, they still did not know what they were fighting for: on the eve of the great uprising in 1912 the leaders were still divided concerning the content of the joint programme. In July 1912, a new insurrection spread over all of Kosovo;⁵⁸⁶ refusing to shoot Muslims, the rebels were joined by officers, soldiers and gendarmes. The Ottoman response to the Albanian revolt – the interning of women – was unexplainable according to the Albanian moral code and soon the governor of Prizren was forced to flee to Tetovo in disguise. The number of Albanian troops soon increased from 15 thousand to 45 thousand (which also meant that blood feuds were suspended in order to mitigate the frequency of personal showdowns that would affect the efficiency of the assembly), when finally an envoy arrived promising the dissolution of the Parliament. Many of the assembled demanded the decentralization of the Empire, contrary to the political conceptions of the Young Turks (even their legal opponents refused

583 This came directly from the demands of the conservative Peje League in 1901-02 (composed of the opponents of the liberal-nationalist Prizren League).

584 We may consider the Prizren League of 1878-1881 to be a precursor of these demands.

585 Despite the fact that the last of these was autonomist-democratic and a follower of Abdyl Frasheri.

586 Malcolm, *Kosovo*, 246. Hasan Prishtina, in the name of the subsequent insurrection in 1912 demanded special laws for Albania based on the common law; the right to carry arms, amnesty for all rebels; assignment of officials who speak the Albanian language and are familiar with their customs in four vilayets (Kosovo, Scutari, Bitolj and Janjevo); recognition of the Albanian language as official; curriculum and religious schools in the native tongue

decentralization).⁵⁸⁷ The immediate realization of this might have mobilized the Albanian masses against the Slavic small states that were ready to attack the agonizing empire. But the government was paralyzed and no one had the authority to negotiate with the rebels. This further angered the Albanians, who finally occupied Skopje.

Behind these events one can also find the agitation of the small states, who promised weapons early in the summer to Bajram Curri, Nexip Draga and Isa Boletini, if they stepped into action against the central government (it was Dimitrijevič-Apis himself who negotiated with Boletini). After the small states had managed to exacerbate the tensions between the Albanians and the Ottoman government, and recognized that Albanians were unwilling to give any concessions to them,⁵⁸⁸ they saw the moment as opportune to declare war on Turkey. But Idris Sefer, Isa Boletini (2000 fighters) and Bajram Curri (5000 warriors) - though they had received their weapons from Serbia (and despite being rivals) - finally turned against the Serbians and resisted, although the official Ottoman army retreated without having engaged in any serious battle.

This strange story, where everyone fought everybody else, symbolizes the impossible situation in Macedonia as well as the pitfalls inherent in Albanian attempts at nation-building.

Notes in the margin: the limits to Muslim-Christian cooperation

We have already pointed out that there were many reasons for Muslim-Christian tensions. They could be traditional in origin (with socio-economic tensions in the background), but there were a growing number of ethnicized conflicts as well. We have also pointed out that in certain circumstances the opposing parties were prepared to cooperate, putting their grievances and presuppositions aside, but the examples mentioned – ethnically mixed *četas*, enterprises living from violence – were less constructive and small-scale. The transnational weapon-smuggling network was large in scale, but not a positive phenomenon. After ten years of fighting, the

⁵⁸⁷ But official Albanian petitions did not contain demands on the territorial autonomy of ethnic Albanians.

Fearing from the intervention of the Balkan states, Hasan Prishtina and Nexhib Draga, the major negotiators, were satisfied with the resolution of the Albanian issue within the framework of Ottoman legitimacy.

⁵⁸⁸ Bataković stated that many leaders were paid large sums from the funds of the Serbian government and were given weapons. Owing to this, in a draft of demands, an article was inserted which anticipated the recognition of rights demanded by the ethnic Albanians to apply to Serbs as well. Due to the insistence of several Albanian leaders, particularly of the pro-Austrian Hasan Prishtina, this article did not enter the official Albanian requests. See: Bataković, Dušan, T. *The Kosovo Chronicles*.

surviving participants knew their rivals' merits and negative features only too well. What chances were there to establish a (1) constructive, (2) large-scale, (3) long-lasting cooperation? Could distrust and ancient grievances be overwritten in case of necessity?

Prior to 1912 the activity of Albanian bands (e.g. those led by Mersim Dema, Halil Kaljosh) was considered hostile towards the exarchist population, based on the tone and content of many Bulgarian consular reports.⁵⁸⁹ But in the early days of 1912 Hasan Bey Prishtina asked IMRO and official Bulgaria to contribute to the Albanian revolt against the Ottoman Empire.⁵⁹⁰ According to the documents, he came up with the plan to create an autonomous province from Albanian and Macedonian sanjaks.⁵⁹¹ The Albanian-Bulgarian cooperation then failed, because the Bulgarians (especially the government) were afraid of creating an autonomous Greater Albania under the suzerainty of the Sultan that incorporated vilayets with Macedo-Bulgarian population. This was clearly expressed in a letter written by IMRO's Central Committee to the Bulgarian Prime Minister. Another problem was the fact that the Christian Albanians wanted autonomy guaranteed by all Great Powers,⁵⁹² while Bulgaria refused not only autonomy as a solution at that time, but also the interference of Powers after their failure in 1908.

The lack of strong ties between IMRO and the Albanian movement in 1912 is confirmed by the fact that Albania was not mentioned in the published compilation of the writings of the Central Committee up to 1 August 1913.⁵⁹³

In the event of Albania's admission into the alliance (the Balkan League), Kosovo - based on the principle of nationality - would have become a disputed area, reducing Serbia's territorial aggrandisement and also its willingness to cooperate with the League members against Turkey. Contrary to these considerations, Ferdinand, Tsar of Bulgaria, repeated his offer of 1908 to the Monarchy in June 1912

589 See: *История на българите в документи*, I/2. See documents cited on p. 328. and p. 327. These Albanian leaders later fought together with the Bulgarians against the Serbs.

590 Георгиев, 'Бежанският въпрос', 56.

591 See: http://www.albanianhistory.net/texts20_2/AH1921_3.html by Robert Elsie. Hasan Prishtina to the Bulgarian deputy in Skopje, Pavlov: "Since the 1908 Constitution, the Turks have been and are committing massacres in Albania and Macedonia. They have never shown any respect for the rights of the Albanians and Bulgarians. The terror that they are exerting is getting worse and worse and they are pursuing exclusively pan-Turkish policies. I believe that the time has come to throw off this cruel yoke by means of a joint uprising with a view to creating an autonomous Albanian-Macedonian state."

592 *Вътрешната македоно-одринска революционна организация*, Vol. 2. Архивите говорят, 46. No. 261 (19 March 1912).

593 *Вътрешната македоно-одринска революционна организация*, No. 366. January, 1913. "Албанското движение се яви с неимоверни претенции относно етнографическата граница на Албания, и коетосе насърчава от една велика сила и толерира от известни турски кръгове, предизвикаха общо опасение в балканските държави, коетосе ги обедини."

to create a Greater Albania.⁵⁹⁴ This could have meant the total denial of Serbian pretensions, contrary to the principles of the Serbian-Bulgarian treaty already signed in March 1912; therefore, the Bulgarian government protested against the plans of the tsar. At that time neither was the Protogerovist wing of IMRO⁵⁹⁵ thinking of cooperation with the Albanians. They were of the opinion that the organisation should appease Bulgaria's official policy, because Bulgaria was fighting for Macedonia and not for dismembering it.⁵⁹⁶ (IMRO tried to convince the Bulgarian elite not even to give up on the contested zone). In this respect the disputed zone in Macedonia was more important (and more of Bulgarian character) than the area to the west of the Vardar river. According to their data sent to I. E. Geshov, more Bulgarians lived in Skopje than in Prilep, Veles or in Bitola (where 18 thousand inhabitants out of 38 thousand were Turks or Albanians), while in Kumanovo (north), even according to Serbian sources, 5000 Bulgarian houses could be listed, while only 315 were 'Serbomans'. Contrary to this, only 32 thousand of the 80 thousand inhabitants were Bulgarians around Gostivar and Tetovo, the area where the joint Albanian-Macedonian uprising broke out later in the autumn of 1913. Another account shows how unstable the national consciousness or national identity was, if even IMRO leaders were thinking that "*in five years the youngsters will be Serbs and Greeks*" if the territory became dismembered.⁵⁹⁷

Prior to the signing of the London Peace Treaty (30 May 1913), neither IMRO nor official Bulgaria wanted close relations with the Albanian movements: Bulgarian ambassadors even raised the idea of the partition of Albania in 1913, aspiring for Berat and Valona if the state was not functioning as a viable entity.⁵⁹⁸ However, as

594 *Österreich-Ungarns Aussenpolitik*. Eds.: Bittner, Ludwig. - Pribram, A. F. - Übersberger, Hans. Wien-Leipzig: Österreichischer Bundesverlag für Unterricht, Wissenschaft und Kunst, 1930. Vol 4. No. 3549. 1 June 1912. "... *Ein kulturfähiges Volk von 3 Millionen.*"

595 This wing of IMRO, led by Todor Alexandrov and Alexandar Protogerov, relied upon Bulgarian support, and fought for the unification of Macedonia with Bulgaria (more or less opposing Sandansky, who preferred an autonomous Macedonia).

596 *Вътрешната македоно-одринска революционна организация*, No. 372, pp. 1056-1057 (18 July/1 August 1913) and No. 364, p. 1043. 14/27 January 1913.

597 Ibid. The principle of nationality was a key element in the argumentation of the Bulgarian government, which (beyond historical arguments) also referred to San Stefano, and to the Tirnovo Constitution accepted by Macedonians.

598 "*The Montenegrin delegates - as they were not brave enough to complain openly on Serbs - advised to dismember Albania together, so we might get Berat and Valona*" – wrote Danev from the peace negotiations in London. ЦДА, ф. 176к, оп.2, а.е. 1369, л. 147; and ЦДА, ф. 176к, оп.2, а.е. 1369, л. 140 (20.05./02.06.) 1913. See also: „*Засага нас ни интересува поведението на Сърбия, а в по-далечно бъдеще, съдбата на Албания, ако тя се откаже не жизнеспособна. В първия случай, ако Сърбия потъпче договора и ни нападне, и в резултат България получи по-изгодна граница спрямо нея, както и във втория случай, ако България излезе на Адриатическо море, според моето мнение, може да се обещае на Румъния компенсация, като се гледа, щото в първия случай да обхваща само сръбска територия...*” (ЦДА, ф. 176к, оп.2, а.е. 1369, л. 53).

relations between the allies were worsening, Albanian military capacity became more and more important for IMRO.

During the interallied war (second Balkan War), Hristo Matov, a prominent member of IMRO, in his letter from the front line written to Javorov, admitted on 18 July/1 August 1913 that the unification of Macedonia with Bulgaria had become a dream, as the current military situation could not afford this concept to be realised. In this instance autonomy was still preferable to a dismembered Macedonia. (The recognition of an autonomous (and not dismembered) Macedonia would have been possible only if Austria-Hungary had interfered and given effective support. But Austria-Hungary was either unable or unwilling to exert diplomatic pressure on this question – and also on other questions, like the territorial aggrandisement of Bulgaria – and therefore the Macedonians had to search for a new opportunity. In another letter, Todor Alexandrov suggested the idea of an Albanian-Macedonian dualist union, repeating the offer of Hasan Prishtina that had been ignored one year ago.⁵⁹⁹ Unfortunately, this idea only emerged later.

On 8 October an agreement was outlined between IMRO, Bulgaria and Turkey, in which the parties agreed to organise a new revolt in Macedonia in the future, after the stabilisation of Albania as the first step (as Djemal Pasha advised). Beyond 'official Bulgaria' as represented by Rizov and Andrei Toshev, the IMRO leader Alexandar Protogerov was also negotiating with Djemal pasha.⁶⁰⁰ The Turks were also entering into a conversation with the Albanian Essad Pasha Toptani, and the organisers were planning to send Petar Chaulev and Pavel Hristov once again into Albania to promote cooperation.⁶⁰¹

After having sent substantial humanitarian aid to mitigate the consequences of the collapse of the Albanian-Macedonian uprising,⁶⁰² the Bulgarians were also planning to set up ethnically mixed *četas*. The political organisation of districts was also planned on the same basis: creating mixed territorial committees with the participation of the local population.⁶⁰³ Besides this, the Bulgarians also urged for opening schools in Albania (i.e. in Starevo near Lake Ohrid), attracting Bulgarians

599 *Вътрешната македоно-одринска револуционна организация*, No. 375, pp. 1059-1060.

600 *Ibid.* No. 385, p. 1072. 10 Nov. 1913.

601 *Ibid.* 1066.

602 In this critical situation, the Bulgarian government decided to send humanitarian aid of 500 tons of wheat and flour, with the intention of promoting Bulgarian-Albanian relations and to take home those Bulgarians (including civilians and *četa* members) who were expelled from Macedonia to Albania. See: Георгиев, 'Бежанският въпрос.' The step of the Bulgarian government gave helping hand for the stabilisation of the Kemal cabinet favoured by Austria and Italy.

603 ЦДА, ф. 3к.оп.18, л. 62, 49.

from Macedonia, thus increasing the abundance of the Bulgarian element in Albania and the expansion of the Exarchate's boundary.⁶⁰⁴

Even the establishment of a joint Bulgarian-Macedonian-Albanian force of 5-6 thousand men was mooted. The Bulgarians offered the best organisers, like Darvingov, Midilev and Kirpikov, officers of the MOO. It was decided to select one delegate from each nation to organise the army and prepare the population. The Albanian delegates asked for 20 officers from Turkey. The possibility that the Albanian army would be organised without Italian, Austrian or Western interference was not negligible, as the Turks wanted to avoid the rule of Wilhelm Wied.

But the cooperation ultimately failed, due to the conceptual contradiction between the Bulgarian, Turkish and Albanian parties regarding priorities. Distrust and the financial problem of organising a permanent army instead of temporary *četas* came to ruin the plan. As 500 private soldiers each needed three Turkish liras per month (60 francs), the 54 vojvodas expected 10 liras monthly, and the 20 officers required a salary of 15 liras, the costs would have come to a total of 2.5 thousand liras a month (more than 50 thousand leva for 500 persons), which means that an official army would have been more expensive than the few hundred rebels of Chaulev, who received only 5500 leva official support over half a year in 1913.

Some leading Bulgarian politicians were quite pessimistic about the value of such an alliance. The assumption that former enemies could fight together (like Mersim Dema, who was still sacking exarchist villages prior to 1912) was not deep-rooted. Toshev (the diplomat who signed the Peace Treaty of Constantinople) thought that the whole idea was a Turkish trick to regain control over Saloniki, because, for the autonomy of Macedonia and Albania (to be realized in the future), Bulgaria should have resigned from Western Thrace.⁶⁰⁵

The new order

What did the freedom or Serbian occupation bring to the people of the Macedonian provinces? Hardly much in the way of relief. The population got rid of the Ottoman authorities, but not of the abuses. It was more a change of empire than a change of régime, and even social reforms remained on a low scale.

But at least public security was restored – though at huge costs. After the occupation, the Serbian government, instead of extending Serbian laws to all those

604 *Вътрешната македоно-одринска револуционна организация*, No. 385, p. 1072. 10 Nov. 1913.

605 *Вътрешната македоно-одринска револуционна организация*, No. 379, pp. 1063-1064 (29 Sept. 1913).

living in Macedonia, or granting some kind of liberal self-government that Pašić had in mind, introduced martial law in October 1913 to avoid disturbing the Serbian political palette with the emergence of a Macedonian Party. The text testifies that the Serbs learned from the strict methods of the Ottomans. In order to put an end to *četa* activity, not only was 'habeas corpus' neglected, but measures were also taken to discourage local communities and force them to refrain from hiding anybody suspected by the authorities. "Any attempt on rebellion against the public powers is punishable by 5 years' penal servitude. The decision of police authorities in the respective communes is sufficient proof of the commission of crime. If the rebel refuses to give himself up as a prisoner within 10 days from such publication, he may be put to death by any public or military officer... Where several cases of rebellion occur in a commune and the rebels do not return to their homes within 10 days from the police notice the authorities have the right of deporting their families whithersoever they may find convenient. Likewise the inhabitants of the house in which armed persons or criminals in general are found concealed, shall be deported... Any person who uses explosives without any evil intention shall be punished by 5 years' penal servitude."⁶⁰⁶ The same was applied if somebody harmed the roads unintentionally. Anyone who knew a malefactor and did not denounce him to the authorities might suffer the same punishment as the evil-doer.⁶⁰⁷ Nevertheless, most of these measures could be found among the instruments of Ottoman government, not to mention IMRO, that also tended to use oppressive measures if inhabitants refused to cooperate willingly, as discussed earlier.

Neither settlement policy nor violence resulting in the death of thousands (Leo Freundlich even made a record of Serbian atrocities)⁶⁰⁸ could stop the process of gradual ethnic replacement in Kosovo (Table 34). But the social structure was irreversibly changed by the land reforms. Until 1936 in Macedonia 20 thousand out of the 40 thousand former *chiftchi* received a total of 120 thousand hectares (6.5 ha on average). For security reasons (hindering the emergence of *beys*, Albanian warlords again) Muslim owners in Kosovo were limited to possess 5-15 ha after 1920.⁶⁰⁹ Colonization in Macedonia (30 thousand families from the overpopulated

606 Citation from the *Report of the International Commission to Inquire about the Causes and Conduct of the Balkan Wars*. Published by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Washington D. C. 1914. 160-61.

607 Ibid.

608 Freundlich, Leo. *Die albanische Korrespondenz. Agenturmeldungen aus Krisenzeiten (Juni 1913 bis August 1914)*. München: Oldenbourg, 2012

609 Müller, Dietmar. 'Property between Delimitation and Nationalization: the Notions, Institutions and Practices of Land Proprietorship in Romania, Yugoslavia and Poland.' In: *Property in East Central Europe: Notions, Institutions, and Practices of Landownership in the Twentieth Century*, edited by Müller, Dietmar – Siegrist, Hannes. Berghahn, 2015. 126-27.

Montenegro and Dalmatia received a total of 160,000 ha), in order to strengthen loyal elements in the occupied regions, was also serving security considerations.⁶¹⁰

Table 34. The ethnic distribution of the population in Kosovo, 1911-31

	Albanians (in thousands)	Serbs (in thousands)	Total (in thousands)
1911	390	207	600
1921	280 (-110, -28%) ⁶¹¹	156 (-51, -24%)	436 (-160, -26%)
1931	347 (+67, +25%)	205 (+35% increase owing to settlers)	552 (+116, +26%)

Based on Bataković, *Serbia's Kosovo Drama*, 60. and 91.

Conclusions

Summarizing the above, we can draw the following conclusions:

- the boundaries between the different types of violent acts, triggered either by sectarian and school conflicts or by customary law, gradually faded;
- the supporting policy of small states shifted irreversibly from construction to destruction;
- the activity of the irregular troops became limitless (neither the Ottoman authorities nor the withdrawal of support or the change of the seasons could impede them any longer);
- *četas* were transformed into highly organized and self-subsistent groups through involvement in agriculture (opium, tobacco, smuggling) or the expropriation of state and private property;
- loyalty to the state also faded: in addition to troops pursuing nationalist ideas, ethnically and religiously mixed mercenary bands also existed and were hired on the 'market of violence' to promote various goals beyond the nationalistic aims;
- the representatives of the state did not even attempt to address economic and political problems, and if it did it failed because of the discrepancies between local actors, local authorities, central authorities and Powers' ideas. The multiplayer situation, the intermingling of local customs and central laws, the violent and intolerant character of interference (despite


⁶¹⁰ Tomasevich, Jozo. *Peasants, Politics and Economic Change in Yugoslavia*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1955. 361.

⁶¹¹ The number of migrants was approximately 120 thousand, while the number of deaths was as high as 25 thousand, according to Noel Malcolm (Malcolm, *Kosovo*, 254, 258).

some temporary successes), hastened the escalation of conflict into anarchy;

- the 'usual' social conflicts (between public officers and citizens, security forces and inhabitants, etc.) also got out of control,⁶¹² and became overshadowed by the new types of conflict and were gradually ethnicized; the practices of *četas* spread across and were adopted by more and more violent organizations, which forced the authorities to apply the same methods and follow the same strategy based on intimidation;
- the nationalistic movements declared total warfare, in which, compared to the years prior to 1903, not only were the Ottoman administration or military forces and the active members of movements (ideologists, like teachers and priests) regarded as targets, but the passive masses as well, as they could provide shelter, information, ammunition and an economic base for rivals;
- these circumstances triggered a process of dehumanization in which human beings lowered themselves to the level of instincts. And the instinct of survival is among the strongest. Under the given circumstances of general insecurity the population had no choice: violence remained the only answer. Kill or to be killed, *tertium non datur*: as neutrality and national indifference was not a solution any more, this also escalated the conflict;
- the economy had collapsed by 1912; fields remained uncultivated due to the wave of violence, accelerating emigration.
- On the eve of the First Balkan War there was no functioning state administration and economy in the Sanjak of Skopje, which had turned into a frontier zone.

612 ÖStA HHStA PA, VII/Fasz.434, Rappaport to Pallavicini, 28.01.1908, No.5/pol, 14.



Map 8. Main routes used by band and Ottoman patrols. BOA –HRT-0310.

Legend

- railroad
- şose – road of better quality
- wagoon road
- telegraph
- ? askeri tarafında

Archival Sources

Arhiv SFR Jugoslavije (Belgrade)

Fond Jovan Jovanovic-Pizon, 80 (1905)

Централен Държавен Архив, (ЦДА, Sofia),

ф. 331k. оп. 1;

ф. 332k оп. 1;

ф. 335k. оп. 1.

Kriegsarchiv (Wien)

Zentralstellen, Generalstab, AOK-Evidenzbureau, Kt. 3483;

Militärkanzlei Erzherzog Franz Ferdinand (MKFF), Sonderreihe, 193;

Országos Széchényi Könyvtár (Budapest)

Kézirattár

Fol. Hung. 1677, Néhai Dr. Thallóczy Lajos osztályfőnök hátrahagyott iratai sztenograhált részének átírása (VIII/6, IX/1)

Österreichische Haus- Hof- und Staatsarchiv (ÖHStA, Vienna), Politisches Archiv

I. Allgemeines, 8. Generalia, Kt. 766;

VII. Gesandtschafts- und Konsulatsarchiv, Fasz. 433 (Ipek-Mitroviza), Fasz. 434 (Üsküb);

XII. Türkei, Kt. 414;

XIX. Nachlässe, Nachlaß August Kral;

XXXVIII. Konsulate, Kt. 399 (Prizren), Kt. 405 (Prizren), Kt. 430 (Üsküb);

Blazhe Krusheski DA SSID – Fond Izvrshnog odbora Srpske narodne organizacije F-6

Primary Literature

British Documents on the Origins of the War, 1898–1914. Vol. 5. The Near East: The Macedonian Problem and the Annexation of Bosnia, 1903-1909, edited by George Peabody Gooch and Harold Temperley. London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1928.

Correspondence Respecting the Affairs of Southeast Europe. Turkey, No. 1. 1903. London, 1904.

Милић Ф. Петровић (ed.). *Документи о Рашкој области (1900-1912)*. Београд: Архив Србије, 1995.

Documents diplomatiques. Correspondance concernant les actes de violence et de brigandage des Albanais dans le Vieille Serbie (Vilayet de Kosovo). 1898-1899. Beograd: Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, 1899.

История на българите 1878-1944 в документи. Том 1: 1878-1912. Част 1-2. Ред. Стайко Трифонов / Величко Георгиев. София: Просвета, 1994-1996.

K. u K. Ministerium des Äussern. Diplomatische Aktenstücke über die Reformaktion in Mazedonien 1902–1906. Wien: Druck der K. K. Hof- und Staatsdruckerei, 1906.

Osmanli Arşiv Belgelerinde. Kosova vilayeti [From the Ottoman Archives. Kosovo Vilayet]. Istanbul: T.C. Başbakanlık. Devlet Arşivleri Genel Müdürlüğü, 2007.

Nika, Nevila (ed.). *Përmbledhje dokumentesh mbi kryengritjet shqiptare (1910–1912)*. Prishtinë: Instituti i Historisë, 2003.

Ottoman Diplomatic Documents on the Origins of World War One I–II. Edited by Sinan Küneralp - Gül Tokay. Istanbul: The Isis Press, 2011.

Österreich-Ungarns Aussenpolitik von der bosnischen Krise 1908 bis zum Kriegsausbruch. Band IV. Edited by Hans Übersberger – A. F. Probram – Ludwig Bittner. Wien–Leipzig: Öst. Bundesverlag, 1930.

Prepiska o arbanaskim nasiljima u staroj srbiji, 1898-1899. / Documents diplomatiques. Correspondance concernant les actes de violence et de brigandage des Albanais dans le Vieille Serbie (Vilayet de Kosovo). 1898-1899. Beograd: Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, 1899.

Report of the International Commission to Inquire about the Causes and Conduct of the Balkan Wars. Published by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Washington D. C.: Endowment, 1914.

Savremenici o Kosovu i Metohiji, 1852-1912. Beograd: Narodna knjiga, 1987

Вътрешната македоно-одринска револуционна организација. (1893–1919). Документи на централните ръководни органи [IMARO (1893–1919). Documents of the Central Executive Organization] Vol. 1-2. Eds.: Цочо Биярски – Ива Бурилкова. Series: Архивите говорят 45-46. София: УИ "Климент Охридски", 2007.

Secondary Literature

Akarli, Ahmet. 'Growth and retardation in Ottoman Macedonia 1880-1910.' In *The Mediterranean Response to Globalisation before 1950*, edited by Şevket Pamuk – Jeffrey G. Williamson. London: Routledge, 2000.

Akhund-Lange, Nadine. *The Macedonian Question, 1893-1908, from Western Sources*. Boulder, Colorado: East European Monographs, 1998.

Amadori-Virgili, Giovanni. *La questione rumeliota (Macedonia-Vecchia Serbia–Albania-Epiro) e la politica italiana. Volume Primo*. [The Rumelian Question (Macedonia-Greater Serbia-Albania-Epiros). Volume 1] Bitonto: Prem. Casa Ed. Tip. Nicola Garofalo, 1908.

Asbóth, János. *Bosznia és Hercegovina* [Bosnia and Hercegovina]. Budapest, 1887.

Balogh, Ádám. *A nacionalizmus szerepe a görög politikai gondolkodásban*. [The Role of Nationalism in the Greek Political Thinking]. Szeged: SZTE, 2006.

Bartl, Peter. *Albanien: vom Mittelalter bis zur Gegenwart*. [Albania. From the Middle Ages until the Present Day] Regensburg: Pustet, 1995.

Bartov, Omer – Weitz, Eric D. 'Introduction. Coexistence and Violence in the German, Habsburg, Russian, and Ottoman Borderlands.' In *Shatterzone of Empires. Coexistence and Violence in the German, Habsburg, Russian, and Ottoman Borderlands*, edited by Omer Bartov – Eric D. Weitz. Bloomington–Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2013.

Bataković, Dušan T. *Serbia's Kosovo Drama. A Historical Perspective*. Belgrade: Čigoja, 2012.

Bataković, Dušan T. 'Istraga oruzja u Ibarskom Kolasinu 1901.' *Kosovsko-Metohijski zbornik SANU* 1 (1990) 269-84.

Bataković, Dušan, T. *The Kosovo Chronicles*. Beograd: LATO, 1992.

- Bataković, Dušan T. *Dečansko pitanje*. Beograd: Čigoja, 2007.
- Benna, Anna Hedwig. 'Studien zum Kultusprotektorat Österreich-Ungarns in Albanien im Zeitalter des Imperialismus (1888–1918).' [Study on the Cultural Protectorate of Austria-Hungary in Albania in the Age of the Imperialismus] *Mitteilungen des Österreichischen Staatsarchives* 7 (1954): 13-46.
- Berard, Victor. *La Turquie et l'hellénisme contemporain; par Victor Bérard. La Macédoine: Hellènes. Bulgares. Valaques. Albanais. Autrichiens. Serbs*. Paris: F. Alcan, 1911. Bíró László. *A jugoszláv állam 1918–1939* [The Yugoslavian State 1918–1939] Budapest: MTA TTI, 2010.
- Bíró, László. 'A zadrugák felbomlásáról [On the dissolution of Zadrugas].'" *Világtörténet* 22, no 3-4. (2000): 51–60.
- Bozeva-Abazi, Katrin. *The Shaping of Bulgarian and Serbian National Identities 1800–1900* Skopje: Institute for National History, 2007.
- Brailsford, Henry N. *Macedonia. Its Races and their Future*. London: Methuen, 1906.
- Bricmont, Jean. *Humanitarian Imperialism: Using Human Rights to Sell War*. New York: Monthly Review Press, 2006.
- Brown, Keith S. *Loyal unto Death: Trust and Terror in Revolutionary Macedonia*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2013.
- Calic, Marie-Janine. *Sozialgeschichte Serbiens*. München: Oldenbourg, 1994.
- Chomsky, Noam. 'Humanitarian Imperialism: The New Doctrine of Imperial Right.' *Monthly Review* 60 (2008): September, <https://chomsky.info/200809/> (downloaded on 25.07.2017)
- Chupovski, Dimitrija. 'Macedonia and the Macedonians.' *Makedonskij Golos*, 1913.
- Clayer, Natalie. 'The Dimension of Confessionalisation in the Ottoman Balkans at the time of Nationalisms.' In *Conflicting Loyalties in the Balkans: The Great Powers, the Ottoman Empire and Nation-Building*, edited by Hannes Grandits, Nathalie Clayer, Robert Pichler, 89-109. London: Tauris, 2011.
- Clewing, Konrad. 'Mythen und Fakten zur Ethnostruktur in Kosovo – ein geschichtlicher Überblick' [Myths and Facts of the Ethnic Structure of Kosovo – A Historical Overview].' In *Der Kosovo-Konflikt. Ursachen-Akteure-Verlauf* [The Kosovo-Conflict. Causes-Actors-Events], edited by Konrad Clewing and Edvin Pezo, 17-63. München: Bayerische Landeszentrale für Politische Bildungsarbeit, 2000.
- Clewing, Konrad. 'Nationalstaaten im multiethnischen Raum: Ethno- und Identitätspolitik [Nation-States in Multiethnic Spaces: Ethnic and Identity Politics].' In *Geschichte Südosteuropas. Vom Mittelalter bis zur Gegenwart* [A History of South Europe. From the Middle Ages to the Present], edited by Konrad Clewing - Oliver Jens Schmitt. Regensburg, 2011
- Combs Cindy C. and Slann, Martin W. *Encyclopedia of terrorism*. New York: Facts on File, 2009.
- Csaplár-Degovics, Krisztián. *Az albán nemzettévalás kezdetei (1878-1913). A Rilindja és az államalapítás korszaka* [The Beginning of the Albanian Nation-Building (1878-1913). The Period of the National Awakening and State-building.]. Budapest: ELTE BTK, 2010.

Csaplár-Degovics, Krisztián. 'Österreichisch-ungarische Interessendurchsetzung im Kaza von Tirana [Austro-Hungarian Enforcement of Interests in the Kaza of Tirana].' *Südost-Forschungen* 71 (2012): 129-182.

Csaplár-Degovics, Krisztián - Demeter, Gábor - Bottlik, Zsolt. 'Ethnic Mapping on the Balkans (1840–1925): a Brief Comparative Summary of Concepts and Methods of Visualization.' In *(Re)Discovering the Sources of Bulgarian and Hungarian History*, edited by Penka Peykovska and Gábor Demeter, 65-100. Sofia–Budapest: HAS–BAS, 2015.

Ђоровић, Владимир. *Историја српског народа*. Vol. VI. Београд: Ars Libri, 1997.

Ђоровић, Владимир. *Борба за независност Балкана*. Београд: 1937. (Delfi, 2001).

Dakin, Douglas. *Greek Struggle in Macedonia: 1897–1913*. Thessaloniki: Institute for Balkan Studies, 1966.

Demeter, Gábor. *A Balkán és az Oszmán Birodalom: társadalmi és gazdasági átalakulások a 18. század végétől a 20. század közepéig. I–III*. [The Balkans and the Ottoman Empire: Social and Economic Changes from the late 18th Century until the end of 20th Century] Budapest: MTA BTK TTI, 2014–2016.

Demeter, Gábor – Zsolt Bottlik – Krisztián Csaplár-Degovics. *The Role of Ethnic Mapping in Nation-Building and its Influence on Political Decision-Making across the Balkan Peninsula*. Regensburg, in press, 2018

Deusch, Engelbert. *Das k.(u.)k. Kultusprotektorat im albanischen Siedlungsgebiet* [The Austro-Hungarian Cultural Protectorate in Albanian Settlement Area]. Wien–Köln–Weimar: 2009, Böhlau.

Diskusija. Misirkov i nacionalno-kulturniot razvoj na makedonskiot narod do Osloboduvanjeto, Zbornik Misirkov, Simpozium. Red. Slavko Dimevski. Skopje: Institut za makedonski jazik, 1975.

Durham, Edith M. *The Burden of the Balkans*. London: Arnold, 1905.

Елдъров, Светлозар. *Сръбската въоръжена пропаганда в Македония (1901–1912)*. Sofia: ВК "Св. Георги Победоносец", 1993.

Елдъров, Светлозар. *Тайните офицерски братства в освободителните борби на Македония и Одринско 1897–1912*. Sofia: Военно издателство, 2002.

Елдъров, Светлозар. *Върховният македоно-одрински комитет и Македоно-одринската организация в България (1895–1903)*. Sofia: Иврай, 2003.

Elwert, Georg. 'Gewaltmärkte, Beobachtungen zur Zweckrationalität der Gewalt [Violence Markets, Observations on the Goals and Rationality of Violence]. In *Soziologie der Gewalt* [Sociology of Violence]. Sonderheft der Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie, edited by Trutz von Trotha, 86-101. Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1997.

Frantz, Eva Anne. 'Gewalt als Faktor der Desintegration im Osmanischen Reich - Formen von Alltagsgewalt im südwestlichen Kosovo in den Jahren 1870-1880 im Spiegel österreichisch-ungarischer Konsulatsberichte [Violence as Factor of Disintegration in the Ottoman Empire – Forms of Everyday Violence in Southwestern Kosovo in 1870-1880 based on Austro-Hungarian Consular Reports].' *Südost-Forschungen* 68 (2009): 184-204.

Frantz, Eva Anne. 'Violence and its Impact on Loyalty and Identity Formation in Late Ottoman Kosovo: Muslims and Christians in a Period of Reform and Transformation.' *Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs* 29, no. 4 (2009): 455-68.

Frantz, Eva Anne. 'Soziale Lebenswelten im spätosmanischen Kosovo, 1870-1913. Zur Bedeutung von Berg und Ebene, Ökologie und Klima [Social Spaces in Late Ottoman Kosovo, 1870-1913. The Significance of Mountains and Plains, Ecology and Climate].' In *Studime për nder të Rexhep Ismajlit me rastin e 65-vjetorit të lindjes* [Studies for Rexhep Ismajli celebrating his 65th birthday], edited by Bardh Rugova, 261–273. Prishtinë: KOHA, 2012.

Frantz, Eva Anne. 'Religiös geprägte Lebenswelten im spätosmanischen Kosovo – Zur Bedeutung von religiösen Zugehörigkeiten, Eigen- und Fremdwahrnehmungen und Formen des Zusammenlebens bei albanischsprachigen Muslimen und Katholiken [Religion-dominated Social Spaces in Late Ottoman Kosovo – The Significance of Religious Affiliation, Self-image, Perception of the Other and Forms of Coexistence at Albanian-speaking Muslim and Catholic Communities].' In *Religion und Kultur im albanischsprachigen Südosteuropa* [Religion and Culture in Albanian-speaking South Europe], edited by Jens Oliver Schmitt, 127–150. Wien: Lang, 2010.

Frantz, Eva Anne. 'Catholic Albanian Warriors for the Sultan in Late Ottoman Kosovo. The Fandi as a Socioprofessional Group and their Identity Patterns.' In *Conflicting Loyalties in the Balkans: The Great Powers, the Ottoman Empire and Nation-Building*, edited by Nathalie Clayer, Hannes Grandits and Robert Pichler. London: I. B. Tauris, 2011.

Frantz, Eva Anne. 'Muslime und Christen im spätosmanischen Kosovo: Lebenswelten und soziale Kommunikation in den Anfängen eines ethnopolitischen Konflikts, 1870–1913 [Muslims and Christians in Late Ottoman Kosovo: Social Spaces and Social Communication Forms in the Beginning of an Ethnopolitic Conflict, 1870–1913]. PhD-diss., University of Vienna, 2014. Manuscript.

Frantz, Anne Eva. *Gewalt und Koexistenz. Muslime und Christen im spatosmanischen Kosovo (1870-1913)*. München: De Gruyter-Oldenbourg, 2016.

Freundlich, Leo. *Die albanische Korrespondenz. Agenturmeldungen aus Krisenzeiten (Juni 1913 bis August 1914)* [The Albanian Correspondence. Agency Reports in times of Crisis (June 1913 to August 1914)]. München: Oldenbourg, 2012.

Gaulis, Georges. *La ruine d'une Empire, Abdul-Hamid ses amis et ses peuples*, Paris, 1913.

Gawrych, George W. *The Crescent and the Eagle: Ottoman Rule, Islam and the Albanians, 1874–1913*. London: Tauris, 2006.

Георгиев, Георги Н. 'Бежанският въпрос в Албания и българската хуманитарна акция през 1912 г. [The Refugee Question in Albania and Bulgarian Humanitarian Action in 1912]. *Македонски преглед* 35, no 1 (2012): 39-67.

Георгиев, Георги Н. 'Спомени на Евгим Янкулов за Балканските войни и Охридско-дебърското въстание (1912–1913 г.) [The Memoirs of Evtim Yankulov from the Balkan Wars and from the Ohrid-Dibra Uprising].' *Македонски преглед* 36, no. 4 (2013): 119–129

Георгиев, Георги Н. Българското националноосвободително движение в Македония (1893–1912). Идеология, политика, революция [The Bulgarian national liberation movement in Macedonia (1893–1912) – Ideology, politics, revolution]. *Македонски преглед* 40, no. 3 (2017): 7-20.

Georgiev, Georgi N. The Bulgarian national liberation movement in Macedonia (1893–1912) – Ideology, politics, revolution. *Macedonian Review* 40, no. 3 (2017): 21-34.

Георгиев, Величко - Трифонов, Стайко. *Гръцката и сръбската пропаганда в Македония (Краят на XIX – началото на XX век). Нови документи*. Sofia: Македонски научен институт, 1995.

Gjermëni, Sokol: *Kryengritja shqiptare e vitit 1911*. [The Albanian Uprising of the Year 1911] Tiranë: TOENA, 2011.

Гоцев, Димитър. *Идеята за автономия като тактика в програмите на национално-освободителното движение в Македония и Одринско 1893–1941* [The idea of autonomy as a tactic in the programmes of the National Liberation movements in Macedonia and the Adrianople regions]. Sofia: Изд. на Българска Академия на Науките, 1983.

Gounaris, Basil K. 'The Macedonian Struggle 1903–1912. Paving the Way for the Liberation.' In *Modern and Contemporary Macedonia*, vol. 1, edited by Ioannis Koliopoulos and I. Hassiotis, 508–29. Thessaloniki: Papazisis–Paratiritis, 1992.

Gounaris, Basil K. *Steam over Macedonia 1870-1912: Socio-economic Change and the Railway Factor*. New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1993.

Grandits, Hannes, Nathalie Clayer and Pichler Robert. 'Introduction.' In *Conflicting Loyalties in the Balkans: The Great Powers, the Ottoman Empire and Nation-Building*, edited by Hannes Grandits, Nathalie Clayer and Robert Pichler, 1–13. London: Tauris, 2011.

Наcisalihoğlu, Mehmet. *Die Jungtürken und die Mazedonische Frage (1890–1918)*. [The Young Turks and the Macedonian Question (1890–1918)] München: Oldenbourg, 2003.

Hansard's Parliamentary Debates, Fifth Series, vol. 56.

Historia e popullit shqiptar. [The History of Albania] Vol. 2. Edited by Kristaq Prifti. Tiranë: TOENA, 2002.

Hobsbawn, Eric John. *Primitive Rebels: Studies in Archaic Forms of Social Movement in the 19th and 20th Centuries*. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1959.

Les guerres balkaniques (1912-1913). Conflicts, enjeux, mémoires. Edited by Catherine Horel. Bruxelles et al: Peter Lang, 2014.

История на македонскиот народ. [The History of the Macedonian Nation] Ред. Михайло Апостолски. Vol. 4. Скопје: Институт за Национална Историја, 2000.

Извори за българската етнография. Етнография на Македония [Sources of Bulgarian Ethnography. The Ethnography of Macedonia]. Sofia: Ak. Izd. Marin Drinov, 1998.

Ippen, Theodor. *Novi Pazar und Kosovo (Das Alte Rascien)*, Wien: Alfred Hölder, 1892.

Ippen, Theodor. 'Das Religiöse Protektorat Österreich-Ungarns in der Türkei.' *Die Kultur*, 3 (1901-1902): 298-310

Jagodić, Miloš: 'The Emigration of Muslims from the New Serbian Regions 1877/1878.' *Balkanologie* 2, no. 2 (1998).

Kállay, Benjamin. *A szerb felkelés története, 1807–1810. 2. kötet*. [The History of the Serbian Uprising] Sajtó alá rendezte: Thallóczy Lajos. Budapest: MTA, 1909.

Идеята за автономия като тактика в програмите на национално-освободителното движение в Македония и Одринско (1893–1941) [The Idea of Autonomy as Tactics in the programme of the National Liberation Movement in Macedonia and Adrianople (1893-1914)]. Edited by Димитър Гоцев. София: Изд. на Българска Академия на Науките, 1983.

- Kaser, Karl. 'Raum und Besiedlung [Space and Settling].' In *Südosteuropa. Ein Handbuch* [A Handbook of South Europe], edited by Margaditsch Hatschikjan and Stefan Troebst, 53–72. München: Beck, 1999.
- Koliopoulos, Ioannis S. *Brigands with a Cause: Brigandage and Irredentism in Modern Greece, 1821-1912*. Oxford: Clarendon, 1987.
- Krause, Albert Gottfried. *Das Problem der albanischen Unabhängigkeit in den Jahren 1908–14* [The Problem of the Albanian Independence in the Years of 1908-14]. PhD-diss., Wien: 1970.
- Livanios, Dimitris. 'Beyond Ethnic Cleansing: Aspects of the Functioning of Violence in the Ottoman and Post-Ottoman Balkans.' *Southeast-European and Black Sea Studies* 8 (2008): 189-203.
- Livanios, Dimitrios. 'Conquering the Souls: Nationalism and Greek Guerilla Warfare in Ottoman Macedonia 1904–1908.' *Byzantine and Modern Greek Studies* 23 (1999): 1. 195–221.
- Lory, Bernard. 'Schools for the Destruction of Society: School Propaganda in Bitola, 1860–1912.' In *Conflicting Loyalties in the Balkans: The Great Powers, the Ottoman Empire and Nation-Building*, edited by Hannes Grandits, Nathalie Clayer, Robert Pichler, 45-63. London: Tauris, 2011.
- Malcolm, Noel. *Bosnia: A Short History*. London: Papermac, 1996.
- Malcolm, Noel. *Kosovo: A Short History*. London: Macmillan, 1998.
- Marinković, Mirjana. 'The Shaping of the Modern Serbian Nation and of its State under the Ottoman Rule.' In *Disrupting and Reshaping. Early Stages of Nation-Building in the Balkans*, edited by Marco Dogo / Guido Franzinetti. = Europe and the Balkans international network 17. Ravenna: Longo, 2002.
- Memorandum des Syllogues Grecs de Constantinople. Jean D. Aristocles, 6 Avril, 1878. M.A.H. Layard, Ambassadeur de Sa Majesté Britannique à Constantinople. Correspondence respecting the Objections raised by Populations inhabiting Turkish Provinces against the Territorial Changes proposed in the Preliminary Treaty signed at San Stefano. Presented to both Houses of Parliament by Command of Her Majesty*. London: Harrison and sons, 1878.
- Misheff, Dimitar. *The truth about Macedonia*. Berne: Pochon-Jent, 1917.
- Mishkova, Diana. 'The Nation as Zadruga: remapping Nation-Building in the Nineteenth Century Southeast Europe.' In *Disrupting and Reshaping. Early Stages of Nation-Building in the Balkans*, edited by Marco Dogo / Guido Franzinetti. Europe and the Balkans international network 17. Ravenna: Longo, 2002.
- Moore, Frederick. *The Balkan Trail: with 62 Illustrations and Map*. London: Smith, Elder, 1906.
- Müller, Dietmar. 'Property between Delimitation and Nationalization: the Notions, Institutions and Practices of Land Proprietorship in Romania, Yugoslavia and Poland.' In *Property in East Central Europe: Notions, Institutions, and Practices of Landownership in the Twentieth Century*, Dietmar Müller - Hannes Siegrist. New York: Berghahn, 2015.
- Nopcsa, Ferenc. *A legsötétebb Európa* [The Darkest Europe]. Budapest, 1911.
- Palairt, Michael. *Macedonia: A Voyage through History. Vol. 2*. Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2015.

- Perkins, James Andrew. *British Liberalism and the Balkans, c. 1875-1925*. PhD thesis, Birkbeck: University of London, 2014.
- Perry, Duncan, M. *The Politics of Terror: the Macedonian liberation movements 1893–1903*. Durham et al.: Duke Univ. Press, 1988.
- Peruničić, Branko. *Zulumi ago i begova_u kosovskom vilajetu*. Београд: Нова Книга, 1989.
- Peruničić, Branko. *Svedočanstvo o Kosovu 1901-1913*. Београд: Naučna knj, 1988.
- Petrungraro, Stefano. *Balcani. Una storia di violenza?* [The Balkans. A History of a Violence?] Roma: Carocci, 2012.
- Разбойников, А. 'Чифтлицы и чифтлигари в Тракия преди и след 1878г.' In *Известия на Института за История* 9 (1960): 143-187.
- Ракић, Милан. *Конзулска писма, 1905-1911*. Београд: Просвета, 1985.
- Rodogno, Davide. *Against Massacre. Humanitarian Interventions in the Ottoman Empire, 1815–1914. The Emergence of a European Concept and International Practice*. Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2012.
- Rubin, László. 'Albánia állammá alakulása.' *Huszadik Század* 20, no. 3 (1919): 135–41.
- Savremenici o Kosovu i Metohiji, 1852-1912* [Contemporaries about Kosovo and Metohija]. Edited by Dušan T. Bataković. Београд: Narodna knjiga, 1987.
- Schmitt, Oliver Jens. *Kosovo. Kurze Geschichte einer zentralbalkanischen Landschaft* [Kosovo. A Short History of a Landscape in the Central Balkans]. Wien-Köln-Weimar: Böhlau, 2008.
- Schurman, Jacob Gould. *The Balkan Wars: 1912–1913*. London: Humphrey Milford, 1914.
- Schütz, István. 'Az albán szokásjog. Lekë Dukagjini zsinórmércéje [The Albanian Customary Law. The Guideline of Lekë Dukagjini].' *Limes* 2-3 (2000): 185-196.
- Shaw, Stanford J. *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey: Volume 2, Reform, Revolution, and Republic: The Rise of Modern Turkey 1808–1975*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977.
- Soward, Steven W. *Austria's policy of Macedonian Reform 1902–1908. East European Monographs, 260*. New York–Boulder: Columbia University Press, 1989.
- Speitkamp, Winfried. 'Einführung' [Introduction]. In *Gewaltgemeinschaften. Von der Spätantike bis ins 20. Jahrhundert* [Societies of Violence. From the Late Antiquity to the 20th century], edited by Winfried Speitkamp, 8–12. Göttingen: V&R Unipress, 2013.
- St. Clair, S. G. T. – Brophy, Charles. *Twelve year study of the Eastern Question in Bulgaria. Being a revised edition of „A Residence in Bulgaria.*” London: Chapman and Hall, 1877.
- Stavropoulo, Livanios, D. 'Conquering the Souls: Nationalism and Greek Guerilla Warfare in Ottoman Macedonia 1904–1908.' *Byzantine and Modern Greek Studies* 23 (1999): 195–221.
- Stoytcheva, Stanislava. 'Season Work Migration as a Factor in the Development of the Bulgarian Population in Prespa and Bitola in the Early Twentieth Century.' *Macedonian Review* 30, no 4. (2007): 47–76.
- Stoytcheva, Stanislava. 'The Bulgarian Family in Macedonia Between Two Centuries: Aspects of the Crisis (1897-1902).' In: *Proceedings of the Bulgarian Historical Society*. IHS-BAS, Vol. 41.

Strauss, Adolf. *Großbulgarien*. [Greater Bulgaria] Posen-Leipzig-Konstantinopel: Mitteleuropäischer Buch- und Lehrmittelverlag, 1917.

Терзић, Славенко. 'Конзулат Кралјевине Србије у битолју (1889–1897).' *Историјски Часопис* 57 (2008): 327–42.

Thallóczy, Lajos. *Utazás a Levántéban. A keleti kereskedelem története Magyarországon* [Travelling in the Levante. The History of the Eastern Trade in Hungary]. Budapest: Pfeifer N., 1882.

Ther, Philipp. „Caught in Between. Border Regions in Modern Europe,” In *Shatterzone of Empires. Coexistence and Violence in the German, Habsburg, Russian, and Ottoman Borderlands*, edited by Omer Bartov – Eric D. Weitz. Bloomington–Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2013.

Толева, Теодора. *Виянието на Австро-Унгарија за създаването на албанска нация, 1896–1906* [The Contribution of Austria-Hungary to the Creation of the Albanian Nation]. Sofia: Ciela, 2012.

Tomasevich, Jozo. *Peasants, Politics and Economic Change in Yugoslavia*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1955.

Tomes, Jason. 'The Italo-Albanian Estrangement 1933-35 in its International Context.' In *Monarkia shqiptare 1928-1939. Përmbledhje studimesh*, edited by Marenglen Verli, 59-63. Tiranë: Toena, 2011.

Trotsky, Leon. *The Balkan Wars, 1912-1913: The War Correspondence of Leon Trotsky*. New York: Pathfinder, 1980.

Tsanoff, Radoslav Andrei. 'Bulgaria's case.' *The Journal of Race Development* 8 (1918): 3. 296–317.

Tucović, Dimitrije. *Srbija i Arbanija. Jedan prilog kritici zavojevačke politike srpske buržoazije*. [Serbia and Albania. A Critical Appendix of Conquering Political Serbian Bourgeoisie] Beograd–Zagreb: Kultura, 1946.

vadmezői Főhrer, Lajos. Néprajzi jegyzetek Montenegróból [Ethnographic Notes on Montenegro]. *Földrajzi Közlemények* 41, (1913): 358-371.

Вишњаков, Јарослав Валериянов. 'Македонски покрет и преврат у Србији 29. маја 1903 [The Macedonian Movement and the Uprheaval of May 29, 1903 in Serbia].' *Токови Историје* 3 (2010): 7–23.

Влахов, Димитар. *Мемоари на Димитар Влахов*. [The Memoirs of Dimitar Vlahov] Скопје: Нова Македонија, 1970.

Влахов, Димитър. *Борбите на македонския народ за освобождение* [The Fight of Macedonian nation for Freedom]. Библиотека Балканска Федерация, Nr. 1, Виена, 1925

Volarić, Klara. 'Between the Ottoman and Serbian State: Carigradski glasnik, an Istanbul-based Paper of Ottoman Serbs, 1895–1909.' *Hungarian Historical Review* 3 (2014): 3. 560–586.

Vucinich, Wayne. *Serbia between East and West: The Events of 1903-1908*. Stanford: Stanford Univ. Press, 1954.

Wilkinson, H. R. *Maps and Politics. A review of the ethnographic cartography of Macedonia*. Liverpool Univ. Press, 1951.

Wolff, Larry. *Inventing Eastern Europe. The Map of Civilization on the Mind of the Enlightenment*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994.

Yosmaoğlu, Ipek. *Blood Ties: Religion, Violence and the Politics of Nationhood in Ottoman Macedonia, 1878–1908*. Cornell Univ. 2013.

Zürcher, Jan Erik. *The Young Turk Legacy and Nation Building from the Ottoman Empire to Atatürk's Turkey*. I.B. Tauris, 2010.