

Zsolt Szilagyi*

**NOMADIC TRADITIONS AND THE MODERN MONGOLIA
LINGERING NOMAD IDEOLOGY IN 21ST CENTURY MONGOLIA¹**

Mongolian political life over the last 25 years has seen changes that cannot be experienced in any other post-Socialist or ex-Soviet satellite nation in Asia. Even by European standards, Mongolia today is a functioning democracy that has undergone a spectacular economic and social transformation. Mongolian nomadism today partly continues to follow centuries-old traditions, making Mongolia one of last countries – if not the only one – where traditional nomadic pastoralism is still practiced in its original form, this lifestyle is rapidly being supplanted.

Apparently, the disappearance of the nomadic lifestyle also means that a traditional pillar of Mongolian cultural tradition is disappearing as well. In contrast, even though Mongolians have over the past twenty years increasingly adapted to the influence of “Western” consumer society – often indirectly conveyed to them through the “Oriental” – filter of Korea, Japan and Chinese traditions have not completely vanished and are in fact currently experiencing a kind of renaissance.

Mongolian society in transition

While the structures of the traditional nomadic lifestyle are apparently disintegrating under the effects of the new political and economic environment, two distinct social groups have gradually emerged. In Mongolian cities – and primarily in the capital – one group is living an entirely settled lifestyle adapted to urban economic circumstances, including those who increasingly see living abroad (not necessarily in an “urban” setting) as a means to achieve their existential goals. Their aim is to settle and work in Asian countries with better economic conditions – mainly South Korea and Japan. China is a less attractive destination, partly due to prejudices arising from misinterpreted national consciousness, historical tradition and nationalism – mostly in Chinese cities – despite the fact that a significant Mongolian minority can be found living in the territories bordering Mongolia. I will return to this special issue later in this study.²

* Силади Жолт - Унгарын ШУА-ын Хүмүүнлэгийн судалгааны төвийн угсаатан судлалын хүрээлэнгийн эрдэм шинжилгээний ажилтан

¹ Part of the present article is related to my paper published in the *Ethnolore* XXIX. Szilagyi, Zsolt: A nomad ideology tovbbbййise Mongyлиbбан. In: *Ethnolore* XXIX. (2012), pp. 123-136. [Survival of the nomad ideology in Mongolia]

² <https://www.iom.int/countries/mongolia> last retrieved: 28. April 2016.; Solongo, A.: *Growth of Internal and International Migration in Mongolia*. <http://apmrn.anu.edu.au/conferences/8thAPMRNconference/6.Solongo.pdf> last retrieved: 28. April 2016.

An outstanding number of young people living in cities are following a new trajectory completely divergent from the traditional Mongolian model. For them, the fashion, music and lifestyle dictated by the global culture of the United States or major economic centres in Asia are the example of choice. They are gradually losing their connection with Mongolian traditions, rejecting the example represented in the way of life their parents and grandparents followed. As a consequence, migration is a growing tendency, primarily among young urbanites moving abroad to study or work, and who are being replaced by new arrivals from rural communities. The depopulation of rural areas and the disappearance of traditional lifestyle can largely be attributed to this trend. Half of Mongolian society today lives in cities, with the population of Ulaanbaatar drastically increasing over the last decade. Residents of the Mongolian capital during the 1990s numbered around 700,000. By 2010 the registered population had increased to over one million³ and has steadily continued to grow since then.⁴ This phenomenon has been clearly visible from year to year in the growth of *ger* (yurt) districts built by settlers on the hillsides surrounding the city, which have continued to expand and are now extending to the far side of the hills in the area to the north of the capital.⁵ Over the past few decades, it has become a common habit among local urban dwellers to maintain smaller rural homes near the city, usually in the form of yurts, where they live from spring to autumn, only returning to their city residences during the extremely cold winter months. This acquisition of space has been simplified by zoning laws stipulating that all Mongolian citizens have the right to fence off a specified area for their own use, which has led to the development of a special system of “summer homes” (*juslan*) or yurts in the outlying areas beyond the residential districts surrounding Ulaanbaatar.⁶

This situation has radically changed in the years following the transition, especially in the last decade and a half, which has seen the number of new settlers increase far more rapidly than the number newly constructed flats – which those moving in from rural areas were often unable to afford.⁷ Taking advantage of the aforementioned regulations, many people have simply chosen to fence off an area of a few hundred square meters as a mode of settlement in the capital. As a consequence, the vicinity of Ulaanbaatar has been populated by yurts and wooden cottages standing on plots surrounded by wood fencing. These settlements are provided with electricity, but running water and sewers are often lacking, making it impossible to provide residents with appropriate hygienic conditions. Due to the inherent features of the territory, it is especially difficult to establish a suitable infrastructure as there are no designs guaranteeing the establishment of an appropriate street grid. Many yurts have been washed away by heavy summer rains in recent years,

³ Szilögyi, Zsolt: Vöröslaky nomádok. A politikai változás és a globalizáció hatása a Mongol társadalomban. In: Berta, Péter (ed.): *Ethno-lore*. (Az MTA Néprajzi Kutatásintézetének Évkönyve XX-VII.) Budapest, MTA Néprajzi Kutatásintézet. 2010. pp. 25–337.

⁴ According to the latest data from the Ulaanbaatar Bureau of Statistics, the registered population of the capital in 2011 was 1,206,000. <http://www.ubstat.mn/> last retrieved 16 January 2012.

⁵ Data from 2013 indicates that the population in the capital had reached 1,226,991. <http://www.infomongolia.com/ct/ci/208/137/Ulaanbaatar%20General%20Information>, last retrieved: 28 April 2015.

⁶ In addition to establishing temporary homes and “summer residences”, many have also used this opportunity to build storage facilities and wholesale warehouses connected to their businesses.

⁷ Estimates by the Asian Development Bank suggest that the annual number of new arrivals to Ulaanbaatar is up to 40,000. <http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/2/dafeddc6-9bfc-11e4-a6b6-00144feabdc0.html>, last retrieved: 23 April 2015.

and these catastrophes have claimed the lives of numerous residents, which means that first generation settlers have by no means found the living circumstances that prompted them to leave their rural homes.⁸

At the same time, it is also important to mention some additional pressing factors. Unfortunately, Mongolia today still lacks suitable veterinary treatment for the livestock that provide a living for the rural population, which means that in some cases a significant portion of these animals are vulnerable to extinction. Furthermore, as there is no established feeding system, and given the fact that open-air grazing can only ensure the circumstances necessary for survival and reproduction under certain environmental conditions, mass death among livestock during the winter continues to occur. This often leads to complete financial disability for some families, who are then forced to leave their pastures behind.⁹

While suitable work opportunities for large numbers of first generation urban dwellers have been scarce for years, the pace of migration to cities has continued to increase up to the present day. Rising unemployment has also led to significant social tension, a fact made clearly evident by the riots that took place in the summer of 2008¹⁰ – and the simultaneous depopulation of rural areas may also mean the end of traditional Mongolian nomadic pastoralism. It is no accident that there is now growing discourse regarding ways to integrate the nomadic lifestyle within a 21st century economic environment. This issue gives rise to numerous problems.¹¹ Some are already envisioning the “end” of nomadism¹² while others have described nomads as a gradually marginalizing group.¹³ Nomadic conditions cannot provide an appropriate standard of education, which can only be achieved in cities, and this in turn reinforces migration. It is only in the rarest of cases that young people who have moved to cities from rural environments in order to study in secondary schools or universities return to their original communities, which is the second major reason for the rapid growth of urban populations and the depopulation of rural areas.

The tradition and the economic benefit

The growing demand for financial income in rural areas has also resulted in the appearance of new strategies, manifest in the emergence of new enterprises,

⁸ Janzen, Joerg – Bat-Ochir, E.: Rural-urban Migration of Pastoral Nomads in Mongolia – Causes, Course and Consequences for the Country’s Development. In: Enkhtuvshin, E. (ed.): *Nomadic Civilizations in Cross-Cultural Dialogue*. Ulaanbaatar, International Institute for the Study of Nomadic Civilizations 2011. pp. 309–313.

⁹ Such mass extinction took place in the winter of 2001–2002 and more recently in 2010. Reports on the latter indicated that more than two million animals had died, with the complete destruction of entire livestock herds in some territories. “Severe winter kills two million livestock”. Montsame News Agency, Ulaanbaatar, 11 February 2010. http://www.montsame.mn/index.php?option=com_news&mt=normal_news&tab=201002&task=news_detail&ne=799, last retrieved: 16 January 2012.

¹⁰ Szilőgyi, Zsolt: Vőroslaky nomádok. 2010. pp. 25–337.

¹¹ Campi, Alicia J.: Problems Integrating Mongolia’s Nomads into 21st Century Nation State. In: Enkhtuvshin, E. (ed.): *Nomadic Civilizations in Cross-Cultural Dialogue*. Ulaanbaatar, International Institute for the Study of Nomadic Civilizations, 2011, pp. 383–391.

¹² Huphrey, Caroline – Sneath, David: *The End of Nomadism?* Durham – Cambridge, Duke University Press – The White Horse Press 1999.

¹³ Dyer, Caroline: Nomads and Education for All: Education for Development or Domestication? In: *Comparative Education*, 37. No 3. (2001) pp. 315–327.

such as goat breeding for kashmir, for which there is an increasing demand, and the wholesale purchase of other animal products.¹⁴ The latter does not necessarily entail an environmental burden, and so can easily be combined with a nomadic lifestyle. The former, on the other hand, is already having a significant visible impact on territories in southern Mongolia. The number of goats in the northern area of the Gobi has grown to a point where desertification has accelerated and traditional nomadic livestock husbandry is no longer viable.¹⁵

Strategies for obtaining direct financial income have primarily developed near major centres of tourism, where nomads have established small “open-air museums” for visiting tourists. While these families are ostensibly conducting their traditional way of life, their primary source of income is the money they earn by providing tourists with photo-ops and other services. One of the most visited tourist destinations in Mongolia is Lake Khöwsgöl (Khalkha: Xöwsgöl nūr), the shores of which are populated – in the spring and summer months – by the aforementioned nomad families, who “control” specific territories among themselves. There is frequent “cartel activity”: guests regularly hosted in yurts built by certain entrepreneurs, or specific families offering photo opportunities to foreign tourists who are always transported by chauffeurs familiar with the territory. Families providing such tourist spectacles have seemingly not rejected their nomadic lifestyle – grazing their animals in their winter abode and then moving to their “summer residence” by the lake. Their main source of direct income, however, is the photo-ops they sell to both Mongolian and foreign visitors for pre-negotiated fees, allowing visitors to take pictures with them or with their animals. On such occasions, friction between locals and other Mongolians who have arrived at the lake as tourists is not uncommon.

Rural travel destinations are popular among urban Mongols nowadays, but while such trips may seem to be simple excursions, they are often infused with a special emotional content, and their aim is not only to provide “settled” Mongolians with an opportunity to relax outside of the city or to visit their nomad relatives in the countryside. The Mongolian plains and the traditional Mongolian way of life today are prominent elements of Mongolian national identity, and so Mongolians living in urban environments show far greater pride and enthusiasm in visiting the rural territories of their country than can be observed among city dwellers in other nations. For such urban visitors, paying fees to be photographed with families camped by Lake Khöwsgöl constitutes a decidedly negative experience, even if they are being photographed with reindeer or horses. Comments like the following can be frequently heard: “It’s my country. Why should I have to pay for it?”

Such environments have also given rise to the appearance of self-entitled “business shamans” who no longer play the traditional role of shamans in their communities and who have not become religious specialists in the traditional sense. Such individuals have merely recognized “market opportunities” and perform various rituals for travelling visitors – often based on information they have learned from books or just have seen somewhere similar spectacles.¹⁶ If they do these activities well, it is often difficult to

¹⁴ http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTISPMA/Resources/Training-Events-and-Materials/Training_Mar11,2003_Songwe_MongoliaCashmereTradePolicy.pdf last retrieved : 28 April 2016.

¹⁵ Batjargal, J.: *Desertification in Mongolia*. http://forum.mn/res_mat/Desertification%20in%20Mongolia.pdf last retrieved: 28 April 2016.

¹⁶ A similar theme is addressed by anthropologist Letitica Merli in the documentary film *Shaman tour*, which premiered on 7 October 2011 at the 10th annual ISSR conference in Warsaw.

distinguish them from authentic shamans, which means they are even able to provide their audiences with a sacred experience. In local communities, however, self-proclaimed shamans fulfil an entirely different role than their authentic counterparts who achieved their status in accordance with sacred traditions. In fact, it can be said that they play no important role at all and do not even attempt to do so. They have simply taken advantage of developed stereotypes in connection with nomads and conduct shamanistic activities merely as a source of income.

This process correlates with a phenomenon that has also been observed outside of Mongolia in certain territories of China and Siberia. The general demand for sacral fulfilment in the post-Soviet age of free religious practice has seen an increase in the number of fake shamans working to satisfy this demand, in connection with whom adherence to tradition would be difficult to verify. Although researchers claim that it is also possible to find shamans who can be regarded as authentic, it is likely that many individuals are performing rituals that they have reconstructed based on the accounts published by researchers. Whether taking place in cities or in rural settings, this phenomenon raises many new questions. In the period of revival arising as a result of free religious practice over the last two and a half decades, followers of both Buddhism and shamanistic tradition have been attempting to reconstruct and reassert the role of Mongolian traditions forced into the background or eliminated during the time before the political transition. This is an easier process in the case Buddhism thanks to written source material and religious centres abroad, where a young generation of Lamas have now for several decades been able to train themselves in keeping with Mongolian Buddhist traditions originating from Tibet. In addition, it has taken nearly two decades to re-launch religious education in Mongolia, which has now developed education centres that are also able to provide suitable training for monks.¹⁷

With regards to shamanism, which lacks written traditions, the same process has proven to be far more complex. On one hand, Buddhism has significantly limited shaman activity since the beginning of the 18th century – especially in central territories – which means that shamanistic traditions only survived among Mongolian groups living in peripheral regions, including Darkhats, Buryats and western Mongols. The impact of anti-religious movements during the 20th century was far more drastic in these territories, leaving very little or practically no basis for the reconstruction of traditions. The lack of written sources had two consequences. Firstly, it was only possible to reconfigure the role and function of shamans in a traditional way in areas where shamans or shaman families had survived the more than 70 years of socialist rule preceding the political transition. Secondly, an increasing number of “self-proclaimed” shamans riding the tide of “neo-paganism” familiar to western societies as well began to engage in shamanistic practices for financial gain, often using the earlier work of researchers to establish their own systems. As was typical of the new socio-economic circumstances, they often moved to cities, where there was a concentrated demand for their services. In contrast to earlier times, it is not uncommon today for individual shamans to practice in shamanistic centres, attracting potential clients before setting out to establish private practices. Given this unique market environment, some shamans engage in a form of self-promotion, publishing books about their own activities or about shamanism *in general* – thereby creating an illusion of academic credibility and making sure to emphasise that they are

¹⁷ Field work in 2012 and 2015 in Ulaanbaatar.

also practitioners.¹⁸ In this way, audiences intrigued by shamanism and shamanistic traditions, who obviously have a sensitive commitment to the topic, often help to increase the clientele of the given authors.

While sacred traditions, especially Buddhism, have become a pillar of Mongolian national identity, financial considerations were not ignored among representatives of dogmatic religious circles either. In the wake of the recent Buddhist revival in Mongolia, there are obviously many who have taken on a monastic way of life based on personal conviction, but in an urban environment fraught with unemployment there are also individuals who merely view joining a monastery as a means to ensure a livelihood. The gradual reconstruction of the religious education system over the past twenty years has led to partial success in alleviating this problem, but it is doubtful that it can be fully eliminated.¹⁹ Even so, a certain restructuring can also be observed in recent years. While the first decade after the political transition showed a gradual increase in the number of lamas and monasteries, currently there is an apparent decrease in the number of monks, and so it is likely that those who are choosing this way of life today are only doing so out of personal commitment.

The nomad ideology in nowadays

State ideology prior to the political transition did not benefit the independent manifestation of different ethnic groups. As the consequence of a process lasting since around the 17th century, this continued to reinforce the predominance of the Khalkha peoples, which also resulted in the development of the literary Mongol language based on the Khalkha dialect. The political transition therefore created a new situation in this sense as well. While Mongols had previously taken into account ethnic origin in the course of personal communication, during the reorganization of administrative procedures it was suggested that ethnic origin should also be registered on personal documents. Although this procedure was not introduced, it can be recalled that when attempts were made to do so during the 1990s, there was a sudden increase in the number of people who declared themselves to be of Borjigid descent, directly placing their origin in the Chinghisid tradition. It should also be mentioned that around the same time it was not uncommon for young people in urban environments to proudly use the term “pure Khalkha” (Khalkha *jinxen xalx*) when asked about their origins. While this could certainly be a natural answer, the inherent pride suggests a possibility that for young urbanized Mongols the expression also symbolizes a connection with urban life and modernity as a value.

In accordance with the ideology of the Soviet period, mention of the great Mongol Empire, or Chinghis Khan – as a symbol of the Mongol state, independence and power – was not acceptable in the prevalent political environment. The historical role of Chinghis

¹⁸ hivatkozás

¹⁹ During the religious revival after the political transition, one of the biggest problems facing the Buddhist church was that religious education had been dismantled in the period of religious persecution. As a consequence, underqualified lamas were put in charge of many monasteries, which often resulted in the degradation of these institutions. In the course of reconstructing the education system over the last twenty years, this problem has been considerably alleviated through assistance from education centres, which are often operated by Tibetan emigrants. Szilógyi, Zsolt: The Status and Political Role of Mongolian Buddhism after the Political Transformation. In: Birtalan, Égnes (ed.): *Mongolian Studies in Europe. Proceedings of the Conference held on 24–25, November in Budapest*. Budapest, Department of Inner Asian Studies of ELTE 2010. pp. 117–127.

Khan was blurred more as a result of suppression than falsification of history. It is no accident that when Mongolian independence was declared, the founder of the Mongol state became one of the most important subjects in Mongolian culture, public discourse and historical research. Innumerable books have been published dealing with the Great Khan's life and his role in history, making him the symbol of Mongolia, although his personality has been somewhat degraded as a result. Chinghis Khan's name has also become a well-known commercial trademark outside the borders of Mongolia. A wide variety of products have been named after him, ranging from beer and vodka to travel agencies. His portrait adorned Mongol banknotes issued after the political transition, and the international airport in Ulaanbaatar is also carries his name today. Moreover, his personality enjoys a unique respect outside of today's Mongolia as well.²⁰

A sacred Chinghis Khan cult has existed in Inner-Mongolia²¹ in the Ordos region since the 13th century, and legend holds that he was buried here. It is interesting to note that Genghis Khan has also been elevated to the pantheon of Chinese emperors as the founder of the Yuan Dynasty, which ruled in the 13th and 14th centuries, although Genghis Khan never intended to establish a dynasty. He wanted to rule China as a conqueror rather than sitting on the Chinese throne. The latter was achieved by his grandson, Kublai/Kubilai (mong. Qubilai) Khan, who did so in the face of growing hostility among the contemporary Mongol aristocracy. Naturally, Kublai is remembered today as one of the greatest rulers in Mongolian history – his statue stands beside that of the great founder in front of the Mongolian Parliament – but judgement by his contemporaries was by no means uniformly positive.

It is intriguing that increased attention to the preservation of Mongolian national traditions today in the territories of Inner-Mongolia – naturally due to favourable political changes – has unfortunately not brought Mongolian people living on opposite sides of the border closer to one another.²² In fact, the reverse is true. Recent years have indicated a peculiar kind of opposition, which is rarely voiced, but which is nevertheless present in public thinking. Nowadays, a portion of the Mongolian population, typically the urban segment, is especially hostile towards those in Inner-Mongolia. China can be regarded as the most significant commercial and investment partner in Mongolia today, and nearly 5.6 million Mongols – almost double the population of Mongolia – are currently living within her borders.²³

To an outsider, this fact would constitute an opportunity to expand economic cooperation, but in everyday life it has actually not strengthened relations between the two countries. The anti-Chinese sentiment that can be observed today in Mongolia – which is clearly visible in the communication taking place between young people bickering with each other on social network sites – also presents Inner Mongolians in

²⁰ Surprisingly, one of the reasons for the relative urgency of re-christening the airport in Ulaanbaatar is that Kazakhstan was also planning to name one of its airports after the Great Khan, which Mongolia naturally could allow to happen.

²¹ Birtalan, Egnes: Die Mythologie der mongolischen Volksreligion. In: *Wörterbuch der Mythologie* 34. Ed. Schmalzriedt, Egidius – Haussig, Hans Wilhelm. Stuttgart, Klett-Cotta Verlag 2001. pp. 879–1097.

²² This is also evident in the maintenance of the Chinghis shrine, a gigantic Inner Mongolian museum built in 2008 in Hühhot ("Blue City", the royal seat founded in the middle of the 16th century by the Түмен Mongol Altan Khan, today the centre of the Chinese Autonomous Province of Inner Mongolia).

²³ The territory of Inner Mongolia comprises 1,200,000 square kilometres. Based on the census in 2000, only 17.13% of those living here, approximately 4 million people, referred to themselves as Mongolian. Mongols can also be found living in Northeast China, in Qinghai, Gansu and Xinjiang.

a negative light. I have heard more than once in Ulaanbaatar that Mongol people living south of the Gobi cannot even be considered Mongolian because they are “Chinese”. At the same time, when travelling in Inner Mongolia, on several occasions I experienced locals qualifying Ulaanbaatar “city Mongols” with a simple dismissive wave of the hand, designating an extremely negative critique. When I asked about the reason for this opinion, I was told that “those are not real Mongols anymore”: they live in the city, they engage in commerce, they imitate the West, and so cannot be considered the true heirs of Mongol tradition – rural Mongolians perhaps, but definitely not those in Ulaanbaatar.

To the outside observer, it would seem that a certain rivalry has developed between the two groups, based on the preservation of Mongol and nomadic traditions. Both sides are driven by a uniquely interpreted national consciousness, which is understandable when we examine the circumstances. Preserving and practicing their cultural traditions is imperative for Mongolian people living in China as it is the only way for them to preserve their identity within the overwhelmingly Han Chinese majority.²⁴ For the inhabitants of The Republic of Mongolia, it is the reinforcement of national identity and the preservation of traditions that bring a guarantee of social stability, and it is here that we return to the unequal socio-economic circumstances mentioned at the beginning of this study.

A similar argument can be heard in connection with Mongolian cultural tradition and the history of the Buddhist religion, which constitutes another important pillar of Mongol national identity. In keeping with the accepted consensus among the academic community dealing with the topic, two Mongol Buddhist conversions are usually mentioned in relation to the spread of Buddhism in Mongolia - one in the 13th century and another from the 16th – 17th centuries. In recent years, however, “newer” conversions are said to have been discovered which characteristically seem to date farther and farther back in time. In this context, there is talk today of a Buddhist tradition that appeared in the territory of present day Mongolia from the 6th – 8th centuries, the Buddhism of the Kitan (Kitai), who can indeed partially be traced to the territory of Mongolia today, but cannot be considered predecessors of Mongol Buddhism as there is a significant difference between speaking about Mongol Buddhism and the Buddhism which appeared later in Mongol territories. Nevertheless, the aim in both examples is the same; to project religious and historical traditions as important elements of national identity as far into the past as possible.

We do not intend to deal with the validity of the theory in connection with Xiongnu here.²⁵ At present, it is perhaps more interesting to mention that it is not only the Mongolian government who uses the possibility of Xionghu origin at a political level. Many researchers in Mongolia and Inner Mongolia are showing serious interest in this issue. The subject is experiencing a kind of renaissance today, and yet, surprisingly, it is not serving as a means to bring Mongols living on the two sides of the Gobi together either. Government rhetoric on both sides incorporates the idea that nomadic peoples appearing in the region in the 4th century B. C. established the first nomadic state and that the nomadic people who Chinese sources first described in detail can be regarded

²⁴ A smaller factor contributing to this may be that according to current Chinese law minorities receive certain benefits in connection with childbirth, which are well known to be limited among Han inhabitants.

²⁵ Ligeti, Lajos: *Le tabgatch, un dialecte de la langue sien-pi*. In: *Mongolian Studies*. (1970) pp. 265–308; Pelliot, Paul: *L'origine du nom de la „Chine”*. In: *T'oung Pao* 13, (1912), pp. 727–742.

as cultural predecessors of Mongols. In spite of this, nothing is said about how Mongol peoples on either side of the border are related to one another. At the moment, it seems that distrust is only the observable arch spanning across the border.

ТОВЧЛОЛ

Силады Жолт

21-р зууны Монгол дахь нүүдэлчин үзлийн үргэлжлэл шинэ монгол ба нүүдэлчдийн уламжлалууд

Сүүлийн жилүүдэд Монголын нийгэм эдийн засгийн тогтолцооны хурдацтай шилжилтийн үр нөлөөгөөр монгол хүмүүсийн сэтгэлгээ болон амьдралын хэв маягт бас ихээхэн өөрчлөлт гарсан бөгөөд үндэсний онцлог буюу нүүдэлчдийн үзэл гарсан нь аажмаар улам хүчирхэгжсэн юм. Энэ нь үндэсний ялгарах шинжийн нэг багана болжээ. Тус үзэл нь эрх тэгш байдлаараа олон монголчуудын хүндэтгэлийг хүлээсэн билээ. Эдийн засгийн орчинд Монголын нийгэм эрчимтэй хурдаар өөрчлөгдөж байна. Хотын хүн ам нүүдэлчин амьдралын хэв маягаасаа холдож байгаа ба уламжлалт хэв маягаасаа маш ялгаатайгаар биеэ авч явах загварыг нэгэнт дагаад эхэлчихсэн юм.

Нүүдэлчний амьдрал доройтож байгаа нь Монголын соёлын суурь бүрэлдэхүүн хэсгийн нэг хэсэг алга болоход хүргэж байна. Хэдийгээр өнгөрсөн 25 жилд монголчууд дэлхий нийтийн соёлтой илүү их зохицож байгаа ч соёлын бие даасан ялгарах шинжийг илүү хүчтэй болгох шаардлага тулгарч байна. Энэ нь орчны өөрчлөлтөд хялбар тохируулж болох эдийн засгийн стратегийг сонгоход чухал үүрэгтэй юм. Түүнийг нь тухайлбал, хот дахь бөө мөргөлд оролцогчдын тоо, буддын сүмийн нийгмийн чиг үүргүүдийн өөрчлөлт, эсвэл жуулчдын голчлон очдог газрын эргэн тойрон дахь “хуурмаг” нүүдэлчдийн амьдралын хэв маягаас ажиглаж болохоор байна.