CONSULTATION

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THE RUBIK'S CUBE OF DEMOCRATIC DEVELOPMENT
A NORMATIVE MODEL OF STATEBUILDING

Introduction

If we would like to identify the ultimate challenge of the 21st century we will be not able to name a single phenomenon, actor or threat. The media covers only the spectacular events from the international politics, thus we can easily think that terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, or international criminal activities are isolated events or phenomena. However, we have to admit that the root of all challenges lies in the changed conditions for development. The states are prone to fail and state failure is a development trap from which the country cannot escape from itself. Consequently, the ultimate challenge of the 21st century is the complex constellation of state failure which gives floor to negative spillover of new threats.

At the same time, we also have to admit that any reaction of the international community presupposes a political decision. The decision makers, however, need clear advice. For instance, today, after nine years in Afghanistan or seven years in Iraq we can feel some apathy on the level of decision makers, especially in Europe. It is reasonable but definitely wrong attitude. It is understandable that a politician sees the problem of state failure and statebuilding as a too complex puzzle which cannot be solved. Id est, it makes no sense to sacrifice time, money or the lives of the people involved in the reconstruction process. On the other hand, a politician may feel a moral duty to help people living under inhuman conditions, or may understand the security threat of untreated state failure. In conclusion, we need a new model which defines the problem clearly, which answers the question why we have to deal with failed states. We need a model which collects the experiences of former historic and normative statebuilding models, which can respond the query of what to do. And finally, we need a model which can show how we have to manage the complex interdependencies of the different dimensions of development. This is the model which is introduced by this article. The starting point is the belief that democracy, or a functioning state is too difficult, if not

impossible, to achieve in a failed state. But when Ernő Rubik invented his famous cube in the 1970s it was also held impossible to solve. The cube is a perfect analogy that six different dimensions can develop interdependently through different stages of development.

The Rubik's cube model is not a masterplan for statebuilding but it proves that we can follow and repeat certain scheme during the process. Furthermore, the model is an exact summary of the existing statebuilding models and it aims at simplifying the thinking about state failure and the solutions

The changes in the international system and new definitions

The increasing number of both democratizing countries and failing states drew attention to the necessity of rebuilding the security architecture that was designed according to the realities of the Cold War. Although, there are several ways to address state failure, most of them are ineffective. Even if the problem of state failure is not a new phenomenon, there are no clear and comprehensive frameworks which could help analyze, explain and forecast the events and phenomena associated with it. After the end of the Cold War, the term state failure appeared in the political lexicons. Humanitarian claims for intervention in states which fail to perform the necessary functions became stronger after the pictures of depressing events from Somalia to Cambodia perambulated the Western media at the beginning of the 1990s.

The shift towards a more (national) security oriented approach was forced by the regrettable events of the simultaneous terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001. The attacks shocked the world, but more importantly woke up the world's alone superpower from its strategic slumber. The events finally raised the attention of foreign policy scientists and researchers on the external consequences of state failure. After 2001, several studies addressed the relationship between the accumulated knowledge on failed states and the policy decisions. (see eg. Dorff 2005) Many theorists and policy advisors believed that statebuilding is the general cure. (see eg. Dobbins 2007; Fukuyama 2004)

After the end of the bipolar world system, anarchy, which was envisaged by Thomas Hobbes, became the rule in the weak states. Simultaneously, the scholars (Cooper 2003; Fukuyama 1993; Sorensen 2001) celebrated the victory of democracy in the post-modern world. It is true that on systemic level democracy became "the only game in town" defeating, or losing its counter-alternative organizing principle. But the anarchy of the international system, which penetrated in several weak performing states, encumbered the realization of the "end of history". The gap between the pre-modern states and post-modern democracies has grown constantly.

Per definition state failure is an international phenomenon which does not know borders and spills over neighboring countries, creating regional and in the worst case scenarios international instability. In the world of sovereign states, sovereignty protects all states from intervention under the aegis of the international law, but "cooperative sovereignty" (Marton 2008) means that sovereignty is not evidently attached to the state. The territory of the world is the common good of the world's population and the states have the duty to protect the population living on the given territory. Territoriality in this sense is not a right but a duty to control the sovereign portion of the world's territory. The definition of state failure is the failure of the control of this territory which puts the population of the country and the population of other countries in danger. The fact that failed states are not able to develop by themselves does not necessarily mean that external actors cannot give useful assistance. In line with "cooperative sovereignty", the external actors become responsible for the reinstallation and maintenance of the control over the territory. Statebuilding means the rebuilding of the state's capacity of control the sovereign share.

Several studies were born on the analogies between statebuilding experiences in the past and present. The historical examples help understand the complexity of the process but are unable to provide clear and copyable blueprints. On the other hand, it is evident that normative models (see eg. Dobbins 2007; Etzioni 2007; Paris 2004) and logical frameworks of statebuilding draw conclusions from the historical examples. Thus, these examples are indeed necessary because they lead us to deeper understanding that statebuilding is influenced by the complex constellation of different latent and manifested factors, dimensions and sequences.

The Rubik's cube model

The ultimate challenge in interpreting a complex model is the enormous number of variables that influence each other and consequently change the final outcome of statebuilding. Contrarily to most of other statebuilding models which evaluate specific cases and try to extrapolate the findings to other cases, the Rubik's cube analogy is a schema for thinking about different cases at the same time. The number of permutations resonates with the number of different options during statebuilding; however, the solution methodology also shows that the outcome is always the same despite of the number of different variations. With the use of the Rubik's cube analogy there is a possibility to incorporate the high number of variables and different "take off situations".

The Beginning and the End Situation of the Solution Process of the Rubik's Cube.
Source: Hardwick n.d.

The general rule is that there is a list of well defined instructions for implementing the process from a given initial state, through well defined successive states to a desired outcome. The originality of the algorithms is the fact that they are strategies for transforming only the necessary parts without scrambling the already solved problems. These strategies can be applied several times even in case of different parts during a sequence. Similarly, statebuilding is sequenced process but the gradual development of the different dimensions at the same time. Thus, the possible interim setbacks cannot indicate the failure of the dynamic process. The model incorporates the interconnected development of the six dimensions, the security, the institutional, the economic, the societal, the domestic and the external dimensions through four steps. These steps are satisfying the basic needs, interim authority, emerging local actors and national level development.

In the first sequence, there is a need for at least a minimal state that is able to maintain the achievements for the next sequence. During the first sequence, the real stakeholder is the international community and the external actors that are present in the given country. From the point of view of the external actors, the goal of this stage is to create an environment in which the exit strategy is a viable option in the future.

The Centerpieces of the Rubik's Cube. Source: Hardwick n.d.

The first sequence of statebuilding represents the fundamental basis for future development. Without completing this, the other sequences cannot be successful. Basic needs are present in all dimensions, however, does not cover comprehensive statebuilding stages. Basic needs can be satisfied if there is a minimal state present that can maintain basic security and order in most of the

territory of the state. The goal is to find or create hope for further development. Assuming, that the state is incapable to maintain security, the foreign military intervention is unavoidable to reestablish peace and security. Nevertheless, the success of the intervention depends on other external factors, such as on the willingness of the interveners, on the size and scope of the intervention, on the role and reaction of the neighbors, and on the domestic capacities that represent the limits of foreign presence. The security-military dimension shows the general state of peace and security from that the statebuilders can conclude on the size and scope of the needed action. The external dimension has to answer the questions: who is able to take the role of leading the statebuilding, and what are its limits? Whilst the domestic dimension gives clear picture about the feasibility of any plans. As long as we believe that external-domestic balance is important, we can understand why more external effort is needed in situations, where domestic limits are high, that is the capacity of local actors is low. This argument resembles to Michael Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis' triangle of peacebuilding. Where the hostility is higher, the destruction will be more severe and the necessity of heavier international assistance is bigger. The efforts and success to resolve civil wars depend on three factors: the degree of hostility; the extent of local capacities remained after the war, and the scope of the international assistance. (Doyle et al 2006: 4) The lower is the local capacity and the bigger is the hostility in the given country, the bigger effort has to be made by the international community. The triangle's territory represents the opportunity for solution, and the bigger is this territory, the bigger is the hope for solution.


The Nexus between the Level of Hostility and the Local Capacities for Solutions and the Scope of Necessary International Involvement. Source: Doyle et al 2006: 68

Nevertheless, it seems that the three important dimensions in this stage are the ones on the vertices of the triangle introduced by Nicolas Sambanis and Michael Doyle. However, the importance of the economic, societal and the institutional dimensions are latent, because the real effect of failure in these will be revealed only later. For instance, prior democratic experience, the level of economic development, or the homogeneity of the society all are factors which made former complex interventions easier to succeed. In case of Germany after the Second World War, the high level of education and industrial know-how, the

strong traditions of rule of law, existing culture of protected property rights, and belief in free trade made the job of the occupying powers easier. Similarly, in Japan the honorific culture that respects the victor and the discredited former ideology, and in addition, such as in Germany, the highly developed economy and society made Japan a ready market for the American statebuilders. (Bali 2005; Dempsey 2001; Dobbins et al 2004; Jennings 2003) Similarly, the same complexity of interdependent development of dimensions explains the unprecedented and unanticipated success of democracy in India. In India, the domestic vertex of Sambani and Doyle's triangle would have given little hope. India was not an industrialized country and the middle class was underdeveloped, moreover, the society was deeply divided along ethnic, religious and cultural lines. But the legacy of the British colonialism, such as the strong centralized state with capable civil service and the democratic elite, made India able not to fail like Pakistan. (Shakar 2001)

According to the logic of the sequences, the second stage of statebuilding has to contribute to the achievements of the first step. After securing the basis of development in all dimensions, the statebuilders have to prepare the local actors for the transition. As it can be seen, the external actors still have the final authority, however, this power should not be permanent, and the local actors should not be socialized for the trusteeship. The goal of this sequence is to identify the right directions of future development. Using the Rubik's cube analogy, it means that the statebuilders have to identify the right "edge groups", i.e. the nexus among the dimensions.


The Composition of the Edge pieces of the Rubik's Cube. Source: Hardwick n.d.

It is still less important to force the local actors to have a perfect performance, but it is crucial that they become slowly part of the process. It means that the external actors have to find the appropriate stakeholders of development, who will be the basis of power transition. During this process, the most important goals are avoiding renewed fighting, strengthening the rule of law through a strong transitional authority, providing the key public goods and services, and beginning reconciliation. Winning the war does not lead automatically to sustainable peace. The appropriate interim solutions need the joint effort of the external and the local actors even if it slows down the process for a while. This stage can be only successful if the root causes of the former

conflict are not present or they are weaker than the attractiveness of development. This is the key of the future because external actors cannot be present indefinitely. Consequently, the final indicator of success of this stage is the increased ability of the local actors to bear the responsibility of development in the future.

In the interim stage, the significance of the security-military, the external and the institutional dimensions seem to be stronger. However, the economic dimension is also extremely important, but it is closer relation with the societal and the domestic dimensions. It is clear that the presence of foreign actors is the key, the development of security situation depends on them, and also they will shape the frame of the institutions. On the other hand, the locals can only have an organic role in the statebuilding process if the economy develops. Furthermore, the societal conflicts can be mediated easier if the locals are willing to change the situation and the opportunity costs of new economic development are higher than the motivation for renewed fighting.

The third sequence of the statebuilding process began in a situation where the external actors prepared the environment for power transition and the local stakeholders are identified. This stage is for making these stakeholders feel the responsibility for the statebuilding process.

*The Sound Composition of the Rubik's Cube. Source: Hardwick n.d.*

In all dimensions, the most important goal is to increase the ownership of the local actors. Ownership can range from loose attachment to a program, to actual controlling authority. In case of complex statebuilding, there is a need of excessive external involvement and responsibility in the first two stages due to the fact that the cause of conflict was the inability or unwillingness of the state to develop the country and provide better life for the people. Emerging local ownership indicates that the statebuilding process, and the external assistance are responsive to the local needs and consistent with the local capacities and priorities. The statebuilding exercise will only be perceived as legitimate in the eyes of the people when the local factor is significant and sustainable. It does not necessarily represent real self-determination in all dimensions; it rather implies steps which are more than vaguely defined external prescriptions for local authorities to participate in the development. However, giving the real political ownership to the local actors is only the final step of statebuilding,

managing the expectations of the people and the local stakeholders are the key of this sequence. The most important areas where the enhancement of local ownership is necessary are the administration of justice and the civil administration. Both postulates are only realizable if the security environment allows looser control by the international forces, which obviously implies that local ownership in the security dimension has to increase, as well. Local participation and ownership needs broader consent of the society. Therefore, there are several technical tools which can help the process. For instance, the translation of materials and documents, which are related to the statebuilding process, and the media appearance are crucial. Trainers are important actors of this stage, who help locals understand the sequences and the needed participation better through consultations and trainings on political issues such as the demobilization and reintegration process, the security sector reform, or the recruitment for political offices. Concluding from personal experiences[132] with programs in Kosovo and Afghanistan, an external actor can only work sufficiently where the local counterpart is also able to participate. We have to recognize that a talented, open-minded and educated layer of young experts is emerging in all countries where the external community is present. The young experts had opportunity to adapt certain knowledge from the external actors but at the same time these young experts understand the local dynamics better. They are the bridge between "neo-trusteeship" and full local independence in the statebuilding process.

From the external actors' point of view, local ownership means the possibility to leave the country. The problem is that in reality the external statebuilders sink into the quagmire of mutually reinforcing dilemmas about the effectiveness of statebuilding when the locals have more space. The self governing local structures are not always effective and rather contradict the goals of the statebuilding process; the short term operational requirements and the long term needs are usually conflicting; and the identification of local partners is not always easy as the external actors do not want to empower the potential spoilers of the statebuilding process. Gradual ownership transfer is the way forward, when the short term requirements are reduced and the statebuilding means more investment in educational projects. (Narten 2009)

During the last stage of statebuilding, democratic structures have to become dominant in all dimensions. We would easily think that the institutional dimension is more important because of the institutional nature of the last stage but it would lead to false conclusions. The main problem with most of the international mechanisms is the simplistic conditional nature of such programs. One good example is the logic of the World Bank or the International Monetary Fund, which presumes that institutional change can reform the whole state.

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[132]The author worked for the International Centre for Democratic Transition since 2007. The ICDT has programs related to Afghanistan and the Western-Balkans.

The Composition of the Rubik's Cube Before "the Last Move". Source: Hardwick n.d.

The final goal of the stage of national level development and eventually the statebuilding process is to put the country on the path of sustainable national development, where the country becomes the member of the coherent and interdependent international networks and where the institutions of the state are able to exploit the domestic endowments and the security of the state, the economy and the society are in a sound harmony. This sequence aims at preparing the country to be integrated in the global economy, which eventually serves the security of the given country and the international community. Statebuilding obviously cannot aim at building a developed state from a failed state, but we can say that a statebuilding process is successful, when the state is able to maintain its internal and external security, possesses functioning institutions, it is able to manage its debt, provides economic growth, manages the societal conflicts in a peaceful way, and balances the external interdependency and its domestic capacities. To sum up, the outcome of the statebuilding process is in an ideal-typical case a state which is able to develop with the help of its own capacities and is not overly dependent on the external conditions. In the final sequence, the main question is not how to create or maintain physical stability, but how to preserve institutional stability of the state which is the final guarantee of security, too.

The dilemmas of the last stage follow from the quality of the institutions. The main question is how much state we need, and what the role of free automatisms in the development is. This is the sequence when questions and dilemmas emerge on the extent of liberalization, decentralization, privatization or marketization of the economy. The conflict management ability of the state is also a crucial characteristic in this sequence. It is generally accepted that states with democratic institutions and functioning democratic mechanisms are more able to handle societal and economic conflict peacefully. Therefore, the participation of the wider public in development is necessary. This sequence is the appropriate time to expand participation in decision-making processes, because the institutions are strong enough, and the societal grievances will not hold the same possibility of renewed conflict than democratization in former stages. Democracy is not the only possible outcome, but without the feedback from the people the state is not able to sustain development in the complex

interdependent world, because it is unable to collect all the information needed without the real participation of the people.

Conclusion

State failure became the single most important threat in international development, and we have to recognize that development failure is a threat to democratization and to international security in the end. It is easy to read from the literature on democratization and statebuilding that the only acceptable outcome of statebuilding is the functioning state, id est a liberal democracy. The complexity of statebuilding is reflected in the big number of different models on statebuilding. The reality eventually shows that statebuilders have to face the Rubik's cube of development, because the number of variables is high and different in each individual situation whilst the goal is the same in each case: a liberal and functioning democracy.

In the world of sovereign states, sovereignty protects all states from intervention under the aegis of the international law, but "cooperative sovereignty" means that sovereignty is not evidently attached to a state. The territory of the world is the common good of the world's population and the states have the duty to protect the population living on a given territory. Territoriality in this sense is not a right but a duty to control the sovereign portion of the world's territory.

The large number of different solution models called the attention to the necessity of a comprehensive, complex but new schema which incorporates in a single framework all the dimensions and steps which are present in the different models. Statebuilding necessarily means more than the simple reconstruction of narrow state functions. It is important to build a state which is legitimate and effective, id est a democratic and functioning structure. Statebuilding in this sense rather means shaping the environment which allows and strengthens "good state functions" by maintaining a healthy balance between legitimacy and effectiveness of the institutions. Furthermore, the state has to become able to influence not only these institutions but the environment, as well.

When Ernő Rubik invented his cube it was held impossible to solve. Today, only a few months ago, there was published an algorithm which solves the cube in 20 moves from every possible beginning situation. It is strikingly similar to the general thinking about statebuilding and democratization, according to which it is impossible to describe statebuilding exercises in a single model which handles all the dimensions and steps together. It is beyond doubt that the Rubik's cube analogy can be used as schema for thinking. The model pays attention to the interaction and development of the different dimensions in each sequence. Differently from other normative models which overemphasize

the role of a single dimension, such as security, the Rubik's cube analogy introduces the dynamic and simultaneous development of six dimensions: security-military; institutional; economic; societal; external and domestic. The connection among the dimensions is different in each sequence and the beginning situation is also not the same in case of different countries.

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Brigadier-General István Tarján

THE VALIDITY OF SECURITY GEOGRAPHY, A NEW APPROACH AND OF DEFINING ITS BASIC CATEGORIES

1.The Validity of Security Geography

We may have met the term of security geography several times, but in most cases those were limited to one of its segments. Such are the criminal- or the military geography, which are – wrongly – identified with security geography.

Does security geography exist at all? Dr. Mária Rédei's opinion is expressed in her lecture titled "On the Edge of Geosciences"[133] as follows:

"The study of the limits of a science helps in our analysis to mention its fields and the continuously appearing new trends. The question of limit can be brought up from the side of the new content, with regard to the new indicators, which later with more or less regularity get into the study and become a part of the science. And there are new topics that may seem far fledged, and attracting a lot of attention, but later not followed upon. This is the time when we ask the question: is this still geography? A few examples for the new or recurring fields of the last decades: ethnic and religion geography, criminal and security geography, regional income differences, information society, e-economy, trade

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[133]Lecture at Őcsény – Pécs Conference "Our Geography" 17-18 March 2005