

EVALUATIONS, ANALYSES, STUDIES

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THE FIRST ANNIVERSARY OF THE "ARAB SPRING" – WHAT KIND OF CHANGES HAVE TAKEN PLACE SINCE THEN?

Abstract

The wave of „Arab Spring” has generated an atmosphere of hope and enthusiasm within and beyond the borders of the Arab World. The journalists termed the process as the „Arab revolution”¹, and it was expected that the downfall of old dictators would bring about basic changes in North Africa and the Middle East. Nevertheless, the results have remained limited yet. Although some authoritarian leaders have left the scene, this does not automatically mean a regime change. The structures and the reliable persons of the former dictators are still in power, as it is obvious in the case of the key country of the region, Egypt. If the protesters of the „Arab Spring” would like to reach a real breakthrough, which the scientists can call „revolution”, they must continue the efforts to transform the political and economic system of their countries into a modern one, which is able to give adequate answers to the internal and external challenges of the 21st century. Although there is no silver path for the success in this transformation, and each country should find her own way, it is likely that the halfway measures will not bring the hoped better life for the Arabs, and these insufficient solutions will only increase the gap between the different parts of the society – and between the Muslim world and the West.

Introduction

According to the famous writer Hannah Arendt, we can speak about revolution only if the use of violence leads to the creation of a totally new political structure, which breaks with the structures of the past, and it determines itself as a new beginning.² The overthrowing of a dictator does not mean per se a „revolution”, because the structure of an authoritarian regime is more stable, and there is no leader who can maintain his power alone. In most cases, an authoritarian regime forms its client-system, which, through the security services and the army, serves as the basis of its power. But if the society can no longer bear the rule of the dictator, and it becomes evident that he must go, some

¹ <http://www.budde.com.au/Presentations/Content/Social-Networks-and-Revolutions.pdf>.

Downloaded: 13-12-2011

² Hannah Arendt: A forradalom (The Revolution), Európa, 1991. 45.

key persons of the regime can join the demonstrations. It happened so in Egypt: after the first days of the rebellion, the army decided to support the changes and no longer supported Mubarak. But the leaders of the armed forces and the police, who served as the main basis of the Mubarak regime, did not lose their power, and they are playing a crucial role in the current politics of the „new” Egypt, too.

The classic examples of revolution were in 1789 or in 1917, when the figures of the „ancient regime” were expelled or executed, and not only the persons of the leadership changed, but also the whole structure of the political and economic life. 1789 or 1917 really meant a „new beginning”, and the revolutionists radically tried to break away from the elements of the former regime.

„Revolution” is a fashionable term. But not every demonstration is a revolution. In the Arab World we can mostly see demonstrations, not revolutions. Now it seems that perhaps some demonstrations can be called “revolution” – e.g. in the case of Tunisia –, but the definition is unsure, because we can recognize a revolution by its effects and results – not by the words of the participants. And this will need much more time.

The dynamics of the unrests


The reasons behind unrest can be numerous: they can have roots in social, religious or ethnic tensions, political suppression or economic crisis. Sometimes they feed upon only the political sphere of the society, and the protesters demand more freedom and human rights, but in other cases we find that the insufficient living conditions are the main motives under the surface. The beginning of riotings is often spontaneous, and a peaceful demonstration transforms into a more violent protest. It happened in Western Sahara, where the funeral of Saharavi activist Hamdi Lembarki – killed by the Moroccan police – became a huge mass demonstration.³ These riots often serve for channelling tensions, and if the authorities are careful, and do not try to immediately suppress the rioting, after some days the protestations can lose their power. We can see this scenario realized in most of the Arab countries: the authoritarian leadership agreed and made some limited reforms, which were enough to calm the protesters. But in some states, the regime was not so wise: the Power does not show any willingness for changes and even uses brutal violence against the demonstrators. This gave impetus to the fragmented and disorganized opposition to come together into one platform and become stronger than ever. If the strength and the support of the opposition is big enough, it can very easily lead to a civil war, like in Greece after WWII or in Spain in the ‘30s. In addition, a

³ Stephen Zunes and Jacob Mundy: *Western Sahara. War, Nationalism and Conflict Irresolution*. Syracuse University Press, Syracuse, 2010 p. 154-161

civil war usually does not remain only an inner policy issue; in both of the aforementioned conflicts, it could be observed that the external actors played a crucial role in the war.

The revolutionists can seize the power if they have small, but organized elite which is capable of driving the processes, giving direction to the events and obtaining the support of the people. If the unrest cannot produce such a group, the protests can lead to anarchy and chaos, which finally results in legitimating the rule of the former regime.

Till the end of 2010, North Africa was considered as a relatively stable part of the world. The nationalist, authoritarian leaders of the region came to power in the '60s and '70s, and it seemed that their rule would never end. They survived the Cold War, the Arab-Israel wars, the collapse of the CCCP and the „War on Terror” campaign. The regional status quo was more or less acceptable for the dictators, the West and the „rest of the world” – e.g. the BRICS countries –, too, and because of this consensus the analysts considered that the status quo is sustainable.⁴ Therefore, the unexpected events in Tunisia, and then in Egypt, shocked the international system, and the great powers needed weeks to react to the unrests.



Data: BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2010

The Egyptian oil production. The decline of the exports cut the endowment of the main consumer's goods, which undermined the social and economic security in the country.⁵

⁴ http://konzervatorium.blog.hu/2011/03/10/kerdesek_az_arab_tavaszi_mozgalmairol. Downloaded: 12-12-2011

⁵ <http://www.transitionedinburghsouth.org.uk/blog/egyptian-oil-and-natural-gas>. Downloaded: 12-12-2011. See also: Egypt – the convergence of oil decline, political and socio-economic crisis. <http://crudeoilpeak.info/egypt-the-convergence-of-oil-decline-political-and-socio-economic-crisis>. Downloaded: 12-12-2011.

The Arab dictators of the Cold War era usually came to power by revolutions. But these new leaders – Gaddafi, Mubarak, Ben Ali, Saleh – did not provide a new way of ruling for their people. They often based their power on the newly revealed oil-fields, which allowed moderate welfare for their citizens without the broadening of their political rights, and this compromise worked well until recently.

But the depletion of the natural resources undermined the power of the regimes. The social investments and the endowments declined, and the living standard decreased. The middleclass – which was the leading force of the demonstrations – started to come down, and it was evident that with the exception of a very small group (the close adherents of the dictators), the whole society only lost under the rule of the dictatorial regimes. The corruption, the nepotism, the lack of freedom and other human rights only strengthened the dissatisfaction. The traditional problems of the region as the demographic boom, the desertification, the lack of drinking water, and the current economic crisis also contributed to the blast. The unemployment rate among the youth was critical, and these people could be easily won for the demonstrations. In this environment, the last years' moderate economic reforms could not raise the living standards on the contrary, they increased the gap between the different social classes.⁶ As a result of the crisis in Europe, many Arab immigrants working in Europe lost their job, and they could no longer send money home to their families.

Besides the economic reasons, several other factors also contributed to the birth of the „Arab Spring“. One of the main causes of the problems in many countries is the tribalism: the dictators always preferred their own tribesmen to hold the key positions in government. As in general in Africa, the principle of the „winner takes all“ was true in the Maghreb, too. The structure and the basis of the power were not political, but familiar and tribal. This is the reason why the Libyan protesters are trying to arrest everybody from the Gaddafi family, and why they launched a war against the Gaddafi tribe instead of trying to negotiate.

As already mentioned, the interests of external actors also play a crucial role in the conflicts. In the multipolar world, the USA, the EU, the BRICS countries or Iran all try to utilize the situation according to their own interests, which leads to conflict between these actors. This can be clearly seen in the case of Iraq, Bahrain and Oman. Iran gives serious support to the protesters from the background in order to strengthen the Shiite groups, which would increase Iran's power in the Gulf and the Middle East.⁷ This is, however, unacceptable for the

⁶ http://pages.eiu.com/rs/eiu2/images/Arab_Spring_Tide_Whitepaper_Jun2011.pdf. Downloaded: 14-12-2011.

⁷ <http://www.eurasiareview.com/06072011-the-arab-uprising-of-2011-ibn-khaldun-encounters-civil-society-analysis/> Downloaded: 14-12-2011.

USA. The loss of the US RQ-170 Sentinel drone shows that there is an ongoing secret war between the two countries.⁸

The situation is similar in Libya, where the biggest loser of the fall of Gaddafi is Italy, while the positions of France and the UK seem to be strengthened. The NATO air strikes also underlined the importance of the region for Europe, which can be a strong message for Russia and China.

Last but not least, we should explore the role of the Islamists in the unrests. At the beginning, it seemed that the fears of the West would not be confirmed: the demonstrators had no links with the radical Islam groups, and the ideology and the catchwords of the protesters were not dominated by anti-Israel or anti-West feelings. Furthermore, the al-Qaida needed – similarly to the Western politicians – long weeks to react to the events, but nobody dealt with it. The main ideological framework of the unrests was not Islamism, but the demand of the Western rights for freedom and equality.⁹ Nevertheless, it did not mean that the Islamist remained passive. In the anarchy and chaos, some Islamist organizations significantly increased its power. Although most of them are officially moderate, and in their declarations the winner Ennahda Islamist Party in Tunisia¹⁰ and the Justice and Development Party in Morocco promised¹¹ an open society, the rule of law and the respect for human rights, it is unquestionable that some radical Islamist groups became stronger in the region. The murder of a Polish catholic priest in Tunisia¹² and the attacks against the Coptic churches in Egypt¹³ show their increasing power and influence. Some former mujahideen got leading power in the new political structure, like Abdel Hakim Belhaj in Libya, who earlier had fought against the Allies in Afghanistan.¹⁴ Although none of them is openly against the Western values and relations, it is hard to determine how strong their commitment is in the field of human rights and some Arab type of democratization. Later we will examine this problem in more detail.

After the general exploration of the „Arab Spring”’s circumstances, we will try to arrange in groups the events of the different countries and determine whether we can call them „revolutions” or not. In most cases we will see that

⁸ <http://www.businessweek.com/news/2011-12-12/iran-shows-downed-spy-drone-as-u-s-assesses-technology-loss.html>. Downloaded: 14-12-2011.

⁹ Elham Fakhro – Emile Hokayem: Waking the Arabs. *Survival*, 53:2, 2011, 23–24., 26.

¹⁰ http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/11/10/tunisia-ennahda-islamist-party_n_1087006.html. Downloaded: 15-12-2011.

¹¹ <http://www.lonelyplanet.com/travelblogs/235/140392/No+Islamic+Dress+Code+for+Moroccan+Women?destId=355491>. Downloaded: 15-12-2011.

¹² <http://uk.reuters.com/article/2011/02/18/uk-tunisia-priest-murder-idUKTRE71H5RR20110218>. Downloaded: 15-12-2011.

¹³ <http://www.asianews.it/news-en/Attacks-against-Coptic-churches,-part-of-a-plan-to-expel-Egypt%E2%80%99s-Christians-22828.html>. Downloaded: 15-12-2011.

¹⁴ <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-14786753>. Downloaded: 15-12-2011.

they were not revolutions, and the power systems of the old regimes are still strong.

Moderate reforms without breakthrough

After the first wave of the „Arab Spring”, most of the leaders of the Arab States had to implement moderate reforms. These changes did not affect the basic principles of the political system or the rule of the countries: the main aim of them was to calm the protesters and prevent further demonstrations. In some cases it was enough that the monarch or the president appointed new government officials, promised economic reforms and new workplaces. This happened in Oman, Morocco, Algeria, Jordan and Iraq. The opposition has become legal, like in Morocco the currently winner Islamist party. The state of emergency, which was in place for decades, was suspended as in Algeria by Abdelaziz Bouteflika. It seems that these steps were enough until now. But it is only the surface. The main question is whether the leaders of these countries are able to cope with the challenges of the new environment. Most of the economic problems remained, and they can be solved only through structural reform and a new distribution of the goods of the State, which will be likely delayed by the corrupt elite. Therefore, on the one hand it is not impossible that the lack of basic changes will bring about in these countries a new wave of demonstrations, similar to those currently going on in Egypt, and the „Arab Spring” will be followed by another „Arab Season”. On the other hand, the chaos and instability – which we can see in Libya, Egypt or Yemen, and which contribute to the serious decline of economy and incomes – can also become a retarding force. According to some economists, the direct „price” of the „Arab Spring” reached the 56 billion USD only in Libya, Bahrain, Egypt, Tunisia and Syria until October, which means that the total loss of the region is hundreds of billions of dollars.¹⁵ The Arab population can see that the willingness and the opportunities of the international community to donate billions of dollars for the recovery and the rebuilding of the region are limited. Libya is lucky because Gaddafi’s unimaginable amount of savings – at least 100 billion USD, but the real amount can be the double¹⁶ – can give a great impetus to the economy. But it is questionable whether who will finance the necessary structural reforms of Egypt, Tunisia and the other Arab states. Therefore, the citizens of the Maghreb states will consider twice whether they want a real revolution or they are satisfied with moderate reforms, with a little bit more money without more political freedom.

¹⁵ The piquancy of the whole case is that some Arab countries, like Saudi Arabia or Kuwait have huge profits from the increasing oil prices. <http://www.arabianbusiness.com/cost-of-arab-spring-close--56bn-says-study-425412.html>. Downloaded: 15-12-2011

¹⁶ <http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/politics/nation/muammar-gaddafi-spirited-over-200-billion-out-of-libya-report/articleshow/10450416.cms>. Downloaded: 15-12-2011.

The resisters – Syria and Bahrain

At first sight, we cannot see too much similarity in the events in Syria and Bahrain. But the basic political answers of the regimes and the power relations in the two countries are the same: both regimes declared that they will not contribute to the structural changes, and according to the current situation, it is not too likely that the protesters can reach serious successes here.

The reasons, of course, are different. Bahrain is one of the main scenes of the Shiite-Sunni – and Saudi-Iranian¹⁷ – conflict in the Middle East. Furthermore, the base of the 5th US Fleet can be found here, so the geopolitical importance of Bahrain for Washington is unquestionable. The Shiite majority of Bahrain would have been probably strong enough to overthrow the monarch, Hamad bin Isa Al Khalifa. However, this was unacceptable for both the USA and Saudi Arabia. Thus, the Saudi army – officially in the framework of GCC and on the request of King Hamad – marched in the country and suppressed the riot. The events in Bahrain demonstrated well that besides – and if it is necessary, in contrast to – the catchwords of democracy and freedom, the Western powers defend their geopolitical interests in the region.

In Syria the circumstances are different, but the results are the same. Although the demonstrations have been going on since March, the protesters were not able to force President Asad to leave his position. The EU sanctions and the decision of the Arab League to suspend the membership of Damascus in the organization do not seem enough to enforce the changes in Syria.¹⁸ In contrast to Libya, most of the population does not want a regime change, and the intensity of the fighting is low. The opposition is divided and there is no such kind of central and recognized authority as the Libyan NTC. The fact that demonstrators were not able to form a united platform against the regime proves that their opportunities are limited. Asad tries to be careful and he does not use as brutal and open violence against the protesters as Gaddafi did. The international community is also divided. It is almost sure that the UN Security Council will not accept sanctions against Syria, and the demonstrators cannot expect such robust foreign support as the NTC in Libya. A huge part of the society supports the regime and condemns the riots and some analyses state that the fall of Asad could lead to an endless civil war between the different religious groups (Sunni, Shiite, Druze, Christian, Alawite) similarly to Iraq.¹⁹

To sum up the situation, the leadership has a stable power in both countries. In Bahrain, the Saudi and US presence is a guarantee for the survival of the Kingship. In Syria the opposition is divided and unorganized. The overthrowing of Asad would be possible only by an increased external pressure,

¹⁷ <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/95-1013.pdf>. Downloaded 15-12-2011.

¹⁸ <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-15901360>. Downloaded: 15-12-2011.

¹⁹ A pokol tornácán. HVG, 3. December 2011, 27–29

but currently there is no state really insisting on the fall of the President – mainly, because nobody sees what could come after the rule of the Alawites.

Egypt and Yemen – leader change instead of regime change

The dynamics of the „Arab Spring” can be very well followed by the events in Egypt, one of the key – if not *the* key – countries of the region. Egypt was the second scene of the Arab unrest, and the demonstrators reached the overthrow of Mubarak relatively quickly. The Egyptian President was an emblematic figure of the Arab World. He received serious Israeli and American support and had good relations both with the EU and the Arab nations. The fall of Mubarak symbolized the strength of the protesters, who were capable of overthrowing a dictator in contrast to the willing of the great powers.

But the symbol remained only a symbol. The failure of Mubarak did not bring radical transformation in the political life of Egypt. The army remained the most powerful actor in the internal policy and any change can happen only with the agreement of the Military Council. The attempts to put the army under the rule of the civil administration have failed. The economy stagnated, and millions of Egyptian citizens remained poor and dissatisfied. The structure of the economic and the political system of the Mubarak era was untouched. The death of hundreds of protestors contributed to the fall of the dictator, but it was not enough to break the power of the military and the economic elite. The prominent figures of the „new” regime – Mohamed Hussein Tantawi, Kamal Ganzouri or Sami Hafez Anan – were the key persons of the former dictatorship. The Military Council has the support of the US and Israel. This support is likely to be increased after the success of Muslim Brotherhood and the Salafist Nour Party.²⁰

The citizens recognized this tendency, which led to a new wave of demonstrations in mid-November. In the „free” Egypt, dozens of people died during the unrests.²¹ Although the Military Council appointed a new government, it was only a tactical step. The key question is how the balance of forces will change between the military leadership and the ever stronger Islamist groups in the next month during the elections. Unfortunately it seems that the liberal opposition in Egypt is too weak and divided to provide a realistic alternative between the Islamists and the army.

The situation is worse in Yemen. In the deeply fragmented society, President Saleh was the symbol of unity: he was the only person who was capable of holding together the North and the South, the Shiites and the Sunnis.

²⁰ http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/11/28/egypt-elections-2011-salafis_n_1117463.html.
Downloaded: 15-12-2011.

²¹ <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/africa/dozens-die-the-cabinet-teeters--and-chaos-rules-6265837.html> Downloaded: 15-12-2011.

The centrifugal power of the inner policy was already strong in the '90s, but after the al-Qaeda and the Salafist groups had more and more influence in „Felix Arabia”, the position of the central government became critical. What we can see in Yemen was not an uprising against a dictator, but a civil war against the unified Yemen. The current processes will not bring peace and welfare for the country, but rather a further disintegration of the state. Yemen is the second most important base of the al-Qaeda and the global Jihad (after the AfPak mountains) and the anarchy will only support the operations of the terror organization.²²

Furthermore, the situation of the political leaders is the same as in Egypt. The current acting president, who serves until the January elections, is Abd Rabbuh Mansur al-Hadi, the former Vice-President of Saleh. The ministers of defense, oil and foreign affairs also could retain their posts.²³ What happened in Yemen was not a „revolution”, but a new chapter of a prolonged, low intensity civil war, which is obviously the success of the separatist, the Jihadist, the Salafist, and the al-Qaeda.

Regime change in Libya

The death of Gaddafi in October meant a big relief both for the NTC and the external actors. But the future of Libya remained questionable. What went off in the country was not a revolution, but a civil war. Although the media tried to show the events as a national uprising against the dictator, it was in fact a civil war between the different tribes of Libya. Fortunately, the leaders of the western tribes recognized soon that – because of the international pressure and the NATO air campaign – there was no way back to the former regime and Gaddafi had to go. But it is unsure how long this peace can be sustained. The support of the NTC is limited, and the fragmentation among the different opposition groups – the fighters of the western mountains, who occupied Tripoli or the militias of Misrata, which suffered the most serious casualties – is strong. As we could see – besides the liberal politicians who came home from emigration – we can find mujahideens among the leaders of the militias. In addition, there are serious tensions between the civil administration and the military commanders. The circumstances of the death of Gaddafi showed that the NTC was not able to regulate the armed groups; and in contrast to its promises it could not capture the dictator alive.²⁴ When Minister of Interior Mahmoud Jibril tried to extend his authority to the militias, he faced serious

²² Shaol Shay: *The Red Sea Terror Triangle. Sudan, Somalia, Yemen, and Islamic Terror.* Transaction Publishers, Piscataway, 2005.

²³ <http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/2/8/28941/World/Region/Yemen-unity-government-sworn-in.aspx>. Downloaded: 15-12-2011.

²⁴ Béke poraira? Líbia Kadhafi után. HVG, 29 October 2011, 20.

resistance.²⁵ The lack of effective central power is proved by the torture and execution of the captured pro-Gaddafi troops.²⁶

Other important condition for a successful transition would be the state-building, but it is being delayed. The lack of civil society means that the main driving forces of the changes are the tribes, which queries the perspectives of the structural reforms. The current aims of the NTC and the external actors – the creation of a democratic, open Libya – are unrealistic because of the lack of necessary conditions. Gaddafi was very careful and he did not leave place for any resistance or organized opposition, including the creation of civil society. Egypt and Tunisia have strong middle classes and opposition, civil organizations, as well as influential emigrant groups abroad. All of these are lacking in Libya. Chairman of the NTC, Abdul Jalil and the first Prime Minister, Mahmoud Jibril were prominent members of the Gaddafi regime. The difference between Egypt and Libya is that Libya has no alternative leaders, while Egypt could have. Libya has a huge amount of money from the assets of the Gaddafi-family. But there are no assurance that the 100 billion USD will really serve the rebuilding and welfare of the country. The transition is too slow and the citizens are dissatisfied. The centrifugal powers are strong and the lack of effective central government can jeopardize the creation of a new state-system. The worst case scenario is that the different factions will not be able to find a compromise, and the civil war will continue. We can only hope that after the bloody war against the pro-Gaddafi forces, all actors want to avoid further fighting.

Tunisia – what kind of revolution?

At the end of our exploration we find only one country in the Arab World where the buds of real changes have appeared. This is Tunisia. After the long months of insecurity and instability, the victory of the Ennahda Party seems to give new direction to the political system of the country. But it is a big question what will be this direction. Although the Ennahda promised that they would practice moderate governance, it is very hard to say what this actually means. The organization has good relations with the Hamas, and the two groups had a common rally on 13 November 2011. The voice of the Ennahda at the meeting was in sharp contrast to the official statements the party communicated to the West. The Ennahda's general secretary Hammadi Jebali – who has been recently proposed by the party to be the new Prime Minister of Tunisia – said that the event was „*a divine moment in a new state and ,hopefully, in a 6th caliphate*”,

²⁵ <http://articles.latimes.com/2011/sep/12/world/la-fg-libya-fighting-20110912>. Downloaded: 15-12-2011.

²⁶ <http://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/libya-leaders-acknowledge-abuse-prisoners-15046063>. Downloaded: 15-12-2011.

and „*the liberation of Tunisia will, God willing, bring about the liberation of Jerusalem.*”²⁷

As we stated, the Islamists played a marginal role in the outbreak of the unrests. But the situation has changed in the recent months. The liberal opposition was divided and faint. Their ideas have no deep roots in the tradition of the Arab states and they have limited support at home. Although the Western states try to back them, the citizens of the region do not trust in the external actors, because they had made it possible for the dictators to have a stable rule for decades. The problems of the region need organized leadership which is capable and willing to face the challenges and is brave enough to use radical, unorthodox solutions if necessary; currently the Islamists can meet these demands.

And not only the moderate Islamists can meet them. As we could see in Egypt, the Salafist received serious support, too. In Egypt the moderate Islamist party, the Freedom and Justice Party – the Party of the Brotherhood – has good relations with the Salafists, and there is no doubt that if it needs, the Brotherhood will choose the other Islamist party for a coalition, not the liberal ones.

It seems that the downfall of the dictators can be followed only by the rule of Islamists in most countries of the region. The basic question is which way of governance will there be. One of the two options is the strengthening of radical elements, which we have already known from Afghanistan or Iran. The other is a new, hybrid way of political system with the unification of the sharia, the Islamic and local traditions and the experiences of the Western governance. It is sure that the European model of liberal democratic political system cannot work in North Africa. But elements of the Turkish system can be useful for the new governments. The complete copy of this model is not possible, but the way ahead for the Arabs can be similar.

There are many examples for the unlimited rule of sharia, but there are only few examples for the creation of new type of governance which unifies the advantages of the Islamic and the Western legacy. Furthermore, in the Maghreb we need a model containing the local political and cultural traditions, too, which is different in each country. It is not a simple task, but there is no other acceptable alternative for the state-building in the region.

Conclusion

The „Arab Spring” brought about the downfall of dictators who had been ruling for decades. But the overthrow of the tyrant does not automatically mean freedom. Most of the unrests in the Arab World did not lead to revolution. The structures of the political and economic system have not changed yet, and the

²⁷ <http://www.tunisia-live.net/2011/11/15/hamas-representative-addresses-tunisian-political-rally/>.
Downloaded: 15-12-2011.

roots of the conflicts have sustained. The external actors could not provide adequate answers to the challenges of the region, and the movements of the North African countries went back to their traditions. In the first anniversary of the beginning of the „Arab Spring”, it seems that the main ideological background of the transformation is Islamism. The question is whether the successful Islamist political parties of the region will choose the moderate, hybrid way of political system or they will give in to the pressure of the radicals.

Finally, we can see the second wave of the „Arab Spring”, e.g. in Egypt, where the population is fed up with the rule of the key persons of the former dictator. In addition, if the situation becomes worse in Syria and Yemen, it can cause a further escalation of the local conflicts. All of these phenomena show that the unrests of the „Arab Spring” have not yet finished, and the consolidation needs much more time.

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FINANCING TERRORISM: AFGHANISTAN AND THE HAQQANI

Abstract:

Terrorism is evolving in the new millennium, and so are the ways that terrorists finance their activities. While large attacks can be accomplished with relatively small amounts of money, terrorists continue to diversify their sources of funding. Terrorism in Afghanistan is funded by a variety of sources including donations, drug trafficking, kidnapping, and corruption. The Haqqani network is one of the most dangerous terrorist networks in Afghanistan, and has strong ties to many financial sources. Efforts are underway to enhance the Afghan government's ability to interdict terrorist financing, but due to the weak government structure and the ubiquitous nature of corruption in the country, the future of those efforts is uncertain.

Keywords: *Terrorism, terrorist financing, money laundering, Afghanistan, Haqqani*

Introduction

In this article we introduce the reader to some basic concepts about the financing of terrorism. The first part of the article – written by Prof. Istvan Laszlo Gal of the University of Pecs – provides a general overview of terrorist

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