

Logistics Experiences; the Case of Darfur

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I would like to present to you the logistics matters and experiences in the mission area of Darfur. Everything that is written in this article is based on my personal experience, observations and opinion and does not reflect the official position of Hungary or the Hungarian Defence Forces.

When the politicians make an agreement on a case usually the next job is for the soldiers (peacekeepers). There are a lot of kinds of jobs, which can only be done by soldiers and not by civilians. For this reason, after the Peace negotiations when the Parties (African countries, various fighting fractions-SLA, JEM, NRMD, UN, EU, NATO and the USA) agreed to send peacekeepers to Darfur to stop the violence, they had to act immediately. The African Union (AU) decided to send troops as soon as possible to the area to secure it. Because the AU as a new organisation faced serious financial shortages and lacked some capacities (Logistic, Air Ops, IT) the EU, USA and NATO offered the AU help in these areas.

After the Donor Conference all of the organisations decided to send observers to help and participate in the AU second peacekeeping mission (African Union Mission In Sudan-AMIS) in Africa. The donors started to send their aid (money and equipment as well) to the mission area but the African troops were not prepared to handle them. Both the shortage of military and police forces and the missing positions mostly in the logistics field made the situation very difficult on the ground. The African countries mostly sent infantry troops without working logistics support system (combat support units, etc). Even though the soldiers did a good job as infantry units, nobody took care of records keeping or administrative handling of the donated equipment. For this reason a lot of things were missing or were used in a wrong way. There were shortages of staff officers in the logistics and planning sections, which caused Serious and various problems with the provision (food, drinking and potable water, bed items, sanitation, communication, etc).

The donors sometimes offered complete services or facilities to the AU. For example the USA provided the construction of all of the camps through the state owned company, PAE. Although PAE made a really good job based on the contract between AU and USA, from the AU/AMIS side nobody could direct and check them properly because of the missing logistics experience.

At the same time the AU officials realised that they overcharged their troops on the ground and that they did not have enough capacity to both secure the Darfur area and run the mission as well. So for this reason they


decided to increase the number of troops and expand the whole mission. In the first phase the real strength of the troops were 138 MILOBs (Military Observers) and 195 Rwandese and 193 Nigerian Protection Forces (Aug 2004)

On the second phase the strength of the troops was supposed to be 3320 people but the AU and the participants could not manage to fill all the positions (2774 troops, including CIVPOLs were on the field by the end of June 05.). This happened in the enhancement phase as well (AMIS-IIIE), where the mission was expected to expand to 6171 military personal and 1560 civilian police by the end of October 05. However they could not fill all the positions and the third phase, (AMIS III), planned to have 12300 personal, was never materialised.

On the AMIS II-E Phase launched 1 July 2005 the donors with the consent of the AU officials agreed to offer logistics advisors and expertise besides the money, equipment and Airlift to the AU. At this time the EU logistics experts were deployed to Addis Ababa, Khartoum and El-Fasher as well. Under the same accord new post were approved in the establishment to further improve the logistics capacity of AMIS.

The EU, NATO and the USA advisors worked in the ACMC section under the Darfur Integrated Task Force (DITF), the highest organisation inside AU to co-ordinate the mission in Darfur. You can see its organisation on the next chart.

AU / ACMC STRUCTURE AT ADDIS



Source: AMIS 2005

Generally the ACMC is the J4 and J8 function within the DITF, working directly for the Chief of Staff. The ACMC is responsible for co-ordinating all logistics support between the AU, the Donor / Partner nations and Contractors in order to provide support to the operational commanders. It provides logistics synchronisation support to the movement plan, the force generation plan, the infrastructure development plan and the equipment delivery programme working in co-ordination with the Logistics Cell at Mission HQ in Khartoum and the JLOC in El Fasher. The ACMC co-ordinates and prioritises the overall sustainment effort for AMIS tasking the JLOC through the chain of command as required.

Responsibilities:

Chief ACMC. He was responsible to the DITF Joint Chief of Staff for the delivery of logistics support and oversight of the theatre logistics effort.

J1/ Personnel. He acted in co-ordination with the existing J1 cell of the DITF as the J1 focus and co-ordinating authority for all non-AU personnel deployed in support of AMIS. He ensured that Donor personnel deployed to theatre in a timely and co-ordinated manner, as agreed and co-ordinated with the AU. He provided administrative support to Donor personnel to include RSOI, welfare and leave.

Log Ops and Plans. He provided logistics planning support to the Chief ACMC. Provided real time logistics support to the operation ensuring that the military and CIVPOL were properly sustained with C Sups in co-ordination with PAE.


J4/ Supply. He provided the co-ordination with Donors and contractors for the timely delivery of equipment and materiel to the AU, and acted as the interface with the JLOC to ensure that the delivery plan to AMIS meets the operational requirement and is synchronised with the deployment plan.

JFBMC (Strategic Movement)[1]. He provided Strategic Movement support to the DITF and co-ordinates and plans all strategic movement between AMIS, AU enhancement nations and the EU and NATO. Acted as the forward movement cell for the European Airlift Centre (EAC) at Eindhoven and the Allied Movement Co-ordination Centre at SHAPE.

J8/Contracts. She was responsible for all contracting support to AMIS working with PAE, Crown Agents and other contractors.

CIVPOL. He acted as the CIVPOL interface to the ACMC ensuring that all CIVPOL requirements and enhancement needs are met. Additional expertise and advisors worked in the Headquarter to help the work of the AU in Sudan (Airlift, etc.) Because Darfur is only a part of Sudan it was important to establish an HQ in Khartoum to deal with the Sudanese authorities and represent the AU in all AMIS related matters. In Khartoum we had a logistics cell as well. You can see their organisation here:

AU / LOG CELL STRUCTURE AT KHARTOUM



Source: AMIS 2005

Generally this section acted as the logistics transit hub in co-ordination with ACMC and the JLOC. Provided diplomatic clearances (Visas and Customs clearance), as required, and provided movement and contractual support to AMIS.


J1 Personnel. He provided J1 support to AMIS, including provisions of visas for all AU personnel, as required, and customs clearance with GOS. It was his responsible the delivery of the CASEVAC plan in co-ordination with the JLOC.

J4/ Procurement and Supply. He acted as the focus for Procurement and Supply in co-ordination with ACMC.

J4/ Movement. He assisted with movement of personnel and equipment, including tactical airlift moving through Khartoum.

The Joint Logistics Operation Centre (JLOC) was deployed in El-Fasher (the capital of Darfur) The JLOC organised and directed the logistics system in the mission area and did the real work on the field.

AU / JLOC STRUCTURE AT EL FASHER



Source: AMIS 2005

Generally the JLOC acted as the logistics focus within the FHQ for both the Military and Police missions. It prepared operational logistics plans in support of the operation and acted as the operational level logistics authority. The JLOC ensured that the operational theatre is properly sustained. The JLOC worked in direct co-ordination with the Logistics Cell at Mission HQ in Khartoum and the ACMC in Addis Ababa.

Chief JLOC. The Chief JLOC was responsible for the delivery of logistics support to AMIS within the operational theatre. He worked through the Deputy Head of Mission and operated on behalf of both the Force Commander and the CIVPOL Commissioner.

Deputy Chief JLOC. He acted on behalf of the Chief JLOC and is the JLOC Chief of Staff, co-ordinating all operational logistics staff effort.

Field Support Section (FSS). The FSS provided the direct logistics contact with Sectors on behalf of Chief JLOC and worked in co-ordination with the functional cells. The FSS was responsible for the delivery of up to date logistics reports and returns from Sectors to the Chief JLOC.

He was responsible in the mission area (with close relation with PAE and its subcontractors) for the food-catering service, camp management, water supply, environmental, health and camp sanitation, fire marshalling and for other orders from Chief JLOC.

Log Ops and Plans. He provided logistics planning support to the Force Commander and the CIVPOL Commissioner. Provided real time logistics support to the operation ensuring that the military and CIVPOL are properly sustained with C Sups in co-ordination with PAE.

Maintenance. He ensured that all vehicles in theatre are properly maintained and supported in co-ordination with Contractors.

Materiel Management. He ensured that all equipment is properly distributed and managed to support the needs of the operation and all equipment is properly accounted for.

Movement / Air Ops. He co-ordinated all in-theatre J4 movement including tactical airlift, SH, (when in a J4 function) and road convoys.

Medical / Environmental Health. He co-ordinated medical and health service support to include treatment and evacuation of casualties, medical logistics, preventative medicine and environmental health with PAE and other medical providers. This position was not filled either by EU or AU at this time, for this reason everybody from JLOC dealt with these matters.

Communications / IT. He co-ordinated the distribution and maintenance of all communications and IT equipment in accordance with the communications plan.

CIVPOL. He acted as the CIVPOL interface to the JLOC ensuring that all CIVPOL requirements and enhancement needs are met. EU did not man this position under my service time.

The first EU advisors arrived in the theatre on 29 June from the United Kingdom, Spain and Hungary. We spent our first weeks in Addis Ababa because we did not get our visas in time, so we occupied ourselves in Addis to help in the DITF. After we received our visas we first went to Khartoum and then to Darfur. When we arrived there we got temporary accommodation only for a time, because the camp was overcrowded. Nearly all the European experts had worked and lived in Africa before (myself in Western Sahara-MINURSO) but we were not prepared for the amount of difficulties that we had found there.

We needed a few days to accommodate ourselves and to get our job started. Unfortunately we did not have offices. The JLOC existed only on paper and not in real life. We could not find our African counterparts who we had

to co-operate with. For this reason the Force Commander decided that we have to work in the FHQ logistics section and take part in the replacement and development of AMIS II-E. Despite that we were not under the Force Commander's command we begun to work with the FHQ Logistics cell and were faced with more problems.

No matter how hard the PAE and its subcontractor worked to construct new camps and to expand the existing facilities they were already late because of the rainy season (in this time the only way to transport material was by helicopter). We had to support the troops on the ground and organise the Airlift in close co-operation with AU, EU, NATO and the USA. We also had to provide accommodation, food, water and others for the newcomers.

The next chart shows the AMIS II-E deployment schedule:

Battalions	Deployme Dates	Number Pax	Estimated Freight (Tons)	Est Ammo (Tons)	Preferred APOE	Preferred APOD	Airlift Donor Nation
Nigerian Bn 1 Sector 2	1 – 14 Jul	680	40	18	Kaduna	Nyala	GER UE
Rwandan Bn Sector 1	15 – 29 Ju	680	32	16	Kigali	Nyala	US NATO
Rwandan Bn Sector 7	30 Jul – 9 Aug	538	32	16	Kigali	El Fasher	US NATO
Gambian Coy Force HHQ	30 Jul – 9 Aug	196	12	7	Banjul*	El Fasher	?
Nigerian Bn 2 Sector 8	10 – 18 Aug	876 (note 3)	40	18	Abuja*	Nyala	UK NATO
Senegalese B Sector 5	20 – 29 Aug	538	32	16	Dakar	El Fasher	France UE
Nigerian Bn 3 Sector 3	1 – 9 Sep	484 (note 3)	40	18	Abuja*	El Fasher	UK NATO
Rwandan Bn Sector 4	30 Sept – 6 Oct	538	40	18	Kigali	El Fasher	?
South African Bn Sector 6	22 – 25 Oct	550 (Note 4)	32	16	Bloemfontein or Pretoria	El Fasher	Netherlands NATO
South African Eng Coy, EOD team Reserve Coy	28 – 29 Sep	210	12	(Note 2)	Bloemfontein or Pretoria	El Fasher	Netherlands NATO
Kenyan MP Sector 1	30 Sep	25	2	-	Nairobi	El Fasher	?

Source: AMIS 2005

Of course this schedule had changed because of the circumstances (weather, readiness of camps, etc) and and it wasn't until October that we could carry out the enlargement of AMIS.

During this period all of the JLOC positions (except the CIVPOL and the Medical Environmental Health) were filled by the donor countries (Spain, France, United Kingdom, Sweden, Denmark, Italy, Cyprus, Hungary, USA and Canada) but the AU didn't fill the logistics positions in JLOC until by the end of October. Until then we worked alone with all responsibility. When we received our partners it was clear that except some of them they do not have any logistics background (graduation in logistics school or field experience). This made our job more difficult.

The other problem was that none of the African units (except the South Africans) arrived with full capacity units. In the battalions Combat Support Units (Sector Support Cell), only one existed on paper. These units consisted of infantry troops only without any logistics support element. Only the South African contingent was totally equipped to comply with the requirements of a fully capable battalion in the mission area. They had their own logistics platoon and a lot of officers who had logistics qualification and experience.

With the lack of logistics skills, everybody expected full support from the civilian contractor (PAE). However there is a new trend in peacekeeping or/and other operations that civilian companies perform a lot of the tasks, for which the military does not want to waste soldiers or they do not have the necessary qualification for (Logistic, Air Ops, IT, Communication, cleaning and construction jobs). The military component has to plan the mission needs, order the service and properly check the contractors before payment. For this reason it is very important that the J4 (logistic) section is manned with qualified and capable officers, who can deal with the civilian companies in all matters and on all levels. In Darfur this did not work properly and the mission leaders did not know exactly what was in the contracts, therefore they expected sometimes more service from the contractor, than what the AU and the USA government had agreed on previously. One of our first tasks was to read through the contracts in order to finalize what the civilian companies have to do and what is our (AMIS) right and obligation. We also had to create a working system together with sectors and the civilian companies (reports, registrations, etc). After that all of us began working on this task. I was responsible for the Field Support Service, this means catering, camp management, water supply, environmental, health and camp sanitation, fire marshalling and for other orders from Chief JLOC. The mission area was the size of France and in the 8 sectors there were 33 camps located.

What made our task more difficult was that during this time (from June till the end of 2005) the security situation was relatively calm but unpredictable. The banditry attacks, stealing of livestock, harassment of the civil populace by armed militias were taking place nearly every week.

The fighting renewed in the general areas (Jebel Marra, Amu valley, Muhjeria, etc.) between Sudanese Armed Forces, Janjaweed militias and SLA and JEM. The armed Arabic militias attacked villages (Tawila, Mukjar, etc) and IDPs camps as well. The rebels attacked GOS and Humanitarian convoys as well and there were some clashes between SLA and JEM. Violent threats against AMIS, UN and NGOs (Non Governmental Organisations) have increased so the situation started to become more problematic. I believe that sometimes the fighting factions agreed that AMIS could be a common target. It happened that between Khor Abechi and Menawashi an unknown fighting fraction attacked PAE trucks, where they killed the civilian drivers and not much later another 5 Nigerian soldiers, who arrived to relive the convoy. In another case an other group attacked a patrol in Sector 5, where they took over all the equipment from the soldiers and released them without combat boots, so they had to walk back to the camp on bare foot. A lot of times they shot at AMIS helicopters convoys and camps. On 24 December 2005 one helicopter was shot down killing everybody on board. The Sudanese Army was not much better either. They painted their attack helicopters and military vehicles white and attacked the SLA and JEM positions with them. Of course after a time the fighters did not make any difference between GOS and AMIS white cars. From time to time the Sudanese Army organised us a quite nice military parade around the FHQ, which frustrated our soldiers. When we received the first Canadian APCs (Armoured Personal Carriers) the Sudanese authorities sent us an official warning letter stating that they will not tolerate any of them ending up in the hands of SLA or JEM. After this letter they organised a tour with soldiers, tanks and various military equipment (from the early 1960s till today, mostly Russian equipment). The soldiers were yelling, crying and shouting with weapons around the camp, I think they tried to show us who has the real power in Sudan. During my tour I could witness two of this kind of parades in El-Fasher.

The Humanitarian situation in the IDP camps were becoming over congested, the camp facilities were overstretched. However the Humanitarian Agencies had continued to provide life-saving Humanitarian assistance to IDPs as well residents in the villages, but some of them evacuated their aid workers because the banditries and attacks against the Humanitarian convoys and workers.

Although the situation was unpredictable the presence of Humanitarian agencies, AMIS MILOBs, CIVPOLs and foreign observers helped in stemming the tide of hostilities.

In this situation the AMIS/CFC (Cease Fire Committee) had continued to intensify its activities to reduce the incidence of cease-fire violations in Darfur. In accordance with its mandate, as contained in article 4 of HCFA (8 April 2004 AMIS) they continuously investigated allegations in response

to reports of cease-fire violations (Baraka, Graida, Kalma, etc). The regular patrols were conducted by MILOBs to promote confidence building and also to show AU presence on the ground. Unfortunately after some shooting incident against AU personnel or in difficult situations (for example when the SLA and GOS fought for Sheria city) the leaders of AMIS gave orders to delay patrols in order to save our soldiers. These orders were only temporary and after that we begun to conduct the patrols again. The mission leaders and the CFC embarked on consultations with all parties in the conflict and the Humanitarian Agencies and attended the Joint commission meeting once a month at N'djamena, Chad. This was the real situation in AMIS-IIIE phase.

By the end of October we had 3 infantry battalions from Nigeria, 3 infantry battalions from Rwanda, 1 infantry battalion from Senegal, 1 infantry company from Gambia (as a reserve unit in FHQ), 1 Military Police Unit from Kenya and 1 infantry company, 1 engineer platoon and a EOD section from South Africa.

In the same time we had Military Observers, Civilian Police members, the contractor workers (**PAE-USA** and **Skylink-Canada**) and their subcontractors (**Amzar-Food**, catering service, **MSS-medical** and Hygienic service, etc.) and other local workers (building and cleaning camps, etc) who did not all live in the camps but they used our facilities as well. This caused new challenges to our overloaded camp systems. The strength of AMIS developed quickly and when I left it was as follows:

Military all ranks: 5611

CIVPOL:	1195
PAE:	229
AMZAR:	418
Skylink:	139
Total:	7589

As the Deputy of Field Support Service I had to work in close relationship with my African counterpart and the contractors on the below listed topics:

Food-catering service:

- To monitor PAE and AMZAR on the field, so they are adhering to the contract and SOPs, as set out by the AU.
- To organise the food delivery to the remote camps with AirOps in close co-operation with AMZAR & PAE.
- To co-ordinate with the PAE Food & Facilities Manager any problems regarding the AU

- To advise AMZAR in catering, training for cooks (for example I wrote a kitchen guidelines to help the cooks work, etc.).
- To co-operate with another sections (Ops and Plans, Logistics, Mess committee, etc.)
- Delegations, guests

Camp management:

- To monitor PAE on the field, so they are adhering to the contract and SOPs, as set out by the AU.
- To run the camp catering, liaise with the Catering Contractor on a daily basis.
- To supervise all Facilities including but not limited to Laundry, Dining Rooms, Accommodation, Camp Maintenance & Equipment Security.

Water supply:

- To monitor PAE on the field, so they are adhering to the contract and SOPs, as set out by the AU.
- Close co-operation with PAE water manager to provide drinkable and potable water to the whole mission area
- Regular quality control of the water

Environmental, Health and Camp sanitation:

- To monitor PAE and MSS on the field, so they are adhering to the contract and SOPs, as set out by the AU.
- Close co-operation with PAE camp sanitation manager and MSS operational manager
- Health & Hygiene Management within the Camp Facilities, to include waste management (Fuel spillage, waste disposal, sewage). stress management (entertainment)

Fire Marshall:

- To monitor PAE on the field, so they are adhering to the contract and SOPs, as set out by the AU.
- Develop and check the Fire evacuation plans
- To organise fire extinguisher delivery and replacement to the remote camps with AirOps in close co-operation with PAE.
- To co-ordinate with the PAE Operational Manager any problems regarding the AU (cooking inside the tents, etc.).

The main challenges, problems that we faced:

The circumstances were quite difficult and we were faced with some challenges. Because of the time shortage we only got one day of training in Brussels to prepare ourselves for this mission. I think later in other operations at least 2-3 day preparation courses need to be organised so that those participating in the operation get to know each other better can and make more detailed preparations.

The AU was not prepared to handle the EU-NATO-USA advisors in a right way (“white face problem”). We faced a lot of uncomfortable situations when African officers told us that we are colonialist or the spy of western countries. It happened that an African politician questioned the content of our reports from Darfur. He told us that our report did not reflect the real and true situation on the field and he sent us various e-mails, in which he stated our limited capacity to help the AU mission in Sudan. As a Hungarian I felt really bad because Hungary never-ever occupied any colonies in Africa and we do not have any economic or other interest there. We came to Africa to help and left behind us our families, jobs and risked our life and personal safety. No one of us from the JLOC received any salary or any goods from AU; we were paid by EU and our own countries. Fortunately this was not a very usual situation because most of our colleagues were helpful and from the AU officials we got all the support that we needed. However we learned that the Africans are very sensitive and to give them advice and help can sometimes be difficult.

The operational environment was quite basic, no EU standard (camp sanitation, personal hygiene, accommodation, food, etc.) As I mentioned previously when we arrived to Darfur, it was the enhancement time and most of the camps were overcrowded and that caused problems.

The different cultural conventions and different nationals, religious practice and possible oversensitivity (to work in a Muslim environment as a Christian) and a different approach to responsibilities and rights in the Mission (rank, position, qualification, etc.) caused difficulties.

Life/work in an unknown environment was challenging. The place was unknown not only for us but also for some African officers and soldiers. We had to learn to respect and understand the locals and co-operate with them.

No JOC only JLOC worked in the mission. When the JLOC was created we saw that there were some misunderstandings between the military and civilian components and this caused unnecessary difficulties in the everyday life. The JLOC begun to harmonise between the components to clarify their logistics needs and give them advice and help to fulfil their tasks. We faced other problems as well, which we could not solve alone so

for this reason we suggested to create JOC (Joint Operation Center) to harmonise the work of all parts of AMIS (CFC, military, police and civilian parts). I do not know why but some high ranking officers rejected this idea and in 2005 this organisation existed only in our dreams.

No real responsibility (missing positions such as camp commandants, logistic, hygiene and fire officers). As I mentioned before we had to take more responsibility in the work with civilian companies/contractors. For example, I suggested that we have to appoint in each camp logistics officers, camp commandants (a kind of quartermaster, who is dealing with the camp order and organise everything that is related to the camp), hygiene and fire officers, who had to work in close relationship with PAE camp managers (their responsibilities were to run the camps) and with the MSS doctors. Military people do not like it when a civilian tries to give them orders (how they have to clean their tents, behave in the camps etc.) for this reason it was important that the Army part of this mission, was not to be only a customer who order services from the civilians but a participant who takes his own responsibility to run the mission. When I left only in El-Fasher we had an appointed camp commander and his work proved that when the military and police forces took more responsibility and worked with the contractors, everything went more smoothly than before.

Slow decision-making. Lack of information, problems with communications and other short falls made it difficult to decide in time and act as rapidly as is necessary in a military operation.

No daily LOGSITREPS from sectors to FHQ. Some camps did not have radios, laptops or computers and if they sent any reports they wrote them by hand. Most of the camps did not send any daily logistics reports as we did in UN or NATO missions therefore we did not get correct information of their needs. The sector logistics officers (who were mostly infantry, artillery or other specialities) without this information could report only their request to us. For this reason they got more logistical help than the camps. When we arrived in any camp the problems came out immediately (we do not have cars, spare tires, communication equipment, cameras, computers, no enough food, etc) and we were surprised because nobody reported their real situation. If we want to run a military or peacekeeping operation smoothly it is very important to receive real information from the field and act immediately to fulfil the logistics needs.

No proper planning. It means logistically not in operations. For example it caused a lot of problems when AU officials planned their fuel needs (helicopters, cars, etc) because they planned for 12 days but the amount fuel that they calculated was enough only for 8 days. So AU could save approximately 1million USD because Canada donated the helicopters and the flight hours. For this reason in the rainy season we could not send

enough food to the camps to feed our soldiers. One soldier was supposed to get 15 kg food/week (including the wrapping materials) so we needed for the whole mission 120 tons of food a week. When I arrived we received 35-45 % of the necessary amount of ingredients and when I left 76%, but we never received the full amount. This happened because we did not get enough fuel and for other reasons as well. A lot of times the PAE used its own helicopters to supply African troops on the ground because the AMIS helicopters could not fly in lack of kerosene. As I know we were never paid for the extra work and the used fuel, flight hours to PAE. This is only one of the problems that we faced because of the improper planning.

Lack of Human resources or using them in a wrong way, in a wrong position. For example, when the positions in JLOC were filled by AU, we did not have enough African officers who graduated from Logistics school or had logistics experience. We requested an officer from FHQ who has 15 years experience in the transportation field but we could not get her, because she was the only one who could make PowerPoint presentations in her section. For this reason they did not release her and we got another officer who did not know too much about transportation matters and he had to learn. Fortunately all officers who got positions in JLOC wanted to do a good job and this made our job easier.

Lack of communication between sections or components and rivalry. First we did not have enough communication equipment and the donors did not give the same type of systems. This is a technical thing, which we could solve with professional communication and IT personnel and harmonise the systems to work. But we never had enough specialists for this job. Another problem was that there were clashes between the military and police components in the JLOC as well (rights, responsibilities, etc.). It took extra time and efforts to solve these situations

Suggestions for AMIS mission in Sudan:

- EU has to clarify the role and position of the non-African advisors;
- EU should make clear that we are in Sudan (Africa as well) to help and not impose the western will;
- Create JOC as soon as possible;
- Proper planning and training;
- Create and use LOGSITREPs;
- Enlarge the storage facilities (MRE, fresh and frozen food);
- Giving priority to food and Medevac (No VIPs or medals);
- Appoint camp commandants, hygiene officers and fire marshals in each camps as soon as possible;
- Donors have to continue to put pressure on AU to handle properly the donated equipment (missing first aid kits, car accidents, using laptops, computers, etc.).

Possible future for EU in Africa:

- Bringing some of our experience as advisors;
- Take part in the training and build of a working training system (Communications, IT, Logistics and AirOps)
- We can expect growing ethnical and religious problems in Africa and more hot place but it is not a good idea to send any European troops there, only military and police advisors and trainers (historical reasons, sensitiveness);
- Establish a planning process in the EU to be able to provide support to other organisations (AU) in crisis management operations and to provide short and long term support;
- It can be a long term support to have staff or liaison officers at AU HQ in Addis Ababa to support the AU with long term crises management (mostly in logistics and contract issues);
- Take part in the rebuilding process and help to develop the local economy

I think the EU advisors did a useful job in AMIS and if we use the experience what we got in Sudan we can prepare ourselves to do a better job in the next missions in Africa (Somalia, etc) and develop a real partnership with the African countries to solve the problems of the continent.