Abstract

In this paper, we use a social representational perspective to consider the interplay between pacifist attitudes and representations of armed conflicts. Specifically, we consider the social representations of World War I, an event that gave rise to a wide pacifist movement across the globe. Across 10 European countries (N = 1347 undergraduate students) we invited participants to report the first five words that came to mind when thinking about this event and measured their level of pacifism. A hierarchical classification analysis on the words revealed the presence of 7 lexical classes. Three of the classes highlight an “analytical” perspective on the war, with a focus on the places and actors of the war whereas three others highlight negative emotions and appraisals of the war. These six classes are well represented across the whole sample, which reveals the presence of a shared representation of the war but the last class is specifically associated with the Serbian subsample. Overall, pacifist attitudes are related to a view of the conflict in terms of negative evaluations, both at the emotional level and in terms of concrete consequences. Conversely lower pacifist attitudes are linked with an emphasis on weapons. This way of appraising the relation between shared representations of a major historical event and pacifism establishes a bridge between the mainstream approaches of attitudes relying on individual premises and the social representational theory.
100 Years After: 

What is the Relation Between Pacifist Attitudes and Social Representations the Great War?

The question of the relationship between war and peace is not new. Whether we think of just war theory (*jus bellum iustum*) dating back to pre-Christian era or of the more recent concept of preventive war (already developed by Hugo Grotius, 1625/2012), this question seems to span cultures and ages. In psychology, it has been discussed in terms of people’s attitudes towards peace and war, attitudes being defined as “evaluations individuals hold towards elements in their environment” (Aronson, Wilson, & Akert 2005, cited by Sammut, 2015, p. 97). Psychological research on this topic emerged in the 1930s, a period marked both by an unprecedented wave of pacifism and by the anticipation of a new impending conflict (see e.g., Chant & Salter, 1937; Droba, 1931; Farnsworth, 1937; Pihlblad, 1935). Concurrently, psychology has witnessed a growing interest for attitudes towards peace and war, accompanied with debates surrounding the very nature of this concept (see e.g., Bizumic, Stubager, Mellon, Van der Linden, Iyer, & Jones, 2013; Cohrs & Moschner, 2002; Van der Linden, Leys, Klein, & Bouchat, 2017; Nelson & Milburn, 1999). At the conceptual level, several authors agree to define the attitudes toward war as the moral evaluation of the use of war/violence as a way of resolving conflictual situations (see e.g., McAlister, Bandura, & Owen, 2006). Correspondingly, attitudes toward peace involve the rejection of violence and acceptance of social harmony.

While research on attitudes toward peace and war relies on a strong tradition and has yielded many publications, we strikingly know very little about people’s representation of its object. Yet, in order to evaluate an object, an individual naturally needs to have information about this object (see Moliner & Tafani, 1997). Considering the links between representations of war and attitudes towards peace and war will precisely be the focus of this paper.
A social representational perspective

We adopt a social representational perspective to address this question. Social representations are bodies of knowledge shared among group members. They help people make sense of the world (Moscovici, 2000) and contribute to the formation of the groups’ identities (Breakwell, 1993). Beyond referring to a specific concept, the social representations approach also offers a unique perspective on social psychological phenomena (Laszlo, 1997). Indeed, social representations are considered as being shared across minds rather than within them (Wagner & Hayes, 2005). In such perspective, the individual is “ontologically” part of the social sphere (Sammut, 2015) and the representational objet cannot be radically separated from the subject. This approach to social psychological phenomena is radically different from the more individualistic perspectives traditionally adopted in research on attitudes. Indeed, while social representations are primarily of a collective nature, the concept of attitude is grounded on an individualistic premise (Moliner & Tafani, 1997). Despite the variety of its definitions, the idea that an attitude is an attribute of the individual is widely accepted (for a review see Eagly & Chaiken, 2007). In this view, an attitude is clearly distinct from a social representation, both epistemologically and conceptually. Still, attitudes are addressed specifically in the social representational perspective. This is especially true of the socio-dynamic approach of social representations.

The socio-dynamic approach

In the socio-dynamic approach, social representations are considered as produced by individuals and groups that occupy specific social positions (Doise, Clémence, & Lorenzi-Cioldi, 1992). In such an approach, attitudes and social representations correspond to different levels of analysis. Social representations are a function of an ideological and collective level and concern the relations between a group and its social system (Salès-Wuillemin, Stewart, & Dautun, 2004). By contrast, an attitude is more of an individual nature and relates to the
interaction between an individual and its social system (Doise, 1982, 1985). The individual, depending on his position in the social system, possesses a specific perspective on a given object. This perspective will guide her evaluation of the object. In this view, an attitude can be considered as a specific position-taking individual makes (individual-level) inside a common frame of interpretation (societal-level).

In summary, this approach constitutes a compelling way of appraising the nature of the relations between attitudes and their representational objects. It shows that attitudes and social representations, while concerning different levels of analysis, can be interpreted inside a common frame that is truly social psychological. In this view, far from being antagonistic, attitudes and social representations can be interpreted in a dialectic relation (see Van der Linden, Bizumic, Stubager, & Mellon, 2011). Attitudes toward an object are determined by the way an individual represents it (the common frame of interpretation) but his representation of the object will also be influenced by the way he evaluates it (from his position in the social system). But what do we know about attitudes toward peace and war and their representational object?

**Representations of war and attitudes toward peace and war**

To date, to the best of our knowledge, the relation between representations of war and pacifist attitudes has received little attention in the social psychological literature. More precisely, the question was addressed in two articles. The first (Herrera & Reicher, 1998) investigates the categorization of the Gulf war by pro-war and anti-war undergraduate British students. When asked to rate images from the war featured in the press, pro and anti-war participants use different categories to characterize the same event. Pro-war students categorize war as opposing the civilized world to the Iraqi troops – embodied in the image of the dictator Saddam Hussein. By contrast, anti-war individuals interpret the Gulf War in terms of an opposition between ordinary people (humanity) and business and political leaders. The
second article addresses the question of the relation between attitudes toward peace and war and the representations of war – viewed here as a generic concept. Van der Linden and colleagues (2011) adopt a social representational approach. They first use a word association task in order to reveal the representations of peace and war held by the participants (Danish and American undergraduate students). Then, running hierarchical classification analysis, they distinguish between clusters of pro and anti-war attitudes. Finally, they show that while social representations of peace and war are only weakly related to the clusters based on the attitudes, pro and anti-war attitudes are linked with different representations. Pro-war attitudes are linked to representations of war such as bomb, necessary, aggression and dictatorship. By contrast, anti-war attitudes are linked with representations depicting war as associated with fear, poverty and hate.

In summary, despite the small number of studies on the topic, we see that pro-war attitudes are linked with representations of the conflict as an opposition between the “civilized world” and an army of “villains” represented by a dictator. War is also perceived as a necessary evil. Finally, participants characterized by a high level of pro-war attitudes also represent the conflict by putting an emphasis on the weapons and linked to the idea of aggression. By contrast, anti-war attitudes are linked with representations of war as opposing Humanity to political and economic leaders. War is also linked to negative and aversive emotions and represented in terms of negative and concrete consequences. In the present paper, we also investigate the relation between attitudes toward peace and war and social representations of war. But rather than considering war in general, we focus on a conflict that constituted the matrix of pacifism in the 20th century and that influenced attitudes toward peace and war on a time scale never seen before: The First World War.

**Great War and Pacifism**
On June 28 1914, Gavrilo Princip, a young Bosnian Serb, killed Franz-Ferdinand, heir to the throne of Austria-Hungary in Sarajevo. This event is the trigger of a war of a new kind, the First World War (WWI). Between 1914 and 1918, the Allies (mainly France, Russia, and the United Kingdom) confront the members of the Central Powers (mainly Austria-Hungary, Germany and the Ottoman Empire) in the first industrialized war. The conflict is characterized, among other aspects, by the extreme brutality of the trench warfare and the use of chemical weapons. After four years of fighting, the Central Powers are defeated. More than 17 million peoples have died and the European continent is devastated.

While WWI may share many features with other wars, it is idiosyncratic in many ways. An aspect of WWI that is of special relevance to this paper is its association with the rise of pacifism. Although the concept already existed before WWI (Cooper, 1991), the end of the war witnesses the rise of pacifism in many strands of society (Olivera & Offenstadt, 1993; Siegel, 2004). According to the French historian René Rémond (1984), the experience of suffering and atrocities of the war led individuals to massively adhere to pacifist ideas. Faced with catastrophe and the relative absurdity of the conflict, it soon became necessary to give meaning to the sacrifice of so many lives (Haddat, 2012). As a result, WWI was quickly reframed as the war to end all wars – at least for the victorious nations. During the interwar period, pacifist ideas were channelled in concrete political decisions. For example, members of the British Labour Party pleaded in favour of a unilateral disarmament while French Socialists voted for the suspension of military credits (Rémond, 1984). At the international level, the 1928 Kellogg-Briand Pact, signed by 63 countries, condemned the use of war to resolve conflicts (Josephson, 1979). This desire to avoid the disaster of the war later has contributed to the failure of the politics of appeasement towards the Nazi regime (Brock & Young, 1999). In this sense, the first global conflict constitutes the original matrix of pacifism.
Thus, WWI is historically linked with the rise of an important pacifist current. Further, recent evidence suggest that the first global conflict is also linked to the pacifist attitudes of young Europeans. More specifically, Bouchat and colleagues (2017) have shown that indicators of victimization at two distinct levels are linked to pacifist attitudes on a hundred years span. At the societal level, the death toll by country during the war is positively linked with the level of pacifist attitudes of the young Europeans. However, at the family level, the presence in their family of an ancestor who fought or died during the war is negatively associated with their endorsement of pacifist attitudes. In line with previous findings by Elcheroth (2006), the authors suggest that countries that faced strong war trauma would develop social representations valuing a peaceful coexistence. On the contrary, at the family level, resentment would remain present.

Given the role of WWI in the emergence of pacifism, the association between representation of this conflict and pacifist attitudes is particularly interesting. Using the social representational approach sketched above and in line with the results of the two previous studies, we formulate the following hypotheses:

According to the socio-dynamic approach, anti-war and pro-war individuals should possess different perspectives on WWI. More specifically:

1. Anti-war attitudes are expected to be linked to negative evaluations of the conflict, both in terms of emotions and concrete consequences. They should also be linked to a set of representations opposing the "people" to the elites.

2. Pro-war attitudes should be associated with representations of the conflict stressing the following aspects: its necessity, a moral opposition between "good people" and villains, the view of war as a defence against an aggression, and an emphasis on military equipment.

Method
1347 participants from 10 European countries took part in a large interdisciplinary survey between March 2014 and July 2015. These 10 countries included the main European actors of the war: Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Russia, Serbia, Turkey and United Kingdom. The samples’ characteristics are provided in Table 1. This online survey designed by historians and social psychologists was presented to them in their language of education (questionnaires were translated and then back-translated from an original English version). The sample was composed of university students (63.4% women) whose average age was 23.37 (SD = 6.43). 56.6% of them were psychology students, 21.6% history students and 20.1% were students in other programs in social science. Distributions of gender and study program vary across subsamples (Gender: $\chi^2 (9, N = 1346) = 144.5, p < .001$; Study program: $\chi^2 (18, N = 1325) = 492.4, p < .001$). Besides demographics question, the questionnaire was composed of a large set of measures, most of which are not relevant to this paper (for a full description, see: https://osf.io/smuk8/?view_only=00d86911f44a40379f78743528d2939). We focus on the following measures:

**Social Representations of WWI.** The first question of the survey aimed at appraising the social representations of the war of the participants. They were asked to write the first five ideas that came instantly to their mind when they thought about the First World War. This type of question is widely used in research on social representations, as it allows grasping a broader set of representations than pre-established scales, while being more easily translatable and amenable to coding than interviews (see e.g., Liu et al., 2005, see also Hilton & Liu, 2008).

**Pacifism.** The level of attitudes toward peace and war of the participants was appraised using the Attitudes Toward Peace and War Scale (Bizumic et al., 2013). This scale
is composed of 16 items such as “There is no conceivable justification for war” and “Our country's first priority should be world peace”. Although the scale is composed of two sub-dimensions (Attitudes toward peace and Attitudes toward war), a factor analysis showed that the items highly loaded on one main factor. Such factor/dimension is characterized on one side by a high adhesion to peace and a rejection of war/violence and on the other side, by a positive evaluation of war and a low adhesion to peace. Therefore, we computed an indicator using the 16 items. Depending on the subsamples, Cronbach’s alphas vary from .79 to .89, suggesting a good internal consistency. Mean level and standard deviation of pacifist attitudes are provided for each sample in Table 1.

Insert Table 1 here

Results

Social Representations of WWI

Data were analysed using Iramuteq (Ratinaud, 2009), an interface of the R software, allowing for multidimensional content analyses. They were previously cleaned of misspellings and automatically lemmatised by the program (terms expressing a similar semantic content were aggregated: i.e., trench and trenches, slaughter and slaughtering). Among the 10,024 occurrences, 1695 active forms were found of which 53.16% were hapax (appeared only once).

The first step of the analyses consisted in running a descending hierarchical classification analysis in order to investigate the structure of the representations of the war (see Reinert, 1983, 1990). This analysis reveals differences and proximities between lexical items. Seven lexical classes were automatically extracted (see Table 2). The three first classes – 1, 6 and 4 – are closely linked. They represent 17.5, 13.8 and 16.2% of the information respectively and focus mainly on the actors, objects, places and formal

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1 We asked for a high number of classes at the end of the first round of analysis (20) in order to obtain detailed results. Aside from that, the defaults values of the program were maintained.
consequences of war. The category of the actors of war is composed of the generic figure of
the fighter: “soldiers” and “poilus” (an informal name for the French soldiers during WWI)
and by the names of the two main alliances: “Entente” and “Central Powers”. The places of
war are composed of the names of two famous battles (Verdun and Isonzo) and the name of
the continent where the most battles took place (Europe). More specifically, class 6 includes
the artefacts of war (i.e., mustard-gas, rifle, machine-guns, shell) and finally, class 4
emphasizes the formal consequences of the conflict (i.e., treaty, Trianon, end, Versailles,
peace). These classes evidence representations of the war that are quite analytic and divorced
from emotions as they focus mainly on formal aspects of the conflict, in a somehow detached
way. These representations resemble experts’ analyses. The second main lexical category is
formed of classes 3, 2 and 5 (7.4, 13.3 and 16.4%). They share in common a global negative
appraisal of the war. The three classes are composed of negative evaluations (i.e., slaughter,
horror, chaos), negative emotions (i.e., fear, sadness, affliction) and concrete negative
consequences of the war (i.e., hunger, destruction, poverty). However, each class is quite
specific. Class 3 focuses on a moral evaluation of the war (i.e., injustice, history, politics,
stupidity). Class 2 emphasizes the negative consequences (i.e., poverty, destruction, death,
victim) and emotions (i.e., sadness, hate, sorrow, mourn) and finally, class 5 seems
characterized by the concrete and negative conditions of the conflict (i.e., blood, hunger, pain,
wound, cold). In summary, these three classes are composed of social representations of the
war that seem of mainly negative valence. Finally, class 7 is characterized by elements
associated with the Serbian experience of the war: the name of the Serbian murderer of the
Austro-Hungarian archduke, name of a famous battle of the Serbian army (i.e., Cer) and bases
of operations in Greece (i.e., Salonika, Corfu).

Insert Table 2 here
The descending hierarchical classification analysis not only reveals classes, but also their interrelations and their links with illustrative variables. It shows that some classes of representations are more or less linked with specific variables (i.e., gender, nationality, status of the country during WWI, type of study). We observe that there are two basic groups of classes – the “negative valence” and the “analytical” classes – and a single additional one – class 7 (see Table 3). Class 7 is the least central one and is characterized by an overrepresentation of Serbian participants (see Table 3). The lexical classes seem therefore associated with specific nationalities. For instance, the participants of the former allied countries (the Entente) are overrepresented in classes 1 (analytical), 3 (moral evaluation). By contrast, several countries belonging to the ex-Central powers are found in classes 4 and 6 (the analytical classes; see Table 3). Other illustrative variables are also related to specific classes: psychology students are overrepresented in classes 2, 3, 5 (negative evaluation) and 1, while history students are preferentially found in class 4. Finally, women are overrepresented in the three “negative evaluation” classes and in class 1 and men in two out of the three “analytical” classes. The overrepresentation of women in the “negative evaluation” classes is consistent with the findings of previous studies. For instance, Sarrica (2007) and Van der Linden et al., (2011) show that to some extent, females tend interpreting war more in terms of negative emotions and negative consequences than their male counterparts. Such effect would be linked to the perception of the classical social roles and stereotypes associated with women and the image of the war as mainly led by men (see also Nincic & Nincic, 2002). The analysis of the links between representations and illustrative variables shows that the representations are not uniformly shared across individuals and cultures. However, it is not the purpose of the present paper to highlight such relation but to appraise their link with pacifist attitudes.

Insert Table 3 here
In order to appraise the links between pacifist attitudes and social representations, we divided participants in two categories based on the median of the pacifist scale ($Mdn = 5.50, M = 5.40, SD = .95$). This allows us to distinguish the 50% of the participants who are the most pacifist from the other half. Given that the median is quite high, we have to keep in mind that we probably distinguish between the most pacifists and the other half of participants, who are less pacifistic but still probably not militaristic neither. Finally, the median split was performed on the whole sample, regardless of the nationality of the participants. We opted for this choice because our aim was the analysis of the relation between attitudes and representations regardless of nationality. We first appraised the link between pacific attitudes and the seven classes highlighted in the previous analysis. Although effects are small (moderate), pacifist attitudes are related to social representations of WWI. This result suggests that high pacifists and low-pacifists occupy different positions in the representational field of WWI (see Table 2).

More specifically, high pacifists are overrepresented in class 2 ($\chi^2 (1, N = 1347) = 6.6, p = .01$) and in class 3 ($\chi^2 (1, N = 1347) = 8.7, p = .09; \text{trend}$). Consistent with Hypothesis 1, it shows that high pacifists seem to view the conflict more in terms of negative evaluations, both at the emotional level (sadness, hate, sorrow) and in terms of concrete consequences (poverty, destruction, death, mourn). However, it is not clear if the opposition between leaders and masses can be found in one of these two classes despite the reference to negative moral evaluations (i.e., injustice, stupidity) and the word “politics” in class 3. Conversely, low pacifists are more present in class 6 ($\chi^2 (1, N = 1347) = 5.5, p = .02$). In line with Hypothesis 2, this result shows that lower pacifist attitudes are linked with representations of weapons (mustard-gas, rifle, machine-guns, shell). However, there is no mention of the necessity of the conflict and of the opposition between good and villains.

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2 When performed on three groups of pacifists (corresponding to the three main percentiles) instead of two, the analyses reveal highly similar results. High pacifists are overrepresented in “negative evaluation” classes.
Next, an analysis of the specificities was run in order to appraise the representations that were the most associated with pacifist attitudes. This allows finding the words on which high pacifists and low pacifists are most differentiated. High pacifists are associated with representations of the war stressing its negative consequences (poverty, casualty) and the concrete conditions of the fight (bomb, blood, cold). Still, there is no mention of the opposition between leaders and masses and of the negative emotions. By contrast, low pacifists are characterized by representations of consequences of war (victory, treaty) that are of a more positive and political nature, by more detached representations of the fight (warfare, Verdun), the figure of the emperor and weapons (weapon, shell). In this case, while the mention of the weapons is still present, low pacifists focus especially on analytical and more detached representations of the war.

Discussion

We opened this paper by exposing a gap in the literature on attitudes toward peace and war. While the field is well developed and anchored in a long tradition of research, little is known about the representational objects of these attitudes. Starting from the obvious premise that in order to be able to evaluate something, one has to have a representation of it – we investigated the relation between pacifist attitudes and the social representations of WWI. To our knowledge, the first global conflict is particularly appropriate to study this relation given its strong historical links with the pacifist wave and its lasting impact on current pacifist attitudes.

Building on a large and diversified sample, the present study provides evidence that pacifist attitudes are linked with social representations of the Great War. In line with previous findings (see Herrera & Reicher, 1998; Van der Linden et al., 2011), our results show that high levels of pacifist attitudes are linked with negative evaluations of the war and a focus on

while low pacifists are slightly overrepresented in “analytical classes”. Mid pacifists are not overrepresented in any lexical class.
its concrete and negative consequences. The emphasis is placed on the outcomes of the conflict but none of them being of strategic or political nature. This way of representing WWI is similar to what Rémond (1984) and later Haddat (2012) described as having led to the development of the pacifist current: “As the call to co-operate with the enemy is unlikely to be heard, it is the horrors of war that are invoked in an attempt to "visualize" warlike violence” (Amossy, 2012). In this case, the pacifist wave of the interwar period and current pacifist attitudes seem associated to a similar interpretation of the conflict. This finding does not prove that social representations of the conflict in the direct post-war period are identical to the current ones but still suggests that a common interpretational framework underlies the view of the conflict associated with the pacifist wave that emerged a hundred years ago and current pacifist attitudes. Further, students who are characterized by the highest level of pacifist attitudes seem to interpret WWI mainly through a moral and emotional prism. Such a result suggests that rejection of war would be associated much more with emotional and moral representations than with macrosocial and political arguments. By contrast, the less pacifist students represent war in a more detached and analytical way than their high pacifist counterparts. In this case, the representations that they share seem to be more a matter of knowledge than a matter of feelings or morality. Still, less pacifist students do not mention positive aspects of the war and do not glorify it. Broadly speaking, the less pacifist students show that they know things about the Great War, especially the famous battles, political consequences and weapons used at that time.

While most of our findings are consistent with those of previous studies, some results are not in line with our hypotheses. First, we did not find a clear representation of the conflict as opposing elites to the masses among the representations shared by high pacifists. This finding is surprising given the fact that the narrative of WWI as a sacrifice of the masses is highly present (at least in part of the population) since 1925 (see e.g., Standaert, 2013).
Moreover, this opposition is one of the key results of a recent study by Bouchat and colleagues (2017; see above) on a similar sample and that shows that the representation of the war as an opposition between elites and masses is widely shared across European countries. The absence of such a representation (even if we see mentions of the words “politics” and “injustice”) could be explained by the formulation of the questions asked to the participants. These do not allow for elaboration and did not focus on the causes of the war (contrary to Bouchat et al., 2017). Indeed, participants were asked to write down only one or a few words that came to their mind when thinking about WWI. Second, it was hypothesized that less pacifist students would associate war with necessity. This prediction was not supported. This result highlights that findings about representations of the war as a generic concept (e.g., such as Van der Linden et al., 2011) do not necessarily apply to representations of specific conflicts. In retrospect, this is not surprising if one considers that WWI – at least in most European countries – is the archetype of the war that wasn’t necessary. Finally, we did not find any representation of WWI as opposing good people and villains. Once again, this could be the result of the type of question asked that did not leave much space for elaboration.

Further, this result can be understood at least partially by looking at the historical evolution of the representations of the conflict. Since the Locarno Treaty in the twenties, WWI tends to be less interpreted as having opposed good people and villains, but rather as a conflict where masses were all victims. The narrative of reconciliation promoted by European integration (see e.g., Haas, 1958) could also have influenced this perception. In summary, the present results suggest that, even if its social representations are weakly linked with current attitudes, WWI can still be interpreted as a matrix to which pacifist attitudes are linked. In doing so, our study contributes to the understanding of the relation between pacifist attitudes and their representational objects, and helps filling a gap in the literature on the topic.
Further, by highlighting the collective nature of the representations of war, the social representational approach allows replacing the study of some aspects of the attitudes in a multilevel perspective. Indeed, we showed that the evaluations an individual makes about peace and war – her attitudes – are linked at least to some extent to representations that are shared at the societal level (inside a common frame of interpretation).

In addition to its specific focus on the links between attitudes and representations, the present study is one of the firsts that addresses the question of the social representations of the Great War in psychological science. Using content analysis, we showed that young European students from ten countries are sharing similar representations of the Great War. Even if it wasn’t the aim of the study, this is the first time that the representational field of WWI is highlighted on such a scale. Moreover, in line with the socio-dynamic approach (see Doise, Clémence, & Lorenzi-Cioldi, 1992) and even if we didn’t develop this aspect in the present paper, we showed that individuals occupy different positions in this representational field depending on their gender, nationality and social category. As such, these results constitute a primary source of information for scientists working on the memory of distant wars.

Limitations

While the present study offers new insights on the relation between attitudes and social representations, it is characterized by several limitations. The first resides in the composition of the sample of participants (see Henrich, Heine, & Norenzayan, 2010). It is composed of university students (mainly psychology and history), both more educated and potentially more in contact with other cultures (due to the Erasmus-type programs) than other members of their generation. As such, the contact with a more globalized culture could influence their representations of the conflict. However, given the majority of psychology students and the fact that historians are undergraduate, we have good reasons to think that their representations of WWI are closer to the ones of lay individuals than the ones of experts.
Moreover, sample sizes aren’t similar across countries. This could influence the set of representations highlighted given the differences of weight of each sample in the factorial analyses. Second, the nature of the question aimed at appraising the social representations of the conflict can have limited the variety of representations presented by the participants. Indeed, the question was designed for short answers (a word or a few) and did not allow for more elaboration. For instance, it wasn’t possible to catch narratives that could have revealed more nuanced representations of the conflict. However, we endorse the choice of limiting the length of the answers, given the need to translate the answers from ten countries into English in order to run the content analysis. Finally, having split the sample at the median level of pacifist attitudes resulted in one main issue. Given the high level of the median (5.5 on a 1 to 7 scale), we distinguished between very high pacifist individuals and less pacifist others, but still most of them being in favour of peace. As a result, we found interesting information on the relations between high pacifist attitudes and social representations of war but far less info on the links with pacifist attitudes. We tried to overcome this issue by dividing the sample into three groups as a function of their level of pacifist attitudes. In this case, results are highly similar than the ones we obtained with two groups. Further, studies on participants that are more likely to approve war (e.g., students in a military school) would be welcome.

**Conclusion**

To our knowledge, the present paper constitutes the first attempt at investigating the links between attitudes and social representations in a large sample of Europeans students. Using a social representational approach, it helps filling a gap in the literature on attitudes toward peace and war by highlighting their links with specific representations of a conflict. Doing so, it establishes a bridge between the mainstream approaches of attitudes relying on an individual premise and social representational theory. In addition, the present study offers the first overview of how young Europeans represent the Great War a hundred years after the
event. The highlighting of such results constitutes a plea in favour of the study of the social representations associated with specific historical events.
Table 1.

*Sample Characteristics and Level of Pacifist Attitudes.*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>% Women</th>
<th>Pacifist Attitudes Mean &amp; (SD)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>5.73 (.78)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>215</td>
<td>71.2</td>
<td>5.35 (.84)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>78.8</td>
<td>5.38 (.77)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>134</td>
<td>30.6</td>
<td>5.01 (1.13)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>5.32 (.93)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>80.3</td>
<td>5.62 (.89)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>80.2</td>
<td>5.08 (.95)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serbia</td>
<td>304</td>
<td>57.9</td>
<td>5.59 (.96)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>75.7</td>
<td>5.64 (.90)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>31.7</td>
<td>4.82 (.93)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 2.  
**Illustration of the Structure of the Social Representations of World War I Across 10 European Countries**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Class 7</th>
<th>Class 3</th>
<th>Class 2</th>
<th>Class 5</th>
<th>Class 1</th>
<th>Class 6</th>
<th>Class 4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>15.4%</td>
<td>7.4%</td>
<td>13.3%</td>
<td>16.4%</td>
<td>17.5%</td>
<td>13.8%</td>
<td>16.2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Gavrilo Princip (334.24)
- Horror (141.96)
- Poverty (153.14)
- Blood (186.87)
- Dead (199.14)
- Warfare (133.37)
- Treaty (246.98)

Salonika (262.99)
- Injustice (138.21)
- Destruction (121.23)
- Hunger (153.6)
- Trench (136.9)
- Trench (107.88)
- Entente (156.79)

Cer (235.9)
- Human (82.66)
- Death (91.41)
- Fear (61.91)
- Poilu (128.45)
- Verdun (103.42)
- Trianon (146.46)

Albania (176.41)
- History (71.85)
- Sadness (84.93)
- Death (58.93)
- Soldier (73.95)
- Mustard-Gas (80.01)
- Monarchy (140.33)

Front (171.57)
- Politics (67.3)
- Victim (66.73)
- Power (55.55)
- Germans (59.78)
- Slaughterhouse (55.7)
- End (97.87)

Austro-Hungary (167.13)
- Stupidity (62.69)
- Hate (52.8)
- Pain (46.95)
- Europe (59.17)
- Rifle (50.46)
- Versailles (73.11)

Corfu (123.97)
- Past (50.1)
- Suffer (45.14)
- Innocent (46.2)
- 1914-1918 (56.13)
- Shock (44.1)
- Positional (51.15)

Golgotha (122.51)
- Slaughter (47.85)
- Mourn (32.89)
- Wound (35.85)
- Great (53.15)
- Schlieffen-plan (43.12)
- Isonzo (41.66)

Albanian (112.45)
- Chaos (46.41)
- Violence (32.56)
- Affliction (35.85)
- War (45.38)
- Machine-guns (37.76)
- Peace (41.63)

Battle (96.71)
- Resistance (38.53)
- Sorrow (26.29)
- Cold (34.73)
- Conflict (34.08)
- Shell (36.89)
- Central-Powers (40.27)

Note: the numbers in brackets are chi-square values; \( \chi^2 \) indicates the strength of the link between the variables and the classes.
### Table 3.

**Links between Illustrative Variables and Main Classes**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Classes</th>
<th>Illustrative variables</th>
<th>National/International</th>
<th>Studies/Gender</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>France (113.14), Belgium (82.03), Entente (47.59), Italy (18.52)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Psychology (47.55), Women (13.04)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Austria (9.14), United Kingdom (7.37), Italy (5.36)</td>
<td>Austria (9.14), United Kingdom (7.37), Italy (5.36)</td>
<td>Women (13.85), Psychology (13.56)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Belgium (21.32), Entente (8.18)</td>
<td>Belgium (21.32), Entente (8.18)</td>
<td>Psychology (12.94), Women (4.56)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Central powers (137.42), Hungary (70.86), Austria (59.63), Germany (10.6)</td>
<td>Central powers (137.42), Hungary (70.86), Austria (59.63), Germany (10.6)</td>
<td>History (33.01), Men (7.67)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Germany (133.13), Central Powers (51.72)</td>
<td>Germany (133.13), Central Powers (51.72)</td>
<td>Women (23.03), Psychology (8.53)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Serbia (473.84), Entente (79.24)</td>
<td>Serbia (473.84), Entente (79.24)</td>
<td>Men (41.5), History (8.21)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note:* The numbers in brackets are chi-square values; $\chi^2$ = strength of the link between the variables and the classes.
References


http://aad.revues.org/1413


Henrich, J., Heine, S. J., & Norenzayan, A. (2010). Most people are not WEIRD. *Nature, 466*(7302), 29-29. [http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/466029a](http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/466029a)


http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10781910701471298


