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The Future of Crime and Crime Control

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Abstract

Following a brief conceptualization of security and public order, we provide an overview of the factors that affect trends of criminality and law enforcement. These include an explanatory background for public order, the transformation of the concept of security (and the shifting boundaries of the rule of law), changes in the operational principles of policing, as well as trust in the police. Then we turn to the assessment of future trends to discuss demographic changes, macroeconomic factors, the technological revolution, globalization and political populism. We shall focus on models of criminal politics and the criminal justice system; this will be followed by the analysis of trends in criminality focusing on cost-benefit models, the demographic prognosis of young males, migration, unemployment, and trends in incarceration, and violent crimes and crimes against property. A subsequent assessment concentrates on future victims and perpetrators, the effects and consequences of crime, as well as challenges for the law enforcement machinery. In this section technological development, private security, the alienation of law enforcement, career prospects for a new generation of officers, as well as community and local policing, institutional discrimination and Roma-focused law enforcement strategies are discussed. The last section of the paper focuses on lacuna in research and regulation in the field of law enforcement.

Keywords: public safety, fear of crime, crime trends, crime control, penal policy, criminal justice, demographic changes, macroeconomic factors, technology revolution, globalization, punitive populism, trust in justice, private security

Public order and public security

Some people regard security as stability (permanence), while others believe that the key to security is the potential which lies in change (progress). Also, colloquial language and professional interpretations attribute different meanings to the concept. Typically, professional

interpretation construes this concept as national security, international military security, or information security. Sociological studies, however, established that the average citizens think about social security and public security when they hear this word (GAZDAG–TÁLAS, 2008: 3.).

Public security, as Géza Finszter (2009) puts it, is the part of the immaterial infrastructure which is required for individuals and their communities to realize those of their goals that are valuable for the society. The contemporary European mindset regards public security as a collective product of the society, which consists of the activities of persons and their communities, official measures taken by public agencies, the citizens' self-defence capabilities, and services provided by the private business sphere. Public security is, therefore, a cooperative product (FINSZTER, 2009), a category carrying multiple meanings, in which various interests and values, and multiple tasks of profoundly different types are combined. Based on a review of studies in this subject, Podoletz (2014) points out that public security is closely related to the concept of public order, which is either defined as a formally existing situation or "order", or as a positive category imbued by value elements. In the legal system, public security appears as a component of public order, but the opposite can also be true when public order constitutes a part of public security, or they may be presented as equivalent categories (AB, 2001). It is apparent that there are a lot of ways to categorize them, but the constitutional value aspect of public security is more essential than any other interpretation. Nowadays, local, regional, national, integrated and global dimensions of public security gained special significance.

Factors influencing trends

Crime and public security are correlated concepts. A considerable amount of literature is devoted to exploring the factors that affect the trends of crime: why crime was on the rise in the 1960s, why it started to decline in the past two decades around the world, and what is to be expected in the future. This paper offers a compilation about the forecasted trends in crime, taking into account the facts, hypotheses and assumptions that professionals associate with future developments in criminal activities.

First of all, we need to emphasize that, according to the researchers of this subject, there are two variables which are indubitably related to past trends and future changes in crime: macroeconomic factors (e.g. the level of development of the economy, the rate of unemployment, characteristics of consumption) and demographic factors (in particular, the distribution of young males within the population, who are characterized by an increased propensity to commit crime). Today, technology was added as the third variable to these factors, which – as it will be shown – has an increasingly dominant influence on the instruments and methods of crime (SCHNEIDER, 2002).

The society that responds to an act of crime when it has been committed, which is characterized by "act of crime, perpetrator and victim, crime control, police activities, investigation, trial and punishment", is being transformed nowadays into a society that is characterized by "calculation, risk and uncertainty, surveillance, precaution, prudentialism, moral hazard, prevention and, arching over all of these, there is the pursuit of security" (ZEDNER, 2007: 262.). Literature related to public security claims that in the next decade the

conditions of handling crime will be dominated essentially by two characteristic features: on the one hand, *post-crime society* will shift towards *pre-crime society* that responds to abstract threats of crime (ZEDNER, 2007), and on the other hand, justice responding to the commission of an illegal act is more and more intertwined with the security oriented logic of threat assessment (ERICSSON-HAGGERTY, 1997).

Interpreting public security

The changing concept of security – the crumbling boundaries of the rule of law

After the end of the cold war, security moved beyond the military interpretation of the concept. A key factor that influenced the shifting of this issue into focus is globalization, the “shrinking” of the world, with intensifying interaction of various regions and the balance of power between international actors that changed at the time and has been changing ever since.

The terrorist attack on 11th September 2001 against the World Trade Center drew attention to the “shrinking” of the world in a cruel way. In the aftermath, the war on terror opened the door to new possible interpretations of security related issues. The fight against terrorism became an international security problem, because – especially based on the concerns of the USA – it raised the threat of attacks with nuclear, chemical and bacteriological weapons. A new approach to the problem claims that, due to the aforementioned reason, economic migrants, refugees fleeing from conflicts, and smuggled people pose a threat to societies hosting them and even to those that are wary of doing so. Such an interpretation of international security regards jihadist terrorism and the 13 million Muslims living in Europe as a potential threat.

The new legitimacy of the police is related to its role in the fight against terrorism: its security related authority widens its mandate in regard to terrorism, but also restricts it as it is, in part, a return to its law enforcement role. However, the long process of “re-legitimization” may entail the reinterpretation of the legal concept of “citizen” as the new developments in connection with the prevention of terrorism indicate. The counterpart of enemy criminal law is the “citizen” who is entitled to all constitutional rights and the guarantee of due process (GÓMEZ-JARA, 2008; DUBBER, 2010; JAKOBS, 2004).

In addition to new threats manifesting themselves in undeniably dangerous forms, there are still conventional threats, mostly religious and ethnic conflicts that threaten to disrupt the integrity of nation states. However, it is becoming increasingly apparent that in the dialogue about security policy these conventional threats are being replaced by issues such as illegal immigration from less developed countries, radicalization of certain groups within the society or the difficulties of integration.

By now the concept of security has absorbed several other fields that have never been associated with internal security before. Before 1991 there were barely any examples of internal security related issues that necessitated consultation between the European countries. The situation changed, however, owing to the problem of migration and terrorism, and it seems that in the future the issues of handling external and internal security will be even more interconnected.

The question arises as to “what extent the number of issues falling within the scope of the definition of security can be increased without jeopardising the intellectual integrity of the concept of security” (GAZDAG–TÁLAS, 2008: 6.). The response of contemporary governments to the solution of issues related to the lack of security is *securitization* (Csiki, 2014; GAZDAG–TÁLAS, 2008). The process has three stages: in the first stage, an issue that involves the community should be regarded as a threat, which means that it should be elevated to a level where the community interprets it as a danger to its conditions of life or an existential threat. In the second stage, the topic should be communicated using security related words, which would reposition the subject of the issues to the special category of security. This also indicates that the handling of the issue is undertaken by a group which was made responsible and given authority to act in matters related to security. In the final stage of the process, the public opinion accepts the phraseology related to the issue, thereby legitimizing the interpretation of the subject as a security issue (BUZAN et al., 1998).

There are several issues that can be securitized either directly or indirectly. Organized crime threatens the security of the society and creates a parasitic relationship with the state. Large scale immigration evokes a sense of insecurity in the host country because the issue can be interpreted as the loss of national identity and jobs. Topics that threaten personal security are particularly suitable for securitization, for example when immigrants commit breaking and entering or sexual offences. This demonstrates that securitization is an “extreme” version of politicizing a social issues, and lays down the foundations of presenting a given issue as an existential threat, justifies the necessity of taking extraordinary measures, and legitimizes the crossing of the regular limits of political procedures. In this way, politics moves beyond the accepted rules, and the issue becomes embedded into a special political context or raises above politics (BUZAN et al., 1998: 81.).

Nowadays, the inability to cope with globalization and the ensuing rapid societal changes and social uncertainty in connection with traditional values create a certain sense of social discomfort. And this social depression is here to stay in the long run. This means, in particular, one of its form of manifestation, the fear of crime, which absorbs, like a “sponge effect”, abstract fears related to social situation, future and health. According to a Eurobarometer survey conducted across 27 countries, the intensity of the fear of crime differs significantly between EU member states. At the individual’s level, the fear of crime is always stronger among women, persons with a low level of education, the unemployed and the city dwellers. The fear of crime is the strongest among those who regard themselves as socially marginalized and among people who see both their own future and the future of their country in a grim light. There is a comparably intensive fear among those who consider the social supply chain of their country less than adequate. Economic indicators of the fear of crime include the measure of economic inequalities in the country and low spending on education and social supply chain. In contrast, crime, migration, and the rate of unemployment did not show a positive correlation with the fear of crime (VIENO et al., 2013). This fact led researchers to the conclusion that the fear of crime is a component of societal insecurity and it is closely related to the basic need for social acceptance (VIENO et al., 2013). BRAITHWAITE (1979) claimed that unfavoured groups of the society never have a determinant impact on the general trends characterising the frequency of criminal acts, and only economic measures can shrink the gap between the rich and the poor (BRAITHWAITE, 1979: 231.). Only societies operating a capable educational system and social supply chain

built on egalitarian principles can reduce the fear of crime. Societies that promise their citizens direct protection and pursue zero-tolerance criminal policies cannot achieve such a reduction.

Operation of the law enforcement state

New players have emerged in the field of public security: local medical and social professionals, community and local government employees, and persons employed by other governmental agencies. Private security is becoming a key factor and so is security-oriented interpretation of the role played by banks and content providers. The rise of new the players necessitate establishing new forms of collaborations, and typically this collaboration will be the source of the special knowledge that will help the police overcome the challenges arising from crime. There is no doubt that cooperation with the new players has special significance in the fight against terrorism, and also in connection with handling environmental damages, radicalization, organized crime, and issues related to policing issues.

Policies intending to remedy the people's lack of security with the wrong tools may produce several adverse consequences. One of the most important outcomes can be that the issue of internal security becomes involved in military operations. The precursors are noticeable in Hungary too, which is further amplified by the securitization of the issue of illegal immigration. The previous division of labour assigned the army to home defence while the police was responsible for providing protection within the country. In the past two decades, the mandate of the police was considerably broadened as part of the fight against terrorism, and the powers given by anti-terrorism legislation shifted police activities even further away from law enforcement, and the surveillance and identification of potentially dangerous residential groups/individual citizens became increasingly important. The attention directed at the threat of terrorism and the part of the population that may be a potential source of problems changed the requirements related to the police: on the one hand, it militarized the police, and on the other hand, the local crime prevention role of the organization was transformed from law enforcement into threat management, and in the handling of petty crimes, the lines between the competences of law enforcement bodies and social services became blurred.

“Militarization is not just something that happens in war zones; when our government invests billions of dollars in war planes, prisons and the ‘digital economy’, while starving resources in social justice, education, the environment and culture, we are living the consequences of global militarization”, wrote Berland and Fitzpatrick about the situation in the USA (BERLAND–FITZPATRICK, 2010). The overarching presence of militarization permeates even civilian culture. The culture of militarization is normalized through ethnicization, criminalization and securitization, giving rise to new forms of violence (e.g. hate crimes) and the emergence of various forms of dehumanization and othering, and builds a special “chain of fortifications” within white societies (LINKE, 2010). The postmodern political system of Europe in the 21st century clearly demonstrates how governments can elevate themselves to a position of power over life and death: they have the power to exclude, to establish exceptions, and to drive a wedge between human life, human rights and societal values (COMAROFF–COMAROFF, 2007: 22.). In the postmodern society, a universal victim

mentality was born, which have a profound transformative effect on the management of social problems and the philosophy of crime control. This approach changes the attitude towards human rights, and in general people are becoming more tolerant to restrictions imposed on the rights of other people and their own rights, and to the use of control measures.

At the same time, the actors of local security are also changing, and the conditions of crime prevention are transformed. After all, security is turned into a commodity that can be purchased and yields profit. So much so, that, according to certain authors, security and law enforcement, provided not only as a private service but also as a state function, will be limited to what the customers, motivated by business considerations, expect from it. According to the radical views of Angus Bancroft (2005), widely shared by many scholars, the most important function retained by the nation state reshaped by globalization is to provide a peaceful and secure arena for the free-flowing international capital and the mobile workforce. These “secure locations”, however, usually lead to segregation and the forcing of social classes that are considered “less secure” or “less competitive” into postmodern hyperghettos. The threat of terrorism drives the security industry into frenzied development; although it does protect the secure zones of the middle class, but at the same time it creates a “grey zone” for the excluded people, where private (or quasi-private) security services for the wealthy will grow, while public law enforcement will be mostly reduced to maintaining police control of the classes that are lagging behind: while middle and upper classes are given preventive protection, the poor will only experience reactive law enforcement.

Professionals studying cohesion within the society conceived the notion of “parallel lives” (CANTLE, 2008; BURGESS–LUPTON, 2004) to describe a situation in which social groups live next to each other, but there is no contact between them. This concept is based on the social experience where there are communities that, not just in terms of their territories but also in regard to their social and cultural levels, are isolated from each other. This segregation is more than simply geographical separation. If members of the different communities are in contact, if not geographically, but in other areas, such as education, employment or recreation, then these shared spaces will provide enough information about the other group to compensate for the effect caused by geographical separation (CANTLE, 2008). However, segregation described by the concept of parallel lives carries the risk of a social disaster. In Hungary, the lives of the Roma and non-Roma groups of the society seldom cross each other: they do not go to the same school, do not work for the same employer, do not shop at the same place, do not live in the same neighbourhood, and, as a result, their future children will not play on the seesaw at the same playground either. To simplify the situation to a certain degree, we can claim that they only meet at a single location: in the field of criminal justice, where the “service providers” of criminal justice came from the favoured class while the “users” are typically from disadvantaged social groups (KEREZSI, 2013). It is easy to realize that in our society criminal justice provides the arena where dialogue between different social classes and cultures takes place (KEREZSI, 2013). The analysis authored by Herbert Gans concerning “the uses of the ‘undeserving’ poor” is noteworthy in this context (GANS, 1992). If no effective social measures are taken in order to dismantle barriers between communities so dialogue may start and mutual trust and understanding may improve, then prejudices will continue to plague these relations, which, as a result, supports the forecast that extremist groups will spread, racial and religious discrimination will increase, and disadvantages and inequalities will be even more prevalent.

Policing is easy to see as it attends to people in need (e.g. the law enforcement state's efforts to achieve dominance is indicated by the interpretation of communal work as a law enforcement measure instead of an instrument of social policy). One of the consequences is *overpolicing*, an excessive response to the behaviour of disadvantaged social groups, and their closer monitoring. These social groups, however, are left without real protection; even though their members are overrepresented among the victims, the conventional police mindset does not regard the protection of victims, cases of family violence, etc. as a "real" police duty. As a result, difficult to reach social groups are becoming even more difficult to approach.

Collaboration changes the boundaries of professional competences, and reallocation of measures opening the door to the legitimate use of force is a phenomenon that is on the rise. The latter is the most significant change in the past decades, and is driven by legislators delegating "policing and sanctioning" powers to non-judicial organizations. An example of this process is the judicial sanctioning powers that are "redistributed" in the context of diversion, which is one of the signs that indicate a shift in the balance between the players in criminal justice (KEREZSI, 2006). Diversion boosts the involvement and the powers of prosecution in criminal procedure (KEREZSI, 2010). Another example of the redistribution of policing powers enabling the use of legitimate force is the establishment of public area surveillance organizations and the restructuring of disaster management. Giving broader policing powers leads to an increase in the number of inmates, and if it is not followed up by sufficiently expansive prison construction projects, ethical, political and budgetary problems will ensue. An example from our country: according to the Hungarian Helsinki Committee, prisons in Hungary are the most crowded in Europe. The number of incarcerated persons has been increasing since 2008; in 2014, the average number of inmates was 18.204, the average occupancy was 141%, which means that more than 18.000 persons were crammed into a prison capacity of about 13.000 inmates (KIRS, 2015; KLEMENICS, 2015). In its ruling of March 2015¹ (in the case of Varga and others vs Hungary²), the European Court of Human Rights declared that overcrowding of Hungarian prisons is a systemic problem.

The penal state successfully converts anxiety arising from globally increasing insecurity to anxiety and hate associated with criminals or certain minorities (FERGE, 2014), and tolerance is replaced by a vision of an enemy that threatens security (FLECK, 2014). If priorities in social policy do not change, and instead of ensuring the functioning of social policy instruments against insecurity, poverty and increasing inequalities, it prefers penal solutions, then social policy will be a subservient part of penal policy (NAGY F., 2014). Current trends show that ranking security above all shifts institutional practices from consensus towards coercion, from social welfare and integration functions towards the intensification of surveillance and policing, and criminalization.

¹ Systemic issues related to the conditions of detention have also been found by the Commissioner for Fundamental Rights and the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CPT) of the Council of Europe. See e.g. http://helsinki.hu/wp-content/uploads/Varga_v_Hungary_osszefoglalo.pdf

² Varga and others vs Hungary, case no:14097/12, 45135/12, 73712/12, 34001/13, 44055/13, 64586/13, JEMA, 2015/3, 75–81; and also, Klemencsics Andrea: Embertelen fogvatartási körülmények a magyar börtönökben, *Arsboni*, 23rd March 2015.

Trust in justice

Societal controls do not work properly if citizens do not trust the institutions and their willingness to abide by the laws is poor. The surveys conducted by Eurobarometer in the EU measure from year to year what the people think of criminal justice, how they trust the legal system of their countries, how secure they feel and so on. In our experience, the lack of trust and the security deficit are higher in the Eastern-Central-European region than what would seem to be justified on the basis of objective data about security (at least, data that appear to be more objective than opinion polls).

Trust in criminal justice is a fundamental requirement of the democratic operation of a society. Lappi-Seppälä used data from Western-European countries to prove the correlation between the proportion of prison populations and the trust in the given country's legal system (LAPPI-SEPPÄLÄ, 2004). In countries where adherence to social norms is not based on fear and deterrence but on maintaining trust and legitimation, the latter goal can be achieved by applying less severe legal sanctions. When supplemented with data from Eastern-European countries, the data examined by Lappi-Seppälä make it even more evident that handing out prison terms is not the most successful way of shoring up trust in the legal system and reinforcing its legitimacy.

Findings of the Eurojust project presented the issue of trust in criminal justice as part of broader context. As it stands, the issues of a "good society" have been contemplated as political problems, subject to political considerations. The findings of the aforesaid study confirmed that political trust is strongly related to the subject of welfare – as Mike Hough put it: inequality of income is the friend of crime and an enemy of trust in the society (HOUGH-SATO, 2011).

Rober Reiner (2011) argues that the police mostly serves people who are in trouble, this is its most important function, and for this reason criminal statistics are unsuitable for evaluating police activities as the police have little influence on criminal trends. During its historical development, a special emphasis was placed on the investigative function of the police while providing support for general law enforcement tasks and social services were devalued (DEMPSEY-FORST, 2014: 68.). According to the classic research by John Webster (1970) in a city with 400.000 residents the police spends 55% of the police officers' working hours on providing services and administrative functions, and 57% of the reports require such tasks. Crime investigation takes up only 17% of the working hours. A 4-month study conducted in Kentucky (USA) produced similar results: 61% of the incoming calls were information requests and 13% were related to traffic issues. Less than 3% of the calls reported violated crimes and about 2% were about theft (DEMPSEY-FORST, 2014: 136.).

A study regarding trust in the Hungarian police (BODA-MEDVE-BÁLINT, 2015) indicates that micro-factors determining trust in justice are not different from those in the Western democracies. Trust in the police is determined basically by its performance and the fairness of its procedures, but a factor that is just as important as the previous two is the opinion of persons under investigation about the current problems of the country. Persons interviewed in Hungary are sensitive to the subject of police corruption, but they are much more tolerant to discriminating police practices. Additional findings of the research confirm that positive personal experience in connection with the police does not improve

the overall positive view of the police any further, however the opinion of those who had less than favourable experience in a police procedure became negative in every respect.

Table 1
“How much do you personally trust the police?” (2013; 2015)

Year	Averages by gender			Averages by age groups						
	male	female	to- gether	16–24	25–34	35–44	45–54	55–64	65–74	74 years or older
2013	5.6	5.8	5.7	5.7	5.7	5.6	5.5	5.6	5.8	6.1
2015	5.6	5.7	5.6	5.7	5.8	5.6	5.6	5.5	5.5	5.9

Source: www.ksh.hu/docs/hun/xstadat/xstadat_aves/i_zaa012.html

Factors determining future trends

“Criminal trends can be considered stochastic processes, which means that while both their past and the contemporary social phenomena have an impact on their future, these effects, however, are not causal, the degree of interaction is not a constant value but a random variable. [...] The annual crime rate affects that of the next year, but it is just not possible to specify a multiplier that could be used to calculate the value for the next year. The same is true for other phenomena indicating how deep rooted crime is in the society, such as the rate of unemployment or population numbers in the age groups that are the most active in crime”, wrote Mátyás Arató, Imre Kertész and Vilmos Tisza 15 years ago (ARATÓ et al., 2002: 4.) in a study aiming to forecast crime. Even then changes in the level of technology (decline, stagnation, development) were regarded as an uncertainty factor, but a potential third industrial revolution was not excluded either. The verdict on the issue of migration was similarly dubious: in their words, the member states might close their borders, but they might also open them to varying degrees. “Globalization might create a world without borders, but it may also resurrect regional isolationism, and lead to a global crisis” – that is how they outlined the difficulties of tackling the task at hand (ARATÓ et al., 2002).

The mentality of our day struggles with similar hurdles when contemplating the possible turning points or persistent characteristics of crime and the handling of crime, and for this reason it resorts to the evaluation of processes that emerged not just in our country but in other European countries too, thereby amplifying the examined trends.

Demographic changes

As we have already mentioned, future trends in crime seem to be profoundly influenced by the current demographic changes that are expected to continue in the future. A review of the age distribution of the population reveals that the most significant factor is the

number of 15 to 25-year olds, especially the percentage of young males. In societies where the population in this age group shrinks, a declining trend in crime can be expected. The decreasing number of young people in Hungary points to a further drop in the already declining trend of criminal activities. At the same time, demographic characteristics represent only one of the contributing factors that drive crime. Crime can be on the rise despite shrinking young age groups if members of these groups are less integrated, their educational levels or qualifications are poor, and they do not work and do not study either. Within the age group of young people, minority youth may also appear as an additional “source of problems”. Among the young males who commit crimes, professionals with hands-on experience clearly notice the “macho” behaviour pattern, which is inspired by movies, advertisements, and computer games. Professionals call this phenomenon “tough-guy context” (JEFFERSON, 1996) as the young people interpret the aspects of a situation that is not beneficial for them using the notions of “toughness”. This scope of interpretation can be so widespread today, typically among the deprived young males, because they do not have any real social power as they are uneducated and unemployed, but they live in a culture that imparts the values of patriarchal power to them. The studies of Sophie Body-Gendrot (2005) showed that even violent juvenile delinquents do not have direct path from minor infractions to committing mafia-type offences and acts of terrorism. Commitment to a law abiding conduct is compromised mostly by the deficiencies of socialization, which lead to a lack of respect for the law. Poverty does not affect the development of a macho attitude, but preference for computer games in which the objective is to kill everyone else (“*beat them up games*”) and for violent media programmes is closely related to violent behaviour (BAKÓCZI-SÁRKÁNY, 2001). Propensity to use violence as a norm may indicate in a lot of different ways that arenas for legitimate competition available to this age group are either scarce or unappealing. Similar to money and knowledge, violence may be a means to gain power, and many young people have no other way to exercise power. Not to mention that in addition to being able to learn how to become violent, one can also learn how to normalize and rationalize violence and how to evade compliance with moral obligations towards other people. The shrinking of the Hungarian demographic group, which is beneficial in terms of the reduction of the frequency of criminal acts will not necessarily lead to a reduction in crime. For now, however, data gathered in Hungary point to a further decline in the number of perpetrators and criminal acts.

The other consequence of demographic changes (due to prolonged life expectancy thanks to advances in medical sciences and technology) is a significant increase in the age group of elderly population. Globally, people live longer than in the previous decades. The number of elderly people increases in Europe in the first place: in the past 60 years, the European population older than 65 years tripled and the number of people older than 80 years is six times what it was in 1950. This situation carries the risk of the elderly being exposed to an increased number of criminal acts exploiting their vulnerability, including, in the first place, various frauds and crimes against property. Experience shows that this age group is more trusting and pays less attention to preventing crime. It is expected that the number of violent acts against the elderly that, in many cases, remain latent, will also rise. The growing number of elderly people will not only change the characteristics of crime but, based on experience, the elderly have different expectations in regard to the organizations of law enforcement.

Table 2

Changes in age groups of 15- to 25-year old people and those over 60 and forecast of their distribution in the Hungarian population (1980-2025)

Time period	Population on 1st January (persons)	Male population aged 15 to 25	As a % of the population	Population older than 60	As a % of the population
1980	10,709,463	852,309	7.96	1,830,132	17.1
1985	10,657,420	765,076	7.18	1,921,935	18
1990	10,374,823	801,829	7.73	1,959,846	18.9
1995	10,245,677	902,988	8.81	1,986,313	19.4
2000	10,200,298	862,914	8.46	2,081,559	20.4
2005	10,097,549	755,614	7.48	2,152,120	21.3
2010	10,014,324	706,890	7.06	2,252,965	22.5
2015	9,855,571	652,924	6.62	2,472,802	25.1
2016	9,830,485	641,126	6.52	2,521,684	25.7
2017	9,735,621	619,066	6.36	2,531,577	26
2018	9,693,531	601,749	6.21	2,546,547	26.3
2019	9,651,940	585,537	6.07	2,556,891	26.5
2020	9,610,945	571,996	5.95	2,561,683	26.7
2021	9,570,535	561,570	5.87	2,565,310	26.8
2022	9,530,739	553,911	5.81	2,563,763	26.9
2023	9,491,479	547,659	5.77	2,555,276	26.9
2024	9,452,153	546,258	5.78	2,549,993	27
2025	9,412,663	546,276	5.8	2,545,891	27.1

Source: Author's own chart based on data from Central Statistical Bureau

Macroeconomic factors

For now, economic indicators point to the continuation of the trend that was experienced in the past 5 to 8 years. A number of research projects confirm that the frequency of criminal acts, especially crimes against property, is closely related to the level of economic development. This does not just mean that at the time of an economic crisis crime against property starts to exhibit a rampant growth, but also that at the time of an economic boom it drops. It is a fact that in a period of prosperity the number of people who have a job and the amount of money they earn are higher so committing crimes against property is less attractive to them. It is also a fact, however, that a developing economy produces an abundance of goods and a wider choice of opportunities for crime.

In the domestic trends of crime – in particular, crime against property –, macro-economic effects are easy to track. The economic opening in the 1970s and the wider range of opportunities to do extra jobs (small economic associations called GMKs within companies)

allowed several classes in the society to start accumulating wealth. Economic opportunities were quite limited in terms of meeting individual needs (accommodation, food, etc.) at a higher level, and barely allowed for an increase of consumption involving properties, investment projects as well as technical and accumulated assets. The time for the latter arrived with the regime change when economic and political opening created unprecedented supply of consumption and investment opportunities that were unimaginable in the previous decade. Then the above mentioned accumulation of assets found its consumption target. This change was reflected in the skyrocketing of crime rates, which also indicated that the appearance of high-value consumer goods in households and at private companies did not entail the use of efficient security measures. Availability of investment sources to citizens but their lack of financial skills led to the sudden proliferation of pyramid schemes. These days the constant decline of crime against property is mostly due to the prevention oriented mindset that implements the right security measures to protect assets (DIJK et al., 2012). The citizens' lack of skills in the area of finances and in investment issues, however, were marked by frauds (mostly investment frauds) that have been flourishing ever since.

Technology revolution

Industrial revolutions have a definitive impact on the methods of production. The first industrial revolution was marked by the invention of the steam engine, the second by the use of electrical energy for mass production, the third by applying information technology to production automation. In this stage, production is being digitalized through the use of intelligent software, new materials and work processes, massive robots, web-based services and so on. Schwab (2016) argues that the start of the fourth industrial revolution will be probably triggered by the blurring of the boundaries between physics, biology, and digitalization.

Development of technical equipment has a significant impact on trends in crime. New technical solutions offer easy access to systems, not just for legitimate users but also for criminals with a lot of technical savvy. Advances in technology loosened the connection between crime and geographical locations, and can fully ensure the anonymity of the person committing the unlawful act. In the next decade, the Internet will be the prevailing interface for criminal activities, and as a result, we can expect an explosive rise in IT crime. Technical changes facilitate even the conventional forms of crime (e.g. theft, counterfeiting, money laundering, scam, child pornography, etc.). So, in part, technical changes modify the conditions of committing conventional crimes, but in doing so they also expose services to unprecedented forms of attacks, which may cause serious harm or damages, and had been unfeasible before. We cannot stress enough the fact that in that regard the population's distribution among age groups has particular significance. The point is that young people aged 15 to 25 are very skilled – more skilled than any other age groups – at handling the devices of information technology. And people older than 65 are the least skilled in using IT technology.

Development of technology has a three-pronged effect on future trends in crime: first, it helps perpetrators commit conventional crimes using new instruments (e.g. scam, theft, money laundering, counterfeiting). Second, the technical equipment itself is the target of criminal activity (e.g. theft of telecommunication devices, spreading of viruses, etc.). Third,

the new technology is used for prevention or detection of crime. The rise in the number of various forms of counterfeiting has a causal relationship with the technical development of personal computers, scanners, colour printers, etc. The number of frauds committed using electronic devices will rise as the adoption of automated bank transfers and online banking will spread, offering more opportunities to commit online theft and fraud.

Development of conventional and IT technologies, however, also helps the police, for example, with the analysis of criminal activities. In the future, statistical analysts will be aided by various software applications, and evaluation of registered acts of crime will be an automated process supported by technical devices and computer programs. In addition to the traditional methods of data collection, gathering so-called “Big Data” will also be a source of knowledge about crime – in the latter case, data used in the analysis are generated constantly and at a high rate. Big Data collection provide data in real time together with their changes, and evaluating them will always reflect the current situation (NAGY T., 2015). In the words of Tibor Nagy: “For example, the Hungarian National Police Headquarters (ORFK) release an Internet-based crime map on the home page of the police that can be searched down to street level. Statistical data from investigations are published on the page and are used to visualize the crime rates – in this way it is directly observable which territories are safer than the others and which areas require increased police presence. The so-called *smart city* projects involve collation of unstructured data streams (e.g. camera captures) in real time from several sources at a number of locations and geocriminal statistical data for the purpose of crime prevention” (NAGY T., 2016).

Advances in technology automatize a number of analysis tasks, such as fingerprint and DNA analysis and vehicle identification. Also, this technology supports surveillance, monitoring and patrolling activities. As it has already been mentioned, certain instruments of crime control are “migrating” to other areas and certain solutions are adopted quickly in the law enforcement practices of various countries. Satellite and electronic surveillance systems will probably represent such a rising technology.

Globalization

Development of telecommunications, rising international trade, growth of tourism and other travel activities, and migration rendered borders negligible for criminals and criminal groups. In the future, the number of perpetrators who have never entered the territory where they committed their crimes will grow even more. The globalized market led significantly reduced the risk of getting caught while smuggling legal and illegal goods, and created an excellent opportunity for international organized crime groups (WARDLAW, 1999). A human smuggling network was built around the masses migrating from the conflict zones of the world (or just in the hope that they will find a better life). International organized crime groups can exploit the fact that investigation of crimes and criminal justice continue to operate within the jurisdiction of nation states.

In the European concept of security, significant changes were introduced by the European Union, which brought the members states closer to each other by opening the door to the free movement of goods, services, capital, and persons. Development of telecommunication devices, the Internet, and the revolution of technology amplified this interaction. These

changes threw a different light on the problems associated with external and internal security on the continent. Some of these changes directly affect the security of people. Migrants, refugees, and applicants for asylum illegally crossing the borders have no intention to harm their target countries, rather they desire security, a better life, and success for themselves and their families. Obviously, there are also groups that have clear harmful intents: cross-border organized crime, human smuggling, drug and arms trafficking, cigarette smuggling, human trafficking, and the various forms of modern age slavery are all illegal activities that aim to maximize profit (EC, 2008). The aforesaid criminal phenomena as manifestations of organized crime have already been encountered by the law enforcement bodies of the individual countries. Intensity of the forms of cross-border crime create a new situation for the investigative and law enforcement systems of each state. It seems that militarization of the police, outlined previously as background information about the handling of crime, creates favourable conditions and the use of a “common language” in the collaboration of law enforcement organizations, special police units and certain elements of the armed forces, within and between countries.

In the global system of the division of power, the weight of Europe diminished and this trend is expected to continue in the future. The EU expanded to the geographical borders of European identity (MARSH-REES, 2012: 161.), but it was exhausted by the conflicts ensuing from the expansion. The new neighbours it gained as a result of its expansion are less secure, less accepting of the European values and norms, and are more dangerous than before (MARSH-REES, 2012). Brexit too can be attributed to this process. The interest of the USA is diverted towards territories outside Europe. When European countries analyze their own security, it is difficult to determine which priority is higher: problems posed by the recovering Russia or the North-African and Mediterranean region (BUZAN et al., 1998). Europe considered the economic influence of globalization (so far) and was subject to its effects during the crisis of 2008. However, it was only able to think in a linear way that was restricted to the influence a center exerts over the peripherals. The current process and extent of migration forces the centre to face cultural influences from the peripherals, however Europe does not seem to be sufficiently prepared for it. The reason, among other things, is that this cultural influence is associated with imagined or real security problems such as illegal immigration or the threat of terrorism. The final outcome of this process cannot be seen yet, but the issues around migration in Europe do not suggest a success story at this time...

Populism

From Le Pen to Trump, populist political rhetoric is a phenomenon that is spreading all over the world, relegating law enforcement to a role subservient to politics. “Security” and “enemy” are the core concepts in these campaigns and in political dialogue, often with completely disregard for data that can be obtained through scientific analysis and a variety of studies.

Responses in penal policy and criminal justice

Without doubt, operation of criminal justice and the magnitude of sums spent on it, technological readiness of crime control, efficiency of the penal system, and existing and missing systems of crime prevention all have an impact on the trends of crime. Technological enhancement of law enforcement (in regard to identification of persons, monitoring of drug trafficking, etc.) is one of the best investments in curbing crime.

Globalization does not only transform crime, but penal policy will “emigrate” and instruments of crime control will “immigrate” too. A crime control solution can be attractive for the government of another country, such as the “three-strikes” legislation or the introduction of neutralization among the objectives of punishment. Such “cross-talk” suggest the spreading of punitive populism (GÖNCZÖL, 2015; FLECK, 2014). Punitive populism is a penal policy which aims to meet the assumed or real expectations of the public, thereby gaining political popularity (GÖNCZÖL, 2014). Punitive populism can be blamed for the appreciation of incarceration among the punitive measures, and in certain cases the widening gap between the assumed value of the punishment and its proportionality in relation to the crime (e.g. actual life sentence). A new development, which is expected to gain momentum, is that in regard to sanctions not involving detainment (which were only related to personal characteristics) expectations of proportionality in relation to the crime have appeared. Alternative sanctions are used more frequently, but there will not be fewer prison sentences unless economic considerations begin to influence penal policy. It may also happen that penal policy will be directly affected by budgetary criteria. This process can be bi-directional: on the one hand, a strict penal policy complemented by a human rights rhetoric aiming to reduce the overcrowding of prisons may trigger a wave of prison building projects that may give a boost to the labour market and, depending on the circumstances, to the building industry.

Let us see the example of the United States: between 1979 and 2000, 137 prisons were built only in Texas. However, the maintenance costs of penal institutions may induce trends in the other direction. Prison population in the past three decades grew from 270.000 to 1.3 million, generating an outlay of 50 billion per year, with about 0.5% of the adult population serving various terms in 2007. (6% in Alabama, Mississippi, Oklahoma, and Texas, and 8.5% in Louisiana.) It is important to note that it occurred independently from criminal and detention statistics, without any correlation with them.³

Besides penal policies becoming stricter, lack of reintegration also increases prison population: according to a study made in 2011, more than 40% of the prisoners released in 2004 were back in prison by 2007. This is, of course, partly due to longer terms handed out in accordance with the mandatory sentencing requirements: for example, between 1988 and 2012, the average term served by persons incarcerated in federal prisons more than doubled, growing from 17.9 to 37.5 months (MACDONALD, 2013).⁴ We should also bear in

³ See e.g. www.cbpp.org/research/changing-priorities-state-criminal-justice-reforms-and-investments-in-education

⁴ See e.g. States Cut Prison Costs; Can Federal Government Do the Same?, Winter 2016, <http://magazine.pewtrusts.org/en/archive/winter-2016/states-cut-prison-costs-can-federal-government-do-the-same>

mind that medical services provided to inmates serving long sentences who are growing old increase costs even more.⁵

Maintenance of prisons in the USA is the third biggest budget item after education and healthcare, which grew between 1986 and 2013 from 4.7% to 7%, but amounts to more than 11% in certain states (Arizona, Michigan, Oregon, and Vermont) (MITCHELL–LEACHMAN, 2014).⁶ California built 23 prisons between 1982 and 2000, for a cost of 280 to 350 million dollars each, to address a more than 500% growth of prison population. By 2005, there were 616 inmates for every 100.000 adults, amounting to more than 6% of the adult population. In 2011, the federal supreme court⁷ ordered a reduction of the prison population to no more than 137.5% of the prison capacity. These efforts, in the end, fitted in with the government's cost reduction policies as the maintenance of prisons amounted to no less than 7% of the budget of 2013 and 2014, and in time, the conservative, often populist rhetoric demanding strict penalties subsided.⁸ In a few years, New York, New Jersey and California reduced its prison population by about a quarter (MITCHELL–LEACHMAN, 2014).

A significant change started in the responses of the state to acts of crime, and we can expect this trend to definitely continue in the future, especially as a result of European immigration and the acts of terrorism that have been committed. In this process, commission of a crime is not a mandatory prerequisite of the use of force by the state: detection of a threat, a risk assessment, or an expression of the lack of security may be enough to produce a restrictive state response. A society that focuses, in particular, on policing and risk management will put the emphasis on the elimination of threats at all costs. There is no doubt that such efforts carry a different kind of danger: the threat of leaving the criminal law behind in that even though the regulation will formally stay within the boundaries of the law, it will break away from the traditional fundamental principles and values, and in the handling of crime criminal law, in the traditional sense, is separated from the so-called "enemy criminal law". This regulatory procedure will stay with us as long as the population's fear of crime justifies it.

Fundamental principles of criminal law determine the operation of criminal justice for 200 years. At the end of the 20th century it became apparent that globalization and the postmodern state that was born from it may interpret those fundamental principles and the limits of the state's punitive powers differently (SZABÓ, 1993; GÖNCZÖL, 2002). In the past 30 years the boundary areas of criminal justice in which the lines between the competences of criminal law are getting blurred are clearly visible.

Enemy criminal law, different from civilian criminal law keeping within the limits of the rule of law and drawing on the status of law-abiding citizens as persons, basically deprives certain individuals posing an extreme threat of their status as a person, treating them merely as a source of danger who are not entitled to the guarantees of due process and other constitutional principles. This indicates a shift towards preventive, pro-active protection under criminal law and sanctioning the abstract offence of posing risk; in practice

⁵ Between 1990 and 2013, the number of incarcerated persons older than 50 years grew from 4% to 21%. www.ppic.org/main/publication_show.asp?i=702

⁶ See e.g. www.ppic.org/main/publication_show.asp?i=702

⁷ *BROWN v. PLATA*, 563 US 493 (2011)

⁸ See e.g. The 2014-15 Budget: Administration's Response to Prison Overcrowding Order, February 28, 2014, www.lao.ca.gov/reports/2014/budget/three-judge-panel/three-judge-panel-022814.aspx

this is a transition from criminal legislation to wartime (combative) legislation involving preventive or extended detention or monitoring after serving a sentence, employed mostly in the context of terrorism. The “perpetrator” in this case faces severe forms of sanctioning if s/he threatens to commit an act even though no preparations have been made to actually go through with it. Essentially enemy criminal law means that, for example, in regard to terrorism, terrorists pose such a serious threat to the society simply by their existence that moving the boundary of punishability forward is justified, that is to say protection should not be extended only to preparatory behaviours as provided by the substantive law, but prior to those behaviours, measures must be taken, if possible, against acts that will be committed, preventing them from getting into the “preparatory” phase (BARTKÓ, 2010; NAGY F., 2006). In addition to counter terrorism, enemy criminal law is also used against organized crime, and in cases of insurance fraud or against persons with a mental disorder.⁹

Extending the scope of intervention under criminal law, the use of force by the state is employed to address a growing number of phenomena. Basically this is done through legislative measures, which has a two-fold effect. On the one hand, the line between a criminal act and an act of war is removed, and the areas of operation of home defence and law enforcement get fused. This development is clearly noticeable as the police joins in the fight against terrorism. Another consequence of this phenomenon is that law enforcement agencies are getting involved to an ever increasing degree in peacekeeping operations, which, in turn, may amplify the militarization of the police. On the other hand, legislation makes less and less distinction between crimes and less severe public-order offences (misdemeanour, administrative infringements). Blurring the lines between criminal justice and law enforcement will entail the proliferation of measures typical of criminal justice in the legal basis of law enforcement, but without the guarantees of the former (NAGY M., 2012). The number of the various behaviour patterns that open up the door to the use of force by the state will rise significantly, and the number of institutions (penal institutions, border troops, local law enforcement agencies and the private security sector) operating in this field and their areas of competence will be boosted to a great extent (HÖRNQVIST, 2004). Operating principles of these organizations is only driven by the overarching logic of risk mitigation and security. The question arises if this means that the system does not function as it should or if it no longer functions as it did before.

In addition to the broadening of the scope of measures needed for providing security, we can also notice that the interpretation of security has a different target group now. Increasing overall security is losing significance; instead, priority is given to determining whose security is involved and what or who threatens it. This kind of security mentality is counterproductive as it improves security by using methods that are, in fact, reinforce the conditions threatening security, as stated by Hörnqvist (2004).

Nowadays political dialogue about public security pays less attention than it should to solutions that have a direct impact on trends in crime. The inequality of incomes is significant within the EU (EC, 2010) and in the members states, and the gap is expected to widen even further. Employment is not an assurance against poverty as job opportunities

⁹ Out of the cases heard at the European Court of Human Rights, see e.g. *Morsink v. Netherlands*, May 2004, Application No. 48865/99., *M. v. Germany*, 17 December 2009, Application no. 19359/04., *Haidn v. Germany*, 13 January 2011, Application No 6587/04. *Vinter v. United Kingdom*, 17 January 2012, Applications nos.66069/09 and 130/10 and 3896/10., *Schummer v. Germany*, 13 January 2011, Applications nos.27360/04 and 42225/07

are typically dominated by fixed term temporary job offerings in the labour market (EC, 2010). More frequently the police is expected to prevent crime in a neighbouring area. This is so because it is easier to secure funding for local initiatives if they are meant to prevent crime. However, in this form of collaboration, law enforcement expects social services ever more often to perform constant monitoring, shaping those services in their own image. “Penalization of the social sphere” is a real threat today, which is reinforced by the vision of a security providing state that arises after the dismantling of the welfare state.

Changing crime

In the coming years, global economic depression, ongoing migration between continents, deepening inequalities, crumbling constitutional frameworks, and the spreading of social media will also affect the trends and the handling of crime. It seems the most decisive change in the nearest future will not be a quantitative shift in crime but a change in its nature and its complexity. Such a change is, for example, the entanglement between wars and the organized forms of terrorism and crime. One of its most dangerous forms is human trafficking and human smuggling. Money laundering and illegal trafficking in works of art also suggest the same change as new pieces enter the illegal distribution of works of art from sites in war zones and destroyed public and private collections and then the money earned in this way is transferred back to warlords. The density of population is increasing, there are a lot of settlements in the danger zones, and climate change also augments risk factors related to human safety. We need to take serious environmental threats into account (SCHEFFRAN–BATTAGLINI, 2011).

Factors explaining the trends in crime

Based on experience gained from research, five factors can be used to provide a fairly accurate description of changes in crime trends.

1. Opportunity cost

Opportunity cost is the yield of the most probably selectable alternative, which may directly affect the possibility and the conditions of committing a crime. It includes the number of people serving in the police, the prison population numbers or the rate of unemployment. In particular, the strength of the police force and the prison population support deterrence and neutralization, and – mostly through legislation – politicians can directly influence these effects.

2. Young male population numbers

It is a well-known fact in criminology that from a statistical point of view crime is typically committed by young males. In the period between 1970 and 2008, the proportion of young males increased in European countries, followed by an exceptionally strong and sustained growth of the older population. Violent crime, just like crime itself in general, is a “male prerogative”: most of the violent crimes are committed by males (young males in the first place) against male victims. The

proportions are similar to those of the overall crime figures: 80 to 90% of the violent perpetrators are males (VIRÁG et al., 2016).

3. Migration

There are several reasons why immigrants and “natives” are involved in crime. However, there is not enough evidence related to these effects in European countries. Bianchi and his colleagues (2012) examined the relationship between migration and crime in the period between 1990 and 2003 in Italian provinces. When they analyzed data supplied by the police, they found that a 1-percent increase in the number of migrants led to a 0.1% increase in the number of registered crimes. Examining crime categories separately, they established that the correlation is the strongest in the case of crimes against property, including, in particular, robbery and theft. The next stage made the issue more complicated as variables derived from the other data of migrants entering Italy showed absolutely no causal relationship between migration and crime trends.

Today it is often emphasized in forensic literature that it is not so evident that migration should affect crime. The migrant population is heterogeneous, ranging from applicants for asylum through sponsors to economic migrants. There may be a considerable difference between migrants depending on the country where they come from, the levels of their income, and their qualifications. Not to mention that statistics may be distorted by hate crimes against migrants or refugees, for example, in a prejudiced society or a society riled up by hate campaigns. It should also be noted that the term “migrant” is not easy to handle – due to lack of suitable integration strategies, the situation and the opportunities of second or third-generation migrants who were born as local citizens, and their limited paths of progress present a special challenge.

4. Unemployment rate

According to the researchers who developed the economic model of crime (BECKER, 1968; EHRLICH, 1973), job opportunities may have an impact on the individual’s decision to get involved in criminal activities: if salary prospects do not look as good as benefits that can be earned by committing crimes, then those individuals will chose crime.

5. Frequency of prison sentences

There are significant differences between the USA and Europe, and within Europe between the Eastern and the Western countries in regard to sentencing practices and incarceration rates, with the Central-Eastern-European countries having higher rates of incarceration. It is also a fact that the frequency of handing out prison sentences is increasing across Europe (BUONANNO et al., 2011).

Forecasted characteristics of crime

Predictions made by politicians and professionals usually differ about the future trends of crime. Politicians tend to draw conclusions from a particularly serious or significant criminal act while professionals usually observe trends. For this reason, they seldom draw the same conclusions. The global decline of crime will continue in the coming years. Exceptions may

include a few acts of crime or crime categories that are given special attention by the politicians or the public (e.g. crimes against children, family violence, football hooliganism, etc.). In that regard the above mentioned changes in demographics and the markedly decreasing number of males aged 15 to 25, who commit crimes more often, according to the experience of the society, play a key role. Crimes against property will continue to involve desirable assets, although they will target electronic services, information, knowledge or personal identities more and more often. Acquisition of physical assets will rather serve for gaining access to various services, facilitating unauthorized logins, rather than obtaining the item itself. Crime is becoming more organized and even more internationalized.

Characteristics of *organized and internationally organized crime* can be summarized as follows:

- it can exploit innovations in transport and logistics enabling organized crime groups to commit crimes anonymously anytime and anywhere through the internet, without actual physical involvement;
- nanotechnology and robotics open up new markets and provide new tools for committing unlawful acts;
- big data and personal data that can be obtained through computer-based fraud allow for committing scams at a previously unimaginable scale;
- organized crime groups continue to increase their control of the recycling of electronic waste in Europe;
- increasing economic inequalities in Europe make citizens more tolerant to organized criminal activities and organized crime will be increasingly integrated into economically weak communities, thereby becoming a provider of job opportunities and services (see, for example, recruitment in organized crime, acts of usury and food usury in Eastern European countries);
- organized crime will continue to attempt to infiltrate business organizations dealing in natural resources, and act as an intermediary of these goods and resources in trade;
- internet-based crypto-currencies (e.g. bitcoin) will create more opportunities for criminal entrepreneurs presenting themselves as “freelancers” to adopt the business model of the provision of criminal services as there is no need for a well-established criminal infrastructure in order to e.g. launder money;
- organized crime keeps targeting the aging population, but it also serves them by supplying prohibited services and commodities, building a new market in this way by taking these opportunities (Europol, 2015).

Violent radicalization of organized crime and certain social classes can be observed, with the latter interacting with each other in the wider criminal economy. Tools developed for overcoming societal opposition often facilitate criminal acts. Some of the radicals or individual perpetrators use ideology to rationalize their criminal intents or the profit-oriented nature of their activities. The economic crisis and the progress that came to a dead stop provided these groups with great publicity and gave them an opportunity to recruit new members and maintain their coercive capacity.

Crime is being transformed while the decade-long decline continues

A fundamental issue in regard to forecasting crime is the period of predictability and the ability to identify the prevailing trends. Compared to international figures, crime rate in Hungary is not considered high: the number of crimes per 100.000 residents ranks the country in the middle among European states. Since the early 2000s the trend of declining crime has continued in Europe and in the United States. According to Eurostat data, the overall number of crimes registered in the EU-28 countries has been in decline since 2003. Figures of the Hungarian criminal statistics are also decreasing, and in the next years the decline in crime rates will probably continue. However, criminal statistics should only be used as a base of reference after a lot of refinement. It should be taken into account that criminal statistics exclude latent crimes such as family violence, child abuse, acts committed against minority groups, etc. Unfortunately there are no interviews with victims in Hungary that could be used to derive the figures characterizing latent crimes. Criminal infringements are also excluded from crime statistics. Overall a great flaw of Hungarian crime analysis and forecasting projects is that statistics indicating deviant behaviour are not compared to various social statistical data.

Figures of registered crimes in the developed countries started to decline a decade earlier. The decline of crime started in 1991 in the US, in 1995 in the United Kingdom, and in 2001 in France (The Economist, 2013). Based on Eurostat data it can be seen that in the 28 countries of the European Union the number of reported violent crimes dropped by 10% in the period between 2007 and 2012. A clear decline is observable in the data from the United States where FBI statistics (*Uniform Crime Reports*) in 2012 registered 37% fewer violent crimes compared to a period of two decades and 15% fewer than in 2007. There was another 4.4% drop in the number of violent crimes in 2013, with a proportional reduction in the number of homicide cases.¹⁰

The root cause of this phenomenon is debated by the professionals. According to Broadhurst, acts with catastrophic consequences for individuals, enterprises and governments have never been so easy to commit, even from the other side of the world (Broadhurst, 2006). In a given country, 80% of the cybercrimes are attacks initiated from abroad (MARSH-REES, 2012).

Decline in crime is expected to continue, but at the same time the police will need to adapt itself to the constantly changing character of crime. Increase in cross-border crime is an already well-established trend among the new developments. UN data from 2012 show that international organized crime became a business valued at 870 billion dollars by 2009, which includes a wide variety of crimes ranging from money laundering to the various methods of smuggling (human, drug, arms, counterfeit products, wild animals and animal products, protected cultural items, etc.). Computer crimes are also on the rise as part of the international organized crime (MARSH-REES, 2012). Crime is becoming more complex, affecting multiple jurisdictions and causing even more harm in this way. In addition to conventional threats, new crimes and new threats, such as interpersonal violence

¹⁰ Despite the decline, violent crime rates in the United States are still higher than in most of the European countries (VIRÁG et al., 2016).

and theft emerge. This new challenge may significantly compromise the efficiency of police intervention.

Linear trends in Hungarian criminal activities

József Kó (2013) has made an attempt at predicting crime statistics related to the trends in Hungary. In a single year in 1989 the number of crimes reported to the authorities rose by 21.6% and in the next year the highest ever rise of 51.3% was recorded in the data. The change in the rate of increase was linked in time to the change of the political system, and for this reason Kó asks the question as to what extent this change of pace can be attributed to the change of the political system and if it is possible to establish the effect of the trend of increase that seemed to be universal at the time. After the millennium, domestic crime data showed a significantly reduced rate of change. Compared to the exceptionally high figures of the 1990s, there was a significant drop in crime, followed by a slight increase in the recent years. There are a number of options to perform a mathematical analysis of registered crime data in order to study future trends. Kó used a twenty-year forecast in the calculation of his models, and outlined three models: 1. a model of exponential increase, 2. a model based on a trend of a linear increase, and 3. an exponential model

Kó stated the following (Kó, 2013):

“mathematically the most accurate fit was shown by an exponentially increasing curve as it has the highest R2 value ($R^2 = 0.84$). Experience indicates, however, that such a dynamic growth is very unlikely. The model shows a good fit to the currently available data, but its implications would be difficult to interpret. As it stands, there are no apparent signs of a significant change in the society and crime cannot be separated from its social background factors. As a result, we consider the realization of this option unlikely.

Another model which is based on a linear trend of growth also shows a good fit ($R^2 = 0.8$). There are several arguments that support the occurrence of this scenario. As we have already mentioned, data after the millennium seem to follow the previous trend of a slight linear increase that lasted until the end of the 1980s. The only problem here is the slope of the trend plot. Owing to the considerable difference in the level of data (figures around 200.000 in the 1980s are as high as 400.000 in the 2000s), the rate of increase of the trend is fairly steep. This model forecasts about 600.000 reported crimes in 2022. The probability that this model will come true is not negligible, however, there are factors that act against growth. One of these factors is the raising of the infraction limit to 50.000 forint. As a result of this amendment of the law, the number of registered crimes will decrease by 30 to 35 thousand in the next year, and this decline will continue to have an impact in the next few years.

A third exponential model predicts a much slower rate of increase, but in a mathematical sense, the fit is not so good in this case ($R^2 = 0.6$). However, the improvement of the detective work carried out by the investigative authorities makes this model slightly more probable. In the recent years, the efficiency of detective work deteriorated. Growing crime came with a reduction in the number of identified perpetrators, however, this trend is hardly sustainable in the long run.

Based on experience gained so far, the number of known perpetrators will be correlated with the lower number of detected crimes in the next years. In our opinion, the actual data will be probably between the values predicted by Model 2 and Model 3, and around 2020, 450 to 500 thousand detected crimes are expected to be registered.”

Future characteristics of crimes against property and violent crimes

According to official crime statistics, criminality against property has the largest share in registered crime, and its trend follows the changes in the overall crime rate. It is notable, however, that the forecasts differ because different factors influence the trends of certain crime categories. In the coming years, crime against property will split into two tiers: one of them includes conventional crimes that require physical contact, the other one contains new types of criminal acts against property, using electronic devices.

There is no doubt that advanced technologies will transform the traditional methods of crime against property because acquiring electronic information (e.g. credit cards, personal financial information, etc.), PIN codes, mobile phone data, etc. require different modes of operation, and will significantly increase the damage caused. Conventional crimes against property will still be dominated by theft, taking into account, in particular, the ongoing technical development efforts and miniaturization which creates exceptionally favourable conditions for stealing small-sized but highly valuable items. Items that are attractive to both consumers and perpetrators are called *hot products* after *hot spots*. These items are identified with acronyms in the literature: *CRAVED* means *Concealable, Removable, Available, Valuable, Enjoyable, Disposable* (SUTTON, 2010). The police in the US regularly warns the public that the list of stolen items is topped by electronic devices, and within the latter category, the number of mobile phone thefts shows the highest rate of growth (KSHETRI, 2013). In the light of this fact, police leaders in the US and Canada keep encouraging legislators to make laws that make it mandatory to build anti-theft devices into certain items (WINKLER, 2012). Copyrighted materials show the same dynamics; in their case, technical development is expected to focus on finding ways to reduce the possibility of illegal copying and use (MUELLER et al., 2012). In the past 25 years, fraud became the “driving segment” of crime. The conventional and new forms of this offence (computer fraud, pyramid schemes, investment fraud, etc.) will continue to characterize crime in Hungary.

In addition to conventional crimes against property, IT devices and valuables that can be acquired by using them represent dominant segment. The use of computing devices will become a typical *modus operandi* in crimes against property that target the business sphere and private entrepreneurs. Information and entertainment are increasingly associated with services that can be accessed with electronic devices, which means that the technical devices itself will be a simple point of access to the service. Access to these services (music, films, games) will be targeted as part of the crimes against property.

Interest in and fear of violent crimes, including murder and sexual violence, are attributable in the first place to the severity and consequences of these acts, and not to their proportion within crime (VIRÁG et al., 2016). Their proportion within crime in general has been in decline since the end of the eighties – in 1998 it was only 4.7% – and then it was stabilized around 8% by the end of the first decade of the 2000s. This proportion, however,

is misleading in regard to the actual trend of changes in violent crime. From the data of registered crimes it is clear that the number of known violent and disorderly acts has been increasing since 1989, exceeding 38.000 in 2010. In fifteen years, the number of crimes per 100.000 persons has doubled: In 1990, there were 196 crimes per 100.000 person, while in 2014, there were 369. Diminishing proportions were a result of the growth rate of violent crimes that lagged behind the skyrocketing overall crime rate that started at the time of the change of the political system. At the same time, while the number of all known acts of crime followed a declining trend after peaking in 1998, the rise of violent crime did not stop and it even continued in this period too.

Table 3
Number and proportion of violent and disorderly acts of crime (1970–2014)

Year	Total crimes	Violent and disorderly offences	Proportion (%)	Violent and disorderly offences/100.000 citizens
1970	122,289	16,464	13.5	160
1971	123,147	15,947	12.9	154
1972	125,399	14,566	11.6	140
1973	125,388	13,581	10.8	130
1974	111,825	13,154	11.8	126
1975	120,889	14,049	11.6	134
1976	129,424	14,795	11.4	140
1977	123,623	14,016	11.3	132
1978	126,907	13,131	10.3	123
1979	125,267	12,714	10.1	119
1980	130,470	13,196	10.1	123
1981	134,914	14,565	10.8	136
1982	139,795	14,290	10.2	133
1983	151,505	16,743	11.1	156
1984	157,036	18,099	11.5	169
1985	165,816	17,598	10.6	165
1986	182,867	18,967	10.4	178
1987	188,397	17,791	9.4	168
1988	185,344	16,283	8.8	154
1989	225,393	17,043	7.6	161
1990	341,061	20,383	6	196
1991	440,370	23,078	5.2	223
1992	447,222	24,503	5.5	237
1993	400,935	24,574	6.1	238
1994	389,451	26,035	6.7	253

1995	502,036	25,731	5.1	251
1996	466,050	24,674	5.3	242
1997	514,403	26,987	5.2	265
1998	600,621	28,414	4.7	280
1999	505,716	28,277	5.6	280
2000	450,673	29,144	6.5	290
2001	465,694	30,821	6.6	302
2002	420,782	31,214	7.4	307
2003	413,343	31,486	7.6	310
2004	418,883	33,366	8	330
2005	436,522	32,760	7.5	324
2006	425,941	29,728	7	295
2007	426,914	29,645	6.9	295
2008	408,407	33,035	8.1	329
2009	394,034	32,048	8.1	319
2010	447,185	38,445	8.6	384
2011	451,371	37,201	8.2	373
2012	472,236	37,368	7.9	375
2013	377,829	36,307	9.6	366
2014	329,575	36,413	11	369

Source: ENyÜBS

In mass criminality in Hungary there are still no threatening new effects that would concern society. A further reduction in registered crimes can be expected, and the current situation in which interpersonal acts (violent crimes and crimes against property) dominate the trends of known crimes will not change until the 2020s.

Changing trends in crime

As mentioned above, computers and the Internet change the characteristics of crime against property profoundly. Obviously computerization also changes the distribution of perpetrators as only criminals who are knowledgeable about software can benefit from the new opportunities. For them, even committing conventional crimes against property (e.g. fraud) offers greater returns. However, organized crime groups attack service providers and often they use organized methods to collect data required for their criminal activities. The popularity of electronic transfers and the spreading of e-commerce can make these systems particularly vulnerable to such intrusions.

Committing highly profitable crimes (e.g. illegal waste dumps, trafficking in arms and hazardous chemical substances, human smuggling, human trafficking) requires more intensive organization efforts. Corporate crime that used to be the arena of corporate em-

ployees is becoming more organized and to an ever greater extent it is complemented by a network of external connections. In particular, the bank sector creates favourable conditions for organized offences. Crime in the future will be less restricted by borders and typically it will become transnational. The best prepared criminal groups satisfy demand appearing in the world market, exploiting the flaws and deficiencies of the regulatory frameworks of nation states and the limited jurisdiction of their regulatory powers.

A special segment of crime is the criminal acts committed by the “powers that be”. The crimes of people who are privileged either politically or economically – the so-called white collar crime – is rooted in the economy and it is closely related to the objective of gaining more social and political power. According to the findings of research projects, white collar crime can amount to 10% of all crimes against property and 40% of economic crimes (KRÁNITZ, 1995). Wealth is concentrated rapidly over the world. In the upper echelons of the society, the limitless growth of revenues and the extreme concentration of wealth pose a real threat to the meritocratic values and social justice of democratic societies. Globalization clearly increases inequalities in wealth and in social structures it puts millions at a disadvantage. The direct correlation between this effect and criminality has been known for a long time as structural inequalities foreshadow the potential spreading of crime and violence (BLAU–BLAU, 1982, quoted by: IRK, 2013).

PIKETTY (2015) used data from the past 300 years to study inequalities inherent in the workings of capitalism. He confirmed that return on equity is always higher than the rate of economic growth. Before the 19th century, return on equity was around 4 or 5%, while the rate of growth remained below 1%, and probably the same situation will occur in the 21st century: return of equity will be 4 or 5% again, while the rate of growth calculated for the long term will barely exceed 1.5%. This mechanism puts wealthy social classes that can accumulate capital in a privileged position. Evaluation of economic crime rates is still almost impossible on the basis of official criminal statistics, in part because of the high latency, in part due to inconsistent regulations, and in part due to difficulties of obtaining proof. Describing corruption closely related to economic activities poses a similar challenge and so does forecasting its future trends.

In the case of first and second-generation information technology crimes we can simply remove the internet from the equation – despite this move the crime remains feasible, however, different channels will have to be used to obtain the desired information or to perform organization. In contrast, modern age third-generation *sui generis* information technology crimes would not exist without the internet (WALL, 2008; quoted by: PARTI–KISS, 2016). As we have already discussed, Internet is a technology that, in part, facilitates the commission of conventional crimes and, in part, creates opportunities for finding new ways to commit crimes. Sexual harassment or blackmail committed using an Internet based device can cause exceptionally severe financial and moral damages to the victim. In many cases, the perpetrator has no idea that whatever is uploaded to the Internet cannot be deleted ever. In the future, the young generation’s lack of moral and ethical preparedness may significantly increase damages caused by acts of crime on the Internet. Victimology studies confirm that victims can play a role in triggering certain crimes. It is especially true for participation in online community spaces where members share their personal data themselves. It is expected that possession of devices representing an ever increasing level of technology without any actual knowledge of their operation will contribute to an increase in IT crime rates.

Drug problems and crime were linked to each other in the 1960s. In Hungary consumption of drugs appeared in the 1970s, first as the consumption of a combination of various medicines and spirits, followed by the use of cheap replacements for classical hallucinogens. Technical development also left its mark on the drug scene; increasingly dangerous new psychoactive substances were placed on the market. To so-called designer drugs are untested substances of unknown composition and mode of action – often the dealer does not know what it is they sell. Synthetic drugs such as “herbal” or “bioweed” which, despite what its name suggests, is synthesized in drug laboratories and mixed with plant scraps are becoming popular. In a single year the proportion of those who have tried the synthetic drug called “herbal” at least once rose by 5% in Hungary, according to the most recent data of Global Drug Survey (GDS) (Winstock et al., 2016). Professionals argue that use of designer drugs should be considered so-called “poverty drug use”. An ever increasing number of people from the most marginalized classes turn to these substances that are cheaper than alcohol. Synthetic weed is frequently ordered on the Internet. As Miklós Lévay and Ildikó Ritter point out (LÉVAY–RITTER, 2016):

“[The data] indicate that all phenomena associated with drug problems that are present in most of the European countries can also be found in Hungary. Compared to the drug situation in the more developed European countries, however, the key difference is that (although it is difficult to estimate how wide spread the phenomenon is) in all likelihood only a small part of the Hungarian population is involved in the drug problem. Another difference is that in Hungary the drug situation has less influence on crime rates and public security compared to what is experienced in the majority of the Western-European states. [...] 2013 was the first year when the proportion of seized new synthetic drugs exceeded the proportion of seized »classical« drugs. The seized amounts of herbal substances containing synthetic cannabinoids have been increased since 2010, but only exceeded the seized amounts of marijuana in 2013. The increasing frequency of encountering new drugs and the partial loss of market share of classical drugs (e.g. marijuana, heroin, cocaine, amphetamine) indicate the reorganization of the drug market.”




Figure 1

Percentages of the number of drug seizures

Source: Tamás CSESZTREGI, <http://444.hu/2015/06/11/a-herbal-felzabalta-magyarorszagot/>

In the age of globalization, criminality also operates internationally. Unrestricted movement across borders, cross-border crime, and organization of criminal networks forces criminal justice to change its paradigms (CASTELLS, 2007). Trends in terrorism and in domestic and international organized crime are also noteworthy. The fight against crime is becoming globalized, even though it is undeniable that criminal justice works best within the framework of nation states. Ever more often the police encounters new forms of crime and/or threatening consequences of social/environmental changes that it is not prepared to handle and which require a complex and collaborative response.

ANDREAS and NADELMANN (2006) considers two trends as determinants which influence the complexity of the international system of crime control. The first one is that law enforcement and national security organizations act together in the fight against terrorism; the second one is that a transatlantic security community has been formed in which cooperation is furthered by associations of law enforcement agencies and a network of relationships, and which is also supported by a system of intensifying transnational police cooperation and agreements.

Future criminals and victims

In the future households, persons, business ventures, and governmental and local governmental institutions will fall victim to crime. Demographic makeup of the population will also play a role in this case. Forecasts indicate that the population of people older than 60 years will increase significantly. Aging of the population has been clearly noticeable in the data for some time now, and this steady trend will continue in the next 20 years. The population will remain the target of crimes against property, especially because the development of high-value but highly miniaturized technical devices continues. According to data from the year 2014, victims of crimes against property are typically adults (65%) and elderly people (24%). The exposure of the elderly is signified by the fact that as perpetrators their involvement in crime against property is only 3%, while as victims it is close to 25% (ROSTA, 2016). Among perpetrators, the dominant age group is still the risk taking 15 to 25-year olds who are typically divided into two groups: those who usually commit conventional crimes and those who resort to more advanced methods and have higher level skills in the field of cybercrime.

The first group is not so different from the current category of conventional young criminals: their members tend to belong to the lower classes of the society and are embedded in an environment burdened with a lot of dysfunctions, they did not perform too well in school and got involved on several occasions with child protection or law enforcement services. Furthermore, this group is responsible for committing simple crimes against property, breaking and entering or thefts from cars. The emergence of a new knowledge-based economy and the rise of new technologies have a disproportionate impact on disadvantaged classes of the society, and groups who lag behind in the process of acquiring specific types of knowledge get excluded from the more profitable categories of crime.

Groups of skilled young middle-class people with technological savvy can put this knowledge to use by committing unlawful acts. The average citizen is getting better at using technical devices but less and less familiar with their principles of operation. This may

create an excellent situation for malicious and well-prepared perpetrators. As a result, the exposure of the elderly age groups to risks is expected to increase and so is the frequency of scams committed against older people. Demographic trends show that the risk of the elderly population becoming victimized will rise in the next 10 to 15 years.

Effects of crime in the future

Financial and other consequences of crime are not negligible even today. Damage caused by crime in 1989 was 3.9 million forints, and the highest amount of damage, 153.7 billion forints, was recorded in 2003 (ROSTA, 2016). Practical experience shows that only a fraction of the damage is recovered. Crime against property includes not only damage involving personal effects and property, but affects a situation regulated in an already established way and the existing system of social relations (KORINEK, 2010: 140). In order to protect the mental hygiene of the society, it is important to notice that certain forms of crime against property (e.g. reaping of produce, theft of livestock, etc.) cause serious damage to solidarity between individuals and social groups, because not only a valuable asset gets stolen but also the product of a serious investment of labour (KEREZSI, 2007).

The changing management system

Trends in crime can be predicted on the basis of economic and social changes and the relationship between the players of the security and protection sectors. The increasingly multicultural character of terrorism and population, the changes in the mix of age groups, and other effects of technical progress and globalization will also influence the characteristics of crime and the system of crime control. In regard to the complex system of factors affecting the phenomenon of crime, the question is rather what elements on the list of priorities should be taken into account.

Cutting edge technology and crime control

At the end of the 20th century and the start of the 21st century, high-end technology made its debut in crime control. The change in the global political situation made it necessary to find a “target market” that needs the advances in high-end technology and can use them too. Nowadays, crime control is an excellent playground for high-end development. First, due to technological upgrades (e.g. the roll-out of geographic information systems or GIS) that can be used to investigate crime, second, through the development and deployment of new devices needed in the fight against terrorism that require further development themselves (iris diagnostics, Echelon system), and third, the other areas of criminal justice (e.g. enforcement of sanctions) and crime prevention can also serve as a target market (KEREZSI, 2009). This is how new generations of mobile phones and personal surveillance devices suitable for satellite tracking are added to the assets of the electronic personal tracking

systems. High-end technology upgrades are particularly useful in the security industry and in property protection.

The quick spreading of security cameras is one of the visible signs of technical development. The constantly upgraded versions of these devices are expected to monitor public and private spaces in ever greater numbers in the future. The system of security cameras is an investment that offers a good return indeed, but leaves the questions unanswered whether or not these devices are suitable for improving security in an era of transition and whether by using them the requirements of reducing crime and those of public security and human rights can be met through their use (SHELDON, 2011).

Security provided law enforcement agencies versus private security

The existence of the private security sector is the proof that citizens are not satisfied with the level of security guaranteed by the state, and for this reason they take security in their own hands, taking back a right that they had delegated to the state in the past. The private security sector saw a significant growth in North-America and in Europe in the middle of the 20th century, but exponential growth was observed in the past three decades. By the end of 1996 there were almost 600 hundred employees working in the security sector in the then-15 member states of the European Union. Private security was the second source of protection in European countries, but it was already ranked first in Canada, the USA, and Australia. But the absolute champion of the security industry is South-Africa (WAARD, 1999). For example, between 1991 and 2001 in Canada the private security and private investigation sector grew by 69% (BROWN, 2006: 2.). Beyond conventional private security activities (such as night-time guard service or private investigation), the Canadian private security sector assumed roles such as the deportation and guarding of migrants (PRATT, 2005), surveillance of passengers at airports (LIPPERT–O'CONNOR, 2003), and investigation of certain economic crimes (WILLIAMS, 2005). Hungarian private security companies are also expected to start moving in that direction, but for now the beefed up staff numbers at the police and other law enforcement bodies seem to satisfy the increased demand for security.

The migration of professionals whose training was financed by public funds from the public security service sector to the private sector became a common phenomenon and so did the proliferation of private security services. At the end of the 1960s in the USA almost twice the number of professional police officers were active than the number of employees in the private security services sector, but in the past decades the trend was clearly reversed (SKLANSKY, 2006). Today, employees of private security companies guard various industrial facilities, financial institutions, office buildings, transports, sports facilities, shopping centres, and even entire shopping and residential districts. An average middle-class US citizens will more often encounter a security guard than a police officer. For example, according to official data, in 2004 in the USA there were 43 thousand (contracted and full-time) private investigator jobs while the number of security guards was slightly more than 1 million compared to 842 thousand police jobs, including detective jobs too.

Today the private sector is a dominant part of the security industry. Based on data from the Hungarian National Police (ORFK), there were 127 thousand valid bodyguard and property guard identity cards in 2015 in Hungary. The actual number of active employees

is made up of 75 thousand bodyguard and property guards and 1600 private investigators, with about 3000 companies involved in private security (CHRISTIÁN, 2015). The number of persons working as security guards is one and the half time that of the number of professional police officers, which is 48 thousand currently.

A criticism aimed at private service providers gaining ground in the field of law enforcement claims that they cause a shortage of labour in the public sphere, and as a result the tax money spent on their training is wasted. The most frequently expressed criticism claims that even though they attend to their duties more efficiently than the state, but the scope of their services is obviously limited to what their customers motivated by business considerations expect. By protecting metropolitan locations, shopping centres, and residential areas, the player of the Hungarian security industry provide services to the favoured classes of the society that are willing and able to pay for them. We should not forget, however, the not so favoured groups of the society. They are not users of these services, rather they constitute the target group that must be monitored by security companies, most often on behalf of local governments. We could also refer to the order placed with the security company that patrols the "Avas" residential district in Miskolc and the establishment of "guarded" zones in the city of Budapest. Another example involves a local government mandate given to a security company after the closure of apartments vacated at the Dzsumbuj district due to constant evictions, to prevent the return of unlawful occupants. This means that security guards do not protect only the members of the favoured or privileged classes, but they also monitor the people who belong to disadvantaged social groups. This is how poverty turns into a state of helplessness (KEREZSI, 2013).

Alienation of law enforcement bodies

In European countries outsourcing, privatization and subcontracting of security-related operations to other public, private or profit-oriented organizations working in the field of security is becoming typical. In our domestic system, the reallocation of the rules of jurisdiction to various law enforcement agencies or the transfer of certain powers to local governmental law enforcement agencies and the civil guard is a fact. In this process, plurality of police work will be more evident, similar to the strengthening of the professional model.

In our opinion, there is a good chance that in the next decade a professional police model that uses technical equipment in a wide variety of applications and adapts itself more readily to increasingly militant expectations will be reinforced. This process will increase control over the community and maybe get rid of the ideological undertones of a community police that had been so difficult to interpret. This represents a return to a narrower interpretation of professional police activities, which, in turn, means increased intrusion into the citizens' lives, transitioning from surveillance to a wider lifestyle-control. Regardless of how much we disapprove of it, it is forecasted that this trend will gain momentum. At the same time we also need to point out that the approach which regards the police as an organization above/outside the social structures is incorrect. There is a great need for sociology-based studies of the operation, composition and practices of the police. We do not think that defining the social mission of the police would be "outdated" because the police is not just a law enforcement agency. Its community tasks involve the provision of

security and peace and the promotion of crime-prevention measures, no matter how little the current social conditions support this approach.

This topic is related to the alienation of law enforcement from certain groups of the society. For the social workers and teachers involved, the obligation to report the suspicion of terrorism presents a serious dilemma in communities where mutual trust constitutes the foundation of work. Working in minority communities and migrants coming from a different culture poses extra challenges to the professionals. Politics may reject multiculturalism, but it remains the reality for society. Adopting sensitive and non-discriminative rules of procedure is of utmost importance. In regard to the efficiency (and legality) of ethnic profiling, the risk of alienating the communities of minorities is a frequently used argument because it is an important consideration in crime prevention and law enforcement (including conventional law enforcement and national security policy). A community law enforcement model that has been widely recognized for several decades is based on the recognition of fact that local police duties (or national security tasks) can be more efficiently performed with the active cooperation of the population; the police organization functions correctly if the community regards it not as a hostile, unjust and oppressive power, but as a protector of peaceful law-abiding people where the real enemy is the criminal.

Institutional discrimination

Discrimination and exclusion implemented and maintained in cooperation with law enforcement is an extremely complex phenomenon. For example, structural discrimination (PAP, 2015) is not a legal concept but a notion used in social sciences, which refers to a universal systemic form of exclusion that goes beyond the operation of the individual, sometimes broadly interpreted institutions. It draws the attention to the fact that exclusion became a permanent part of the various forms of social contact, and may be based on recurring habits and behaviour patterns that take the form of attitudes, norms, values and choices of values, and causes certain groups to be put at a systemic disadvantage. In addition to not requiring any detectable individual exclusionary behaviour patterns or intents, it cannot be detected in the formal rules regulating the practices of certain social institutions.

In the USA, “three-strike” laws that specifically disadvantage African-Americans or the peculiar codification practices of drug laws are described as institutionalized discrimination. In regard to its purport, the concept of institutional discrimination means more or less what the Hungarian ombudsman for minority rights wrote in regard to the *National Strategy for Social Inclusion and Roma Integration*: “Institutional discrimination is not necessarily a result of an intentionally discriminative procedure or mindset, but from an institutional mode of operation and institutional culture that ignores the situation and considerations of those members of the society whose ability to protect their interests is compromised. Institutional operation [...] without suitable means may also augment institutional discrimination.”¹¹

¹¹ Position of the Parliamentary Commissioner for the Rights of National and Ethnic Minorities concerning the draft document entitled *National Strategy for Social Inclusion and Roma Integration*. www.kisebbsegombudsman.hu/hir-702-nemzeti-es-etnikai-kisebbseg-jogok.html

We can find examples of institutional discrimination in the Hungarian practices too. The Commissioner for Fundamental Rights and the deputy commissioner for the protection of the rights of minorities living in Hungary initiated a comprehensive joint investigation into the official control practices of the law enforcement agencies of the local government of the town Miskolc. The report found that¹² the Law Enforcement Agency performed control operations in cooperation with different local government agencies¹³ simultaneously at scheduled dates and times and along pre-selected roads, in a joint and combined manner, often in the form of a massive shakedown – without any specific legal authority – in segregated residential districts of Miskolc.

Systemic under-classification of hate crimes resulting in an investigation conducted, and in charges being laid, on the basis of different and less severe facts¹⁴ or if police officers and judges talk to marginalized persons, defendants or witnesses in interrogation rooms or at courts in an impolite or condescending manner can also be regarded as institutionalized discrimination (STUMMER–STUMMER, 2014).

Roma policy in law enforcement

Forecasts of public security should also address Roma policies. We do not believe that the situation in which migrant communities from different cultural background will avoid Hungary in the long run. For this reason, the political and public policy approach that currently prescribed law enforcement practices for dealing with the only major minority is particularly concerning (PAP, 2015). The Hungarian state defines the Roma community in an essentialist way that could be characterized by the terms “neo-racism” and “culturalism”. The documents that describe ethnicity based conflicts do not refer to actual ethnical conflicts but conflicts that have been ethnicized by this approach, while they also ethnicize the approach based on the “culture of poverty” (SZUHAY, 1999) which is problematic in itself (KORINEK, 2006; KEREZSI et al., 2010). This is caused, among other things, by the fact that the legislator and the government chose to adopt documents and rhetoric created in a migration-based

¹² See the joint comprehensive investigation of the Commissioner for Fundamental Rights and the Deputy Parliamentary Commissioner for the Rights of National and Ethnic Minorities concerning the joint control practices coordinated by the Law Enforcement Agency of the Local Government of Miskolc, the local housing regulation, and other measures affecting access to housing, adopted by the Local Government of Miskolc, and amendments to local regulations of settlements in the neighbourhood of Miskolc; Joint Report no. AJB-1474/2014.

¹³ The investigation was joined by the Family Assistance and Child Welfare Service (which is not authorized to conduct official investigations pursuant to the Act XXXI of 1997 on the Protection of Children and the Administration of Guardianship); organizational units of the office of the mayor (e.g. head of the healthcare and social department, chairman of the healthcare and social committee, spokesperson, public security rapporteur); the Police Headquarters of Miskolc; ÉMÁSZ; District Public Health Institution of the District Office of Miskolc; District Guardianship Office of the District Office of Miskolc; Digi Ltd.; Miskolci Városgazda Városgazdálkodási Kht.; MIVÍZ Ltd. and MIHÓ Ltd.

¹⁴ According to the Workgroup Against Hate Crimes, perpetrators of violent crimes against members of groups which are the most vulnerable to hate crimes, including the Roma people, members of LGBTQ communities, refugees, migrants, Jews and homeless people are often either not indicted at all or they are charged with crimes other than hate crimes in Hungary. www.gyuloletellen.hu/aktualitasok/tasz-allaspont-gyulolet-buncselekményekrol

Western-European multicultural environment that differs from domestic conditions, which proved to be inadequate when applied to the Hungarian Roma community. In part, it is due to an incoherent and inconsistent representation of the Hungarian Roma community in public law, as minority self-governments defined as the repository of cultural identity were channelled into public policy institutions for social integration which also covers the area of law enforcement. Public policy documents regard conflicts as cultural, and for this reason minority self-governments are the institutional partners for law enforcement authorities in education, crime prevention, law enforcement and penitentiary matters.¹⁵

Local crime prevention

Changes are expected to take place in local crime prevention: the instruments available to crime prevention will rely increasingly on suppressive techniques and on the control and identification of dangerous locations and groups of persons. Security appears to be emphasized as an organizing principle in local services. Local problems will be evaluated more and more as law enforcement and security issues. However, using arguments that are dominated by claims about lack of security is not the best way to build a balanced community. The police must not be an active part of the conditions in which the community prospers, but we must realize that this is just a minor element of a wider framework that sustains communities that are capable of progressing.

New generation of police officers career at the police

Changes are taking place in the organizational and operational culture of the police. The new generation of police officers have different views about police activities. Today, young people are more prepared, more ambitious, and more impatient to achieve results, and they change jobs and professions more quickly and more frequently during their careers. They have a different attitude towards the hierarchical structure of the organization and these new characteristics must be recognized by the organization too. Due to the phasing out of the early retirement option, it is becoming a tempting alternative for the personnel to switch not after the end of their formal law enforcement career but earlier, to start a career in private security by leaving the police.

Lack of understanding and/or regulating the Hungarian crime control system

There is no doubt that terrorism, an increasingly multicultural population, mass migration, changes in the distribution of the population among age groups, the technological revolution

¹⁵ Summary Report of the Thematic Workgroup for Roma Matters operating within the framework of the Human Rights Workgroup, issued in 2015 about 478 agreements concluded in 2015 between the police and various Roma local governments. 11.

as well as other effects of globalization will strongly influence the system of crime control in the next two or three decades. By now the causes of crime and the possibilities of influencing it are far removed from the competences of conventional justice, however it does not mean that criminal justice may give up its values that manifest themselves in the due process.

In the following points we summarized deficiencies in research, knowledge and regulation that should be eliminated to reinforce the system of crime control:

- A lot of information related to public security is missing from criminal statistics. Such information include infringements and data related to petty crimes. Criminologists have been arguing for the necessity of researching latent crimes for many years.
- Data about victims, that is, national and regular victimology studies are painfully lacking. This kind of information gather is not superfluous even if there are refined and accurate official criminal statistical data. In the possession of such data, it is possible to verify trends that appear in criminal statistics, but these data can also verify, in part, the functioning of the crime control system (e.g. reported but unregistered cases).
- There are no investigations regarding the expenses of the judicial proceedings. Without such data, we can win a Pyrrhic victory as the outlays intended to curb crime may be higher than the damage caused by crime itself. Such investigations were carried out in the past years as rare exceptions (VÁRADI-MÁRK, 2015; KEREZSI et al., 2011; GYÓRFI-VÁRADI, 2016). Lack of studies concerning the effectiveness of justice is a similar problem (HACK, 2008; FARKAS, 2002).

In the fight against crime, politicians seldom look beyond the exercising of rights and the punishment, while several other targeted policy measures could also be effective. There is a lot of evidence that better qualifications, higher standards in education will definitely reduce crime rates. In addition, extensive research in law enforcement should be conducted as the global spreading of populist rhetoric is built on the notions of and the public policy dialogue about threat, security, and public order without reflection, criticism or reliance on scientific analyses and explanations.

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