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EU GOVERNANCE TRENDS – DILEMMAS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE VISEGRAD COUNTRIES

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INTRODUCTION

This study is interested in the changing structure of European integration. First it attempts to briefly outline the past and recent trends and challenges of EU governance and on the basis of those developments offers some scenarios that can be expected in the near future. In the light of the governance trends and potential scenarios it finally formulates some modest recommendations for the high-level policy-makers of the Visegrad countries. The aim of those recommendations is to contribute to an eventual joint position of the four countries while shaping the future of the European Union.

EU GOVERNANCE: PAST AND RECENT TRENDS AND CHALLENGES

Governance issues have been on the agenda of European integration from the outset. In 1949, when the Council of Europe was founded, the battle between the federalists and the intergovernmentalists ended with the victory of the latter group. Two years later, when the European Coal and Steel Community Treaty was signed, the dilemma was circumvented again: not a top-down federation but a special kind of supranational integration was launched. This however was meant to lead in the longer run to a kind of a bottom-up European federation. Ever since the 1950s (with the birth of all three founding Treaties) we usually speak about a *sui generis* Community or now Union. This means a special alliance of states where an increasing part of national sovereignty is being transferred to the supranational level where it is pooled and exercised in common via the institutions. This sui generis system has been characterised by an important evolution of the institutional balance among the European Commission, the Council and the European Parliament, accompanied by an equally spectacular evolution of Community law ever since the 1964 Costa/ENEL case introducing the primacy of EC (now EU) law. In the integration process, the Maastricht Treaty represented a quantum leap as the EC/EU became responsible, in one way or another, for many areas well beyond market integration and resembling the responsibilities of a federal state. These ambitious changes (i.e. economic and monetary union, internal security issues, foreign policy, etc.) however have not been accompanied by a thorough institutional reform resembling a kind of a federal state.
Thus since the first half of the 1990s, as a response to the deepening launched by the Maastricht Treaty and also with a view to the upcoming historical enlargement, this challenge has been addressed by European leaders who proposed different solutions to it. One of the best known ideas was the Schäuble-Lahmers initiative in 1994 about the future structure of European integration. In this paper¹ the authors – as representatives of the German Christian Democratic party alliance (CDU/CSU) – argued for the establishment of a so-called hard core, composed of those introducing the single currency, which would have a pulling effect on the other member states temporarily outside of it. At the same time, the initiative also emphasised the importance of subsidiarity including an eventual repatriation of competences from European to national levels. Another important milestone in the common thinking about the future of the EU was the model presented by then foreign minister of Germany, Joschka Fischer in 2000, in a speech at the Humboldt University.² This concept urged the willing and able member states to re-establish the EU on a federal basis with new structures. This “centre of gravity” would be open to the rest of the member countries.

This proposal paralleled with Jacques Delors’ concept on a federation of nation states. In his various speeches/interviews in the 1990s, Mr. Delors referred to federalism as a method of organising competences between the EU and the member states and not as an attempt to build up the United States of Europe. “A federal structure is the only kind of structure that could boost our clout with the rest of the world, yet without weakening either the nation state or member countries’ domestic democracy. It clearly sets out who is responsible for doing what.”³ Delors also recognised the importance of differentiation within an ever widening Union.

It has to be admitted that in 2013 most of those ideas are still relevant, as there are indeed tendencies towards the formation of a hard core along the single currency (with a kind of parallel structures between the ins and outs) while the issue of subsidiarity is also being recurrently emphasised in the debate about the future of the EU. To what extent will these developments lead to a federative structure for the eurozone or in the longer run for the whole Union, remains to be seen.

It seems logical that most of the proposed EU models originated in Germany and France, but other concepts of other nations can be equally valid and relevant. In this respect it has to be emphasised that the European Convention – with the participation of representatives of 28 nations and of the main EU institutions – was so far the best forum to discuss and harmonise those concepts at the EU level. Even though the member states adopted the Constitutional

¹ Schäuble–Lahmers (1994)
² Fischer (2000)
Treaty with only minor changes made to the Convention’s draft, finally it did not pass in two referenda in 2005. Instead, we now have the Lisbon Treaty (namely the Treaty on the European Union, TEU, and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, TFEU).

The Lisbon Treaty actually preserved the initial sui generis nature of the EU where different policy areas are being governed with different intensity/methods at the EU level. In fact, most of the policies were grouped into exclusive, shared or complementary competences which can be carried out via the so-called Community method, while some areas that did not fit into these categories are being managed either via coordination (economic and employment policies) or via intergovernmental decision-making (foreign affairs, security and defence policy). The Lisbon Treaty did not bring substantial deepening about, and it also preserved the existing institutional structure with several innovations however (e.g. permanent President of the European Council, High Representative-Vice President, ordinary legislative procedure as a rule, reforms in the size of the Commission and the voting mechanism in the Council).

While – along the lines of the Constitutional Treaty – the Lisbon Treaty did not (want to) create a federal Europe, it reinforced its federative nature to some extent (e.g. the “bicameral” system thanks to the ordinary legislative procedure, or the position of the “foreign minister”). On the other hand, it continues to guarantee the Treaty-based framework for differentiation (Art. 20 of TEU on enhanced cooperation) while it also introduced the possibility of repatriation of competences (Art. 48 of TEU on ordinary revision procedure) as well as that of leaving the Union (Art. 50 of TEU) – features not typical for federations. Despite the lack of a fully fledged federal structure, the Constitutional Treaty failed in two referenda and the Lisbon Treaty in one – pointing to alarming legitimacy challenges. This fact combined with growing Euroscepticism must be an important lesson for those who would like to push for “more Europe” in terms of both competences and institutional restructuring, even if in the name of more transparency, democracy and efficiency.

Hardly did the Lisbon Treaty enter into force, the most serious financial and economic crisis ever hit the European Union. The crisis is still with us and it actually has two parallel impacts on European integration: a centripetal one (pushing for deeper cooperation in some key areas than ever before) and a centrifugal one (UK’s reservations about membership, growing Euroscepticism among EU citizens and the rise of Eurosceptic parties). The reason is simple: as mentioned, since the Maastricht Treaty, but more intensively since the crisis, the EU increasingly behaves like a state while it still suffers from legitimacy gaps. Thus, even if the EU is not and will never become a state, due to its mounting functions – recently including the politically so sensitive area of national fiscal policies – it has to close the legitimacy gap. As
this tension is being felt for a long time by analysts (e.g. Hix, 2008, Sarduski, 2013) and recently also by EU leaders, the issue of a more democratic political union is being discussed more intensely than ever before. The debate is once again about the future structures and governance of the Union which should also be able to respond to both the centripetal and the centrifugal pressures. A further challenge is to have such a system which would enable fast and efficient decision-making within and not outside the Treaty-based mechanisms. And last but not least – as Figure 1 warns – the confidence of the EU citizens in the Union must also be regained as fast as possible.

**Figure 1**

In general, does the EU conjure up for you a very positive, fairly positive, neutral, fairly negative or very negative image?

![Image](image.png)

*Source: Standard Eurobarometer 79, Spring 2013, First results, p. 10.*

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**THE PAST FEW YEARS IN TERMS OF GOVERNANCE**

Since the outbreak of the crisis, the EU has been using mixed methods and instruments to tackle it and there has been a boom of new institutions, legislation and financial tools proposed/created. Here the centripetal and centrifugal forces became visible. On the one hand, all the member states were united in some initiatives to tackle the crisis and work together (e.g. European Semester, Europe 2020 Strategy, Six-pack, Two-pack), on the other hand, there were initiatives not supported by all members (Euro Plus Pact, Fiscal Compact) and again others not involving everybody (e.g. European Stability Mechanism Treaty, Single Surveillance
Mechanism). Table 1 shows the main building blocks of the EU’s response to the crisis in terms of governance. It also shows the great variety of instruments and implementation methods used.

**Table 1**
Main measures taken by the EU since 2010 to tackle the crisis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of measure or new institution</th>
<th>Legal basis</th>
<th>Aim</th>
<th>Method of implementation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Europe 2020 Strategy</td>
<td>European Council Conclusions (no Treaty-provision)</td>
<td>Gradual compliance with the five headline targets across the EU in terms of average levels</td>
<td>Coordination: EU-level benchmarking, national target setting and implementation (27 MS)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Semester</td>
<td>Art. 121 and 148 of TFEU</td>
<td>Strict coordination of national economic and fiscal policies according to a fixed calendar</td>
<td>Coordination at EU level, weak role of EP (27 MS)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Six-pack Two-pack</td>
<td>Art. 121, 126, 136 of TFEU</td>
<td>Ensuring public finance stability via a complex set of preventive and corrective rules concerning both public budgets and debts</td>
<td>Community method with specific features (incl. use of scoreboard, reversed QMV* on sanctions) (27MS, but sanctions only for 17MS)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Treaty on the Stability, Coordination and Governance of EMU (TSGC or Fiscal Compact)</td>
<td>TSCG – a new intergovernmental treaty (with aim to become part of EU law)</td>
<td>Balanced budget rule: structural budgets to have a 0.5% deficit (guaranteed by a national legal basis) if not: CJ** decision, sanctions; Public debts: reduction benchmark</td>
<td>Semi-intergovernmental cooperation involving several EU institutions and binding rules (25 MS)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Euro Plus Pact</td>
<td>Euro Plus Pact a new intergovernmental agreement</td>
<td>Stronger coordination of labour market, pensions, health care, social security and direct taxation policies</td>
<td>Intergovernmental cooperation involving euro area + other member states (23MS)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Financial Stability Mechanism/Facility (EFSM, EFSF)</td>
<td>Art. 122.2. of TFEU</td>
<td>Temporary mechanisms for financial assistance with total lending capacity of €500 bn., collecting money via bonds, lending to EU members</td>
<td>Semi-intergovernmental decision-making EFSM: 27 MS EFSF: 17 MS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Stability Mechanism (ESM)</td>
<td>ESM Treaty and amended Art. 136 of TFEU</td>
<td>Permanent mechanism replacing the EFSM and EFSF with a lending capacity of €500 bn., financing primarily of governments and banks in euro area</td>
<td>Semi-intergovernmental with Commission, ECB and CJ** involved, but no role of EP (17MS)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB), EBA, ESMA, EIOPA***</td>
<td>Art. 114 of TFEU</td>
<td>Macro-prudential and micro-prudential supervision of financial services across the EU to prevent malfunctions</td>
<td>Monitoring, supervision, recommendations (27 MS)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Single Surveillance Mechanism (SSM) and Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM) (in the pipeline)</td>
<td>Art. 127.6. of TFEU</td>
<td>To have a “strict and impartial supervisory oversight, thus contributing to breaking the link between sovereigns and banks and diminishing the probability of future systemic banking crisis”4</td>
<td>Bank supervision and control (in 17+ MS) by ECB, direct recapitalisation of banks by ESM (in euro area)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: own compilation based on European Commission, DG ECFIN website
*QMV: qualified majority voting in the Council, ** CJ: Court of Justice, ***European Banking Authority, European Securities and Markets Authority, European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority

Note: Croatia, as the 28th member state, is joining the relevant institutions and agreements

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As it can be seen, those measures are completing the incomplete edifice of EMU set by Maastricht and the Stability and Growth Pact, and they also represent substantial guarantees to prevent from similar (primarily financial and fiscal) crises in the future. There is however an obvious mixture of the Community method and the so-called Union method – promoted by the leaders of Germany and France – in terms of both preparation of proposals (see the rivalry between the European Commission and the Van Rompuy Task Force) and the end result. This mixed approach and the patchwork nature of the above mentioned measures and instruments is however very detrimental to transparency and accountability. It also makes the whole machinery of economic and fiscal policy governance extremely complex and bureaucratic. Of course, the constant dialogue between especially the euro area member governments and the EU institutions can in the long run lead to enhanced stability of EMU, but transparency, legitimacy and accountability still remain an issue in the coming years. All the more that there are no clear lines between national policy discretion and the depth of European Commission influence on the highly sensitive budgetary strategies of member states; which can result in conflicts and spark a more vivid debate on national sovereignty.

SCENARIOS TO BE EXPECTED BASED ON RECENT TRENDS AND PROPOSED REFORMS

Since autumn 2012, at least two important speeches and two key documents must be mentioned when scrutinising the ideas and initiatives on future European structures and governance. In a chronological order the first one was the speech on the state of the Union by Commission President Barroso in September 2012. In this speech Mr. Barroso urged for an upgraded economic integration (based on the single market), for a stronger economic and monetary union

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5 Highlighted among others by Chang (2013)
6 It is enough to mention the Annual Growth Surveys, the National Reform Programmes, the Stability/Convergence Programmes, the County-Specific Recommendations, the Alert Mechanism Reports, the In-Depth Reviews, etc.
8 Another example is the dispute between Hungary and the European Commission on recent lowering of retail gas and electricity prices for end-users, which is a core element of the current government’s programme heavily criticised by the European executive.
and finally for a political union. In his view, while most aspects of the first two dimensions can be done in the present Treaty framework, for the indispensable political union there is a need to create the European federation of nation states. This however – as he underscored – should not mean a superstate. It should rather be: “A democratic federation of nation states that can tackle our common problems, through the sharing of sovereignty in a way that each country and each citizen are better equipped to control their own destiny. This is about the Union with the Member States, not against the Member States. In the age of globalisation pooled sovereignty means more power, not less.” To build the federation of nation states Barroso pleaded for a new Treaty – i.e. not an amended Lisbon Treaty but a new one. He emphasised that we have to be careful about this, and that such a process has to be well prepared.

In fact, in this respect a key prerequisite would be a German-French accord but – despite championing for “more Europe” – so far neither of the two parties seems to favour explicitly a European Federation of Nation States. On the German side it is important to highlight the legal difficulties. In 2009, the German Constitutional Court has ruled that the Lisbon Treaty should be seen as the upper limit of European integration, and further deepening would not be compatible with the German Basic Law. For a deeper integration, let alone a European Federation, Germany would need a new constitution which can be problematic.9 Moreover, in her speech in Bruges in 2010, German Chancellor Angela Merkel advocated the Union method (instead of the Community or the federal approach).10 On the French side there are also reservations vis-à-vis the federal concept. France under President Nicolas Sarkozy has been supportive of German ideas on reinforcing cooperation at the European level to fight the crisis. Beyond strengthened economic and fiscal policies and a “banking union” President Hollande would also be in favour of more Europe in terms of solidarity, employment and social policy, a bigger common budget, stronger defence cooperation, etc. – but certainly not in the form of a European federation. He would rather support a differentiated Europe based on a kind of variable geometry involving different willing and able countries into different policy areas. In his view, greater democracy in the EU should be ensured via the strong role of the European Parliament.11

The other important speech was given by British Prime Minister David Cameron in January 2013.12 In this speech Mr. Cameron highlighted the need to reform the EU, namely by making

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9 http://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/pressemeldungen/bvg09-072en.html
10 http://www.bruessel.diplo.de/contentblob/2959854/Daten
11 Video of François Hollande’s speech (in French) before the EP on 5 February 2013: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=F6vsOoAALRY
12 Video of David Cameron’s speech: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8LS60Wbq_dK
it more flexible, more adaptable, more accountable while also less bureaucratic and able to
make decisions faster. In his view, the repatriation of certain competences to national levels
should be feasible as “we cannot harmonise everything”. Since there is no European demos, the
democratic legitimacy of the EU should be strengthened via the national parliaments. With a
view to achieving such changes Mr. Cameron would prefer to have a new Treaty. In his view,
the UK would fit well into such a flexible and cooperative EU that can also provide the
necessary framework for differentiation. But in any case, the British citizens will be asked
about staying in or leaving the EU (which would take place before the end of 2017, in case of
an electoral victory of the Conservative Party in 2015).

There were also two key proposals put forward towards the end of 2012; one by the
European Commission13 and the other one by European Council President Herman Van
Rompuy.14 Taking an ambitious stance, both papers called for substantial further deepening in
the direction of financial, budgetary and economic integration accompanied by more political
accountability. A highly important common element in both papers is the contractual
arrangement to be concluded between euro area member states and EU institutions about longer
term structural reforms, and “in exchange” a certain financial support (Convergence and
Competitiveness Instrument) would be available to back those reforms in the given member
states.15 The financial background of this would actually be a new budget, parallel to the
existing one. In terms of political union implying more democracy and accountability, the Van
Rompuy proposal suggests to accompany “further integration of policy-making and a greater
pooling of competences at the European level” with a “commensurate involvement of the
European Parliament in the integrated frameworks for a genuine EMU.”16 The paper adds the
importance of fostering cooperation between national parliaments and the EP – without
specifying its mechanisms. The Commission proposal goes much more into details. Among
others it also foresees a stronger role of the EP in the whole process of fiscal and economic
policy coordination. Furthermore, it proposes that members of the Commission take part in
debates of national parliaments about the Country Specific Recommendations, on their request.
By looking more thoroughly into the draft, it becomes obvious that a potential split between
euro area ins and outs within the Commission, the Council and the EP is unfolding.

Full text: http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2013/jan/23/david-cameron-eu-speech-referendum

13 European Commission (2012)
15 A comprehensive critical comparison and analysis of these two instruments can be read in Vanden Bosch (2013)
Based on the above mentioned ideas and proposals, and also based on current realities and citizens’ attitudes, we can broadly project the following scenarios for governance developments in the near future.

Table 2
Possible scenarios for future EU structures proposed by the author

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of scenario</th>
<th>Content of scenario</th>
<th>Treaty change or new Treaty needed</th>
<th>Strength of scenario</th>
<th>Weakness of scenario</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>European federation of nation states</td>
<td>Federation would be accepted as a method of EU governance, revised institutional set up, clearer delimitation of competences, subsidiarity</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>More transparent and efficient decision-making, better representation of the EU in the world</td>
<td>No European demos; different national interpretations; federation would be incomplete without a genuine fiscal federalism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Two-tier EU</td>
<td>The two-tier model for the euro area would be further institutionalised within the EU institutions and also within the financing system</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>More efficient functioning of EMU within the Union with stricter rules and greater chances for fiscal stability</td>
<td>Fragmented EU, institutional and budgetary dividing lines between ins and outs, detrimental to EU integrity and image to the outside world</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Streamlined and flexible EU</td>
<td>Rearrangement of competences (in some areas more, in others less), differentiation, more subsidiarity</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Reconciliation of centripetal and centrifugal forces, less bureaucracy, could lead to a more viable integration</td>
<td>Difficult to find consensus on the restructuring of competences, could lead to the erosion of integration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preserved status quo</td>
<td>The current system would be preserved with mixed modes of governance but converging back to the TFEU/TEU framework</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Greater use of existing tools and mechanisms, no split among member states over the future EU structures</td>
<td>Lack of transparency, issues of legitimacy and accountability would still be pending</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**SOME RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE HIGH-LEVEL POLICY-MAKERS OF THE VISEGRAD COUNTRIES**

It seems to be quite a challenge to formulate recommendations to the Visegrad (V4) countries on EU strategy as, apart from some shared positions (e.g. in the field of cohesion policy financing, energy supply issues, enlargement and Eastern Partnership\(^\text{17}\)) these countries have different attitudes and also occupy different positions in the Union. Poland aspires to become an important medium-sized power in the EU, while the Czech Republic has been more

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\(^{17}\) See more on this topic in Vida (2012)
eurosceptic, and Hungary recently more critical. Unlike Slovakia, these three countries are not in the euro area, and as regards the EU’s crisis management measures the Czech Republic and Hungary did not adhere to all of them, as it can be seen in Table 3 below (while adherence to the Single Surveillance and Single Resolution Mechanisms will be optional by non-eurozone countries).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of instrument</th>
<th>Membership by V4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Europe 2020 Strategy</td>
<td>V4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Semester</td>
<td>V4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Six-pack, Two-pack</td>
<td>V4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TSCG</td>
<td>HU, PL, SK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Euro Plus Pact</td>
<td>PL, SK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ESM</td>
<td>V4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ESRB, EBA, ESMA, EIOPA</td>
<td>V4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSM, SRM</td>
<td>SK+</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Despite the non-homogenous status of the Visegrad countries vis-à-vis those key institutions and instruments, I attempt to draw up some proposals that could serve as a basis for V4 cooperation in shaping the future of European integration. A common denominator could be the recognition of the EU’s already mentioned legitimacy gap and the necessity to do something about it. In my view, to close this gap the EU should make efforts in two dimensions in the near future: it should try to strengthen both its input and output legitimacy.¹⁸ When considering the future structures and functioning of the EU and formulating the position of the V4 countries on it, these two dimensions should serve as a compass for them.

On the one hand, there is a need to reinforce the input legitimacy of the Union by strengthening its democratic aspects. In concrete terms it would primarily mean to foster the emergence of a European demos. This could be done, among others, via the creation of a genuine European media supplying EU news and offering platforms for debates without taboos and double standards in all EU languages; as well as via “Europeanizing” the EP-elections through formulating/communicating common European electoral programmes by the representatives of the different political groups across the Union; and in close connection to this, via establishing a clearer link between EP elections and the would-be president of the European Commission. Furthermore, the more intensive involvement of national parliaments

¹⁸ The concept – widely used in EU studies – was introduced by Fritz Scharpf. Its importance was recently emphasised among others by Schmidt (2013) or Karaman (2013).
into European affairs, or the more frequent use of the European Citizens’ Initiative would also belong to the appropriate tools to bring the EU closer to its citizens in terms of input legitimacy.

On the other hand, it would be equally important to reinforce the output legitimacy of the Union. This would primarily mean a reinforced use of subsidiarity – advocated recently also by Commission President Barroso\(^1\) – via which the EU should focus on policy areas which really matter for citizens\(^2\) and/or where it can really be more efficient and effective compared to the national, regional or local levels by bringing about an obvious added value (e.g. strict surveillance of the financial sector, establishing trans-European infrastructure networks, deepening energy policy, fighting climate change, promoting student exchange programmes, etc.).\(^3\)

Regarding the unsuccessful/problematic ratification processes of the recent past (Nice Treaty, Constitutional Treaty, Lisbon Treaty) and also keeping citizens’ scepticism in mind (coupled with an ever lowering participation in European Parliament elections\(^4\)), it could probably be a good strategy for the V4 countries to push for more input and output legitimacy before any Treaty change is put on the agenda. The V4 group, together with other allies could perhaps draw up concrete proposals in both dimensions, first in the framework of the current primary law. Any Treaty change – or eventually a new Treaty – could then be supported with a view to reinforcing those initiatives which seem to bring about a tangible improvement of the EU’s performance. In case the Union’s input and output legitimacy is not reinforced in the near future, a deeper Euroscepticism can be expected among EU citizens. Therefore, when reshaping the European Union to enhance its legitimacy, voices from Eurosceptic or simply more critical countries/parties should also be heard and the V4 leaders as well as EU leaders should be more open-minded towards their arguments too.

To sum up, the following aspects might serve as a basis for elaborating future recommendations to the leaders of Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary, in case this group would be determined to shape the upcoming developments of European integration.


\(^2\) Among others Simon Hix (Hix, 2008) draws attention to the fact that, based on Eurobarometer surveys, there is often a discrepancy between what the EU is doing at the supranational level (e.g. agricultural policy, trade liberalisation) and what really matters for its citizens (e.g. immigration, education, health care, taxation).

\(^3\) On every day level a positive example would be the lowering of the prices of mobile phone conversations across the Union, while a negative one would be the failed proposal on how to serve olive oil in restaurants. In a more general dimension, of course a more successful crisis management in Greece would have strengthened the EU’s output legitimacy while its failure magnifies the lack of it.

* To stand against ad hoc intergovernmental solutions in tackling the crisis and to be careful about the so-called Union method;
* To stick to the Lisbon Treaty framework and to the integrity of the institutions and the acquis;
* To work for increased input and output legitimacy first within the Treaty framework and to elaborate joint proposals thereof;
* To build up a dialogue with those who are more sceptical/critical;
* To support any Treaty change only
  o after some improvements of input and output legitimacy are tangible
  o if it does not lead to an institutionalised two-tier model;
* To discuss and harmonise interests/strategies vis-à-vis the potential scenarios of future EU structures;
* To play a catalyst role in these approaches by creating a wider alliance network.

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