László Vértesy

Demography in the EU and in Hungary

- snapshot, opportunities and challenges

Gazdaságelemző Intézet
Institute of Economic Analysis
Budapest, 2021

László Vértesy

Demography in the EU and Hungary - snapshot, opportunities and challenges

DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.10389761

Gazdaságelemző Intézet
Institute for Economic Analysis

Printed in Hungary, Budapest

Table of contents

Demography in the EU and Hungary
snapshot, opportunities and challenges

Demographic phenomena and their long-term consequences are receiving increasing attention in the European Union and the Member States, including Hungary. The changing composition of the population, declining birth rates and ageing are challenging societies and economies alike. In this context, it is important to analyse demographic trends, understand their causes and consequences and prepare for future challenges.

In this working paper, we look in detail at the demographic situation in the European Union and Hungary. As a single economic and political area, the EU faces specific demographic trends, which are coloured by regional differences and the specificities of each Member State. In the case of Hungary, demographic trends are of particular importance as the country faces unique challenges in terms of population decline and ageing.

In addition to an overall analysis of the demographic situation, the focus is on the opportunities and challenges that need to be considered to cope with and manage demographic change. The European and Hungarian policy measures and their effectiveness will also be an essential theme of the article, presenting possible ways to address demographic challenges and the current instruments to do so.

Understanding and responding effectively to demographic processes is essential to building sustainable and prosperous societies. In this context, the aim is to provide a comprehensive picture of the demographic situation in the EU, highlighting Hungary's specificities and offering perspectives that can help to overcome the challenges and seize the opportunities arising from demographic change.

The first chapter, "Demography in General," lays the foundation for understanding demographic concepts, theories, and key indicators. It delves into the fundamental aspects of population dynamics, exploring topics such as birth rates, death rates, migration, and population structure. This chapter provides a comprehensive overview of the principles that underpin the study of demography, setting the stage for a nuanced examination of demographic trends in subsequent sections.

The second chapter, "European Union," focuses on demographic trends and challenges within the EU. It delves into the unique demographic landscape of the European Union, considering factors such as ageing populations, declining birth rates, and migration patterns. By examining regional variations and policy responses, this chapter provides insight into how the EU as a collective entity addresses demographic shifts and the implications for its member states.

The third chapter, "Hungary," narrows the focus to the specific demographic context of Hungary. It explores the country's population dynamics, demographic challenges, and the impact of policies implemented to address these issues. Analysing Hungary's unique socio-economic and cultural factors influencing population trends, this chapter offers a detailed understanding of how demographic changes manifest at the national level.

The final short chapter, "Summary," consolidates briefly the key findings and insights from the preceding sections. It distils the overarching themes, challenges, and opportunities identified in the European Union's and Hungary's demography. This section synthesises the broader context and specific nuances discussed in the previous chapters, providing a concise yet comprehensive overview of the demographic landscape and the implications for future considerations and policy directions.

I. Demography in general

One of the most critical questions for the near future will be how the world, regions and countries will evolve in terms of population. This will affect almost everything, be it politics, economics, culture or simply survival. We draw attention to a few thought-provoking, primarily very recent phenomena dating back only a few decades, focusing on the future of our planet but in some cases, on Hungary.

The subject has not been attractive for centuries. Throughout history, the world's population has grown modestly, a major epidemic (cholera, typhoid, plague, etc.) has decimated it, man has produced minimal non-recyclable waste, and so, in essence, the balance has existed. Our planet's carrying capacity also proved sufficient; in classical feudalism, there was land for everyone, deforestation was a civilised activity, and fish and game were plentiful. Thus, we went from the serf with a plot to the mercenary and from the artisan guilds to industrial exploitation. Large-scale industrial production gave rise to the manufacturing industry and its associated metropolises and the world's scarcity. Thus, the demographic problems arose.[1]

Population of the world



Source: https://ourworldindata.org/world-population-growth

[1] Murdock, S. H. (2019). Applied demography: An introduction to basic concepts, methods, and data. Routledge.

1. Demography theories

Throughout thousands of years of humanity's unwritten and written history, different factors have governed population change. In the Stone Age, natural factors were dominant, but from the end of the Stone Age, man began to withdraw from the working laws of nature and regulate the reproduction of the community, then the clan, and later the tribe. After permanent settlement, **overpopulation** and food scarcity were always the main concerns of humankind.[2]

1.1. Ancient

There were signs of overpopulation in ancient China as early as the centuries BC, especially in the Huangho and Yangtze cultural areas. **Confucius** (551-479 B.C.) referred to ensuring an appropriate ratio between land area and population. According to him, upsetting the ratio would lead to impoverishment. He observed that deaths increase when food supplies decrease and that an increase in early marriage increases infant mortality.[3]

In his Laws, **Plato (427-347 BC)** calls for the state to take measures to limit population. According to him, the magistracy regulates the number of births by means of honours and punishments. The number of marriages should also be determined by taking wars and diseases into account, and the age of marriage should be regulated. Children born beyond the permitted age were considered illegitimate, which in many cases meant that they were killed. Plato was concerned about the quality of the city-state's citizens and believed that this could only be preserved or increased if the quantitative development of the population was controlled by society itself.

Aristotle (384-322 BC) builds on the Platonic doctrines. In his Politics, however, his central idea was not the connection between food and overproduction but the fear of poverty. In his view, poverty was the mother of evil and rebellion. Aristotle limits the number of children for each married couple, saying that men should not have children beyond the age of 54-55 because such children are physically and mentally imperfect. A free citizen

[2] The chapter makes use in several places of Dialogue Campus' 2014 publication General Social Geography I-II (Dialóg Campus 2014, Általános társadalomföldrajz I.-II.), which provides a good summary of the various theories.

[3] https://regi.tankonyvtar.hu/en/tartalom/tamop425/2011_0001_528_Toth_Jozsef_Altalanos_tarsadalomfoldrajz_I_II/ch06.html

should instead pursue philosophy, poetry, politics and sport, for this is how he becomes a classically educated citizen of the city-state.

They both proclaimed that limiting population growth was a state task and that the population should be adjusted to the available land (since it was a city-state).

Tertullianus, Quintus Septimius Florens (Carthage, c.160 - Carthage, c.220): a lay theologian about 1800 years ago, when humanity numbered 180 million, he saw that man was a great burden on the Earth and would soon exhaust the treasures of nature.[4] "*Our numbers are burdensome to a world that can hardly support us ... in fact, plague and famine, wars and earthquakes, must be regarded as the remedy of nations, as the pruning instrument of the overpopulation of the human race.*"

1.2. Middle Ages

During the Middle Ages, Christian culture created a new system of human thought. The spiritual ideology of Christianity at the end of antiquity and in the early Middle Ages proclaimed that Providence cares for the birds of the air, not to mention "man" - man should not interfere with this will, for to do so is to sin. It is characteristic of this time (despite all the misery) that the population is multiplying rapidly. These early medieval views of population were favourable, for the great slaughter of the population throughout Europe by the migration of the people, and the population was so reduced that unlimited population growth was a distinct advantage. This was coupled with frequent epidemics and wars. Despite poverty and starvation, Christian spirituality created the high birth and death rates of its time. The great Italian scholastic theologian of the age, **St Thomas Aquinas** (1225-1274), proclaimed the commandments of Moses: grow and multiply, populate the earth. The development of the Middle Ages culminated in the Renaissance, in which architecture, art and the intellectual world reached wonderful heights. The aim is to create a perfect world where a high culture develops. The great thinkers of the Renaissance world of culture, **Thomas More** (1478-1535) and **Machiavelli** (1469-1525), were proponents of the theory of absolute monarchy, which can be achieved by achieving an unchanging population. In their view, population growth would lead to social disruption.

[4] Tainter, Joseph A. (2006): Archaeology of Overshoot and Collapse. Annual Review of Anthropology. 35: 59-74. doi:10.1146/annurev.anthro.35.081705.123136

1.3. 18th – 19th century theories

As a result of recent data collection, the German scientist J. P. **Sllissmilch** (1707-1767) pointed out important demographic correlations, such as the death rate at different ages, stillbirth rates, the number of accidents and the number of births, which remained unchanged over a long period of time. He described the immutability of demographic phenomena as a divine order.

In the middle of the 18th century, the main reason for a nation's greatest perfection, wealth, was seen in its growing population, and population experts suggested various ways of increasing the population. At the same time, they failed to see the immense danger of this growth in the distance. Forty years before Malthus, the Danish theologian O. D. **Lütken expressed his** fear of overpopulation in a novel thought. In one of his essays, he argues that the view that the most populous nations are the richest is a mere coincidence. He drew attention to the discrepancy between population and food growth rates, saying that the Earth's resources limit the growth of food production and that the overpopulation of humanity is limited by the Creator through war, disease and increased infant mortality. He adds that human activity and population policy can somewhat influence this process.



Malthusianism is the theory of **Thomas Malthus** (1766-1834), an English clergyman and economist, which he expounded in his 1798 work Studies on the Law of Population. It is considered by the literature to be the stove of the subject because he was the first to deal in depth with the future of the population. According to his theory of overpopulation, population growth is a geometric series *(1,2,4,8,16...)*, but the rate of production of subsistence goods is only a numerical series *(1,2,3,4,5...),* and this is the main reason for the contradictions in social development. Therefore, the gap between subsistence production and population growth is constantly widening, living standards constantly fall, and poverty and hunger are increasing. In his work, he argues that food production cannot keep pace with population growth and that curbing the birth rate is a moral imperative. Malthusians consider it necessary to reduce births, wage wars, to destroy millions of people (e.g. by starvation) in order to solve the problem of overpopulation. In the early 1800s, there were

980 million people on Earth. He uses the example of the English cities to get there early, at a time when there was hardly any manufacturing industry in Hungary. Eastern central Europe is only in the second half of the 20th century, whereas England was in the 1700s. Hungary, too, only turned from an agrarian country into an industrial state by the 1950s, and ironically, half a century later, services account for a larger share of GDP, so the triumph of 'industrialism' and the 'working class' has not even lasted half a century.

Malthus was not, of course, talking about the whole of humanity but about individual peoples. From his experience in the North American colonies, **David Hume** already knew that the number of human communities increases in a geometric series in the case of natural increase. Malthus argued that if the material conditions for exponential population growth are not available, the people who are socially disciplined will prevail. Discipline was based on the control of marriage and marital fertility. Marriage was made conditional - marriages were relatively late, and some of the population could never marry; within marriage, however, it was not acceptable to limit fertility. So, only the successful could pass on their genes.

Many prominent figures were among the Malthusians: Max Weber, John Cazenove, and Jean Say. **Say,** for example, argued that man reproduces himself as long as nothing slows his progress. Therefore, if we set aside all the reasons that limit the growth of our species, we will find that a man and a woman, once married, can easily have twelve children. Without barriers to this reproduction, a country's population would triple after 26 years. Therefore, the issue in the population question is not men's propensity to reproduce but what slows down this development. "*It is obvious, gentlemen, that the cause which keeps the population within the limits we see them at, or at least condemns them to ever slower growth, is the limit of their means.*" The conditions of the theory of population are, therefore, clearly stated: the growth of the population is limited by its means of subsistence, in other words, by its needs.

1.4. 20th century theories

In 1919, John Maynard **Keynes** (*The Economic Consequences of the Peace*) began his polemic by portraying the political economy of Europe as Malthusian in its depiction of instability due to the pressure on the food supply of the Malthusian population. Many of the resource depletion and scarcity models are Malthusian: the energy consumption rate outstrips the ability to find and produce new energy sources, leading to a crisis.

In 1968, **Paul Ehrlich** wrote his book The Population Bomb, in which he predicted that mass starvation would result from overpopulation in the coming decades and that overpopulation in India would lead to a crash around 1980. In 1971, 3.6 billion people populated the Earth.

The theory of demographic transition

Investigating the nature and interrelationships of the demographic phenomena accompanying socio-economic changes, the staff of the Princeton University Office of Population Studies, led by **Notestein, F.W.,** developed the theory of demographic transition based on a research project that lasted for about ten years (1936-1945). A demographic transition (like all transitions) can be understood as a transition from one stable state to another stable state. More recently, researchers have been talking about equilibrium rather than steady state.

Demographic Transition overview



Source: https://ourworldindata.org/data/population-growth-vital-statistics/world-population-growth

The **demographic transition model** is most often broken down into four stages. The first stage is the demographic growth of premodern society, in which high death rates accompany high birth rates. In the second stage, while births remain high, deaths fall sharply, resulting in a population explosion (demographic revolution). In the third stage, mortality continues to fall, and fertility levels decline. In the final stage, both factors (births and deaths) are stabilized at low levels, and the initial level of population growth is restored.[5]

The biggest problem is that this scheme is clearly not applicable to population change in all countries. For example, the population process in France during the second phase differed, as births and deaths started to fall simultaneously. Another example was Germany, where fertility decline preceded mortality in many villages. However, the model is a useful tool for analysing long-term population time series and comparing population trends in different regions, countries and groups of countries.

The theory of **natural fertility** was defined by **Louis Henry in** 1953: we can call fertility natural if there is no conscious birth control. He called the deliberate act of contraception a social expectation, a social control. Examples are marriages later in life or breastfeeding for more extended periods. In the case of conscious use of contraceptives, social control is transferred to individual control, i.e. the decision is transferred from the social level to the individual level.

In 1973, **Ansley Coale** identified a combination of three preconditions as the cause of the incipient decline in marital fertility: 1) a conscious decision by married couples; 2) a preference for limiting childbearing; and 3) sufficient knowledge and access to effective contraceptives for birth control.

The most important factor in fertility economic theories was the "demand side" for children. In **Easterlin**'s population development model, he considered the demand for children and the supply side. He described the onset of long-term fertility decline in terms of five factors explaining socioeconomic development: public health, education, urbanisation, the emergence of new consumer goods, and national income. He could not explain the demographic transition in general terms.

The most prominent demographic transition theory formulated since the 1970s is the **theory of wealth flows** developed by **John C. Caldwell** and his colleagues. In a society before the demographic transition, production

[5] Lesthaeghe, R. (2020). The second demographic transition, 1986–2020: sub-replacement fertility and rising cohabitation—a global update. Genus, 76(1), 1-38.

was organised on a family basis. In multigenerational families, the decision-maker was the head of the family, and the members of the family who carried out production had specific functions. The work done by women and children was devalued. The children benefited, as there was a flow of income, support and services from the younger generation to the older. In modern society, a new family model, the nuclear type family, is becoming dominant. In these families, income, support and services no longer flow towards the head of the family but towards the child or children in the opposite direction. This challenge has created the developed world's one- or two-child family model.

In recent sociological research, R. Lesthaeghe has adopted many theories from different disciplines and created a new **homeostatic** system. A homeostatic or self-regulating system contains not only a specific combination of parameters for mortality, fertility, marriage and migration to bring population numbers, growth and density into line with resources but also a set of mechanisms capable of restoring the equilibrium of the system when it is upset by an external shock.

The theory of demographic transition is also increasingly criticised today. However, everyone agrees that the model is a valuable tool for analysing long-term time series of population change and comparing demographic trends across continents and countries.

After the demographic transition

The question of what happens after the demographic transition is a growing concern for scientists. Demographic planning, population projections, and accurate knowledge of the expected age structure and population trends are essential for medium- and long-term investments. In addition to 10 and 20-year projections, researchers also produce long-term projections. At the dawn of the 21st century, the idea of "what future for us?" and the associated notion of extinction are again coming to the fore. **Biraben**, J.N., studied the 40,000-year history of humanity and concluded that three demographic transitions had occurred during this time and that the fourth demographic transition, leading to the extinction of humanity, began in the late 1980s. **Bourgeois-Pichat**, J. analysed the post-industrial demographic transition using the Federal Republic of Germany data. In his model, the developed world's population increases until 2025 and that of the developing world until 2080, after which a rapid population decline begins in both worlds, leading to the extinction of humanity in 2250 and 2400, respectively.

Even today, these models of the future fall into the same error as those of the earlier great scientists: they explain the future from the socio-

economic-intellectual aspect of the present, although (as we have seen in some theories), as socio-economic-theoretical expectations change, so do demographic processes and structures.

Some **public figures** have also spoken out on the issue. For example, Elon Musk is a vocal critic of overpopulation. According to Musk, supporters of the idea are misled by their immediate impression of dense cities.[6] With negative replacement rates in many countries, he expects the biggest problem by 2039 to be population collapse, not explosion. Jack Ma expressed similar views.

1.5. Discussion

The population theories of antiquity and the Middle Ages were speculative population theories, and despite concerns, scientists have not found historical societies that collapsed due to overpopulation or overconsumption. This may be because, before modern **medicine,** infectious diseases prevented excessive population growth. However, progress will make many diseases curable, and life expectancy will increase. Infant mortality will fall.

Tertullian could not have foreseen that man would discover **new resources**, such as uranium. However, from the 17th century onwards, census data began to be collected through church registers, although sporadically. The precise quantification of the population made it possible to discover the laws of population movement. Malthus, however, also failed to foresee the agrarian revolution, and his followers today underestimate man's creative capacity. At that time, he had not yet reckoned with the impact of the agricultural revolution from the German Lowlands, nor with the introduction of fossil fuels. These, however, did not change the laws he had established, but the boundary conditions in the sentence above. The improvement in agricultural productivity in the 17th and 18th centuries increased the chances of survival, but the industrial revolution of the 18th and 19th centuries did not yet bring an improvement in prosperity.

Modernised agricultural production and increased productivity later on clearly contributed to unprecedented population growth, especially in industrialised countries, especially in industrialised areas. A positive correlation between population growth and prosperity (primarily due to extensive agriculture in the settler states) is only established from the last third of the 19th

[6] Döpfner, Mathias. "Elon Musk reveals Tesla's plan to be at the forefront of a self-driving-car revolution - and why he wants to be buried on Mars". Business Insider.

century onwards. This is what John Maynard Keynes called **the reverse Malthusian regime**.[7]

Critics suggest that there are sufficient resources to support the projected population growth and that the human impacts on the environment cannot be attributed to overpopulation. According to the Fraser Institute's liberal think-tank, both the idea of overpopulation and the alleged resource depletion myth are myths; thanks to technological advances, most resources are more abundant today than they were a few decades ago. These theories see only the consumer, the newborn, and the hungry mouth in man, not the future creator who will discover and invent new resources. Today, the Earth's population is twice what it was then, and in India, the population has doubled, but average life expectancy and living standards have risen.

It is also important to note that **fertility rates** have declined since the second half of the 20th century. Even this has not been taken into account by many researchers, such as Malthus and Ehrlich, who in their lifetimes had the vast majority of people with large families: each woman had an average of five children. Fertility rates are also falling in India, China, Muslim countries and Africa.









[7] https://www.metazin.hu/index.php/item/1966-1966

Statistics show that around half of the world's population lives in countries with only surrogate fertility.



Some **population planning strategies** proposed by overpopulation advocates are **controversial on ethical grounds**. Overpopulation advocates, including Paul Elrich, have been accused of influencing human rights abuses, including India's forced sterilisation policy and China's one-child policy, as well as mandatory or coercive contraceptive measures in other countries.

On **women's empowerment**, a 2020 study in The Lancet concluded that continuing trends in women's education and access to contraception will accelerate fertility decline and slow population growth, with the world population projected to reach 9.73 billion in 2064 and decline by 2100. Betsy Hartmann sees the myth of overpopulation as destructive because it prevents constructive thinking and action on reproductive rights, which sharply affects women and communities living in poverty.[8] The 1994 International Conference on Population and Development (ICPD) defines reproductive rights as the fundamental right of all couples and individuals to decide freely and responsibly on the number, spacing and timing of their children and access the information they need to do so. Scientist Heather Alberro argues that she rejects the overpopulation argument, stating that human population growth is slowing rapidly, that the fundamental problem is not the number of people

[8] Hartmann, Betsy (2016). Reproductive rights and wrongs: the global politics of population control. Haymarket Books. p. 26.

but the way resources are distributed, and that overpopulation can trigger a racist backlash against the populations of poor countries.[9]

The overpopulation argument has been labelled **racist** by some scientists and environmentalists. They argue that it is rooted in colonialism and white supremacy, as human population control and reduction often focuses on the Global South rather than overconsumption and the Global North. George Monbiot said that when affluent white people wrongly shift responsibility for environmental impacts onto the birth rates of much poorer brown and black people, their finger-pointing reinforces the [white genocide conspiracy] narratives. It is inherently racist.[10] Overpopulation is thus supposedly a common component of ecofascist ideology.[11]

[9] Alberro, Heather. "Why we should be wary of blaming 'overpopulation' for the climate crisis". The Conversation.

[10] Population panic lets rich people off the hook for the climate crisis they are causing | George Monbiot". the Guardian. 26 August 2020. Retrieved 30 July 2021.

[11] Thomas, Cassidy; Gosink, Elhom (25 March 2021). "At the Intersection of Eco-Crises, Eco-Anxiety, and Political Turbulence: A Primer on Twenty-First Century Ecofascism". Perspectives on Global Development and Technology. 20 (1-2): 30-54.

2. Forecasts

Population growth was the highest in human history in 1962-1963, at 2.2%. It is 1%, but there are 7.9 billion[12] of us on the planet, so 1% is an annual increase of 80 million people. Eight Hungary! There are many predictions for the future; many are already talking about 10 billion. UN experts believe the peak will be around 2100. IHME, the Population Research Institute at the University of Washington, puts the demographic peak at 2064, with 9.7 billion people. A third figure will undoubtedly be correct, the experts themselves think.

While it is possible to roughly predict population decline in rich and developed countries - although it is difficult to estimate the extent of the decline - it is not possible to say anything about the future of poorer countries. A lot depends on the high-population countries; for example, India will catch up with China in terms of population within 2-3 years, and Pakistan, Bangladesh, Indonesia, Brazil, Mexico, etc. will catch up in a big way. There is little chance of introducing a one-child policy, as the Chinese are now well aware. (There are many social problems: very few girls, many dependent parents, etc.)

2.1. Club of Rome

The Club of Rome has also addressed the issue on several occasions. Their first manifestation, The **Limits To Growth**, 1972, was a bombshell. Almost none of their predictions came to pass, or at least not as predicted. Computer simulations at the time suggested that economic growth could not continue indefinitely because of resource depletion. The 1973 oil crisis heightened public concern about this problem. The report sold 30 million copies in more than 30 languages, making it the best-selling environmental book in history. The findings mentioned here are far from definitive, as the authors are well aware, just as none of the previous research has proved to be a perfect predictor. However, one thing is sure: there are, and will be, limits to growth, especially in the future, in the essentials of life: clean air, potable water, affordable food, essential raw materials, and tolerable temperatures. Add to this desertification, rising sea levels, the disappearance of coastal cities, and erratic and inclement weather, and they have a whole range of factors that are not conducive to population growth.

[12] https://www.worldometers.info/hu/

In 1974, a second report (**Mankind at the Turning Point**) revised the original growth limit scenarios. It gave a more optimistic forecast for the future of the environment, noting that many of the factors involved were under human control and that environmental and economic disaster could therefore be prevented and/or avoided.

In a book published in 2017 (**Reinventing Prosperity**: Managing Economic Growth to Reduce Unemployment, Inequality and Climate Change), two Club of Rome researchers, Graeme Maxton and Jorgen Randers, concluded that one of the 13 proposals is to encourage smaller families, thus reducing the pressure of humanity on the planet. Women who do not have children should not even have to have children, and women who do not have children should be rewarded, because the main obstacle to the sustainability of the planet is man himself. There is also a Hungarian counter-example: researchers working on pension reform (József Botos, Katalin Botos, among others) have proposed that the pension calculation for parents with several children should be more favourable than that for those without. Such views were not seen a hundred years earlier.

2.2.KPMG

The current situation in 2021 was compared by **Gaya Herrington**, Head of Sustainability and Systems Analysis at **KPMG in the** US, with the Club of Rome's earlier projections from 1972.[13] Herrington pointed out that collapse does not mean the extinction of humanity but that as economic growth ends, production and living standards begin to fall. This is expected to occur around 2040. In the CT scenario, which assumes a comprehensive technological revolution, the negative consequences will also start to multiply at this time but will not ultimately lead to collapse.

[13] Herrington, Gaya. 2021 Update to limits to growth: Comparing the world3 model with empirical data. Journal of Industrial Ecology 2021; 25: 614- 626



Herrington, Gaya. 2021 Update to limits to growth: comparing the world3 model with empirical data. Journal of Industrial Ecology 2021; 25: 614- 626. The BAU, BAU2, CT, and SW scenarios. Adapted from Limits to Growth: The 30-Year Update (p. 169, 173, 219, p.245), by Meadows, D. H., Meadows, D. L., & Randers, J., 2004, Chelsea Green Publishing Co. Copyright 2004 by Dennis Meadows.

Script	Description	Ok
BAU	There are no assumptions for historical averages.	Collapse due to depletion of natural resources.
BAU2	Double the BAU's natural resources.	Collapse due to pollution (equivalent to climate change).
CT	BAU2 + exceptionally high technology development and application rates.	The rising cost of technology will eventually cause a downturn but not a crash.
SW	CT + changes in social values and priorities.	Population is stabilising in the 21st century, and human well-being is at a high level.

The BAU2 and CT scenarios show that growth will stop in about a decade, and it will become impossible to keep things going, i.e. to keep chasing growth, at that point. This, even with unprecedented technological progress, will lead to an inevitable decline in industrial capital, agricultural production and welfare in this century. In his presentation at last year's World Economic Forum, Gaya Herrington argued for a 'no growth' approach focusing on other economic goals. She used the development of vaccines against

Covid-19 as an example of how we can solve global problems quickly and effectively if we want to - and we should do the same with the pollution crisis.[14]

2.3.University of Lund University of Lund

Also in 2017, two researchers from the University of Lund, Kimberly Nicholas and Seth Wynes, published a study entitled **The climate mitigation gap**: education and government recommendations miss the most effective individual actions, in which they set out four recommended actions for the whole developed world: one less child, no car, avoid air travel and eat a plant-based diet.



Source: Wynes, S., & Nicholas, K. A. (2017) The climate mitigation gap: education and government recommendations miss the most effective individual actions, Environmental Research Letters, 12(7), 074024.

So we are slowly going to the extremes: to save the Earth, do not get on a plane, do not have a car, do not eat beef or any other meat, and have few clothes and other utensils because that is where consciousness begins.

[14] https://index.hu/techtud/2021/07/17/herrington-a-novekedes-hatarai-elorejelzes-futurologia-jovokutatas-osszeomlas/?fbclid=IwAR1jFW_0v7AdSCLA5KW0PPphiIYxF9Vnh-HiOMWWGvKLUvPn44f7mRi3LisY

Moreover, children are the most damaging to the environment, as they are the main contributors to carbon dioxide pollution in the atmosphere.

The facts are somewhat contradictory. In today's world, most children are born where there is the least pollution. The most commonly cited example is Nigeria, where fertility is very high, with an average of 7 children per woman. However, its inhabitants are responsible for only 540 kilograms of carbon dioxide per person per year (in Europe: 3780-7470 kg, and in the USA: 1303 kg it is ten, twenty times higher).[15] The same ration for Germans is nine tonnes per year, so it is clearly not the population that is decisive, but the degree of civilisation. Wealth goes hand in hand with wastefulness and pollution, although rich parents tend to have fewer children, which is an advantage.

2.4. United Nations

One of the great lessons of the demographic history of countries is that population explosions are temporary. In many countries, the demographic transition has already ended, and with global fertility rates now halved, we know that the world as a whole is coming to the end of a period of rapid population growth. This visualisation presents a big picture of the global demographic transition - with the latest data from the UN Population Division. The global population grew slowly until 1700, by just 0.04% per year.

For many millennia in history, high child mortality has offset high fertility. The world was in the first phase of a demographic transition. As health improved and mortality declined, things changed rapidly. Especially during the 20th century: in the last 100 years, the world population has more than quadrupled. In the last 100 years, the world's population has increased by more than 100 times over the last 100 years. Providing space, food and resources for the world's large population in a sustainable way for the foreseeable future is undoubtedly one of our generation's tremendous and severe challenges. Population growth is still rapid: 140 million people are born every year, and 58 million die.

As demographers had expected, the world as a whole is witnessing the end of a major demographic transition. As population growth continues to decline, the world population curve will steepen. By the end of the century – when the UN projects global population growth to fall to 0.1% – the world will be very close to the end of the demographic transition.

[15] https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/EN.ATM.CO2E.PC?locations=NG



Source: https://ourworldindata.org/future-population-growth

The burgundy line shows the annual population growth rate of the global population (i.e. the annual percentage change in population). It peaked half a century ago. Peak population growth was reached in 1968 with an annual increase of 2.1%. Since then, world population growth has slowed and is now growing at just over 1% per year. This slowdown in population growth was not only foreseeable but predictable.

It is difficult to know the population dynamics after 2100; it depends mainly on the fertility rate. Fertility first decreases with development and then increases with development. The world is entering the final phase of demographic transition, which means not repeating the past. The world population quadrupled during the 20th century but will not double during this century. The world population will reach an extraordinary size in human history; the world population will be more than 10-fold in 250 years. The new balance differs from the old one when very high mortality rates kept population growth in check. The new balance is likely to show low fertility and little population change.

3. Demography in different ways

Demography, the study of populations and their characteristics manifests itself in diverse dimensions, shaping and reflecting societal dynamics.[16] In the realm of geopolitics, demography emerges as a weapon, wielded strategically to influence power dynamics and geopolitical outcomes. Governments and entities may manipulate demographic factors, such as population growth rates, to assert influence on a global stage.

Labour migration and population dynamics intertwine in a complex dance that impacts economies and societies. The movement of people across borders for work not only influences the demographic composition of nations but also sparks discussions around multiculturalism, integration, and the global distribution of labour.

Population policies implemented by governments navigate the delicate balance between population growth and available resources. These policies shape family planning, healthcare, and education, influencing the overall well-being of societies. In contrast, the concept of "Limits to Growth" underscores the ecological constraints on population expansion, emphasizing the need for sustainable practices in the face of environmental challenges.

The quality of a population extends beyond mere numbers, encompassing factors like education, health, and socio-economic status.[17] As societies strive for progress, the focus on enhancing the quality of life for individuals becomes pivotal.

Pandemics, such as the unprecedented COVID-19 crisis, expose vulnerabilities in global health infrastructure and prompt discussions about preparedness, response mechanisms, and the societal impact of widespread disease outbreaks. Interestingly, periods of crisis, like the COVID-19 pandemic, can sometimes lead to unexpected demographic phenomena, such as a "Baby Boom" resulting from increased time spent at home.

Finally, as societies become more inclusive and accepting, understanding and acknowledging the LGBTQ population's unique demographic characteristics becomes crucial for shaping policies and fostering an environment of equality and respect.

[16] Edgecombe, N. (2019). Demography as opportunity. TU O'Banion (Ed.), 13, 213-229.
[17] Gietel-Basten, S., & Sobotka, T. (2021). Trends in population health and demography. The Lancet, 398(10300), 580-581.

3.1. Demography as a weapon

We have lived in peace for almost 80 years. Except for local conflicts, humanity does not need to take up arms. In many countries, including Hungary, there is no military conscription. How does demography become a weapon here?



Source: https://ourworldindata.org/future-population-growth

Population growth varies from state to state and territory to territory. This can really redraw the map. It can also be used as a weapon in politics: we have seen small nations rise up at international conferences and others fall apart. Have a look at the Hungarian example after Trianon: in cities that used to be Hungarian majority or ethnic Hungarian majority but do not belong to the motherland, we can hardly hear the Hungarian word today, be it in rich Austria or poor Ukraine. Nor is it any consolation that the same has happened to other minorities in the Carpathian Basin: where are the Transylvanian Saxons, the Cypriots of Upper Hungary, the Swabians of Bačka, the Jews of Transcarpathia?

Put simply: for small nations, low population growth – or, more accurately, decline – is the nation's death. There have been many in history, and there probably will be. The opposite is also true: when population growth is high, a group, tribe or nation can carve out a more extensive habitat for itself.

This is particularly true of nations where, due to a lack of linguistic and cultural affinities, the environment cannot be relied upon, and survival can only be achieved by self-sufficiency, as is the case with the Hungarians.

Nevertheless, the case of Kosovo is also worth noting. In the 43 years between the 1948 and 1991 Yugoslav censuses, the ethnic Albanian population in Kosovo increased by 220 %, while the Serb population increased by only 13 %. A number of factors, including migration, influenced demographic change. However, one phenomenon has been recorded by many: the high birth rate of Kosovo Albanians.[18] In the 1950s, when birth rates were beginning to be better documented, the average woman in Kosovo, the vast majority of whom were Albanian, gave birth to 7.58 children.



Another trigger for war conflict is the **lack of living space**: no food, drinking water, or livelihood opportunities. They have to migrate, but where do they go? The world is full, and very few countries want to take in newcomers. Not so long ago, it was easy to immigrate to America and Australia, and in the 1950s and 1960s, West Germany was a magnet for foreign labour. That is no longer the case, and in a few decades, it will be a severe conflict, even in some places. The problem has to be solved where it arises, says the current Hungarian government on migrants, which is correct, but the problem is more significant than donor countries could effectively tackle even if they acted together (there is little chance).

Speaking of guns, the **army** also needs the population. With a larger population, we can usually maintain a larger army and better select the right

[18] https://kosovotwopointzero.com/en/the-politicization-of-having-children/

people. Combat technology cannot always replace the traditional army, think of urban street fighting, the actual occupation of conquered territories, or even occupation tasks: all of these require men, and the classic infantry cannot be bypassed.

In the **war of the future** - let it not be, the peaceful solution is clearly the more fortunate - this is where China will have a considerable advantage, especially as it has recently become a leader in military technology. We can even play with the idea: if the Chinese army surrendered overnight, who would feed it? Where are the logistics that can do that? We have seen the same after the Second World War, where there was no more fighting but no way of feeding the prison camps, one of the most glaring examples being the German Army Group VI Paulus in Stalingrad, where only thousands (!) of the hundreds of thousands were left when they came home, even though they were young, fit for military service and healthy men - that is when they were taken, prisoner. Unfortunately, there are Hungarian examples from this period, including civilians.

The great world wars of the **20th century** brought a new face to warfare: the destruction of civilian populations. This, too, can bring about demographic changes that have not been seen before or are only sporadically. The bombing of cities, the ordering of free raids, and the humiliation and extermination of the masses have taken on a new dimension. Genocide is also an invention of the 20th century, and war can override human reason and fair judgment. Unfortunately, it does, more and more often.

New **weapons of mass destruction** could have a major demographic impact. The proliferation of nuclear and hydrogen bombs and missiles is almost ubiquitous, no longer possessed by just 2 superpowers but by dozens of states. We would venture to say that international control of these weapons is uncertain and is likely to remain so. However, we have seen weapons containing radiological materials disappear since the break-up of the Soviet Union. If such weapons fall into the wrong hands, they could have a terrible effect, especially as they could provoke a response, and all hell could break loose.

3.2.Labour migration and population

Labour migration is not a new phenomenon. We have seen many examples of it in antiquity, and in medieval guilds, craftsmen and artisans needed to get to know the workshops of other countries. Slavery and the great crises of the 19th century sent millions of people to the New World. However, today's migratory wave is different. First, it is striking in its scale, especially in poor countries. According to the UNHCR (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees), the number of workers who have left their country of origin is estimated at 200 million. There is also a high level of migration within many countries in search of employment; for example, China has more than 100 million such workers. In many developed countries in Europe, the third generation of temporary migrant workers (mostly Turkish and Yugoslavian) from the 1950s are now living abroad as full citizens of the countries concerned.

There are around 20 million foreign workers in the **EU**, just over 5 % of the total population, and the rate will continue to rise, with migration for humanitarian reasons, family reunification, political refugees, people from former colonies and other areas, which is seen as necessary to keep Europe's ageing economy alive. A new phenomenon is intra-regional movement, where the political context is changing, such as the flow of workers from Eastern Europe to Western countries, where a new wave of migration is expected in the next decade following the opening of the borders of the most affected countries (Germany, Italy, Austria). The disintegration of the Soviet empire has also led to a significant migration: the German and Jewish population has almost disappeared, the CIS countries have seen millions of their inhabitants displaced, and the process is not yet complete, with some 25 million Russians still living outside Russia's borders, from the Baltic to Kazakhstan.

Mass **migration is a** relatively new phenomenon. There were migrations before; millions of people went to America, but then there were free territories. Now, the world is full. Even where there is still room, young people who cannot assimilate and lack professional skills are not welcome. They are mostly boys who say they are under 18 and who, if they succeed, are likely to bring their families with them. Today, we do not yet know what will happen to the vast refugee camps in Turkey, Greece or even Italy. One thing is for sure: it cannot last; something must be done. Repatriation is not an option, at least as the examples so far show. We are talking about the organised movement of millions of people, which is difficult to control.

From the 1970s, with the economic boom, access to developed countries became increasingly difficult: first, Western Europe closed its doors, followed by the United States, then Canada and Australia. The latter were classic immigration countries, but from the 1970s, restrictions were imposed everywhere. In addition to a reduction in numbers, there has been a change in direction: whereas European immigrants used to be the majority, Mexicans now dominate in the USA and the Far East in Australia. This trend looks set to continue in the coming decades, with the News of Future predicting that by the middle of the decade (2050: 419 million people), a quarter of the US population will be of Hispanic origin.

Asian migration has started. On the one hand, to developed countries within the continent (e.g. significant immigration to Malaysia from Indonesia and the Philippines), and on the other hand, beyond the continent (Chinese to Europe, Australia, Canada, etc.) Chinese are increasingly taking up the position of Asia's traders, being present in almost all Far Eastern countries, including in the local retail trade in the literal sense. There is likely to be a forced migration of the majority of the current one-and-a-half billion or so small peasant farmers who will not be able to make a living in the countryside due to modernisation.

Labour migration is also high in **Latin America.** Civil war, economic recession or boom can easily lure people from one country to another, as there are no language barriers. There is also the back-and-forth, i.e. the return migration caused by changes in the economic barometer, particularly in countries that have experienced major upheavals (Venezuela, Argentina).

Africa's poor are no longer welcome in richer countries than in other continents. However, there is migration: civil wars force millions from one poor country to another - making Burundi, Ethiopia, Cameroon, Congo, Rwanda, Somalia, and Sudan, a major recruiter. Following the oil crisis, the Gulf countries became spectacularly rich, hiring 12-15 million workers in a few years, mostly from Arab countries, but also bringing in low-wage workers from India, Bangladesh and Pakistan. From the 1990s onwards, this was severely curtailed, and migration virtually stopped.

Last but not least, **Hungary and migration**. Hungary's population is shrinking, with one less settlement (county capital!) in Szekszárd every year. A shrinking population could justify immigration, especially in areas with a chronic labour shortage (skilled construction workers, nurses, etc.). However, it is not that simple. Although there are plenty of people who want to immigrate, the Balkans and the southern Mediterranean EU countries are full of them, but most of them are unskilled, aid-oriented and not looking to

Hungary. The resettlement wave in the poorer neighbouring Hungarian-inhabited regions is at its end; there will be no hidden reserves here.

The Hungarian government is **against migration**. Its propaganda is the strongest in the EU. Even within the V4, seen as a closer grouping, it is not fully accepted everywhere. The last 12 years have impacted domestic and international public opinion but with a different sign. The strong pro-immigration stance is not welcome, but a more moderate path can be found. Moderato – the instruction in the music goes. Translated: we should allow at least as many - selected - immigrants to stop the depopulation. We still find people in Eastern Europe and the Balkans with a strong tendency for young people to emigrate, and assimilation is not a problem.

The other side of the coin is the **emigration of Hungarians**. Especially since our accession to the EU, but even more so with the free movement of labour, hundreds of thousands of Hungarians have left their country hoping for a better life, and most of them are not returning. These are typically young, skilled people, and we are losing the best. Attracting them back is a dream, especially in areas with a considerable wage gap and where working conditions are much more favourable (doctors, IT specialists, researchers, etc.). The gap is so wide that no major shift is expected in the near future. Indeed, the huge increase in domestic medical salaries and the Hungarian Academy of Sciences' scholarship scheme to attract researchers back home have failed. The solution here is not to roll back administrative barriers but to actually kick-start economic growth. Our immediate neighbours have already passed us by. In a buoyant economy, money will be available for nurseries, kindergartens, and health care - all of which can indirectly improve the demographic situation, not least the population's well-being.

3.3.Population policy

Another important aspect is that there are different interests in population change. Obviously, the interests of an overpopulated country are different from those of a nation on the brink of extinction or decline. We have seen harsh but effective austerity (China in previous decades) and harsh but effective population growth (Hungary, Ratko era), but this is not the way to go. Individuals should have and retain their dignity and be free to decide for their children. Progress could be made internationally, but efforts to harmonise these are still very much in their infancy, even for the same cultures.

There are different interpretations of **population control depending on** the culture. It is safe to say that there will not be a unified concept in the near future, as not only states, but also parties, churches and groups have

different views. In such cases, it is not necessarily rationality that is decisive but respect for tradition, individual ideas and the unquestionability of religion. There are examples of flexibility and inflexibility. To avoid cemetery overcrowding - because it already exists - Christian churches, for example, allowed cremation a few decades ago, but now there are more urns than coffins. Moreover, space is only guaranteed for 10-25 years. At the same time, and in the same place, e.g. the Jewish churches do not allow such burials; not only in death but also in the creation of life. This is also demography.

Strangely, the **church** has only a little role in changing demography. Christianity, Europe's most widespread religion, is universally pro-life, with most denominations explicitly banning birth control. Despite this, the most Catholic countries of the Old Continent (Italy, Spain, Poland) have some of the lowest population growth rates. Nor can we really report on the successes of NGOs on this issue.

The **school** would be another forum that could increase family centricity. The fashionable liberal trends differ from this, and not a little. It is quite certain that gender theories will emerge, LGBTQ will spread, and the more it is banned, the more it will spread. It is also certain that it will confuse many and not help the population grow.

Hungary. The Hungarian government's population policy is aimed at the **middle class**, which is very good in principle; the only problem is that it is a very small group. While in Europe, Hungarian families have the highest levels of bank debt; almost a quarter of them cannot go on holiday and have problems buying food at the end of the month - what are we talking about? There is an upper class, a truly empowered class, but it is only a few tens of thousands of families, 1-2% of the population.

The statistics consider a person to be **poor** if the person in the middle of the income-ranked group (here: household) has less than half of his or her per capita income. Absolute and relative poverty are accompanied by income poverty, with many ways of measuring it, but they all have one thing in common: they are not middle class. On the other hand, this study considers the attainment of a middle-class lifestyle to be middle class, based on pre-war and current Western European practice, and those below that level to be poor. In the former logic, the middle class is muscled out by the general impoverishment of society, while in the latter, there is no middle class in the bourgeois sense in Hungary, and the poor are those who live with significant economic deprivation. This would, therefore be the Hungarian population group from which the government hopes to increase population growth.

So, according to the statistics mentioned above, we are European, even though since the regime change there has been a noticeable shift in income relations in our country - in a negative direction. The rebalancing has not stopped! This is also where the idea that the current Hungarian tax system is a further step towards greater income polarisation comes in. It is not just that the tax cuts have shifted income from individuals to businesses (contribution cuts), but the restructuring of the personal income tax system gives much less to those on lower incomes, with the highest earners doing best - in other words, the social gap is widening. Poverty will be exacerbated by a further, sharply felt tearing of the social safety net. In other words, if we want the middle class to be at the forefront of Hungarian demography, we must first create a massive middle class. By strong, we mean that the majority of society should belong to this category, and those in it should not be at the bottom of the lower middle class.

Middle class and health are also linked. In health surveys, it is not surprising that the majority of the over-60s in the country say that their daily life is already limited by illness. For many, a monthly medical bill of tens of thousands of euros is a selective limitation. One admission to the healthiest sport, swimming, is a four-digit number and sometimes does not start with one. Regular maintenance of the body is (should be) part of a middle-class daily routine. Developing and maintaining a healthy lifestyle is not a luxury, and it is not primarily a matter of money but of attitude. Nothing is cheaper and more effective than health prevention, yet we do not take advantage of it. A great deal could be achieved with well-targeted and effective discounts and propaganda, and longer life expectancy would also improve the demographic picture. Also, in international comparison, we are at the bottom of the European league in mortality and morbidity. The health situation also determines the limit to population growth.

3.4. Limits to growth

The fundamental barrier is the development of the **economy.** If its rate exceeds the rate of population growth, there is no big problem, especially if this is true not for one country but for the world as a whole. However, output growth has never been continuous, there are always crises, and demographic waves are typically not evenly related. International efforts to date have yielded few results. It is also true that the gap between rich and poor has widened considerably recently, whether in international comparisons of countries or in terms of the population's wealth within a country (there are some good examples of the latter, especially in the Nordic world).

The limit of demographic growth is where the **Earth's carrying capacity is**. Nevertheless, until now, no one has been able to say how many people our planet can support. How long can nature sustain us? Could the current population be the maximum? In the 1960s, predicting a world famine was all the rage, but nothing came of it.[19] But: local hunger is also terrible.

3.5. Quality of the population

The quality of the population is also a topic. The number of educated men is the true power of a nation, said the greatest Hungarian already in the first half of the 19th century. Count Széchenyi's statement is even more actual today, which is why it is so sad that the nation's day labourers[20] , who are most responsible for the quality of the next generation, have such low wages. The difference between medical salaries and teachers' salaries is sky-high; how can we expect, except for a few obsessives, that the very best of them should be teachers? Where is the revolution in quality? [21] We are still at the bottom of the EU league table regarding the proportion of people with higher education qualifications in many professional jobs and foreign languages. The Balkans should not be the role model here!

3.6.Pandemics, Covid and Baby boom

Pandemics and epidemics have accompanied human history. In earlier centuries, the Black Death, the plague, was the most significant threat, and the first documented source dates back to the time of the philosopher emperor Marcus Aurelius (165 AD), who contemplated the banks of the Garam, when about a quarter of the population of the Roman Empire died. A similar epidemic occurred in the reign of Justinian (541 AD) but with the loss of half the population.

In the Middle Ages, it was the Black Death of 1331, which also swept across Europe. The appearance of the plague in 1545 killed 80% of the people living in what was then Mexico. Notable among these was the bubonic plague in Baghdad (1772), where 'only' 2 million deaths were due to the first – and effective – quarantine.

As for the demographic impact of these major epidemics, we can say that it was minimal. Although there are no statistics from these periods in the

[19] They are headed by American biologist couple Anne and Paul Ehrlich.
[20] The term was originally used by Vas Gereben to describe actors, but in today's circumstances their pay is no longer the most pitiful.
[21] László Németh wrote a detailed work on the subject, and he himself practised this profession for many years.

present-day sense, it is known that infant mortality is high in normal times, people are prepared for it, and that is why families with 6-8 children, and in some cases even more, are typical. Medical science is underdeveloped, human life spans are short, and marriage and childbearing start at a very young age. After epidemics, there is an initial demographic stagnation, but recovery takes a few years. After that, the average pace of population growth resumed: the rate of population increase was slow, although some researchers (most famously Malthus[22]) have already drawn attention to the limits of the Earth's carrying capacity.

The series of major epidemics ended with the Spanish flu of the 20th century (1918-20), which killed more people than the horrors of the First World War. There is no similar scale until the advent of COVID-19, so we describe it in more detail. It is a pandemic, in fact, the first true pandemic, with at least 3% of the world's population killed. The massive movement of people between continents, especially military deployments, made it almost impossible to track the epidemic and thus stop it. The pandemic of 1918-20 claimed 50 million victims worldwide (other sources estimate 100 million), with an average death rate of 2-4%. The H1N1 virus, known as the Spanish flu, appeared in three or four waves: the first in the spring of 1918, the deadliest between September 1918 and February 1919, and the last in the later months of 1919. In some countries, there was a fourth wave in 1920. The mortality of the Spanish flu is particularly striking: on average, 2.1 % of the population in the 48 countries studied, which covered 92 % of the world's population in 1918, fell victim to the epidemic in these three years.[23] Hungary was below average, with a cumulative mortality rate of 1.27%, while in the worst affected countries (Kenya and India), the rate was over 5%. One researcher has identified a 'rare macroeconomic disaster' in 12 countries, with the lowest point occurring during the Spanish flu, meaning that since 1870, the shock of the Spanish flu period has been eclipsed only by the shocks of the two world wars and the Great Depression.

The current **Covid epidemic** shows how vulnerable people are. Even though the vaccine was produced quickly, it is not known how long it will

[22] An Essay on the Principle of Population from 1798. His main point is that while food production can increase at most in arithmetical order (e.g. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, ...), population increases in geometric order (1, 2, 4, 8, 16, ...).

[23] https://koronavirus.hu/hirek/20200514/a-koronavirus-vagy-a-spanyolnatha-okoz-nagyobb-kart
https://economaniablog.hu/2020/05/14/miert-osszemerheto-a-covid-19-gazdasagi-hagyateka-a-spanyolnathaeval/?utm_source=rss&utm_medium=rss&utm_campaign=miert-osszemerheto-a-covid-19-gazdasagi-hagyateka-a-spanyolnathaeval

last, what its future side effects will be, and what subspecies of infection it will protect against. Nor do we know what new subspecies will emerge against which the current vaccine is ineffective. The development of transport and mass tourism also opens up new perspectives for the global spread of infections. The more densely populated a settlement is, the greater the danger zone and the more vulnerable we may be to a new demographic situation in the near future. A year and a half after the outbreak, the majority of the population in developed countries is already vaccinated, with 58% in Hungary in July 2021, which is about the best, but nearly two dozen countries (e.g. Malta 90%) are ahead of the rest (e.g. Malta). Elsewhere, the situation is disastrous, especially in Asia and Africa, but even in EU member Bulgaria, vaccination coverage is only 15%. There has never been and will never be perfect immunity. All it takes is to appear somewhere with anthrax or some other similar infectious agent, and disaster is already upon us. The risk of this happening is exceptionally high in wartime.

Figure 2. Impact of the Spanish Flu on births



Source: Authors' calculations using data from Linder and Grove (1947).
Note: The month of conception is defined as 9 months prior to the birth.

B Economic Studies at BROOKINGS

US and Scandinavian data suggest that it has had three effects on births. Firstly, it reduced the number of conceptions - presumably due to behavioural changes and a temporary decrease in fertility among men. In addition, at the height of the epidemic, it increased the number of premature births and early miscarriages. In addition, the mortality rate of pregnant mothers and their

late-term fetuses has increased, with a demonstrated increase in the number of advanced pregnancies that do not end in stillbirth.

The current situation is very different from a century ago. Most importantly, far fewer deaths (still under 4 million worldwide) have so far occurred in COVID-19 worldwide. By comparison, the world population in 2020 will be 7.8 billion;[24] i.e. today, an epidemic killing 2.1% of the population would mean the death of some 164 million people. In addition to the differences in the epidemics themselves, advances in medicine and health care are likely to contribute to the lower figures. It is also important to note that the Spanish flu victims were very young, whereas now, it is more likely to affect the elderly. A further difference is that it did not cause a severe farm recession at the world level at the time. Furthermore, it happened at a time when there were no modern dental contraceptives to control fertility easily. However, it should be added that while birth rates continue to fall in many countries, the epidemic has interrupted many procedures worldwide aimed at providing contraception, abortion or other access to maternity care.

Major modern influenza epidemics

Name	Year	World pop.	Type	Infected (estimated)	Deaths worldwide	Case fatality rate
1889–90 influenza	1889–90	1.53 billion	H3N8, H2N2	20–60% (300–900 m)	1 m	0.10–0.28%
Spanish influenza	1918–20	1.80 billion	H1N1	33% (500 m) or >56% (>1 Mrd)	17–100 m	2–3%, ~4%, ~10%
Asian influenza	1957–58	2.90 billion	H2N2	>17% (>500 m)	1–4 m	0.2%-0.67%
Hong-kong influenza	1968–69	3.53 billion	H3N2	>14% (>500 m)	1–4 m	<0.2%
Russian influenza	1977–79	4.21 billion	H1N1	?	0.7 m	?
Swine flu epidemic	2009–10	6.85 billion	H1N1/09	11–21% (0.7–1.4 Mrd)	151,700–575,400	0.01%
Typical seasonal influenza	each year	7.75 billion	A/H3N2, A/H1N1, B, ...	5–15% (340 m – 1 bill.) 3–11% or 5–20% (240 m – 1.6 bill.)	290,000–650,000/year	<0.1%

Source: Hilleman MR (2002): Realities and enigmas of human viral influenza: pathogenesis, epidemio-logy and control". Vaccine. 20 (25–26): 3068–87. doi:10.1016/S0264-410X(02)00254-2. PMID 12163258. and Potter CW (2001): A history of influenza. Journal

[24] https://www.ksh.hu/docs/hun/xftp/stattukor/nepesedesi_vilagnap/2020/index.html

of Applied Microbiology. 91 (4): 572–9. doi:10.1046/j.1365-2672.2001.01492.x. PMID 11576290.

The IMF's latest forecast suggests that the world economy could contract by 3 % in 2020, compared to almost 3 % growth in 2019. A considerable contraction (5-6 %) is expected in developed countries. This means that, although the coronavirus is much less deadly, it will take at least 2-3 years to return to pre-pandemic levels.

In many epidemics and disasters with mortality, we observe a drop in births after 9 months, but this is corrected in the next year or two: i.e. childbearing is delayed. In general, the worse a country's epidemiological indicators were, the greater the drop in births. Likewise, the severity of closures and the decline in the economy correlated with the decline in birth rates.

Economic downturns are usually associated with a fall in birth rates. This is later followed by a pseudo-increased fertility rate - which either compensates for the lost births or at least mitigates the decline in births. From the onset of the recession, a decline in the number of babies occurs in the first 1-2.5 years. This is partly explained by the length of pregnancy but also by the impact of a recession on the number of marriages (linked to the propensity to have children). Thirdly, it is important to know when individuals experience the impact of the crisis in their own lives, which does not necessarily coincide with the course of the virus.

However, the views of those hoping for a **baby boom** are not entirely unfounded. They are usually based on the fact that after various natural disasters, there is often a visible surge in the number of newborns nine months or more after the event. Among others, the 2008 study The fertility effect of catast¬rophe: U.S. hurricane births, by prominent American demographers, clearly shows that hurricanes and other tropical storms do stimulate births. A pandemic can also be classified as a natural disaster, but the important point is that its spread is not local but global, and its temporal scale is much greater, probably taking years to subside since at the time of writing, the wave is still gathering strength in Africa or, for example, in India, the world's second most populous country. So the idea that the world may witness a 'baby boom' of the coronavirus in nine months' time is not as overwhelming as it may seem. Such predictions are common in the aftermath of disasters, especially those in which citizens are ordered to shelters. Extreme weather events are a prominent example, with a surge in births expected after Hurricane Sandy (2013), blizzards in New York State (2015), and Hurricanes Harvey, Irma and Maria (2017). A 2008 study found that hurricanes and tropical storms are associated with increased birth rates after nine months.

Epidemics, disasters and baby boom



Source: https://www.economist.com/graphic-detail/2020/04/03/will-the-coronavirus-lockdown-lead-to-a-baby-boom

The **Covid-19 pandemic** quickly changed the world, triggering an economic crisis unprecedented in two centuries and transforming social interactions and habits. The wearing of protective masks became compulsory, not only in health care institutions but also in all social contacts; we began to use disinfectants in everyday life, to keep a distance (1.5 metres in some places, 2 or 3 metres in others), to wash our hands more often and more thoroughly than before, to quarantine the infected and their environment, and to treat the most serious cases in hospital. Clubs and museums were closed, restaurants stopped serving buffets and later only takeaway food. Tourism has almost disappeared, airports are empty, and we no longer board the bus at the front door. These restrictions have slowed the spread of the virus without causing a complete disaster in health care. The real breakthrough came with the advent of vaccines, with vaccines that are truly effective in fighting the virus being developed almost from scratch.[25] As early as summer 2020, the European Union (EU) is negotiating with pharmaceutical companies to buy the vaccine from AstraZeneca, Moderna and Pfizer to implement the trials. The necessary trials will be completed, and marketing authorisation will be

[25] Of course, virological research has been done before. For example, Katalin Karikó and her team have been working on mRNA research for several decades, but practical applications have not been in the forefront.

granted in December 2020 and January 2021 respectively. Mass vaccination will start everywhere in the spring, with more than half of the Hungarian population vaccinated by the end of May 2021.

There have been major changes in the life of society, and there are certainly many that will have an impact even after the virus has passed. New demographic trends have been set in motion, and these will have an impact on population trends.[26] There is little experience. The elapsed time is relatively short; the Hungarian virus story really only begins with the March 2020 restrictions, and if we take into account the 9 months of the pregnancy, the first demographic effects can only really be measured from the beginning of 2021, i.e. we do not even have half a year of data. Nevertheless, we consider it very important to examine the new situation, because we believe that it has a very significant impact not only on the number of children born but also on the social relations involved, in all areas from starting a family to education and working at home.

We already have some data and statistics. We can see some of the social movements and how the coronavirus affects mortality trends and population change. The World Health Organisation has previously said that the pandemic has so far claimed around 3.4 million lives. However, the real figure could be in the region of 6-8 million, says Samira Asma, deputy director of the organisation's data analysis office, in her latest report.[27] While many claim that cohabitation is expected to lead to a rise in births, demographers say that past examples do not support this. In the short term, fertility tends to fall in the event of similar moral crises, natural disasters and epidemics, mainly because of uncertainties about the economic outlook and health risks.[28] On the other hand, the COVID-19 pandemic is taking place in the world of electronic media and the Internet, where the sense of confinement has changed compared to previous epidemics.

January 2021 was the first month in which babies conceived during the epidemic were born, and data from 21 countries show an average 11% drop in the number of births per 1,000 people compared to January 2020.

[26] Sannigrahi, S., Pilla, F., Basu, B., Basu, A. S., & Molter, A. (2020). Examining the association between socio-demographic composition and COVID-19 fatalities in the European region using spatial regression approach. Sustainable cities and society, 62, 102418.
[27] WHO report 2021 May
[28] https://demografia.hu/hu/letoltes/tudastar/covid-info/szakirodalom-10-IZA-Discussion-Papers.pdf

Furthermore, compared to what would be expected based on fertility figures for the period 2009-2019, there is a 12 % drop.[29]

Number of births per 1,000 people, difference compared to 2009–19 (average * % point in month, average of 21 countries with available data)



Source: https://www.economist.com/graphic-detail/2021/05/15/park-visits-predict-changes-in-birth-rates-during-the-pandemic?utm_campaign=editorial-social&utm_medium=social-organic&utm_source=facebook&fbclid=IwAR1DICZWtjnBxP4cDA_eC0uTvmVm6_Z-nuQprP8MTIExB-L6HlROz_IuAJY

The increase in **mortality** predicted by the WHO, if the disease continues to affect mainly the older age group, will not necessarily have an impact on the lives of fertile individuals and will therefore not pose a physical barrier to childbearing. Although the intimacy associated with quarantine could theoretically increase the chances of having a baby nine months later, market reports of a dramatic increase in condom sales suggest caution, as couples having sex to pass the time does not necessarily mean they will have a baby. Not to mention that in China's Vuhan province, for example, the end of the quarantine has seen a sharp increase in divorce filings.

The most determining factor, according to experience so far, is the development of the **economy**, including **unemployment**. A deep recession, or even the threat of one, can significantly discourage people who can have children from having children or even starting a family. Nevertheless, the

[29] https://qubit.hu/2021/05/19/tobb-szuletes-maradhat-el-a-jarvany-miatt-mint-ahanyan-meghaltak-covid-19-ben

good news is that responsible policies can repair the damage and even if a downturn does occur, historical experience suggests that it is unlikely to be permanent.

Millions of families, including young couples, are now living their lives in isolation because of the crown virus. What would they use all this free time for if not to have children? Some optimists say that babies will be popping out nine months into the quarantine. The President of Ukraine, Europe's most demographically declining country, has also been struck by the idea, with Volodymyr Zelensky calling on citizens to take advantage of the lock-in and try to tilt their country's disastrous demographic curve upwards, even by European standards.

Some, of course, come to a different conclusion. The **pessimists** believe that the insecurity of existence in the wake of the pandemic will severely discourage childbearing. Not to mention, the cynics add, that young parents who now spend months cooped up with their children without any help from relatives, teachers or other sources will think twice or thrice about having another child on top of the ones they already have. In any case, the fact is that in most countries in Europe, the number of births did not increase during the pandemic, the trend of a slow but steady decline in the number of newborns continued unabated, which in the demographic data was accompanied by an increase in the number of deaths, which meant that overall the population was shrinking and shrinking at a higher rate than usual. However, it should be noted that it is impossible to draw any conclusions on long-term trends from the data for a few months.

An infectious disease such as COVID-19, which at the macro level negatively affects the economy and causes prolonged unemployment and at micro level has significant psychological effects such as anxiety, fear, insecurity and strains on marital relationships, would trigger a negative trend in birth figures even if it would otherwise cause few deaths. Researchers at the Brookings Institution expect 300-500,000 fewer newborns in the US next year, and in Australia, COVID is expected to reinforce already declining birth trends.[30]

The fact that the **mum hotel** (hotel mama) is still a trend during the pandemic does not increase the propensity to have children, a phenomenon (also known as Peter Pan syndrome) affecting the masses in Hungary. According to a recent survey by OTP Bank, one-fifth of Hungarian households have children of adult age, and 27% of these are children who have

[30] https://qubit.hu/2020/08/11/a-jelek-szerint-elmarad-a-karanten-miatt-vart-baby-boom

completed their studies and are self-employed.[31] This is not the result of the pandemic, as it was before, although there is no doubt that the few people who were hesitant about a possible change are now even more keen to keep their situation unchanged. Anyone who does not start a family before the age of 40 is unlikely to do so later, and in the case of women, the biological clock is also ticking. Even during the epidemic, homosexuality and even same-sex marriage are spreading, even in church circles. Even in Catholic churches, such couples are being blessed, which was never before. Moreover, how the world is changing: evangelicals now have a transgender bishop.[32] Adoption is undoubtedly a noble cause and a qualitative leap in the child's development, but it does not improve the demographic situation of society.

The **lack of pregnancy and gynaecological services** or the necessary equipment and drug deliveries, as well as the interruption of services, prevented many women from accessing family planning services, the UN Population Fund reported. They estimate that 23 million women in low- and middle-income countries may not have had access to family planning services in the first year of the pandemic, leading to 2.7 million unplanned pregnancies. Some countries, such as Indonesia, are preparing for the boom as coronavirus restrictions have hampered access to contraceptives.[33]

The development of **unemployment among those of childbearing age** is significant from the point of view of fertility. Even within this, at least during the crises so far, the male unemployment rate was the most decisive factor, reflecting the traditional family model that occurs in many places. Several studies have shown that in Southern Europe, especially in Spain and Greece, the main reasons for the high and long-term unemployment and precarious labour market situation of young people (even if they had a job, they were often employed on a short-term contract), the late formation of stable relationships and the late founding of families, as well as behind a low fertility rate (number of births/woman) even in European comparison. Unsurprisingly, the economic sector is essential: during a crisis, the decline in childbearing among self-employed individuals can be greater, while for women working in the public sector, less insecurity can result in a reduction in the decline in births.

[31] https://24.hu/tudomany/2018/04/15/mamahotel-40-eves-pszichologia-levalas/
[32] https://felszabter.hvgblog.hu/2021/05/15/az-elso-transznemu-puspok-az-evangelikus-egyhazban/
[33] https://www.forbes.com/sites/roberthart/2021/05/05/american-birth-and-fertility-rates-plunge-to-all-time-lows-during-covid-pandemic-cdc-says/?sh=428d5a107aa8

We do not know what effect the pandemic will have on **fertility capacity** in the long term. The side effects of vaccines are also unknown. All vaccines are new; the multi-year effects – if any – are later. In any case, even before the pandemic, the health profession noticed that more and more couples are coming to them with the problem that they want children but are unable to. It is part of the completeness of the picture that the time of the birth of the expected first child has been greatly delayed, and as much as a late marriage is financially advantageous, it is just as disadvantageous from a biological point of view. In the Hungarian medical universities of the 1970s, it was still taught that having a first child for a woman over 30 is particularly dangerous, so it is desirable to bring it earlier. Today, it is not rare for women over 40 to have their first child, and we even come across cases over 50 in the press, which is turning from a curiosity into a frequency.

There can be big differences between countries in **family policy** and the welfare net, which is also not incidental from the point of view of having children. In Finland, for example, despite the deep recession of 1992-1994, the number of second and third children increased. Furthermore, especially for unemployed women under 30, having children became an attractive option since instead of an uncertain and burdensome labour market situation, the possibility of staying at home for 3 years and the related child-rearing support came with greater stability. Similarly, in Iceland, during the deepening recession of 2009, the somewhat increased fertility rate was linked to the generous family policy. In Norway, the number of births increased significantly during the epidemic; even Norwegian researchers explain this differently because no significant socio-economic changes would have justified this. For example, the main goal of Swedish family policy is not to increase the number of children but to improve women's participation in the labour market and thereby create equal opportunities.[34]

In the USA, due to COVID-19, the unemployment rate in 2020 jumped from 3.5 % to 14.7 % in April and to 13.3 % in May; however, it resulted in about 19.7 and 16.3 %. This economic shock alone causes a 7-10 % decrease in births in the following years. Based on the 3.8 million births in 2019, this means a decrease of between 266,000 and 380,000 births by 2026. In addition to the economic impact, health and psychological factors, such as uncertainty and anxiety, are also likely to play a role, and, to some extent, the direct consequences of social distancing and isolation. A combination of the economic recession and modern contraception, a decline of 300-500,000 births

[34] https://qubit.hu/2019/02/14/hogyan-lehetne-valoban-elerni-hogy-tobb-gyerek-szulessen-magyarorszagon

is projected in the United States. This will be further strengthened if the labour market remains weak after 2020. The conditions are likely to be permanent and cause a prolonged loss of income for many people. Also, it can be expected that many such births will not only be delayed - but will never happen. Roughly 3.6 million babies were born in 2020, the fewest births since 1979.



3.7.LGBTQ

The pushing of traditional families into the background is not good for childbearing. In the developed world, **LGBTQ is on the rise**, with the rainbow flag appearing in more and more places. The gender world is booming, and under the guise of pseudo-liberalism, it is spreading nicely. The new ideals of parenthood and the distorted (?) family are emerging, and the gender-switching trend is set to grow. We have only seen a scattering of these in the past, even abroad, and even medicine has not been able to do so.

In many countries, there are anti-gay laws – in the Hungarian press, more like the Pedophile Law – while in others, there are explicitly supportive measures. This can and does confuse people's minds; it is difficult to draw a clear line, perhaps not even possible. Nor is it possible to see any future impact.

II. European Union

This section describes the population and family policy practice in the European Union and some countries within it. The initial idea is to look for successful foreign examples and best practices that Hungarian governmental bodies could adopt, in whole or in part.

As a preliminary point, it is worth noting that there is no general example to follow, but at most, some elements of family policies could be used. No EU countries have been able to tackle this issue with a lucky hand, if not in terms of success in slowing population decline. Migration must be treated separately because allowing immigration increases the population, but it also creates unintended and, in some cases, unmanageable social tensions.

The situation is different in other parts of the world. In countries in Europe where economic development is more modest, and the degree of civilisation is lower, there are results, be it Kosovo or Moldova in previous decades. Population growth has led to the creation of independent states, particularly in the south of the former Yugoslavia, where the Albanian population has grown several times as fast as the Serbian population, and the fragmentation of the southern Slav state has also led to the creation of a new state that is entirely different from the southern Slavic traditions and language. Is this the best practice, the demographic success, the solution to Trianon? In any case, the fact is that the proportion of Serbs in the new country of 2 million is already well below 10% (some 200,000 left after 1999, after the withdrawal of Serbian troops). The independent state was established in 2008, and Hungary recognised it in the same year. Family policy in a country with a GDP per capita of 4649 USD?[35] The last decades have been about the fact that a good part of the Albanians went to work in the West, bought the Serbs' properties cheaply with the money they saved, created a situation and thus, the state was formed in the area that, for centuries, practically until today, was the cradle of Serbian culture, and today the bells are no longer ringing but the muezzin's roar. There is no successful demographic policy in the more prosperous European countries.

The situation is similar in poorer regions beyond Europe, whether in Asia, Africa or Central and South America. However, this cannot be called a successful population policy in these countries since, in many places, population growth should be reduced, at least to the level of economic growth, so

[35] For comparison Hungary: 18,535 USD/person

as not to increase poverty. In other words, a negative demographic policy would be successful here, as we have already seen examples of, for example, the one-child family model in Chinese families. The earth's carrying capacity is also finite, and the family form of 6-8-10 children does not really fit in with sustainable development. This was the practice in the past, but even a hundred years ago, most children did not reach adulthood, so reproduction was justified. However, even in less developed countries, modern medicine has been introduced, infant mortality has fallen, and life expectancy has increased everywhere.

As almost all countries in the region are facing similar problems, in addition to the general European picture, the population policies of the five most populous countries of the EU (Germany, France, Italy, Spain, Slovenia) and one smaller country (Austria, which is similar to Hungary in terms of area and population) will be presented in more detail, with an effort to learn about their advantages and disadvantages, focusing in particular on what can and/or should be put into practice in Hungary. What is the demographic situation in Europe? What changes are taking place in the population movement?

4. General overview

The starting point for the general overview is natural increase/decrease. The heat map below shows that the more developed part of the world is in the blue zone, i.e. population growth is very low, between 0 and 10, or, as in most of the Central and Eastern European countries, rather in the negative range between 0 and -10. Sub-Saharan and Central Africa, the Middle East, and South-West Asia are the growth drivers.



Source: The Natural increase in population per 1000 people, from the CIA World Factbook, 2017.

4.1. Population structure

The KSH table provides detailed data on population change in Europe and some other countries today, i.e., in 2020. They show that Hungary (-3.8) is well below the mid-range in terms of population change per 1000 inhabitants (EU average: -0.8). However, for completeness, all the countries that are performing well, i.e. those approaching a positive figure (France, Luxembourg, Ireland, Sweden, etc.), have achieved their results by pursuing an intensive immigration policy. No EU country can achieve at least 0 in its traditional population, i.e. through its successful family policy, so we will not present best practices. The statistics do not indicate which ethnic groups within a country have a higher birth rate, but it is likely that, as in Hungary, the rate is significantly higher for races of Indian and other Asian origin, so too for those from Africa and Asia in the case of former colonial countries.

Natural increase/decrease (per thousand inhabitants)

Country	2000	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019
Austria	0,2	0,2	0,2	-0,1	0,0	0,4	0,2	0,8	0,5	0,2	0,2
Belgium	1,1	2,3	2,2	1,7	1,5	1,8	1,0	1,2	0,9	0,7	0,6
Bulgaria	-5,1	-4,7	-5,1	-5,5	-5,2	-5,7	-6,2	-6,0	-6,5	-6,6	-6,7
Cyprus	4,5	5,7	4,8	5,2	4,9	4,5	3,9	4,7	3,8	4,1	4,1
Czech Republic	-1,8	1,0	0,2	0,0	-0,2	0,4	0,0	0,5	0,3	0,1	0,0
Denmark	1,7	1,6	1,2	1,0	0,6	1,0	1,0	1,5	1,4	1,1	1,2
Estonia	-3,8	0,0	-0,4	-1,1	-1,3	-1,5	-1,0	-1,0	-1,3	-1,0	-1,0
Finland	1,4	1,9	1,7	1,4	1,2	0,9	0,5	-0,2	-0,6	-1,3	-1,5
France	4,4	4,4	4,3	3,8	3,7	3,9	3,1	2,9	2,4	2,2	2,1
Greece	-0,2	0,5	-0,4	-1,5	-1,6	-2,0	-2,7	-2,4	-3,3	-3,2	-3,9
Netherlands	4,2	2,9	2,7	2,1	1,8	2,1	1,4	1,4	1,1	0,9	1,0
Croatia	-1,5	-2,0	-2,3	-2,3	-2,5	-2,7	-4,0	-3,4	-4,1	-3,9	-3,9
Ireland	6,1	10,4	10,0	9,2	8,5	8,2	7,5	7,0	6,6	6,2	5,8
Poland	0,3	0,9	0,3	0,0	-0,5	0,0	-0,7	-0,2	0,0	-0,7	-0,9
Latvia	-5,0	-4,9	-4,7	-4,5	-4,0	-3,4	-3,3	-3,4	-4,1	-4,9	-4,7
Lithuania	-1,4	-3,7	-3,6	-3,5	-3,9	-3,4	-3,5	-3,7	-4,0	-4,1	-3,9
Luxembourg	4,5	4,2	3,5	4,0	4,2	4,0	3,7	3,6	3,2	3,2	3,1
Hungary	**-3,7**	**-4,0**	**-4,1**	**-3,9**	**-3,8**	**-3,3**	**-4,0**	**-3,2**	**-3,8**	**-3,9**	**-3,8**
Malta	3,7	2,1	2,2	1,7	1,9	2,1	2,0	2,5	1,6	1,6	1,3
Germany	-0,9	-2,2	-2,4	-2,4	-2,6	-1,9	-2,3	-1,4	-1,8	-2,0	-1,9
Italy	-0,2	-0,4	-0,8	-1,3	-1,4	-1,6	-2,7	-2,3	-3,2	-3,2	-3,6
Portugal	1,4	-0,4	-0,6	-1,7	-2,3	-2,2	-2,2	-2,3	-2,3	-2,5	-2,5
Romania	-0,9	-2,3	-2,7	-2,7	-2,9	-2,8	-3,1	-2,7	-3,0	-3,1	-3,8
Spain	0,9	2,3	1,8	1,1	0,8	0,7	0,0	0,0	-0,7	-1,2	-1,2
Sweden	-0,3	2,7	2,3	2,2	2,4	2,7	2,4	2,7	2,3	2,3	2,5
Slovakia	0,5	1,3	1,7	0,6	0,5	0,7	0,3	1,0	0,7	0,6	0,7
Slovenia	-0,2	1,8	1,6	1,3	0,9	1,1	0,4	0,3	-0,1	-0,4	-0,6
EU27_2020	**0,5**	**0,6**	**0,3**	**-0,1**	**-0,3**	**0,0**	**-0,7**	**-0,3**	**-0,8**	**-1,0**	**-1,1**
United Kingdom	1,2	3,9	4,0	3,8	3,2	3,2	2,7	2,7	2,3	1,8	1,6
EU28	**0,6**	**1,0**	**0,8**	**0,4**	**0,2**	**0,4**	**-0,2**	**0,0**	**-0,4**	**-0,6**	**-0,8**
Eurozone-19	**1,0**	**0,9**	**0,7**	**0,3**	**0,1**	**0,3**	**-0,4**	**-0,1**	**-0,6**	**-0,9**	**-0,9**
Iceland	8,8	9,1	7,9	8,0	6,7	7,1	5,9	5,1	5,3	5,6	6,0
North Macedonia	5,9	2,5	1,6	1,7	1,9	1,9	1,3	1,2	0,7	0,8	-0,3
Montenegro	6,2	2,9	2,2	2,5	2,5	2,4	1,7	1,8	1,5	1,2	1,0
Norway	3,4	4,1	3,8	3,6	3,5	3,6	3,5	3,5	3,0	2,7	2,6
Russia	-6,6	-1,7	-0,9	0,0	0,2	0,2	0,3	0,0	-0,9	-0,9	..
Switzerland	2,2	2,3	2,4	2,2	2,2	2,6	2,3	2,7	2,4	2,4	2,1
Serbia	-4,0	-4,8	-5,2	-4,9	-4,8	-4,9	-5,4	-5,1	-5,5	-5,4	-5,3
Turkey	14,0	11,8	11,4	11,7	12,0	12,3	11,8	11,2	10,8	10,1	9,1
India	17,7	13,6	13,1	12,6	12,2	11,8	11,4	11,1	10,9	10,6	..
Israel	15,7	16,6	16,1	16,3	16,1	16,3	16,0	16,1	16,0	15,8	..
Japan	1,7	-1,0	-1,6	-1,8	-1,9	-2,1	-2,3	-2,7	-3,2	-3,6	..
China	7,6	4,8	4,8	5,0	4,9	5,2	5,0	5,9	5,3	3,8	..
Republic of Korea	8,1	4,3	4,3	4,3	3,3	3,3	3,2	2,4	1,4	0,6	..
Egypt	19,4	21,0	21,7	22,2	22,4	22,4	22,2	21,8	21,2	20,6	..

Brazil	13,9	9,3	9,0	8,8	8,6	8,4	8,2	8,0	7,7	7,5	..
United States	5,9	5,0	4,6	4,5	4,2	4,3	4,0	3,7	3,2	3,0	..
Canada	3,6	4,1	3,9	3,9	3,6	3,5	3,3	3,2	2,8	2,4	..
Mexico	19,1	14,8	14,4	14,0	13,6	13,2	12,8	12,4	12,0	11,6	..
Australia	6,3	7,2	7,0	7,1	6,9	6,6	6,3	6,3	6,1	6,3	..
New Zealand	7,8	8,2	7,1	7,1	6,6	5,8	6,4	6,0	5,5	5,1	..

Source: KSH (2021): 7.1.5. Természetes szaporodás/fogyás (–) (2000–)*(2/2)

Fertility rate (1960-2018)

	1960	1970	1980	1990	2000	2010	2016	2017	2018
EU-27	**:**	**:**	**:**	**:**	**:**	**1,57**	**1,57**	**1,56**	**1,55**
Belgium	2,54	2,25	1,68	1,62	1,67	1,86	1,68	1,65	1,62
Bulgaria	2,31	2,17	2,05	1,82	1,26	1,57	1,54	1,56	1,56
Czechia	2,09	1,92	2,08	1,90	1,15	1,51	1,63	1,69	1,71
Denmark	2,57	1,95	1,55	1,67	1,77	1,87	1,79	1,75	1,73
Germany	:	:	:	:	1,38	1,39	1,60	*1,57*	*1,57*
Estonia	1,98	2,17	2,02	2,05	1,36	1,72	1,60	1,59	1,67
Ireland	3,78	3,85	3,21	2,11	1,89	2,05	1,81	1,77	1,75
Greece	2,23	2,40	2,23	1,39	1,25	1,48	1,38	1,35	1,35
Spain	:	:	2,22	1,36	1,22	1,37	1,34	1,31	1,26
France	:	:	:	:	1,89	2,03	*1,93*	*1,90*	*1,88*
Croatia	:	:	:	:	:	1,55	1,42	1,42	1,47
Italy	2,37	2,38	1,64	1,33	1,26	1,46	1,34	1,32	1,29
Cyprus	:	:	:	2,41	1,64	1,44	1,37	1,32	1,32
Latvia	:	:	:	:	1,25	1,36	1,74	1,69	1,60
Lithuania	:	2,40	1,99	2,03	1,39	1,50	1,69	1,63	1,63
Luxembourg	2,29	1,97	1,50	1,60	1,76	1,63	1,41	1,39	1,38
Hungary	**2,02**	**1,98**	**1,91**	**1,87**	**1,32**	**1,25**	**1,53**	**1,54**	**1,55**
Malta	:	:	1,99	2,04	1,68	1,36	1,37	1,26	1,23
Netherlands	3,12	2,57	1,60	1,62	1,72	1,79	1,66	1,62	1,59
Austria	2,69	2,29	1,65	1,46	1,36	1,44	1,53	1,52	1,47
Poland	:	:	:	2,06	1,37	1,41	1,39	1,48	1,46
Portugal	3,16	3,01	2,25	1,56	1,55	1,39	1,36	1,38	1,42
Romania	:	:	2,43	1,83	1,31	1,59	1,69	1,71	1,76
Slovenia	:	:	:	1,46	1,26	1,57	1,58	1,62	1,60
Slovakia	3,04	2,41	2,32	2,09	1,30	1,43	1,48	1,52	1,54
Finland	2,72	1,83	1,63	1,78	1,73	1,87	1,57	1,49	1,41
Sweden	:	1,92	1,68	2,13	1,54	1,98	1,85	1,78	1,76
United Kingdom	:	:	1,90	1,83	1,64	1,92	1,79	1,74	1,68
Iceland	:	2,81	2,48	2,30	2,08	2,20	1,74	1,71	1,71
Liechtenstein	:	:	:	:	1,57	1,40	1,61	1,44	1,58
Norway	:	2,50	1,72	1,93	1,85	1,95	1,71	1,62	1,56
Switzerland	2,44	2,10	1,55	1,58	1,50	1,52	1,54	1,52	1,52
Montenegro	:	:	:	:	:	1,70	1,79	1,78	1,76
North Macedonia	:	:	:	:	1,88	1,56	1,50	1,43	1,42

Albania	:	:	:	:	:	1,63	1,54	1,48	1,37
Serbia	:	:	:	:	1,48	1,40	1,46	1,49	1,49
Turkey	:	:	:	:	:	2,04	2,11	2,07	1,99

Source: Eurostat (2020): Fertility statistics

Of the EU Member States, France reported the highest total fertility rate in 2018, with 1.88 live births per woman. It was followed by Sweden and Romania with 1.76 live births and Ireland with 1.75. In contrast, the lowest total fertility rates in 2018 were recorded in Malta (1.23), Spain (1.26), Italy (1.29), Cyprus (1.32), Greece (1.35) and Luxembourg (1.38).

In most EU Member States, the total fertility rate fell significantly between 1980 and 2000-2003, with Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Greece, Spain, Italy, Latvia, Slovenia and Slovakia all having fertility rates below 1.30 by 2000. After reaching a low point between 2000 and 2003, total fertility rates increased in seventeen Member States, with all but Malta, Spain and Italy reporting total fertility rates above 1.30 in 2018.

Over the past 45 years, the **extremes of the total fertility rate** in the EU Member States **have generally converged**: in 1970, the difference between the highest (recorded in Ireland) and lowest (recorded in Finland) rates was around 2.0 live births. By 1990, this gap - between the low in Cyprus and the low in Italy - had narrowed to 1.1 live births per woman. By 2010, the gap had narrowed further to 0.8 live births. By 2018, the gap had narrowed to 0.6, with France's highest total fertility rate and the lowest in Malta. The equilibrium would be ideal if the average increased at least towards a sustainable population replacement rate.[36]

The low fertility rate also means that there are many **families with one or two children**. In 2018, almost half (45.5%) of children born in the EU-27 were firstborns, a share that exceeds half in Romania, Luxembourg, Portugal, Malta and Bulgaria. In contrast, the share of first-born children was lowest in Estonia (36.7%), Ireland (38.4%) and Latvia (39.5%). In the EU-27, more than one-third (36.2%) of all live births in 2018 were second-born children, around one-eighth (12.5%) were third-born children, and the remaining 5.7% were children born four or later. In the EU Member States, Finland (10.9%), followed by Ireland (9.3%) and Belgium (8.3%), registered the largest share of all live births in the fourth or later ranking.

[36] Vignoli, D., Guetto, R., Bazzani, G., Pirani, E., & Minello, A. (2020). A reflection on economic uncertainty and fertility in Europe: The narrative framework. Genus, 76(1), 1-27.

Another important part of the demographic picture is **mortality**. How long do people in a country expect to live? Long and healthy lives are within reach due to the interaction between the scientific and technological revolution and socio-economic development. The chances of survival have improved so much that life expectancy at birth has doubled by the 21st century compared to earlier ages. It has become a worldwide trend to extend human life expectancy, especially in the 20th and 21st centuries, when advances in medicine, the management of epidemics, the development of social networks and the mass emergence of education have had/are having an impact almost everywhere. Life expectancy at birth in ancient times was under 40 years, while the world average in 2010 (eleventh column in the table above) is over 60 years.

The following graph illustrates the drastic change that has taken place over the last 100 years. This is an entirely new situation that needs to be addressed. This positive phenomenon brings several new challenges, ranging from the transformation of health care to new types and increasing numbers of elderly care services. We are convinced that it is a very good time for international cooperation, even if a country's traditions, cultures, religions, or groups of countries are completely different. We live on a globe.

To the first figure in this chapter, it is worth adding that life expectancy has increased significantly in recent decades. It is particularly interesting to note that the best-performing African countries are experiencing rapid population growth due to high fertility and a 50 % increase in average life expectancy from 40 to 60 years.

Life expectancy at birth by region (years)



Source: UN World Population Prospects 2008.

Today, however, differences in life expectancy between continents, countries and even between groups of people within a country are greater than in the past. All the great epochs of epidemiological development are present on Earth simultaneously: epidemics and famines, the era of persistent infectious and chronic diseases.

However, in Europe – with the exception of one or two underdeveloped (economically and therefore also in terms of health) countries – life expectancy is above 70 years everywhere. Table 3 presents the data for each country. Compared with its EU peers, Hungary's figures are not very good. Moreover, by international comparison, life expectancy in good health is very low: 60 years. We also lead in mortality statistics for several groups of diseases (certain cancers, cardiovascular diseases). There are several ICD codes[37] where Hungary unfortunately ranks first. All this shows that the Hungarian health sector has urgent work to do. Doing the most important ones would bring about an almost immediate improvement in demographic indicators and even have a knock-on effect on the fertility rate.

[37] International Classification of Diseases (ICD), the international classification of diseases

Average life expectancy at birth - total (2000-) (years)

Country	2000	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018
Austria	78,3	80,7	81,1	81,1	81,3	81,6	81,3	81,8	81,7	81,8
Belgium	77,9	80,3	80,7	80,5	80,7	81,4	81,1	81,5	81,6	81,7
Bulgaria	71,6	73,8	74,2	74,4	74,9	74,5	74,7	74,9	74,8	75,0
Cyprus	77,7	81,5	81,2	81,1	82,5	82,3	81,8	82,7	82,2	82,9
Czech Republic	75,1	77,7	78,0	78,1	78,3	78,9	78,7	79,1	79,1	79,1
Denmark	76,9	79,3	79,9	80,2	80,4	80,7	80,8	80,9	81,1	81,0
Estonia	71,1	76,0	76,6	76,7	77,5	77,4	78,0	78,0	78,4	78,5
Finland	77,8	80,2	80,6	80,7	81,1	81,3	81,6	81,5	81,7	81,8
France	79,2	81,8	82,3	82,1	82,4	82,9	82,4	82,7	82,7	82,9
Greece	78,6	80,6	80,8	80,7	81,4	81,5	81,1	81,5	81,4	81,9
Netherlands	78,2	81,0	81,3	81,2	81,4	81,8	81,6	81,7	81,8	81,9
Croatia	..	76,7	77,2	77,3	77,8	77,9	77,5	78,2	78,0	78,2
Ireland	76,6	80,8	80,9	80,9	81,0	81,4	81,5	81,7	82,2	82,3
Poland	73,8	76,4	76,8	76,9	77,1	77,8	77,5	78,0	77,8	77,7
Latvia	..	73,1	73,9	74,1	74,3	74,5	74,8	74,9	74,9	75,1
Lithuania	72,1	73,3	73,7	74,1	74,1	74,7	74,6	74,9	75,8	76,0
Luxembourg	78,0	80,8	81,1	81,5	81,9	82,3	82,4	82,7	82,1	82,3
Hungary	**71,9**	**74,7**	**75,1**	**75,3**	**75,8**	**76,0**	**75,7**	**76,2**	**76,0**	**76,2**
Malta	78,5	81,5	80,9	80,9	81,9	82,1	82,0	82,6	82,4	82,5
Germany	78,3	80,5	80,6	80,7	80,6	81,2	80,7	81,0	81,1	81,0
Italy	79,9	82,2	82,4	82,4	82,9	83,2	82,7	83,4	83,1	83,4
Portugal	76,8	80,1	80,7	80,6	80,9	81,3	81,3	81,3	81,6	81,5
Romania	71,2	73,7	74,4	74,4	75,1	75,0	74,9	75,2	75,3	75,3
Spain	79,3	82,4	82,6	82,5	83,2	83,3	83,0	83,5	83,4	83,5
Sweden	79,8	81,6	81,9	81,8	82,0	82,3	82,2	82,4	82,5	82,6
Slovakia	73,3	75,6	76,1	76,3	76,6	77,0	76,7	77,3	77,3	77,4
Slovenia	76,2	79,8	80,1	80,3	80,5	81,2	80,9	81,2	81,2	81,5
EU27_2020	**..**	**79,8**	**80,1**	**80,2**	**80,5**	**80,8**	**80,5**	**80,9**	**80,9**	**81,0**
United Kingdom	78,0	80,6	81,0	81,0	81,1	81,4	81,0	81,2	81,3	81,3
EU28	**..**	**79,9**	**80,2**	**80,3**	**80,5**	**80,9**	**80,6**	**81,0**	**80,9**	**81,0**
Eurozone-19	**..**	**81,1**	**81,3**	**81,3**	**81,6**	**82,0**	**81,6**	**82,0**	**82,0**	**82,1**
Iceland	79,7	81,9	82,4	83,0	82,1	82,9	82,5	82,2	82,6	82,9
Norway	78,8	81,2	81,4	81,5	81,8	82,2	82,4	82,5	82,7	82,8
Russia	65,5	68,8	69,7	70,1	70,6	70,7	71,2	71,7	72,4	72,7
Switzerland	80,0	82,7	82,8	82,8	82,9	83,3	83,0	83,7	83,7	83,8
Turkey	70,0	74,5	74,9	75,4	75,8	76,2	76,5	76,9	77,2	77,4
India	62,5	66,7	67,1	67,5	67,9	68,3	68,6	68,9	69,2	69,4
Israel	79,0	81,6	81,7	81,7	82,1	82,2	82,1	82,4	82,6	82,8
Japan	81,1	82,8	82,6	83,1	83,3	83,6	83,8	84,0	84,1	84,2
China	71,4	74,4	74,7	75,0	75,3	75,6	75,9	76,2	76,5	76,7
Brazil	70,1	73,6	73,9	74,2	74,5	74,7	75,0	75,2	75,5	75,7
United States	76,6	78,5	78,6	78,7	78,7	78,8	78,7	78,5	78,5	78,5
Canada	79,1	81,2	81,4	81,6	81,7	81,8	81,9	81,9	81,9	81,9
Mexico	74,3	75,1	75,0	75,0	74,9	74,9	74,9	74,9	74,9	75,0
Australia	79,2	81,7	81,9	82,0	82,1	82,3	82,4	82,4	82,5	82,7

Source: KSH (2021): 7.1.8. Születéskor várható átlagos élettartam – összesen (2000–) [év]

Average life expectancy at birth - men (2000-) (years)

Country	2000	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018
Austria	75,2	77,8	78,3	78,4	78,6	79,1	78,8	79,3	79,4	79,4
Belgium	74,6	77,5	78,0	77,8	78,1	78,8	78,7	79,0	79,2	79,4
Bulgaria	68,4	70,3	70,7	70,9	71,3	71,1	71,2	71,3	71,4	71,5
Cyprus	75,4	79,2	79,3	78,9	80,1	80,3	79,9	80,5	80,2	80,9
Czech Republic	71,6	74,5	74,8	75,1	75,2	75,8	75,7	76,1	76,1	76,2
Denmark	74,5	77,2	77,8	78,1	78,3	78,7	78,8	79,0	79,2	79,1
Estonia	65,6	70,9	71,4	71,4	72,8	72,4	73,2	73,3	73,8	74,0
Finland	74,2	76,9	77,3	77,7	78,0	78,4	78,7	78,6	78,9	79,1
France	75,3	78,2	78,7	78,7	79,0	79,5	79,2	79,5	79,6	79,7
Greece	75,9	78,0	78,0	78,0	78,7	78,8	78,5	78,9	78,8	79,3
Netherlands	75,6	78,9	79,4	79,3	79,5	80,0	79,9	80,0	80,2	80,3
Croatia	..	73,4	73,8	73,9	74,5	74,7	74,4	75,0	74,9	74,9
Ireland	74,0	78,5	78,6	78,7	78,9	79,3	79,6	79,8	80,4	80,5
Poland	69,6	72,2	72,5	72,6	73,0	73,7	73,5	73,9	73,9	73,7
Latvia	..	67,9	68,6	68,9	69,3	69,1	69,7	69,8	69,8	70,1
Lithuania	66,7	67,6	68,1	68,4	68,5	69,2	69,2	69,5	70,7	70,9
Luxembourg	74,6	77,9	78,5	79,1	79,8	79,4	80,0	80,1	79,9	80,1
Hungary	**67,5**	**70,7**	**71,2**	**71,6**	**72,2**	**72,3**	**72,3**	**72,6**	**72,5**	**72,7**
Malta	76,3	79,3	78,6	78,6	79,6	79,9	79,8	80,6	80,2	80,4
Germany	75,1	78,0	77,9	78,1	78,1	78,7	78,3	78,6	78,7	78,6
Italy	76,9	79,5	79,7	79,8	80,3	80,7	80,3	81,0	80,8	81,2
Portugal	73,3	76,8	77,3	77,3	77,6	78,0	78,1	78,1	78,4	78,3
Romania	67,7	70,0	70,8	70,9	71,6	71,3	71,4	71,6	71,7	71,7
Spain	75,8	79,2	79,5	79,5	80,2	80,4	80,1	80,5	80,6	80,7
Sweden	77,4	79,6	79,9	79,9	80,2	80,4	80,4	80,6	80,8	80,9
Slovakia	69,2	71,8	72,3	72,5	72,9	73,3	73,1	73,8	73,8	73,9
Slovenia	72,2	76,4	76,8	77,1	77,2	78,2	77,8	78,2	78,2	78,5
EU27_2020	**..**	**76,7**	**77,0**	**77,1**	**77,5**	**77,9**	**77,7**	**78,0**	**78,1**	**78,2**
United Kingdom	75,5	78,6	79,0	79,1	79,2	79,5	79,2	79,4	79,5	79,5
EU28	**..**	**76,9**	**77,3**	**77,4**	**77,7**	**78,1**	**77,9**	**78,2**	**78,3**	**78,3**
Eurozone-19	**..**	**78,1**	**78,4**	**78,5**	**78,8**	**79,2**	**78,9**	**79,3**	**79,4**	**79,5**
Iceland	77,8	79,8	80,7	81,6	80,5	81,3	81,2	80,4	81,1	81,3
Norway	76,0	79,0	79,1	79,5	79,8	80,1	80,5	80,7	81,0	81,1
Russia	59,0	63,1	64,0	64,6	65,1	65,3	65,9	66,5	67,5	67,8
Switzerland	77,0	80,3	80,5	80,6	80,7	81,1	80,8	81,7	81,6	81,9
Turkey	66,4	71,2	71,7	72,2	72,6	73,1	73,5	73,8	74,1	74,4
India	61,7	65,7	66,1	66,5	66,8	67,2	67,5	67,7	68,0	68,2
Israel	77,1	79,7	79,9	79,9	80,3	80,3	80,1	80,7	80,6	80,9
Japan	77,7	79,6	79,4	79,9	80,2	80,5	80,8	81,0	81,1	81,3
China	69,6	72,5	72,7	73,0	73,2	73,5	73,8	74,1	74,3	74,5
Brazil	66,4	70,0	70,3	70,6	70,8	71,1	71,3	71,6	71,8	72,0
United States	74,1	76,2	76,3	76,4	76,4	76,5	76,3	76,1	76,1	76,1
Canada	76,6	79,1	79,4	79,6	79,7	79,8	79,9	79,9	79,9	79,9
Mexico	71,7	72,1	72,1	72,0	72,0	71,9	72,0	72,0	72,0	72,1
Australia	76,6	79,5	79,7	79,9	80,1	80,3	80,4	80,4	80,5	80,7

Source: KSH (2021): 7.1.9. Születéskor várható átlagos élettartam – férfiak (2000–) [év]

The tables show that Hungary is moving towards the Balkans in terms of **life expectancy**, with only Bulgaria, Romania and the Baltic States in the EU showing a worse performance. The gender breakdown is particularly bad for men. The difference is more than five years. Even countries such as Montenegro and Northern Macedonia are ahead of us, which economic development cannot explain. This means that a healthy lifestyle, proper nutrition, exercise, and quality health care also play a role in life expectancy. The medical profession agrees that rapid and lasting results could be achieved by broadening prevention and expanding primary care. The economics profession adds that this type of change is not expensive. The table below shows the number of years expected to be spent in good health in each country for those born now:

Expected healthy life years

	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018
European Union - 27	**61,0**	**61,8**	**61,4**	**61,3**	**61,0**	**61,3**	**62,8**	**64,0**	**63,9**	**64,0**
European Union - 28	**61,5**	**62,2**	**61,8**	**61,7**	**61,4**	**61,5**	**62,9**	**63,8**	**63,7**	**63,6**
Belgium	63,9	63,3	63,5	64,6	63,9	64,1	64,2	63,7	63,7	63,4
Bulgaria	63,9	65,0	64,0	63,9	64,5	64,0	63,2	65,7	64,5	65,8
Czechia	61,8	63,3	62,9	63,2	63,3	64,1	63,0	63,3	61,4	62,7
Denmark	61,1	62,0	61,8	61,4	60,5	60,9	59,1	60,3	59,7	60,9
Germany	57,6	58,3	58,2	57,6	57,4	56,5	66,4	66,4	66,0	65,8
Estonia	57,1	56,2	56,1	55,1	55,5	55,2	55,0	56,8	56,0	53,9
Ireland	64,6	66,4	67,2	67,2	66,9	66,9	67,2	68,5	68,6	69,4
Greece	66,4	66,9	66,6	64,9	64,9	64,5	64,0	64,3	64,8	65,4
Spain	62,7	64,2	65,5	65,3	64,3	65,0	64,0	66,2	69,4	68,0
France	63,1	62,6	63,1	63,2	63,6	63,8	63,6	63,4	63,7	63,9
Croatia	:	59,0	60,7	63,1	59,0	59,3	56,1	57,9	57,6	57,5
Italy	62,9	:	63,0	61,8	61,6	62,4	62,6	67,4	66,3	66,8
Cyprus	65,0	64,7	61,3	63,7	64,7	66,0	63,3	68,2	65,2	62,2
Latvia	54,1	54,8	55,1	56,8	53,0	53,4	53,0	53,6	51,4	52,3
Lithuania	58,9	59,8	59,5	59,1	59,2	59,7	56,5	57,8	58,1	57,7
Luxembourg	65,7	65,5	66,5	66,1	63,3	63,8	62,2	60,2	59,2	60,7
Hungary	**57,0**	**57,5**	**58,4**	**59,8**	**59,5**	**59,9**	**59,1**	**59,8**	**60,2**	**61,1**
Malta	70,2	70,7	70,3	71,9	72,1	73,4	73,6	71,7	72,7	72,7
Netherlands	60,9	60,7	61,5	61,2	59,5	61,2	59,1	60,3	60,0	59,2
Austria	60,1	60,1	59,8	61,4	59,9	57,7	58,0	57,0	57,1	56,9
Poland	60,4	60,4	61,1	61,0	61,0	61,3	61,6	62,9	62,0	62,4
Portugal	57,3	58,0	59,6	63,6	63,0	56,9	56,5	58,6	58,5	58,6
Romania	60,7	57,4	57,5	57,6	58,4	59,0	59,2	59,4	58,7	59,4
Slovenia	61,0	53,9	53,9	56,0	58,5	58,7	58,1	58,3	55,0	55,5
Slovakia	52,4	52,2	52,2	53,3	54,4	55,1	54,9	56,7	55,6	56,1
Finland	58,4	58,2	58,0	56,7	:	58,2	57,8	58,1	57,4	57,4
Sweden	65,8	66,1	65,5	:	65,8	72,9	72,7	73,2	72,6	72,8
Iceland	68,8	68,8	68,5	69,3	69,3	68,8	68,9	66,7	:	:
Norway	68,4	69,9	75,1	71,3	70,0	71,1	70,4	69,9	70,9	70,4

Switzerland	64,2	64,5	65,5	68,2	60,0	58,6	59,4	59,4	60,6	60,5
United Kingdom	65,5	65,3	65,2	64,5	64,6	63,8	63,5	63,1	62,7	61,2

Source : https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/view/hlth_hlye/default/table?lang=en

Another set of data on the subject: according to the experts, life expectancy at birth in Hungary will be 80.1 years for men and 85.5 years for women in 20 years, i.e. by 2050. If the fertility rate remains unchanged, the current 9.7 million people will be reduced to 7.5 million,[38] but even an optimistic version mentions 8.5 million.[39] If we consider national terms, the total number of Hungarians in the Carpathian Basin would decrease by 3 million.[40]

Immigration and migration figures by country

	2010	2012	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019
Belgium	135 281	129 477	123 158	146 626	123 702	126 703	137 860	150 006
Bulgaria	:	14 103	26 615	25 223	21 241	25 597	29 559	37 929
Czechia	48 317	34 337	29 897	29 602	64 083	51 847	65 910	105 888
Denmark	52 236	54 409	68 388	78 492	74 383	68 579	64 669	61 384
Germany	404 055	592 175	884 893	1 571 047	1 029 852	917 109	893 886	886 341
Estonia	2 810	2 639	3 904	15 413	14 822	17 616	17 547	18 259
Ireland	52 339	61 324	73 519	80 792	85 185	78 499	97 712	85 630
Greece	60 462	58 200	59 013	64 446	116 867	112 247	119 489	129 459
Spain	360 705	304 053	305 454	342 114	414 746	532 132	643 684	750 480
France	307 111	327 431	340 383	364 221	377 709	369 621	387 158	385 591
Croatia	8 846	8 959	10 638	11 706	13 985	15 553	26 029	37 726
Italy	458 856	350 772	277 631	280 078	300 823	343 440	332 324	332 778
Cyprus	20 206	17 476	9 212	15 183	17 391	21 306	23 442	26 170
Latvia	4 011	13 303	10 365	9 479	8 345	9 916	10 909	11 223
Lithuania	5 213	19 843	24 294	22 130	20 162	20 368	28 914	40 067
Luxembourg	16 962	20 478	22 332	23 803	22 888	24 379	24 644	26 668
Hungary	25 519	33 702	54 581	58 344	53 618	68 070	82 937	88 581
Malta	4 275	8 256	14 454	16 936	17 051	21 676	26 444	28 341
Netherlands	126 776	124 566	145 323	166 872	189 232	189 646	194 306	215 756
Austria	70 978	91 557	116 262	166 323	129 509	111 801	105 633	109 167
Poland	155 131	217 546	222 275	218 147	208 302	209 353	214 083	226 649
Portugal	27 575	14 606	19 516	29 896	29 925	36 639	43 170	72 725
Romania	149 885	167 266	136 035	132 795	137 455	177 435	172 578	202 422
Slovenia	15 416	15 022	13 846	15 420	16 623	18 808	28 455	31 319
Slovakia	5 272	5 419	5 357	6 997	7 686	7 188	7 253	7 016
Finland	25 636	31 278	31 507	28 746	34 905	31 797	31 106	32 758
Sweden	98 801	103 059	126 966	134 240	163 005	144 489	132 602	115 805
Iceland	3 948	4 960	5 368	5 635	8 710	12 116	11 830	9 872
Norway	69 214	69 908	66 903	60 816	61 460	53 351	47 864	48 680

[38] HVG - Ténytár HVG 2021.február 18.

[39] According to the 2018 projection scenario of the Population Research Institute of the KSH

[40] Péti Márton, Pakot Levente, Megyesi Zoltán, Szabó Balázs (2020): A Kárpát-medencei magyarság népesség-előreszámítása, 2011-2051 In: Demográfia 2020/4

Switzerland	161 778	149 051	156 282	153 627	149 305	143 377	144 857	145 129
United Kingdom	590 950	498 040	631 991	631 452	588 993	644 209	603 953	:
	3 469 155	**3 543 886**	**4 016 977**	**4 907 258**	**4 502 570**	**4 605 512**	**4 751 456**	**4 420 546**

Source: https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/view/migr_imm8/default/table?lang=en

Migration has become the main demographic issue of the day. Many countries believe that the ineffectiveness of internal family policy can be offset by allowing migration. It is, therefore, no coincidence that the liberal leadership of several developed European countries has tended to see the key to the solution as allowing, or even directly inviting, the opening of gates. The chaos caused by the great wave of immigration in 2015 has led many governments to change their minds, and we can only agree that the old continent has a finite capacity to absorb all the refugees from poor countries. It should be pointed out, however, that there are a number of time bombs in this respect, just one of which is the current 'temporary' residents in Turkey, all of whom are heading for Europe.[41] There are already more than 4 million of them! The EU is funding this for the time being, it is an economic benefit for Turkey, the migrants are tolerating it, but what next? What if one partner gets bored? Moreover, similar groups, although still small in number, are present off the coast of Greece and Lampedusa.

We would like to stress that these figures show that Hungary receives fewer migrants than other EU countries in relation to its population, and even has multiple fences along the vulnerable border sections. But the statistics do not show where they are coming from. Hungarian practice is to let in fellow citizens from across the border, which improves the demographic situation in the fragmented country, but what about those who remain across the border? What prospects can a parent in Ruthenia offer his or her child in school, work, and life? Since Trianon, the proportion of Hungarians in neighbouring countries has fallen spectacularly, almost disappearing in two states (Burgenland due to economic abundance, Carpathian due to economic poverty - the former with well under 100,000 Hungarians, the latter with 122,000 still[42]).

[41] Koslowski, R. (2019). Migrants and citizens: demographic change in the European state system. Cornell University Press.

[42] According to the Demography article already mentioned, 81,000 people are expected by 2050, i.e. currently (!) 50% more.

4.2. Eurostat, 2020

Eurostat published its forecast for the EU in 2020.[43] EUROPOP2019, the latest population projection published by Eurostat at the end of April 2020, includes baseline projections and five sensitivity tests for population projections from 2019 to 2100 for 31 European countries: all EU-27 Member States and all four EFTA countries. The population of the EU-27 is projected to increase from 446.8 million in 2019 to 449.3 million in 2026 (+0.6%), then gradually decrease to 441.2 million in 2050 and 416.1 million in 2100, for an overall decrease of 30.8 million (-6.9%) from 2019 to 2100. For the 11 EU-27 Member States and all four EFTA countries, the population is projected to be more prominent in 2100 than in 2019, with net migration contributing to population growth.

Demographic balances, 2019 - 2100 (1000 persons)

	Population 2019	Cumulative births 2019-2099	Cumulative deaths 2019-2099	Cumulative natural population change 2019-2099	Cumulative net migration 2019-2099	Total population change 2019-2099	Projected population 2100
EU-27	446 825	308 705	422 713	-114 007	83 257	-30 750	416 074
Belgium	11 456	9 089	10 420	-1 331	1 730	399	11 854
Bulgaria	7 000	3 782	6 629	-2 847	585	-2 262	4 738
Czechia	10 650	8 037	10 012	-1 975	1 533	-442	10 207
Denmark	5 806	4 970	5 414	-444	885	441	6 247
Germany	83 019	61 048	79 091	-18 043	18 225	182	83 202
Estonia	1 325	882	1 262	-379	199	-180	1 145
Ireland	4 904	5 310	4 755	555	1 152	1 707	6 611
Greece	10 725	5 631	9 977	-4 346	1 764	-2 582	8 143
Spain	46 937	30 227	46 047	-15 820	14 672	-1 148	45 789
France	67 013	57 297	60 983	-3 686	6 325	2 639	69 652
Croatia	4 076	2 144	3 749	-1 604	304	-1 300	2 776
Italy	60 360	33 738	59 564	-25 826	16 882	-8 944	51 416
Cyprus	876	834	811	23	220	242	1 118
Latvia	1 920	935	1 651	-716	-122	-838	1 082
Lithuania	2 794	1 413	2 499	-1 086	-29	-1 114	1 680
Luxembourg	614	533	620	-87	254	167	781
Hungary	9 773	6 641	9 632	-2 990	1 932	-1 058	8 714
Malta	494	400	583	-184	379	196	689
Netherlands	17 282	13 940	16 125	-2 184	2 870	685	17 967
Austria	8 859	6 584	8 383	-1 798	2 176	378	9 237

[43] https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=People_in_the_EU_-_population_projections&oldid=497115

Poland	37 973	20 336	35 409	-15 073	4 755	-10 318	27 655
Portugal	10 277	6 067	9 745	-3 678	1 382	-2 296	7 981
Romania	19 414	10 424	17 196	-6 772	138	-6 634	12 781
Slovenia	2 081	1 361	1 986	-626	433	-193	1 888
Slovakia	5 450	3 429	5 081	-1 651	547	-1 104	4 346
Finland	5 518	3 329	5 183	-1 853	1 051	-802	4 716
Sweden	10 230	10 322	9 908	414	3 015	3 430	13 660
Iceland	357	446	362	84	182	266	623
Liechtenstein	38	30	37	-7	18	11	49
Norway	5 328	4 896	5 154	-258	1 977	1 719	7 047
Switzerland	8 545	7 773	8 292	-520	4 017	3 498	12 042

The population is projected to fall between 2019 and 2100 in the 16 EU Member States. Among these, the total population of Spain, the Czech Republic and Slovenia is expected to decrease relatively moderately, with a population decline of less than 10%. Hungary, Estonia, Finland and Italy are projected to see increased population declines of 11% and 20%, while Slovakia, Portugal and Greece are expected to see significant declines of between 21% and 27%. Croatia, Bulgaria, Romania and Lithuania are projected to experience the largest shrinkage, with a decrease of more than 30.0% in the total population, while Latvia is projected to experience the largest decrease, with a population decline of 43.7% between 2019 and 2100.



Ageing is identified as the biggest challenge. According to Eurostat's baseline scenario, the current pattern of population ageing in the EU-27 is likely to continue until 2100, with the proportion of older people and the total population increasing. Various demographic indicators are used to analyse the shift in the age distribution towards older ages, including:

- the median age;
- the proportion of the population in each of the main demographic age groups-children (here, children aged 0-14 years were fined), the working-age population (15-64 years) and the elderly population (65 years and over); and,
- age-dependency ratios - for example, the dependency ratio for young people, the old-age dependency ratio or the dependency ratio for the whole life (which shows the proportion of dependants - children and elderly people - as a function of the number of working-age people).



4.3. Green Paper, 2021

The European Commission announced on 27 January 2021 that it will present a Green Paper[44] to launch a wide-ranging policy debate on the challenges and opportunities of an ageing society in Europe. In the Green Paper, the EU institution outlines the impact of this marked demographic trend on our economy and society and invites public members to express their views on possible solutions in a public consultation, which is now open and will run for 12 weeks. General findings on EU demography:[45]

- men born in 2070 are expected to live on average **86** years and women **90** years;
- the composition of households in the EU as a whole is changing - in addition to families with two parents and children, there are more and more households made up of people living alone, single parents or childless couples;
- some people move more than once, and many move abroad, but the size of these flows is volatile and can change rapidly;
- In 2070, 30.3% of the population is projected to be aged 65 or over (compared to 20.3% in 2019), and the proportion of people aged 80 or over (5.8% in 2019) is expected to reach 13.2%.
- Europe's population as a share of the world's is falling and will account for less than 4% of the world's population by 2070.

The impact of demographic change

- Europe's **working-age population is shrinking**, so we need to find ways to sustain economic growth. To do this, we need to attract more people into the labour market and increase productivity.
- To cope with the challenge of Europe's ageing society, our health and care systems need to be adapted, and we need to consider how to finance the **increasing public expenditure associated with ageing**.
- Demographic challenges can typically vary significantly between different parts of the same country. **Rapid population change** is expected in some regions, creating new opportunities and challenges in

[44] Green Papers are documents published by the European Commission to discuss a specific topic at European level. Green Papers invite interested parties (bodies or individuals) to participate in the consultation process and debate on the basis of the proposals they put forward. Green Papers can lead to legislative developments which are subsequently developed in White Papers.

[45] EPRS | European Parliamentary Research Service (2020): Demography on the European agenda - Strategies for tackling demographic decline

many areas, from investment to infrastructure and access to services. It is vital to find **new solutions to** help people through the difficulties caused by change.

- Demographic changes may also affect the **role Europe plays in the world**. Its importance relative to the world's population and GDP is declining. It is, therefore more important than ever for Europe to be more united, stronger and more ambitious in its planning.
- Demographic changes and the **green and digital dual transition** often interact, support, or accelerate each other - strategic foresight will be essential for designing and preparing policies to address these challenges.[46]

[46] Alburez-Gutierrez, D., Zagheni, E., Aref, S., Gil-Clavel, S., Grow, A., & Negraia, D. V. (2019). Demography in the digital era: New data sources for population research.

5. Population and family policy

The big challenge is **sustainable family policy**, the most important element of which is to increase the propensity to have children. The basic premise is that family policy is not a competence of the European Union. Article 9 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights states that family law is a matter of national competence.

Article 9 - Right to marry and right to found a family

The right to marry and the right to found a family shall be guaranteed in accordance with the national laws governing the exercise of these rights.

However, the European Union can and does make rules on reconciling **family life and work**, on gender equality at work, on the protection and development of children and on related issues etc. Thus, for example, the European Social Fund and the Regional Development Fund have already contributed to implementing family policy measures in some Member States.

Modern family policy, regulated by governments, is new. It first appeared as unpaid maternity leave at the turn of the century. The first family policy benefits, i.e. widow's pensions, orphan's benefits, maternity premiums, paid maternity leave and social assistance specifically for large families, were introduced in developed countries in the first decades of the 20th century. Family allowances covering various groups were introduced between 1930 and 1960. It was not in Japan until 1971, and there is still no benefit in the USA that fully matches with it. The last half-century after the Second World War saw/has seen a gradual expansion of unpaid and paid childcare leave in developed European countries, which is still continuing today, and the large-scale development of nursery and kindergarten systems from the 1960s onwards. These are closely linked to the general - or at least much more frequent - increase in female employment in the younger age groups. The rising divorce rate and the concomitant increase in the number of single-parent families have made it necessary to introduce new family policy instruments to support single parents. [47]

It is clear that **European families are undergoing a complete transformation**. For decades, fertility rates have been well below the level needed for generational renewal (at least 2.1, but preferably 2.3), women are having their first child later and later, more couples are choosing to separate, the

[47] http://epa.oszk.hu/02900/02943/00057/pdf/EPA02943_kapocs_2013_2_38-49.pdf

proportion of single-parent households (single-parent families) and the number of families without a stable income is rising. National governments can help by showing young people that we support such and such a family policy, so be prepared. So, what does it look like on our continent?

Population and family policies in country groups

Country group	Clear or partial	Related policies	Tools
Francophone zone	Specific social policy goals for families	• Demographic policy • Economic support • after the child • Promoting gender equality /gender/	• Money transfers after children • Services for children (nursery, kindergarten, day-care)
Scandinavian zone	There are no specific family policies	• The politics of equality • Universal citizenship rights • Family and work reconciliation policy	• Public services are free or at a discount • Conciliation policies for families
Germanic zone	Not specifically family policy: public intervention is secondary, only indirect support	• Increase in the number of active women • Family-friendly labour market	• Tax benefits • Services for children from nursery to school
Anglo-Saxon zone	Liberal family policy: basically non-interference in family issues	• The private sphere of the family • To whom the policies are addressed • family members and their partners, people in need	• Guaranteed minimum income for parents with children
Southern European zone	There are no explicit family policies, but fragmented and some partial, non-universal solutions.	• The subsidiarity model • Status and the strong role of solidarity • Strengthening the family-parent relationship	• Tax relief • Services for children from nursery to school

Source: Silvia Vogliotti, Sara Vattai (2015) Welfare state Parte 2 - Le politiche della famiglia in un confronto europeo IPL

The following examples from a few countries show what parents with children are entitled to regarding days off. The picture is mixed, with Hungary - exceptionally - in the lead, with a few rare examples. In our opinion, it is very important for the child, especially at a very early age, to spend a lot of time with his or her parents, which is a clear determinant for later life.

Parental days off in some European countries

Country	Type	Duration (month)	% of payment	Paternal months
Italy	Mixed	6 months until the child is 8 years old, rises to 10 months if both parents make use	30%, up to 6 months until the child is 3 years old	maximum paternity leave 7 months.
Austria	families	first 36 months can be at home, plus 5 extra days holiday/year the child is 2 years old from age	As the length of leave increases, the % of salary received decreases	2-4 months bonus for fathers in 5 different variations
Germany	Mixed	36 months (156 weeks) 3 years and under	In the first year (12 months) the 67% of salary, up to a maximum of €1800 . Second year only reduced subsidy. No payment for the third year.	2 month bonus (8 weeks
France	families	36 months (156 weeks) 3 years and under	for 1st child €560 per month 6 months after 2nd child: €560 per month 33 months. for a 3rd child or more: €801 per month 12 months	
Portugal	Mixed	36 months (156 weeks)	No payment	
Spain	families	36 months to 3 years	No pay (holidays with reduced pay in some regions)	

Sources:Moss 2012, OECD 2012 indicator PF2.523, Escobedo/Wall and ILO 2014, IPL 2015 and Silvia Vogliotti, Sara Vattai (2015) Welfare state Parte 2 - Le politiche della famiglia in un confronto europeo IPL

In Europe, it became common in the 20th century for both parents to work. The availability of daycare for a young child makes a big difference. Therefore, two tables are provided for day nurseries (Table 7) and kindergartens (Table 8). It should be noted here that there is an easing in this respect: part-time work is becoming more and more common in many countries, especially for women. There are already countries, such as the Netherlands,

where the majority of women (55 %) work part-time, but 20 % of men do so too... The trend is growing worldwide, and more recently, among fathers.

The table below shows the percentage of children under 3 years who attend nursery and later kindergarten in the form of full-day and half-day childcare.





Source: Philip Rathgeb & Tobias Wiß (2020): Österreichische Familienpolitik verstärkt Geschlechterungleichheit. Momentum Institut

5.1. Germany

The country, which has a critical demographic situation, introduced an ambitious policy a few years ago to reconcile work and family life in practice and certainly in social thinking because previously, it was looked down upon to have children and work. More advanced and better-scheduled nursery, kindergarten and school48 care and 14 months' parental leave at two-thirds of salary have been introduced. These measures were accompanied by specific targeted income support to combat child poverty.

In the early 2020s, there are around **150 types of family benefits.** These include child benefits and daycare and free co-insurance for the family member by the health insurance company, housing benefit or BAföG[49] . Over the past decades, new measures have been taken to improve social change, particularly to curb the deterioration of the demographic situation. Various state benefits support families and make their lives easier. The most important financial benefits include child benefit (Kindergeld[50]), the family allowance supplement for low-income earners (Kinderzuschlag[51]) and parental allowance (Elterngeld[52]). There is also the childcare allowance (Kinderbetreuung).[53]

The Maternity Protection Act covers mothers with a job in Germany (Mutterschutzgesetz, MuSchG). This law protects against workplace hazards

---

[48] This is commonly known as KiTa (Kindertagesstaette). It covers nursery school for children aged ½-3 years, kindergarten for children aged 2.5-6 years, and school day care. Payment is either symbolic or free, e.g. in Berlin you only pay for meals, which cost just €23 per month (€1 per day). It doesn't necessarily have to be state-run, it can be family day care (Kindertagespflege) or child care (Tagesmutter). For little ones it can be between 1-6 years, school is uniform.

[49] Bundesausbildungsförderungsgesetz - BAföG) Federal Training Assistance Act grants

[50]Parents resident in Germany are entitled to family allowances. The allowance is paid until the child reaches the age of 18, 25 for children in higher education or 21 for unemployed children.

[51]The supplementary allowance is paid alongside the family allowance to low-income families with a minor or unmarried children under 25. Each unmarried child under 25 in the household can claim a maximum of €140 per month, which is always paid at the same time as the family allowance.

[52]The mother or the father may be entitled to this family benefit if he is not employed or is employed part-time for up to 30 hours a week and lives in the same household as the child. The benefit is paid for 12 months as a general rule and varies between €300 and €1,800 per month, depending on the amount of previous pay.

[53] It helps the family to pay for the costs of bringing up the child, i.e. by contributing to the cost of nursery care or babysitting. The maximum amount of the allowance is €130 per month.

and provides special protection against dismissal. Thus, expectant mothers can only work with their consent **6 weeks before giving birth and** not at all until the end of the **8th week after giving birth.** In the case of premature birth or twins, mothers are not allowed to work for 12 weeks after the birth. In the case of medically induced preterm and premature births, the period of maternity protection (maternity leave) is extended by the number of days of absence before the birth. The law also prohibits certain types of work (e.g. piecework, assembly line work, overtime, Sunday or night work). If the doctor issues a certificate of prohibition of individual work, this is also valid.[54] In addition, there is a maternity benefit (Mutterschaftsgeld), employer's allowance and maternity protection (Mutterschutzlohn) in the event of a (medical) ban on working. All these benefits are linked to insurance status. It is paid for the six weeks before birth and the eight weeks afterwards. For women who are employed in Germany and entitled to maternity insurance and have state sickness insurance, the benefit amount is based on the mother's wages or salary, up to a maximum of €13 per day. For women who do not pay sickness insurance but are still covered by the state sickness insurance scheme (e.g. students) or whose employment has ended during pregnancy, the state health insurance pays €13 per day. Part-time employees insured with the state health insurance on a family basis are entitled to a lump sum of €210 from the state health insurance. The public health insurer also pays a lump sum of €210 for those with or without private sickness insurance. A contribution from the employer can supplement this.

Today's German population policy **is** essentially **family-centred**. In the following, the main benefits and elements of family policy are presented, focusing on money, time and infrastructure. The official German view is that families hold society together. They are at the heart of the federal government's policy and are also the focus of specific support from individual member states. The priorities are:

- improve the financial situation of families
- facilitate the reconciliation of family and work
- provide greater support for low-income families
- reduce child poverty
- build more daycare centres and
- develop the teaching profession
- to help carers.

[54] https://www.eu-gleichbehandlungsstelle.de/eugs-hu/eu-%C3%A1llampolg%C3%A1rok/infot%C3%A9ka/szoci%C3%A1lis-juttat%C3%A1sok/csal%C3%A1d-%C3%A9s-gyerekek

In Germany, child benefit, parental leave, and parental allowance apply to all families with children. To better support low-income families who would depend on basic security (unemployment benefits) without benefits, there is a child benefit - in addition to the child benefit. In addition, single parents who do not receive maintenance for their child or do not receive it regularly from the other parent can apply for advance maintenance.

Needs-based childcare enables parents to combine work and family better - often a key requirement for mother's and fathers' ability to work. That is why the federal government has been providing substantial financial support to help individual Member States set up nurseries and daycare centres for years. As qualified and motivated professionals are also needed for education and care, the government supports various state initiatives and projects to achieve the necessary staffing levels.

To make things even easier for families, the federal government has increased the **child benefit by** €15 since 1 January 2021. Thus, the child benefit is now €219 for the first and second child, €225 for the third child and €250 for the fourth and other children.

Many **young parents** want **more flexible working hours.** In particular, mothers who work less per week often want to work more after a part-time phase. Previously, part-time laws only allowed for unlimited part-time work. Since 1 January 2019, the new option for part-time employees is to work part-time for one to five years and then return to their previous working hours.

The reform of the **Adoption** Act provides comprehensive and sound advice for parents, especially those who cannot have children of their own.

With the change to the Family Act, the government has redesigned **child** benefits in two steps: from 1 January 2020, the upper-income limits have been abolished, which means that families with higher incomes can also receive child benefits. As the child's expenses are only partially offset - for example, by alimony or education allowances - children of single parents are also effectively supported by the benefit. Recently, the child benefit has been increased twice: from €170 per child per month on 1 July 2019 to €185 per child per month on 1 July 2019, and from 1 January 2021 to €205 per child per month.

Families in need receive education and participation benefits for their children. Since 1 August 2019, the Strong Families Act has improved these benefits: the monthly amount for school supplies and social and cultural

activities has been increased, lunch at nursery and school, and student bus and train tickets are now free or with a token contribution, and the cost of learning support (tutoring) is covered. Single parents who do not receive maintenance for their child or do not receive it regularly from the other parent can apply for advance maintenance. This amount was increased on 1 January 2021: depending on the child's age, the advance payment ranges from €174 to €309 per month per child.

As a further step in childcare, the government has set itself the goal of permanently improving the quality of early education and easing the burden on low-income families. To this end, the Gute KiTa Act[55] will support the federal states with a total of €5.5 billion until 2022. It is up to each federal state to decide how to use the federal funds - for example, for longer opening hours, additional teachers, targeted language training, etc. In addition, low-income families will no longer have to pay a daily fee from 1 August 2019.

As part of the federal "Skilled Workers Offensive for Educators" programme, the federal government will make around €300 million available to countries and local institutions until 2022. The aim is to attract young people into the teaching profession and retain the professionals who work there.

The amount of child benefit is graded according to the number of children:

- for the first and second child: €219 per month,
- for the third child: €225 per month,
- for the fourth and each additional child: €250 per month.

The child benefit has been increased by €15 since 1 January 2021.

- Basic parental allowance between €300 and €1800 per month
- Parental allowance (Elterngeld Plus) of between €150 and €900 per month.

From 1 January 2021, the child benefit has been increased to €205 per child per month. The benefit has also been opened to single parents, as the children's income, such as alimony, is no longer fully offset, but only 45% of the allowance.

Parental care, because that's what it is. Adult children are obliged to pay maintenance to their parents in need of care if their gross annual income exceeds €100 000, as part of the so-called "law on benefits" (in Hungary, there is already compulsory parental maintenance, albeit in isolated cases,

[55] The law, which came into force in 2020, means that the 18 federal states have separately agreed with the government on childcare.

and while it may be an economic solution, it is certainly not one that strengthens personal relationships.)

What is transferable from the German system and what is not? Its main virtues are reliability and predictability. The other is social justice, i.e. the government and society appreciate the greater financial sacrifice of those raising children. The latter also includes social solidarity (multiple taxation, differential benefits, etc.), which thus reduces the gap between rich and poor. Parents know years in advance what benefits they will receive if they have children, which is guaranteed. This makes family planning a real possibility.

On the other hand, this does not solve the demographic issue, and the long-term success of the immigration path may well create serious social problems in the not-too-distant future. To confirm the latter, here is a figure. Most of them are Turkish: 1.5 million.[56]

[56] Federal Statistical Office: Microcensus - Population with migration background

5.2.Austria

According to the official government slogan, Austria must become the most family-friendly country in Europe by 2025.[57] It is almost like what Katalin Novák says: "*we will be able to overcome the demographic crisis and become a thriving, rejuvenating region of Europe.*"[58] The Austrians have a similar vision. This will be supported by a steady stream of new measures from 2016. These include the introduction of a childcare account, a fixed amount of support for babies between 12 and 35 months, a family month payment after birth, and an increase in income-related child benefits. In addition, there are the old subsidies, such as the income-related childcare allowance. The following table shows the amount of the family allowance for Hungarians working in Austria:

Family allowance amount	from 01.01.2019
Age	
from birth	64,07 €
from 3 years	68,51 €
from 10 years	79,52 €
18 years and over	92,79 €
For additional children	
+ 1 child	3,99 €
+ 2 children	9,78 €
+ 3 children	14,89 €
+ 4 children	17,98 €
Child tax credit[59]	32,82 €
Starting school allowance (once a year)	56,20 €
Increased amount for a disabled child	87,62 €
Examples	
1 child (2) and 1 adult (18)	230,48 €
1 child (4) and 1 adult (18)	234,92 €
1 adult (19) child	125,61 €
for 2 minor (8, 11) children	221,65 €
for 2 children of legal age (18, 20)	251,22 €

Source: Sophie Karmasin (2018): Familienpolitik in Österreich - Schwerpunkte der österreichischen Familienpolitik Bestehende familienpolitische Maßnahmen (Best Practice) Research&Identity

[57] http://www.provinz.bz.it/familie-soziales-gemeinschaft/familie/downloads/SophieKarmasin.pdf

[58] https://444.hu/2021/02/18/novak-a-visegradi-orszagok-demografiai-ertelemben-peldatmutatnak-europanak

[59] Supplementary allowance, paid together with the family allowance, paid automatically, between €50 and €100

In recent years, family policy has played a clearly visible role in Austrian policy: in 2008, **childcare** allowances were made more flexible with the introduction of two new models, and two further variants were introduced in 2010, including for the first time Austria's income-related variant. There have also been expansion programmes for kindergartens, the (partial) introduction of a free kindergarten, and a compulsory final year of kindergarten. Measures such as part-time work for parents (from 2004) or the recent introduction of a 'father's month' (although initially limited to the civil service) support the thesis, which has been referred to several times in this volume, that the Austrian family is undergoing a policy shift that points to a paradigm shift. Kindergarten is not compulsory; 75% of parents of 3-6 year olds work, 63% of mothers work part-time.

From the 2017/18 school year, half of the textbooks ordered in primary schools will be digital. The transition is also ongoing for classroom visual aids. There is also free family counselling and babysitting training, the latter for a fee, and the 35-hour course, which includes an exam and can be taken at home during the pandemic, costs €95, including exam.

Family support benefits

Financial support	Tax relief	Dologi support
childcare allowance	family tax allowance	parent counselling
family allowances	single-parent education allowance	parent training
	tax relief for single-earner taxpayers	kindergarten
		textbooks
		free travel

Source: Sophie Karmasin (2018): Familienpolitik in Österreich - Schwerpunkte der österreichischen Familienpolitik Bestehende familienpolitische Maßnahmen (Best Practice) Research&Identity

5.3. Italy

Italians are traditionally a family-loving people. Due to historical traditions, more than 90% of the population is Catholic, although there are fewer and fewer practising believers. Having children (but only 1 or 2), close family life, especially the almost ritual of eating together and the love of young children, is taken for granted. Being a Catholic country (over 90%), the divorce rate is also more modest than in most European countries. Despite this, the population is declining, with only one or two families, and large families are more common only in the south, in the Mezzogiorno (downstream from Naples). Italian mothers want more children - was the general belief, but life proves otherwise. Italy has a fertility rate of 1.3 children per woman, ranking last in Europe. The report surveyed 536,000 women who had a child in 2003 and were asked after 2 years if they would like another. 40% of women said they were unwilling to have more children. After giving birth, they gave up new pregnancies due to economic, job and organisational difficulties.

Workplace: 18.4% of mothers leave their jobs in the 7th to 8th month of pregnancy, 28% after childbirth. 72.5% of mothers who continue to work experience severe difficulties. These include difficulties with childcare, with only 27.8% attending public or private nursery schools and 52.3% of cases leaving children in the care of grandparents. An interesting fact is that 28.3 % of mothers who do not use a nursery would do so if the fees were not so high or if they could find a place at all, especially in smaller municipalities.

If the family's annual income does not exceed €35,000, the mother and her child up to the age of six can receive all free medical care and laboratory tests. Mothers are entitled to compulsory maternity leave and maternity allowance (indennità di maternità) for a total of five months, one or two months before the birth and three or four months after the birth of the child. The maternity allowance is 80% of the salary for the compulsory period and 30% for the additional period. Eligibility is conditional on the mother not receiving a salary during this period. Maternity leave can be extended by six months and the other parent can take this period as paternity leave if the mother waives it.[60]

Other **maternity benefits**. State allowance for families with three children: paid by the municipality of residence for 13 months, €122.80. State maternity allowance: €1813.08 per year, regardless of the family's income. This allowance is not payable if they claim other maternity benefits.

[60] www.inps.gov.it INPS website (Instituto Nazionale della Previdenza Sociale) Temporarily unavailable during the Covid.

Maternity allowance paid by the municipality: paid for five months; the basic amount is €294.52 per month, but the specific amount depends on the family's income situation. It cannot be combined with other maternity allowances. The family allowance (assegni familiari) is income-related.

In Italy, family policy is based on a model of **extended subsidiarity**, i.e. the family is the primary focus of solidarity. Traditionally, the role of the mother is to take care of the home and children (as well as elderly parents or people with disabilities), and to do the housework. This also explains the relatively high female part-time employment rate: 40.9%[61] . The further south we go, the more they cling to tradition. The female employment rate is one of the worst in Europe (only Greece and Malta worse)[62] , with only 48% of working-age women in work, a striking difference between North (60.2%) and South (33.2%).[63]

Minimal interventions have characterised family policy in Italy; successive governments have done almost nothing in the last thirty years, writes the well-known expert Donati.[64]

Migration is an important factor in the Italian demographic situation. The last time the number of migrants landing in Italy via the Mediterranean was exceptionally high was in 2017 when the number of migrants approached 120,000. The last two years have seen a downward trend, with around 23,000 migrants arriving in 2018 and less than 12,000 in 2019. The 2020 figure is expected to be above 30,000.[65] The new Italian government's migration policy's impact is unknown. However, one thing is certain: Italy will always be at the forefront of migration due to its geographical position, especially as the most accessible destination for migrants from North Africa (the so-called Central Mediterranean route) is the island of Lampedusa.

What is transferable from the Italian system, and what is not? The love of family, the respect for the community, and the solidarity of kinship are all things to follow. In addition, religiousness is also emphasised among family members. Avoid an overly liberal approach to migration, which is already causing serious social tensions, especially in the big cities.

---

[61] ttps://thinkmagazine.coopservice.it/persone/occupazione-femminile-in-italia/

[62] https://thinkmagazine.coopservice.it/persone/occupazione-femminile-in-italia/

[63] https://www.ilsole24ore.com/art/italia-ultima-nell-ue-il-divario-donne-e-uomini-lavoro-recovery-occasione-irripetibile-ADpjTDx?refresh_ce=1

[64] Donati P.: La famiglia in Italia. Sfide sociali e innovazioni nei servizi, Volumes 1 and 2, Osservatorio nazionale sulla famiglia. Rapporto biennale 2011- 2012, Carocci.

[65] https://magyarnemzet.hu/kulfold/megallas-nelkul-erkeznek-az-illegalis-bevandorlok-olaszorszagba-8954378/

5.4. France

In France, family policy has a long history and is therefore characterised by a high degree of stability over time - four decades - regardless of the government in power. This policy combines financial benefits, fair tax conditions for families, labour law provisions introducing various forms of special paid leave in pension schemes, free nursery care from 0 to 3 years of age and free kindergarten from the age of 3. Its importance is also enhanced by involving both the state and the counties and cities, irrespective of their political affiliation. The counties and cities complement national policy with various local family policies on nursery care or family support. Family allowances are designed to compensate for the costs borne by the family for each child and benefit families with many children. They are not dependent on income, in line with the principle of universality. They benefit the child by distinguishing family policy from social policy. As a result, France is one of the European countries with the highest female employment rate and the highest fertility index. Freedom of choice in how children are looked after is an essential element of French family policy, but to have freedom of choice, there must be choice, i.e., sufficient supply.

In France, women have an average of 2 children, although this is only close to the EU's best rate of total reproduction. So, some European countries seem to be moving in the right direction on family policy. How did this come about? France has chosen to promote the family as a key factor for development and growth. Families receive 3% of gross domestic product. Support is given to mothers who have opted for one-year maternity leave, while a number of legislative measures have given firm guarantees to working mothers who do not risk having their careers interrupted or slowed down by children.

Tax relief and benefits: French families with three or more children benefit from almost full tax relief and full access to essential services. Since 2001, paternity leave has lasted up to 14 days; since 2004, a birth bonus of €800 per child has been paid.

Families with children are entitled to **family allowances** in France, subject to certain conditions. There are 22 different types of allowances, which can be divided into four broad categories: allowances linked to the birth of a child, education of the child, household allowances and other special categories. PAJE - Childcare allowance A benefit similar to the Hungarian GYES (Prestation d'accueil du jeune enfant - PAJE) is paid to the family after the birth of the child and is available until the child is 3 years old. AGED - Childcare allowance, a French benefit similar to the Hungarian GYED, can

be claimed until the child is 6 years old. When claiming AGED, each of the parents living in the same household must be in gainful employment. The family allowance is automatically paid to families with at least two children living permanently or regularly in France until the children reach the age of 20.

Children are an asset for economic development, says the government. A rising birth rate benefits the country's economy: 830,000 more children a year means more workers, consumers and taxpayers in the long term. This policy perspective, which began in France in 1992, is leading to an initial redress of the growing imbalances in the social security system, which is in crisis in all European countries. In the short term, it will lead, among other things, to an expansion in the sector of jobs linked to childcare and education.

In Hungarian practice: the success rate is half-hearted because the best birth rate is true, but the problem is that the result is mainly among immigrant families, which leads to increasing social tensions, and in some big cities, there are already no-go zones (essentially ghettos) where white people cannot even set foot, including official bodies such as the police or even ambulances.

5.5. Spain

The **national strategy** to address the demographic challenges addresses a number of challenges and possible actions. Furthermore, decree 40/2017 appointed a government commissioner to address this. Spain applies various family-friendly incentives such as tax credits, crèche subsidies and additional support for families with more than two children.

Several measures have been introduced to support **rural and depopulated areas**, such as direct grants to local organisations to finance employment, self-employment, and collective enterprise projects to address demographic challenges in municipalities with populations ranging from less than 5,000 inhabitants to between 5,001 and 10,000. To maintain the level of the rural population measures such as co-financing support for the installation of young farmers, support for rural women, innovation and digitisation of the agri-food chain and forestry, and digitisation of the agri-food chain will also be implemented. The **National Rural Development Programme** aims to support the associative integration of agri-food sector organisations, forest fire prevention and the development of 17 regional rural development programmes. The **Next Generation Broadband Breakout Programme** supports 30 Mbps fixed broadband internet (Programa Ayudas Banda Ancha Fija 30Mbps), mainly used to reach digitally connected rural areas. Programmes such as Employ through Equal Opportunities and Programa Desafío Mujer Rural aim to improve the quality of life of women in rural areas.

Programmes such as the **Decent Work Plan** and the **Youth Employment Action Plan 2019-2021** aim to facilitate the integration of young people into the labour market and improve precarious working conditions. The Return to Spain programme aims to facilitate the return and labour market integration of Spanish residents abroad who want to return to the country. Strategies to promote active ageing, such as the Health Promotion and Prevention Strategy and the Spanish Network of Age-friendly Cities and Communities, aim to maintain a healthy elderly population.

For **Hungary**, it is worth observing these information technologies, equal opportunities and demographic policies to retain the rural population and demographic initiatives.

5.6.Poland

At the national level, several ministries are actively addressing demographic issues, including the Ministry of Family, Labour and Social Policy, the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Agriculture, the Ministry of Regional Development and the Ministry of the Interior.

The Ministry of Labour and Social Policy has introduced a number of programmes to address demographic issues by supporting families in Poland. For example, the **Family 500+** programme was launched on 1 April 2016, initially providing for payment of PLN 500 for the second child of each family (and for all children born after that); however, the scheme was extended to all children under 18 in Poland on 1 July 2019. The **Dobry Start** (Good Start) scheme provides for a one-off payment of 300 PLN for each pupil at the start of the school year and for all families who qualify for this support, regardless of income. The **Maluch + 2020** programme supports the development of childcare facilities for children aged 3 and under in the form of crèches, children's clubs and childminders. Beneficiaries of the programme can receive financial support to set up and run childcare facilities. The **Large Families Card** provides a system of discounts and extra benefits for families with three or more children. The card can be used to purchase goods or services provided by public institutions or private companies. The **Mama 4+** allowance, introduced in 2019, is paid to mothers with at least four children when they reach retirement age if they have had to stop working (and thus stop paying contributions) to raise their children. This allowance is equal to the minimum old-age pension, which in 2019 was PLN 1,060 (€245) per month. The **child tax credit** is another measure to support families with children.

Launched in 2015, the multi-annual **Senior+** programme focuses on local municipalities (and local territorial units) to increase the participation of older people in community life and develop the social network of day care centres and clubs for older people.

In 2019, the Polish Ministry of the Interior and Administration's Migration Unit published a draft strategy document, **Polityka Migracyjna Polski** (Polish Migration Policy), which aims to respond to the country's economic policy needs by attracting skilled foreign workers to fill the labour market shortages caused by the country's demographic and migration situation.

6. Declining population

In both developed countries and rapidly developing economies, the changing demographic structure of society is accompanied by similar processes, such as an ageing population and a parallel process of rural depopulation, increasing agglomeration, and declining birth and family fertility rates.



The effects of population decline include fewer schools because there are fewer school-age children; lower house prices; fewer new homes being built; less demand for rented accommodation; fewer care facilities; lower shopkeeper and business turnover; fewer sports facilities; fewer people using cultural and entertainment facilities (theatre, cinema, concerts, sports), so the number of these facilities will eventually be reduced; fewer people using public transport, which will be more expensive to fund; local residents will have to travel further to reach their desired destinations. In the context of a declining population and the associated ageing of society, there are three main economic problems associated with ageing: labour shortages, increased health care expenditure on the elderly and the financing of pensions.

A community with a higher proportion of older residents may be less attractive to businesses because it is harder to find suitable staff locally. At the same time, the **labour shortage** is countered by the fact that many developed countries currently have fairly high youth unemployment rates, stagnating wages, and many more work processes that can be automated, all of

which create great opportunities. Looking at the issue from the other side, an ageing population also increases competition for jobs, especially if the retirement age is extended. This increases the labour supply and makes it harder for young people to find jobs because older people have longer to retire. In this case, organisations have less innovation and change as firms are confined to old ways of doing things, making businesses less dynamic and slower to adopt technology. Rising wages also reduce social inequalities, while high unemployment and low-paid, precarious jobs (typical of younger middle-aged societies) increase them, and the degree of inequality is a more meaningful indicator of social and individual well-being than GDP per capita.

Health care costs have been driven not so much by care for the elderly but by the cost of modern diagnostics and treatment, which is on the rise, and by overpricing trends by pharmaceuticals and health care providers. The ageing of society also brings with it untapped economic opportunities. Demand for some products and services may increase, and new needs may emerge. This could include increased health care and treatment demand, representing an export market. Demand for education could increase, shifting the economic structure towards knowledge-intensive industries and research and development. [66]

The problem of **pension provision** has been addressed in most countries by raising the retirement age, although the state's unilateral introduction of a mandatory age increase raises questions. Investment in infrastructure to support a larger (older) population places a significantly greater economic burden on society than financing ageing.

Among the disadvantages in general is that **unequal population decline** (e.g., a significant reduction in the number of young people) can have negative effects on social and economic balances, such as family structures and labour market challenges. The decline of younger generations may reduce the potential for innovation and economic development, as new ideas and perspectives mainly come from younger generations.

Some authors[67] also see **benefits** in a shrinking society, as they argue that in ageing societies, fewer children bring a number of additional benefits:

---

[66] Kreiszné Hudák Emese – Varga Péter – Várpalotai Viktor (2015): A demográfiai változások makrogazdasági hatásai Magyarországon európai uniós összehasonlításban. in Hitelintézeti Szemle, 14. évf. 2. szám, 2015.

[67] Landy-Gyebnár Mónika (2018): Lehet, hogy az öregedő társadalmak hasznosak a bolygónak?;
Andre Haughton (2015): The pros and cons of an ageing population. The Gleaner

less overcrowding, more young people can get their own housing, and the amount parents can invest in a child increases. Smaller families also reduce poverty rates in society and help to tackle inequalities. In education, smaller class sizes mean more attention can be paid to individual skills. Overall, this also implies a smaller state, with numerically lower public education and, over time, health care costs, public subsidies and spending needs. At the same time, new types of social programmes the government provides for children may emerge. However, it should always be added that fewer people are funding these.

With a declining population, **resources are** distributed more economically sustainably across the population. Societies with lower populations can more easily address labour market challenges, and a more efficient allocation of resources can help ensure economic stability. With a declining population, services are better distributed, which can contribute to a higher quality of life for the population. Fewer people can make it easier to provide better quality services.

Last but not least, a smaller population means less **pollution**, less environmental damage, lower CO_2 emissions and less traffic. A smaller population means less pressure on environmental resources such as energy, water and other natural resources. This can contribute to sustainable development and environmental protection. A smaller population requires less destruction of remaining wild habitats, less agriculture, and less urbanisation. Species on the brink of extinction can thus benefit from our declining reproduction. Some of the agricultural land that is no longer used can be rewilded. Fewer people mean not only less food but also less energy, less water and less pollutants. Current expectations are to reduce per capita consumption while the number of 'main' people steadily increases. This is not a solution because resources are not growing with us.

Sociological observations show that older people are more experienced than younger people because they have lived longer. In this case, an ageing population can benefit by using their experience to help maintain morals and values in a country. They are more familiar with a group of people's

---

Čiutienė, R., & Railaitė, R. (2015). A development of human capital in the context of an aging population. Procedia-Social and Behavioral Sciences, 213, 753-757.

Bardazzi, R., & Pazienza, M. G. (2017). Switch off the light, please! Energy use, aging population and consumption habits. Energy Economics, 65, 161-171.

Lakin, K. C., & Burke, M. M. (2019). Looking forward: Research to respond to a rapidly aging population. Research and Practice for Persons with Severe Disabilities, 44(4), 280-292.

culture and way of life than their younger counterparts, and therefore have much to contribute to preserving and presenting traditions, customs, traditions and folklore, folk and rural ways of life.

The social aspects include that as the proportion of elderly people in the population increases, the so-called volunteer population is also growing. This has been identified as a global benefit, where older people contribute to community and government projects through free labour and **voluntary activities** after retirement.

Many argue that economic policy measures can cushion the adverse economic effects of demographic trends. For example, economic policy can encourage workers to work longer through tax and pension systems and reduce the growth in pension expenditure by raising the effective retirement age. However, despite these benefits, we do not consider the theory of a declining society viable, although some of its elements are undoubtedly worth considering. Overall, the pros and cons of a declining population are complex and depend on environmental, economic and social contexts. Managing demographic change and responding to its challenges is vital to building a sustainable future.

III. Hungary

One of the most essential questions for the future of Hungary is how many Hungarians we are and how many Hungarians we will become. History shows us many examples of how even great nations disappear and are replaced by others, while at the same time, tiny nations can survive and even develop, even for thousands of years. We are looking for ways to stop population decline and achieve a larger population.

At the end of the 18th century, Johann Gottfried von Herder[68] , one of the leading figures of Sturm und Drang, in one of his works, saw the future of Hungary as follows: '*The Hungarians, as the smallest part of the country's population, are now wedged in between Slavs, Germans, Oláhs (Vlahs) and other peoples, and centuries from now their language may hardly be discovered.*' This statement, which caused a great stir in its day, with Ferenc Kazinczy at the forefront, prompted Hungarian writers to turn over a new leaf, but unfortunately, it was not followed up, even though the subject's topicality remains unchanged. No Hungarian translation of his book exists to this day, the Hungarian sentence being quoted by the historian Dezső Dümmerth from a relevant study by Emil Grandpierre of Kolozsvár in his book Herder's Shadow.[69] Closely related to the subject, the idea of the nation's death is also a Herderian one.

More than 200 years after the prophecy was written, the question remains as relevant as ever. Although the apocalyptic formulation of the death of a nation is slightly robust, there is a real threat that must be dealt with. For the government of the day, the population, the literate, and everyone who is Hungarian. Because demography is a weapon, even today. The example of Kosovo in the 21st century shows how the significant Albanian population growth was able to displace the indigenous Serb from the ancient Serbian national cradle and create a quasi-new Albanian state simply because Serbian families are monogamous and Albanians typically have 4-6 children per family, and in less than a century it was able to bring about such a change. Unfortunately, the domestic trend is more similar to the Serbian one, unfortunately not showing an increase in the nation's population since the 1980s.

[68] "Da sind sie jetzt unter Slawen, Deutschen, Wlachen, und andern Völkern der geringere Teil des Landeseinwohner, und nach Jahrhunderten wird man vielleicht ihre Sprache kaum finden." Johann Gottfried HERDER, Werke, Band III/1, Ideen zur Philosophie der Geschichte der Menschheit, [1791] herausgegeben von Wolfgang Pross, Carl Hanser Verlag, München, 2002. 633.

[69] Herder árnyékában. Magvető, 1979 Accelerating Time series 143. p.

Just two numbers to start with: at the dawn of the regime change in 1990, 125,679 children were born; at the time of writing, the latest figure is 2019, with only 89 193 children. In short, more people are dying every year than are being born, and fewer are being born. For decades, we have not even come close to the 2.1 reproduction rate, which is at least equilibrium. In addition, life expectancy at birth is one of the worst in Europe (not even among the best in the world, 73 for men and 79 for women), and this, combined with the unfortunate attitudes of society and politics, is leading to a steady decline.

Because we are fewer and fewer, a lot! Since 1993, we have been steadily losing 30-40 thousand people yearly. In addition to natural decline, the storms of history have also helped. Already in the decades before the first war (1871-1913), we lost about 1,800,000 people[70] , according to other statistics, 2,000,000, most of them to the United States. Attila József wrote about this: '*one and a half million of our people staggered out to America*.'[71] This is the period when, through the liberal wave of the time, the disintegration of the classical family model began with the help of secularisation. Over a century and a half, it has been developed to such a degree that half of the already few marriages end in divorce within five years, a good third of kindergarten children live in broken homes, and 10% of babies do not even have a father at birth. Gay families have recently begun to appear, still well below 1%, but with the rise of liberal populism, gender is gaining ground and, after a change of course, rainbow flags may even appear on public buildings.

The great bloodbaths of the 20th century did not escape Hungary, and their demographic impact is still felt today. As successful as the great resettlements after the Ottoman period were, recent events have worked against us. The first such trauma of the last century was the Great War itself, with the loss of some half a million people. Then came Trianon, the post-World War I peace treaty that took away territory and the people who lived there. Some 350,000 people came over to the shattered country between 1920 and 24, but this only increased the population of the new Hungary, not the nation. A hundred years on, we can see that the break-up of the Hungarian minority in our neighbours has unfortunately led to results everywhere, from discrimination against the Hungarian population to the redrawing of administrative borders and the forced use of the local language to the many forms of shrinking the Hungarian minority that have existed and continue to exist. It is no exaggeration to say that the peace treaties around Paris caused the most significant decline in the numbers of Hungarian nations to date and are still

[70] https://www.magyarhirlap.hu/velemeny/Masfel_millio_emberunk
[71] József Attila: Hazám 1937. május

being caused a century later. To give just one example, treasured Cluj-Napoca, the capital of Transylvania, used to be almost exclusively Hungarian (82% Hungarian in 1910, 88% in 1941), but now only 15% of the population is Hungarian (2011 census: 50,000 out of 325,000). It doesn't take a great visionary to say that the situation will be even more deplorable in a quarter of a century.

Task: however difficult it may be, we must push through diplomatic relations to improve the situation of our compatriots beyond our borders, support Hungarian-language schools and kindergartens, and help Hungarian families to prosper by strengthening local and regional communities, and by launching economic and cultural tenders so that they do not leave their homeland and find their life opportunities there. Links with governmental factors must be strengthened at national, regional and local levels. The churches must not be left out of this, and the help of the local churches can and must be enlisted. Closer cooperation is also needed with nationalities, minorities and international human rights organisations.

The Second World War also saw a great loss of life, with approximately 1 million Hungarians dying in battlefields and prisoner-of-war camps. In terms of population, this was the largest loss after Poland, the Soviet Union and Germany. In other countries, the proportion is less than 3%, and in ours, less than half. The extermination of the Jews in rural Hungary also falls in this period. All this has had an impact up to the present day; since then, the Jewish population of the countryside has ceased to exist, and with a few exceptions in large cities, it is concentrated in Budapest. More than half (70-80 000) of the 130 000 people deported to the Malenky robot died in the camps of the Soviet Union. It should also be added to the immediate post-war period that the deportation of the Germans - commonly known as Swabians - in Hungary also meant the loss of hundreds of thousands of lives. Between 1946 and 1948, the Hungarian government deprived at least 185,000 ethnic Germans of their citizenship and of all their movable and immovable property and expatriated them.[72] *"Let them leave the way they came, with a bat on their backs." - writes Imre Kovács, a member of the National Peasant Party, echoing the incitement of the time.[73] It is typical of the selectivity of Hungarian memory that the company named after him even erected a marble plaque*

[72] Fehér István: A magyarországi németek kitelepítése 1945-1950. Akadémiai Kiadó, Budapest, 1988

[73] Egy batyuval. Szabad Szó 1945. április 22.

in his honour.[74] *It is as if we were erecting statues of the hardest-working men of Auschwitz.*

The next major demographic cataclysm for the country was in 1956. Some 200,000 people left their homeland, primarily young people with a great zest for life and a strong will to succeed. This was a massive loss for the Hungarian people, as only a tiny fraction of them returned home, almost all of them having found their way to the outside world. It is interesting to note that there were even cases when an entire university faculty left teachers and students, and it is typical of the times that they found a place in such a formation and functioned successfully, and still do.[75]



The last big wave is now our century, or more precisely our days. Hungary's accession to the EU (2004), but especially the emergence of free labour movement (2011), has mobilised many people. According to mirror statistics, the number of Hungarian citizens immigrating to European countries has reached almost 60,000 per year, and by 2013, it had already exceeded 85,000 per year - excluding the UK. Taking into account that during this period, 24-25 thousand Hungarian citizens applied for tax and social security numbers in the island country, it can be said that at least 100,000 people left

[74] Budapest V. Nyáry Pál utca 4.
[75] The College of Forestry team in Vancouver, British Columbia

Hungary every year from 2012.[76] This is a very high number even if we consider the high rate of return migration of almost 50%. Again, without official statistics, the number of emigrants is only an estimate, ranging from 300,000 to 600,000, with many predicting that London could be the second-largest Hungarian city after Budapest. Portfolio, for example, has this statistic for the distribution of 600,000 people in 2017: [77]

Task: stopping emigration. There is nothing more to do with the previous periods, at most only one or two symbolic meetings, which is not superfluous either because the common national culture is cultivated together with the Hungarians outside, and through their contacts, they can help the old country a lot, especially if they see that the homeland is also doing something for them. Moreover, recent emigration is not yet profound. If the old country can provide living conditions close to those outside, many will likely come home. Starting economic catching-up is a vital issue, a key issue for the survival of Hungarians.



[76] https://www.researchgate.net/publication/325225042_Kivandorlas_Magyarorszagrol_Szelekcio_es_celorszag-valasztas_az_uj_migransok_koreben

[77] https://www.portfolio.hu/gazdasag/20170830/ide-vezetett-a-tomeges-kivandorlas-tobb-magyar-lepett-le-mint-gondoltuk-260665

The chronicler would be well advised to report on population growth waves of the same magnitude in the next section. Unfortunately, there have been none in the last two centuries, so this section is only a single paragraph and a very short one. The only wave also consists of 3 parts: the result of the inhumanity of the two wars and the years of regime change, but all of them are characterised by the fact that they were only intra-national transfers, not population increases. The last major demographic wave of resettlement in Hungarian history took place after the end of the Turkish occupation, during the reigns of Maria Theresa (1740 – 1780) and Joseph II (1780 – 1790), resulting in a population of 9.2 million inhabitants by 1787, up from 3.5 million at the beginning of the 18th century.[78] An example of the latter is the latter's Impopulation Patent (Decree of Settlement), under which each settler received a plot of land, a house, 2 oxen, 2 horses, 2 cows, 1 cart, plough, harrow, etc., and an initial tax exemption. Pure America, you might say. This also contributes to the recent demographic background.

[78] https://hu.wikipedia.org/wiki/Betelep%C3%BCl%C3%A9sek_%C3%A9s_betelep%C3%ADt%C3%A9sek_Magyarorsz%C3%A1gra#A_18._sz%C3%A1zad_n%C3%A9pess%C3%A9gv%C3%A1ltoz%C3%A1sa

7. How many of us are there?

Immediately after his election, in the spring of 1990, former Prime Minister József Antall declared: '*I wish to be the Prime Minister of 15 million Hungarians in spirit and feeling*'. This noble wish was not achieved for various reasons because there were not 15 million of us.

In defence of this statement, it is worth mentioning that in 1996, the World Federation of Hungarians, with the help of Hungarian organisations and their leaders abroad, put the number of Hungarians in the world at 15.7 million, of whom 13 million live in the Carpathian Basin, in the territory of historical Hungary. Of these, 9.8 million live in Hungary; about two million in Transylvania (Romania); 600,000 in Felvidék (Slovakia); 360,000 in Vajdaság (Serbia); 180,000 in Kárpátalja (Ukrajna); 20,000 in Croatia; 10-10,000 in Slovenia and the Őrvidék, Austria. The distribution of our more than two and a half million fellow citizens in the rest of the world is as follows:

Australia and New Zealand	60 000	Hungarian
Africa	30 000	Hungarian
Asia	230 000	Hungarian and Jewish Hungarian
South and Central America	130 000	Hungarian
North America	1 930 000	Hungarian and of Hungarian origin
Europe	360 000	Hungarian
Total Hungarian diaspora abroad:	**2 740 000**	**Hungarian and of Hungarian origin**

World Federation of Hungarians (1996):The composition and population of the Hungarian diaspora - Magyarok Világszövetsége (1996): A magyar diaszpóra összetétele, lélekszáma

There are no exact statistics (there never will be, maybe), so we can only estimate our numbers. Why is this important? It is elementary: we need to know the present to make a demographic forecast.

How big is the Hungarian nation? Who are its members? The concept of a nation includes Hungarians who live worldwide and identify as Hungarians. There are many definitions, e.g. the New Hungarian Lexicon's dictionary says: "*A permanent community of people formed historically, based on a community of language, territory, economic life and spiritual character manifested in a community of culture.*"[79] One of the aptest is "*In its language, the nation lives*", although the quoted phrase was not uttered by any of the greats of the reform era, although many attribute the saying to Kazinczy, Kölcsey,

[79] Új Magyar Lexikon Akadémia Kiadó 1961. 5. kötet 162. p.

Széchenyi, and those who cite the Arad Thirteen as a counter-example, most of whom did not speak Hungarian at all, are also right somewhere. We will not start a debate on these pages, which is not the main theme of this paper, and we will conclude with a quote: "Style: the person himself. Then the mother tongue: the people themselves."[80]

7.1. Hungary

We have relatively accurate information on the number of Hungarians within the country's borders, which is complemented by more detailed data from the decennial census (we fell below 10 million in 2011). According to the Hungarian Central Statistical Office (KSH), we were 9.77 million in 2020. This is accurate without taking into account migration uncertainty data and could be off by a few hundred thousand due to statistical enumeration.



[80] Illyés Gyula: Anyanyelvünk Magvető Kiadó Budapest, 1964 45. p. Gyorsuló idő sorozat

Population of Hungary

Title	1940	1950	1960	1970	1980	1990	2000	2010	2019	2020
Population numbers										
Men	4 560 875	4 423 420	4 804 043	5 003 651	5 188 709	4 984 904	4 851 012	4 756 900	4 675 821	4 680 790
Women	4 755 199	4 781 379	5 157 001	5 318 448	5 520 754	5 389 919	5 349 286	5 257 424	5 096 935	5 088 736
total	**9 316 074**	**9 204 799**	**9 961 044**	**10 322 099**	**10 709 463**	**10 374 823**	**10 200 298**	**10 014 324**	**9 772 756**	**9 769 526**
Average age, 1 January										
Men	31,0	31,5	32,5	34,3	34,6	35,5	37,1	38,7	40,5	40,6
Women	32,1	33,3	34,8	37,0	37,7	39,0	41,1	43,0	44,7	44,8
total	31,6	32,4	33,6	35,7	36,2	37,3	39,2	40,9	42,7	42,8
Women per thousand men	1 043	1 081	1 073	1 063	1 064	1 081	1 103	1 105	1 090	1 087
Population density per 1 km ²	100,1	98,9	107,1	111,0	115,1	111,5	109,6	107,6	105,1	105,0
Marriages										
number	79 074	107 820	88 566	96 612	80 331	66 405	43 583	35 520	65 268	..
per thousand inhabitants	8,5	11,7	8,9	9,3	7,5	6,4	4,3	3,6	6,7	..
The divorces										
number	6 858	12 556	16 590	22 841	27 797	24 888	24 391	23 873	17 600	..
per thousand inhabitants	0,5	1,4	1,7	2,2	2,6	2,4	2,4	2,4	1,8	..
The live births										
number	177 047	190 398	146 461	151 819	148 673	125 679	97 047	90 335	89 193	..
per thousand inhabitants	18,9	20,6	14,7	14,7	13,9	12,1	9,5	9,0	9,1	..
Deaths										
number	123 349	105 718	101 525	120 197	145 355	145 660	132 183	130 456	129 603	..
per thousand inhabitants	13,2	11,4	10,2	11,6	13,6	14,0	13,0	13,0	13,3	..
Natural reproduction, weight loss (-)										
number	53 698	84 680	44 936	31 622	3 318	-19 981	-35 136	-40 121	-40 410	..
per thousand inhabitants	5,7	9,2	4,5	3,1	0,3	-1,9	-3,4	-4,0	-4,1	..
Total fertility rate	2,48	2,54	2,02	1,98	1,91	1,87	1,31	1,25	1,49	..
Reproduction coefficient										
raw	1,194	1,223	0,975	0,956	0,932	0,912	0,633	0,609	0,721	..
cleaned	0,972	1,060	0,918	0,915	0,904	0,891	0,624	0,602	0,715	..
Average life expectancy at birth										
Men	54,95	59,28	65,89	66,31	65,45	65,13	68,15	70,50	72,86	..
Women	58,24	63,40	70,10	72,08	72,70	73,71	76,46	78,11	79,33	..
total	..	61,36	68,03	69,20	69,02	69,33	72,32	74,38	76,16	..
Foetal losses										
abortions										

Title	1940	1950	1960	1970	1980	1990	2000	2010	2019	2020
number	..	1 707	162 160	192 283	80 882	90 394	56 404	40 449	25 783	..
for a hundred living dead	..	0,9	110,7	126,7	54,4	71,9	58,1	44,8	28,9	..
foetal deaths										
number	..	38 428	35 756	31 357	21 128	18 295	16 292	16 710	16 497	..
for a hundred living dead	..	19,6	24,4	20,6	14,2	14,6	16,8	18,5	18,5	..
total										
number	..	40 135	197 916	223 640	102 010	108 689	72 696	57 159	42 280	..
for a hundred living dead	..	20,5	135,1	147,3	68,6	86,5	74,9	63,3	47,4	..
Infant deaths										
number	20 458	17 327	6 976	5 449	3 443	1 863	789	481	335	..
for every thousand living dead	115,6	91,0	47,6	35,9	23,2	14,8	8,1	5,3	3,8	..

Source: KSH: 1.1. Népesség, népmozgalom (1941–)

The situation is even more complicated when it comes to determining the number of Hungarians abroad. Most estimates put the number of Hungarians living outside the Carpathian Basin today at around 2-2.5 million, or approximately 12-13 million in total. For a more accurate picture, we will take a look at some of the available databases, of course, with a relatively large margin of error.

7.2. Carpathian Basin

In **Romania,** the number of ethnic Hungarians in Transylvania was 1 million 225 thousand, while in the rest of Romania, it was 13 thousand. In five of its 16 counties - Arad, Crasso-Szurény, Hunyad, Sibiu and Timis - the decrease was 25 % or more. In these dispersed areas, "the complete disappearance of the Hungarian community is now a real possibility". In **Slovakia,** 459,000 (8.5 %) declared themselves as Hungarians. Two of the country's eight districts - Sibiu and Nitra - have a Hungarian ethnicity of 20-25 %, while three other districts (Košice, Banská Bystrica, Bratislava) have a sporadic but not insignificant Hungarian population. In **Serbia,** 251,000 ethnic Hungarians live in Vojvodina, with only a few thousand more identifying themselves as Hungarians. There are no districts where Hungarians are in absolute majority, but in two of them - North Bačka and North Banat - they are in relative majority with 41 and 47 % respectively. In **Ukraine**, it is currently estimated that the ethnic Hungarian population in Transcarpathia may number around 141,000. In **Croatia,** according to 2011 results, 14,048 people (16,595 in 2001) declared themselves as ethnic Hungarians, of whom

only 8,249 lived in Osijek-Baranya County, which includes Drăvaska, with the rest scattered in other parts of Croatia. In **Slovenia**, there was no traditional census, and the KSH estimated the number of ethnic Hungarians at 4,000.

7.3. Europe

Germany has the highest number of Hungarians living outside the Carpathian Basin in the European Union. Their number is estimated at less than 200,000. According to Eurostat, the number of Hungarians in Germany more than tripled from 60,000 in 2008 to 190,000 at the beginning of 2018. Most of them live in Bavaria, Baden-Württemberg and Hesse. There are also many in neighbouring **Austria.** According to official Austrian statistics, there were nearly 100,000 (98,227) Hungarian citizens working in Austria in 2019, with an estimated number of undeclared workers. Around 25,000 Hungarians live in Vienna. Most of them live in Burgenland, but they are also present in the industrial plants of Upper Austria, Carinthia, Tyrol and, more recently, in the catering units of Voralberg. There was a quadrupling in Austria, but the top country is surprisingly the Czech Republic, where the number of Hungarian citizens has increased ninefold.

There are around 50,000 Hungarians in **Italy**, mainly in the north, with a few isolated cases down from Rome. The Hungarians in France emigrated in several waves (1711, 1848/1849, 1956), and today nearly 40,000 Hungarians live in the country, mainly in Paris. In **Switzerland,** there are nearly 25,000 Hungarians. The Hungarians arrived in the country at three points in time – 1945, 1947/1948 and 1956 – and after the revolution, nearly 15,000 Hungarians emigrated to Switzerland. 80% of them are Swiss citizens.

Nearly 9-12 thousand Hungarians live in the **Netherlands.** After the First World War, it helped many Hungarian children - mainly Reformed - who could not be cared for by their parents because of the economic situation after the war. After the Second World War, especially after the events of 1956, thousands of Hungarians arrived in the Netherlands. Today, the universities in Amsterdam and Groningen offer Hungarian-language education. Hungarians also discovered **Denmark**, with around 2,000 refugees arriving after 1956. In the following period, they were joined by a steady flow of 'replacements', but at the same time, there was a significant flow of emigration (Sweden, Canada, USA, Norway, etc.) to other countries. The most recent significant wave of immigration, of several hundred people, during the regime change was mainly from Transylvanian Hungarians.

In **Sweden** in 1999, there were around 30-35 thousand Hungarians or persons of Hungarian origin, most of whom arrived in the Kingdom after 1956. The universities of Uppsala and Lund have a Department of Hungarian Language and Literature. There are nearly 900 Hungarians in Finland, 300-300 Hungarians in the **Baltic States**, Latvia and Estonia, and 120 Hungarians in Lithuania, according to the 2001 census. In **Norway,** there are nearly 3,000 people of Hungarian origin, mainly from Transylvania and Vojvodina, who came after the 1956 revolution and most recently after the turn of the millennium.

A large group of political emigrants first arrived in **Britain** after 1848/1849. After World War I, a small number of emigrants arrived in the country, but before World War II, the number of Hungarians settling in Britain increased significantly, mainly due to the Great Depression and Hungary's pro-German policies. Nearly 5,000 Hungarians arrived in the island nation after World War II and nearly 21,000 in 1956. Today, it is difficult to estimate the number of Hungarians on the island due to the discrepancies in the figures. What is certain is that since 2000, many have immigrated to the country, primarily for work purposes. Their number has certainly exceeded 200,000. The fact that English has become the language of choice in the country's schools in recent decades and that Albion has been a member of the EU for some time has helped in the Hungarians' choice. The post-Brexit situation is likely to change, and it is only conjecture at the time of writing this.

Hungarian citizens in Europe (Eurostat, persons)

	2008	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2018/2008**
Czech Republic	**587**	**999**	**1 522**	**2 304**	**3 140**	**4 109**	**5 372**	915,2%
Norway	**651**	**2 168**	**2 653**	**3 144**	**3 500**	**3 677**	**3 698**	**568,0%**
Iceland	**87**	**139**	**155**	**200**	**242**	**316**	**438**	503,4%
Denmark	**1 019**	**2 785**	**3 311**	**3 846**	**4 343**	**4 730**	**5 009**	491,6%
Switzerland	**4 400**	**9 914**	**11 596**	**14 882**	**17 525**	**19 569**	**21 302**	**484,1%**
Netherlands	**2 921**	**9 245**	**10 280**	**11 223**	**12 256**	**13 123**	**14 107**	483,0%
Estonia	**:**	**43**	**45**	**154**	**173**	**161**	**199**	462,8%
Slovenia	**127**	**229**	**279**	**355**	**413**	**506**	**586**	461,4%
Austria	**19 233**	**37 004**	**46 264**	**54 939**	**63 550**	**70 584**	**77 113**	**400,9%**
Slovakia	**2 702**	**9 920**	**8 134**	**8 629**	**9 185**	**9 799**	**10 248**	379,3%
Romania	**:**	**1 610**	**1 632**	**2 841**	**4 040**	**4 521**	**4 457**	350,1%
Germany	**60 221**	**106 342**	**132 284**	**150 712**	**171 154**	**180 168**	**190 647**	**316,6%**

Lichtenstein	:	33	37	43	43	45	50	312,5%
Lithuania	:	:	18	23	38	48	55	305,6%
Luxembourg	688	:	:	:	1 548	1 650	1 828	265,7%
Sweden	3 104	5 547	5 911	6 297	6 704	6 979	7 296	**235,1%**
Belgium	2 917	5 327	5 820	6 125	6 389	6 469	6 611	226,6%
Finland	900	1 622	1 784	1 879	1 968	1 973	1 907	211,9%
Spain*	:	12 918	13 714	14 514	15 389	16 327	17 345	**193,8%**
Poland	457	:	:	:	678	771	813	177,9%
Latvia	:	21	21	25	28	28	30	176,5%
Portugal	386	414	424	482	480	520	597	154,7%
Italy	5 467	6 840	7 483	7 708	8 034	8 181	8 288	**151,6%**
Ireland	6 261	:	:	:	:	9 431	9 379	149,8%
United Kingdom	:	:	74 544	86 489	83 707	96 374	99 596	**133,6%**
Croatia	:	:	:	:	556	627	680	122,3%
Greece	:	:	:	:	775	770	792	102,2%
France	:	:	6 279	6 543	6 593	6 548	6 181	**98,4%**
Bulgaria	141	142	148	153	144	142	136	96,5%

7.4. Outside Europe

Outside Europe, most Hungarians live in the **United States.** During the 2000 census, 1,398,724 people declared themselves Hungarian or of Hungarian descent. The emigration stopped after World War I, when the US authorities tightened immigration rules. After World War II, nearly 40,000 Hungarians arrived in the country, and after 1956, about 30,000. According to official data from Canada's 2001 census, 267,255 people declared themselves Hungarian. Canada also became a valid destination country with the emigration of 1948 and 1956. According to official figures, most Hungarians live in Ontario (Toronto), but Alberta and British Columbia also have significant Hungarian populations. Among the **South American** countries, almost all have a Hungarian community, but the most significant are Argentina (about 15,000, mainly in Buenos Aires), Brazil (Sao Paolo, but there are also Hungarian settlements, such as Árpádfalva, Mátyáskirályfalva, Szentiványfalva or Rákóczifalva, where there are 10 to 15,000 Hungarians), Uruguay and Venezuela (5 to 5,000).

Hungarians live elsewhere - where don't they? There are nearly 60,000 Hungarians in **Australia** and **New Zealand**; the majority - around 55,000 - have chosen Australia as their place of residence. There is a significant Hungarian community in Sydney, as well as in the cities of Melbourne, Adelaide, Brisbane, Perth and the Australian capital Canberra. The number of

Hungarians in **Oceania** is estimated to be close to 100. In **Israel**, the majority of the population of Hungarian culture and language fled Hungary to escape the persecution of the Jews. The founder of the state and founder of Zionism, the Budapest-born Tivadar Herzl[81] , played a historic role in the creation of Israel. It is estimated that between 200,000 and 250,000 Hungarians live in Israel, mainly in and around Tel Aviv.[82]



We have little influence on the demographic situation of Hungarians living in the **non-Carpathian Basin.** Their financial situation is typically better than ours, and this part of the country does not need to be helped. However, we can support local community initiatives to cultivate the Hungarian language and strengthen ties with the homeland. The process of atrophy cannot be slowed down or stopped. A condition for their return would be a substantial improvement in economic conditions in Hungary or even a rise in standards, but we do not feel this is a realistic prospect. Our experience shows that the emigrating generation is very Hungarian, their children are less so, and most of their grandchildren do not speak Hungarian. In other words, the proposed solution is also an economic catch-up with Western Europe.

[81] הרצל זאב בנימין, 1860 - 1904

[82] https://regi.tankonyvtar.hu/hu/tartalom/tamop425/2011_0001_547_Demografia/ch14s08.html

8. Our population policy

Artificial demographic control is classically a function of a country's population policy. That is to say, many factors of the demographic situation can be very well influenced, be it the number of births or even the morbidity or mortality rate.

Population policy is an effort by society, the state, or any larger human community to change population processes and structures according to an objective. This can be done through direct, population-directed legislation or measures (e.g. laws, legislation, and legal institutions that directly affect marriage, divorce, fertility or migration). However, changing population processes (the intention to change them) can be done by means of laws or measures of an economic, political, social, cultural, etc. nature which may affect certain population processes (tax system, social policy, family policy, education policy, health policy, etc.). [83]

The first known exponent of **restrictive population policy** was Thomas Malthus[84] . However, restrictive population policy emerged at the end of the 20th century as a population policy proposed by science (zero population growth theory). Some countries, such as the Scandinavian world, are trying to compensate for population decline and ageing by immigration, and some Western European countries have achieved population stability (France, UK, Germany).

Expansionary *population* theory is based on the idea that regions with high population density have a more advanced economy and a higher level of civilisation than sparsely populated parts of the world. On the other hand, population growth can positively impact the development of unpopulated areas, and there are many examples of this.

There are also cases where it is not the state but **a population group that develops** its own population policy. An example of this in Hungary between the two wars was the one-child policy, i.e. only one child in the family, so that the small fortune would not have to be divided up.

---

[83] https://regi.tankonyvtar.hu/hu/tartalom/tkt/oktatas-gazdasagtana/ch03s06.html#ftn.id527748

[84] 1798: in an anonymously published essay (Essay on the Principle of Population), he theorized that the improvement of living conditions increases the population, and that this is not followed by an increase in food production, but that the population increases according to a geometric, mathematical standard of production.

8.1. Generations

GENERÁCIÓK	Baby boomer	X	Y	Z	Alfa
Mikor születtek?	1946-1964 között	1965-1981 között	1982-1995 között	1996-2007 között	2008-
Hány évesek most?	55-73	38-54	24-37	12-23	0-11
Hányan vannak ma Magyarországon?	1,994,261 fő	2,527,445 fő	1,721,275 fő	1,284,439 fő	933,828 fő

Source: Nemes Orsolya (2019): Generációs mítoszok

After the Second World War, the planned management of Hungarian population growth began. From the 1950s onwards, a system of planned population control was in operation in all areas; why not here? Moreover, unlike in the surrounding countries, there was no birth wave, and in the early 1950s, net reproduction fell below 1%. Party directives were used to remedy this: in March 1953, abortion was severely restricted, and a childlessness tax was introduced, which led to a rise in fertility. This is the so-called Ratkó era, a reference to Anna Ratkó's ministry of health between 1950 and 1953, or more broadly to the population policy of 1950-1956. This regulation was effectively relaxed only in 1956. As a result, fertility subsequently fell extremely rapidly. So much so that in 1963, Hungary had the lowest birth rate in the world, where this period (1945-1964) was the baby boomer era.

The new Hungarian population policy was developed to counterbalance this: in 1968, childcare allowance was introduced, which halted the decline in the birth rate and even achieved a slight increase, but without any significant results. In 1973, a new population policy programme was launched, aiming at a steady-state population situation. Its instruments were the classic ones: a substantial increase in pregnancy and maternity allowances and family allowances, the provision of housing benefits, and a moderate tightening of the abortion regime (while allowing modern contraception with the pill). The impact of these measures is not really measurable since the 1953-1956 birth wave, which was just at childbearing age, also occurred during this period, which produced a second demographic wave in 1974-1975, which was more modest than in the 1950s. The 30-somethings of the

2000s (born between 1970 and 1979) are the so-called Ratkó grandchildren, the children of the Ratkó children. With their parents' retirement (2015-2020), Hungary is increasingly facing an ageing society. The effects of the ageing of the elderly will have faded by the end of the 1970s, the era of Generation X (1965-1979). It is not a generation that has run its course: younger people can still have children, while others can help the next generation as grandparents.



Source: KSH: Természetes népmozgalmi arányszámok Magyarországon 1950 és 2009 között

By the 1980s, a new era of population began: the era of natural decline. The 1980s was the last year in which the Hungarian population closed with a surplus, with 3,318 more people born than dying. The final days of the occupation were also largely caused by economic problems, the consequence of which was that the relevant state subsidies could not be increased or even maintained and so fell in real terms. The early years of regime change were not about population policy either, with too many more important problems arising and waiting to be solved. The Peter Pan Syndrome is emerging worldwide, which, in simple terms, means that members of a generation behave as adults in terms of consumption but as children, i.e. dependants, in terms of production and accumulation. Childhood is indeed prolonged, mainly in terms of independence and starting a family. This is the age of Generation Y (1980 - 1994). And today's childbearing depends primarily on them.

Heritage, the years of socialism, were not about getting rich. In fact, even the wealthy were restricted, as everyone was allowed a maximum of one apartment, one holiday home and one car. If there was a proletarian middle class, almost everyone belonged to it, since the difference between the highest and lowest incomes was no more than 8:1. Poverty was disguised by scarcity: you had to queue for the occasional piece of tropical fruit as well as for a pair of shorts, you had to wait months for a TV or a fridge, years for a car. The system was vigilant to prevent the accumulation of large private fortunes. In addition to the economic proletarians, there were the intellectual proletarians, which was evident in everything from visiting museums to reading books and learning languages, and unfortunately, is still inherited today, as the new generation sees a lack of demandingness in their parents.

With the change of regime, social values have changed a lot, which greatly impact the demographic situation. Today, pursuing individual goals is more likely to overshadow other goals than in the past. In an alienating world, people are not listening to each other; there is little deep and true connection. Traditional small communities (villages, small towns) are disappearing; friendship is replaced by cronies and pals, love by sexuality, patriotism by cosmopolitanism, and love of God by narcissism. In the absence of family and community role models, the role of the media is emphasised: for a new generation growing up in the unpretentiousness of mass communication, the lack of values and the unscrupulous pursuit of values is almost taken for granted, aided by schools that offer no education but education, and the mechanisation of the workplace and the propagation of undemanding entertainment. So many factors do not help young people have children or even have a child-free family life. 'Pride' and gender appear.

8.2. Current situation



Source : https://data.oecd.org/hungary.htm

According to the **OECD survey,** Hungary performs well in only a few well-being indicators compared to most countries in the Better Life Index. Hungary is above average in work-life balance. It is below average in social relations, civic engagement, environmental quality, education and skills, income and wealth, housing, jobs and earnings, personal security, subjective well-being and health.



Although money cannot buy happiness, it is an important tool for achieving a higher standard of living. In Hungary, the net adjusted average disposable income per capita is lower than the OECD average of $34,962 per year. Regarding employment, around 68% of people aged 15-64 in Hungary have a paid job, in line with the OECD employment average. Around 75% of men are paid, compared to 61% of women. Around 3% of workers work long hours, well below the OECD average of 11%.

Good education and skills are an essential part of the job search. In Hungary, 84% of adults aged 25-64 have completed upper secondary education, above the OECD average (78%). In terms of the quality of the education system, the average student scores 474 in reading literacy, mathematics and science in the OECD's Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA), lower than the OECD average of 486.



From a health perspective, life expectancy at birth in Hungary is 76 years, four years below the OECD average of 79 and one of the lowest in the OECD. Life expectancy for women is 79.33 years compared to 72.86 for men. Increasing life expectancy depends firstly on developing health care and secondly on a healthy lifestyle. Atmospheric levels of PM 2.5 – tiny air pollutant particles small enough to enter and damage the lungs – are 19.4 micrograms per cubic metre, higher than the OECD average of 13.9 micrograms per cubic metre. Hungary could do better on water quality, with 77% of people saying they are satisfied with their water quality, lower than the OECD average of 81%.

Task: improving the health system, increasing primary care, and strengthening same-day care. Prevention and education are key components of healthy living. Regular check-ups can prevent many diseases and treat them more effectively and cheaply, and a healthy lifestyle, healthy diet and a positive attitude have been shown to increase the number of years spent in good health.

As for the public sector, there is a moderate sense of community and a moderate level of civic participation in Hungary, where 86% of people feel

they know someone they can rely on in case of need, lower than the OECD average of 89%. Voter turnout, a measure of citizens' participation in the political process, was 70% in the last elections, higher than the OECD average of 68%. Voter turnout for the top 20% of the population is estimated at 79% and for the bottom 20% at an estimated 58%, wider than the OECD average gap of 13 percentage points and highlighting the gaps in the political mobilisation of the most disadvantaged.

Hungarians are generally less satisfied with their lives than the OECD average. When asked to rate their overall satisfaction with life on a scale of 0 to 10, Hungarians gave it an average score of 5.6, lower than the OECD average of 6.5.

There is no **value system**, the majority of families have broken up (there are 400,000 single women in Hungary today, typically with 1-2 children, and their parents are limited to economic support), and school only provides knowledge, not education. The older part of the current teaching staff studied and worked in the world of socialism, where, for a long time, the prerequisite for promotion was to present a passionate attachment to the international workers' movement, and it is difficult to become a credible teacher. This situation is slowly being resolved for the simple reason that this generation is ageing out. Nevertheless, the problem remains because the younger teachers have no vision either. The churches are slow to find their feet, many monastic orders have disappeared (e.g. the Servites), others have had to be adopted from abroad (e.g. even the Hungarian-founded Palaipans), their social standing is still in the process of being established, and they are finding their place in the new order with difficulty and pitfalls (for many, a past as a peace priest, paedophile scandals, agent activity). Public service media do not transmit values but struggle desperately to get ratings and audiences close to the tabloids. All this works against the classical family.

Task: if the state has/should have much to do anywhere, here too. It could also use the part of the media in its hands in this direction. The aim is to create a family-centred, child-loving society. Highly watched, targeted programmes help a lot. In addition to money, a professional journalist and a respected reporter are essential. Of course, you also need the right airtime and

a select group of guests. The power of the press can be enormous, and today's digital world has opened up many new doors which should be exploited.

Another government task is to dialogue with the relevant churches and social organisations. Most of them have a core value of protecting and strengthening a spiritually healthy family; some have thousands of years of experience. They need to be worked with and supported. The spectacular restoration of ecclesiastical monuments before elections is lovely, but it is just as important to support spirituality, especially if the aim is the same as that of the government. It is advisable to negotiate with the churches separately, not together. Curricula should be developed where, in addition to the curriculum taught, there is also the possibility of lessons related to the child's development, to classical education. One class teacher-lesson a week is not enough. Teachers and teachers need to be prepared for this during their university years. The social esteem of teachers is very much part of the issue. It cannot be done with low salaries and by putting people unsuitable for other jobs into teaching careers. Parents are also disdainful of this because they know how low teachers' salaries are and what their situation is, and so are the pupils because they can already distinguish between good and bad teachers. It is difficult to claim that the salary of a multi-disciplinary teacher with up to 40 years' experience is less than that of a junior specialist. We repeat: after the parents, the future of Hungary lies mainly in their hands, in the hands of the nation's day labourers.

Social attitudes are also changing in many areas, as illustrated by how **divorce** is viewed. Until the last third of the 19th century, when secularisation came about, there were hardly any divorces. The valid marriage was ecclesiastical; most of the historic churches made the dissolution of the relationship explicitly difficult, and in the case of Catholicism, the most common religion in Hungary, one had to go straight to Rome for a dissolution or annulment. The emergence of the two-earner family model (classical middle class?) and moral freedom after the Second World War further loosened the traditional family bond, and the neoliberal forms of post-change of the regime then brought new dimensions to the acceptance of otherness (fashionably: gender). It is no coincidence that Europe's highest divorce rates tend to be in the Protestant Scandinavian countries (Denmark, Norway, Sweden), while the lowest are in countries with a Catholic tradition (Italy, Poland, Portugal, Spain, etc.). The increasing number of broken families is not a factor in population growth.

Task: to strengthen family values. Ideologically through mass media and social organisations, financially through financial recognition of childbearing, ranging from direct support to family tax allowances. There is nothing diabolical about society's lifelong respect and recognition of the burden of childbearing, but we know no example of this in our country. [85] The current legislation favours the childless.

Intellectual values are distorted. Middle-class values are absent in the majority of families. There is hardly any time for education and even for conversation: TV and the rest of the media have become the substitute. The school and education system is also loosening, especially in higher education, where there is less and less demand for knowledge. This can be partly explained by the funding that has been available so far. It could go even lower: with the emergence of the pandemic, even the minimum language exam is no longer required for a degree. What values will this new generation be able to pass on to their children, if any? And will they? As Dezső Kosztolányi and László Németh put it decades earlier: after *homo moralis,* we need *homo æstheticus*, i.e. a man born to contemplate and to make art, alongside/after the man who seeks power.[86]

Mental health should be part of the family values. The classical function of the church is increasingly in the background. Psychiatrists and psychologists do not solve everything, although there are more and more of them, because, unfortunately, there is a demand for them. A society with a sick soul is not necessarily the best demographic promise. Drug abuse, depression, alienation and burnout are on the increase among young people, and it is they who are the foundation of a society that has children. The Californian film industry suggests that the decent middle-class American now has a psychologist - is this the future?

The new world, **globalisation,** is also changing family values. It is increasing individualism, forcing people to compete constantly, breaking up classical social relations, of which the family is the main victim. Money and power become the role model, the primacy of acquisition becomes the dominant factor, and having children becomes a secondary issue. However, history shows that the citizens of wealthier nations and wealthier people are not necessarily happier. Neither a nation's happiness nor individuals' happiness can be measured solely by financial indicators. The various increasingly

[85] Yes to initiative: for example, the proposal of József Botos, then head of Social Insurance, to recognise childbearing in pensions. In none of these cases has any substantive action been taken so far.

[86] Németh László: Sorskérdések Magvető, 1989. 205. p.

fashionable happiness indicators are not even friendly to demographic issues but suggest that they are happier without children.



Source: https://ourworldindata.org/happiness-and-life-satisfaction

Millennium. Young people have grown up in an environment where few children are in the family and in the circle of friends, where mothers are older and families are small. They were born into a globalised world, a wholly digital environment. All this is a background that does not encourage them to have children. However, in demographic terms, they are very much the ones to be addressed, and increasingly so: born between 1995 and 2009, this is the age of Generation Z, the beginning of the generation that is already well into the age of starting a family, even if the time is getting longer. Serious government work, but even more so societal concertation, is needed to develop a new approach.

Task: setting up and developing crèches and kindergartens (together with the relevant private companies), increasing the number of language schools, and preparing for further education. Strengthening special classes and specifications. Promoting home education, promoting reduced working hours of 4 to

6 hours, even with employer discounts. We are intensively involving pensioners in helping raise children, including through financial recognition.

Finally, in chronological order, the youngest, who are now toddlers. The Alfa generation started in 2010. They are not yet of child-bearing age, but the Hungarian future will rest more and more on their shoulders, including regarding having children. No matter how we prepare them, yes, we do: the family, the environment, the school, the church, the communities – the many places where children are found. We need to start now, at the most receptive age. It can be done later, but it is nowhere near as effective or lasting.

We believe that setting a good example is the best way forward.

8.3. Forecasts

KSH - Központi Statisztikai Hivatal (Hungarian Central Statistical Office). Population projections have been made in Hungary since the late 1950s, and since its establishment in 1963, the Population Research Institute has been responsible for preparing them. It is the most important scientific workshop for Hungarian population projections. The method used by the Institute is based on the cohort component method.



The population of Hungary decreased by more than 200 thousand between the two most recent censuses (2001 and 2011), but according to the Hungarian Census Office (KSH), the population loss from 2001 to 2017 exceeded 400 thousand. According to the results of the latest projections for 2018, one of the reasons for the decline is natural attrition, i.e. deaths outnumber births.[87] Although the number of deaths has fallen and the number of births has increased slightly in recent years, the balance of the natural decrease is still above 30 thousand. Another reason for the decline is the higher emigration of Hungarian citizens in recent years, which the positive migration balance of foreign citizens has not compensated. " According to the population projections, the population continues to decline. The high variant assumes that, with high fertility, positive net migration and high life expectancy at birth, the regression will moderate, and the population could stabilise at around 9 million. In the most likely (baseline) scenario, Hungary's population could fall to 7.75 million by 2070 and, in the worst case (low scenario), to 6 million.

Main scenarios of demographic change

Basic version

Mutatószám	2016	2020	2040	2070
Teljes termékenységi arányszám	1,49	1,45	1,45	1,45
Születéskor várható élettartam, férfi	72,4	73,0	76,7	81,4
Születéskor várható élettartam, nő	79,2	79,5	82,3	85,5
Nemzetközi vándorlások egyenlege (magyar állampolgárok)	–22 700	–30 000	–22 000	–20 000
Nemzetközi vándorlások egyenlege (külföldi állampolgárok)	13 339	12 500	12 500	12 500
Vándorlási egyenleg	–9 361	–17 500	–9 500	–7 500

The baseline scenario leads to moderate but realistic changes in demographic trends. The life expectancy improvement considered is lower than the conceivable maximum, but the number of children is higher than the future minimum. In the longer term, this will improve old-age dependency ratios and reduce the decline in the population as a whole, including the working-age population. The reduction in emigration of Hungarian citizens and the maintenance of a positive migration balance of foreign citizens will result in an immigration surplus, which will positively impact the population size and age composition. The baseline scenario represents a slightly favourable overall condition for the country's population development. It should be stressed that the hypotheses are based on the assumption of a balanced family and health policy, alongside other structural factors such as favourable

[87] Obádovics, Csilla (2018). A népesség szerkezete és jövője. In Monostori Judit – Őri Péter – Spéder Zsolt (szerk.) (2018) Demográfiai Portré 2018. KSH Népességtudományi Kutatóintézet, Budapest, 271-294.

developments in living standards, lifestyles and health behaviour, which will bring substantial and lasting results in improving life prospects.

Low version

Mutatószám	2016	2020	2040	2070
Teljes termékenységi arányszám	1,49	1,65	1,65	1,65
Születéskor várható élettartam, férfi	72,4	73,2	77,8	83,5
Születéskor várható élettartam, nő	79,2	80,0	83,7	88,3
Nemzetközi vándorlások egyenlege (magyar állampolgárok)	–22 700	–20 000	–10 000	–10 000
Nemzetközi vándorlások egyenlege (külföldi állampolgárok)	13 339	15 000	15 000	15 000
Vándorlási egyenleg	–9 361	–5 000	5 000	5 000

High version

Mutatószám	2016	2020	2040	2070
Teljes termékenységi arányszám	1,49	1,67	1,80	1,80
Születéskor várható élettartam, férfi	72,4	73,2	78,6	85,5
Születéskor várható élettartam, nő	79,2	80,0	84,5	90,3
Nemzetközi vándorlások egyenlege (magyar állampolgárok)	–22 700	–10 000	–5 000	–5 000
Nemzetközi vándorlások egyenlege (külföldi állampolgárok)	13 339	15 500	20 000	20 000
Vándorlási egyenleg	–9 361	5 500	15 000	15 000

The low and high variants give the minimum and maximum population numbers imaginable in terms of total population, subpopulations, and population movement caseloads. In this way, the range of future population growth is mapped out as a funnel that becomes wider as time goes on. The variant without migration is identical to the baseline scenario's hypotheses, except that both the Hungarian and the foreign migration balances are zero and are therefore not presented in a separate table.

The **United Nations Population Division** has published a report with the results of the latest population projections for 233 countries worldwide in 2017. The nine population projections using the cohort component method. Most of the different variants refer to fertility and are: "medium fertility", "high fertility", "low fertility", "constant fertility", "instant replacement". In addition, the so-called "Momentum" scenario is obtained by modifying the mortality and migration parameters of the "instant replacement" variant, keeping mortality at the average level of 2010-2015 and the migration balance at zero. Five of the nine variants result in a steady, albeit varying, decline in the population of our country. Three variants are also set up that will likely be effective in halting population decline sooner or later. The 'Momentum' variant stops population decline by 2080, the 'Instant replacement' variant stops decline and starts a moderate increase by 2052, and the 'High' variant is expected to reverse the decline in 2060.



In 2017 the UN also used a probabilistic method to estimate population numbers. It estimates that the population of Hungary will decrease to 6.4 million by the end of the century (the same as the medium scenario of the traditional calculation). The confidence interval at the 95% confidence level is 3.9 million, i.e. 1.95 million people from the mean (6.4 million), i.e. a 95% probability of between 4.4 and 8.3 million people by 2100. For comparison, the UN estimated 7.37 million people in 2070 using the probability method, while our baseline version of the cohort-component projection estimates 7.5 million.

Eurostat also uses the component method in its forecasts. Its basic assumption is that the birth and death rates of the EU Member States will converge and that international migration will reach equilibrium, with the latest projection assuming 2150 as the year of convergence. Their calculations are updated every two years and published in the Europop series. Eurostat has prepared five scenarios for projecting the population of countries:

- Low fertility: fertility is 20% lower than the baseline.
- Low mortality: age- and sex-specific mortality rates are gradually reduced, so life expectancy at birth is +2 years higher than baseline by 2070.

- Higher migration: the migration balance rises by a third in the pre-accession period and a third during the pre-recession period.
- Lower migration: the migration balance falls by one-third over the forecast period.
- No migration variant: the migration balance does not reach zero in the projected time period; it is only a hypothetical value, referring to the migration balance converging to zero in the long run.



According to the baseline scenario, Hungary will have a population of 8.88 million in 2070, compared to the HCSO's NKI projection of 7.5 million. The main reason for this discrepancy is the inaccuracy of migration data, as Eurostat has consistently projected a positive migration balance for Hungary based on official KSH data. In contrast, our estimated migration balance has been negative in recent years and is not projected to turn positive in the near future under either of our scenarios.

9. The economic opportunities

In the previous paragraphs, we have made several references to the impact that education, the environment, especially the family, and good examples can have on how a generation lives. In addition to ideology, it is necessary to create economic conditions to help slow down the depopulation process. The primary means by which this can be done are briefly outlined below. The bottom line is to stop the drift away from Europe and start catching up.

Task: to develop feasible economic plans. Deliver relevant election promises, enforce them, and hold them to account. Actual responsibility in a leading economic position. Expert, professional leadership and professional background. Creation of an environment conducive to development, from infrastructure to the regulatory system. Independent and authoritative control of the spending of public money. Effective and drastic punishment of corruption. A unique role for small businesses, including family farms.



From a demographic point of view, the economic distribution of Hungarian society is divided into 3 parts: the poor, the so-called middle class and the rich. We differ from Western Europe mainly because of the proportions: there is a considerable gap between the poorest and the richest, and the middle class is practically non-existent, and we tend to think of it as the aspirations of the lower-middle class. There has been no middle-classisation of Hungarian society (although this was expected in the early 2000s). From the point of view of population policy, this means that the rich are not really to be bothered with, as having children is not a material issue for them. However, a population of around 200,000 - the so-called top ten thousand - will not solve the Hungarian demographic problem, especially as the rich do not favour large families. For a good part of the middle class, having children is already a financial problem, and this is where the need for support is greatest. The same applies even more so to people with low incomes, where the task is to bring them up to middle-class level so that they can not only have children but also bring them up.

From an economic point of view, **poverty** is the leading cause of demographic decline. Our current impoverishment has been ongoing since the regime change, with minor interruptions, but its origins go back further. The first borrowing from the West dates back to the years following the 1973 oil crisis. Thanks to the price principle in Bucharest, Hungary has been slower in absorbing the price shock, but we have not avoided it. The world of gulag communism and the happiest of hovels meant that living standards were more or less maintained at the cost of foreign indebtedness, i.e. impoverishment did not occur then. So we went from poor rich to rich poor. What is very bad is that we have not managed to climb out of the hole since then, and we have not really tried. The second wave of great poverty came after the regime change - and has remained. Taking the index of real income per worker for 1960 as 100, we reached 129 % in 1970, and by 1980, we were at 158 %, but the post-change crisis brought us back to 118 % in 1995, the pre-1970 level, and we did not reach the 1970 level until 2000. In other words, the Hungarian population has not grown any richer in 30 years, moving away from the middle class. Nor has growth been uninterrupted since the turn of the millennium: after 2006, the crisis led to a slowdown and a decline, and we only reached the then level in 2004. The pandemic of 2020 has essentially repeated the same situation.

However, it should be pointed out that rising prosperity does not necessarily mean rising fertility. The European countries with the most successful demographic development today are all poor (Kosovo, Albania, Moldova, etc.), and France, which has also achieved the best results among the

developed countries, has only been able to achieve a relatively good position with the help of immigrants (see Part II for more details).

We can prove this with concrete figures in other ways. Just look at the development of one of the most important indicators, GDP in dollars, to make an international comparison. The table below shows that we have made no progress in the last decade or so. Moreover, there is no doubt that the situation is not ideal from a childbearing point of view.



You could also include health care if you want to make international comparisons. We have the worst indicators in Europe for causes of death and life expectancy. Short life is part of the demographic disadvantage but also part of the malaise of society. So, the lesson here is also a given.

Task: Radical transformation of the Hungarian health system. Improving mortality and morbidity rates is of great demographic importance. In addition to the expansion of primary care already mentioned, it is advisable to increase the number of outpatient treatment options and to make more intensive use of hospital beds. As with the increase in doctors' salaries, the salaries of middle-skilled workers should be brought up to the same level, and support staff should be paid, not forgetting social care workers. Selective bonuses, i.e., performance recognition (not only quantity but also quality!), would be more valuable than the current, age-only remuneration. Adequate rewarding of home care can alleviate overcrowding in inpatient facilities and is cheaper and more efficient. It is advisable to bring dental treatment back into the

public health system, otherwise, we will become an increasingly toothless nation. From the point of view of our subject, the densification of paediatric practices is also one of the most urgent tasks.

The income distribution has changed a lot since the change of regime. The ratio between the average of the top and bottom deciles of per capita income has increased considerably: from 4.6 in 1987 to 6.0 in 1992, 8.1 in 2003 and 9.2 in 2019.

Task: consider a tiered income tax system, if only for social solidarity and justice. Our proposal is for a low rate (e.g. 5-10%) for the lowest-income earners, which should not be tax-exempt. Let them also feel that they are contributing to the burden of society, not being the testicles of the world. The next level would be a tax burden that could be considered average (e.g. 10-20%), which would not yet inhibit the growth of the middle class. Finally, a higher rate (e.g. 30-40 %) for above-average or certain types of income in annuities would be significant. In addition, some reduction in VAT would be necessary, as the tax wedge is relatively high by international standards.

Income distribution

Indicator/dimension	2008	2009	2010	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019
Poverty threshold (illustrative value), for a single person household								
PPS	3 958	4 097	4 164	4 751	4 960	5 025	5 162	5 616
euro	2 640	2 844	2 544	2 734	2 861	2 993	3 254	3 511
forint	663 556	715 187	713 291	843 941	886 803	932 162	1 006 249	1 119 752
Inequality of income distribution	3,6	3,5	3,4	4,3	4,3	4,3	4,4	4,2
Poverty rate, %	12,0	12,4	12,3	14,9	14,5	13,4	12,8	12,3
Poverty rate without social benefits %	52,1	51,3	51,4	49,1	47,7	46,7	46,1	43,0
Poverty rate without social benefits (including pensions), %	30,4	28,9	28,4	25,7	25,8	25,0	25,0	20,0

Source: KSH: 2.6.1. Jövedelem-eloszlás, szegénység (2006–2019)

Due to the economic effects of the **pandemic** (debt, public deficit, economic recovery, etc.), it will be necessary to increase public revenues anyway, and this would also include the achievement of demographic targets, which means that more of the redistribution would be allocated to, for

example, public education and education. Experience shows that if people see that they are getting something for their money and that the state's care is visible everywhere, they are more willing to pay taxes.

Related to this is the **social justice** aspect of the idea that **raising a child is** costly. It is, therefore, fair that those who do not wish to bear such a burden should contribute to reducing the burden on others. We are not talking about a child tax, which is completely outdated these days, but about tax breaks and exemptions for those with families.

It is not diabolical to impose a **wealth tax on** the richest, of course taking into account social circumstances, especially the proportion of dependants. We do not mean an overall social burden, since after the regime changes hundreds of thousands of families became multimillionaires through the privatisation of housing, leaving them as panelproles (panel proletariats), but a tax on the actual rich above higher savings, e.g. above HUF 200 - 300 million, would be introduced, of course also here depending on the number of dependants. The fairness of this is also justified because, with few exceptions, the wealth came from being in good standing at the time of privatisation and from government contracts.

Revenues after **expenditure**. The system of family allowances is well-known and has existed in Hungary since 1912[88] . Maternity and childcare allowances are also centuries old. From a demographic point of view, there is obviously a need to increase some of them, but the state coffers are finite on the one hand, and on the other hand, there are other essential expenditure items. Childcare allowance (GYES) has existed since 1967, initially at HUF 600 a month until the child is 2.5 years old. In the meantime, the amount and the duration of the allowance have been changed several times. The family and population policy packages in 1967 and 1974 brought temporary success, as did the GYED (Childcare Allowance) or even the family allowance, introduced in 1985. We believe economic recovery and creating a massive and broad middle class are much more effective and lasting.

[88] Although then only among public officials.

Current family support benefits:

The **family allowance** has not risen for 12 years (since 2008), while the number of families in working poverty is increasing. They are the ones who are active in the labour market, but do not have enough monthly income to live decently. The amount remains between 12,200 and 25,900 HUF. The rate of the one-off maternity allowance (currently 64,125 HUF), the rates of the child benefit (gallant for half a year, 225,000 HUF per month), child support (2 years, up to 234,000 HUF per month) and child benefit (26,000 HUF per month) could be increased, although in our opinion a 10-20 % increase would not increase the incentive to have children, and a higher allowance would be a budgetary obstacle. Internationally, these benefits are high, including the possibility of mothers staying home with their children. Other areas of expenditure include increasing the number of crèches and nurseries, improving their equipment and reducing the cost of transport for the little ones. This includes the construction of playgrounds, the creation of occupational premises for older children and the development of day-care facilities. The long-overdue increase in teachers' salaries in these categories is particularly urgent and justified.

10. Immigration

On the issue of demography, we cannot ignore migration. A quick and spectacular solution is to allow immigration. Do we need it? The answer is that if it is done with a reasonable filter, it can be successful in moderation.

Immigration to Hungary is very different from that in Western Europe. The old EU Member States receive mainly people from outside the continent who differ from the host nation in their customs, religion and, less frequently, language, which can sometimes be a source of conflict. Hungary, on the other hand, is not yet a destination country for non-European immigrants, and given the economic situation and the reluctance of Hungarian society to immigrate, it is unlikely to become one in the near future. Examples from previous years have shown that when they were able to enter Hungary, they were seen as a transition, and after a few days, they moved on to the west, to the north. Another illustrative figure is that 90% of immigrants who have been granted citizenship since the fall of communism are of Hungarian nationality. According to KSH data, our immigration statistics look like this:

Immigrant foreign nationals

Country	The year of immigration							
	2000	2005	2010	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019
Europe								
Austria	156	793	585	394	385	456	351	377
Belgium	47	146	165	139	193	178	191	196
Denmark	22	100	57	33	22	41	45	27
Finland	132	178	63	97	74	80	76	56
France	188	650	344	376	378	414	434	359
Greece	66	88	39	92	97	96	114	109
Netherlands	88	425	328	363	328	445	503	470
Ireland	22	83	55	78	78	91	118	80
Luxembourg	1	3	1	7	10	4	8	4
Germany	785	3 857	2 420	1 968	2 282	2 503	2 525	2 616
Italy	99	320	253	576	601	598	552	582
Portugal	5	25	36	86	92	108	103	100
Spain	16	79	191	322	265	278	286	323
Sweden	66	265	143	127	153	173	182	228
Bulgaria	62	55	65	69	99	81	76	92
Croatia	168	45	178	210	149	189	179	145
Poland	75	290	192	246	232	267	299	262
Romania	8 894	8 895	6 581	3 494	3 090	2 934	2 853	2 713
Slovakia	1 034	1 632	1 195	1 275	1 338	1 508	1 494	1 520

Country	The year of immigration							
	2000	2005	2010	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019
EU27_2020	**12 130**	**18 157**	**13 088**	**10 135**	**10 097**	**10 673**	**10 641**	**10 495**
United Kingdom	149	707	332	414	435	508	498	587
Norway	181	220	146	126	147	163	162	166
Russia	311	170	391	907	655	814	868	928
Switzerland	75	30	90	115	135	149	148	153
Serbia	1 777	1 096	998	583	578	1 659	2 917	2 499
Turkey	92	120	520	565	698	953	956	1 177
Ukraine	2 427	2 069	1 619	1 143	1 202	6 325	16 699	21 185
Other European	119	132	188	681	572	951	1 259	1 321
Together	**17 261**	**22 701**	**17 372**	**14 669**	**14 519**	**22 195**	**34 148**	**38 511**
Asia								
Israel	217	229	311	234	177	255	227	226
Japan	163	271	279	513	467	580	552	552
China	1 066	544	1 141	3 524	1 461	2 259	1 993	2 354
Mongolia	118	97	96	98	169	271	708	835
Syria	45	31	39	280	236	580	294	250
Vietnam	199	221	212	347	280	731	1 279	1 961
Other Asian	409	674	2 013	3 064	3 397	5 580	6 099	6 368
Together	**2 217**	**2 067**	**4 091**	**8 060**	**6 187**	**10 256**	**11 152**	**12 546**
America								
United States	365	394	1 125	1 188	1 132	1 405	1 260	1 379
Canada	48	50	172	214	189	226	240	242
Other US	71	98	353	577	563	780	962	1 115
Together	**484**	**542**	**1 650**	**1 979**	**1 884**	**2 411**	**2 462**	**2 736**
Africa								
Nigeria	30	93	181	235	177	310	206	180
Other African	127	135	365	757	960	1 199	1 229	1 232
Together	**157**	**228**	**546**	**992**	**1 137**	**1 509**	**1 435**	**1 412**
Other and unknown	**65**	**44**	**225**	**87**	**76**	**82**	**115**	**92**
Total	**20 184**	**25 582**	**23 884**	**25 787**	**23 803**	**36 453**	**49 312**	**55 297**

Source: KSH: 1.10. A bevándorló külföldi állampolgárok földrészek és országok szerint (2000–)

As a member of the **European Union,** Hungary cannot ignore its position on migration:

- **Legal migration:** the EU has the power to determine the conditions of entry and residence of third-country nationals entering or staying in a Member State, including for family reunification purposes. Member States remain responsible for determining the number of third-country nationals they admit for employment.
- **Integration:** the Union can encourage and support Member States in taking measures to promote the integration of third-country nationals residing legally on their territory, but there is no provision for harmonising Member States' laws and regulations.
- **Fight against irregular immigration:** the EU must prevent and reduce irregular immigration, particularly through an effective return policy, while respecting fundamental rights.
- **Readmission agreements:** in accordance with its powers, the Union may conclude agreements with third countries for the readmission of persons residing in its territory who do not, or who no longer, fulfil the conditions for entry to, presence in, or residence on, the territory of a Member State to their country of origin or the country from which they came."[89]

Since the migration crisis peaked in 2015, the EU has implemented measures to control external borders better and manage migration flows. As a result, the number of irregular migrants entering the EU has fallen by more than 90%. Hungary has gone even further.

The European Union and its Member States are working even harder to develop an effective, humane and secure European migration policy. The EU Council will decide on this basis. The problem is still manageable, with a relatively small migrant population in the community: on 1 January 2019, 21.8 million people were living in the EU-27 who were not nationals of EU-27 Member States.[90] This is 4.9% of the total population (448 million people). After the crisis in 2015, the rules became effective, as the figures show: 1.83 million immigrants in 2015, down from 0.14 million in 2019.[91]

[89] Articles 79 and 80 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU).

[90] https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=Migration_and_migrant_population_statistics/hu

[91] https://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/headlines/society/20170629STO78629/the-eu-response-to-the-migrant-challenge



In 2018, 3.9 million people migrated to one of the EU-27 Member States, while 2.6 million emigrants are reported to have left the EU-27. However, these totals do not represent the migration flows to/from the EU-27 as a whole, as they include flows between the different EU-27 Member States. In 2018, 2.4 million migrants arrived in the EU-27 from non-EU-27 countries and around 1.1 million people emigrated from the EU-27 to non-EU-27 countries. Concerning the resident population, Malta received the highest number of immigrants in 2018 (55 immigrants per 1,000 inhabitants), followed by Luxembourg (41 immigrants per 1,000 inhabitants) - see Figure 2. In the same year, the highest rates of emigration were recorded in Luxembourg (23 emigrants per 1,000 inhabitants), Malta (19/1000 inhabitants), Cyprus (18/1000 inhabitants) and Romania (12/1000 inhabitants). In Hungary, the majority of new citizenships were granted to citizens of other EU-27 Member States, with citizens who acquired citizenship coming almost exclusively from Romania (Romanians in the original text).

The current government's political product is the continuation of Christian traditions. This two-thousand-year-old religion approaches the problem slightly differently from the Orbanist approach. Governments and political parties that proclaim a Christian outlook - if they are Christian - cannot ignore the relevant doctrine. Among the **corporal acts of mercy** (7 of them), we find: 1. to feed the hungry, 2. to give drink to the thirsty, 3. to clothe the poor, 4. to give accommodation to travellers...[92] , in which it is not easy to explain the anti-migration. The unbiased interpretation is that the Christian man can

[92] Catechism. In: http://www.szeretetfoldje.hu/index.php/cikkek-irasok/5862-a-szentlelek-het-ajandeka-az-irgalmassag-cselekedetei-es-a-szentlelek-elleni-bunok

relate to the gift of the Holy Spirit to help his fallen fellow human beings, i.e. migrants.

"Fearing that immigrants will dilute Christian culture is a grotesque portrayal of Christianity and our culture as a whole," says Pope Francis in his book *Dream Together. "Migration is not a threat to Christianity at all, only in the minds of those who benefit from these claims. To popularise the Gospel while not welcoming foreigners in times of need - this creates a culture that is Christian in name only, stripping our religion of what makes it different."*[93] - writes Pope Francis in his newly published book. The outright rejection is crude and unhelpful.

Task: selective, sensitive management of migration. To welcome migrants from peoples of a kindred spirit and race, and to treat groups of different skin colour, religion and thought with appropriate humanity. The main criteria for admission are assimilation skills, education and life purpose. They are dealing with rejections in a civilised way, lowering expectations and helping them to return home. Stopping the influx of Hungarians living near the border, improving their home conditions, sending Hungarian helpers, and helping them stay temporarily (education, work, health care, etc.) so they can find their way in their homeland.

[93] Ritorniamo a sognare. Hungarian: Álmodjunk együtt. 21. század Kiadó Budapest, 2020

IV. Summary

In summary, the prevailing absence of a successful demographic program across European Union countries serves as a stark reminder of the inefficacy of various family policies. Within this context, Brussels maintains the viewpoint that demographic challenges are predominantly within the realm of individual Member States, and its intervention is generally limited to offering support through tangential policies. Despite the diverse approaches taken by national governments, a unifying goal emerges: the imperative to arrest or at least decelerate the ongoing rate of population decline.

This shared objective is further underscored by the comprehensive findings of the EU Commission's demographic report, emphasizing the absence of a one-size-fits-all approach and stressing the necessity for policy-making that carefully considers local realities. The European Union, along with its Member States and regions, stands united in recognizing the imperative of addressing demographic change for the collective well-being of EU citizens. The repercussions of demographic shifts are far-reaching, affecting everyone, making it paramount to harness its potential as a transformative force for Europe's resurgence and to glean insights for constructing a more resilient, sustainable, and equitable Union.

While some advocate for immigration as a solution to offset declining populations, concerns linger regarding potential societal changes stemming from the integration of different races and cultures. This evokes reflections on historical shifts, particularly during colonial eras, where demographic dynamics underwent significant transformations. Although economic support is undeniably crucial, it is concurrently acknowledged as insufficient and falls short of offering a comprehensive solution to the multifaceted challenges posed by demographic changes.

Societal perception, especially attitudes toward children and family-centeredness, emerges as a pivotal determinant in addressing demographic challenges. Regrettably, essential facets such as motherhood, the feminine ideal, and the responsibilities associated with family maintenance have been relegated to the realm of romanticized notions, now serving as symbols of stagnation and primitiveness.

Addressing these deep-rooted issues necessitates collaborative efforts from various societal pillars, including the media, schools, the church, civil society, and the state. The example set within households stands out as the primary and most influential force shaping societal values. However, it is

disconcerting that these societal entities underutilize their enormous reserves. A cohesive and sensible cooperation among these pillars could potentially mobilize substantial forces, counteracting the foreseen predictions mentioned at the beginning of this paper.

If they are realised, the Herderian prediction mentioned at the beginning of this paper will remain a literary curiosity. So be it!

Finally, at present, there is no evident solution to elevate natural population growth beyond the desired 2.1 level. The rejection of violent solutions is grounded in their undemocratic, humiliating nature and the realization that they fail to provide a lasting resolution. Nevertheless, while a comprehensive solution remains elusive, the ongoing demographic process can be mitigated through a series of measures, some of which are less about financial investment and more about cultivating a nuanced understanding and fostering a positive societal attitude. These measures, if implemented judiciously, hold the potential to act as catalysts in shaping a more balanced, sustainable, and equitable demographic landscape.

The future of Hungary depends on these!

List of sources

- Alberro, Heather. "Why we should be wary of blaming 'overpopulation' for the climate crisis". The Conversation.
- Alburez-Gutierrez, D., Zagheni, E., Aref, S., Gil-Clavel, S., Grow, A., & Negraia, D. V. (2019). Demography in the digital era: New data sources for population research.
- Andre Haughton (2015): The pros and cons of an ageing population. The Gleaner
- Bardazzi, R., & Pazienza, M. G. (2017): Switch off the light, please! Energy use, aging population and consumption habits. Energy Economics, 65.
- Bleha, Branislav – Sprocha, Branislav – Vanjo, Bpris. – Földházi, Erzsébet (2014): Population projections for Hungary and Slovakia at national, regional and local levels. INFOSTAT Bratislava – Hungarian Demographic Research Institute.
- Čiutienė, R., & Railaitė, R. (2015): A development of human capital in the context of an aging population. Procedia-Social and Behavioral Sciences, 213, 753-757.
- Donati P.: La famiglia in Italia. Sfide sociali e innovazioni nei servizi, Band 1 und 2, Osservatorio nazionale sulla famiglia. Rapporto biennale 2011– 2012, Carocci.
- Edgecombe, N. (2019). Demography as opportunity. TU O'Banion (Ed.), 13, 213-229.
- Egy batyuval Szabad Szó 1945. április 22.
- EPRS | European Parliamentary Research Service (2020): Demography on the European agenda - Strategies for tackling demographic decline
- Európai Unió működéséről szóló szerződés (EUMSZ)
- Eurostat (2020): Fertility statistics
- Fehér István: A magyarországi németek kitelepítése 1945-1950. Akadémiai Kiadó, Budapest, 1988
- Földházi Erzsébet (2012): A népesség szerkezete és jövője. In: Őri Péter - Spéder Zsolt (szerk.): Demográfiai portré 2012. KSH Népességtudományi Kutatóintézet, Budapest: 155-168.

- Földházi Erzsébet (2013): Magyarország népességének várható alakulása 2060-ig. Korfa 2013/4, KSH Népességtudományi Kutatóintézet, Budapest.
- Földházi Erzsébet (2014): Hungarian population projections 2013. Research Highlights no.15, Hungarian Demographic Research Institute, Budapest.
- Földházi Erzsébet (2015): A népesség szerkezete és jövője. In: Monostori Judit – Őri Péter – Spéder Zsolt (szerk.): Demográfiai portré 2015. KSH Népességtudományi Kutatóintézet, Budapest: 213-226.
- Gietel-Basten, S., & Sobotka, T. (2021). Trends in population health and demography. The Lancet, 398(10300), 580-581.
- Hablicsek László (2005): A Kárpát-medencei magyarság demográfiai helyzete és előreszámítása, 1991-2021. KSH NKI Kutatási jelentések 78. KSH Népességtudományi Kutatóintézet, Budapest.
- Hartmann, Betsy (2016). Reproductive rights and wrongs: the global politics of population control. Haymarket Books
- Herder árnyékában. Magvető, 1979 Gyorsuló idő sorozat 143. old.
- Herder, Johann Gottfried (1791): Werke, Band III/1, Ideen zur Philosophie der Geschichte der Menschheit, [1791] herausgegeben von Wolfgang Pross, Carl Hanser Verlag, München, 2002. 633.
- Herrington, Gaya (2021) Update to limits to growth: Comparing the world3 model with empirical data. Journal of Industrial Ecology 2021; 25: 614- 626
- Hilleman MR (2002): Realities and enigmas of human viral influenza: pathogenesis, epidemio-logy and control". Vaccine. 20 (25–26): 3068–87. doi:10.1016/S0264-410X(02)00254-2. PMID 12163258. and Potter CW (2001): A history of influenza. Journal of Applied Microbiology. 91 (4): 572–9. doi:10.1046/j.1365-2672.2001.01492.x. PMID 11576290.
- http://epa.oszk.hu/02900/02943/00057/pdf/EPA02943_kapocs_2013_2_38-49.pdf
- http://www.provinz.bz.it/familie-soziales-gemeinschaft/familie/downloads/SophieKarmasin.pdf
- https://24.hu/tudomany/2018/04/15/mamahotel-40-eves-pszichologia-levalas/
- https://data.oecd.org/hungary.htm

- https://demografia.hu/hu/letoltes/tudastar/covid-info/szakirodalom-10-IZA-Discussion-Papers.pdf
- https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/view/hlth_hlye/default/table?lang=en
- https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=Migration_and_migrant_population_statistics/hu
- https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=People_in_the_EU_-_population_projections&oldid=497115
- https://economaniablog.hu/2020/05/14/miert-osszemerheto-a-covid-19-gazdasagi-hagyateka-a-spanyolnathaeval/?utm_source=rss&utm_medium=rss&utm_campaign=miert-osszemerheto-a-covid-19-gazdasagi-hagyateka-a-spanyolnathaeval
- https://felszabter.hvgblog.hu/2021/05/15/az-elso-transznemu-puspok-az-evangelikus-egyhazban/
- https://index.hu/techtud/2021/07/17/herrington-a-novekedes-hatarai-elorejelzes-futurologia-jovokutatas-osszeomlas/?fbclid=IwAR1jFW_0v7AdSCLA5KW0PPphiIYxF9VnhHiOMWWGvKLUvPn44f7mRi3LisY
- https://koronavirus.hu/hirek/20200514/a-koronavirus-vagy-a-spanyolnatha-okoz-nagyobb-kart
- https://kosovotwopointzero.com/en/the-politicization-of-having-children/
- https://magyarnemzet.hu/kulfold/megallas-nelkul-erkeznek-az-illegalis-bevandorlok-olaszorszagba-8954378/
- https://ourworldindata.org/data/population-growth-vital-statistics/world-population-growth
- https://ourworldindata.org/future-population-growth
- https://ourworldindata.org/happiness-and-life-satisfaction
- https://qubit.hu/2019/02/14/hogyan-lehetne-valoban-elerni-hogy-tobb-gyerek-szulessen-magyarorszagon
- https://qubit.hu/2020/08/11/a-jelek-szerint-elmarad-a-karanten-miatt-vart-baby-boom
- https://qubit.hu/2021/05/19/tobb-szuletes-maradhat-el-a-jarvany-miatt-mint-ahanyan-meghaltak-covid-19-ben

- https://regi.tankonyvtar.hu/en/tartalom/tamop425/2011_0001_528_Toth_Jozsef_Altalanos_tarsadalomfoldrajz_I_II/ch06.html
- https://regi.tankonyvtar.hu/hu/tartalom/tamop425/2011_0001_547_Demografia/ch14s08.html
- https://regi.tankonyvtar.hu/hu/tartalom/tkt/oktatas-gazdasagtana/ch03s06.html#ftn.id527748
- https://thinkmagazine.coopservice.it/persone/occupazione-femminile-in-italia/
- https://www.economist.com/graphic-detail/2020/04/03/will-the-coronavirus-lockdown-lead-to-a-baby-boom
- https://www.eu-gleichbehandlungsstelle.de/eugs-hu/eu-%C3%A1llampolg%C3%A1rok/infot%C3%A9ka/szoci%C3%A1lis-juttat%C3%A1sok/csal%C3%A1d-%C3%A9s-gyerekek
- https://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/headlines/society/20170629STO78629/the-eu-response-to-the-migrant-challenge
- https://www.forbes.com/sites/roberthart/2021/05/05/american-birth-and-fertility-rates-plunge-to-all-time-lows-during-covid-pandemic-cdc-says/?sh=428d5a107aa8
- https://www.ilsole24ore.com/art/italia-ultima-nell-ue-il-divario-donne-e-uomini-lavoro-recovery-occasione-irripetibile-ADpjTDx?refresh_ce=1
- https://www.ksh.hu/docs/hun/xftp/stattukor/nepesedesi_vilagnap/2020/index.html
- https://www.magyarhirlap.hu/velemeny/Masfel_millio_emberunk
- https://www.metazin.hu/index.php/item/1966-1966
- https://www.portfolio.hu/gazdasag/20170830/ide-vezetett-a-tomeges-kivandorlas-tobb-magyar-lepett-le-mint-gondoltuk-260665
- https://www.researchgate.net/publication/325225042_Kivandorlas_Magyarorszagrol_Szelekcio_es_celorszag-valasztas_az_uj_migransok_koreben
- https://www.worldometers.info/hu/
- Illyés Gyula: Anyanyelvünk Magvető Kiadó Budapest, 1964 45. old. Gyorsuló idő sorozat
- József Attila: Hazám 1937. május

- Katekizmus. In: http://www.szeretetfoldje.hu/index.php/cikkek-irasok/5862-a-szentlelek-het-ajandeka-az-irgalmassag-cselekedetei-es-a-szentlelek-elleni-bunok
- Koslowski, R. (2019). Migrants and citizens: demographic change in the European state system. Cornell University Press.
- Kreiszné Hudák Emese – Varga Péter – Várpalotai Viktor (2015): A demográfiai változások makrogazdasági hatásai Magyarországon európai uniós összehasonlításban. in Hitelintézeti Szemle, 14. évf. 2. szám, 2015. június
- KSH (2021): 7.1.5. Természetes szaporodás/fogyás (–) (2000–)*(2/2)
- KSH (2021): 7.1.8. Születéskor várható átlagos élettartam – összesen (2000–) [év]
- KSH (2021): 7.1.9. Születéskor várható átlagos élettartam – férfiak (2000–) [év]
- KSH Népességtudományi Kutatóintézet 2018-as előreszámítási forgatókönyve szerint
- KSH: 1.1. Népesség, népmozgalom (1941–)
- KSH: 1.10. A bevándorló külföldi állampolgárok földrészek és országok szerint (2000–)
- KSH: 2.6.1. Jövedelem-eloszlás, szegénység (2006–2019)
- KSH: Természetes népmozgalmi arányszámok Magyarországon 1950 és 2009 között
- Lakin, K. C., & Burke, M. M. (2019): Looking forward: Research to respond to a rapidly aging population. Research and Practice for Persons with Severe Disabilities, 44(4), 280-292.
- Landy-Gyebnár Mónika (2018): Lehet, hogy az öregedő társadalmak hasznosak a bolygónak?;
- Lesthaeghe, R. (2020). The second demographic transition, 1986–2020: sub-replacement fertility and rising cohabitation—a global update. Genus, 76(1), 1-38.
- Malthus: An Essay on the Principle of Population from 1798
- Moss 2012, OECD 2012 indicator PF2.523, Escobedo/Wall and ILO 2014, IPL 2015 and Silvia Vogliotti, Sara Vattai (2015) Welfare state Parte 2 - Le politiche della famiglia in un confronto europeo IPL
- Murdock, S. H. (2019). Applied demography: An introduction to basic concepts, methods, and data. Routledge.

- Nemes Orsolya (2019): Generációs mítoszok
- Németh László: Sorskérdések Magvető, 1989 205. old.
- Péti Márton, Pakot Levente, Megyesi Zoltán, Szabó Balázs (2020): A Kárpát-medencei magyarság népesség-előreszámítása, 2011-2051 In: Demográfia 2020/4
- Philip Rathgeb & Tobias Wiß (2020): Österreichische Familienpolitik verstärkt Geschlechterungleichheit. Momentum Institut
- Population panic lets rich people off the hook for the climate crisis they are causing | George Monbiot". the Guardian. 26 August 2020. Retrieved 30 July 2021.
- Ritorniamo a sognare. Magyar változatában: Álmodjunk együtt. 21. század Kiadó Budapest, 2020
- Sannigrahi, S., Pilla, F., Basu, B., Basu, A. S., & Molter, A. (2020). Examining the association between socio-demographic composition and COVID-19 fatalities in the European region using spatial regression approach. Sustainable cities and society, 62, 102418.
- Sophie Karmasin (2018): Familienpolitik in Österreich - Schwerpunkte der österreichischen
- Statistisches Bundesamt: Mikrozensus – Bevölkerung mit Migrationshintergrund
  Lizenz: cc by-nc-nd/3.0/de/
- Tainter, Joseph A. (2006): Archaeology of Overshoot and Collapse. Annual Review of Anthropology. 35: 59-74. doi:10.1146/annurev.anthro.35.081705.123136
- The Natural increase in population per 1000 people, from the CIA World Factbook, 2017.
- Thomas, Cassidy; Gosink, Elhom (2021): At the Intersection of Eco-Crises, Eco-Anxiety, and Political Turbulence: A Primer on Twenty-First Century Ecofascism. Perspectives on Global Development and Technology. 20 (1-2): 30-54.
- Új Magyar Lexikon Akadémia Kiadó 1961. 5. kötet
- UN World Population Prospects 2008.
- Vignoli, D., Guetto, R., Bazzani, G., Pirani, E., & Minello, A. (2020). A reflection on economic uncertainty and fertility in Europe: The narrative framework. Genus, 76(1), 1-27.

- Vogliotti, Silvia, Sara Vattai (2015) Welfare state Parte 2 - Le politiche della famiglia in un confronto europeo IPL
- WHO report 2021 May
- World Federation of Hungarians (1996):The composition and population of the Hungarian diaspora - Magyarok Világszövetsége (1996): A magyar diaszpóra összetétele, lélekszáma
- www.inps.gov.it
- Wynes, S., & Nicholas, K. A. (2017) The climate mitigation gap: education and government recommendations miss the most effective individual actions, Environmental Research Letters, 12(7), 074024.