



László Vértesy

From Movement to Employment: decoding migration and labour market

Gazdaságelemző Intézet
Institute of Economic Analysis
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From Movement to Employment: decoding migration and labour market

The 21st century presented the world with new developments. In an era marked by unprecedented globalization, the intricate interplay between labour markets and migration has become a pivotal force shaping the economic landscape of nations worldwide. Movement dynamics within and across borders have evolved into a multifaceted phenomenon that extends far beyond the traditional employment paradigms. The study encapsulates the intricate web of relationships between the ebb and flow of human capital, employment patterns, and the broader socio-economic fabric.

Throughout history, countless examples have shown that many people are forced to leave their homeland for various reasons. History has no end, so even today, the migration of people, groups of people, even peoples and nations, and their escape, temporary or permanent abandonment of their homeland, is a world phenomenon. The change in people's spatial position is called migration in a foreign term. Its direction depends on where it is going: it can be an emigrant, an immigrant, or even a transmigrant, although the latter term is not common. Socialist practice (not only Hungarian) used the term dissident with preference.

The journey from one geographic location to another is no longer solely characterized by pursuing a livelihood; it has transformed into a complex interconnection of factors influenced by geopolitical events, technological advancements, demographic shifts, and policy frameworks. As we delve into the heart of this subject, it becomes evident that understanding the nuances of migration is inseparable from comprehending the dynamics of labour markets.

This exploration seeks to unravel the threads that bind migration and employment, providing insights into how these phenomena influence and shape each other. It delves into the motivations driving individuals and communities to traverse boundaries in search of better opportunities, examining the impact of this movement on the supply and demand dynamics within labour markets. Additionally, the study endeavours to dissect the role of governmental policies, international agreements, and societal structures in regulating and responding to the confluence of labour and migration.

The significance of this inquiry extends far beyond academic curiosity; it is a critical examination of the forces that shape the future of societies and economies. By decoding the complex relationship between movement and employment, we aim to contribute to a deeper understanding of the challenges and opportunities that arise in the contemporary global landscape, paving the way for informed policymaking, innovative solutions, and a more equitable distribution of resources and opportunities on a global scale.

Navigating the intricate tapestry of migration and its profound implications on labour markets requires a comprehensive understanding of its multifaceted dimensions. This structural exploration, organized into distinct sections, offers a panoramic view of the intricate relationship between migration and the world of employment. From laying the general foundation by examining various forms of migration to dissecting its impact on labour markets in the European Union and Hungary, this framework aims to unravel the complexities inherent in the migration-employment nexus. The findings here, primarily on the subject, are, on the one hand, theoretical in nature, and on the other hand, they provide practical data from international life and the situation in the European Union and Hungary.

The initial section serves as the cornerstone, providing a broad foundation for comprehending the spectrum of migration. Here, we delve into the variations that characterize migration – ranging from unrestricted free movement to situations with no such liberty, seeking to strike a balance termed the "golden mean." Further, the focus extends to the critical realm of labour migration and guest workers, exploring their definitions, historical contexts, evolving perceptions surrounding guest work, and attendant rights and duties.

Building upon the general foundation, the second section focuses on migration in a broader context. The European Union, as a case study, becomes the focal point for dissecting migration patterns within its borders. European examples illuminate the diversity and complexity of migratory movements within this supranational entity, while Hungary emerges as a specific lens through which the evolution of migration and the prevailing perceptions of immigration are scrutinised.

The third section narrows the focus to the impact of migration on labour markets. Within the European Union, the exploration spans various facets, including self-employment, employment trends, and the complex dynamics of unemployment influenced by migratory flows. Simultaneously,

the spotlight turns to Hungary, delving into the specifics of guest work within the country and the experiences of Hungarian workers venturing into the European labour market.

In the concluding section, the threads of exploration are drawn together to weave a comprehensive summary. The synthesis of insights from each segment aims to provide a holistic understanding of how migration, in its myriad forms, intersects with and shapes the dynamics of labour markets. This comprehensive overview not only distils critical findings but also lays the groundwork for informed discussions, policy considerations, and further research endeavours in the ever-evolving landscape of migration and employment.

I. General foundations

Within the intricate tapestry of human movement across borders lies a fundamental understanding that serves as the cornerstone of our exploration. The general foundations unfold the layers of complexity inherent in migration, delineating the nuanced variations that shape its diverse landscape. As we embark on this journey, our focus spans from the different types of migration to the delicate equilibrium found in the spectrum between free movement and its antithesis, aptly described as the "golden mean."

The foundation we lay extends beyond the broad classifications of migration, delving into the realm of labour migration and the significant role played by guest workers. Definitions of these terms form the bedrock, providing clarity to the intricate concepts we encounter. A historical outlook then traces the evolution of these phenomena, casting light on the dynamic interplay between societies, economies, and individuals seeking opportunities across borders.

As we navigate through the historical dimensions, we also turn our gaze to the perceptual shifts surrounding guest work. The lens through which societies view and interpret the phenomenon of individuals working away from their home countries is a critical aspect of our exploration. Additionally, the rights and duties entwined with the status of being a guest worker become integral components of our analysis, shedding light on the intricacies that define the relationship between the host nation and those seeking employment within its borders.

This part sets the stage for a comprehensive understanding of migration in its manifold forms. It lays the groundwork for an exploration beyond surface-level observations, aiming to unravel the complexities of human movement in its various shades—from the freedoms of migration to the intricacies of labour mobility and the unique challenges and opportunities presented by the phenomenon of guest work. Through this comprehensive foundation, we embark on a journey to decode the intricate dynamics that characterize the intersection of migration and employment.

1. Variations on migration

This chapter unfurls an exploration into the diverse manifestations of this dynamic force, dissecting types of migration, the dichotomy between free and restricted movement, and the delicate balance encapsulated in the concept of the "golden mean."

Migration, in its essence, defies simple categorization, reflecting the complexity of human choices and the forces that propel individuals across borders. Our examination begins by scrutinizing the various types of migration, acknowledging that the motivations, challenges, and outcomes of human movement are as diverse as the people undertaking these journeys. From economic migration driven by employment opportunities to forced migration propelled by conflicts or environmental factors, we traverse a spectrum encompassing the richness and intricacy of migratory experiences.

The dichotomy between free and no free movement becomes a pivotal axis of analysis within this exploration. Free movement, a cornerstone of specific regional alliances and global ideals, empowers individuals to traverse borders relatively easily, fostering economic integration and cultural exchange. In contrast, the absence of such liberties gives rise to a landscape where movement is constrained and dictated by geopolitical boundaries, policies, or other restrictions. Understanding this binary allows us to delve into the profound implications of the freedom or restriction of movement for individuals, communities, and nations alike. The golden mean as delicate equilibrium strikes a balance between the freedoms afforded by migration and the imperative to regulate movement. This nuanced approach recognizes the benefits of mobility while acknowledging the need for responsible governance and sustainable practices. As we explore this golden mean, we aim to unravel the complexities inherent in finding a harmonious equilibrium that accommodates the aspirations of individuals while addressing the concerns of societies and nations.

Natural population growth has stopped in almost all countries of today's Europe, but at the same time, the development of the economy requires more and more workers. One of these problems – but not the only one! – and its controversial bridging option is the liberalisation of migration. In the following, we will talk about the advantages and disadvantages of this, as well as arguments for and against it.

It is necessary to make a distinction between a **migrant and a refugee**. We do not want to get involved in a theoretical debate, so we quote an English definition: A migrant changes their country of residence. A refugee or asylum seeker is someone who does so "from fear of persecution for reasons of race, religion, social group, or political opinion". In this sense, asylum seekers are generally counted as a subset of migrants and are included in official estimates of migrant stocks and flows.¹

Migrant vs. Refugee

Criteria	Migrant	Refugee
Definition	A person who moves intending to settle in a new location.	An individual who has fled their home country due to a well-founded fear of persecution.
Motivation	Can be driven by economic opportunities, family reunification, education, lifestyle, etc.	Forced to leave due to persecution, violence, human rights violations, or other life-threatening circumstances.
Legal Status	May or may not have legal authorization to reside in the destination country.	Has a specific legal status recognized by international law. Entitled to protection under the 1951 UN Refugee Convention.
Voluntary/Forced	Voluntary movement: individuals choose to move for various reasons.	Forced movement: individuals are compelled to flee due to life-threatening circumstances.
	Generally, have the freedom to choose where they want to live and work	Not entitled to freedom of movement and may be required to remain in a particular location.
Causes of Movement	Diverse reasons including economic, educational, personal aspirations.	Primarily to escape persecution, armed conflict, violence, or threats to safety.
International Protection	May or may not benefit from legal protection, depending on immigration status.	Entitled to international protection under the 1951 UN Refugee Convention. Has the right to seek asylum and not be forcibly returned to their country of origin.

Source: own compilation

¹ <https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk/research-briefings/sn06077/>

Migrant is a broad term that refers to any person who has left their country of origin to settle temporarily or permanently in another country. People migrate for many reasons, including economic opportunities, family reunification, education, or political or environmental factors.² **Migrants** are generally free to choose where to live and work and are not required to seek asylum or refugee status. **Refugee** is a more specific term that refers to a person who has been forced to flee their country because of persecution, conflict, generalized violence, or other circumstances that have seriously disturbed public order. Refugees are unable to return to their home countries safely, and they are entitled to international protection under the 1951 Refugee Convention.³ The term applies to any person who – as a result of events occurring – is owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.

While the term refugee is precisely defined in the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and the 1967 Protocol, migrants are a heterogeneous group with no international consensus. Migrant is a more neutral term as it disregards the direction of movement and may include migration within or across borders. Migrants can be defined from legal, administrative, research, and statistical perspectives. They can be distinguished as to motives of those concerned, such as economic, family reunion, or safety. Migration events are related to place of birth, citizenship, place of residence, or duration of stay.⁴ Different states refer to legal migration as regular, controlled or free migration.

² Douglas, P., Cetron, M., & Spiegel, P. (2019). Definitions matter: migrants, immigrants, asylum seekers and refugees. *Journal of travel medicine*, 26(2), taz005.

Orcutt, M., Patel, P., Burns, R., Hiam, L., Aldridge, R., Devakumar, D., ... & Abubakar, I. (2020). Global call to action for inclusion of migrants and refugees in the COVID-19 response. *The Lancet*, 395(10235), 1482-1483.

³ <https://www.unhcr.org/media/convention-and-protocol-relating-status-refugees>

⁴ De Beer, J., Raymer, J., Van der Erf, R., & Van Wissen, L. (2010). Overcoming the problems of inconsistent international migration data: A new method applied to flows in Europe. *European journal of population= Revue europeenne de demographie*, 26(4), 459.

1.1. Types of migration

Migration is a complex and multifaceted phenomenon, encompassing various types that reflect the diverse reasons, circumstances, and outcomes associated with human movement across geographic borders. The **basics of migration** are based on four expressions: two reflect only the direction, like internal or external migration, while upon the basis of intent, it can be an emigration or an immigration.⁵ An immigrant is the term used for a person after arriving in the destination country, whereas an emigrant migrates away. All of them can be temporary or permanent.

Internal migration: the movement of people within a country. Various factors, such as employment opportunities, education, family ties, or environmental change, can drive it. Internal migration can be rural-to-urban, urban-to-rural, or interregional.	
External migration: the movement of people across international borders. Economic opportunities, political instability, or environmental factors often drive it. It can be permanent or temporary, involving any skill or education level.	Emigration: the movement of people from one country to another, with the intention of settling permanently in the new country. Emigrants often leave their home countries for better economic opportunities, political freedom, or a better quality of life.
	Immigration: the movement of people into a country to settle permanently. The receiving country often welcomes immigrants, as they can contribute to economic growth and diversity. However, immigration can also lead to social tensions and economic challenges.

Source: own compilation

Migration, the movement of people from one place to another, can have positive and negative impacts, often varying based on individual perspectives, economic conditions, and cultural contexts. Here are some general pros and cons of migration:

⁵ Anghel, R. G., & Coşciug, A. (2018). Introduction to the special issue: Debating immigration in a country of emigration. *Social Change Review*, 16(1-2), 3-8.

Weinar, A. (2018). Politics of emigration in Europe. *The Routledge handbook of the politics of migration in Europe*, 38-49.

Anghel, R. G., & Coşciug, A. (2018). Introduction to the special issue: Debating immigration in a country of emigration. *Social Change Review*, 16(1-2), 3-8.

Advantages and disadvantages of migration

Pros	Cons
<p>Economic Contributions: Labour Market Benefits Remittances</p> <p>Cultural Exchange and Diversity: Cultural Enrichment. Innovation and Creativity</p> <p>Brain Drain: Acquisition of Skilled Workers</p> <p>Demographic Balance: Population Dynamics</p> <p>Global Understanding: Increased Global Understanding</p> <p>Human Rights and Asylum: Humanitarian Reasons</p>	<p>Strain on Resources: Pressure on Services</p> <p>Social Integration Challenges: Social Tensions</p> <p>Economic Competition: Job Market Competition</p> <p>Brain Drain: Loss of Skilled Workers</p> <p>Security Concerns: Security Risks</p> <p>Health Concerns: Public Health Issues</p> <p>Xenophobia and Discrimination</p>

Source: own compilation

Among the **advantages** of migration, it can be said that within economic contributions, migrants can fill labour market gaps, contribute to economic growth, and sustain industries facing workforce shortages.⁶ They often send money back to their home countries, providing economic support to their families and contributing to the development of their home communities. Migration fosters cultural diversity, bringing together people with different traditions, languages, and perspectives. A diverse population can increase innovation and creativity as different ideas and viewpoints converge. The new arrivals can address demographic imbalances, supporting countries with ageing populations by providing a younger workforce. Migration can promote understanding between nations and bridge cultural gaps, fostering global cooperation and harmony. It also provides an avenue for individuals seeking refuge from persecution, violence, or natural disasters, contributing to protecting human rights.

⁶ Bove, V., & Elia, L. (2017). Migration, diversity, and economic growth. *World Development*, 89, 227-239.

National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. (2017). *The economic and fiscal consequences of immigration*. National Academies Press.

Within the **disadvantages** is that a large-scale migration can put pressure on and strain public services such as healthcare, education, and housing, leading to challenges for host countries. Cultural differences and language barriers may lead to social tensions and challenges in integrating migrant populations into host communities. In some cases, migrants might be perceived as competing for jobs with the local population, leading to economic concerns. Some countries experience a "brain drain" when skilled professionals migrate, leading to losing talent in their home countries.⁷ There are concerns about the potential for criminal activities,⁸ terrorism,⁹ or other security risks associated with migration. It can contribute to the spread of diseases if not managed effectively, raising public health concerns. The increased migration can trigger xenophobia, discrimination, and anti-immigrant sentiments in host countries.

The **classification of migration types** helps better understand migratory flows' motivations and characteristics. There can be several reasons for leaving one's place of residence, home, or home. Primarily, livelihood problems, most often a more favourable financial situation and more accessible prosperity, and less often political persecutions are in the background. In some cases, they are forced to migrate due to natural disasters.

⁷ Dohlman, L., DiMeglio, M., Hajj, J., & Laudanski, K. (2019). Global brain drain: how can the Maslow theory of motivation improve our understanding of physician migration?. *International journal of environmental research and public health*, 16(7), 1182.

Adesote, S. A., & Osunkoya, O. A. (2018). The brain drain, skilled labour migration and its impact on Africa's development, 1990s-2000s. *Journal of Pan African Studies*, 12(1), 395.

⁸ Pinotti, P. (2017). Clicking on heaven's door: The effect of immigrant legalization on crime. *American Economic Review*, 107(1), 138-168.

⁹ Nussio, E., Bove, V., & Steele, B. (2019). The consequences of terrorism on migration attitudes across Europe. *Political Geography*, 75, 102047.

Böhmelt, T., Bove, V., & Nussio, E. (2020). Can terrorism abroad influence migration attitudes at home?. *American Journal of Political Science*, 64(3), 437-451.

Types of migration

	Definition	Motivation
Economic Migration	Movement is driven primarily by economic factors, such as seeking better employment opportunities, higher wages, or improved living standards.	Individuals or families move to enhance their economic prospects and financial well-being.
Forced Migration	Involuntary movement resulting from threats to life, safety, or livelihood, often due to conflict, persecution, or natural disasters.	People are compelled to flee their homes due to external factors beyond their control.
Internal Migration	Movement within the borders of a single country, involving a change in residence from one region or locality to another.	Factors may include job opportunities, urbanization, or seeking a better quality of life within the same country.
International Migration	Movement across international borders, involving a change in residence from one country to another.	Diverse factors such as economic opportunities, education, family reunification, or seeking asylum in another country.
Seasonal Migration	Temporary movement of people who relocate for short durations, often in response to seasonal employment opportunities.	Individuals move to areas where seasonal work, such as agriculture or tourism, is in demand.
Return Migration	Movement of individuals or families back to their country or region of origin after a period of living or working abroad.	Often driven by a desire to reunite with family, contribute to hometown development, or retire in the home country.
Brain Drain and Brain Gain	The movement of highly skilled or educated individuals from one country to another (brain drain) or the reverse flow of talent (brain gain).	Can be influenced by better career opportunities, education, or research prospects.
Family Reunification	Migration driven by the desire to reunite with family members who have migrated previously.	Individuals move to join family members who have

	Definition	Motivation
		established residence in another country.
Refugee and Asylum Seeker Migration	Forced migration due to fear of persecution, conflict, violence, or human rights abuses. Asylum seekers are individuals seeking protection in another country but have not yet been granted refugee status.	Escaping danger and seeking safety and protection.
Environmental Migration	Movement prompted by environmental factors such as climate change, natural disasters, or environmental degradation.	Individuals move to escape the adverse effects of environmental changes on their homes and livelihoods.

Source: own compilation

Other types of migration include chain, circular, and retirement. Chain migration is the movement of individuals to a new country following relatives or friends who have already settled there. Circular migration involves people moving between two or more countries for work or other reasons. Retirement migration involves people moving to a new country to retire and enjoy a better quality of life.

Modern migration appeared. It is a particularly new phenomenon since migration waves of this magnitude did not exist in Europe in the past, except for the world wars, and migrations between continents were also significantly more modest. It is also an important aspect that the second half of the 20th century brought the turning point when the rich, more developed countries were no longer willing to welcome those coming from the poorer countries; this is especially true for countries that previously welcomed large crowds even in waves, primarily to North America and Australia, to a lesser extent to Western Europe and South America.

Political migration, mass population migration, takes on a new meaning. Hungary also experienced something like this in connection with the fall of Trianon after the First World War. However, we saw it on a much larger scale during the religious division of India, among others, when after the withdrawal of the British, the separation of Hindus and Muslims took place

with the forced movement of tens of millions, thus creating today's Pakistan and Bangladesh. Mass voluntary migration also appeared in the 20th century: from Italy, e.g. 13 million (!) emigrated in the few years before the First World War.¹⁰ The realisation of the dream of Herzl Tivadar from Bratislava, the creation of the Jewish state, Israel, is almost 100 % due to migration.¹¹

The trend in the size of the **local population** is also unprecedented. Such is the **stagnation of natural population growth** in the developed world, which began in the 1970s and has become pronounced today. The opposite is true but is also a novelty, with very high population growth rates in Asia and Africa. This is accompanied by a structural transformation of the population: more and more people are migrating from the countryside to the cities, which of course brings changes in livelihoods and pollution problems.

The **European refugee crisis** is a new concept which arose as a result of the migration of refugees due to various armed conflicts, political and religious persecution, or economic impossibility.¹² Refugees, mainly from the Middle East, Africa, the Balkans and Central Asia, try to reach the territory of the European Union via the refugee routes established in the Mediterranean Sea and the Balkans. Most of the refugees are travelling from Syria, Afghanistan and Eritrea. The term was first used in April 2015, when five boats full of migrants sank, killing more than 1,200 people.¹³

The aforementioned also significantly impact the available workforce, which is contributed in no small measure by the rapid development of technique and technology, especially concerning the appearance and rapid spread of IT and robotization. The gap in education and workforce training is enormous, not only between countries but also within each state. More and more efforts are being made to replace natural (and expensive) labour with ma-

¹⁰ https://www.google.com/search?q=world+migrants&rlz=1C1NHXL_huHU807HU807&oq=world+migran&aqs=chrome.2.69i57j0i512j0i22i30i18.11407j0j15&sourceid=chrome&ie=UTF-8

¹¹ In 1896, Herzl published his seminal work, "Der Judenstaat" ("The Jewish State"), where he outlined the need for a Jewish homeland and the establishment of a political entity to achieve this goal. Penslar, D. J. (2020). Theodor Herzl. Yale University Press. Háry, G. (2018). Izrael reptőlő csillaga. Múlt és Jövő, (2-3), 215-226.

Olosz, L. (2019). Az izraeli magyar-zsidóság történetei. Múlt és Jövő, (3), 118-120.

¹² Agustín, Ó. G., & Jørgensen, M. B. (2018). Solidarity and the 'refugee Crisis' in Europe. Springer.

¹³ Cantat, C., & Rajaram, P. K. (2019). The politics of the refugee crisis in Hungary. In The Oxford handbook of migration crises (p. 181). Oxford University Press.

chines. We have already seen something similar with the advent of the industrial revolution; for example, it is enough to recall the invention of the loom¹⁴ and the sewing machine,¹⁵ as well as the change in the job opportunities for weavers and tailors, which already led to considerable riots in England at that time - in the 19th century - even though we know of a much smaller change there to do.

1.2. Free movement

One of the fundamental problems of the Western world – in a sense, we also belong here – is that few children are born. Except for France, we cannot report a successful population increase, but the relatively favourable numbers in Paris are not due to the desire of the natives to reproduce either. The economic impact of this is that **the available workforce will decrease**.

There is currently **no successful population growth policy** in the developed world, nor Hungary, although there is a vibrant and internationally outstanding family support programme. It cannot be successful in the short and medium term since the number of women of childbearing age is so low that it is physically impossible. Fashion is not conducive to population growth either: building a career is more important than family, the birth date of the first child is being pushed back, some people do not even want to get married, they do not want another child again, and more and more people are sticking to mom's skirt. These nations are diminishing, albeit slowly. First, they age, and then the labour force becomes less and less.

With such a background, it is almost evident that **migration is the solution to the labour shortage**. A lot is going for it. The great emigration started from Asia and started from Black Africa because there is undoubtedly a big difference in economic development between these countries and Europe, and hundreds of thousands of people were left at the German Mutti's¹⁶

¹⁴ Edmund Cartwright patented the first miscarriage weaving loom in 1785, and introduced a water-powered model in 1788. The mechanical loom was first used in 1790, but the first plant was burnt down by weavers fearing for their bread. In: Ivitz Rudolf (1992), Szabó Rudolf. Szövéstechnológia. Műszaki Könyvkiadó, Budapest

¹⁵ Today 's machines already no they are foot-powered, but with an electric motor they work and most of them already widely they are also programmable. Naturally the manual remained seam specially valuable quality and beauty , but that's today especially luxury .

¹⁶ Angela Merkel, since 2005 Germany chancellor

call, like a starting horn. Many of them are already waiting for admission at the EU border, so it is almost apparent that the number of people.

The West still remembers **successful immigration**. Among the horrors of the Second World War, we include the loss of the population, especially the population of men conscripted into the army, the loss of which shook societies to their foundations. At the same time, economic development required labour, the lack of which would undoubtedly have been an obstacle to growth. This was especially true in West Germany, where the Wirtschaftswunder economic miracle that unfolded in the 1950s could not have been realised without the large-scale influx of guest workers. We experienced something similar in Italy (il miracolous economico), Austria, etc. Turkish and Yugoslav guest workers initially arrive only for employment and later for settlement and family reunification. They settled in and quickly became good workers; the economy is booming; that is what the 1950s, 60s, and 70s are all about. If it worked once, why can't it be done again?

An aspect is the **cost of training**. The completely uneducated immigrant is rare. Almost all of them now have a primary school education, and most have some background in further education. The host country saves the costs of this. Here, only special training and further education according to the needs of the given area is needed, which means that there is a lot of time and money left over. There is primarily a demand for trained work, the training of which involves minimal financial implications and can be implemented quickly. Most of the young people in their 20s are in the crosshairs, who can work for at least 30-40 years and thus make a long-term contribution to the country's economic development.

Already in the 20th century, **brain drain** was a big trend. The aim was to attract the best researchers, scientists and workers from developed countries to stimulate science and the economy. These countries could (and still do) lure the best specialists from poor countries for many times their salaries at home. It is still cheap for them, as the cost of the expensive training, which takes many years, is borne by the home country, and the chosen one is not at risk, as he has already proven himself in his career. The best example of this is its clearly indispensable role in the emergence of the United States as a superpower.

Lower wages given to immigrants can strengthen the economic competitiveness of the host country. The disadvantage is that the locals' wage position deteriorates, inciting social tension. Most immigrants willing to take

up work are poorly educated, and accordingly, their wages are close to the minimum wage, thus lowering the average.

If migrants **capable of assimilation** arrive, there are no social problems, which is an additional advantage. Within a generation or two, they will be integrated into the mother country's society and just as valuable members of the host state as the natives. The example of the Hungarian emigrants clearly shows how fast integration can be: the dissidents of 56 (that is what they were called at the time) were still native Hungarians, their children only a few, and most of their grandchildren no longer speak Hungarian.

An aspect is the change in the host country's society. Through **natural ageing**, there will be more and more **dependents**. Health and social spending will increase. Those who used to live there do not take on specific jobs willingly or at all. All this requires migrants.

Mechanisation is not a solution in many areas. This can significantly help in industry and agriculture but not in services. Undoubtedly, IT has also made great progress in recent decades, but not so much that it will replace human work in the near future. Especially not en masse, and a solution must be found. The easiest way is here.

Last but not least, **religion is a consideration**. Europe is characterised by Christian culture, and Christian teaching favours acceptance. We can even refer to the Sermon on the Mount (Eight Beatitudes) and the physical act of mercy (the first three of the five can be explicitly interpreted for migrants). We can refer to the various Gospel details, the personal actions of Jesus Christ, the apostles and some of the saints, or even the various pro-migration expressions of the current Pope Francis - himself the child of Italian emigrant parents. Pope Francis's third encyclical in 2020, *Fratelli tutti* (All brothers), draws attention to the world's failure in the COVID-19 pandemic. Its aim is urgent: a call for greater solidarity and more fraternal love while firmly rejecting wars.¹⁷ Perhaps the most succinct and striking wording in the encyclical:

Let us recognise Christ in the face of every excluded person!

¹⁷ https://www.vatican.va/content/francesco/en/encyclicals/documents/papa-francesco_20201003_enciclica-fratelli-tutti.html

In: *Mindnyájan testvérek*. It was published in Hungarian by the Szent István Társulat in 2021.

1.3. No free movement

The alternative also has advantages. First and foremost, it does not cause social tension. It does not disturb the usual tranquillity of the natives; there is little chance of disturbance in this direction. This version will be kinder if the conservative view dominates in a country. The **peace of confinement** also favours power. There is less conflict within the country, one of the crucial links of people's cohesion. Discussing the benefits increases the proportion of conservative voters.

If it is possible to increase the **population** somewhat under its power, the perception of the lack of population will weaken and may even temporarily disappear. In such cases, even the liberal side does not force the freedom of migration so much. With the development of the healthcare system, life expectancy can be increased, and thus, the period of population decline can be postponed, so the need for migration can also be postponed.

An important aspect is that the increase in **local unemployment** can be more easily stopped if not avoided altogether.¹⁸ The vacancies are all filled by nationals. Wages can, therefore, be raised more, and the position of workers in wage negotiations is improved. The state can also better plan to shape the skills of those entering the workforce if it has a modern education policy.

Raising the **retirement age** can solve part of the labour demand. The increase in life expectancy has also been associated with a significant improvement in the physical condition of the population worldwide, and it is no coincidence that the specialised body of the UN, the WHO, has pushed the limit of middle age from 60 to 65 years. In the Scandinavian world, Japan already has a retirement age of 68. Germany and other European states are already planning to introduce it, and some have been thinking about it for 70 years.

The **work of students** of higher education institutions also represents local labour. This is not only trendy in the modern world, but in addition to the rapid rise in tuition fees, their employment is becoming more frequent. If we take into account that nowadays, this represents up to 50% of the 18-25 age group in the EU countries, then there is quite a large labour force, and of course, this also works against the importation of migrants.

¹⁸ Basile, R., Mantuano, M., Girardi, A., & Russo, G. (2019). Interregional migration of human capital and unemployment dynamics: evidence from Italian provinces. *German Economic Review*, 20(4), e385-e414.

The **development can help a lot in replacing the migrant workforce** application of **technology**, distribution of intelligent and smart technologies, Internet-based IT, and various machine controls. The trend is their strengthening, which also means that the economy will not necessarily need foreign labour in those areas where this can be solved quickly and relatively economically.

It is difficult to make the correct **selection among those who want to immigrate** if possible. Who will later adopt the customs of the host nation, and who will not? Who is willing to work and not just come for help? Who will bring a large number of relatives later? Who just wants to come in, but only temporarily, so they can leave afterwards? Complete closure makes them forget about these problems.

1.4. EU regulation

Among the four freedoms in the EU (free movement of goods, free movement of capital, freedom to establish and provide services), the last but not least is the **free movement of people**. In the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), Article 45 declares that the Freedom of movement for workers shall be secured within the Union. Such freedom of movement entails the abolition of any discrimination based on nationality between workers of the Member States as regards employment, remuneration and other conditions of work and employment. It entails the right, subject to limitations justified on grounds of public policy, public security or public health:

- to accept offers of employment actually made;
- to move freely within the territory of Member States for this purpose;
- to stay in a Member State for the purpose of employment in accordance with the provisions governing the employment of nationals of that State laid down by law, regulation or administrative action;
- to remain in the territory of a Member State after having been employed in that State, subject to conditions which shall be embodied in regulations to be drawn up by the Commission.

Furthermore, the **right of establishment** can be found in Article 49. Within the framework of the provisions set out below, restrictions on the freedom of establishment of nationals of a Member State in the territory of another Member State shall be prohibited. Freedom of establishment includes the right to take up and pursue activities as self-employed persons and to set up and manage undertakings in particular companies or firms.

Anti-migration is against the policy of the European Union. Brussels' current position is **to distribute refugees proportionately among the member states**.¹⁹ It is also conceivable that in the future, the position according to which the support taps will be shut off in case of non-fulfilment of certain Brussels conditions will be more strongly enforced. The danger of this is now clearly visible. We quote Articles 79 and 80 from the TFEU: The Union develops a **common immigration policy** aimed at ensuring, at all stages, the efficient management of migration flows, fair treatment of third-country nationals residing legally in the Member States, and the prevention of, and enhanced measures to combat, illegal immigration and trafficking in human beings.²⁰ For these purposes of paragraph, the European Parliament and the Council, acting in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure, shall adopt measures in the following areas:

- the conditions of entry and residence, and standards on the issue by Member States of long-term visas and residence permits, including those for the purpose of family reunification;
- the definition of the rights of third-country nationals residing legally in a Member State, including the conditions governing freedom of movement and of residence in other Member States;
- illegal immigration and unauthorised residence, including removal and repatriation of persons residing without authorisation;
- combating trafficking in persons, in particular women and children.

¹⁹ Holtug, N. (2018). A fair distribution of refugees in the European Union. In *Refugee Crisis: The Borders of Human Mobility* (pp. 34-43). Routledge.

Gibney, M. J. (2018). The ethics of refugees. *Philosophy Compass*, 13(10), e12521.

²⁰ Boswell, C. (2018). Migration in europe. In *Politics of Migration* (pp. 91-110). Routledge.

Scipioni, M. (2018). Failing forward in EU migration policy? EU integration after the 2015 asylum and migration crisis. *Journal of European Public Policy*, 25(9), 1357-1375.

The **European immigration policy** focuses on three main areas:

- **regular immigration:** it is within the competence of the EU to determine the conditions of entry and residence of third-country nationals who enter or reside in individual Member States for the purpose of, among other things, family reunification. It remains the responsibility of the Member States to determine how many third-country nationals are admitted for employment (Single Permit Directive 2011/98/EU, Directive 2014/36/EU, Directive 2014/66/EU, Directive 2016/801 Directive 2003/109/EC).
- **integration:** the Union can encourage Member States to take measures to promote the integration of third-country nationals legally staying on their territory and can support these Member States in their actions; at the same time, there are no regulations on the harmonisation of the legal and regulatory provisions of the member states (Directive 2003/86/EC on the right to family reunification).
- **irregular immigration:** the Union must prevent and reduce irregular immigration, in particular through an effective return policy, while respecting fundamental rights (Directive 2002/90/EC, Directive 2011/36/EU, Directive 2004/81/EC, EU action plan against migrant smuggling (2015-2020), Returns Directive 2008/115/EC, Employers Sanctions Directive 2009/52/EC, Directive 2001/40).²¹

It is difficult to dispute that the authority is clear; Hungary also understood/understood this upon accession. Directive 2009/50/EC on the conditions of entry and residence of third-country nationals for the purposes of highly qualified employment introduced the "EU Blue Card", a fast-track procedure for issuing third-country workers with a particular residence and work permit under more favourable conditions to take up highly qualified employment in the Member States.

²¹ <https://www.europarl.europa.eu/factsheets/hu/sheet/152/bevandarlasipolitika>

1.5. The golden mean

Left-wing parties are currently in the majority in the union; friendship with migration is an inherent part of the **liberal approach**. This is especially true for the northern states, although the latter is more characterised by restraint. If immigration is good for twenty-some countries, why not for the other 3 to 4? - we could ask.

The demand of the economy speaks in favour of a small opening. It is also an incidental aspect that the EU bears part of the costs of admission (settlement, etc.). Some Mediterranean states, especially Turkey and Greece, have serious economic benefits from running migrant camps with EU money. It is a multibillion-dollar subsidy. To give an idea of the magnitude of some numbers, thanks to EU-financed projects, the living conditions of refugees in Turkey have noticeably improved:

- 685,000 refugee children receive education
- nearly 12 million consultations took place in the framework of primary health care
- more than 3.5 million refugee children and pregnant women were vaccinated
- 1.7 million refugees receive support to cover their basic daily needs.²²

At the same time, it is also clear that there are limits to the growth of the **camps**; tens of thousands of people cannot be kept in tents for years. The experts are also aware that more than half of the people living in the camps will never be employed.

Proper **screening** would be an essential element of a more lenient migration policy. The current situation is that the majority, or rather almost everyone, arrives without documents, and if they have any, they destroy them. Previously, almost all refugees identified themselves as Syrians, but this has changed in recent days: since NATO's withdrawal from Kabul, they suddenly feel like Afghans. The younger ones all indicate an age under 18 years. Another unmissable part of the screening would be the identification and final deportation of terrorists and Islamic fanatics.

²² <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/hu/policies/eu-migration-policy/eastern-mediterranean-route/>

In our opinion, it would be necessary to introduce a **trial period**. Who is willing to work and also learn a profession and language. The current situation is that half of those who have flowed in do not want to take up work; they live on the aid, which they feel is grandiose compared to the standards at home. The majority of the other half also only earn around the minimum wage since they have no education or knowledge. With tests, it would be possible to accurately determine intellectual ability and previously acquired preparation. In order to catch up faster, at least the learning of European languages should be started in the camps.

Filtering **religion** is also critical. A truly Syrian Christian remains a Christian later on, and a Muslim does not change his faith. Today, 44 million Muslims live in the European Union, which is more than 6 % of the population (Germany and France also have 5-5 million people).²³ Fanatical versions of this are difficult to reconcile with classic EU expectations, even with the broadest interpretation of freedom. In addition, settlement in a block almost naturally leads to ghettoization, which manifests itself not only in the fact that they only use their own language, their own customs, and even their own legal system (sharia) in their closed residential areas, but they also lack contact with the local population.²⁴ The isolation becomes almost complete, so much so that even the local authorities cannot/do not dare to go there to take action.

The territorial location of the **origin country** matters a lot. Due to the **cultural similarity** for example, immigrants from the former Soviet Union and the Balkans are more likely to integrate into EU countries than their African or Asian counterparts because of cultural similarities.

Another key to the solution is **temporary employment**. This is needed in many areas, especially in the construction industry and seasonal agricultural work. In the case of really fair contracts, this is not a problem; it is another matter that it cannot be applied en masse and permanently.

A unique part of the golden mean for **Hungary** is stopping the (e)migration of Hungarians from beyond its borders. Above all, this is true for the

²³ https://www.google.com/search?q=world+migrants&rlz=1C1NHXL_huHU807HU807&oq=world+migran&aqs=chrome.2.69i57j0i512j0i22i30l8.11407j0j15&sourceid=chrome&ie=UTF-8

²⁴ Supik, L., & Spielhaus, R. (2019). Introduction to Special Issue: Matters of classification and representation: Quantifying ethnicity, religion and migration introduction. *Ethnicities*, 19(3), 455-468.

most critical area, Transcarpathia, where only 100,000 to 120,000 Hungarians remain today.

- In **Romania**, the number of Hungarians in Transylvania was 1 million 225 thousand, while in other parts of Romania, it was 13 thousand. A decrease can be observed in the area; in five of its 16 counties – Arad, Krassó -Szörény, Hunyad, Szeben and Temes – the rate reached or exceeded 25 %. In these scattered areas, "the complete liquidation of the Hungarian community came realistically close."
- In **Slovakia**, 459,000 (8.5 %) declared themselves to be of Hungarian nationality. In the case of two of the country's eight districts - Nagyszombat and Nyitra - the proportion of Hungarians is 20-25 %, while in three other districts (Kassa, Besztercebánya, Bratislava), Hungarians live in scattered but not negligible numbers.
- 251,000 Hungarians were living in Vojvodina in **Serbia**, of which only a few thousand called themselves Hungarian. There is no district where the Hungarians form an absolute majority, but in two - Northern Bácska and Northern Banát - they are in a relative majority with their proportions of 41 and 47 %.
- In **Ukraine**, according to estimates, the group of Hungarians in Subcarpathia may currently number around 141,000 people.
- In **Croatia**, according to the 2011 results, 14,048 people (16,595 in 2001) declared themselves to be of Hungarian nationality, and only 8,249 of them lived in the Eszék-Baranya county, which also includes the Dráva angle, and the rest were scattered in other areas of Croatia.
- The census was not held in **Slovenia**; the KSH estimated the number of Hungarians to be 4,000.

The solution is indeed what the Fidesz slogan says: to *bring help where it is needed*. Otherwise, Hungarians will disappear there. So, for a completely different reason, the migrant stop must(should) apply to them too.

There is a connection between migration and the world of work, where local tasks in developed countries can be done without migration because the employees stay **home in their country**. Nowadays, we see such an opportunity, for example, in India, where call centres have already been established that serve European/American needs, their location and at the same time, their computer/telephone is in a local settlement, and with their comprehensible English and little computer knowledge, they can perform this type of work. Specific data transmission and programming tasks are similar; in some

cases, they can perform them at a high, even European level. The cheapness of the Internet makes this kind of work increasingly easy to implement. The investment is minimal, just a laptop, phone, and IT subscription.

In most cases, the customer on the other side of the line has no idea that his partner is thousands of kilometres away, and the damage is that he is talking to him from Calcutta, Pune, Bangalore, Bombay or even New Delhi, at best his pronunciation is foreign. The spread of this kind of work has a great perspective; there is no need for actual migration, it does not cause conflict, it solves part of the absorption of local labour, and the employer also gets labour at a lower price. (In the case of the construction, it is of great help that out of the nearly two thousand spoken languages in India, English enjoys the status of a secondary official language and is the most important language of national, political and commercial communication; it is the only official language in the upper legislature and in communication between federal states (At least 10 % of the population speaks the language well, this means at least 130 million people, i.e. potential employees.) With IT becoming cheaper and using routers, this can be significantly more than the current situation, but due to the size of the country, it can only be one and not the only solution. The author sees more imagination in the new Silicon Valley emerging around Bangalore, which is experiencing a similar development to the American one and already has a lot of external supplier work. We are talking about a special kind of export here, where the customer receives the local service in the same way as if it were at home.

2. Labour migration, guest workers

In the global panorama of human mobility, the phenomenon of labour migration and the integral role of guest workers form a pivotal chapter in the intricate narrative of societal, economic, and cross-cultural dynamics. We delve into definitions, historical perspectives, the perception of guest work, and the associated rights and duties.

Within the definitions, labour migration, at its core, encapsulates the movement of individuals across borders in pursuit of employment opportunities. By elucidating the terminologies that define these concepts, we set the stage for a comprehensive understanding of the multifaceted dynamics inherent in the global movement of workers.

The historical lens becomes our guide as we navigate through the annals of time to uncover the roots and evolution of labour migration. From the historical exchange of skills and knowledge to the organized movement of individuals for economic purposes, we trace the historical trajectories that have shaped the contours of labour migration.

The perception of guest work, both from the perspective of the host nations and the individuals undertaking such journeys, becomes a focal point of our exploration. We delve into the societal, cultural, and economic dimensions that influence how guest work is perceived – a lens that often reflects not only the aspirations and challenges of the workers but also the attitudes and policies of the receiving societies.

As labour migration unfolds on the global stage, the rights and duties associated with guest work emerge as crucial considerations. We scrutinize the legal, ethical, and social dimensions that define the parameters within which guest workers operate. By exploring the rights afforded to individuals seeking employment abroad and the corresponding duties they shoulder, we aim to unravel the intricate tapestry of responsibilities that characterize the relationship between guest workers and host nations.

The groundwork for a comprehensive understanding of labour migration and guest workers—an exploration that goes beyond mere statistics to uncover the human stories, historical nuances, and ethical considerations that define this dynamic facet of our interconnected world.

2.1. Definitions

The specialised body of the United Nations, **the International Labour Organization** (ILO), uses the term **migrant worker**, with its official definition: "... all international migrants who are currently employed guard unemployed and seeking employment in their present country of residence." In other words, this is a broader interpretation, as it includes not only the employed, the unemployed and job seekers.

However, much of the literature – correctly – distinguishes between **guest workers** and **migrant workers**. This is also reflected linguistically in Migrant worker, Wanderarbeiter, or Guest worker, Gastarbeiter, although in practice today, the two are increasingly confused due to the large influx of migrants. In fact, a third term, refugee or Flüchtling, has been added in the last decade. A refugee is someone who "is outside the country of nationality because of a well-founded fear of persecution on grounds of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, and who is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of his or her country of origin." With this status, admission is quicker and more accessible, and it is no coincidence that the majority choose it.

The current national thought structures and ideas are also made understandable by the technical terms used. In Switzerland, they spoke of foreign workers (Fremdarbeiter) until the 70s, while in Germany, they already spoke of guest workers (Gastarbeiter). This term soon spread to neighbouring countries (Switzerland, Austria, Netherlands, Denmark). The official designation at the same time was a foreign worker (ausländische Arbeitnehmer). On the other hand, England, France and Sweden talked about immigrants from the beginning, which is more permanent. Their stay was assumed.²⁵

To make the difference clear, **migration** is the process in which some people or groups change their living environment and society, and this change from temporary to permanent, long-lasting.²⁶

In the **European Union** and according to the **International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Mem-**

²⁵ <http://epa.niif.hu/00000/00036/00027/pdf/02.pdf>

²⁶ Treibel, Anette: Migration in modern Gesellschaften . Weinheim und München 1993. p. 21.

bers of Their Families adopted by the UN in 1990, the guest worker = migrant worker „, a person who is to be engaged, is engaged or has been engaged in a remunerated activity in a state of which they are not nationals.”²⁷

Types of migrant workers



migrant worker	a person who is to be engaged is engaged or has been engaged in a remunerated activity in a state in which he or she is not a national
frontier worker	a migrant worker who retains his or her habitual residence in a neighbouring state to which he or she normally returns every day or at least once a week
seasonal worker	a migrant worker whose work, by its character, is dependent on seasonal conditions and is performed only during part of the year
seafarer	includes a fisherman, refers to a migrant worker employed on board a vessel registered in a state in which he or she is not a national
worker on an offshore installation	a migrant worker employed on an offshore installation that is under the jurisdiction of a state of which he or she is not a national
itinerant worker	a migrant worker who, having his or her habitual residence in one state, has to travel to another state or states for short periods owing to the nature of his or her occupation;
project-tied worker	a migrant worker admitted to a state of employment for a defined period to work solely on a specific project being carried out in that state by his or her employer;
specified-employment worker	a migrant worker: (i) who has been sent by the employer for a restricted and defined period of time to a state of employment to undertake a specific assignment or duty or (ii) who engages for a restricted and defined period of time in work that requires professional, commercial, technical or other highly specialized skill; or

²⁷ International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families (Adopted by General Assembly resolution 45/158 of 18 December 1990)

https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-do/networks/european_migration_network/glossary_search/migrant-worker_en

	(iii) who, upon the request of the employer in the state of employment, engages for a restricted and defined period of time in work whose nature is transitory or brief; and who is required to depart from the state of employment either at the expiration of an authorized period of stay or earlier if he or she no longer undertakes that specific assignment or duty or engages in that work;
self-employed worker	a migrant worker who is engaged in a remunerated activity other than under a contract of employment and who earns his or her living through this activity, normally working alone or together with members of his or her family, and to any other migrant worker recognized as self-employed by applicable legislation of the state of employment or bilateral or multilateral agreements

Source: International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families (Adopted by General Assembly resolution 45/158 of 18 December 1990)

While both terms are used to describe individuals moving for employment, "**migrant workers**" is a more general and neutral term, encompassing various types of labour migration. The term is more neutral and encompasses a broad range of workers who move temporarily or permanently for employment. It does not inherently imply a specific legal status or the nature of the work arrangement. On the other hand, "**guest workers**" implies a specific arrangement where workers are invited for a temporary period, often under a formal program. The choice of terminology can have implications for understanding the nature of migration and the legal and social status of the workers involved. The term carries a connotation of a temporary or guest-like status. Historically, guest worker programs have been established by countries to address labour shortages in specific industries. However, the term has also been criticized for potentially leading to unequal treatment and limited rights for these workers.

Migrant workers vs. Guest workers

Feature	Migrant workers	Guest workers
Definition	Individuals who move from one place to another often cross national borders, seeking employment and better living conditions.	Individuals who are invited or permitted to work in a country for a specific period and purpose, typically under a temporary employment arrangement.
Recruitment	May migrate independently or through informal channels, seeking employment opportunities on their own.	Invited or recruited by host country employers or governments for specific job opportunities, often with a defined contract duration.
Duration of Stay	It can be short-term or long-term and may involve permanent settlement in the host country.	Typically temporary, with a fixed duration specified in the employment contract.
Legal Status	May or may not have legal authorization to work in the host country, depending on the migration status and the country's immigration policies.	Usually, they have legal authorization to work in the host country for the specified period and purpose outlined in the guest worker program.
Rights and Protections	May face challenges in accessing labour rights and protections, depending on their legal status and the host country's policies.	Often provided with certain rights and protections outlined in the employment contract or guest worker program but may still face limitations compared to local workers.
Employment Sectors	Can work in various sectors, including low-skilled and high-skilled jobs, agriculture, construction, services, etc.	Typically recruited for specific sectors facing labour shortages, such as agriculture, hospitality, or seasonal industries.
Social Integration	May or may not integrate into the local community depending on factors like language, cultural differences, and the permanency of their stay.	Often, they have limited social integration, as their stay is temporary and tied to their employment contract.
Economic Impact	Can contribute to the economy through labour, taxes, and consumption. May also send remittances to their home countries.	Contribute to the host country's economy during their stay, but the impact may be limited by the temporary nature of their employment.
Examples	International migrants are moving from Mexico to the United States for work opportunities.	Seasonal agricultural workers are invited to Canada under the Temporary Foreign Worker Program.

Source: own compilation

The word "guest worker" itself can be misunderstood. Who is the **guest**? A guest is a "person entertained in one's house" or "a relative, friend, acquaintance who comes to visit a family or a house," says the dictionaries.²⁸ Domestic practice has used the term for decades and is still using it. In the general wording, instead of family and house, we use the term state - country; we have already come closer, especially if we interpret the visit as broadly as possible. A guest is someone we welcome, and we usually offer food and accommodation as well. From the point of view of our topic, it is imperative that the guest stays with them temporarily, since if it were permanent, then he would no longer be a guest. It is also included in the plot: he visits.

There is a similar problem with the **worker**, which would initially mean "one that works especially at manual or industrial labour or with a particular material", someone who creates, works, is usefully active, and in today's practice, the main goal of migration is not to achieve this. In the dictionary formulation mentioned, the worker is: "a worker who performs production work directly and professionally" - this was written in the eighties of the last century, even though it was not current.²⁹ Tautology did not even make sense in its time, but then there was a need for it.

At the same time, the experience of our time shows that most guest workers are not guests, and the majority are not necessarily looking for work but rather travel for aid and support. On the other hand, the term has remained unchanged for decades; it does not deceive anyone, and everyone uses it in its modern sense. Where does the visual disturbance come from?

2.2. Historical outlook

The idea of using **guest workers** is not new; it is just the name. History has shown us many examples of workers being brought in temporarily to work in deserted areas or for more skilled jobs, just as it is not new that many of these workers do not want to return home and stay in their new place.

²⁸ "Guest." Merriam-Webster.com Dictionary, Merriam-Webster, <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/guest>. and A Magyar Nyelv Értelmező Szótára (1980), Hetedik Kötet. Akadémia Kiadó, Budapest, 323.

²⁹ Worker." Merriam-Webster.com Dictionary, Merriam-Webster, <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/worker>. and A Magyar Nyelv Értelmező Szótára (1980), Ötödik Kötet. Akadémia Kiadó, Budapest, 63.

Guest work existed in **early capitalism** as well and even later. The first guest worker agreement based on an intergovernmental contract in today's sense is the so-called Bracero Pact,³⁰ which allowed about 4.5 million Mexicans to come to work in the United States between 1942 and 1964. At first, a few tens of thousands of people a year, from the 1950s, 200,000 to 400,000 people a year got a job in this way. This was good for the United States, which was struggling with a large labour shortage during and immediately after the war, but it was also good for Mexico in alleviating massive unemployment, as well as helping relatives and indirectly the public finances through remittances.

At first, the guest worker was really a guest and a worker. It originates from the recovery period after 1945. The first generation of guest workers arrived in the period after the Second World War during the period of reconstruction and then the economic miracle (*Wirtschaftswunder*),³¹ mainly in the Federal Republic of Germany, where after the destruction, there were almost no men left, especially not in the 15-40 age group, there was a great need for labour. They came from where there was excess: primarily. From Italy, later from the area of the Iberian Peninsula, then from Morocco, Tunisia, etc. The organisation of guest work in the classical sense began in 1954 when the Italian government turned to the Germans to alleviate unemployment in the country, and after the conclusion of the contract – so they did not just round up - so the first 100,000 people set off on special trains. All this was not enough for the fast-moving German economy: in the 1960s,³² more and more guest workers were recruited from South-Eastern Europe (from the Balkans, primarily from Yugoslavia, Tito was the only communist country to allow travel to capitalist countries) and mainly from Turkey. The real big season, the golden age, is the period between 1955-1973.³³

³⁰ bracero = manual worker (Spanish)

The Bracero Program, also known as the Mexican Farm Labour Program, was a series of labour agreements and diplomatic pacts between the United States and Mexico that allowed Mexican citizens to work temporarily in the United States as agricultural labourers.

³¹ The fifties years, the GDP is average growth over 8% per year, the recovery of the 1973 oil crisis except continuously until 1990, the German until reunification held.

³² Josip Broz, partisan leader, president, field marshal, the "chained dog", between 1943 - 1980 in South Slav state first no its leader.

³³ Penninx, R. (2018). *Old Wine in New Bottles? Comparing the Post-War Guest Worker Migration and the Post 1989 Migration from CEE-Countries to EU-Member Countries. Between Mobility and Migration: The Multi-Level Governance of Intra-European Movement, 77-97.*

The guest workers came in droves. So much so that by the end of the 1960s, they were already causing a commotion on the highways and international roads during vacations when they went home to celebrate with their families - to rest. The first example of the phenomenon of guest workers' road (because it existed) was on Christmas 1969, and in the following years, the traffic load on these roads - which were not yet a motorway system at the time - increased more and more. On the busiest days, up to 40,000 to 50,000 vehicles passed through the Munich - Graz - Nis line.³⁴ One holiday season meant 2-3 million people, sometimes more. They typically travelled by car.

In the case of guest workers, the **original idea** was that **cheap new labour** from the south would start the economy and then go home after it had recovered. Staying there is, therefore, temporary, hence the term guest (well, the fact that they were invited is also a consideration!), and they came specifically for work purposes. It is also true that the economic miracle would not have been possible without these guest workers, and the Germans are still grateful for that today. It can be said that the German miracle is due to Marshall aid (capital) and guest workers (labour). The rise was spectacular; by 1960, the German locomotive had reached the largest one in Europe at the time, the English one. Based on this, it is easy to understand, e.g. Why is Merkel and her team this way about today's migration?

It is necessary to mention. **Hungary** also has a tradition of this: in those areas where it was not possible or hardly possible to recruit domestic labour, they were brought in from abroad. We know many such examples, such as e.g. Europe's first mining academy in Selmecbánya,³⁵ where Maria Teresia brought foreign (German) masters to extract high-quality ore, but even more so to teach. Some of the teachers stayed there after that. Let us not forget: the guild world of the Middle Ages and Modern Times also required working abroad for one or two years; this is also a form of guest work.

In the 20th century, for example, Vietnamese women were employed in the Hungarian textile industry during socialism, and they were really guest

³⁴ The full route is Hamburg - Frankfurt - Stuttgart - Munich, and from Nis to Thessaloniki and Istanbul.

Castles, S. (1986). The guest-worker in Western Europe—An obituary. *International migration review*, 20(4), 761-778.

Miller, J. A. (2018). *Turkish guest workers in Germany: Hidden lives and contested borders, 1960s to 1980s*. University of Toronto Press.

³⁵ The Mining and Metallurgy Institute (1735), later the Academy from 1762, and since the abolition of the country, the University of Sopron has followed the tradition.

workers because the Hungarian government called them in, and after the end of their term, they all went home with a few exceptions.³⁶ Hungarians also went abroad to work legally, primarily in developing countries, and these were also concluded based on interstate contracts, the Hungarian part of which was handled by Tesco, a specialised foreign trade company.³⁷ Today, from agriculture to the construction industry, guest workers are present everywhere in Hungary, mainly Romanians, Ukrainians and Serbs. If they go home, they are really guest workers; if they stay, then they are migrants, and among them, the Hungarians - well, they came home. The latter is not at all fortunate because it greatly contributes to the decline of the surrounding Hungarian population, which can be seen best in Transylvania and worst in Transcarpathia, where the Hungarian population is less than 100,000.

2.3. Perception of guest work

Frequently asked question: what is more? Is guest work an advantage or a disadvantage? The answer to this question is far from simple. Like everything, it has multiple readings and judgments. Let us summarise briefly.

The following **SWOT** analysis provides a clear picture of the general assessment of guest work from the point of view of European host countries. The situation of those who come from the same nation but from a different country is ignored here because they do not migrate but stay at home, and even more so because Hungary is the only state in Europe that is surrounded everywhere by regions inhabited by Hungarians, so this is very special (distance, language etc.) guest work.

³⁶ One too many of which: even in 1989, 42 women came from Ho Chi Minh City to Pápa for a 4 years period of time. <https://archivum.mtva.hu/photobank/item/MTI-FOTO-YkkzekJVcEY0VjFtSHhWWpMVG1mdz09> Budapest was similar at Goldberger's, etc. Three shifts work, the Hungarian women not really, they undertook. The Vietnamese being here social tension no caused, since outgoing their opportunity it was minimal, so personal relationships rarely were formed who.

³⁷ It is not the same as Tesco, an international retail chain with a presence in Hungary. The provision of Hungarian expert assistance and "intellectual export" was the responsibility of the TESCO International Technical and Scientific Cooperation Office, which – contrary to its name – operates as a company, which from 1962 received scholarship holders from third world countries to study in Hungary and Hungarian experts overseas dealt with its placement.

SWOT for guest work

Strength	Weakness
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Ample, even unlimited labour supply • It is relatively cheap • He also does hard work • In some cases, it is the only source of labour • It can be installed at first • It is more unpretentious than the domestic one • It requires less social infrastructure • It can be taken to any location • Easy to import 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Unqualified • Different culture • A different religion • Lack of assimilation in the majority • Unpretentiousness • Language skills • Adaptation problems • Inflexibility • Work pace • Quality work • Passive to changes • It devalues the domestic workforce • It requires special treatment • It cannot be sent home
Possibility	Danger
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Large dip net • It can be increased almost arbitrarily • Selectable • It can be taught • Can be converted • It can be installed with proper preparation • Some of it can be assimilated • It increases the workforce 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • It goes further West or North • It creates a demographic problem • Law enforcement issues • Special education • The emergence of new social habits (cleanliness, dress, etc.) • Ghettoization • It is not a well-thought-out mix of people • Destruction of old national customs, traditions, religion, etc. • Public outrage

Source: own compilation

As the figure shows, **the judgment is not clear**. Basically, it depends on how the decision-maker weighs these and what the conditions in the host country influence the decision. The big problem is that what is considered lucky and good at one point can become a serious – in some cases even unsolvable – problem a few decades later.

Advantages

Most countries employ guest workers because there is little domestic labour. There are sectors where the domestic workforce does not want to appear, mainly because of depressed wages and/or difficult work. Even in today's Hungary, it is easy to see that although many people have been laid off due to the coronavirus, the majority of them do not want to work under the existing conditions, even though there are plenty of vacancies. The reason is lower wages than before and/or lower prestige.

The biggest labour problem in Hungary (but also in the majority of EU countries) is currently felt in the construction industry, industry, including the manufacturing industry, but due to the virus, it is temporarily even greater in healthcare and social care than in trade and transport. In the case of most jobs that are difficult to fill, an important factor is the low level of the salary offered and/or the higher requirements of the new workplace than before. In these places, guest work does not solve the problem but alleviates it. In the field of white-collar jobs in industry, the most sought-after employees are engineering positions (electrical, mechanical and chemical engineers) and IT - all over Europe. Nowadays, the current coronavirus has greatly increased the value of medical and nursing work. Therefore, guest workers would be needed, if not from Africa, then at least from Romania or Ukraine, and it would be particularly fortunate if they were skilled, especially in the professions that are in short supply.

It is also likely that the situation in these areas is expected to worsen in the coming years: the large development centres of international companies are now exerting an increasingly strong absorbing effect not only from Western Europe but also from the United States and the Far East. The members of the Y and Z generations are significantly more flexible than the previous age groups; they have better language skills (mainly English, less often German) and greater mobility, as well as much higher salaries, better social conditions and almost unhindered flow of information, making it much more difficult for them to stay at home. For example, a specialist in Sopron earns almost as much as his entire month's gas back home with just one neighbouring weekend deal, an office lecturer earns his second salary by regularly cleaning Kismarton on Saturdays – and they are also guest workers, the former in white, the latter in black.

A good guest worker is, therefore, an advantage for the receiving country in those professions where there is a labour shortage; an additional advantage ³⁸is saving the cost of training (e.g. 6+4 years for a specialist), and it can also be an advantage for the sending country, especially where unemployment is high.

Disadvantages

After the initial euphoria, black clouds appeared. Due to large settlements, independent **colonies** were created in many large Western European cities, where almost only guest workers lived. Guest work has completely lost its original meaning: today, no one invites them in, and they do not stay temporarily in their new place, and the new generation does not want to work anymore.

The problem first appeared when the guest workers no longer wanted to go home, at most, to visit. They got citizenship and settled, and the family came after them. More than half a century has passed since then, and we are now in the third and fourth generations, where many young people do not know the old country, having only heard about their grandparents' and great-grandparents' kinship through the news.

With the development of better conditions at home, the Italian and Iberian guest workers went home in large numbers, as there was also an economic miracle (*miracolo economico*), and after the fall of the Salazar -Franco regimes, the democratic development did indeed bring economic recovery at first. Not so for other guest workers. The difference in development between the mother country and the host state grew (and is still growing), and the intention to go home also shrank.

It is no coincidence that the majority of guest workers from the Balkans, Anatolia and North Africa are Muslim, with religious and social traditions modest or even zero desire for assimilation. The younger generation no longer uses the host country's language since they do not even need it in the independent, closed colony. In addition, misinterpreted liberalism means that the respective governments make no effort to help integration and in some cases, even explicitly support separation, be it education or religion.

³⁸ The brain drain is not a new phenomenon, it used to be called brain drain, the process by which scientists from less developed countries were lured to richer countries with higher salaries. Clearly, the rich country that took them on benefited: it saved the long training period and got the best minds.

Demographically, the process is also getting stronger: the number of children in former guest worker families is substantially higher than in the families of the host countries, and today, there are many large Western European cities where there are more children from settled families in primary school classes than from native families. With the latter phenomenon, it is not difficult to guess what will happen in 20-30 years.

With the advent of prosperity, the guest worker also chooses: while the 50s, 60s, and even in the 70s and 80s took on all the jobs, today, he is very careful about where he commits himself; moreover, there is no significant difference between the wages of the unqualified and the amount of various social benefits, so many people - respect for the exception - choose to do nothing. Most of them received citizenship a long time ago, so there is no chance for them to go home.

Last but not least, millions of migrants who want to settle in EU countries stand at the gates here. The migrant boats are working, and the vehicles of specialised civil organisations arrive on the island of Lampedusa, the closest to Africa, several times a day. Only Turkey, if it opens the border, can start a batch of millions. This will be/could be the new generation of guest workers. Almost without exception, they are young men; they all say they are under 18 and Syrian, Afghan, etc. They indicate citizenship without documents - that is how they were trained. If they receive a settlement permit, family reunification starts, i.e. the minimum doubling, but starting from the family model with many children, there can even be a demographic explosion. If they are not allowed to continue, what will be their fate? How can so many young men be treated in a crowd for a long time?

A note at the end of the topic: the Hungarian government's position regarding migration is that the problem must be dealt with where it arises. This principle is very appealing; the only question is, how can it be implemented? The fact that the Bem quayside sends 1-2 million euros is a drop in the ocean. If the union sends even a hundred times that amount, that is too. Tens and tens of millions are waiting to leave, and after a possible larger border opening, the masses will also start from the interior of Asia and Africa. A few million euros will not solve this dripped to the place of origin. Nevertheless, it is also true that inclusion is not a good solution either because it will no longer be considered inclusion with such a large crowd.

2.4. Rights of migrant workers

At an international level, four main documents contain the fundamental rights of migrant workers:

- International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families (ICRMW, 1990);
- International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR, 1996);
- International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR, 1996);
- Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR, 1948).³⁹

Rights, abuses and threats related to migrant work



The United Nations Global Compact summarises the fundamental rights as the following:⁴⁰

³⁹ ICRMW: <https://www.ohchr.org/en/instruments-mechanisms/instruments/international-convention-protection-rights-all-migrant-workers>

ICCPR: <https://www.ohchr.org/en/instruments-mechanisms/instruments/international-covenant-civil-and-political-rights>

ICESCR: <https://www.ohchr.org/en/instruments-mechanisms/instruments/international-covenant-economic-social-and-cultural-rights>

UDHR: <https://www.un.org/en/about-us/universal-declaration-of-human-rights>

⁴⁰ <https://bhr-navigator.unglobalcompact.org/issues/migrant-workers/>

Right	Legislation	Content, comment
Right to equality of treatment and non-discrimination	ICRMW, Articles 43 and 45, ICCPR, Article 2, ICESCR, Article 2	Migrant workers can be subject to unequal treatment when compared to nationals. This is likely to occur in recruitment processes, their treatment at the workplace as well as in terms of the legal protections that they are afforded in the workplace.
Right to freedom from slavery and forced labour	UDHR, Article 4, ICRMW, Article 11, ICCPR, Article 8	Migrant workers are at a higher risk of being subject to conditions that may amount to forced labour and/or modern slavery. For example, migrant workers may face the retention of identity documents, debt bondage and restriction of movement, which are some of the indicators of forced labour.
Right to freedom of movement	ICRMW, Article 39 UDHR, Article 13	The freedom of movement of migrant workers can be severely restricted through, for example, the confiscation of passports or other travel documents.
Right of migrants to form, join and participate in associations and trade unions	ICRMW, Article 26 and 40; ICCPR, Article 22; ICESCR, Article 8	In many situations, migrants may - due to their legal status, - be denied the right to freedom of association. ICCPR and ICESCR specify that all workers have the right to form and join trade unions for the protection of their interests. In ICRMW affords migrant workers in both regular and irregular situations the right to join and participate in the activities of associations and trade unions.
Right to just and favourable conditions of work	ICRMW, Article 25; ICESCR, Article 7	Many migrants experience lower pay and poorer working conditions than their domestic counterparts. This can be due to discrimination, prevailing legal frameworks, the legal status of migrant workers and market dynamics.
Right to an adequate standard of living (including access to adequate food, clothing, housing and water)	ICRMW, Article 43; ICESCR, Article 11	Companies that provide housing to migrant workers can directly infringe on this right if the housing is not of an adequate standard.

Right	Legislation	Content, comment
Rights to cultural identity	ICRMW, Article 31, ICCPR, Article 27	Migrants have the right to enjoy their own culture, practice their own religion, and to speak their own language without discrimination. Due to their status, migrant workers may be denied this right as a matter of official policy or through societal discrimination.
Right to an effective remedy for acts violating fundamental rights	ICRMW, Article 83, ICCPR, Article 3	A lack of accessible operational-level grievance mechanisms may hinder migrant workers from accessing remedies for human and labour rights abuses. This is particularly the case where the legal framework and culture in a country prevent migrants from seeking adequate access to remedy.

Source: own compilation based on United Nations Global Compact: Migrant Workers (<https://bhr-navigator.unglobalcompact.org/issues/migrant-workers/>)

II. Migration in general

This part unfurls a focused examination of migration in both a broad and localized context; furthermore, it pivots our attention toward the European Union (EU) and Hungary, two distinct arenas where the currents of human movement converge and diverge.

The European Union, a testament to the vision of a shared community, becomes a focal point in our analysis. We delve into the overarching migration patterns within the EU, exploring the complexities and diversity that characterize this supranational entity. We dissect the general trends through a lens that spans the continent, highlighting European examples that mirror the intricate tapestry of migratory flows and patterns.

Hungary emerges as a unique case study within this continental perspective, offering a microcosm of migration's evolution within a specific national context. We navigate through the historical trajectories that have shaped migration in Hungary, capturing the ebb and flow of human movement within its borders. The focus extends beyond mere statistics, seeking to understand the broader societal dynamics and influences that have contributed to the evolution of migration in Hungary.

It serves as a bridge connecting the macrocosm of European migration trends with the microcosm of Hungary's unique experience. By juxtaposing general patterns within the EU with the specificities of Hungary, our exploration aims to capture the rich diversity of migration and its impact on societies, economies, and the intricate interplay of perceptions that accompany the movement of people. As we traverse this nuanced terrain, our goal is to unveil a comprehensive understanding of migration as a continental phenomenon and a distinctive narrative within the Hungarian context.


The popular movement became big in the 21st century. About 281 million migrants were registered in 2020 alone, 3.6% of the world's population.⁴¹ Roughly, this is the number of unregistered people. According to the IOM (International Organization for Migration), the estimate is the same.⁴² Also,

⁴¹ https://www.google.com/search?q=world+migrants&rlz=1C1NHXL_huHU807HU807&coq=world+migran&aqs=chrome.2.69i57j0i512j0i22i30i18.11407j0j15&sourceid=chrome&ie=UTF-8

⁴² <https://www.iom.int/global-migration-trends>

according to their estimation, half of 150 million people are potential/actual employees.


International migration



Source: International migration around the world, by the numbers; Image: IOM World Migration Report 2020; <https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2020/01/iom-global-migration-report-international-migrants-2020/>

Global estimates of the stock of international migrants and migrant workers, 2019

In 2019, the UN-DESA estimated the stock of international migrants worldwide to be 272 million, 245 million of which are working age (aged 15 and over). The number of international migrant workers totalled 169 million in the same year. The 2019 estimate indicates an increase of 5 million migrant workers (3.0 per cent) from the 2017 estimate of 164 million migrant workers and an increase of 19 million (12.7 per cent) from the 2013 estimate of 150 million migrant workers.




International migrant workers are defined as migrants of working age who, during a specified reference period, were in the labour force of the country of their usual residence, either in employment or in unemployment. For the purposes of this report, the term “international migrants” refers to usual residents in a given country who are foreign-born (or foreign citizens when the place of birth information is not available). The term “migrants of working age” is a subset of international migrants, comprising those aged 15 years and over.

While migrant workers constitute 4.9 % of the labour force of destination countries globally, this figure is highest at 41.4 % in the Arab States. The labour force participation rate of migrants at 69.0 % is higher than the labour force participation of non-migrants at 60.4 %.

Source: ILO (2021): Global Estimates on International Migrant Workers – Results and Methodology

Today, the largest mass of emigrants is represented by the following countries ⁴³:

Number of emigrants (million people)




Source: https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=Migration_and_migrant_population_statistics

This number is not the same as the number of **asylum seekers**. According to Eurostat data, between 2008 and 2012, the number of asylum applications within the EU gradually increased, after which the number of asylum seekers increased more rapidly: in 2013, 400,500; in 2014, 594,200; and in 2015, 1.3 million. In 2016, that number dropped to about 1.2 million. In 2017, the number of applications for the right to asylum showed a significant decrease of 44.5% compared to 2016, and it also showed a downward trend in 2018. In 2019, the number of asylum seekers rose to 698,800, an increase of 11.7% compared to 2018. In 2020, 471,300 asylum seekers requested international protection in EU member states; It decreased by 32.6% compared to 2019. This decrease is due to the COVID-19 outbreak and related travel restrictions implemented by EU member states.

⁴³ <https://worldpopulationreview.com/country-rankings/immigration-by-country>
<https://www.europarl.europa.eu/factsheets/hu/sheet/152/bevandonglasi-politika>

Foreign population in EU member states




Wichtigste Herkunftsländer der Ausländer



Source: Gans, Paul und Andreas Pott: Migration und Migrationspolitik in Europa. 13/2018

Immigrant population in the OECD



Source: OECD: International Migration Outlook 2020


The percentage of immigrant populations in the OECD countries is relatively high, with more than 1 in 10 people being foreign-born. This is likely because most of the OECD countries are economically developed and have relatively high standards of living, making them attractive destinations for immigrants from all over the world. The top five countries in the OECD with the highest percentage of immigrant populations are Luxembourg (47.3%), Switzerland (29.7%), Australia (29.7%), New Zealand (26.8%), and Canada (21%). These countries all have long histories of immigration and have developed policies and programs to support the integration of immigrants into their societies.

Some of the other notable countries on the chart include Sweden (19.5%), the United Kingdom (14%), Germany (16.1%), the United States (13.6%), and Israel (21.2%). These countries are all major destinations for immigrants from all over the world, and their immigrant populations play an important role in their economies and societies.

The chart also shows that the percentage of immigrant populations varies significantly across the OECD countries. For example, the percentage of the immigrant population in Luxembourg is more than four times higher than the percentage of the immigrant population in Japan (2.2%). This is likely

due to several factors, such as the country's size, location, and economic policies. Immigration is still a major phenomenon in the OECD countries, and immigrants play an important role in their economies and societies. Compared with previous data, it suggests that the percentage of immigrant populations in the OECD countries is increasing. This growth is likely due to factors such as globalization, economic opportunities, and political instability in some parts of the world. The majority of immigrant populations are working-age adults. This suggests that immigrants are making a significant contribution to the economy.

COVID-19 has led to a record drop in migration flows



Source: OECD: International Migration Outlook 2021

The figures show the sharp decline in permanent migration to OECD countries in 2020 due to the COVID-19 pandemic. This is the lowest level of migration since 2003. The decline was widespread across all migration categories, including family, free movement, work, and humanitarian migration.⁴⁴ However, family migration experienced the largest decline, falling by

⁴⁴ Miller, H. V., Ripepi, M., Ernstes, A. M., & Peguero, A. A. (2020). Immigration Policy and Justice in the Era of COVID-19. *American Journal of Criminal Justice*, 45, 793-809.

over 35%. There are several factors that contributed to this decline, including:

- **travel restrictions:** Many countries imposed travel restrictions in an effort to contain the spread of the virus. This made it difficult for people to migrate to new countries.
- **economic uncertainty:** The pandemic caused a global economic recession, which led to job losses and uncertainty about future economic prospects. This made people less likely to migrate.
- **health concerns:** People were also concerned about the health risks of migrating during a pandemic.⁴⁵

The decline in migration has had a number of consequences for both sending and receiving countries. In sending countries, the decline in remittances has led to a loss of income for many families. The decline in migration has also reduced the flow of skilled workers, which could have a negative impact on economic growth in the long term. In receiving countries, the decline in migration has led to labour shortages in some sectors, such as healthcare and agriculture. The decline in migration has also reduced cultural diversity and dynamism. It is unclear how long the decline in migration will last. However, migration flows will likely remain below pre-pandemic levels for some time.

Migrants and fiscal policy



Source: OECD: International Migration Outlook 2021

⁴⁵ Hill, J., Rodriguez, D. X., & McDaniel, P. N. (2021). Immigration status as a health care barrier in the USA during COVID-19. *Journal of Migration and Health*, 4, 100036.

According to the OECD survey, the amount of taxes that immigrants pay is significantly higher than the amount of benefits that they receive. The chart shows that immigrants contribute 2.5 trillion USD in taxes, while they receive 2.0 trillion USD in benefits, health, and education. This means that immigrants make a net contribution of 0.5 trillion USD to the economies. In that case, immigrants are not a burden on the economy. In fact, they make a net positive contribution. Second, policymakers should focus on integrating immigrants into the economy so that they can reach their full potential. This includes providing them with access to education, training, and employment opportunities. Third, the chart suggests that policymakers should avoid using immigration as a scapegoat for economic problems.

3. European Union

In the expansive landscape of human movement, we direct the focus to the European Union, a collective of nations with a rich tapestry of migratory patterns and experiences. The aim is to unravel the intricate dynamics that characterize migration within the EU, offering a panoramic view of the continent's diverse experiences.

The European Union stands as a testament to the possibilities and challenges inherent in fostering unity among diverse nations. As we delve into migration in general within the EU, our exploration transcends borders, languages, and cultures. We seek to understand the overarching patterns that define migratory movements within this supranational entity, examining the complexities of mobility arising from people's free movement across its member states.

Within this framework, European examples become crucial narrative threads in our exploration. By illuminating specific instances of migration within the EU, we navigate through the diverse stories that contribute to the continent's rich mosaic. These examples serve as microcosms, allowing us to understand the factors influencing migration, the challenges faced, and the opportunities created within the varied contexts of European nations.


From the bustling metropolises to the serene landscapes, from the northernmost reaches to the southern shores, the EU encapsulates a multitude of migration stories. By examining these narratives, we aim to capture the essence of how migration shapes and is shaped by the unique characteristics of individual European nations. Our journey through European examples seeks not only to provide insight into the patterns of movement but also to uncover the cultural, economic, and social nuances that underpin the broader phenomenon of migration within the European Union.

3.1. Migration in general

The migration figures in 2019 show that 2.5 million people immigrated to the EU and 0.9 million people emigrated from the EU. Total net immigration to the EU: 1.5 million people. What else is worth considering: **If there had been no migration, the European population would have decreased by half a million since 4.2 million children were born and 4.7 million died in the EU.** There is no statistical data on this percentage of people who really

want to take up work and who want to take up work permanently in the given country. Previous data shows that roughly half of them want to make a living from benefits and social and other benefits from the wealthier local milieu. Those involved are well aware that, in many cases, living as a beggar in the chosen country means a more gentlemanly lifestyle than living on even an average salary back home.


Migrant routes to the European Union



Source: Ambrosini, Maurizio (2016): Europe: No Migrant's Land? Italian Institute for International Political Studies (ISPI), 45. Castles, S. (2017). International migration at a crossroads. In *The Politics of Citizenship in Immigrant Democracies* (pp. 89-106). Routledge.

In 2021, the EU experienced a surge in illegal border crossings, reaching nearly 200,000, the highest since 2017, as reported by Frontex. This marked a 36% increase from 2019 and a 57% increase from 2020, despite the impact of COVID-19 restrictions. The situation at the borders to Belarus notably contributed to this surge, continuing the trend of migration being used in a hybrid operation targeting the EU external border.

Illegal border crossing



Source: Frontex (2021): Irregular migration into the EU last year is the lowest since 2013 due to COVID-19

In 2020, the number of illegal border crossings along the EU's external borders decreased by 13% to approximately 124,000, primarily due to the impact of COVID-19 restrictions, marking the lowest since 2013. The **Eastern Mediterranean route** experienced the most significant decline, with arrivals falling by over three-quarters to around 20,000. The region saw a 29% decrease to around 17,000 illegal border crossings. The Canary Islands recorded a record number of arrivals, totalling over 22,600 on the Western African route, eight times higher than the previous year.

The **Central Mediterranean route** saw a notable increase, with the number of irregular arrivals almost tripling to over 35,600, making it the most active migratory route into Europe. The route witnessed a rise of over three-quarters to around 27,000 irregular migrants.


On the **Western Mediterranean route**, around 17,000 arrivals were reported, while the Western African route saw a similar number of detections

as in 2020 (approximately 22,500). It experienced stable detections, with Cyprus recording a significant increase in migratory flow, particularly from Africans, in the last quarter of 2021.

The **Western Balkan route** saw a 78% increase in reported detections of illegal border crossings in 2021 compared to 2020, peaking until September. On the Eastern land borders, roughly 27,000 illegal border-crossings were detected, indicating intense pressure, especially in the context of the state of emergency in EU member states neighbouring Belarus. The figures peaked in the year's second half, focusing first on the Lithuanian border and later shifting to the Polish and Latvian borders.⁴⁶

Data showed a shift in demographics, with a larger share of male migrants and women accounting for less than one in ten detections compared to one in four the previous year. The share of children detected also decreased, with roughly one in ten migrants being younger than 18 years old in 2020, compared to 23% in 2019. Syrians were the most frequently reported nationality of unauthorized border crossings, followed by Tunisians, Moroccans, Algerians, and Afghans. Women accounted for less than one-tenth of arrivals, a significant drop compared to 2019. The Central Mediterranean route remained the most-used, with an 83% year-on-year increase in detections, driven by arrivals from Libyan, Tunisian, and Turkish shores.


TOP 30 nationalities of asylum seekers (1,000 people)



Source: https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=Migration_and_migrant_population_statistics

⁴⁶ Šantić, D., Minca, C., & Umek, D. (2017). 4.2. The Balkan Migration Route: Reflections from a Serbian Observatory. Faculty of Philosophy, University of Belgrade, 221.

Syria has remained the main country of citizenship for asylum seekers in the EU since 2013. In 2020, the number of first-time Syrian asylum seekers in the EU decreased to 63,500 from 74,900 in 2019, while the Syrian share of first-time applicants in the EU increased from 11.9% to 15.2 %. Afghans accounted for 10.6% of first-time asylum seekers, Venezuelans for 7.3%, Colombians for 7.0%, and Iraqis and Pakistanis accounted for 3.9% and 3.8%, respectively. Among the groups of nationalities who applied for asylum for the first time in the EU in 2020, the largest decrease in the number of applications compared to 2019 was registered among citizens of Venezuela (14,500 applications less, i.e., 32.3%), citizens of Georgia (by 13,100 less, or -65.6%), Albania (12,100 less, or -70.8%), Syria (11,500 less, or -15.3%), Nigeria (10,900 less, or -53.4 %), Iraq (10,600 fewer, or -39.6 %), Iran (10,600 fewer, or -62.3 %) and Afghanistan (10,100 fewer, or -18.6 %).⁴⁷



Eurostat (2021): https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=Migration_and_migrant_population_statistics


The influx into Western European countries is gradually increasing year by year, and we see that **the foreign population** is also high in some countries. In the early 1990s, immigration to Germany was very strong, the source of which was partly the significant Eastern European migration following the regime change. Due to the same culture, it did not cause a big

⁴⁷ https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=Asylum_statistics#cite_ref-2

https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=Asylum_quarterly_report

social problem, but it did cause an economic problem, above all due to the difference in wages. After the enlargement of the EU in the EU member states, where the freedom of migration was temporarily restricted, the growth of migration slowed down in favour of those who opened their borders to the free flow of labour. At the same time, a constantly increasing number of migrants flowed into the Northern European countries, as the following table clearly shows. In the new immigration target countries, the same growth was more dynamic; in some countries, such as Spain or Ireland, the number of immigrant migrants grew particularly rapidly and explosively. The ratio is significantly higher in some countries, mainly in the north.

The proportion of non-citizens in the resident population



Eurostat (2021): https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=Migration_and_migrant_population_statistics

In relative terms, the EU member state with the highest proportion of non-EU citizens was Luxembourg, as non-citizens made up 47% of the total population. A high proportion of foreign citizens (more than 10% of the resident population) was also observed in Malta, Cyprus, Austria, Estonia, Latvia, Ireland, Germany, Belgium and Spain. In contrast, non-citizens represented less than 1% of the population in Poland (0.9%) and Romania (0.7%). The relative proportion of those born abroad in the total population was highest in Luxembourg (48% of the resident population), followed by Malta

(23%) and Cyprus (22%). In contrast, Poland reported a low share of foreigners on January 1, 2020, 2% of its total population, followed by Bulgaria (2.7%), Slovakia (3.6%) and Romania (3.7%).

The trend is still strong today: according to the latest statistics, 2.7 million immigrants from non-EU countries arrived in the European Union in 2020. Another recent figure is that on 1 January 2020, 23 million people (5.1%) out of a population of 447.3 million did not have EU citizenship. Of these, 8.7 million were registered workers, representing 4.6% of the 20-64 age group.⁴⁸


On April 13, 2018, the European Commission published the special Eurobarometer survey No. 469 results, "Integration of immigrants in the European Union". According to the results, only a minority of Europeans (37%) think they are well-informed about issues related to immigration and integration. Respondents also tend to overestimate the number of immigrants from outside the EU: in 19 of the 28 member states, the estimated proportion of immigrants in the population is at least twice the actual proportion, and in some countries, this proportion is much higher. The results show that about one in ten (61%) respondents interact with immigrants weekly, whether just exchanging a few words or doing one or two activities in different contexts.

Slightly more than half of Europeans (54%) believe that integrating immigrants is successful, but the numbers vary greatly from country to country. There seems to be a correlation with the actual proportion of immigrants in the country's total population: in countries with a low proportion of non-EU immigrants, respondents are less likely to see integration as successful or feel that immigrants positively impact their society. Europeans tend to overestimate the proportion of immigrants in their countries (2,3 times at the EU level)

⁴⁸ https://ec.europa.eu/info/strategy/priorities-2019-2024/promoting-our-european-way-life/statistics-migration-europe_en

Migrant rate - Public perception and actual numbers

Q43T To your knowledge, what is the proportion of immigrants in the total population in [OUR COUNTRY]?
AVERAGE - (%)



Source: Ungleichheit und Migration in Europa: Das Beispiel der "Gastarbeiter" aus Jugoslawian. Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung organized Colloquiums zu Flucht und Migration, 4 April 2019, based on Eurobarometer (2018): Integration of immigrants in the European Union. Special Edition 469.

On average, across the EU, almost three in ten (29%) respondents were unable to estimate the percentage of immigrants in their country's population. This percentage varies significantly among countries, ranging from less than one in ten in the Netherlands (8%), Belgium, and Sweden (both 9%), to more than half in Spain (52%), Malta (56%), and Bulgaria (71%). With only three exceptions, the average respondent tends to overestimate the proportion of immigrants in their country's population, sometimes significantly. The exceptions are Croatia, where there is no difference between the estimate and the actual figure; Estonia, where respondents slightly underestimate the proportion of immigrants (by a ratio of 0.9 to 1); and Sweden, where respondents slightly overestimate the proportion of immigrants (by a ratio of 1.1 to 1). The extent to which this overestimation occurs varies significantly. When examining the ratio of estimated to actual immigration proportions, respondents in Denmark, Germany, Latvia, the Netherlands, Finland, and Austria overestimate the real proportion of immigrants in their country by less than a factor of 2. However, in 19 out of the 28 Member States, the estimated proportion of immigrants exceeds twice the actual proportion. This ratio is much higher in certain countries, reaching over eight times greater than the

actual figure in Romania, Bulgaria, and Poland and nearly 14 times greater in Slovakia.⁴⁹

There are many reasons for this **cognitive dissonance**, such as the **virulent ethno-nationalism** in Eastern Europe, the lack of experience of immigrants from 'other' cultures, the high ethnic homogeneity of most countries in the region today and the low tolerance of 'others'. These phenomena can be explained against the background of the region's history and the deep social upheaval of the last three decades, which will not last forever.⁵⁰ An explanation of the immigration scepticism that is widespread in the East and South-East must address even deeper causes, namely the collective insecurity, the fear of the future that is widespread in the region despite strong economic growth - and which is less reinforced in social reality by immigration than by the will to emigrate.

Between 2015 and 2017, the European Union (EU) grappled with a significant historical crisis, commonly referred to as the "European refugee crisis." Given the multifaceted nature of this crisis and the varied responses it elicited, it is plausible that it impacted individuals' perceptions of immigrants and European integration. Stockemer, Niemann, Unge and Speyer, in their study, utilized data from three waves of the European Social Survey (ESS) – the wave preceding the crisis in 2012, the wave at the onset of the crisis in 2014, and the wave immediately following the perceived peak of the crisis in 2016. Their objective was to examine the extent to which the European refugee crisis heightened anti-immigrant sentiments and Euroscepticism among Europeans and the influence of anti-immigrant attitudes on their level of Euroscepticism. In line with previous research, the results consistently demonstrate a robust relationship between more critical attitudes towards immigrants and increased Euroscepticism. Surprisingly, the findings indicate that the crisis did not escalate anti-immigrant sentiments or critical attitudes towards the EU. Moreover, it did not strengthen the connection between rejecting immigrants and rejecting the EU. These results suggest that fundamental political attitudes remain relatively stable even when faced with a substantial external shock.⁵¹


⁴⁹ Eurobarometer (2018): Integration of immigrants in the European Union. Special Edition 469.

⁵⁰ Dempster, H., & Hargrave, K. (2017). Understanding public attitudes towards refugees and migrants. London: Overseas Development Institute & Chatham House.

⁵¹ Stockemer, D., Niemann, A., Unger, D., & Speyer, J. (2020). The "refugee crisis," immigration attitudes, and euroscepticism. *International Migration Review*, 54(3), 883-912.

Immigration and integration

QA8T Generally speaking, how successful or not is the integration of most immigrants?



Source: Eurobarometer (2018): Integration of immigrants in the European Union. Special Edition 469.


In the overall responses, more than half of the participants (54%) who answered the question expressed agreement that integration is successful in their local area or country. Conversely, just under half (40%) disagree with this statement, and 6% indicate they do not know.⁵² However, there is substantial variation at the country level on this matter. Upon examining the detailed results, respondents are more inclined to agree that integration is successful in their city or local area, with nearly half (47%) providing this response. In contrast, just under four in ten (39%) agree that integration is successful in their country.

In both scenarios, only small percentages of respondents agree that integration is very successful (7% for the city or local area; 5% for the country) or perceive it as not at all successful (9% for the city or area; 11% for the country). Additionally, in both cases, around one in ten respondents expressed uncertainty about their stance (12% for the city or area; 9% for the country).

⁵² Hellwig, T., & Sinno, A. (2017). Different groups, different threats: public attitudes towards immigrants. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, 43(3), 339-358.

Perception of the immigrants' impact on society

QA9T Perception regarding the impact of immigrants on society (%)




Source: Eurobarometer (2018): Integration of immigrants in the European Union. Special Edition 469.

The results at the country level exhibit significant variability, ranging from fewer than one-fifth of respondents in Slovakia (19%), Hungary (17%), and Bulgaria (12%) expressing an overall positive perception of the impact of immigrants on society, to more than six in ten holding a positive view in Luxembourg (66%) and the UK (63%). Sweden stands out with the highest proportion of respondents expressing an overall positive perception of the impact of immigrants on society (76%). Conversely, four Member States, including Bulgaria (64%), Greece (61%), Hungary (60%), and the Czech Republic (51%), find themselves at the opposite end of the spectrum, with majorities perceiving that immigrants have a negative impact regarding society. Half of the respondents in Slovakia share this view (50%). The perception of a positive or negative impact of immigrants on society appears to be correlated with the actual share of immigrants in a country's total population. Indeed, respondents in countries such as Sweden, the UK, or Luxembourg, where the proportion of immigrants exceeds 8%, tend to have a positive perception. On the other hand, those in Hungary or Bulgaria, where the proportions are lower than 2%, tend to negatively perceive immigrants' impact on society.⁵³

⁵³ Davidov, E., & Semyonov, M. (2017). Attitudes toward immigrants in European societies. *International Journal of Comparative Sociology*, 58(5), 359-366.

Migrants impact on the national economy

QA9.1 There are different views regarding the impact of immigrants on society in (OUR COUNTRY). To what extent do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements? Overall, immigrants...



Source: Eurobarometer (2018): Integration of immigrants in the European Union. Special Edition 469.

In 16 out of the 28 Member States, less than half of the respondents agree that immigrants positively impact the economy of the respondent's country.⁵⁴ In four countries, less than a third of respondents express agreement: Slovakia (31%), Greece (29%), Hungary (27%), and Bulgaria (17%). Conversely, three countries stand out for having a notably high proportion of respondents who agree with this statement: Ireland (72%), the United Kingdom (69%), and Sweden (69%). In eight countries, more than half of the respondents disagree with the statement that immigrants have a positive impact on the economy, particularly in Greece (67%), Hungary (66%), and Bulgaria (63%), where more than six out of ten respondents hold this view. In 13 countries, at least one in ten (10%) of those surveyed express uncertainty about their stance on this statement, with a particularly high proportion of respondents in Bulgaria (20%) providing this response.


⁵⁴ Пудрик, Д. (2020). Migration process: Impact on sustainable development of the national economy. *Економічні горизонти*, (4 (15)), 51-58.

Leitner, H. (2017). The political economy of international labor migration. A companion to economic geography, 450-467.

National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. (2017). The economic and fiscal consequences of immigration. National Academies Press.

Migrants impact on the welfare system

QA9.2 There are different views regarding the impact of immigrants on society in (OUR COUNTRY). To what extent do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements? Overall, immigrants...



Source: Eurobarometer (2018): Integration of immigrants in the European Union. Special Edition 469.

In most countries, a majority of respondents concur that immigrants pose a strain on their country's welfare system.⁵⁵ However, this sentiment varies, ranging from just over half (51%) of those surveyed in Ireland to approximately three-quarters of respondents in Malta (75%), Greece (75%), and Hungary (74%). In six instances, less than half of the respondents agree that immigrants burden their country's welfare, with a notably low proportion in Luxembourg (27%) endorsing this statement. Contrastingly, in five countries, the majority of respondents disagree that immigrants are a burden on their country's welfare system: Luxembourg (66%), France (58%), Spain (52%),⁵⁶ Finland, and the United Kingdom (both 50%). Bulgaria (16%) has the lowest proportion of respondents expressing disagreement with this statement, but it also has a significantly higher-than-average proportion of those who are uncertain about their stance (14%).


⁵⁵ Piyapromdee, S. (2021). The impact of immigration on wages, internal migration, and welfare. *The Review of Economic Studies*, 88(1), 406-453.

Razin, A. (2021). *Globalization, Migration, and Welfare State*. Springer Books.

⁵⁶ Ribas-Mateos, N. (2017). *The Mediterranean in the age of globalization: Migration, welfare, and borders*. Routledge.

Migrants impact on crime problem

QA9.7 There are different views regarding the impact of immigrants on society in (OUR COUNTRY). To what extent do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements? Overall, immigrants...



Source: Eurobarometer (2018): Integration of immigrants in the European Union. Special Edition 469.

In 20 out of the 28 Member States, a majority of respondents, at least 50%, express agreement with the statement that immigrants exacerbate crime problems in their country.⁵⁷ In Portugal (50%) and Romania (50%), precisely half of the respondents agree with this, while in Italy, three-quarters (75%) of those surveyed hold this view, and nearly eight in ten (79%) respondents in Malta share the same perspective. Notably, in Denmark, where attitudes toward immigrants tend to be more positive on other questions, there is a high proportion (73%) of respondents who believe that immigrants worsen crime problems. Conversely, four countries stand out with substantial proportions of respondents who disagree with this statement: Luxembourg (55%), Ireland, France (both 53%), and Lithuania (51%), where more than half of the respondents do not believe that immigrants contribute to worsening crime problems in their country.⁵⁸

⁵⁷ Pinotti, P. (2017). Clicking on heaven's door: The effect of immigrant legalization on crime. *American Economic Review*, 107(1), 138-168.

⁵⁸ Bosworth, M., Parmar, A., & Vázquez, Y. (Eds.). (2018). *Race, criminal justice, and migration control: Enforcing the boundaries of belonging*. Oxford University Press.

3.2. European examples

Germany

Currently, more than 10% of **Germany's** population are foreign nationals (this is not the same as those born abroad!), including about 1 million Poles, 600,000 Romanians, 360,000 Croatians and Greeks, and 310,000 Bulgarians. To make the picture complete, there are also nearly one and a half million Turkish citizens, 700 thousand Syrians and almost the same number of Italians in Germany. The Turks tend to live around Hamburg, Frankfurt and Stuttgart, the latter being particularly numerous in the most developed southern federal state, Bavaria.

The picture is much more nuanced according to country of origin rather than citizenship. The number of Turks alone exceeds 4 million, except for the first generation and their families, the rest do not have German citizenship. The Arab population also exceeds a million. In all of them, the number of children is multiple times that of the native population, which clearly shows the vision of the future. It can already be seen that nearly half of the lower classes of primary schools are made up of people of colour.


Region	Country	Population
Deutschland	TUR	1.483.515
	POL	866.855
	SYR	698.950
	ITA	643.065
	ROM	622.780
Bayern	TUR	194.425
	ROM	151.040
	POL	112.255
	ITA	101.140
	KRO	98.875
Regensburg	ROM	2.517
	BUL	1.802
	TUR	1.535
	POL	1.132
	SYR	1.121

The most problematic world after France. (The French guest worker-migrant situation is worse because there are almost exclusively Arabs from the former colonies; their ability to assimilate is significantly lower than that of the Turks, and there are also many of them, about 12-14% of the total population.)

Following the enlargement of the EU in 2004, the number of people arriving from southeastern Europe increased significantly. They also work in Germany; people from EU countries have no problems due to **the free flow of labour**. People from other Balkan countries are in principle, guest workers, but they do not want to go home either, so they are rather migrants. There

are fewer problems with them: same culture, religion, and Europeanness, most probably, the second and third generations will already assimilate. The increase in their influx – especially Romanians – is clearly shown.

Number of immigrants from Southeast Europe living in Germany



Source: <https://ostblog.hypotheses.org/1160>

The numbers are, of course, higher than this, as the Federal Statistical Office (Statistisches Bundesamt) only takes into account registered residents. According to estimates, it is **at least** the same (if not twice as much) unofficially (for a short time, black), etc., with staff staying outside. Eastern Europe can give even more to this: from the Baltic states and Poland.

Economic luck/destiny and, with it, the direction of migration also changes. More than 200 years ago, the direction was reversed: thousands of "guest workers" came from the then German-speaking areas to the uninhabited but high-quality **lands liberated from the Turks**, where tax concessions and exemptions were paradise. This is how, e.g. In Hungary, Schwaebische Türkei, where several counties next to each other were populated with mostly German-speaking people, and this situation remained like this until the large displacement after the second war. The latter is also a kind of guest worker migration, but it is a completely different, harsh category because it happened

out of compulsion; it is one of the greatest shame of humanity because, in judgment, it was not the individual who was guilty, but the people from which he came. Here, we only wanted to point out how each of these judgments in a historical perspective belongs to the moment, as the poet who otherwise sings of contentment says: "The grace of our fairy luck throws up, sows, / Playfully lifts and knocks down with a smile."⁵⁹

Netherlands


We mention one more example: **the Netherlands**. With the exception of Yugoslav guest workers, before the political changes, only a small number of Eastern Europeans lived and worked in the Netherlands, as in other Western European countries. Rather, only political refugees - for example, the approximately four thousand Hungarians who arrived in 1956 and women who emigrated as wives.⁶⁰ However, the situation changed by the nineties. Statistics put the number of guest workers from Eastern Europe at around 100,000, but there may be twice as many, as many of them work illegally, and more and more come as families. Like England and Germany, the Poles were the first in the Netherlands, followed later mostly by Romanians and Bulgarians. In the case of Hungarians, it is not a priority destination country, representing only a few tens of thousands of people.

The approximately fifteen-year history of the Poles working in the Netherlands can be a kind of example of how the labour market and social situation of a group with a specific cultural background changes when its number reaches a more serious size, a specific network system is formed, and the rules regarding the group are relaxed. It is possible that the Romanians, the Bulgarians, and all those Eastern European groups who choose the Netherlands as their temporary or even permanent place of work and residence will follow a similar path in relatively large numbers. One of the important changes of the past fifteen years is that, although the majority of Poles still do work that does not require special skills, the proportion is changing: more and more people are taking up highly qualified jobs, and fewer and fewer are taking on seasonal work. Parallel to all this, the number of independent Polish small businesses is growing rapidly.

Immigrants nationality

⁵⁹ Dániel Berzsenyi: To the Hungarians

⁶⁰ A very small number, more than 200,000 Hungarians left the country during the revolution.



Source: Dutch News (2021): Fewer immigrants came to the Netherlands during the coronavirus. <https://www.dutchnews.nl/2021/07/fewer-immigrants-came-to-the-netherlands-during-coronavirus/>

In 2020, 171,000 people without Dutch nationality moved to the Netherlands, 44,000 fewer than in 2019. The pandemic especially put off migrants from outside of the European Union; their numbers were down by one-third. Of those 171,000, 108,000 came from the European Union or European Free Trade Association countries (Liechtenstein, Norway, Iceland and Switzerland.) The remaining 61,000 were from elsewhere in the world. In 2019, 91,000 non-EU/EFTA nationals relocated to the Netherlands. For the past several years, immigration to the Netherlands has been on the rise. At its peak in 2019, 215,000 people moved to the country, a mix of students, those moving for work and asylum seekers. Fewer Dutch nationals returned in 2020 as well. Some 50,000 Dutch people returned home, but that is nearly 5,000 fewer people than in 2019.

There are already at least twenty to twenty thousand Poles living in The Hague and Rotterdam, and there are larger Polish communities in other cities, so it is clear that the debates about coexistence **are no longer about theoretical issues**. The appearance of Polish grocery stores, bakeries, and even churches indicates that a well-defined inner world is emerging. Furthermore, this is the need - today, a Polish-language newspaper is also published in the Netherlands, with fifty thousand copies! - it is often closely intertwined with

the desire to express and preserve one's own identity. The creation of Polish churches, for example, is not just language problems reason, but also the fact that Polish Catholics who follow a more traditional direction find rather unusual Dutch Catholicism, which is rather separate and "free-spirited". There is no doubt that the presence of guest workers from Eastern Europe causes problems and tensions, and the debate about them would not be so heated and would not arouse so many emotions if the immigrants who were former guest workers had successfully integrated.

Wherever Eastern Europeans living and working in the Netherlands are mentioned, sooner or later, the question will be asked: which scenario will their story follow, that of the Southern Europeans who came to the Netherlands as guest workers in the 1960s and then went home after the recovery of the Spanish and Italian economies, or the Turks and Moroccans, who are stuck here, and even their third generation is struggling with serious integration problems. In vain, almost all experts claim that the first version will probably come true because these people, in addition to their declared intention to return home - unlike the former Moroccan and Turkish guest workers - "essentially commute". Today, it cannot be repeated what happened before, that integration was "left to nature".⁶¹

In 2021, labour is the most common motive for 38,860 immigrants from within the EU/EFTA. For 29,350 immigrants, the reason is family-related. Education is the reason for 21,125 EU/EFTA citizens. The motive is unknown for 28,240 EU/EFTA citizens who immigrated to the Netherlands.⁶²

⁶¹https://magyarnarancs.hu/lokal/lengyelek_hollandiaban_-_marad-e_a_mehetken-69359

⁶² <https://www.cbs.nl/en-gb/dossier/asylum-migration-and-integration/how-many-people-immigrate-to-the-netherlands->

Mediterranean countries

France is another major destination for migrants in Europe. According to the projections, in 2022, there will be more than 7 million foreign nationals, representing more than 10% of the population. The largest groups of migrants in France come from Algeria, Morocco, Turkey, Portugal, and Tunisia. Some of them were French colonies. Many migrants come to France to work, as the country has a strong economy and a variety of industries. Others come for family reunification or to escape conflict or persecution. France has a long history of immigration, and the country has developed a relatively well-integrated immigrant population. However, there are still integration challenges, and some migrants face discrimination and social exclusion.⁶³

Italy is also a popular destination for migrants in southern Europe. In 2021, more than 6.5 million foreign nationals living in Italy, representing 8% of the population. The arrivals come from Morocco, Albania, Romania, Ukraine, and China. Many migrants come to Italy to work, as the country has a strong economy and a need for labour in certain sectors, such as agriculture and construction. Others come for family reunification or to escape conflict or persecution. In recent years, the country has faced a large influx of migrants from Africa (e.g. Lampedusa⁶⁴), which has led to political tensions and debates about immigration policy.⁶⁵

Thirdly, we mention Spain, where the number of immigrants is less than 5.5 million, representing 10% of the population. Spain hosts substantial migrant populations primarily originating from Romania, Morocco, Colombia, China, and Ecuador. A significant influx of migrants is drawn to Spain's robust economy, particularly in sectors like agriculture and tourism, where labour is demanded. Additionally, individuals migrate for reasons such as family reunification or to seek refuge from conflict or persecution. The coun-

⁶³ Freedman, J. (2017). *Immigration and insecurity in France*. Taylor & Francis.

Beaman, J. (2017). *Citizen Outsider: Children of North African Immigrants in France* (p. 168). University of California Press.

⁶⁴ Zerback, T., Reinemann, C., Van Aelst, P., & Masini, A. (2020). Was Lampedusa a key event for immigration news? An analysis of the effects of the Lampedusa disaster on immigration coverage in Germany, Belgium, and Italy. *Journalism Studies*, 21(6), 748-765.

Franceschelli, M. (2020). Global migration, local communities and the absent state: Resentment and resignation on the Italian island of Lampedusa. *Sociology*, 54(3), 591-608.


⁶⁵ Campomori, F., & Caponio, T. (2017). Immigrant integration policymaking in Italy: regional policies in a multi-level governance perspective. *International Review of Administrative Sciences*, 83(2), 303-321.

try maintains a relatively inclusive immigration policy rooted in a longstanding tradition of embracing migrants from diverse global origins. Nevertheless, the nation encounters challenges, including complexities in integration and social tensions. Despite its open approach, Spain grapples with issues associated with the reception and assimilation of migrants into its society.⁶⁶

United Kingdom

The United Kingdom was a major destination for migrants until the country's withdrawal from the European Union (EU) in 2020.⁶⁷ In 2019, an estimated 8.9 million foreign nationals lived in the UK, representing 13.4% of the population. The most significant migrant cohorts in the UK originated from Poland, India, Romania, Pakistan, and Bangladesh. A considerable number of migrants chose the UK as their destination for employment, leveraging the country's robust economy and demand for labour in specific sectors like healthcare and IT.⁶⁸ Other migrants arrived for purposes such as family reunification or pursuing education.

Foreign-born population in the UK



Source: <https://migrationobservatory.ox.ac.uk/resources/briefings/migrants-in-the-uk-an-overview/>

⁶⁶ Fellini, I. (2018). Immigrants' labour market outcomes in Italy and Spain: Has the Southern European model disrupted during the crisis?. *Migration Studies*, 6(1), 53-78.

⁶⁷ Kaufmann, E. (2017). Levels or changes?: Ethnic context, immigration and the UK Independence Party vote. *Electoral Studies*, 48, 57-69.

⁶⁸ Ottaviano, G. I., Peri, G., & Wright, G. C. (2018). Immigration, trade and productivity in services: Evidence from UK firms. *Journal of International Economics*, 112, 88-108.

The UK maintained a sophisticated immigration management system, encompassing a points-based structure for skilled workers and policies facilitating family reunification. However, the UK's departure from the EU introduced challenges, particularly for migrants from EU countries, making it more arduous for them to reside and work in the UK.

Between 2004 and 2014, a substantial influx of migrants from the new member states in Eastern Europe was observed in Britain. While considerable attention has been directed towards Polish migrants, who form the largest national group, the experiences of movers from smaller nations like the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Slovakia. The findings reveal noteworthy differences that suggest potential disadvantages and discrimination faced by these migrant workers. Notably, the prevalence of over-qualification was relatively high among individuals migrating from the selected countries, highlighting significant disparities in the labour market experiences of these overlooked migrant groups.⁶⁹

⁶⁹ Privara, A., Rievajová, E., & Yüceşahin, M. M. (2019). Labour market disadvantages faced by migrant workers from Czech Republic, Hungary, and Slovakia in Britain. *Migration Letters*, 16(4), 585-594.

4. Hungary

The evolution of migration in Hungary is a testament to the nation's dynamic history and geopolitical shifts. This exploration traces the ebb and flow of people, capturing the impact of historical events, political transitions, and economic transformations on migration patterns. As we traverse the annals of Hungary's past, we aim to illuminate the forces that have shaped the movement of individuals within and beyond its borders, contributing to the diverse tapestry of its population.

Parallel to the historical narrative, we scrutinize the contemporary landscape of how immigration is perceived within Hungary. Public sentiment, cultural attitudes, and governmental policies collectively shape the lens through which the nation views the influx of individuals seeking a new home. This examination extends beyond statistical analyses to encompass the societal dynamics that influence the reception of immigrants, exploring both the challenges and opportunities embedded in Hungary's perception of immigration.

Hungary's unique geopolitical position, nestled within the heart of Europe, has rendered it a focal point for migratory trends. By juxtaposing the historical evolution of migration with the prevailing perceptions of immigration, this section seeks to unravel the complex interplay between Hungary's past and present. Our objective is to provide a comprehensive understanding of the forces that have sculpted Hungary's migration narrative and to shed light on the intricate tapestry of sentiments surrounding immigration in this diverse and historically rich nation.

4.1. The evolution of migration

In the 20th century, in the aftermath of the **Trianon treaty**, a large wave of Hungarian refugees (app. 500,000) fled from the newly formed countries to Hungary.⁷⁰ These refugees were often destitute and traumatized, and they placed a significant burden on Hungary's already struggling economy. The Hungarian Red Cross played a crucial role in providing relief to refugees in the aftermath of the war and the treaty. The Red Cross established refugee

⁷⁰ Koloh, G. (2021). The number of Trianon refugees. *Regional Statistics*, 11(04), 170-181.

camps provided food and shelter, and helped to reunite families. These efforts were essential in alleviating Hungarian refugees' suffering and helping them rebuild their lives.

During the **interwar period**, the country's economy remained weak, and there was widespread poverty and unemployment. Many Hungarians sought to escape these difficult conditions by emigrating to other countries. A large Hungarian diaspora developed, with Hungarian communities forming in countries all over the world. These communities provided a sense of support and belonging for Hungarian emigrants and helped preserve Hungarian culture and identity.⁷¹

World War II led to a new wave of migration. Hungary was allied with Nazi Germany, and the country suffered from the war's destruction and economic devastation. In the 1940s, Jewish scientists, actors, and other intellectuals they were moved from the country.⁷² After the war, Hungary came under Soviet occupation, and the country's political and economic system was radically transformed. Many Hungarians fled the country after World War II, seeking to escape communism and to find better opportunities elsewhere. These emigrants settled in countries such as the United States, Canada, and Australia. During socialism, the restricted border policy and strict criminal justice consequences made emigration difficult, but even some athletes (soccer players) and politically motivated people tried.

In a **demographic concept**, in the Ratkó era, in 1954, natural reproduction was still fast compared to European conditions (12‰). Due to the abolition of the childlessness tax, the social changes that occurred after the 1956 revolution and the lifting of the abortion ban, there was a large decline. Between 1954 and 1962, the rate of natural reproduction fell from 12‰ to 2.1‰. In the 1960s, next to the German Democratic Republic, Hungary was the country with the lowest fertility in the world.⁷³ Abortions also played a major role in reducing population growth; between 1960 and 1973, there were more abortions than live births. There were no labour problems at this time, and employment was full on paper. The migration was not a problem either since the border was closed.

⁷¹ Kosa, J. (1957). A century of Hungarian Emigration, 1850-1950. *American Slavic and East European Review*, 16(4), 501-514.

⁷² Ritter, A. (2019). Escape from traumas: Emigration and Hungarian Jewish identity after the Holocaust. *The American Journal of Psychoanalysis*, 79(4), 577-593.

⁷³ <http://static.hlt.bme.hu/semantics/external/pages/Kaposvár/>

From the end of the consolidation in the **1960s**, mass public housing constructions and the introduction of the GYES in 1967 resulted in a smaller population increase, but since 1957, it has not yet reached the level necessary for population reproduction. Between 1974 and 1977, due to the arrival of the Ratkó children of childbearing age and the tightening of abortion, another spectacular – but similar to its counterpart in the 1950s – demographic peak was registered, and the total fertility rate for this short period reached the level necessary for the medium-term maintenance of the population 2.1 level. After 1977, spectacular and lasting ups and downs followed, which continues today. The ever-decreasing number of births could no longer offset the ever-increasing number of deaths, so the population began to decline in 1981. Even then, there is no unemployment, although even within the gate it is decreasing, and there is a serious shortage in some areas, such as, e.g. at that time, foreign women - of course from socialist countries - work in Hungarian factories (e.g., Pápai Textilgyár).⁷⁴ There is no social tension because they did not even have the opportunity to leave the factory. In the **1980s**, the profitability of the light industry branches significantly deteriorated due to high-profit centralisation, depressed prices for KGST exports and the reduction of the state price supplement that corrected it, the effect of multiple devaluations of the forint made the import of raw materials for basic production more expensive, and regulatory reforms that increased the costs of employment. Opportunities for investment and wage improvement have narrowed, and in some industries (textiles, leather, etc.), a serious labour shortage has developed, which has been partially remedied by employing guest workers from Cuba, Vietnam, and Mongolia. However, they are special migrants, the agreement between the two countries forced them to do work that Hungarian women did not even undertake.

The political changes in **1989** came against such a background. The change is small; the former case is an example of continuity from the current time, after the third wave of **COVID-19**: "While restaurants and hotels were still counting layoffs a few months ago, now 20,000 workers are missing

⁷⁴ Péter, A. Szocialista migráció, posztkolonializmus és szolidaritás: Magyarország és az Európán kívüli migráció. Felelős kiadó, 26.

from the area. Some of the employers are looking for Vietnamese and Mongolian guest workers for the summer season, according to the Hospitality Industry Board...".⁷⁵ *Nil novum sub sole.*

Migration of Hungarian citizens

Designation	2010	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020
Immigrant							
Born abroad	60	17,747	13,600	10,711	10,224	10 112	8,581
A returnee born in Hungary	1 575	14,810	16,215	20,906	23 401	23 172	23 104
Altogether	1 635	32,557	29,815	31,617	33,625	33,284	31,685
Emigrant	7 318	32,852	29,425	26,957	23,808	21,900	19,322

Source: KSH (2021): 22.1.1.30. Magyar állampolgárok vándorlásának összefoglaló adatai https://www.ksh.hu/stadat_files/nep/hu/nep0030.html

Emigration to other member states picked up again after the fall of communism and then in 2004 when Hungary joined the EU. The reasons are almost exclusively of economic origin: better job opportunities and especially higher salaries attract people. According to the latest data, approx. 600,000 Hungarians live in EU countries, primarily in the United Kingdom and Germany. Currently, the measurement of emigration faces difficulties because, due to the free flow of labour within the EU, there are no obstacles to changing locations, which is why, for example, it changes rapidly, or the data includes commuters.⁷⁶

A new trend is that Hungarian emigrants are starting to come back. A decade-long trend was reversed the year before last year when more citizens born in Hungary moved home than emigrated (KSH). In 2019, 23.2 thousand people returned, while 21.9 thousand left the country. On the emigration side of the international migration balance sheet, the number of people leaving Hungary has been decreasing for four years, and the number of people returning home has started to increase during this period. According to the KSH, the peak of emigration since 2010 was in 2015 when almost 33,000 Hungarians moved abroad for one reason or another.

The number of emigrating Hungarians also increased in 2017, with 600 - 700 thousand Hungarians currently living in Western Europe. Between

⁷⁵ <https://24.hu/belfold/2021/06/20/vendeglatas-balaton-etterem-szalloda-vendegmunkasok/>

⁷⁶ https://isc.pte.hu/sites/isc.pte.hu/files/kepek/e_mozaikok_a_magyar_tortenelembol_kivandorlas_szoveg_2.pdf


2007 and 2016, an average of 70,000 Hungarians immigrated to OECD countries each year. In addition to these 700,000 people, another 86,000 came in 2017, which represented a minimal increase compared to the previous year. If we add to this the period between 2004-2006, and if we assume that emigration in 2018-2020 was at a similar level as in the previous years, then it comes out that around one million people have left abroad since Hungary joined the EU. Their location is relatively concentrated; many say that London has become the second-largest Hungarian city.

It is very **difficult to estimate how many Hungarians can currently live abroad** because the statistics are quite imprecise, especially in Western Europe because within the EU, Hungarians can freely take up work. The British statistical office, for example, probably underestimates the number of Hungarians living in the island country, and the British embassy has also acknowledged this. It seems certain that, due to Brexit, the number of Hungarians living in the United Kingdom decreased after 2016, while at the same time, the number of Hungarians living in the other two large European host countries, Germany and Austria, increased. According to Portfolio's estimate, 600,000 Hungarians may then live in Western Europe, slightly less than in 2017.⁷⁷ The majority of them go out for employment, but there is also family reunification, supervision of an uncle, etc.; unfortunately, no specific and reliable statistical data is available from any of the host countries.

⁷⁷ https://hvg.hu/gazdasag/20190920_OECD_Meg_2017ben_is_nott_a_kivandorlo_magyarok_szama

Hungarian citizens living in European countries

■ Németország ■ Ausztria ■ Egyesült Királyság ■ Svájc ■ Hollandia ■ Szlovákia ■ Írország ■ Olaszország ■ Csehország ■ Svédország
■ Franciaország ■ Belgium ■ Dánia ■ Románia ■ Norvégia ■ Finnország ■ Luxemburg ■ Lengyelország ■ Portugália ■ Horvátország
■ Görögország ■ Szlovénia ■ Izland ■ Törökország ■ Észtország ■ Bulgária ■ Litvánia ■ Liechtenstein ■ Lettország




<https://g7.hu/kozelet/20210908/aki-akart-mar-kiment-cskanem-megallt-a-kulfoldon-elo-magyarok-szamanak-novekedese/>

Based on the figure, the most Hungarian citizens in European countries live in Germany (200,000), Austria (90,000) and the United Kingdom (100,000). About 500,000 Hungarians live in another European state.

Hungarian citizens living in European countries

■ Ausztria ■ Egyesült Királyság ■ Németország ■ Többi európai ország (becslés)



<https://g7.hu/kozelet/20210908/aki-akart-mar-kiment-cskanem-megallt-a-kulfoldon-elo-magyarok-szamanak-novekedese/>

The two charts present two categories: residents (Hungarian citizens) and workers (Hungarian citizens). The left chart shows the number of emigrants that increased overall between 2010 and 2020. In 2010, there were approximately 190,000; by 2020, this number had increased to approximately 520,000. The increase in the number of emigrants has been driven by a number of factors, including economic opportunities, family reunification, and the pursuit of education. On the right chart, another development can be observed. In 2010, there were approximately 95,000 Hungarian migrant workers in other countries, but by 2020, this number had increased to approximately 340,000, mainly from Austria, the United Kingdom, and Germany.⁷⁸

What is the **employment status of foreigners in Hungary**? It is a commonplace, well-known fact that migration in Hungary is modest in international comparison and does not seem significant compared to European countries. Although the stock of the migrant population in Hungary is larger, for example, immigrants from Poland and Slovakia are faced with new migration opportunities after the political changes, whether we look at the ratio of the population or the labour force.⁷⁹ However, it falls short of the size of Czech migration, and overall, the migration of all four new EU countries is among the lowest among European countries (even a decade earlier).⁸⁰

4.2. The perception of immigration in Hungary


For the perceptions of immigration in Hungary, we list the Hungarian graphs of the special Eurobarometer survey No. 469, "Integration of immigrants in the European Union", published by the European Commission on April 13, 2018. The survey provides very useful data, to which we also add a short explanation.

⁷⁸ Józsa, I., & Vinogradov, S. A. (2017). Main motivation factors of Hungarian labor-migration in the European Union. *Journal of Management*, 31(2), 47-52.

⁷⁹ Cantat, C. (2020). Governing migrants and refugees in Hungary: Politics of spectacle, negligence and solidarity in a securitising state. *Politics of (Dis) integration*, 183-199.

⁸⁰ Hárs Ágnes (2009): Nemzetközi migráció a számok és a statisztika tükrében. *Statisztikai Szemle*, 87. évfolyam 7-8. szám. 684.

Knowledge about migration



Source: European Commission (2018): Special Eurobarometer 469 - Integration of immigrants in the European Union (October 2017)


Knowledge of immigration and integration. In the EU28, 4 % of respondents said they were very well informed about immigration and integration, while 33 % said they were fairly well informed. However, 46 % said they were poorly informed, and 15 % were not. In Hungary, 4 % of respondents said they were very well informed about immigration and integration, while 29 % said they were fairly well informed. However, 48 % said they were poorly informed, and 18% said they were not. Overall, most of the EU28 and Hungary respondents said they were not very well informed about immigration and integration. This is concerning, as immigration and integration are important issues affecting all society members.⁸¹

Opinions on media coverage of immigration. In the EU28, 36 % of respondents said they thought media coverage of immigration was too negative, while 39 % said it was objective. However, 12 % said they thought media coverage of immigration was too positive, and 13 % said they did not know. In Hungary, 37 % of respondents said they thought media coverage of immigration was too negative, while 45 % said it was objective. However, 8% said they thought media coverage of immigration was too positive, and 10% said they did not know. Overall, most of the EU28 and Hungary re-

⁸¹ Boeskor, Á. (2018). Anti-immigration discourses in Hungary during the ‘Crisis’ year: The Orbán government’s ‘National Consultation’ campaign of 2015. *Sociology*, 52(3), 551-568.

spondents said they thought media coverage of immigration was too negative. This is concerning, as negative media coverage can lead to prejudice and discrimination.⁸²

Immigrants in the total population



Source: European Commission (2018): Special Eurobarometer 469 - Integration of immigrants in the European Union (October 2017)


The graphs show the percentage of immigrants in the total population and the percentage of immigrants who have family members and friends who are immigrants currently living in the country. In Hungary, on average, respondents estimated the proportion of immigrants to be 8.8 %, while the real figure in 2017, according to Eurostat, was 2.0 %. It means that people do not know the real facts. The graphs also demonstrate that nearly one-third (27 %) of the EU population have friends who are immigrants currently living in the country, while in Hungary, it is only 9 %. In fact, 86% of Hungarian citizens have no friends or family members who are immigrants; in the EU, this average is 59%. This suggests that immigrants in Hungary have weak social networks within the immigrant community.

The graphs also raise some interesting questions. For example, why do so many citizens in Hungary have no family members and friends who are immigrants? Is this because immigrants are more likely to move to a country where they have strong social ties? Or is it because immigrants are more

⁸² Barna, I., & Koltai, J. (2019). Attitude changes towards Immigrants in the turbulent years of the 'migrant crisis' and anti-immigrant campaign in Hungary. *Intersections. East European Journal of Society and Politics*, 5(1).

likely to stay in touch with family and friends who have already immigrated to another country? Another interesting question is how the social networks of immigrants in Hungary affect their integration into Hungarian society.

Immigration as a problem



Source: European Commission (2018): Special Eurobarometer 469 - Integration of immigrants in the European Union (October 2017)


Immigration is a problem. Immigration is seen as more of a problem than an opportunity: 63% of Hungarians believe that immigration is more of a problem than an opportunity for Hungary, while only 20% believe it is more of an opportunity.

Successful immigration. Integration is not seen as successful: 37% of Hungarians believe that the integration of immigrants in Hungary is successful, while only 53% believe it is not successful. In the EU, the majority think it is successful.

The results of the survey show that there is a correlative view of immigration in Hungary. On the one hand, a majority of Hungarians believe that immigration is more of a problem than an opportunity. This may be due to a number of factors, such as concerns about economic competition, cultural change, or security. On the other hand, a majority of Hungarians believe that the integration of immigrants in Hungary is not successful. This suggests that Hungary has not been able to integrate immigrants into its society relatively

well.⁸³ This survey's results suggest a need for more public education and dialogue about immigration in Hungary. This would help to raise awareness of the benefits and challenges of immigration, and it could help to build consensus on how to manage immigration in a way that is beneficial for both immigrants and native-born Hungarians.

Impact of immigrants on the society




Source: European Commission (2018): Special Eurobarometer 469 - Integration of immigrants in the European Union (October 2017)

The graph shows the impact of immigrants on the society. Nearly three-quarters of EU people (72%) believe that immigrants help fill jobs for which it is hard to find workers, and even a majority believe that immigrants enrich European cultural life (61%). More than half of them (56%) believe that immigrants are a burden on the EU welfare system. However, a similar proportion of people (55%) believe that immigrants worsen the crime problems. A plurality (49%) thinks that immigrants bring new ideas and/or boost innovation. However, nearly 40% answered that immigrants take jobs away from workers. The figures in Hungary are more dramatic; only 37% said that immigrants positively impact the labour shortage, while 50% agree that they take the job away. 74% think that they are a significant burden for social security expenditures. 65% answered that they jeopardize security by worsening the crime problems.

⁸³ Zubikova, A. (2021). Assessment of the Immigrants Integration Level in the New Member States of the EU in 2009–2018. *Journal of International Migration and Integration*, 22(2), 635-652.

Immigrant roles



Source: European Commission (2018): Special Eurobarometer 469 - Integration of immigrants in the European Union (October 2017)

Responsibility of immigration. The graphs show that a large majority (69%) of people in the EU28 and Hungary (53%) believe that integration is a two-way process where both immigrants and the society are responsible. However, there are some differences in opinion on who is mostly responsible for integration, with more people in Hungary (38%) than in the EU28 (20%) believing that the immigrants themselves are mostly responsible.

Investment in integration. They also agree that fostering integration is a necessary investment in the long run (69% and 41%). Fostering integration by the government is a necessary investment: 51% of people in the EU28 and 59% of people in Hungary agree that.⁸⁴

There are some key differences in opinion on immigration on immigration between the E. Hungarians are more likely to believe that immigrants themselves are mostly responsible for their own integration and less likely to believe that the society is mostly responsible. Hungarians are also less likely to believe that the government is doing enough to foster the integration of immigrants. The survey results suggest that there is a broad consensus among people in the EU28 and Hungary that integration is a two-way process and that fostering integration is a necessary investment.

⁸⁴ Džankić, J. (2018). Immigrant investor programmes in the European Union (EU). *Journal of Contemporary European Studies*, 26(1), 478-497.

III. Migration and the labour market

The inquiry takes a targeted focus on the interplay between migration and the intricate dynamics of the labour market. Titled "Migration and the Labour Market," this segment illuminates the profound impacts of human movement on employment-related facets within both the European Union (EU) and the specific context of Hungary.

The European Union, as a conglomerate of diverse economies, presents a complex tapestry of labour market interactions influenced by migration. Within this framework, we scrutinize the roles of self-employment, employment patterns, and the challenges posed by unemployment. Our examination transcends borders, seeking to understand how the influx and mobility of individuals shape the employment landscape on a continental scale.

Simultaneously, our exploration zeroes in on Hungary, where the dynamics of guest work play a pivotal role in shaping the labour market. We delve into the specifics of guest work within Hungary, examining the intricate balance between the demands of the labour market and the contributions of foreign workers. Furthermore, we explore the experiences of Hungarian workers who venture beyond their national borders, contributing to the European labour market.

By dissecting the multifaceted aspects of migration within the labour market, we aim to uncover the transformative forces at play. How does the self-employed sector adapt to diverse skill sets entering the EU? What patterns emerge in employment trends as a result of migration, and how do nations address the challenges of unemployment within this context? In Hungary, how does the engagement of guest workers impact the national workforce, and how do Hungarian workers navigate employment opportunities in Europe?


One of the most pressing issues today is the situation of guest workers. It is a problem in Europe and other parts of the world, both for the country of origin and destination. Although the historical roots, traditions and customs are essentially the same everywhere, they differ significantly from country to country since the common goal is that all the states concerned want to regulate the process, but the differences in scale, form and strictness are considerable. There are those who support, some who hinder, and some who are indifferent to the process.

It is also common that the problem is getting bigger and bigger, and due to population growth in the developing world and the widening of differences in the development of the economy, more and more people want to go to more prosperous countries. Migration and terrorism - the most frequently raised political issue in the more civilised half of the world, with more and more problems with no solutions for the time being.

The study primarily aims to examine how the process developed in Europe, what the current situation is like, what the expected future is, and especially what the individual countries of the old continent and the European Union can do regarding the management of the situation and the regulation.

As the previous ones have shown, the issue of guest workers in the 21st century is not the same as that of the previous century. Where are we now? The following diagram provides a comprehensive picture of the world.

Distribution of migrant workers by region (2019)



Source: <https://migrationdataportal.org/themes/labour-migration>

As of 2019, the global labour force comprised 169 million international migrant workers, constituting 4.9% of the destination countries' workforce. Economic inequalities and the pursuit of employment are primary motivations for crossing borders. Over two-thirds of migrant workers were in high-income countries, with 60.6% concentrated in Northern and Western Europe, Northern America, and the Arab States. Of the 169 million migrant workers, approximately 41.5% were female. Regional variations exist, with over 50% of migrant workers being women in Northern, Southern, and Western Europe, contrasting with less than 20% in the Arab States. Prime-age adults (25–64 years) constituted 86.5% of migrant workers, while those aged 15–24 and 65 and over-represented 10% and 3.6%, respectively. The services sector employed the majority of migrant workers (66.2%), particularly women (80% of female migrant workers). The demand for labour in the care economy, including health and domestic work, contributes to women's significant presence in the services sector.

In our opinion, the ILO's estimate of 169 million people is very low due to the use of methodological concepts on the one hand, and the possibility of undeclared, undeclared work must also be taken into account. It has certainly happened several times, especially in Asia, but there is no statistical data on this - just because of the nature of the matter.


Type of migrant	Is a foreign migrant worker?	Is an international migrant?
Citizen of the country of residence who is working and was born in another country	No , as did not move in search of work	Yes , as the country of birth is different from the country of residence
Person born in, and working in the country in question, but who does not have citizenship	Yes	No
Citizen returning to work in the country in question after working abroad	No , as holding the citizenship of the country of origin	Yes , due to change in country of residence
Border workers (who reside in one country but work in another)	Yes	No
Consular official	Yes	No
Military personnel	Yes	No

The fault of all statistics is that, in the case of guest workers, **it only takes into account the latest and last generation.** The picture changes significantly if we look at the labour force born abroad. In the USA in 2019, this represented a ratio of 17.4 %, in Germany 15%, and in Austria 18%. The same figure is 24.3% in Switzerland and 45.3% in Luxembourg. The EU average is 6.7 %.

The picture is colourful. There are places where there are almost no guest workers, and there are many. Of course, the immigration policies of previous and current decades, the traditions, customs, the tendency to accept the residents of each country, etc., had an impact. All of this has created a situation where almost no two countries in the world have the same attitude towards guest workers.

This also includes the fact that the migrant is now clearly considered a potential guest worker. According to the previously mentioned classification, this includes not only the person actually taking up work but also the job seeker, the unemployed, and even those living on social assistance. Essentially, nowadays, it is possible to equate migrants and guest workers almost everywhere.

Distribution of international migrant workers by broad subregion, 2019



Source: ILO (2021): Global Estimates on International Migrant Workers – Results and Methodology

The figures show a detailed distribution of migrant workers by 11 geographic subregions. The majority of migrant workers are found in three subregions: Northern, Southern and Western Europe (24.2 %); Northern America (22.1 %); and the Arab States (14.3 %). Collectively, these three regions host 59.3 % of the total international migrants of working age and 60.6 % of migrant workers. Based on the ILO groupings of countries and territories. In Northern, Southern and Western Europe, migrants make up 18.4 % of the labour force. In Northern America, their share increases to 20.0 %. The highest share is observed in the Arab States at 41.4 %. The Arab States host a smaller proportion of international migrant workers (14.3 %) as compared to the other two regions. The higher presence of migrants in this region stems from a relatively small population size (1.7 % of all workers worldwide) and the substantially higher labour force participation of migrants as compared to non-migrants.

Migrant workers are prevalent in essential sectors

Share of migrants in total employment (%)
By sector, 2018

	Canada	EU-28	United States
Domestic work	60	52	46
Hospitality	31	25	24
Warehousing & storage	31	19	23
Health	27	11	17
Security and cleaning services	30	21	30

Source: OECD: International Migration Outlook 2020

Migrants are overrepresented in essential sectors. Governments should recognize the contributions of migrant workers and ensure that they have access to the resources and support they need to thrive. In all two countries and the region, the percentage of immigrants in essential sectors is higher than the percentage of immigrants in total employment. For example, in Canada, immigrants account for 60% of employment in domestic work, 31% in hospitality, and 27% in health care. This may be due as Canada's more liberal immigration policies and its ageing population.

Pre-COVID-19 progress in the employment of migrant women




Source: OECD: International Migration Outlook 2020

Overall, the chart shows that there was significant progress in the employment of women in all of the countries listed between 2014 and 2019. The percentage point change in women's employment rates ranged from +0.5 percentage points in the EU 28 to +1.5 percentage points in Canada. The United States showed the smallest difference in the employment of native-born and foreign-born women (less than 0.5). This suggests that foreign-born women in the United States are progressing in the workforce but still face significant challenges. The EU 28 saw a +1.5 percentage point increase, an average increase, but it is still positive progress.⁸⁵ Canada has the largest increase in women's employment rates, at +1.5 percentage points. This is a very strong increase, and it suggests that Canada is doing a good job of supporting women in the workforce.

⁸⁵ Ballarino, G., & Panichella, N. (2018). The occupational integration of migrant women in Western European labour markets. *Acta Sociologica*, 61(2), 126-142.

Migrant employment has bounced back



Source: OECD: International Migration Outlook 2021


Migrant employment had bounced back in all of the countries listed in the second or fourth quarter of 2020 when the COVID-19 pandemic caused a sharp decline.⁸⁶ Switzerland has the highest employment rate of foreign-born immigrants, at 78 % in Q4 2020. This is followed by the United Kingdom (74 %), Australia (73 %), Canada (72 %), the United States (68 %), Colombia (67 %), France (60 %), and Spain (58 %). All the countries have a lower migrant employment level than 2019, but there is a recovery for the two quarters. The most significant growth can be found in Colombia. In Switzerland, the United Kingdom, Sweden and France, the migrant employment level showed stability.⁸⁷ One possibility is that the economic recovery has been stronger in some countries than others. For example, the United States and Canada have both experienced strong economic growth in the past year.

⁸⁶ Borjas, G. J., & Cassidy, H. (2020). The adverse effect of the COVID-19 labor market shock on immigrant employment (No. w27243). National Bureau of Economic Research.

⁸⁷ Guadagno, L. (2020). Migrants and the COVID-19 pandemic: An initial analysis. Anderson, B., Poeschel, F., & Ruhs, M. (2020). Covid-19 and systemic resilience: rethinking the impacts of migrant workers and labour migration policies. Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies Research Paper No. RSCAS, 57.

This may have led to more job opportunities for foreign-born immigrants in these countries. Another possibility is that the types of jobs that foreign-born immigrants are employed in have been more or less resilient to the pandemic. For example, foreign-born immigrants are more likely to be employed in essential industries like healthcare and agriculture. The pandemic has affected these industries less than other industries, such as tourism and hospitality. Finally, the countries' government policies listed in the chart may have played a role in the different rates of recovery in migrant employment. For example, the United States government has implemented several policies to support the economic recovery, such as providing stimulus payments to individuals and businesses. These policies may have helped to create jobs for foreign-born immigrants in the United States.

Summary of the migrant pay gap based on different estimation approaches




Source: ILO (2020): The migrant pay gap: Understanding wage differences between migrants and nationals

The ILO report, based on mean wages, calculates that migrant workers receive approximately 12.6% and 8.6% lower hourly earnings compared to non-migrant workers in the examined sample of 33 High-Income Countries (HICs) and across the European Union Member States, respectively. Conversely, in the sample of 16 Low- and Middle-Income Countries (LMICs),

migrant workers tend to earn approximately 17.3% more per hour than their non-migrant counterparts. However, significant variations exist among countries. One possible explanation for migrant workers earning more on average than non-migrant workers in certain LMICs is the likelihood of a relatively high proportion of temporary high-skilled "expatriate" workers within the overall migrant population in those countries, among other factors.

The 20 widest migrant pay gaps, latest years



Source: ILO (2020): The migrant pay gap: Understanding wage differences between migrants and nationals

The latest research by the International Labour Organization (ILO) reveals significant disparities in earnings between migrant and non-migrant workers across various countries. Cyprus tops the list, where both male and female migrant workers earn up to 42.1% less than their non-migrant counterparts. This marks a notable increase of 7.3 percentage points from the gap estimated in 2010, as reported in the ILO Global Wage Report 2014/15. Slovenia and Costa Rica follow closely, exhibiting the second and third widest pay gaps for migrants, at 33.3% and 30.1%, respectively. Italy and Jordan claim the fourth and fifth positions in this ranking.

While the migrant pay gap has diminished in six countries, including Argentina, Denmark, Estonia, Greece, Iceland, and Spain, it has expanded in the remaining countries with available historical data. Interestingly, variations arise when comparing monthly earnings rather than hourly wages. The

report introduces four different combinations – mean hourly, median hourly, mean monthly, and median monthly – to assess the migrant pay gap. It is observed that the pay gap based on hourly wages is generally smaller than the gap in monthly earnings, reflecting disparities in working time. Nevertheless, the magnitude of this gap varies among countries and income groups.

The disparities persist when considering education, age, and gender as factors to account for composition effects in estimating the migrant pay gap, resulting in what is termed the factor-weighted migrant pay gap.⁸⁸ In comparison to the standard approach, this factor-weighted approach yields a mean hourly migrant pay gap of approximately 9.5% (in favour of nationals) in High-Income Countries (HICs) and 7.8% (in favour of nationals) in the European Union (EU). Conversely, in Low- and Middle-Income Countries (LMICs), migrant workers tend to earn around 23.8% more than their national counterparts using the factor-weighted approach. By considering composition effects in estimating the pay gap, the factor-weighted approach leads to a narrower pay gap in HICs and the EU and a wider gap in LMICs. This discrepancy arises from the existence of clusters of few workers, particularly migrant workers, at certain locations in the wage distribution.


⁸⁸ The factor-weighted migrant pay gap reduces composition effects caused by the existence of clusters in the wage or earnings distribution of wage workers. In essence, migrant and non-migrant wage workers are somewhat grouped into homogeneous subgroups based on education, age and gender, and then the migrant pay gap is estimated for each of the subgroups. A weighted sum of all the subgroups' specific migrant pay gaps is estimated to obtain the factor-weighted migrant pay gap, with the weights reflecting the size of each subgroup in the population.

5. European Union

As the European Union continues to navigate the complexities of a shared economic space and diverse member states, the intricate interplay between migration and the labour market stands at the forefront of regional dynamics. We embark on a focused exploration of how human mobility influences the employment landscape within this supranational entity. Conversely, the impact of migration on unemployment becomes a crucial facet of our exploration. We delve into the complex relationship between migration and unemployment rates within the EU, examining how the influx of individuals seeking employment opportunities either alleviates or exacerbates unemployment challenges in different member states.

Beyond statistical analyses, our exploration seeks to uncover the human stories, societal impacts, and policy considerations that underpin the relationship between migration and the various facets of the labour market. Through this lens, we aspire to contribute to a more nuanced comprehension of the ongoing dialogue surrounding migration and employment within the ever-evolving context of the European Union.

All valid residence permits by legal title




Source: Eurostat (2020): Migration Europe. https://ec.europa.eu/info/strategy/priorities-2019-2024/promoting-our-european-way-of-life/statistics-migration-europe_hu

According to data from the European Commission, family reunification was the primary reason for legal settlement in the EU at the end of 2019. However, it is a fact that **3 million residence permits in the Union were issued for the purpose of employment**. In 2020, 8.7 million non-EU citizens worked in the EU. This accounted for 4.6% of the working age group between 20 and 64, numbering 188.9 million people.

The figure clearly shows on the map the routes from which the migrants come and the main destination countries to which they go. The thickness presents the size well.


The most important European migrations from "guest worker" migration to the present day, differentiated according to regions of origin and destination



Source: Paul Gans und Andreas Pott: Migration und Migrationspolitik in Europa. 13/2018

Country level – Work colleague

QA6.2 Would you personally feel comfortable or uncomfortable having an immigrant as your...




Source: Eurobarometer (2018): Integration of immigrants in the European Union. Special Edition 469.

In Sweden (95%) and the Netherlands (93%), the majority of respondents express comfort, with 84% and 79%, respectively, indicating that they would feel completely at ease. On the contrary, in Bulgaria (43%) and Hungary (32%), fewer than half of the respondents would feel comfortable having an immigrant as a work colleague, and only around 13% and 10%, respectively, would feel entirely comfortable. Bulgaria (38%) and Hungary (55%) stand out for having notably high proportions of respondents who would feel uncomfortable working with an immigrant. In contrast, in all other countries, no more than 30% would feel uncomfortable; in 10 of the 28 Member States, this figure is less than 10% of those surveyed.

Country level – Manager

QA6.1 Would you personally feel comfortable or uncomfortable having an immigrant as your...



Source: Eurobarometer (2018): Integration of immigrants in the European Union. Special Edition 469.

In nearly all countries, a majority of respondents express some level of comfort with the idea of having an immigrant as their manager. The exceptions to this trend are Bulgaria and Hungary, where only 25% of respondents share this sentiment, and the Czech Republic, where nearly half (46%) provide a similar response. Significant disparities exist in the proportions of respondents who would feel entirely comfortable with this scenario. More than three-quarters (76%) in Sweden would feel no discomfort with an immigrant as their manager. However, in 20 out of the 28 Member States, less than half of those surveyed share this perspective. The range extends from nearly half of respondents in France (48%) and Slovenia (48%) to less than one in ten (7%) in Hungary.

Bulgaria (55%) and Hungary (62%) stand out for the notably high proportion of respondents who would feel uncomfortable with an immigrant as their manager. In all other countries, less than half of those polled express discomfort, though the figures vary from nearly half of respondents in Greece (47%) and the Czech Republic (49%) to less than one in ten in Sweden (6%), the United Kingdom (6%), Ireland (6%), the Netherlands (7%), and Spain (7%).


There is a similar distribution of responses at the country level regarding comfort with having an immigrant as a work colleague or as a manager. It is noteworthy, however, that slightly lower proportions of respondents feel

entirely comfortable with having an immigrant as a manager. In Sweden, where the proportions are highest in both cases, just over three-quarters (76%) express total comfort with having an immigrant as a manager, compared to over eight in ten (84%) who feel entirely comfortable with having an immigrant as a work colleague. In Hungary, less than one in ten (7%) feel totally comfortable with having an immigrant as a manager, while one in ten (10%) feel entirely comfortable with having an immigrant as a work colleague.

Migrants fill jobs

QA9.4 There are different views regarding the impact of immigrants on society in (OUR COUNTRY). To what extent do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements? Overall, immigrants...

Help to fill jobs for which it's hard to find workers in (OUR COUNTRY) (%)




Source: Eurobarometer (2018): Integration of immigrants in the European Union. Special Edition 469.

In nearly all Member States, most survey participants agreed that immigrants assist in filling jobs that are challenging to fill with local workers. The most notable exceptions to this trend are observed in Bulgaria (28%) and Hungary (37%), with Romania also having less than half of respondents (47%) providing a similar response. The extent of agreement varies significantly among countries, ranging from just over half of respondents in Slovakia (51%) and Croatia (53%) to an overwhelming majority of over nine in ten (91%) respondents in Sweden.

Country – take jobs away from workers

QA9.3 There are different views regarding the impact of immigrants on society in (OUR COUNTRY). To what extent do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements? Overall, immigrants...



Source: Eurobarometer (2018): Integration of immigrants in the European Union. Special Edition 469.

Responses to the question of whether immigrants displace jobs from workers in the respondents' countries exhibit a wide range. Fewer than a fifth of those surveyed in Sweden (12%), the Netherlands (15%), Luxembourg (16%), or Finland (16%) share this perspective. In 19 out of the 28 Member States, less than half of the respondents hold such a view. However, in Greece, nearly three-quarters (73%) of those surveyed agree that immigrants are responsible for taking jobs away from workers in their country, as do more than six in ten respondents in Cyprus (65%) and Malta (63%).

The employment rate among the working-age population was higher for EU citizens in 2020 (73.3%) than for third-country nationals (57.4%). What else is worth considering: Many non-EU citizens who work in the EU are so-called "key employees". In 2020, non-EU citizens were overrepresented in some **economic sectors**:

Sector	Joint employment (non-EU citizens)	Joint employment (EU citizens)
Accommodation service and hospitality	11.4%	3.8%
Administrative and service support activities	7.1%	3.7%

Housework	6.5%	0.7%
Building industry	8.6%	6.4%

Source: Eurostat (2020): Migration Europe. https://ec.europa.eu/info/strategy/priorities-2019-2024/promoting-our-european-way-life/statistics-migration-europe_hu

In terms of occupation, non-EU citizens were overrepresented in the following **professions**:

Sector	Joint employment (non-EU citizens)	Joint employment (EU citizens)
Cleaners and helpers	11.9%	3.1%
Occupations providing personal services	9%	4.2%
Personal care sessions	5.1%	2.9%
Construction workers	5.8%	3.6%
Mining, construction, industrial and transport occupations that do not require qualifications	5.6%	2.4%
Hospitality occupations that do not require qualifications	2.7%	0.5%
Agricultural and fishing workers	2.6%	0.6%

Source: Eurostat (2020): Migration Europe. https://ec.europa.eu/info/strategy/priorities-2019-2024/promoting-our-european-way-life/statistics-migration-europe_hu


Non-EU citizens were **underrepresented in other economic sectors**: administration, defence, compulsory social insurance (1.2%), education (3.7%), human health, social care (7.6%), financial and insurance activities (1.1 %). Third-country nationals were underrepresented in the following **professions**: education professionals (2.5 %), business and administrative occupations (2.5 %), general office occupations, typists and data recorders (1.4 %), natural science and technical occupations (2 %), business and administrative occupations (2.1 %), skilled agricultural occupations producing for the market (1.3 %).

Those who live on the borders of the developed world enjoy an advantage: if it is easy to get to the neighbouring country, they can commute even daily and take advantage of the benefits of higher wages for the same work. This does not make the entrepreneur a true migrant, although in many cases, the only difference between him and his partner is that he goes home

to sleep in the evenings or on weekends. In Europe, this became especially common in the western border of the former socialist countries and is still significant today.

In 2020, the activity rate of people of working age born elsewhere in the EU was 80.0%, compared to 78.3% of the national population and 71.9% of people born outside the EU. On an aggregate level, activity rates were generally higher for the national population than for those born abroad. This pattern was observed in 17 EU member states. The largest differences between the activity rates of the native and foreign-born populations were registered in Romania (where the national population's activity rate was 18.3 percentage points higher than that of the foreign-born population), the Netherlands (12.8 percentage points) and Bulgaria (11.1 % percentage point). There were ten Member States, nine of them located in the southern or eastern part of the EU, where the activity rate of the working-age population was higher among persons born abroad than among the native population; this difference was highest in Luxembourg (where the proportion of the foreign-born population exceeded the native population by 7.3 percentage points), followed by Poland (a difference of 7.1 percentage points) and Malta (6.6 percentage points).

The difference in the activity rate of the national and migrant population aged 20-64 by country, 2020 (%)



Source: Eurostat (2020): Migrant integration statistics - Labour market indicators, https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=Migrant_integration_statistics_%E2%80%93_labour_market_indicators

It is necessary to mention here that around the turn of the millennium, Eastern and Southern Europe also contributed significantly to the invasion of guest workers. Until their accession to the EU, these countries were considered external, so their job-seeking compatriots who left for the European Union did not belong to the category of internal movement, i.e., the free flow of labour, but were guest workers. According to the estimate of the IMF, the International Monetary Fund, more than 25 million (!) people left the region, most of them young and qualified (graduates or skilled workers). Since then, the "sending" countries have been struggling with a shortage of professionals, and this is expected to remain permanent. This is a large outflow; more than 20% of the population of Bulgaria, Croatia and Romania went abroad, and the same ratio for Albania is over 40%. Put differently, but it is true: this is the exodus of the 21st century.

Migrant recruitment costs in the EU and in the GCC

Earnings and recruitment costs in European and Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries compared:

1. Earnings are less variable than costs.




GCC countries
In the GCC, the range in earnings was two to one, while the range in recruitment costs was 10 to one.

Earnings Recruitment costs

2:1 10:1

2. The major variable affecting worker-paid migration costs is corridor.



3. Despite recruitment costs, migration is economically worthwhile for most migrants.

Migrants normally repay migration costs and begin to save after one to nine months abroad.



What are migrant recruitment or migration costs?

Migrant recruitment or migration costs are worker-paid fees and expenses to obtain jobs in other countries.

Source: Own elaborations based on Martin, 2017. © IOM's GMDAC 2017 www.migrationdataportal.org

Source: Migration Data Portal (2019): Migrant recruitment costs in the EU (<https://www.migrationdataportal.org/blog/migrant-recruitment-costs-eu>)

Recruitment or migration costs refer to fees and expenses borne by workers seeking employment in foreign countries. Numerous migrant workers invest a significant portion of their foreign earnings, spanning several months, to secure jobs. This has sparked initiatives aimed at assessing and minimizing the migration costs borne by workers. Notably, legal workers relocating within or to European Union countries incur notably lower costs compared to irregular workers, some of whom seek asylum upon entering the EU and subsequently engage in legal employment. Surveys indicate that migrants heading to the EU typically expend one to four months' worth of earnings for job acquisition, a range considerably lower than the costs incurred by many migrant workers securing positions in Gulf oil-exporting nations.

The comparison between recruitment costs in the European Union and Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries, where migrant workers constitute over half of private sector workers, reveals distinct patterns. Low-skilled migrants returning from GCC countries in 2015 reported earnings ranging from USD 265 to USD 500 per month, with recruitment costs varying significantly – USD 400 for Filipinos to USD 4,000 for Pakistanis. Guest workers in the GCC typically stayed for an average of two years, and Filipinos and Indians repaid their migration costs more swiftly than Pakistanis. In the EU, low-skilled workers earned USD 850 to USD 1,000 per month, with recruitment costs ranging from a few hundred dollars to USD 4,500, representing a variability ratio of up to 20 to one. In the GCC, earnings had a range of two to one, while recruitment costs exhibited a much wider range of 10 to one. The corridor influenced Migration costs significantly—little difference in costs among Nigerians in Italy or Pakistanis in Saudi Arabia, but substantial variations between different nationalities in Europe or Saudi Arabia. Despite paying one or more months of foreign earnings to secure jobs, migration proved economically worthwhile for most migrants. Migrants typically repaid their migration costs and began saving within one to nine months abroad, providing them with more income than if they had remained unemployed or in a low-paying job at home.

Within the European Union, migrant employment has three categories: self-employment, employment or unemployment.⁸⁹


⁸⁹ Anderson, B., Poeschel, F., & Ruhs, M. (2020). COVID-19 and systemic resilience: What role for migrant workers. Ginebra: Organización Internacional de las Migraciones.

5.1. Self-employment

The self-employment phenomenon within the EU takes centre stage as we investigate how migrant populations contribute to this sector. The entrepreneurial spirit of migrants, combined with the opportunities and challenges unique to the EU, shapes a dynamic landscape of self-employment. Our exploration seeks to uncover the motivations, success stories, and challenges faced by self-employed migrants, providing insight into the evolving nature of entrepreneurship within the EU.

The proportion of **individual or self-employed persons** in the EU for persons of working age who were born outside the EU was slightly lower in 2020 than in 2010: 11.7% in 2020, down 0.5 percentage points from the share recorded in 2010. However, this ratio increased by 1.4% between 2011 and 2015 before falling rapidly in 2017 (1.7%), thus reversing all the increases of previous years. The proportion of self-employed workers was also lower in 2020 than in 2010 in both other populations, with a decrease for people born in the EU (in other words, those born outside the Member State where it is) by 1.8%, while the native population there was a 1.5% decrease.


Development of the share of the self-employed in total employment among the population aged 20-64, EU, 2010-2020 (%)



Source: Eurostat (2020): Migrant integration statistics - Labour market indicators, https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=Migrant_integration_statistics_%E2%80%93_labour_market_indicators

In absolute terms, 25.8 million working-age people were self-employed in the EU in 2020. Among them, 23.0 million were native-born, while 2.8 million were born abroad (a larger proportion from outside the EU). Among the EU member states, Italy had the most self-employed persons (4.5 million of working age), 17.4% of all self-employed persons in the EU, followed by Germany (3.2 million), France (3.1 million), Spain (2.9 million) and Poland (2.9 million). For persons born in different EU member states, the highest self-employment rate in 2020 was in Malta (22.6%), followed by Slovakia (20.3%), the Netherlands (17.3%), Greece (17.0%), Spain (16.6%) and Belgium (16.0%). At the other end of the scale, the lowest self-employed share of people born in different EU member states was registered in Germany (8.2%), followed by Sweden (8.1%), Luxembourg (8.0%), Ireland and Cyprus (both 7.7%).

Share of self-employed persons in total employment in the population aged 20-64, by country of birth, 2020 (%)



Source: Eurostat (2020): Migrant integration statistics – Employment conditions
https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=Migrant_integration_statistics_-_employment_conditions

In absolute terms, around 26.1 million people of working age were self-employed in the EU-27 in 2019. About 23.2 million are native-born, while 2.9 million are foreign-born (a larger proportion comes from outside the EU). Among the EU member states, Italy had the largest self-employed population (4.6 million of working age), accounting for 17.7% of all self-employed in the EU-27, followed by Germany (3.5 million), France (3.0 million), Spain (2.9 million) and Poland (2.8 million). The share of the national-born, working-age population was 13.9%, while that of foreign-born was lower, 11.8% for persons born outside the EU and 11.5% for those born in another EU member state. Among the EU member states, the proportion of people born outside the EU is by far the highest in the Czech Republic (33.2%), the next highest in Malta (18.7%), Hungary (17.4%), the Netherlands (16.7%), in Portugal (16.6%) and Poland (16.2%). In contrast, the lowest shares were registered in Sweden (8.7%), Germany (8.6%), Austria (7.2%) and Luxembourg (6.4%).


The Czech Republic reported the largest difference in the analysis of the self-employed share of persons born outside the EU and the native-born population, the share of the latter being 17.7 percentage points lower; the next largest difference in this direction was 7.3 % in Hungary and 5.1 % in Malta. In the opposite situation, the biggest difference was observed in Greece, where the registered self-employment rate for the native-born population was 17.5 % higher than for persons born outside the EU; this was again much larger than the next largest gap, 7.5 % in Italy.

A similar comparison of the self-employed shares of the native-born population and persons born in other EU Member States shows that seven Member States had a higher share of the native-born population. Among these, the largest differences were observed in Greece (10.9 percentage point difference) and Italy (10.0 %), while relatively large differences were also observed in Ireland (7.5 %) and Cyprus (5.7 %). In contrast, the native-born population achieved a lower self-employment rate in 12 Member States, the difference exceeding 3.0 % in Croatia (3.7 %), Malta (8.0 %) and Slovakia (8.9 %).

5.2. Employment

Within the broader canvas of the labour market, our analysis extends to the patterns and trends in employment influenced by migration. As individuals move across borders in pursuit of job opportunities, we examine how their integration into the labour market contributes to the economic fabric of the EU. By scrutinizing the sectors, skills, and employment structures impacted by migration, we aim to provide a comprehensive understanding of how the movement of individuals shapes the EU's diverse workforce.

Employment rate of the population aged 20-64, by gender, education level and country of birth, EU, 2020



Source: Eurostat (2020): Migrant integration statistics - Labour market indicators, https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=Migrant_integration_statistics_%E2%80%93_labour_market_indicators

In 2020, the EU's employment rate for the national working-age population was 73.5%, which is 8.3 percentage points higher than for the population born abroad. A closer analysis of the latter figure shows that the employment rate of persons of working age born in another EU member state was also 73.5% (the same as the average of the national population), while in the case of persons born outside the EU, it was significantly lower, 61.9% was

(about 11.6 points below the average of the other two populations). The employment rate is highest among those with tertiary education and lowest among those with at least a lower secondary education: this pattern was observed by the EU for the national population, those born outside the EU, and those born elsewhere.


In the EU, the unemployment rate of the national population was consistently lower than the unemployment rate of the migrant workforce in the period between 2010 and 2020; the difference between the national population and the proportion of persons born outside the EU was particularly large. After the global financial and economic crisis, the differences between the unemployment rate of the native-born and the foreign-born population increased.

In 2019, the employment rate in the EU-27 was the highest among those with a tertiary education and the lowest among those with a lower secondary education: this sample includes the native-born as well as those born outside the EU and elsewhere in the EU residents, and this applied equally to both male and female subgroups. Despite this apparent uniformity, several differences can be observed. While the employment rate of men and women born elsewhere in the EU was highest among men and women without tertiary education, the highest employment rate among men and women with tertiary education was registered for the native-born subgroup. In contrast, the employment rate of non-EU-born persons was lowest among men with tertiary education or men with upper secondary or secondary education without tertiary education, while the employment rate was slightly lower for native-born women. No more than a lower secondary education; among women, those born outside the EU consistently registered the lowest employment rate (regardless of education). According to the Eurobarometer, 5% of the foreign-born labour force in Hungary is Hungarian, but the greater part of this is Hungarians from neighbouring countries, which means that roughly 2% actually come from outside. There are countries where this phenomenon is also almost unknown, e.g., Europe, Romania and Bulgaria, with rates below 2%. The reason in all countries is the very low wages and the social network, which is far behind that of Western Europe.

The share of **temporary workers** among employees born in another EU country was significantly lower in 2020 than in 2010. In 2020, 11.8% of temporary workers in the EU were native workers. This was the lowest share between 2010 and 2020. The corresponding share of foreign-born workers was higher, as 13.8% of workers born in another EU Member State were in

temporary employment, compared to 20.3% of workers born outside the EU. Compared to 2010, in 2020, the share was 1.6 percentage points lower for national workers, 2.2 points lower for workers born outside the EU and 4.1 points lower for workers born in another EU Member State.

The proportion of temporary employees in the total number of employees of the population aged 20-64, by country of birth and gender, 2020 (%)



Source: Eurostat (2020): Migrant integration statistics - Labour market indicators, https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=Migrant_integration_statistics_%E2%80%93_labour_market_indicators

In 2020, the share of temporary workers in the total EU workforce was higher among women than among men for all populations: native-born, non-EU-born and non-EU-born workers. The biggest difference was in the case of native workers.

Between 2010 and 2020, the proportion of the EU workforce aged 20-64 working **part-time** increased faster among the foreign-born than among

the native-born subpopulation. The share of part-time employment in total employment has been steadily increasing in the EU over the last ten years. This pattern was most evident among the foreign-born population, with the fastest growth rate observed among persons born outside the EU. Figure 8 shows that almost a quarter (24.2%) of the EU workforce born outside the EU worked part-time in 2020, while the proportion of people born in another EU Member State was 22.1%, while the native workforce was lower at 16.9%. The comparison between 2019 and 2020 shows that the decline that started a few years earlier continued in 2020 in the case of persons of foreign origin working part-time (both in another EU member state and in the case of persons born outside the EU). On the other hand, a more stable development can be seen in the proportion of part-time employment among the native workforce, continuing the trend of recent years. Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Austria, Ireland, Slovenia, Hungary and Belgium have a higher proportion of part-time employment among the national workforce; the difference was the largest in Luxembourg (7.0 percentage points) and the Netherlands (4.6 points). However, the rate of part-time employment among the foreign-born workforce was 7.6 points higher than in Italy and 6.9 points higher in Greece than for the native-born workforce; the next largest differences between these two populations were observed in Spain (5.7 points) and Finland (5.3 points).

The proportion of part-time employment in total employment in the population aged 20-64, by country of birth and gender

	National born	Foreign	from which	
			EU	Not EU
EU	16.9	23.5	22.1	24.2
Belgium	23.9	23.5	22.1	24.7
Bulgaria	1.8	:	:	:
Czechia	5.6	6.1	7.6	4.5
Denmark	20.0	21.7	18.7	23.1
Germany	28.1 p	28.8 p	26.3 p	30.4 p
Estonia	11.6	13.6	16.7	13.3
Ireland	17.1	16.2	14.1	17.8
Greece	8.0	14.9	15.1	14.8
Spain	12.6	18.3	16.6	18.9
France	16.5	19.9	17.8	20.6
Croatia	4.5	4.8	4.7	4.8

Italy	17.1	24.7	22.8	25.5
Cyprus	9.7	10.2	7.4	12.0
Latvia	8.5	11.2	:	10.6
Lithuania	6.0	7.1	:	7.4
Luxembourg	21.9	14.9	14.5	16.1
Hungary	4.8	4.4	3.7	:
Malta	10.3	11.6	15.2	9.9
Netherlands	48.2	43.6	42.7	43.9
Austria	27.9	26.7	28.2	25.3
Poland	5.7	9.0	:	9.2
Portuguese	7.0	9.2	6.2	10.2
Romania	5,6	:	:	:
Slovenia	8.1	7.3	4.0	8.1
Slovakia	4.5	:	:	:
Finland	13.0	18.3	14.2	20.6
Sweden	20.6	22.4	20.3	23.1
Iceland	20.9	18.0	17.2	19.1
Norway	22.5	26.5	20.3	31.4
Switzerland	43.2	31.8	30.5	33.8



Source: Eurostat (2020): Migrant integration statistics - Labour market indicators, https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=Migrant_integration_statistics_%E2%80%93_labour_market_indicators

5.3. Unemployment

Migrant workers can have complex and varied interactions with unemployment, both influencing and being influenced by employment dynamics in the countries they migrate to. Migrant workers may face higher vulnerability to job loss during economic downturns or crises, as they might be the first to be let go due to factors such as temporary contracts, lower job security, and discrimination. Some migrant workers may be subjected to exploitation and unfair labour practices, including lower wages, longer working hours, and poor working conditions, contributing to their economic insecurity. Migrant workers may sometimes be perceived as competitors by the local workforce, especially during periods of high unemployment. This can lead to tensions and concerns about job scarcity. In certain circumstances, the influx of migrant workers willing to accept lower wages may contribute to wage suppression, affecting both local and migrant workers. Some econ-

omies may become overly dependent on migrant labour, making them susceptible to economic downturns in specific sectors, which could lead to job losses for both local and migrant workers.


Evolution of the unemployment rate of the population aged 20-64, EU



Source: Eurostat (2020): Migrant integration statistics - Labour market indicators, https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=Migrant_integration_statistics_%E2%80%93_labour_market_indicators

The analysis of the individual EU member states, confirms that the **unemployment** rate was generally lower among the national population than among the foreign-born population. Croatia was the only exception among the 27 Member States (for which 2020 data are available), where the unemployment rate was higher for the national population than for the foreign-born population (a difference of 1.4 percentage points). At the other end of the spectrum, the unemployment rate for foreign-born persons was 13.7 percentage points higher (than the national population rate) in Sweden and 12.2 percentage points higher in Greece.

The difference in the unemployment rate among the national and foreign-born population aged 20-64, 2020 (percentage point)




Source: Eurostat (2020): Migrant integration statistics - Labour market indicators, https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=Migrant_integration_statistics_%E2%80%93_labour_market_indicators

The share of **long-term unemployed** among the total unemployed - also known as the long-term unemployment rate - in the EU (residents of all countries of birth combined) increased from 42.0% in 2010 to 52.1% in 2014. This was followed by six consecutive reductions, and in 2016, the ratio was again reduced by less than half (49.9%), and by 2020, it was reduced to 37.0%. The proportion of long-term unemployment in the EU was relatively flat in total unemployment in 2020 when results were analyzed by country of

birth. The proportion of the national population was 37.7%, while the proportion of persons born outside the EU was slightly lower (34.9%), and that of those born in another EU member state was again lower (32.8%). The figure shows the development of the long-term unemployment rate in the period between 2010 and 2020, and the lowest rates were consistently registered for the population born in another EU member state. It should be noted that despite the relatively large increase in the unemployment rate in 2020, the long-term unemployment rate fell sharply. This indicates that the increase in the number of newly unemployed people in 2020 was greater than that in the number of people unemployed for less than a year or more.

Long-term unemployment as a percentage of total unemployment in the population aged 20-64, by country of birth




Source: Eurostat (2020): Migrant integration statistics - Labour market indicators, https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=Migrant_integration_statistics_%E2%80%93_labour_market_indicators

In 2019, the unemployment rate for people aged 20-64 in the EU-27 was 12.3% for those born outside the EU, 7.3% for those born in other EU member states and 6.0% for the native-born population. In the EU-27, the unemployment rate of the native population in the period between 2009 and

2019 was consistently lower than the unemployment rate of the migrant workforce. The difference between the native population and the proportion of persons born outside the EU was particularly large. At the beginning of the global financial and economic crisis, the differences between the unemployment rates among the native and foreign-born populations were relatively small, but these differences increased in the successive years after the crisis, reaching 5.2 percentage points (in 2014); they were born in another EU member state and 12.2 points (in 2013) for persons born outside the EU. After that, the differences in the unemployment rate started to decrease again; the latest data available for 2019 confirm this pattern for people born outside the EU, while for people born in another member state, the difference was roughly the same as in 2017, and in 2018 The EU-27 unemployment rate for the native-born population was 6.0% in 2019, while the rate of people born elsewhere in the EU was 1.3 points higher (7.3%) than that of people born outside the EU and 6.3 points higher (12.3%).

Unemployment rate



Source: Eurostat (2020); Migrant integration statistics - Labour market indicators, https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=Migrant_integration_statistics_%E2%80%93_labour_market_indicators

6. Hungary

In the heart of Central Europe, Hungary stands as a distinctive crossroads where the narratives of guest work, labour migration within its borders, and the ventures of Hungarian workers into other European countries converge. From both the host nation and the guest workers' perspectives, we seek to understand the motivations, contributions, and complexities that define the landscape of guest work in Hungary. Simultaneously, our exploration extends to the experiences of labour migrants within Hungary's borders. Hungarian workers also venture into other European countries in pursuit of employment opportunities. We examine their motivations, challenges, and contributions to the labour markets of other EU member states. In traversing these interconnected narratives, our objective is to offer a holistic understanding of Hungary's role in the intricate web of European labour mobility. Beyond statistical analyses, we aspire to capture the human stories, societal impacts, and economic intricacies that define the experiences of those engaging in guest work, contributing to Hungary's workforce, and exploring opportunities beyond its borders. Through this exploration, we hope to contribute to a nuanced comprehension of Hungary's place within European labour migration's dynamic and ever-evolving landscape.


Guest work in Hungary can be analysed from two perspectives; on the one hand, the number of workers coming to our country is also interesting; on the other hand, emigration is also significant, so it is worth looking into the European diaspora of the Hungarian workforce.

6.1. Migrant and guest work in Hungary

According to the statistics, there were no major changes in the number of sending countries compared to previous years, but the number of workers arriving in Hungary increased drastically compared to 2017: while two years ago, a total of 11,464 workers from the first three sending countries were registered from third countries, last year 34,744 were registered from third countries, *Világgazdaság* wrote, adding that this number had decreased to 31,449 by September this year.⁹⁰

⁹⁰https://hvg.hu/gazdasag/20191105_Magyarország_a_vendegmunkasok_paradicsoma


The number of foreigners working in Hungary



Source: NFSZ and Kálmán Attila: Ötszörösére nőtt a Magyarországon dolgozó külföldiek száma négy év alatt, közelítünk a vendégmunka-alapú társadalomhoz. 24.hu 28.04.2020.

It should be added to the data that no seasonal permits were issued in 2019 or 2020, just like in 2018. The main reason for this is that a permit is no longer required for seasonal employment that does not exceed 90 days, in which case it is sufficient to register the foreign citizen with the local organisation of the labour organisation.

Number of foreign workers reported by employers by nationality in 2019 (TOP 10)



Source: Ministry of Innovation and Technology (Analysis and Wage Policy Department): The main characteristics of the employment of foreign citizens in Hungary, in the year 2019

In Hungary, 43,881 Ukrainians currently (2019) have a residence permit for the purpose of employment, which is the highest number among workers coming to Hungary from countries outside the European Union. According to statistics, Serbs have the second most permits (6,199), while China has the third most workers, 2,965, Világgazdaság reports based on the data collection of the National Directorate General of Immigration (OIF). The largest country in Asia is followed almost behind by Vietnam (with 2,778 people), but a good number of Indian workers are also present in the Hungarian labour market (1,806).⁹¹

The solution to the labour shortage cannot be said to be to attract guest workers: previously, the National Association of Employers and Manufacturers put the number of missing professionals at 150,000-200,000. Moreover, according to the latest data published by the Central Statistical Office, the labour shortage has not increased in recent months.

Therefore, the number of guest workers is expected to not increase significantly this year, and even a decrease is expected. It is because, according to interest groups and financial analysts, the slowdown of German industry will also affect Hungary. This will probably not lead to layoffs in this country - let us ignore the temporary effect of the coronavirus - but if the slowdown were to a greater extent than expected, the jobs of Hungarian workers would still be safe, the downsizing would be carried out among guest workers and temporary workers.

Moreover, the arrivals here are not doctors, engineers, research participants, or highly educated, but the number of seasonal workers (e.g., fruit picking and vegetable harvesting) and classic manual workers is negligible. This suggests that assembly line workers are mostly replaced by Ukrainians.⁹²

In addition, **domestic labour is worth more to employers**: those who come here are usually lured by the fact that they provide housing, primarily in worker accommodation. In addition, in a different way, companies also stop their journey home at certain intervals. At the same time, many companies have problems with guest workers. Previously, the trade unions reported

⁹¹ <https://www.portfolio.hu/gazdasag/20191105/rengeteg-vendegmunkas-jon-magyarorszagra-405983>

⁹² Oláh, J., Halasi, G., Szakály, Z., Popp, J., & Balogh, P. (2017). The impact of international migration on the labor market—A case study from Hungary. *Amfiteatru Economic*, 19(46), 790.

that in companies where Hungarian workers do not have an advantage in wages, guest workers lead to tensions, as they are better off with, for example, support for their travel or housing expenses. It is also typical that the Ukrainians who come here - in possession of the EU work permit - leave for Austria, which attracts much higher wages.

In addition, the double-digit gross salary increases experienced in this country for years show that guest work does not have a wage-depressing effect; mostly companies with typically low added value make a decision born of compulsion.

This trend has been typical in Western Europe for decades: the population living at a higher wage level no longer takes up work in simpler, mostly minimum-wage jobs. The reason for this is not emigration, as well-educated Hungarians take up jobs in Western countries, who would not stand by the ribbon even if they stayed at home. Overall, the just over 31,000 new permits issued last year are insignificant in the region; for example, in Poland, the number of Ukrainians alone exceeds half a million people.⁹³

Why is all this good for Hungarian workers? Although there are those who believe that guest workers pose a threat to the domestic labour market, according to HR experts, all this has a beneficial effect on the Hungarian economy. "The involvement of foreign workers in production is beneficial from several points of view. On the one hand, it reduces overtime, extra overtime, and extra shifts that jump up seasonally from time to time - it helps the employee decide whether to undertake them according to his own needs. On the other hand, it ensures that our companies are able to produce and do not have to reorganize or reduce capacity due to labour shortages. It is easy to see that all this would create an extremely unfavourable situation even in the short and medium term," the specialist points out. As long as necessary, guest work is useful: thousands of jobs could disappear in supply chains.

Overall, guest workers also contribute to the long-term preservation of domestic jobs since if a company sees that the expansion of production capacity in Hungary is facing limitations due to the labour shortage, it can decide to transfer production to another country. This means that existing jobs in Hungary will disappear, and the country's economic performance will decrease. This is especially true in industries where the entire supply chain is located close to each other - in this case, the loss of one link in the chain can

⁹³<https://magyarnemzet.hu/gazdasag/nem-ozonlenek-a-vendegmunkasok-7194698/>

have a negative impact on the entire sector. The automotive industry is typically such an area. The production of rubber, glass, mechanical elements (engine parts, clutches, brakes, etc.), electronics, plastic or steel parts and seats will be located close to car assembly.

"If the labour shortage in the given factory is not resolved, it may lead to the withering of the entire sector in one area, and tens of thousands of jobs filled by domestic workers may be lost. Not to mention the damage and loss of market affecting domestic small and medium-sized enterprises working in the supply chain," sums up Béla Ignác. According to the expert's experience, Hungary has the regulatory and administrative conditions for businesses to be able to respond to the situation and remedy the labour shortage with the regulated employment of guest workers as long as the labour market situation requires it. Work permits can be issued quickly and flexibly, even with the help of an online interface, and the colleagues of the immigration office help businesses that want to employ more (at least 20) foreign workers by moving to the location.⁹⁴

In 2017, the government eased the employment of foreign workers: it is **no longer necessary to apply for a residence** permit from neighbouring non-EU countries; it is enough for the employer to notify the employee. As a result, the influx of foreign workers continued to increase, mainly due to those coming from Ukraine and, to a lesser extent, from Serbia, we wrote.⁹⁵

The biggest jump occurred in 2018: the number of guest workers tripled in one year. So it is no wonder that the National Employment Service (NFSZ) still has not issued its usual annual report for this year; the most recent one is still from 2017. The competent ministry justified the delay by saying that "data collection is taking place". However, in the meantime, the 2018 and even 2019 data were quietly uploaded to the NFSZ website - we were working from them - but the report on foreign workers is still awaited.

It is no exaggeration to say that the government hid the data series for a long time. The explosive increase in the number of guest workers does not really fit with the Orbán government's anti-migration, sometimes downright anti-foreigner rhetoric but not in the narrative that the government helps the Hungarian people to work.


⁹⁴ <https://ado.hu/munkaugyek/a-magyar-munkavallalok-is-nyernek-ha-tobb-az-ideiglenes-vendegmunkas/>

⁹⁵ Papp, I. C., Bilan, S., & Dajnoki, K. (2019). Globalization of the labour market--Circular migration in Hungary. *Journal of International Studies* (2071-8330), 12(2).

Although part of the economy temporarily stopped due to the coronavirus epidemic, and the borders were closed to foreigners, guest workers are still allowed to commute in many places. There is no better proof than this of how much Hungary needs foreign workers, and this can be proven with numbers: since 2016, the number of foreigners working in Hungary has increased fivefold.

Since the **NFSZ did not publish data by nationality**, we can only guess that the jump in 2018 is a consequence of this government decision. If we look at how the number of employment announcements increased by 40,000 in a single year, the facilitation only applied to Ukraine and Serbia since the other neighbouring countries are EU member states, and nobody noticed that from 2017 to 2018, 40,000 workers arrived from EU countries, then it seems clear that contrary to the rhetoric, the government allowed in tens of thousands of Ukrainian and Serbian workers. In the meantime, the summary containing the 2018 and 2019 data on domestic employees has been posted on the NFSZ website - from which 24.hu also worked - but the report on foreign employees is still pending.

Development of employment figures compared to the previous year



Source: NFSZ and Kálmán Attila: Ötszörösére nőtt a Magyarországon dolgozó külföldiek száma négy év alatt, közelítünk a vendégmunka-alapú társadalomhoz. 24.hu 28.04.2020.


It is clear that the number of economically active and employed people has increased year by year, which indicates an economic boom. The number of unemployed people decreased dynamically for years, but in 2018 - a year after the employment of Ukrainian and Serbian workers - an interesting thing happened: 25,000 more foreign workers appeared on the labour market than the number of unemployed people decreased. By 2019, this difference had decreased, but the balance still tipped in favour of foreigners: the number of guest workers exceeded that of the disappearing unemployed by 9,000. In the last two years, more foreigners have arrived than the number of unemployed has decreased.

Meanwhile, the number of **economic migrants from third countries** also increased, but not nearly as much as that of the former group. Since the NFSZ published its annual reports on foreign workers until 2017, we know the data broken down by nationality until then. Based on these, in 2016, 4,464 people received work permits from non-EU and non-neighbouring countries (3,513 of them were from outside Europe), and a year later, 8,484 (7,176 came from other continents). The data for 2018 and 2019 are only aggregated, but if the approximately 80 % share of non-Europeans seen in previous years remains, roughly a total of 10,000 people could have worked in Hungary in both years.

Their number has approximately tripled in four years, while guest workers from neighbouring countries have come in such large numbers that the number of people arriving from neighbouring and EU countries has increased more than sevenfold. However, this is not equally noticeable in different regions of the country.

Central Hungary has the largest number of foreign workers - approximately one in two - and their number has quintupled in four years. The least popular destination is South Transdanubia; only 2.3 % of all foreign workers got a job in Baranya, Somogy or Tolna in 2019, even though 7.7 times more foreigners worked in the region than in 2016. During this period, the largest increase was in Central Transdanubia, consisting of the counties of Fejér, Komárom-Esztergom and Veszprém, where there were 8.4 times more guest workers in four years. It is also worth noting here that the NFSZ does not register workers who come from abroad but also have Hungarian citizenship, so the increase could actually have been even greater.

Foreign workers by region




Source: NFSZ and Kálmán Attila: Ötszörösére nőtt a Magyarországon dolgozó külföldiek száma négy év alatt, közelítünk a vendégmunka-alapú társadalomhoz. 24.hu 28.04.2020.

The largest number of foreign workers work in the three regions with the highest GDP, while the fourth most are located in the Northern Great Plain region, which is considered the poorest. This region is the cuckoo's egg - presumably because of the proximity of the Ukrainian and Romanian borders - because in the last four years, more or less, the characteristic was that the more guest workers worked in a region, the higher the GDP there.

The proportion of workers from outside the EU and neighbouring countries among guest workers is the highest in Baranya: 50 % in 2019. In the county of Győr-Moson-Sopron, the same rate is only 3 %. And 17 % for the entire country.⁹⁶

⁹⁶<https://24.hu/fn/gazdasag/2020/04/28/vendegmunka-kulfoldi-munkavallalo-gazdasag-migracio/>

Number of foreign workers per 10,000 workers



Source: NFSZ and Kálmán Attila: Ötszörösére nőtt a Magyarországon dolgozó külföldiek száma négy év alatt, közelítünk a vendégmunka-alapú társadalomhoz. 24.hu 28.04.2020.

Although part of the economy temporarily stopped due to the coronavirus epidemic, and the borders were closed to foreigners, guest workers are still allowed to commute in many places. Along the borders, clearly. All of this clearly shows that Hungary needs foreign workers, although due to the current situation, this may change temporarily - but only temporarily - in the future.

Based on the NFSZ data, open questions remain as a result, but the reports reveal that roughly every second Hungarian worker had a foreigner in 2018. The reason behind the significant jump is that in 2017, the government made it easier to employ foreign workers. All this means that it is no longer necessary to apply for a residence permit from the surrounding non-EU countries; it is enough for the employer to notify the employee. As a result, the inflow of foreign labour continued to increase, mainly due to those coming from Ukraine and, to a lesser extent, from Serbia.

Foreign citizens residing in Hungary

Continent country	1995	2000	2005	2010	2015	2017	2018	2019	2020
Europe	122,9 17	125,7 84	122,2 61	164,7 44	100,5 01	99 194	104,2 54	117,5 52	131,2 91
Of this:									
Romania	68,43 9	57,34 3	67,52 9	72,72 0	28,64 1	24,04 0	22,74 7	21,01 7	22 162
Serbia	15,29 7	15,57 1	13,64 3	17 197	2 430	2 312	3 356	5 342	4,989
Ukraine	3 501	11,01 6	13,93 3	17,24 1	6,906	5,774	10,50 3	24 197	30,31 6
Germany	7 427	9,631	6,908	18,69 1	18,77 3	18,62 7	17,87 9	16,53 7	18,34 4
Poland	4,628	4 144	2 178	2,515	1 964	2 061	1 928	1 960	2 145
Russia	277	3 002	2 642	3 275	4 341	4,903	4,790	5,093	5,264
Slovakia	231	1 717	1 225	6,424	8,744	9,519	9,652	9,564	10,58 2
Croatia	305	1 162	837	916	831	1 064	1 221	1 403	1 404
Austria	616	1 053	544	3 705	3,990	4,021	3 743	3 142	3 318
Asia	9,635	19,32 6	15 121	25 127	33,86 8	39,93 7	44,69 2	49,05 6	53,09 9
Of which: China	3 469	8,861	6,856	11 173	16,46 7	19 111	19,90 5	18,85 1	19,65 5
America	2,895	4,677	2 667	4,787	6,008	5 397	5,891	6,850	7,631
Of which: United States	1,700	3 261	1 679	3,088	3,090	3 198	3 373	3 387	3 501
Africa	2,081	2 559	1 556	2 513	4,985	5,985	6 334	6,660	7,278
Australia and Oceania	573	779	548	648	606	619	638	655	658
Altogether	138 101	153 125	142 153	197,8 19	145,9 68	151 132	161,8 09	180,7 73	199,9 57


Source: KSH (2020): 1.7. Magyarországon tartózkodó külföldi állampolgárok földrészek, országok szerint, január 1. (1995–)

The KSH data series on foreign citizens staying in Hungary by continent and country is also interesting because it draws attention, typically to family members who stay with employees.


The **employment of third-country nationals in Hungary** is subject to a work permit, with the exception of those specified in the law. The employer must request the work permit from the competent government office. The work permit is a general permit for the applicant employer to employ the third-country national in the job position specified therein at the place of work and during the period. The general condition for the issuance of a work permit is that there is no suitable workforce (domestic, EEA citizen) available for the job to be performed by the third-country national or that the third-

country national is suitable for the job. ⁹⁷This can be requested at the government window, free of charge.

The number of work permits issued in 2020



Number of valid work permits by country group in 2020 (person)



Source: Ministry of Innovation and Technology - NFSZ: The main characteristics of the employment of foreign citizens in Hungary

⁹⁷<https://kormanyablak.hu/hu/feladatkorok/186/MUNKP00081>


As far as **work permits** are concerned, citizens of EU countries generally do not need to obtain a work permit in order to work in one of the member states of the European Union. In the European Union, self-employed persons do not have to obtain a work permit under any circumstances.⁹⁸ There was also a change in the distribution of **work permits** by **country group**. The number of permits issued to citizens of non-EU European countries and neighbouring third countries (Serbia, Ukraine) both show a decrease of around 30%, while at the same time, the proportion of workers from non-European countries in the labour market increased by 15%. In the case of non-EU neighbouring countries, the low number of employees is due to the fact that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs allows the domestic employment of Serbian and Ukrainian citizens in the case of certain occupations with a shortage, even without a labour market examination. The number of neighbouring third-country nationals employed in this way appears in the notifications. In the case of countries outside of Europe, the number of workers coming in from countries in the Far East (e.g. Vietnam and South Korea) has been increasing for years. Examining the issued permits by nationality, it is clear that a significant number of employed people come to Hungary from almost the same countries every year. In 2020, the number of arrivals from South Korea increased the most, almost threefold. The number of people arriving from Vietnam and Turkey shows an increase of around 30%. Japan was not in the top 10 in 2019 but was included in 2020. A decrease can be seen in the case of the other countries, with the largest decrease in the number of arrivals from Thailand. In the case of a work permit, the local representative of the labour organisation is obliged to examine whether an available Hungarian job seeker can fill the given position.

Examining the issued permits by nationality, it can be established that a significant number of employed people come to Hungary from almost the same countries every year. In 2020, the number of arrivals from South Korea increased the most, almost threefold. The number of people arriving from Vietnam and Turkey shows an increase of around 30%. Japan was not in the top 10 in 2019 but was included in 2020. A decrease can be seen in the case of the other countries, with the largest decrease in the number of arrivals from Thailand. In 2020, the majority of those with valid permits came from countries outside Europe. Their ratio was 83.1% on December 31. The proportion of people coming from non-EU neighbouring countries (Serbia and Ukraine) with a valid permit on December 31, 2020, was only 1.8%. At the end of


⁹⁸ https://europa.eu/youreurope/citizens/work/work-abroad/work-permits/index_hu.htm

2020, the proportion of people from Europe with a valid work permit who were not from a member state of the EU was 15.1%. (Employees from the European Union member states have the right to free movement and work, so their employment is not subject to a permit.) Examining the valid work permits by country, we find that the majority of valid work permits were mainly from the Far East (Vietnamese, Chinese, South Korean) citizens at the end of 2020.

Number of permits issued in 2020 TOP 10 citizenships



Number of valid work permits in 2020



Source: Ministry of Innovation and Technology - NFSZ: The main characteristics of the employment of foreign citizens in Hungary


445/2013. (XI. 28.) **Government decree on the authorisation of the employment of third-country nationals** in Hungary based on a non-consolidated application procedure, on the exemption from the licensing obligation, on the professional cooperation of the labour centre of the capital and county government office in the consolidated application procedure, and on third-country nationals who can be employed in Hungary without a permit Pursuant to Section 15, paragraph (3a) on the notification of the employment of citizens of Hungary in Hungary and the reimbursement of wages, the competent **minister** shall state in a notice by March 31 of each year the occupations (occupations in short supply) for which, in the case of permits issued to citizens of neighbouring third countries, the labour organisation examination is not required. While 2018 there were only 109, there are 128 occupations where third-country nationals can be employed in Hungary without a permit.⁹⁹ The main occupations are: 1. Material tester/NDT Operator (x-ray + FPI) 2. Carpenter 3. Trained physical worker 4. CNC operator 5. Deburring operator (deburring locksmith) 6. First phase operator - machine operator 7. Construction worker 8. Building mechanic 9 Restaurant worker 10. Fitter Fabricator / Locksmith 11. Saw and drilling machine operator (PT, saw) 12. Machine adjuster 13. Welding locksmith Fitter 14. Meat processor 15. Computer scientist 16. Calibration technician 17. Maintenance technician (electrical) 18. Cashier 19. Hand packer 20. Bricklayer 21. Manufacturing Engineer (HRLY) (Food industry engineer, Electrical engineer, Chemical engineer) 22. Engineer (Telecommunications engineer) 23. Assembly operator 24. Programmer 25. Project engineer (construction industry) 26. Warehouseman 27. Trained warehouse worker 28. System administrator 29. Cook 30. Assistant mechanic (MMK) 31. Tool inspector (Tool Room) 32. Maid 33. Forklift driver 34. TBC coordinator (Office professional manager, supervisor) 35. TBC Operator (Metalworking, surface treatment machine operator) 36. Seamstress 37. Plumber.

While hundreds of thousands of Hungarians have taken up work mainly in other EU member states in recent years, a **labour shortage** has increasingly developed in Hungary due to economic growth and a declining population. Although the government definitely wants to avoid immigration, since June 2017, it has been made easier for workers from neighbouring countries outside the EU to work in Hungary in occupations with a shortage. It can be seen that the number of foreign workers increased slowly from only

⁹⁹<https://mfor.hu/cikk/makro/ujabb-szakmakba-engedi-a-kulfoldieket-a-kormany.html>

The largest number of **non-EU countries** still come to work from Ukraine, but their number is also declining. Among the major sending countries, Serbia already showed a decline in 2019; only India had more people this year than last year. Mostly Chinese people come to study, but their number has decreased by almost a third in the past year. The number of Turkish students also shows a big decline; they dropped out of the top five sending countries, but Jordan was included for the first time in recent years. The number of domestic registration certificates of EU citizens shows that even among countries with a significant Hungarian community, Hungary is an increasingly less attractive destination: 3,780 Romanian citizens registered in Hungary. True, due to dual citizenship, this is not absolutely necessary in their case. However, in the case of Hungarians in Slovakia, dual citizenship is not really available and sought after, and for years, very few registered themselves - presumably only the border controls due to the aforementioned coronavirus epidemic changed this practice.

Number of applicants for right of residence (non-EU, third countries)



Source: <https://g7.hu/kozelet/20210126/visszaesett-a-bevandorlas-magyarorszagra-a-koronavirus-jarvany-miatt/>

6.2. Hungarian workers in Europe

The other side of the coin is: Hungarian workers abroad, including in the EU. Although they are not guests, in principle, they are at home, members of the big EU family, with its considerable administrative and social advantages, but other than that, they are essentially guest workers. Moreover, some of them come home or want to come home, which is not typical for Asians or Africans. So, they really are guests.

Between 2007 and 2016, an average of 70,000 Hungarians immigrated to OECD countries every year - according to the organisation's recently published International Migration Outlook publication. In addition to these 700,000 people, another 86,000 came in 2017, which represented a minimal increase compared to the previous year. If we add to this the period between 2004 and 2006, it is no exaggeration to say that in the 15 years since our EU accession, one million Hungarians tried their luck abroad.¹⁰¹

The latest estimate of the number of Hungarians who have migrated abroad has been received: according to the recently published OECD data, the number of those who have migrated abroad for a longer or shorter period of time may be close to one million.¹⁰² The reality is that a little more than a million first-timers and commuters are certainly not included.


Roughly, this number is a quarter of the entire Hungarian workforce (4.5 million people). It is a huge number; so much falls out of the national economy's performance, so much is not taxed, etc. Not all of them will stay at home, and the saddest thing is that the majority will not even come home. We lost many hundreds of thousands of people, most of them young and somewhat educated. Moreover, suddenly, in one big wave. The real loss did not start in 2004 when we joined the EU, but in 2011, when the free flow of labour became possible. That is, it did not even take a decade for such a large migration. It is not the fault of the current governments; this is the great tragedy of Central and Eastern Europe; the reason is clearly the four decades of the socialist system, the era of lagging behind the world.

¹⁰¹ Józsa, I., & Vinogradov, S. A. (2017). Main motivation factors of Hungarian labor-migration in the European Union. *Journal of Management*, 31(2), 47-52.
<https://www.penzcentrum.hu/karrier/egymillio-magyar-tunt-el-az-orszagbol-ha-ez-igy-megy-tovabb-elfogyunk.1083077.html>

¹⁰² <https://www.portfolio.hu/gazdasag/20180621/sokkolo-szamok-kozel-egymillio-magyar-vandorolhatott-mar-ki-289658>

Between 2007 and 2016, an average of 70,000 Hungarians immigrated to OECD countries every year, according to the organisation's recently published International Migration Outlook publication. In addition to these 700,000 people, another 86,000 came in 2017, which represented a minimal increase compared to the previous year.¹⁰³ If we add to this the period 2004-2006 and, calculate only average willingness to emigrate, and make a similar estimate for 2018, it is not an exaggeration to say that in the 15 years since our accession to the EU, one million Hungarians have tried their luck abroad.¹⁰⁴

The number of people temporarily working abroad



Source: <https://www.portfolio.hu/gazdasag/20190920/egymillio-magyar-probalt-szerencset-kulfoldon-megallt-mar-a-kivandorlas-401427>

Last year, the number of people working abroad for a short time (temporarily) increased again; that is, more and more Hungarians thought that, despite the rising wages, they would rather try their luck in another country. While employment has developed favourably in our country in recent years, we pointed out in several of our articles that the employment situation of young people has begun to deteriorate, and last year, Hungarians started moving abroad again. During the year, the number of Hungarians working abroad for a short time rose close to a record.

They clearly go out to work, aiming to create financial security and prosperity. Similar to other guest workers, the first generation is rootless and cannot fit in. The second already knows the language well, and if he is lucky,

¹⁰³ Kártyás, G. (2018). Kiküldött munkavállalók Magyarországon és az Európai Unióban.

¹⁰⁴ <https://www.portfolio.hu/gazdasag/20190920/egymillio-magyar-probalt-szerencset-kulfoldon-megallt-mar-a-kivandorlas-401427>

he will even get citizenship - but he is no longer a guest worker. The third generation is characterised by the fact that they do not know Hungarian anymore; they have minimal knowledge of the mother country, where they become real citizens abroad.

Where are the Hungarian workers in Europe? The main target is geographical proximity and language skills. So it is no coincidence that the three main target countries are Austria,¹⁰⁵ Germany and Great Britain. Recently, more and more people go to the Benelux countries and the countries of Southern Europe, but they are also present in the countries of the Scandinavian world. London is the second most populous Hungarian city; according to some estimates, 200-300 thousand of our compatriots live in the British capital, more than in Debrecen.¹⁰⁶



Source: MNB (2020): Report on the Balance of Payments - April 2020

The recent report of the MNB also reveals the income data of Hungarians. In 2019, the decrease in foreign employee incomes in recent years stopped, and the nominal balance rose slightly. As can be seen in the figures, Hungarians earned almost €3.5 billion abroad; such a high amount has never


¹⁰⁵ Melegh, A., Gábel, D., Gresits, G., & Hámos, D. (2018). Abandoned Hungarian workers and the political economy of care work in Austria. *Szociológiai Szemle*, 28(4), 61-87.

¹⁰⁶<https://www.profession.hu/cikk/irodai-munka-londonban-haromszor-annyi-a-fizetes>, previously the dubious reputation owner Bucharest was the Carpathians His genius nationality of his policy thanks to

been seen before. (This is gross income.) It is important to emphasize that this is not about Hungarians who have moved abroad in the last decade, which may be 500-600 thousand, but about those who have not left the country permanently, are only commuting or are temporarily abroad.

Hungarians abroad are thrifty. Last year, five times as much money was transferred to Hungary from abroad as was transferred abroad from here. Hungarians living abroad sent home 4.7 billion dollars (nearly HUF 1,350 billion) last year. With this, Hungary received the fourth most money in terms of GDP among the 11 Central and Eastern European EU member states. Bulgaria and Latvia are in second and third place, respectively, with remittance rates of 3.8 and 3.7 % of GDP.

Residential remittances from abroad in the countries of the region (million \$)



Source: <https://novekedes.hu/elemezsek/vagyonokat-utaltak-haza-a-kulfoldi-magyarok>

The advantage of the transfer is threefold: on the one hand, it improves the balance of payments, and on the other hand, consumption and the related tax revenue increase by spending the money sent home, thus improving the economic position of the country. The political payoff is that those who are dissatisfied with domestic conditions do not voice their opinions at home, and because of their dispersion, they are not capable of political organisation either.

Every year, the World Bank prepares a survey of how much money is remitted home to each country by workers abroad and how much money is remitted from that country to other countries by guest workers living there. In simple terms, it can be said that in the case of well-off, developed countries, the amount of remittances is greater than the amount of incoming remittances, while in the case of less affluent, poorer countries, the amount of incoming remittances exceeds the amount of money sent out.

IV. Summary

In today's interconnected global landscape, the phenomenon of migration holds significant sway over labour markets. This study thoroughly examines the intricate interplay between migration and employment, scrutinizing the drivers behind migration, the repercussions of migrant workers on host economies, and the hurdles faced by migrants as they strive to integrate into the labour market. Guest work and migration have advantages and disadvantages, dangers, but also opportunities. The first part of the study takes these into account. Governments weigh differently, so the willingness to accept is mixed. Countries that have employed guest workers to fuel their economic recovery clearly have a different approach to the issue than others. With the breakdown of the existing social order, especially with the appearance of terrorism, the opinion seems to be changing recently.

Today, millions of people are moving towards Europe; they, too, are looking for work and prosperity. Most of them claim to be young, under the age of 18 and refugees (Syrian, Palestinian, Afghan, etc.) due to the relaxation rules, playing on them and uncontrollability. Nothing can be proven because of the lost and discarded papers. For the migrant, and even for the receiving country, the concept of work is not only directed at the performance of specific tasks but also includes all branches of employment policy: job search, unemployment, and the use of work-related social benefits.

However, a significant difference compared to previous trends is that they no longer want to assimilate: they want to keep home customs, traditions, language, culture, and religion - in a new and more prosperous milieu. Since they are almost exclusively men, it is also likely that the settlement will likely be followed by family reunification or possibly the founding of a family.

There are still millions in the new wave(s). They are waiting to be admitted in Turkey and Greece as well as in Italy and Spain. It is thanks to temporary EU-funded programmes that the four million or so refugees stranded in Turkey are not heading for Europe. Elsewhere, the situation is no better: from Lesbos to Lampedusa, many islands are overcrowded. The destination is one of the welfare states, Germany, Austria and the Scandinavian countries, or France in the case of those from the former French colonies, where language skills are a particular advantage.

The pressure on individual countries is tremendous and growing, so the European Union is trying to deal with the problem in a unified way, and they think that a general quota for everyone would be the solution. This was achieved at the level of the European Commission; the submission with specific numbers was already ready, but some of the member states - Hungary at the forefront - resisted, so the mandatory quota was removed from the agenda (September 2020).

Among the numerous key findings, we highlight that varied motivations, including economic prospects, family reunification, and the pursuit of political asylum compel migrants. Migrant workers assume a pivotal role in global economies, fostering dynamism in labour markets and contributing significantly to economic growth. They can wield a favourable influence on host economies by catalysing economic growth, addressing labour shortages, and infusing diverse skills and perspectives.

Migrant workers encounter obstacles in securing employment, grappling with language barriers, discrimination, and the lack of recognition for their qualifications. Addressing the challenges confronting migrant workers necessitates collaborative efforts among governments, employers, and civil society organizations. The implementation of effective integration policies is paramount to ensuring that migrant workers can access employment opportunities and actively contribute to host societies. The formulation of effective labour market policies and integration programs stands as imperative for maximizing the advantages of migration while safeguarding the well-being of migrant workers. The promotion of mutual understanding and respect between migrants and host communities is crucial for cultivating inclusive and harmonious societies.

In pursuit of fostering a more inclusive and supportive environment for migrant workers, a set of comprehensive recommendations emerges as imperative. These proposals aim to address various facets of the migration experience, ensuring that policies and initiatives are in place to facilitate a smooth and equitable integration process.

Encouraging the establishment of policies that facilitate safe and legal channels for migration is paramount. This involves active engagement with policymakers, international organizations, and advocacy groups to promote the development of frameworks that prioritize the safety and legality of migration pathways. By endorsing such channels, we contribute to the protection of migrant workers from exploitation and unsafe conditions.

A crucial component of successful integration is the development of language and skills training programs tailored specifically for migrant workers. Advocacy efforts should be directed towards urging governments and relevant institutions to invest in and implement programs that equip migrant workers with the linguistic and technical skills necessary for their successful participation in the host country's labour market. This not only enhances their employability but also facilitates better social integration. Strengthening labour market information and support services designed specifically for migrant workers is essential. This recommendation emphasizes the need for governments and organizations to enhance existing support structures, providing migrant workers with the necessary information, resources, and assistance to navigate the host country's labour market complexities. Improved support services contribute to the overall well-being and success of migrant workers.

Advocating for fair employment practices and actively combatting discrimination against migrant workers is crucial for creating an inclusive work environment. This recommendation calls for collaborative efforts between governmental bodies, employers, and civil society organizations to raise awareness about discriminatory practices, establish anti-discrimination policies, and enforce mechanisms that hold perpetrators accountable. By addressing discrimination, we contribute to creating workplaces that respect the rights and dignity of all workers, regardless of their migration status. Highlighting the importance of cultural diversity and inclusion within host societies is essential for fostering harmonious coexistence. This recommendation underscores the need for educational programs, awareness campaigns, and community initiatives that promote understanding, respect, and appreciation for diverse cultures. Emphasizing cultural diversity not only enhances the social fabric of host communities but also contributes to the creation of welcoming environments for migrant workers.

As a concept and reality, the guest worker appeared in Europe in the mid-1950s. Initially, they were active in the prosperity of the German economy, where there was a significant labour shortage due to the war. Without them, the German economic miracle - recognised internationally and still dominates today - would not have been possible. We can also call them guest workers because they came temporarily, according to the original - economic - idea, even though after a few years of work, they would have returned to their country and gone home to their families. By the 1960s, several countries in Europe had already become receiving and sending countries.

Most of the guest workers, however, decided to stay and settle down, so the family came after them. Today, the third generation lives this way, and it has even reached adulthood. Moreover, their original identity is strengthened. After the southern European migration, Africans and Asians also started. They do not even think about guest worker status: they are migrants.

Migration is a multifaceted phenomenon with profound implications for migrant workers and host societies. A comprehensive understanding of the drivers, impacts, and challenges associated with migration lays the groundwork for developing policies fostering sustainable and equitable labour markets.

These recommendations form a comprehensive framework for promoting the well-being, integration, and equitable treatment of migrant and guest workers while prioritising the respect of national interest.

Appendix

Some migration terminology, adapted from the IOM glossary on Migration and OECD glossary of statistical terms:

Asylum seeker	A person who seeks safety from persecution or serious harm in a country other than his or her own and awaits a decision on the application for refugee status under relevant international and national instruments.
Contract migrant workers	Persons working in a country other than their own under contractual arrangements that set limits on the period of employment and on the specific job held by the migrant.
Displaced person	A person who flees his or her State or community due to fear or dangers for reasons other than those which would make him or her a refugee.
Economic migrant	A person is leaving his or her habitual place of residence to settle outside his or her country of origin in order to improve his or her quality of life. This term is often loosely used to distinguish from refugees fleeing persecution and is also similarly used to refer to persons attempting to enter a country without legal permission and/or using asylum procedures without bona fide cause. It may equally be applied to persons leaving their country of origin for the purpose of employment.
Foreign migrant workers	Foreigners admitted by the receiving State for the specific purpose of exercising an economic activity remunerated from within the receiving country. Their length of stay is usually restricted, as is the type of employment they can hold.
Foreign students	Persons admitted by a country other than their own, usually under special permits or visas, for the specific purpose of following a particular course of study in an accredited institution of the receiving country.
Foreigners whose status is regularized	Persons whose entry or stay has not been sanctioned by the receiving State or who have violated the terms of their admission but who are nevertheless allowed to regularize their status. Although most persons regularizing their status are already present in the receiving country for some time, their regularization may be taken to represent the time of their official admission as international migrants.

Internally displaced persons (IDPs)	Persons or groups of persons who have been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their homes or places of habitual residence, in particular as a result of or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human rights or natural or human-made disasters, and who have not crossed an internationally recognized State border.
Irregular migrant	A person who, owing to unauthorized entry, breach of a condition of entry or the expiry of his or her visa, lacks legal status in a transit or host country. The definition covers inter alia those persons who have entered a transit or host country lawfully but have stayed for a longer period than authorized or subsequently taken up unauthorized employment (also called clandestine/undocumented migrant or migrant in an irregular situation). The term 'irregular' is preferable to 'illegal' because the latter carries a criminal connotation and is seen as denying migrants' humanity.
Itinerant worker	A migrant worker who, having his or her habitual residence in one State, has to travel to another state or state for short periods owing to the nature of his or her occupation.
Long-term migrants	A person who moves to a country other than that of his or her usual residence for a period of at least a year (12 months) so that the country of destination effectively becomes his or her new country of usual residence. From the perspective of the country of departure, the person will be a long-term emigrant, and from that of the country of arrival, the person will be a long-term immigrant.
Migrants	According to the United Nations recommendations, migrants consist of four categories: long-term immigrants (or emigrants), short-term immigrants (or emigrants), residents returning after (or leaving for) a period of working abroad, and nomads.
Migrants for settlement	Migrants for settlement are foreigners granted permission to stay for a lengthy or unlimited period who are subject to virtually no limitations regarding the exercise of economic activity.
Migrant workers	See Foreign migrant workers.
Principle migrant	The migrant within a family group is the person who is considered by immigration authorities to be the head of the family and whose admission depends on that of the other members of the family.

Refugee	A person who, 'owing to a well-founded fear of persecution for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinions, is outside the country of his or her nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of that country.
Returning migrants	Persons returning to their country of citizenship after having been international migrants (whether short-term or long-term) in another country and who intend to stay in their own country for at least a year.
Seasonal migrant workers	Persons employed by a country other than their own for only part of a year because the work they perform depends on seasonal conditions. They are a subcategory of foreign migrant workers.
Settlement	See Migrants for settlement.
Short-term migrant	A person who moves to a country other than that of his or her usual residence for a period of at least three months but less than a year (12 months) except in cases where the movement to that country is for purposes of recreation, holiday, visits to friends or relatives, business, medical treatment or religious pilgrimage

Source: Douglas, P., Cetron, M., & Spiegel, P. (2019). Definitions matter: migrants, immigrants, asylum seekers and refugees. *Journal of travel medicine*, 26(2), taz005.

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