

MERCENARIES AND CRUSADERS



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Mercenaries and Crusaders

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Edited by ATTILA BÁRÁNY

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FOREWORD

This volume is the proceedings of an international conference „Mercenaries and Crusaders (1202–1480)” held between 22-24 June 2022 at the University of Debrecen (<https://mercenariesandcrusaders.com/>). It was organised and the proceedings have been edited under the auspices of the HUN-REN (Hungarian Research Network) – University of Debrecen Research Group “Military History of Medieval Hungary and Central Europe”. The conference was funded by National Research, Development and Innovation Fund. The volume is also sponsored by the „Hungary in Medieval Europe” project under the framework of the University of Debrecen’s Thematic Excellence Program as well as the “Sources of Medieval Hungarian Military Organization in Europe, 1301–1437” research program of the National Research, Development and Innovation Fund.

The original idea of a conference like that was brought forward years ago by Ölbei Tamás (Université de Lorraine, Nancy-Metz – University of Debrecen) and João Nisa (Universidade de Coimbra), for which I myself and the editorial board are grateful. It is due to their efforts that the conference was to be organised in a collaboration with the Histoire et Cultures de l’Antiquité et du Moyen Âge (Université de Lorraine, Nancy-Metz) and the Centro de História da Sociedade e da Cultura (Universidade de Coimbra). I need to thank here for the members of the Organizing and Scientific Committee, Professor José Pedro Paiva (Coimbra) and Professor Guy Vottéro (Nancy), Professor Miguel Gomes Martins (Universidade Nova de Lisboa), Professor Francisco García Fitz (Universidad de Extremadura), Professor João Gouveia Monteiro (Coimbra). We are also grateful for the key-note speakers, Professor Valérie Toureille (CY Cergy Paris Université), Professor Sylvain Gouguenheim (Ecole normale supérieure de Lyon) and Professor Saul Gomes (Coimbra). Professor Toureille and Michael Depreter (Harris Manchester College, University of Oxford), László Veszprémy (Péter Pázmány Catholic University), Ágnes Maléth, Zsolt Hunyadi and István Petrovics (University of Szeged) as well as João Nisa (Universidade de Coimbra), László Pósán, Attila Györkös, Ádám Novák and Orsolya Tóth (University of Debrecen) also acted as reviewers. Due to help of João Nisa in the first place the conference was also supported by the Asociación Ibérica de Historia Militar, Cáceres, the Instituto de Estudos Medievais, the Universidade Nova de Lisboa and the Universidade de Extremadura as well as the Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia, República Portuguesa. Some scholars also gave papers in a partnership with the University of Public Service, Faculty of Military Sciences and Officer Training.

In June 2022, 52 researchers presented papers in 16 sessions. We were pleased to welcome distinguished scholars from the Polish Academy of Sciences (Kraków), Webster University Vienna, the University of Bucharest, the Europa-Universität Flensburg, Uzhhorod National University, Institute of History, Belgrade, Novosibirsk State University, the Centre for Transylvanian

Studies, Romanian Academy (Cluj), Odessa Mechnikov National University, University of Novi Sad, University of Crete (Rethymnon-Heraklyon), Cyprus Research Centre (Nicosia), Nicolaus Copernicus University (Toruń), the University of Białystok, the Jesuit University Ignatianum (Kraków), Móra Ferenc Museum (Szeged), Universitat de València, the universities of Pécs and Szeged as well as Eötvös Loránd University Budapest. Special panels were organised by the scholars of Stanford University and Queen's University (Kingston, Ontario) the Universidade de Coimbra and the Universidade Nova de Lisboa. Speakers from Canada, Greece, Albania, Ukraine, Turkey, Azerbaijan and Belarus also presented papers.

The conference explored the subject of crusaders and mercenaries from a broad perspective. It covered the armies of the Hundred Years' War, the Catalan companies, the condottieri in Florence and Genoa, mercenaries in the Balkans, the Levant, the Polish-Lithuanian kingdom, as well as the Turcopoliers of the knightly orders. The Northern Crusades, the Baltic Crusades, the Iberian Reconquista, the crusades against the heretics in Bosnia and Hussites were examined. The role of the ideological and religious background, the Holy See, the papal legates, recruitment, tactics, strategy, supply, logistics, equipment, booty, were also investigated.

The organisers placed an emphasis on mentoring. PhD students also had an opportunity to present themselves in front of prestigious representatives of medieval studies.

I would especially like to thank Sándor Ónadi, Melinda Jakab and Ádám Novák for their enormous work and all their never-ceasing efforts in the editorial process. I also do thank Zoltán Véber for his IT services all through the organization and the hosting of the website. I am also pleased to have – as usual – Balázs Bacsa “at hand” in the English language proofs.

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RICHARD I'S RETURN FROM THE HOLY LAND

It is in a way an organic part of a historical mythology how King Richard I of England (1189–99) was taken captive in Germany, while at home, the Saxons, oppressed by the ‘evil’ Prince John, led by Robin Hood were awaiting the release and return of their true sovereign. Cœur de Lion was imprisoned in the dungeons of Austria and the Holy Roman Empire for over a year from the end of 1192 to early 1194. However, one feels that the question that naturally arises is still unanswered why he made his way through the Empire, why he did go directly to the ‘den’ of his most ardent enemy, Leopold V, Duke of Austria. What was the reason why he chose an overland way, through the Continent and did not join the rest of his army and entourage from the south of Italy? The king deterred from his navy and made a stop first at Corfu and then, sailed through the Adriatic, and landed in Friaul or Aquileian territory, a few miles away from the Babenbergs’ allies. He was soon to find himself in danger near to Vienna. The „normal” way would have been to take the naval route of crusaders and pilgrims, landing in Brindisi or Messina, then sailing up again to Marseille. Duke Leopold was humiliated by the Plantagenet ruler at the siege of St. Jean d’Acre, and he swore to take a revenge. It is extraordinary that Richard was riding in disguise close to the seat of Austria, risking a lot. Might he have believed that how one “qui cor leonis dictus” would at all be taken captive by earthly hands? Yet, there has to be a real reason. He most probably did not wish to travel through Philip II’s France.¹

It may in a way be explained why a scholar from Central Europe sets out to investigate the history of Cœur de Lion. One would naturally find that generations of English and German historians have already done so and unveiled all the details of Lionheart’s captivity. Why would a historian in Hungary explore English and German sources? How come would he have a better knowledge? The reason lies in the fact that the Kingdom of Hungary was in a way touched in the story. There have been an informally based view, or, rather a tradition in Hungarian historiography that the great Lionheart himself reached Hungarian soil, did find shelter in the kingdom of the Árpád dynasty. When he got ashore in Dalmatia,

* The author is a member of the HUN-REN – University of Debrecen Research Group “Military History of Medieval Hungary and Central Europe”. The project has received funding from the HUN-REN Hungarian Research Network. The study was sponsored by the National Research, Development and Innovation Office project “Sources of Medieval Hungarian Military Organization in Europe, 1301–1437”, no. K 131711) as well as was funded by the University of Debrecen Thematic Excellence Program, Project no. TKP2021-NKTA-34, provided by the Ministry of Culture and Innovation of Hungary under the auspices of National Research, Development and Innovation Fund.

¹ I partly dealt with this field at the Colloque International, *Byzanz und das Abendland Byzance et l’Occident VIII. Studia Byzantino-Occidentalia, Gallica – Italica – Graeca*, Collège Eötvös József, Budapest – ELTE, 23–25 mai 2022.

near Zara, he landed in fact in the territory of King Béla III (1172–1196), whose troops recaptured the city of Zara and her Dalmatian neighbourhood in 1181 from Byzantium. The communication with the Hungarian ruler was in a way seen normal since Béla III's second consort, Margaret Capet was the widow of the Young King, Henry, Richard's brother, and both siblings did also maintain good terms with their third sister, Mathilda, the duchess of Saxony, consort of Duke Henry the Lion.

Richard was hoping to reach the Emperor's most bitter enemies, in Saxony, the land of the Welfs – his relatives, his 'old' Plantagenet allies. He could have reached England quickly from one of the northern ports. Because of the urgency of the situation in Normandy, the king was 'impatient' to get home faster than the main army and was eager to go to war again against Philip Augustus for his ancestral lands. It would probably normally arise that the king would proceed from a Dalmatian harbour through Croatia, or, the borderlands of Slavonia and Hungary, possibly even with Hungarian aid towards Saxony. Here I will not go into detail how a Hungarian detour may have arisen – some scholars even took it for granted that Richard was in fact Hungary – since with a colleague of mine, József Laszlovszky devoted much energy to the issue in a monograph on Anglo-Hungarian relations.² Accordingly, the paper will neither oversee here in detail the theories regarding where exactly the monarch might have also landed, from Ragusa through Zara to the coastline of Istria.

Duke Leopold's banner

To understand why Richard fell into captivity in Austria, we must go back to the days following the capture of Acre. One could explain the actions of Leopold V, Duke of Austria, as retaliation for a personal offense. When the victors erected their banners on the walls and towers of St. Jean d'Acre, Richard, upon seeing the banner of the Babenberg duke, had it torn down and trampled in the dust. His reasoning was that Leopold was unworthy of this honour as he had not played a significant role in the siege of the city. However, the story is more complex, with multiple interpretations, and it is uncertain whether only the personal feud between two individuals lies behind it. I have examined the accounts of several contemporary chroniclers, mostly relying on firsthand information. The narrative goes beyond a deeply offended duke seeking revenge and waiting for the King of England to return home through his duchy from the Holy Land. Many coincidences had to align for the most renowned ruler of the time to find himself almost alone, abandoning his army, and escaping on foot through the Alps. It would have been inconceivable just a few months earlier for even a lord of the Empire to set a trap

² Bárány, Attila – Laszlovszky, József – Papp-Reed, Zsuzsanna, *Angol-magyar kapcsolatok a középkorban* [Anglo-Hungarian relations in the Middle Ages]. Vol. I–II. Gödöllő-Máriabesnyő, 2008–2012. Vol. I., 186–188. In a recent volume Judit Csákó investigated the narrative sources reporting about the disguised monarch in Hungary, e.g. Albericus Trium Fontium's *Chronicon*: Csákó, Judit, *Az Árpád-kori Magyarországnak francia tükrében* [Árpád-age Hungary in French mirror]. Budapest, 2023. 106.

and even contemplate capturing the sovereign of England. At that time, Leopold V was not a significant enough force to carry out such a task on his own. The 'lion' was lured into the trap by more powerful players, Philip Augustus and Emperor Henry VI, and the prince's resentment served as a convenient pretext. Leopold could have easily sought retribution for the offense: he could have challenged the king to a duel on the very same day. Nevertheless, this incident escalated to such gravity that one is compelled to seek political motives behind it. It is difficult to believe that Richard the Lionheart was kept in chains for months due to such an issue. The king's adversaries were merely waiting for some pretext with which they could temporarily detain the 'English beast' for a while.

The sources are not clear how and by whom the Austrian flag was raised. In reality, the cause of the hostilities was much more rooted in the fact that the King of England himself wanted to divide the spoils according to his own rules.³ He desired almost everything for himself and his men, explicitly stating that a 'simple' duke should not expect much.⁴ However, this was not only Leopold's cause: Richard and the Plantagenets' longstanding adversary, King Philip II of France had already clashed at Messina on the way to the Holy Land on the matter of the division of the spoils.⁵ From that point, King Philip was awaiting an opportune moment to attack Normandy.⁶ The astute French king could already anticipate a conflict between the ruler of England and the other crusader leaders at Acre. Those familiar with Richard could foresee that he would seek to manipulate the distribution. Philip was already contemplating how he could turn the incident with Leopold to his advantage.

The inland route

Richard was a thoughtful, careful military planner ahead of his time. He was far-sighted in every way, so when he was planning his journey home, he considered every circumstance and he was aware of every possibility. It is quite hard to believe that the haughty monarch, who trampled on the dignity of all, was brought to the clutches of his sworn enemy, the Duke of Austria, by divine retribution after he had been caught in a storm on the borders of Austria thereby getting his just deserts.

³ Otto of Sankt Blasien, *Chronica*. In: *Die Chronik Ottos von St. Blasien und die Marbacher Annalen*. Hrsg. Schmale, Franz-Josef, Darmstadt, 1998. 15–158. 104–105.

⁴ Otto of Sankt Blasien, *Chronica*, 104.; *Chronicon Magni Presbiteri*. Monumenta Germaniae Historica [hereinafter MGH] Scriptores in Folio [hereinafter SS] 17. Hrsg. Pertz, G. H., Hannover, 1861. 476–523. 519.; William of Newburgh, *Historia Rerum Anglicarum*. In: *Chronicles of the reigns of Stephen, Henry II and Richard I*. Vol. I–IV. Ed. Howlett, Richard. (Rerum Britannicarum medii aevi scriptores. Rolls series [hereinafter RS] 82) Vol. I–II. London, 1884–1890. Vol. I., 383.

⁵ *Itinerarium peregrinorum et gesta regis Ricardi*. In: *Chronicles and Memorials of the Reign of Richard I*. Ed. Stubbs, William. (RS, 38.) London, 1864–65. Vol. I., 164.

⁶ "peperit iniquitatem, quam contestatus est natam, dum percussit Normanniam" – *Itinerarium*, 164.; "reis de France ot envie // Qui lui dorra tote sa vie, // E la fud la guerre engendrée // Don,t Normendie fut gastee" – Ambroise, *L'Estoire de la Guerre Sainte*, publiée par Gaston Paris. Paris, 1897. 23. vv. 824–830.; William of Newburgh, *Historia*, Vol. I., 325.

Richard set sail from Acre on 9 October 1192.⁷ Most sources report that he was caught in a storm and his fleet scattered. Richard's ship drifted far away very quickly.⁸ According to the *Itinerarium*, he "had was fed up" with the stormy sea and disembarked on the first land he saw,⁹ and on the feast of Saint Martin we find him on the island of Corfu.¹⁰ However, some chroniclers suggest that it was not the storm that washed him ashore, but rather his decision to dock. Some does not even mention that a storm damaged his boat, and nor are we informed that his fleet, which was a day or two ahead of him, was also caught in a storm. It may also seem that Corfu was a detour from the outset, and the King did not take the "standard" route.¹¹ The fact that most of the fleet set sail at a different time indicates that Richard intended to go a separate way. Had a storm indeed occurred, once it had passed, the fleet could have waited for the king, even on land. It would have made sense to send a vessel back to find out what happened to the king. Corfu is not far from the ports of Italy, so it should not have been difficult to send out a few men. However, we do not have any information about this, it seems that no one in the landing fleet was interested in the whereabouts of the king. His consort, Berengaria, his sister, Joan, Queen of Sicily and the senior members of the court and the army also made their way on to Rome or England as if nothing had happened. Oddly, they were not conflicted by the fact that Richard did not get ashore in Italy. As if sources suggest that Richard's detour had been planned beforehand. The search for the king does not yet begin even when his "great ship" arrives in Brindisi in November.¹² Does no one care why the king is not on board?

Many of our sources do not mention a heavy sea tempest at all. Admittedly, Ralph of Coggeshall does speak at length about a storm, but long before the landing at Corfu. He does not however relate whether Richard was stranded because of the storm or because his boat was damaged. The monarch sailed for six weeks, "heading for Barbary", and he was even claimed to have approached Marseille at a distance of three days' voyage.¹³ If he got so close to the mainland, how did he end up later in Corfu? Something made him veer towards the Adriatic? It seems that it was not just about Richard drifting to Corfu, but that he chose the *unusual* route. The "natural" thing to do would have been to land in a well-known Italian port, either Brindisi, like most pilgrims and crusaders did, or, Messina. From the former, he could have made his way gone overland through Italy. Ralph of Cogges-

⁷ Ralph de Diceto, *Ymagines historiarum*. In: *Radulphi de Diceto decani Lundoniensis Opera Historica*. Vol. I–II. Ed. Stubbs, William. (RS, 68.) London, 1876. Vol. II., 106.

⁸ Ambroise, *L'Estoire*, 327. vv. 12200–12210.

⁹ "ex diutina tumultuantis pelagi jactatione jam pertaesus navigationis, quam citius potuit applicuit terrae primo visae" – *Itinerarium*, 442.

¹⁰ Ralph de Diceto, *Ymagines*, Vol. II., 106.

¹¹ Landon, Lionel, *The Itinerary of King Richard I*. London, 1935. 69.

¹² Schreiber, Albert, "Drei Beiträge zur Geschichte der deutschen Gefangenschaft des Königs Richard Löwenherz", = *Historische Vierteljahrschrift* 26, 1931, 268–294. 276.; Kessler, Ulrike, *Richard I. Löwenherz: König, Kreuzrzer, Abenteurer*. Graz, 1995. 249.

¹³ [Ralph of Coggeshall] *Radulphi de Coggeshall Chronicon anglicanum*. Ed. Stevenson, Joseph. (RS, 66.) London, 1875. 53.

shall seems to have learned that the king decided to return home secretly through Germany, *which is why* he turns towards Corfu.¹⁴

Who or what was the King of England afraid of? Obviously, of the King of France. Richard believed that it was Philip who must have been behind his capture. Months before his return home, he had already received news of how his younger brother, John was troubling his country – into whose ears his “benevolent”, the King of France, was murmuring.¹⁵ Many persuaded Richard that it was time for him to return home.¹⁶ Philip Augustus hastened to let Emperor Henry VI know that he knew from “reliable sources” that Richard had been involved in the murder of Conrad of Montferrat.¹⁷ With this, the French who stayed there slandered the king already in the Holy Land. The King of France spent a long time persuading the emperor about the treachery of Richard. He first made an alliance with him against England in 1191,¹⁸ and then ordered throughout the Empire that Richard be arrested, even with arms, and handed over to him, dead or alive.¹⁹ According to English chroniclers, it was clearly Philip’s intrigue that turned Henry against Richard.²⁰

Richard was indeed afraid of the connings of Philip. Arnold of Lübeck believes that he intended to return home by another route, for he feared that Philip resented his failure to marry his daughter, Alais (Alys) whom Richard had betrothed.²¹ According to Ansbert, he did not set off at the same time as his army because he was worried about the dealings of the King of France.²² Richard was also aware

¹⁴ “disposuit per Teutonicam latenter repatriare, retortisque velis, apud Covrefo insulam applicuit” – Ibid.

¹⁵ Itinerarium, 358–359.

¹⁶ Itinerarium, 126.

¹⁷ Kessler, Richard, 1995. 267–268.; Gillingham, John, “Coeur de Lion in Captivity”, = *Quaestiones medii aevi novae* 18, 2013, 59–83. 60.

¹⁸ 4–8 December 1191: *Regesta Imperii* [hereinafter RI] IV/3.3. 3. Abteilung: *Die Regesten des Kaiserreiches unter Heinrich VI. 1165 (1190)–1197*. Nachträge und Ergänzungen, bearb. von Katrin und Gerhard Baaken†. Elektronische pdf-Ressource. Mainz, 2015. [http://www.regesta-imperii.de/fileadmin/user_upload/downloads/Baaken_Heinrich_VI.pdf – 28 July 2021] no. 192.

¹⁹ RI IV/3.3. no. 193.; Roger of Hoveden, *Chronica magistri de Houdene*. Ed. Stubbs, William. (RS, 51.) London, 1868–71. Vol. III., 167.; Csendes, Peter, *Heinrich VI*. Darmstadt, 1993. 122.; Kessler, Richard, 1995. 176. note 348.; Berg, Dieter, *Richard Löwenherz*. Darmstadt, 2007. 175.

²⁰ Richard of Devizes, *Chronicon Ricardi Divisiensis de rebus gestis Ricardi Primi, Regis Angliae*. Ed. Stevenson, Joseph, London, 1838. 75.; Roger of Hoveden, *Chronica*, Vol. III., 167.; Thon, Alexander, “...wo Hochverräter gegen das Reich auf ewig dem Kerker übergeben werden. Die Gefangenschaft König Richards I. von England 1192–1194 in Österreich und Deutschland und insbesondere auf Burg Trifels”, In. Imhoff, Andreas (Hrsg.), *Politik und Kultur der Staufer*. Annweiler, 2016. 53–176. 130.

²¹ “nec reversus est via qua venerat. Timuerat enim regem Francie” – Arnold of Lübeck, *Chronica Slavorum*. MGH SS 21. Hrsg. Lappenberg, J. M., Hannover, 1869. 115–250. 149.

²² “timore regis Francie” – [Ansbert] *Historia de expeditione Friderici*. MGH SS rerum Germanicarum. N. S., 5. *Quellen zur Geschichte des Kreuzzuges Kaiser Friedrichs I*.

that several of his castles in Normandy had been seized, even though Philip II had given his word that he would not attack the lands of Richard as long as he was wearing the sign of Cross. The Pope also prohibited Philip from going to war against the Plantagenet provinces.²³ Philip Augustus approached Prince John and several barons of Normandy to take his side. There was a serious risk of an attack on England.²⁴ Obviously, had Richard not feared the King of France, he would have gone to Brindisi or Messina, and from there through Italy. Indeed the army, the entourage and Queen Berengaria did just that.²⁵ The crusaders who arrived in England by Christmas knew nothing about the King.²⁶

The natural, logical course of action would have been if Richard's ship had run into a storm, forcing him to harbour in Corfu, for example, to contact King Tancred of Sicily, so that he could cross to Apulia, even repairing the damaged ships. This would have been the normal way. They could have brought help from Brindisi. In 1191, Henry VI planned a campaign against Sicily, meaning that Tancred was dependent on the support of Richard. The Emperor also brought in the Ghibelline Pisa and Genova, and their fleets were then cruising in the western basin of the Mediterranean. Thus, if Richard had wanted to continue his journey from Brindisi or Messina to Marseille, he would have faced their galleys.

The king of England had already received news in the Holy Land, and during his voyage, that it was not advisable to dock at Marseilles or anywhere else in Provence, because if he continued his voyage by land, the Count of Toulouse, Raymond V "set his eyes on him". In 1192, the count had a confrontation with England since he wished to take advantage of Richard's absence and lay his hands on certain Plantagenet territories. He launched a war, but was repulsed as far as the walls of Toulouse. Richard would not have been safe travelling through Toulouse's sphere of influence.²⁷ Moreover, even if he got beyond Toulouse, he could not have been safe in his own provinces, for Philip Augustus II was now waging open war, and even turned some of Richard's vassals against him. Furthermore, the Capetians were more influential to east of the Rhône, in the Rhine region bordering Lorraine, Alsace and Burgundy, and the hands of the Staufs reached

Hrsg. Chroust, Anton, Hannover, 1928. 1–115. 101.

²³ Itinerarium, 224, 443.; Benedict of Peterborough, *Gesta regis Henrici Secundi Benedicti Abbatis*. Vol. I–II. Ed. Stubbs, William. (RS, 49.) London, 1867. Vol. II., 229.

²⁴ Itinerarium, 351.

²⁵ He arrived in Rome in January 1193. Roger of Hoveden, *Chronica*, Vol. III., 194, 228–229.; Ralph of Coggeshall, *Chronicon*, 52.; Landon, *Itinerary*, 1935. 69, 74.; RI IV. *Lothar III. und ältere Staufer 1125–1197*. Hrsg. Böhmer, Johann Friedrich. IV/4. *Vierte Abteilung. Papstregesten 1124–1198*. Teil 4.: 1181–1198. *Lieferung 5.: 1191–1195. Cölestin III*. Erarbeitet von Ulrich Schmidt. Köln, 2018. no. 688, 846.; Lateran, 9 April 1193: Queen Berengaria's charter: *Calendar of Documents Preserved in France 918–1206*. Ed. Round, J. Horace, London, 1899. 95. no. 278.

²⁶ Landon, *Itinerary*, 1935. 69.; Roger of Hoveden, *Chronica*, Vol. III., 194.; Kessler, Richard, 1995. 249.

²⁷ Landon, *Itinerary*, 1935. 69.; Brundage, James A., *Richard Lion Heart. A biography*. New York, 1974. 174.; Gillingham, John, *Richard I*. New York, 1978. 220.

even beyond the western frontiers of the Empire. Henry VI was not naïve either: he sensed that the King of France needed his support *now* against Richard to fulfil his long-held dream of seizing the fiefs of the Plantagenets. And the emperor was in need of support for his planned campaign in Sicily.

According to Landon, Richard had long intended to go to Marseille, but when he was approaching Tunis, fearing the Count of Toulouse and Philip II, he changed his mind and turned towards Corfu. He was also plagued by seasickness, which is why he always travelled on a massive, large ship.²⁸ The end of autumn was also approaching, and only a few ventured out to the open sea at this time. I, however, do not think that this was the only reason why he changed course and anchored in Corfu, and strongly doubt that this was the motive behind why he did not harbour in the nearby port of Brindisi. And if the sea was indeed rough on him, why did he continue on the Adriatic?

Nevertheless, the opponents of the King of England must also have been prepared for Richard landing at Brindisi, and travelling north overland across the Alps, to avoid the route through Toulouse. Even King Philip could not have expected him to turn around and sail up the Adriatic and land in Friaul (Friuli). And even if he had expected this eventuality, it would have been reasonable for Richard to pass through Venetian territory heading north-west. But the fact that he suddenly appeared in Görz (Gorizia) and Carinthia, heading for the heart of the Empire and then turned east to Vienna, astonished even the Capetian ruler, who was obviously waiting for him on the other side of the Brenner and St. Bernard passes. It is conceivable that Richard planned his journey home on this route initially, in order to circumvent the ambush of his opponents: he would go through Germany, where he would be least likely to be sought. Ralph of Coggeshall believed it was only natural that he was secretly planning to return home through Germany.²⁹ This is why he planned to switch to smaller boats to be as inconspicuous as possible.³⁰ Perhaps the storm even served him well, as it gave him the opportunity to hide in the Adriatic, while the spies of the King of France in Brindisi were waiting anxiously to see when Richard would show up.

The king arrived in Corfu on around 20 November. The island was Byzantine territory, and the king “did not want to be seen here”.³¹ The earlier conquest of Cyprus and the imprisonment of the island’s ruler, Isaac Comnenus, led to conflict between England and Constantinople, and the king may have felt that he was in danger if he was in the Byzantine sphere of influence, but it is unlikely that this alone would have led him to rapidly leave Corfu. Torn by the struggles for the throne, Byzantium was not at the height of its power, and the basileus did not really reach the western shores either. The King of England had nothing to fear from him, he had the Crusader fleet at his side. If he had drifted to the island, he

²⁸ William of Newburgh, *Historia*, Vol. I., 382.; *Itinerarium*, 442.; Brundage, Richard, 1974. 175.

²⁹ “disposuit per Teutonicam latenter repatriare” – Ralph of Coggeshall, *Chronicon*, 53.

³⁰ Gillingham, Richard, 1978. 222.

³¹ *Itinerarium*, 442.

would not have had to flee post-haste to the north along the Adriatic, deviating from the usual route. According to several chroniclers, the king and some of his men boarded one (or two, or three) pirate ships.³² Here Richard is now trying to disguise himself.³³ He wants his adversaries to think he is still with the fleet. He sets sail on the Adriatic – except in the opposite direction to his fleet. Roger of Hoveden, who is most likely the best informed, knows nothing about the storm, nor about the need to anchor in Corfu because of it, nor about any pirates. He only tells that Richard is turning back, and with some of his men is boarding three galleys coming from the Byzantine (“Romania”) coast. According to a letter of which Roger of Hoveden reports, written by Henry VI to Philip II, Richard set sail for the country of the King of France, but the tempest damaged his ship and he was shipwrecked. The emperor, however, is unaware of any pirates or any transfer to another ship(s).³⁴

Disembarkation

As to the question of where Richard disembarked after Corfu – in *Sclavonia*, Ragusa, Zara, Pola, Italy – and what happened to him, I shall seek answers in a separate forthcoming study. Here I will concentrate on his route after his landing. Several sources believe that the king was again caught in a storm and was hurled ashore on the Adriatic coast, shipwrecked. This is perhaps the most widely known and accepted theory. It seems most likely that he came ashore in Italy, in the region of Aquileia or in Istria.³⁵ Ralph of Coggeshall does not know of any further storms or other shipwrecks: the pirates put him ashore, he says, he simply landed in the Adriatic, but he does not specify where.³⁶ The *Itinerarium* succinctly tells only that after the king left Corfu, he landed and was captured in the Duchy of Austria.³⁷ Ralph of Diceto – after Richard comes ashore – can only track him in Austria.³⁸ At Gervase of Canterbury, a possible shipwreck can only be hypothetically inferred from the fact that he arrives “unluckily” on Austrian soil. He does not mention pirates, or transfers to other ships. Yet it is significant how

³² Ralph of Coggeshall, *Chronicon*, 54.

³³ “regem dissimulans, piratis crudelibus se commisit intrepidus, habitu mutato sed non animo” – *Itinerarium*, 442.; “multis se dissimulabat” – Guillaume le Breton [Guillelmi Armorici], *La Philippide* [Philippidos Libri XII]. In: *Œuvres de Rigord et de Guillaume le Breton historiens de Philippe Auguste*. Publiées ... par Delaborde, H. E. Vol. I–II. Paris, 1882–85. Vol. I., 3–385. Vol. I., 110. v. 334.

³⁴ Roger of Hoveden, *Chronica*, Vol. III., 185, 195–196.; RI IV/3,1. *Die Regesten des Kaiserreiches unter Heinrich VI. 1165 (1190)–1197*. Nach Johann Friedrich Böhmer neuarbeitet von Gerhard Baaken. Köln, 1972–79. [hereinafter RI IV/3,1.] no. 271.; Rymer, Thomas, *Foedera, conventiones, literae, et cujuscunque generis acta publica, inter reges Angliae*. I–XVI. London, 1816. I/1. 55–56.

³⁵ Roger of Hoveden, *Chronica*, Vol. III., 195.

³⁶ Ralph of Coggeshall, *Chronicon*, 54.

³⁷ *Itinerarium*, 442.

³⁸ “transisset Venetiam et Aquileiam, terram ducis Austriae subintravit. A quo captus est in Wena” – Ralph de Diceto, *Ymagines*, Vol. II., 106.

he seems to know that Richard's affairs call him to Germany.³⁹ William of Newburgh reports that his ship drifts to the northern shores of the Adriatic.⁴⁰

Of the continental sources, Ansbert writes that Richard landed on the Istrian coast and continued his journey through Friaul. What's more, he believes that this is where he parted from his wife and her entourage.⁴¹ He does not mention the stops at Görz and Friesach described by other sources, instead he immediately places the king in Austria. According to Magnus of Reichersberg, the king's ship landed near Aquileia.⁴² Both the Annals of Admont and Marbach report that he sailed directly from the Ionian Sea – without a detour to Corfu – and continued his journey through Friaul and Carinthia. (They do not know about what happened in Görz.⁴³) Of the French sources, Rigord does not mention a storm, but says that the king landed between Venice and Aquileia.⁴⁴ Guillaume le Breton knows neither of a storm nor of a shipwreck: in his case, Richard has initially turned from the Ionian Sea to the Adriatic: his plan was to return home through the Empire, “in secret”, “disguising his royal dignity”.⁴⁵ Ernoul also suggests that Richard intended to return home via Germany: he landed in the region of Aquileia and headed towards the Empire. He was not cast here by the storm, he didn't land in Corfu, and he didn't hire pirate ships.⁴⁶ The *Estoire d'Eracles* has a similar wording.⁴⁷ All this does not contradict our assumption that Richard seemed to have planned in advance to continue his journey on the mainland with a few men.

³⁹ “dispositisque rebus in Alemanniam, et in terram ducis Ostrici tristi infortunatio appulsus est” – Gervase of Canterbury: *Gervasius Cantuariensis Opera Omnia. Historical works*. In: *The Chronicle of the Reigns of Stephen, Henry II, and Richard I*. Chronica. Vol. I., 513.

⁴⁰ “inter Aquileiam et Venetiam naufragium passus” – William of Newburgh, *Historia*, Vol. I., 382.

⁴¹ “Ubi uxorem et familiam totam [...] relinquens ipse per Forum Iulii” – Ansbert, *Historia*, 101.

⁴² “proiectus est in partes vicinas Aquilegiensibus” – *Chronicon Magni Presbiteri*, 520.

⁴³ “in Ionium mare delatus, et ad terram egressus, [...] Forum Iulii et Karinthiam [...] transivit” – *Continuatio Admuntensis*. MGH SS 9. Hrsg. Pertz, G. H., Hannover, 1851. 579–593. 587.; *Annales Marbacenses*. In: *Die Chronik Ottos von St. Blasien und die Marbacher Annalen*. Hrsg. Schmale, Franz-Josef, Darmstadt, 1998. 159–254. 186.; Thon, ...wo Hochverräter, 2016. 162.

⁴⁴ Rigord: *Gesta Philippi II Augusti regis Francorum. Histoire de Philippe Auguste*. Éd. Carpentier, Elisabeth – Pon, Georges – Yves Chauvin, Yves. Paris, 2006. 315–317.; Csákó, Judit, *Az Árpád-kori Magyarország a francia területen keletkezett elbeszélő kútfők tükrében*. Phd-értekezés [Árpád-age Hungary in the light of narrative sources written in French territory. Phd diss.]. Budapest, 2015. 371.; Csákó, *Az Árpád-kori*, 2023. 438.

⁴⁵ “Dissimulat regem [...] // [...] Ionie progressum denique ponto // Adria suscepit; a dextro remige lus // [...] navibus ille relictis // Imperiale [...] intrat” – Guillaume le Breton, *La Philippide*, Vol. I., 109. Vol. I., vv. 326–331.

⁴⁶ “Il ariverent priés d'Aquillée [...] si est l'entrée d'Allemagne, par devers de mer de Gresse” – *Chronique d'Ernoul et de Bernard le Trésorier*, publiée par Mas Latrie, L. de, Paris, 1871. 297.

⁴⁷ [L'Estoire d'Eracles] *L'Estoire de Eracles Empereur*. In: *Recueil des historiens des Croisades: Historiens occidentaux*. Vol. I–V. Paris, 1844–95. Vol. II., Paris, 1859. 201–202.

In disguise – the “pilgrim” and the “Templar”

Richard must have landed on around 10 December 1191.⁴⁸ The fact that the king wore a disguise is confirmed by several sources. According to the *Itinerarium*, he already disguised himself in Corfu.⁴⁹ William of Newburgh says he wanted to keep it a secret who he was.⁵⁰ At Roger of Hoveden, Richard did not want anyone to know that he was the King of England.⁵¹ Many write of a pilgrim disguise, and a fair number write of a Templar apparel,⁵² but Arnold of Lübeck writes of both.⁵³ The whole entourage disguised themselves. The fact that the ruler also took “real” Templars with him is a sign of awareness. Since they also took horses with them, they were preparing for the long overland journey through Germany.⁵⁴ Guillaume le Breton even notes that the Templar habitus provided greater security in the Empire.⁵⁵ (Admittedly, in his other, historical work, he no longer writes about a Templar disguise.⁵⁶) Anyway, friar also accompanied the king all the way.⁵⁷

Contemporary English narrative sources are well informed about the circumstances of Richard's capture. Ralph of Coggeshall and Roger of Hoveden got first-hand information from eyewitnesses.⁵⁸ Nowhere was safe for the king to stay. News of the famous castaway spread and the search for him began immediately.⁵⁹

⁴⁸ Landon, *Itinerary*, 1935. 70.

⁴⁹ “se regem dissimulans, habito mutato sed non animo” – *Itinerarium*, 442.

⁵⁰ “pro tempore propter casus incertos [...] celans personam” – William of Newburgh, *Historia*, Vol. I., 383

⁵¹ “noluit indicare quod esset rex Angliae, sed peregrini essent: [...] vestes et omnia caetera ad similitudinem gentis terrae illius” – Roger of Hoveden, *Chronica*, Vol. III., 186.

⁵² “mutato habitu incenderet ut Templarius” – Gervase of Canterbury, *Chronica*, Vol. I., 513.; “quidam fratres Templi” – Ralph of Coggeshall, *Chronicon*, 54.

⁵³ “peregrino more nam Templariorum habitu se suosque induerat” – Arnold of Lübeck, *Chronica*, 179.

⁵⁴ “si entra en une galee la ou li Templier estoient et prist conge a sa feme et a sa maisnee. [...] avec lui en la galee por faire le prendre [...] il porquistrent chevaus asses et monterent sus et alerent par Alemaigne.” – *L'Estoire d'Eracles*, 201–202.; “Li Templier et li rois [...] pourquisent cevauceures assés, et montèrent sus et alerent par Alemaigne.” – Ernoul, *Chronique*, 297–298.

⁵⁵ “Imperiale solum cultu Templarius intrat // Privato ut tectus habitu securior iret” – Guillaume le Breton, *La Philippide*, Vol. I., 110. vv. 331–332.; See Csákó, *Az Árpád-kori*, 2015. 306.

⁵⁶ “dissimulavit et habitu et splendore quantum potuit eminentiam regale” – Guillaume le Breton, *Gesta Philippi Augusti*. In: *Œuvres de Rigord et de Guillaume le Breton*. Vol. II., 168–333. 195.; Csákó, *Az Árpád-kori*, 2015. 306.

⁵⁷ “aussi comme je soie un Templiers” – Ernoul, *Chronique*, 296.

⁵⁸ Ralph of Coggeshall, *Chronicon*, 53–55.; Roger of Hoveden, *Chronica*, Vol. III., 198–199.; Norgate, Kate, *Richard the Lion Heart*. London, 1924. 268.; Gillingham, John, “The Kidnapped King: Richard I in Germany, 1192–1194”, = *German Historical Institute London, Bulletin* 30:1, 2008, 5–34. 19.; Thon, ...wo Hochverräter, 2016. 126. note 123.

⁵⁹ “Nam cito percrebruit insignem naufragum latere vel oberrare in terra illa. Mox nobilibus simul et populo ad vestigandum eum intentis” – William of Newburgh, *Historia*, Vol. I., 382.

The king was about to go north, through Friesach. It is possible that he deliberately chose a city belonging to the Archdiocese of Salzburg. Since he might indeed have feared Leopold, he wanted to avoid Upper Austria. If he headed straight north, he had to traverse the Pontebba Pass through Udine to reach Villach, which is a considerable distance, about 235 km, and not an easy terrain in wintertime.⁶⁰ It is therefore conceivable that he chose the lower, easier route, bypassing the Dolomites from the east, which would explain why he almost fell into the hands of Count Meinhard in the county of Görz. In this case he set off in the direction of Görz, then bypassed the more difficult terrain through Laibach (Ljubljana), Carniola and Klagenfurt, and as Berthold II of Meran was the Margrave of Carniola and Ulrich II of the House of Sponheim was the Duke of Carinthia, he did not touch the territory of the Babenbergs but made his way through Sponheim and Meranian territories. This route was not short either, about 260 km. If we take Roger of Hoveden as a benchmark, the King completed the journey in four days. This was all but impossible under the conditions of the time. Even if Richard, who was used to soldiering, must have been used to the frantic pace, the more than 80 km a day, in winter, through the Alps, over difficult passes, tested even him. Our sources agree that the king was “incessantly harassed”, and was also pursued by the family of the Margraves of Montferrat, who had estates not far away in the north of Italy and who were agitated by Philip II and held the king responsible for the death of Conrad. According to Ralph of Coggeshall, Philip found out that Richard was travelling in disguise, so he laid a trap for him.⁶¹

Word spread that a royal figure disembarked, and the Count of Görz, Meinhard II, who was indeed related to the House of Montferrat, was looking for him, and captured eight of his entourage.⁶² Richard hastily moved on in the middle of the night.⁶³ Meinhard did not pursue him, but sent spies after him and reported him to the Duke of Austria. The king was now being chased by Meinhard's brother, Engelbert III.⁶⁴ Engelbert had those *hospitia* searched where pilgrims usually stayed. He ordered that all pilgrims be stopped.⁶⁵ In the Marbach Annals, he is also involved in an armed conflict with Richard, in which several of the king's men are captured or killed, and the monarch himself is only able to flee wounded to Styria.⁶⁶

⁶⁰ Kessler, Richard, 1995. 250.

⁶¹ Ralph of Coggeshall, *Chronicon*, 53.

⁶² “Mainardus Gorzite et populus regionis [...] audito quod in terra Goritz erat, [...] insecuti sunt, [...] intendentes eum captivare. Ipso autem rege in fugam converso ceperunt de suis octo milites.” – Roger of Hoveden, *Chronica*, Vol. III., 195.; Rymer, *Foedera*, 1816. I/1. 55.; Broughton, Bradford B., *The Legends of King Richard Coeur de Lion*. Paris, 1966. 112.; Thon, ...wo Hochverräter, 2016. 72.

⁶³ Ralph of Coggeshall, *Chronicon*, 55.

⁶⁴ *Annales Marbacenses*, 186.; According to Rigord, Meinhard himself was chasing the king. Rigord, *Gesta*, 314.

⁶⁵ Brundage, Richard, 1974. 179.; Kessler, Richard, 1995. 251.

⁶⁶ “persecutus comes Engelhardus et cum eo pugna congressus, multis ex parte regis captis vel occisis, ipse fuga lapsus et vulneratus in Stirensem.” – *Annales Marbacenses*, 186.

Richard was then able to go to Friesach, to seek protection against the Babenbergs from Adalbert III (Vojtěch) from the house of Přemysl, Archbishop of Salzburg, who, like his brother, Duke Ottokar I, was opposing the Hohenstaufen. Both Rigord and Newburgh point out that Friesach belonged to the archdiocese of Salzburg, which seems to confirm that Richard wanted to avoid the Duchy of Austria by heading for Salzburg and expected help from the Přemysl prelate against Leopold. Despite this, Friedrich II of Pettau, Vogt of Friesach, treated him with hostility.⁶⁷ He captured several of the king's knights and he had to flee from here as well.⁶⁸ The annalist of the monastery of Marbach claims that Frederick of Pettau, the *ministerialis* of the Archbishop of Salzburg, kept on chasing Richard. He was therefore unable to move towards Salzburg. According to Magnus of Reichersberg, some of Richard's men were killed. The King managed to escape, they could not catch up with him and did not know that he had moved to Austria.⁶⁹

Richard probably set off from Friesach on 17 December. His pursuers caused the king to "run away" from here too, now with only three companions left; and he reached Vienna terribly exhausted, after travelling for three days and three nights straight.⁷⁰ They did not even stop to have a meal, only in the outskirts, where they hoped to be able to hide more easily.⁷¹ At Ansbert, several of Richard's companions were captured, and he reached the environs of Vienna with only two companions, on foot, leaving much of his goods behind and losing their horses.⁷² Leopold made preparations, he set up an ambush for the 'pilgrim', watching the roads and passes.⁷³ At Ansbert, it was the duke's spies who discovered and captured him.⁷⁴

Even if they rode in the Mürz valley, they achieved a tremendous feat by riding from Friesach to Vienna.⁷⁵ It is 260 kilometres, and if they really travelled non-stop for three or four days, and rode 85 kilometres a day, it must have been

⁶⁷ *Annales Marbacenses*, 186.

⁶⁸ Rigord, *Gesta*, 314.; William of Newburgh, *Historia*, Vol. I., 382.

⁶⁹ "occisi etiam et captivatis hominibus suis, per partes Karintiae" – *Chronicon Magni Presbiteri*, 520.

⁷⁰ "processit rex ad burgum in archiepiscopatu Salzeburgensi, qui vocatur Frisorum" – Roger of Hoveden, *Chronica*, Vol. III., 195–196.; RI IV/3,1. no. 271.; "velocibus equis ascensis, [...] properans die ac nocte venit prope Viam et non longe ab ea, in [...] parva villa, ipse et comes suus hospitium ceperunt. [...] rex ex labore itineris fatigatus." – Roger of Hoveden, *Chronica*, 186.; Ansbert, *Historia*, 101–102.

⁷¹ Ralph of Coggeshall, *Chronicon*, 56.; Gillingham, Richard, 1978. 224.; Kessler, Richard, 1995. 251.

⁷² "a pluribus tamen cognitus et in via suis aliquibus captis, [...] rebus etiam suis perditis [...] Circa Wiennam siquidem latenter moratus, pedes" – Ansbert, *Historia*, 101–102.

⁷³ "observata strata, impositis ubique custodibus" – Roger of Hoveden, *Chronica*, Vol. III., 195–196.; RI IV/3,1. no. 271.; Rymer, *Foedera*, 1816. I/1. 55–56.; Arnold of Lübeck, *Chronica*, 179.; Volting, Gerhard, *Von Akkon nach Dürnstein. Herzog Leopold V. und König Richard Löwenherz*. Wels–Salzburg, 2016. 87.

⁷⁴ "per exploratores inventus et captus est" – Ansbert, *Historia*, 101–102.

⁷⁵ Gillingham, Richard, 1978. 224.; Kessler, Richard, 1995. 250.

incredibly exhausting. They had to cross the Semmering Pass.⁷⁶ Unsurprisingly, some believe that Richard had a fever of some kind, which is why they had to stop and seek some sort of shelter. We know that the monarch was ill for a long time before he set out on his journey.⁷⁷ Now even more exhausted from days and nights of vigorous riding, hunger finally forced the king to stop at an inn in just outside Vienna. He sent for food, but his servant was captured, who, to save his life, revealed who his lord was and where he was staying.⁷⁸ One is to wonder, however, if he had been galloping at full speed until now, why he stopped in the capital of his sworn enemy. Perhaps the explanation is that this was the best place to hide, in the suburbs, in the alleyways around the market at a gate of the city. Leopold himself went to apprehend him, but the king finally surrendered.⁷⁹

The Austrian annals of the time speak rather scantily of the king's captivity. The Melk, Kremsmünster and Admont annals mostly relate that the king is on his way here, and the emperor keeps an eye on the coastline to find out where he will land.⁸⁰ In contrast, contemporary German chroniclers almost bubble over with details of the monarch being forced to take shelter in a squalid hut, in an unsightly roadside cottage.⁸¹ About 15 years after the events, Otto of Sankt Blasien already wrote that the king, in order not to be recognised, was even willing to work in the kitchen in disguise as a simple servant. He cooked for himself and twirled the spit with his own hands.⁸² This motif appears many times in the sources, even after a long time.⁸³ The contemporary Pietro da Eboli, in his *Liber ad honorem Augusti*, addressed to Henry VI, also refers to the "royal

⁷⁶ Kessler, Richard, 1995. 250.

⁷⁷ Broughton, The Legends, 1966. 113.

⁷⁸ "in suburban" – William of Newburgh, *Historia*, Vol. I., 382.; "regem juxta Wenam, in villa viciniore" – Roger of Hoveden, *Chronica*, Vol. III., 195–196.; RI IV/3,1. no. 271.; "quandam villam nomine Ginanam" – Ralph of Coggeshall, *Chronicon*, 56.; "in quodam diversorium iuxta Viennam" – Otto of Sankt Blasien, *Chronica*, 110.; Gervase of Canterbury, *Chronica*, Vol. I., 513.; Thon, ...wo Hochverräter, 2016. 128.; Gillingham, *Coeur*, 2013. 67.; Kessler, Richard, 1995. 252.

⁷⁹ "Rex autem in hospitio suo humillime recubans [...] captus est." – Gervase of Canterbury, *Gesta regum*. In: *Opera omnia*. Vol. II., 89–90.; William of Newburgh, *Historia*, Vol. I., 383–384.

⁸⁰ *Continuation Mellicenses*. MGH SS 9. Hrsg. Pertz, G. H., Hannover, 1851. 501–535. 506.; *Continuatio Cremifacensis*. IMGH SS 9. 544–549. 548.; *Continuatio Admuntensis*. MGH SS 9. 587.

⁸¹ "Ibi captus in parvo tuguriolo prope civitatem Wiene." – *Annales Marbacenses*, 186.; "in vili hospitio [...] captus est." – Ansbart, *Historia*, 101–102.; "in domo despecta captivavit" – Roger of Hoveden, *Chronica*, Vol. III., 195–196.; RI IV/3,1. no. 271.; Görich, Knut, "Verletzte Ehre: König Richard Löwenherz als Gefangener Kaiser Heinrichs VI.", = *Historisches Jahrbuch* 123, 2003, 65–91. 65–67.; Pfaff, Carl, "Der gefangene König", = *Basler Zeitschrift für Geschichte und Altertumskunde* 71, 1971, 9–35. 10.; Kessler, Richard, 1995. 251.

⁸² "ne agnosceretur, in coctione pulmentorum per se dans operam, altile ligno affixum propria manu vertens assabat" – Otto of Sankt Blasien, *Chronica*, 110.

⁸³ Volting, Von Akkon, 2016. 88–89.

cook” who posed as a servant in ragged clothes.⁸⁴ Eboli also illustrated Richard’s capture with drawings.⁸⁵ At Magnus of Reichersberg he was found hiding in a peasant’s hut, in the kitchen, where he cooked with his own hands for himself and his companions.⁸⁶

French narrative sources adopt the kitchen motif as well. Richard put on a nasty, filthy apron before going into the kitchen and turning the capons on the spit.⁸⁷ The king dressed as a kitchen servant descends into doing menial, manual labour.⁸⁸ He is willing to take the clothes from the kitchen *garçon* in an attempt to escape.⁸⁹

The captivity

Finally, near a village next to Vienna, the Duke of Austria discovered Richard the Lionheart and captured him.⁹⁰ Richard evidently sought to avoid Vienna, but the most effective way to disappear in the crowd seemed to be entering the suburbs, as they needed to procure supplies. Hence he was found in an inn.⁹¹ The chronicles of Melk and Zwettl unanimously identify Erdberg (“Erpurch”, “Erturch”) as the place where the king stayed, which is today a part of Vienna but was located approximately five kilometres from the city walls at that

⁸⁴ “Turpis ad obsequium turpe minister erat. // Quid prodest versare dapes, servire culine?” // Rex sub veste latens, male nam vestitus ut ospan – [Pietro da Eboli] *Des Magisters Petrus de Ebulo Liber ad honorem Augusti*. Hrsg. Winkelmann, Eduard, Leipzig, 1874. 50–51. vv. 1047–1051.; 1074–1078.; 1081–1084.

⁸⁵ Petrus de Ebulo: *Liber ad honorem Augusti sive De rebus Siculis*. Bern, Burgerbibliothek, Cod. 120.II. 55 ff. ca. 1195 – ca. 1197. f. 129r.: “illustris Rex Anglie a Jerosolimis rediens captus presentatur augusto; Rex Anglie de morte Marchionis accusatur. Quod abnegans se ensiva manu excusaturum promit; Tandem veniam petens liber absoluitur.” Image: *e-codices - Virtuelle Handschriftenbibliothek der Schweiz*. Redigiert von Florian Mittenhuber, Februar 2018. [<https://www.e-codices.unifr.ch/de/bbb/0120-2//129r> – 19 January 2024] See Appendix. Fig 1–2.

⁸⁶ “profugus devenisset [...], occultans se in tugurio cuiusdam pauperis, et cibos propriis manibus sibi et sociis [...] in officina rustica preparans” – *Chronicon Magni Presbiteri*, 519–520.

⁸⁷ “Il prist une malvaise cote, si le jeta en son dos pour lui desconnoistre [...] si entra en le quisine, et si s’asist pour tourner les capons au fu.” – Ernoul, *Chronique*, 298.; “Il prist une mauvaie cote si la geta en son dos por lui desconnoistre; si entra en la cuisine et sasist por torner les chapons au fue.” – *L’Estoire d’Eracles*, 201–202.

⁸⁸ “Quid prodest versare dapes, servire culine? // Quid juvat officio dominum vilescere servi? // Quid flexisse viam, vestes mutasse, suoque” – Guillaume le Breton, *La Philippide*, Vol. I., 111. vv. 343–346.; Guillaume le Breton, *Gesta*, Vol. I., 195.

⁸⁹ “Quant il se perçut, si prist la robe à un garçon, et se mist en la cuisine à tourner les chapons” – *Recits d’un ménestrel de Reims au treizième siècle*. Éd. Wailly, Natalis de, Paris, 1876. 34–35.

⁹⁰ “regem juxta Viennam in villa viciniore in domo despecta [...] captivavit et omnibus bonis suis exspoliavit” – Rigord, *Gesta*, 316.

⁹¹ Kessler, Richard, 1995. 354.; Volting, Von Akkon, 2016. 89.

time.⁹²⁹³ Nevertheless, Erdberg, situated southeast of Vienna, provided a strategic location for those seeking to bypass the city without crossing the Danube and heading eastward. Assuming that the king intended on reaching Bohemia while circumventing the city, he could not risk crossing the Danube at its western crossings (Klosterneuburg, Tulln). Instead, it was worthwhile to continue eastward and cross at the less congested Hainburg, from where he could soon enter Bohemian territory through Marchfeld and towards Marchegg. To avoid Vienna, after reaching the Vienna Basin, Richard needed to continue eastward, as the hilly terrain to the west of the road made it impractical – especially in winter – to head directly towards Moravia, forcing him to take a detour.⁹⁴

The monarch was in a hurry, aiming to reach England as soon as possible. It is noteworthy that Richard was capable of significant riding feats. He travelled with only 2–3 companions, not with an entourage, at a fast pace, reminiscent of a charge, to which he, a ‘child of the sword’, was accustomed. Often, he lived continuously in the saddle for months. Cœur de Lion could potentially cross the Alps in just a few days at a breakneck pace – a task impossible for most.

For him, escape and hiding were integral to warfare, viewing them as a withdrawal in enemy territory. He remained unwavering in adhering to the rules of war, and even in the face of adversity. As a precaution, he exchanged his Templar attire for local merchant-appropriate clothing.⁹⁵ If recognition was a concern, it was his appearance, figure, and demeanour that posed the risk, given the challenge of concealing himself with his long beard and hair.⁹⁶

“The Lion in Winter” – Dürnstein⁹⁷

On 21 December, the king was captured and taken to Dürnstein Castle (also known as Tyernstein or Dirinstein).⁹⁸ Situated in the Wachau Gorge along the Danube, the castle was positioned on a difficult-to-reach elevation.⁹⁹ Although Leopold might have had personal reasons to seek retribution for his own grievances, the capture of the king was not justified, as neither the Duke of Austria,

⁹² Schreiber, *Drei Beiträge*, 1931. 279.; “in Erpurch prope Wiennam” – *Annales Zwetlenses*. MGH SS 9. Hrsg. Pertz, G. H., Hannover, 1851. 677–687. 679.; in Erpurch – *Continuatio Praedicatorum Vindobonensium*. MGH SS 9. 724–732. 726.; Opll, Ferdinand, *Alte Grenzen im Wiener Raum*. Wien, 1986. 130.; Volting, Von Akkon, 2016. 87–88.

⁹³ Kessler, Richard, 1995. 251.; Thon, ...wo Hochverräter, 2016. 74.

⁹⁴ Schreiber, *Drei Beiträge*, 1931. 282ff.

⁹⁵ “mutato habitu incederet ut Templarius [...] dicerent [...] homines essent mercatoris” – Gervase of Canterbury, *Chronica*, Vol. I., 513.

⁹⁶ “ipse barbam haberet prolixam, et capillos prolixos” – Roger of Hoveden, *Chronica*, Vol. III., 186.

⁹⁷ Reference to Henry II: James Golden, *The Lion in Winter* (1966). Film version: 1968. Directed by Anthony Harvey.

⁹⁸ *Annalium Salisburgensium additamentum*. MGH SS 13. Hrsg. Wattenbach, Wilhelm Waitz, Georg, Hannover, 1881. 236–241. 240.

⁹⁹ Radulph of Coggeshall, *Chronicon*, 53.; Roger of Hoveden, *Chronica*, Vol. III., 187.; Landon, *Itinerary*, 1935. 71.; *Annales Marbacenses*, 186.; Ansbert, *Historia*, 102.

nor his liege lord was in war with England. Therefore, the capture of the king was ‘unofficial’ as per legal standards and he did not qualify as a prisoner of war under the prevailing laws.¹⁰⁰ Leopold could have challenged the king to a duel, but in reality, this option only arose after the *miles Christi* returned home, as until then he was protected by the sign of the Cross stitched onto his chest. Therefore, theoretically, he could not have laid a hand on the traveller. In her letters of complaint to Pope Celestine III, Dowager Queen Eleanor of Aquitaine emphasised that “the pilgrim of the Crucified” had been put in chains.¹⁰¹ Immediately upon learning of the king’s capture, the emperor formally ordered Leopold to release him,¹⁰² though in practice Henry VI consistently treated him as a prisoner of war,¹⁰³ asserting that the king had rightfully fallen into captivity as the “enemy of the Empire” and a “disturber of peace” (“*turbator pacis*”, “*inimicus imperii nostri*”), and is now within his jurisdiction (“*in nostra potestate*”).¹⁰⁴ Henry VI may have sensed the weakness of the accusation, as he explicitly stated in his letter to Philip that the English king was also a traitor.¹⁰⁵ According to him, he betrayed the crusading idea through the alleged assassination of Conrad of Montferrat.¹⁰⁶

Naturally, the cunning King Philip did not remain idle either. He dispatched envoys to Austria to renounce his vassalage to Richard and declare war on him. Moreover, he offered a considerable sum to ensure that Richard would be held under stricter confinement.¹⁰⁷

The English government initiated negotiations for the release of Richard almost immediately after learning of the monarch’s captivity.¹⁰⁸ The Bishop of Bath and Wells,¹⁰⁹ along with two Cistercians, the Abbots of Boxley and Rob-

¹⁰⁰ Gillingham, Coeur, 2013. 60.; Volging, Von Akkon, 2016. 93.

¹⁰¹ “*filium meum militem Christi, [...] peregrinum Crucifixi, vinculis alligatum Imperatori vendidit*” – Rymer, Foedera, 1816. I/1. 58–59.; *Petri Blesensis Bathoniensis archidiaconi opera omnia*. Vol. I–II. Ed. Giles, J. A., Oxford, 1847. Vol. II., Epistolae, 64. no. 145.

¹⁰² Volging, Von Akkon, 2016. 91.

¹⁰³ RI IV/3,1. no. 271.; Rymer, Foedera, 1816. I/1. 55–56.;

¹⁰⁴ Jericke, Hartmut, “Richard Löwenherz als Gefangener Kaiser Heinrichs VI. Ein Beitrag über die Hintergründe und Motive”, = *Meilungen des Historischen Vereins der Pfalz* 115, 2017, 115–139. 125.; Csendes, Heinrich, 1993. 124.; Berg, Richard, 2007. 192–196.

¹⁰⁵ RI IV/3,1. no. 271.; Rymer, Foedera, 1816. I/1. 55–56.

¹⁰⁶ Roger of Hoveden, *Chronica*, Vol. III., 195.; Gillingham, *The Kidnapped*, 2008. 16.; Norgate, Richard, 1924. 271.

¹⁰⁷ William of Newburgh, *Historia*, Vol. I., 389. Philip had vassal estates in Aquitaine, Anjou and Normandy, whose liege lord was the king of England.

¹⁰⁸ Roger of Hoveden, *Chronica*, 196–197.; Rymer, Foedera, 1816. I/1. 59.

¹⁰⁹ Roger of Hoveden, *Chronica*, Vol. III., 197.; Norgate, Richard, 1924. 275.; Kessler, Richard, 1995. 256.

ertsbridge, travelled to Germany.¹¹⁰ By the end of March, they were able to meet their sovereign in Ochsenfurt accompanied by the emperor.¹¹¹

The 'King's speech'

The extradition negotiations took place in Speyer.¹¹² In the initial days, the parties were far from reaching an agreement.¹¹³ In fact, the emperor presented his accusations: Richard allegedly hired assassins to send Conrad to his death and even organised an attempt on the life of King Philip.¹¹⁴ It is noteworthy that a significant portion of the accusations is not disclosed by German chroniclers, except for the Marbach Annals.¹¹⁵ Even German commentators found the absurd allegations of the assassination unbelievable. This notion started to gain traction when the French envoys arrived. Richard adamantly rejected the humiliating accusations.¹¹⁶ He suspected Philip Augustus was behind them and was even ready to challenge him to a duel.¹¹⁷ In an illustration of Pietro da Eboli, he immediately drew his sword to challenge those who tarnished his name.¹¹⁸

Richard marshalled a significant faction of the assembly to his cause, although they themselves already regarded the insinuation as lacking merit. It is imperative to underscore that the opposition of the Staufs had previously disagreed with the king's apprehension and had convened to hold Henry accountable for ordering the assassination of the Bishop of Liège. The imperial opposition could not pardon the killing of Albert of Leuven in November 1192, and Henry could not disentangle himself from the accusations of complicity in the crime. The emperor might have sensed the momentary shift in the situation and extended a conciliatory gesture to the English monarch.¹¹⁹ Henry found it necessary to alter his strategy: he agreed to facilitate negotiations for a settlement between the French

¹¹⁰ Roger of Hoveden, *Chronica*, Vol. III., 196–197.; Gervase of Canterbury, *Chronica*, Vol. I., 514.; Norgate, Richard, 1924. 276.; Thon, ...wo Hochverräter, 2016. 76.; Kessler, Richard, 1995. 354.

¹¹¹ RI IV/3,3. no. 222.; Roger of Hoveden, *Chronica*, Vol. III., 197–198.; Gervase of Canterbury, *Chronica*, Vol. I., 514.; Norgate, Richard, 1924. 276.; Thon, ...wo Hochverräter, 2016. 76.; Kessler, Richard, 1995. 354.; Mayer, Hans Eberhard, "A Ghost Ship called Frankenef: King Richard I's German Itinerary", = *English Historical Review* 115, 2000, No. 460/Feb: 134–144. 136–137.

¹¹² Henry VI in Speyer: RI IV/3,1. no. 285, 286.; RI IV/3,3. no. 226.

¹¹³ Roger of Hoveden, *Chronica*, Vol. III., 199.

¹¹⁴ 22 March: RI IV/3,3. no. 225.; Ralph of Coggeshall, *Chronicon*, 58.; Roger of Hoveden, *Chronica*, Vol. III., 199.; Berg, Richard, 2007. 195.

¹¹⁵ *Annales Marbacenses*, 180–182.

¹¹⁶ Roger of Hoveden, *Chronica*, Vol. III., 199.; William of Newburgh, *Historia*, Vol. I., 387–388.; Radulph of Coggeshall, *Chronicon*, 58–60.; Gillingham, *The Kidnapped*, 2008. 19.

¹¹⁷ "Arguat, armatus veniat, subeatque duellum // Me contra, si me super hoc convicere possit" – Guillaume le Breton, *La Philippide*, Vol. I., 113. vv. 398–399.

¹¹⁸ Eboli, *Liber*, 51. vv. 1074–77.

¹¹⁹ *Epistolae Cantuarienses*: In: *Chronicles and Memorials of the Reign of Richard I*. Vol. II., 361–362. no. 398.

king and England. The emperor could not afford to leave his realm with a stirred-up opposition and a captive ruler. Adolphe I, Archbishop of Cologne forged an alliance against the Emperor with Conrad I Wittelsbach, Archbishop of Mainz; Ottokar I of Bohemia and Henry the Lion, Duke of Saxony, the prince deprived of his duchy. They also joined forces with the late bishop's brother and uncle, the Dukes of Brabant and Limburg.¹²⁰ This is partially the reason why Emperor Henry had hopes that the capture of Richard would fortify the Capetian alliance, a leverage he could employ against the looming opposition. There was a risk that discontent in the Rhineland might find its way to the Welfs, who already sympathised with Richard. The opportunity presented itself, as all relevant parties convened in Speyer. There was also the concern that the agreement might fall apart, the emperor might retract, and the prisoner would be remanded to his cell. Richard, too, harboured fears that if Henry became increasingly isolated, he might surrender him to the French monarch.¹²¹ Henry the Lion perceived an opportunity to act in defence of his pilgrim brother-in-law. For Emperor Henry, increasingly divesting himself of the valuable yet cumbersome hostage it was a paramount concern. The presence of the captive could become all the more awkward. The longer he detained Richard in Germany, the opposition might eventually realise that his liberation could equip them with a strategic advantage.

In the background, agents of the English crown were already at work in the Stauf court.¹²² Hubert Walter, the Bishop of Salisbury arriving from the Holy Land to Italy, did not travel directly to England but proceeded straight to the Rhineland.¹²³ He, too, recognised the precarious nature of the English situation. On March 25, the agreement for the extradition of the king was signed.¹²⁴ Subsequently, Walter embarked on a journey towards England to facilitate the fulfilment of the conditions for the king's surrender.¹²⁵

In early April 1193, Richard was transported to Trifels Castle. While Leopold treated him as a knight who had surrendered, Emperor Henry VI already regarded him, in the contemporary sense, as a political prisoner. Trifels was inherently used as a prison, housing those deemed 'traitors' to the Empire for life.¹²⁶ Perched at a high altitude, the weather in Trifels was harsh even in April. Access, both in and out, was impossible, and the prisoners were guarded by a doubled watch. The reason for bringing Richard into such a 'genuine' dungeon might have been to

¹²⁰ Norgate, Richard, 1924. 273.; Jericke, Richard, 2017. 132.

¹²¹ Landon, Itinerary, 1935. 74.; Roger of Hoveden, *Chronica*, Vol. III., 214.; William of Newburgh, *Historia*, Vol. I., 396–397.

¹²² Roger of Hoveden, *Chronica*, Vol. III., 204.; Norgate, Richard, 1924. 277.

¹²³ William of Newburgh, *Historia*, Vol. I., 389.

¹²⁴ RI IV/3,1. no. 284.; Roger of Hoveden, *Chronica*, Vol. III., 198–199.; William of Newburgh, *Historia*, Vol. I., 388.; Ralph de Diceto, *Ymagines*, Vol. II., 106.; Norgate, Richard, 1924. 274.

¹²⁵ Landon, Itinerary, 1935. 74.

¹²⁶ Ralph de Diceto, *Ymagines*, Vol. II., 107.; Norgate, Richard, 1924. 273.; Gillingham, *The Kidnapped*, 2008. 23.; Thon, ...wo Hochverräter, 2016. 79.

deter the opposition from entertaining the idea of freeing the captive.¹²⁷ The choice of Trifels had the advantage of being centrally located in Stauf territories, close to their *ministeriales*, and not far from the courts of Speyer and Worms. Therefore, if any action were taken to rescue the king, Henry would reach it first.¹²⁸

Nevertheless, the emperor's intention was not to break his opponent in inhumane conditions. The king's capture benefited the emperor due to the alliance with Philip Augustus. With the ransom, he could have strengthened his position in Germany for a while. He wanted to remove Richard from the political stage, keeping him as far away as possible from his rivals. Until the ransom arrived, Richard was to avoid contact with both the Welfs and the Stauf-opposing prelates. The emperor may have deemed it too risky for the king to remain at the court during this period.¹²⁹

In total, out of the 411 days of his captivity, he spent approximately five weeks in an actual prison cell. According to customary law, the confinement of the royal person was a form of *libera custodia* ("sub honorabili custodia"¹³⁰; "in libera clausus custodia"¹³¹). He enjoyed certain freedoms that were not granted to other prisoners. Although William of Newburgh writes that he was chained,¹³² according to several accounts, they only put shackles on his hands, not on his feet.¹³³ He was not constantly in chains, and his hands were only bound when he was transported.¹³⁴ However, from Speyer to Trifels, Henry had him transported in chains.¹³⁵ The Salzburg Annals exaggerate when it claims that he spent the entire year in chains at Trifels.¹³⁶ The fact that the majority of sources perceived that he was treated fairly indicates that under no circumstances throughout the entire day, was he ever in chains. The shackles and the watchful guard primarily served *those* who might contemplate the king's liberation. It signalled to the adversaries of the Staufs that Richard was 'within their power'. He was not held in captiv-

¹²⁷ "ad hoc ibi specialiter in loco munitissimo constitutum, ut illuc deportarentur et perpetuo traderentur carceri quicunque fuissent contra imperium de perduellione notati" – Ralph of Diceto, *Ymagines*, Vol. II., 107.; Görich, *Verletzte*, 2003. 76.

¹²⁸ Görich, *Verletzte*, 2003. 77.

¹²⁹ Gillingham, Richard, 1978. 229.

¹³⁰ *Continuatio Aquicinctina*, 430.

¹³¹ [Andreas von Marchiennes] *Andreae Marchianensis Historia regum Francorum*. *Continuationes*, Vol. I., MGH SS 26. Hrsg. Waitz, Georg, Hannover, 1882. 204–212. 212.; Görich, *Verletzte*, 2003. 74.; Pfaff, *Der gefangene König*, 1971. 14.; Norgate, Richard, 1924. 275.

¹³² "citra decus regium in vinculis servabatur" – William of Newburgh, *Historia*, Vol. I., 383.

¹³³ "Qui licet pedes regis in compedibus non humiliaverit, [...] quam si duris artasset in vinculis" – Ralph of Diceto, *Ymagines*, Vol. II., 106.

¹³⁴ Görich, *Verletzte*, 2003. 75.

¹³⁵ "regem sibi presentari iussit presentatumque Wormaciam asportari vinctum ferroque honustum precepit" – Otto of Sankt Blasien, *Chronica*, 110–112. Not Worms but Trifels.

¹³⁶ "regem [...] viculatum imperatori tradidit, quem imparatir toto illi anno vinctum tenuit" – *Annalium Salisburgensium additamentum*, 240.

ity but rather *in confinement*. The constant vigilance of armed guards day and night,¹³⁷ even standing watch with drawn swords around his bed at night, aimed to prevent any contact with the king.¹³⁸

It is conceivable that the emperor entertained the idea of extracting more favourable conditions from England. A suitor for Richard, King Philip II, emerged, from whom Henry hoped to secure even more than the negotiated ransom. As long as the emperor did not negotiate with the French, the king had to be kept secluded under truly strict supervision.

It seems plausible that Richard was hoping to reach the fiercest enemies of the Emperor and the Duke of Austria, in Saxony, the land of the Welfs – his relatives. As has been seen, his sister, Mathilda, was the consort of Henry the Lion, Duke of Saxony, an ‘old’ ally of the Plantagenets. From here, he would have quickly reached England on a good ship from a northern port. Hamburg and Lübeck traditionally had excellent relations with England. It is possible that this was the reason behind his landing in Corfu and sailing up the Adriatic to begin with. The urgency of the situation in Normandy made the king “impatient”, he wanted to get home faster than the main army and was eager to go to war again against Philip Augustus for the lands of his ancestors. William of Newburgh might suggest the same thing: Richard sent his sister and wife ahead, and instead of the slow, long sea voyage, or even the safer larger vessel, he boarded a fast ship and set sail with a small, lightly armed entourage.¹³⁹ He wanted to take a different route in the first place to save time. After disembarking, he was no longer exposed to the vicissitudes of nature, he held his destiny in his own hands: he wanted to ride across Europe on horseback, at breakneck speed, where no one would expect him. That would have been typical of Richard. He did not want to be delayed by the slow-moving fleet.

The easiest route to the Welfs was through the territory of their ally, Ottokar I, Duke of Bohemia. Richard was aware that the Přemysl prince was not on the best of terms with the Emperor. Perhaps his original intention was to try to reach Bohemia by bypassing Austria from the west, via the Archdiocese of Salzburg and Tyrol. This may explain why he went toward Friesach. Reaching Bohemia from Friesach through the Salzburg area did not seem impracticable. From there he only had to cross the border of the diocese of Passau and Austria. However, it is also possible that winter prevented his entry from the west, or that the roads

¹³⁷ “manu militum armatorum die noctuque vicissim vigilantium sub artissima tentus custodia” – Gervase of Canterbury, *Chronica*, Vol. I., 516.

¹³⁸ “militum et servorum turbam [...] qui eum in omnibus locis die noctuque gladiis accincti comitarentur, et lectulum regis ambirent, neminem suorum cum eo pernoctare permens” – Radulph of Coggeshall, *Chronicon*, 58.; Eickels, Klaus van, *Vom inszenierten Konsens zum systematisierten Konflikt. Die englisch-französischen Beziehungen und ihre Wahrnehmung an der Wende vom Hoch- zum Spätmittelalter*. Stuttgart, 2002. 392.

¹³⁹ “cum paucis expeditioribus agiliori navigio sequebatur [...] Impatientior quippe taedii, dum lentum et morosum latissimi aspernaretur, pelagi transitum, tutiorem gravioris navigii, et suo pondere minus timentis spiritus procellarum, evectionem recusavit” – William of Newburgh, *Historia*, Vol. I., 382.

to the north and west were blocked by the Babenbergs. Thus, the only route left open was that on which he was not expected: the one to Vienna. In that case, there was only one option: it was possible to reach Bohemia by crossing the Danube close to – but avoiding – Vienna.¹⁴⁰ This would explain why he travelled east after Friesach. Some German and French sources even state that because of the *interfectio* of the Montferrats the road through Apulia was fraught with dangers, and from the beginning the secret destination of the king was the “country” of his brother-in-law, Saxony,¹⁴¹ via Bohemia.¹⁴² He could have felt safe beyond the Moravian-Austrian border. He could have arrived quickly in Brno, from where Meissen is only a few days away. Vladislav Jindřich, the would-be Margrave of Moravia, Hermann I, Landgrave of Thuringia and Albert I, Margrave of Meissen were all opponents of the Staufts. Had Richard managed to maintain this pace, he could have already arrived in England when his opponents believed he was still sailing towards Marseille. His other ships docked in Italy only in November and his army was on its way home.¹⁴³

Emperor Henry VI began to realise that detaining the King of England in prison did not adhere to the principles of *libera* or *honestia custodia*. This situation not only failed to alleviate tensions with his adversaries but also did not enable him to extract money sooner from his valuable captive. Furthermore, the Pope had issued threats of excommunication against both Henry and the French king.¹⁴⁴ Moreover, Eleanor consistently implored Pope Celestine III to take tangible steps for the release of her crusader son.¹⁴⁵ The emperor found himself compelled to relent.¹⁴⁶

Weeks later, envoys from England succeeded in having the king spend his captivity at the imperial court in Hagenau.¹⁴⁷ The emperor was wary of allowing the case of the innocently detained pilgrim to fuel sentiments against the Stauf

¹⁴⁰ Kessler, Richard, 1995. 250.; Schreiber, Drei Beiträge, 1931. 281.

¹⁴¹ “ut secretius ad nepotem suum ducem Saxonie pervenire posset” – Annals of Anchin: [Andreas Marchianensis?] *Continuatio Aquicinctina a. 1149–1237*. MGH SS 6. Hrsg. Pertz, G. H., Hannover, 1844. 405–438. 430.; “s’en venir en tapigane de Sassoigne” – [Sarrazin] *Histoire des ducs de Normandie et des rois d’Angleterre*, publiée ... suivie de la relation du tournoi de Ham, par Sarrazin. Éd. Michel, Francisque, Paris, 1840. 87.; Kessler, Richard, 1995. 249.

¹⁴² “ad terram egressus [...] ignotus et profugus transivit [...] per Austriam fines Bohemiae intrare vellet” – *Continuatio Admuntensis*, 587.

¹⁴³ Gillingham, Richard, 1978. 223.

¹⁴⁴ RI IV/4,4,5. nos. 781, 782, 783.; RI IV/3,3. no. 293.; Roger of Hoveden, *Chronica*, Vol. III., 209.; Edbury, Peter W., “Pope Celestine III, 1191–1198. Diplomat and pastor”, In. Doran, John – Smith, Damian J. (eds.), *Celestine III, the Crusade and the Latin East*. Aldershot, 2008. 129–144. 132.

¹⁴⁵ Rymer, *Foedera*, 1816. I/1. 56–59.; Petrus Blesensis, *Epistolae*, Vol. II., 58–74, nos. 145, 146, 147.

¹⁴⁶ Roger of Hoveden, *Chronica*, Vol. III., 208.

¹⁴⁷ RI IV/3,3. no. 228.; Roger of Hoveden, *Chronica*, Vol. III., 205–209.; Otto of St. Blasien, *Chronica*, 58.; William of Newburgh, *Historia*, Vol. I., 388.; Ralph of Coggeshall, *Chronicon*, 58.; RI IV/3,3. no. 224.; Berg, Richard, 2007. 197.; Landon, *Itinerary*, 1935. 74.; RI IV/3,3. nos. 287, 288.

administration.¹⁴⁸ Henry, possibly due to a fear towards his imperial adversaries, embraced Richard as “*dilectus amicus noster*”, cementing an indissoluble *foedus amoris*.¹⁴⁹ Henry intervened to facilitate peace negotiations between France and England. He initiated talks with King Philip II, with a meeting scheduled for 25 June.¹⁵⁰ The lenient atmosphere was also influenced by the fact that the ‘subversive activities’ of his adversaries had not abated. The nobility of the Rhineland was almost on the brink of open rebellion, with even the abdication of the ruler being contemplated.¹⁵¹ The emperor deemed it perilous to have a hostage in captivity that promised substantial political gains.

Prince John

Henry failed to draw closer to the English-French peace he sought to negotiate.¹⁵² What was the reason for this? Prince John, ever loyal to ‘good’ Philip, stood behind it. In January 1192, long before Richard’s return from the Holy Land and when he was not even intending to leave Palestine at the time, the King of France called upon the nobles of Normandy to surrender to him the counties of Eu and Aumale, which were taken as his rightful feudal fiefs. John, who until then had only received the county of Mortain from the entire Plantagenet ‘pie’, had long been enticed by the Capet ruler to side with him and swear allegiance for all the French possessions of the House of Anjou. At that time, Dowager Queen Eleanor of Aquitaine was still able to restrain his son, John.¹⁵³ However, when the prince learned of his brother’s being taken captive in January 1193, he immediately headed to Philip. He swore allegiance and declared his brother an “enemy”.¹⁵⁴ The nobility of Normandy, however, regarded the English kings as their natural lords, showing little inclination for the Capetians. The French laid a campaign, captured the keys to Normandy, Gisors, Vexin, and Aumale.¹⁵⁵ The path to the heart of Normandy, Rouen, laid open. However, a considerable portion of the Plantagenet vassals took up arms for Normandy. Philip could not have much hope, despite his armies being stationed in castles in Normandy. John believed that based on the French successes, he could find supporters in England. He recruited followers in Southwest England but only succeeded in gaining the assistance of some scoundrels, along with Flemish and

¹⁴⁸ RI IV/3,3. no. 228.

¹⁴⁹ 19 April 1193: “ubi honorifice [...] recepti fuimus [...] Honeste autem circa, Ipsum Imperatorem moram facimus” – Rymer, *Foedera*, 1816. I/1. 60.; Roger of Hoveden, *Chronica*, Vol. III., 209.; RI IV/3,3. no. 229.; Pfaff, *Der gefangene König*, 1971. 14.; Görich, *Verletzte*, 2003. 84.

¹⁵⁰ RI IV/3,3. no. 227.; Roger of Hoveden, *Chronica*, Vol. III., 212.; Jericke, Richard, 2017. 123.

¹⁵¹ Gillingham, Richard, 1978. 225.

¹⁵² 14–20 June 1193: RI IV/3,3. no. 234.; Roger of Hoveden, *Chronica*, Vol. III., 214.

¹⁵³ Rymer, *Foedera*, 1816. I/1. 57.

¹⁵⁴ Roger of Hoveden, *Chronica*, Vol. III., 203–204.; William of Newburgh, *Historia*, Vol. I., 384.; Rymer, *Foedera*, 1816. I/1. 56.

¹⁵⁵ Roger of Hoveden, *Chronica*, Vol. III., 206, 212.; Ralph of Coggeshall, *Chronicon*, 61–62.; Rigord, *Gesta*, 318, 323.; Ambroise, *L’Estoire*, 330. vv. 12310–12312.

Welsh mercenaries paid in French money. The démarche did not succeed, as England stood firmly in support of her king.¹⁵⁶

Henry VI also disapproved of the prospect that his 'neighbour', the King of France, would increase his power by seizing Normandy. He never wished for Philip to lay his hands on the Plantagenet inheritance and gain significant political influence. While the crown of Sicily was what the emperor desired, he was not willing to let Philip, who would obtain vast territories, become a rival in the eyes of his adversaries. He was not inclined to bring about an English-French peace. The interest of the English king also demanded that Henry and Philip should not enter into a new agreement.¹⁵⁷ Therefore, Richard made an approach towards the Welfs. Thus, the planned negotiations were ultimately abandoned by the emperor. He wanted to free himself from the heavy burden as much as possible. If only the English would pay, their king would return and repel the French king, who eagerly occupied castles. Moreover, the Stauf rival base grew during the spring. The nobility of the Lower Rhine region were joined by the lords of Meissen and Thuringia, and the new star of the Welfs, Otto, emerged with renewed strength. His mother was the sister of the captive of Trifels, and his father fled to England from the Staufs as well as being himself brought up in Angevin lands. Richard was also able to influence his young nephew, the future German king, who idolised his English cousin.

The plan to hand over the captive to the King of France could not materialise either, as Philip did not have enough money, despite surpassing the English offers. He expected that with John's assistance, he could lay his hands on the Anjou territories, and the prince would gain control over larger areas. However, his troops got stuck at Gisors, and John suffered a defeat. His action was promptly crushed by the English government.¹⁵⁸ John was forced to agree to a ceasefire.¹⁵⁹

In late June 1193, the emperor finally concluded a definitive agreement with England, and they agreed on the payment of a ransom of 150,000 Cologne silver marks.¹⁶⁰ The emperor's concern about the Welfs' activation is evident in his willingness to repay one-third of this amount, 50,000 marks to Richard if he intercedes for peace with Henry the Lion, Duke Saxony.¹⁶¹ The imperial opposition could indeed be appeased by the release of Richard: Henry made peace with the relatives of the Bishop of Liège.¹⁶²

The agreement also caught the wind in the sails of the French king. He, too, was inclined towards peace. In July, they concluded a peace agreement based on the status quo.¹⁶³

¹⁵⁶ Gillingham, Richard, 1978. 227.

¹⁵⁷ Roger of Hoveden, *Chronica*, Vol. III., 214.

¹⁵⁸ William of Newburgh, *Historia*, Vol. I., 389.

¹⁵⁹ Roger of Hoveden, *Chronica*, Vol. III., 214.; Ralph of Diceto, *Ymagines*, Vol. II., 110.

¹⁶⁰ RI IV/3,1. nos. 302a, 305.; Roger of Hoveden, *Chronica*, Vol. III., 215–216.; Others put it to 140,000: Ernoul, *Chronique*, 229.; or, 200,000: Rigord, *Gesta*, 316.

¹⁶¹ Gillingham, Richard, 1978. 234.

¹⁶² 14–20 June 1193: RI IV/3,3. no. 233.

¹⁶³ *Recueil des actes du Philippe-Auguste*, Vol. I., no. 454.; *Catalogue des actes de Philippe-Auguste* par Delisle, Léopold, Paris, 1856. no. 400.; Rymer, *Foedera*, 1816. I/1.

The king was provided with quarters in the courts of Worms and Speyer. It is conceivable that he also stayed in Frankfurt, thus getting closer to the Welfs' base.¹⁶⁴ By the end of the year, a portion of the ransom, 20,000 marks, had already been delivered. The emperor was preparing on releasing the captive in January.¹⁶⁵

The return of the king

On 4 February 1194, a *generalis conventus* was held in Mainz, where Richard's release was proclaimed.¹⁶⁶ The guarantors, including two sons of Henry the Lion, surrendered themselves to the emperor.¹⁶⁷ The King of England granted various benefits to a series of imperial dignitaries who swore allegiance to him.¹⁶⁸ They constituted the opposition to the emperor. Symbolically, Richard did not take the fastest route along the Rhine from Mainz to England but via Leuven and Brussels, visiting the members of the imperial opposition.¹⁶⁹ The moral victory, if it can be phrased as such, belonged to Richard. He emerged from the captivity almost strengthened in 'soul and body'.

Richard might have had an idea in mind to find shelter in Hungary when he was either landed in Dalmatia,¹⁷⁰ or, when he was at the outskirts of Vienna, from where the Hungarian border was not far along the Danube. Here we would not take it into serious consideration since our sources do not report it at all. It seems however plausible that it was an alternative to move from Vienna with Hungarian assistance towards Moravia. Esztergom, with Queen Margaret, Young Henry's widow, who spent years and was brought up in England almost together with Richard and Mathilda, must have provided a shelter, if need be. Or, King Béla III may have assisted in Richard's way towards Saxony on the Austrian border. Guido de Bazochiis (Gui de Bazoches) in his *Chronographia* reported that Richard touched the borderlands of Hungary.¹⁷¹ Albert Schreiber did even find it realistic that Richard contemplated that he would receive a

61.; Kessler, Richard, 1995. 277–279.

¹⁶⁴ Mayer finds that the place of issue of a charter "apud Frankenef" refers to a city, as its ending was not preserved in the parchment: it might have been 'Frankenefort'. Mayer, *A Ghost Ship*, 2000. 135–136.; See Landon, *Itinerary*, 1935. 69, 163. no. 367.

¹⁶⁵ RI IV/3. no. 328.; Roger of Hoveden, *Chronica*, Vol. III., 227.; Landon, *Itinerary*, 1935. 80.; Norgate, Richard, 1924. 283.

¹⁶⁶ RI IV/3,3. no. 240.; Ralph of Diceto, *Ymagines*, Vol. II., 113.; Roger of Hoveden, *Chronica*, Vol. III., 233.

¹⁶⁷ *Mainzer Urkundenbuch*. Bearb. Acht, Peter, Darmstadt, 1971. Bd. 2/2: 1176–1200. 975. no. 590.; Landon, *Itinerary*, 1935. 82.

¹⁶⁸ Ralph of Diceto, *Ymagines*, Vol. II., 112–113.; Gillingham, Coeur, 2013. 71, 78.; Mayer, *A Ghost Ship*, 2000. 139.

¹⁶⁹ "ad portum de Swiene" – Roger of Hoveden, *Chronica*, Vol. III., 235.

¹⁷⁰ Dalmatia may have had spread from Guillaume le Breton towards Albericus, then, a range of further sources. Csákó also report that the information was known by Anonymus Laudunensis' *Chronicon universale* as well. Csákó, *Az Árpád-kori*, 2023. 205, 261–262.

¹⁷¹ Csákó, *Az Árpád-kori*, 2023. 343.

friendly reception in Hungary,¹⁷² of which, we are still not able to be convinced in the absence of direct evidence, but it is to be seen as an alternative, a solution that might have been on the table when the Lionheart was struggling to reach his homeland through the Continent. If one takes a closer look at the figures of Duchess Mathilda and Henry the Lion on the “Krönungsbild” of the *Evangeliar Heinrichs des Löwen*,¹⁷³ the connections with the Plantagenets are obvious: the painting shows the coronation of Henry the Lion and his wife Mathilda by Christ. Behind the kneeling duchess appear are her father, King Henry II of England, her grandmother, Empress Mathilda. Christ surrounded by 8 saints close to the duchy, including Thomas Becket, Archbishop of Canterbury. If one is also to oversee the relations Béla III was maintaining with the Plantagenet court and the fact that he proposed to marry the Young King’s widow, a more complex picture is to be drawn, where the disguised pilgrim may have hoped to reach Saxony through the Hungarian borderlands.

Appendix

Fig. 1–2.



Petrus de Ebulo: *Liber ad honorem Augusti sive De rebus Siculis*. Bern, Burgerbibliothek, Cod. 120.II. 55 ff. ca. 1195 – ca. 1197. f. 129r.: e-codices - Virtuelle Handschriftenbibliothek der Schweiz / Bibliothèque virtuelle des manuscrits en Suisse. Université de Fribourg / Universität Freiburg – Schweizerische Akademie der Geistes- und Sozialwissenschaften / Académie suisse des sciences humaines et sociales. Éd./Red. Florian Mittenhuber, Februar 2018. Courtesy of Burgerbibliothek, Bern. [<https://www.e-codices.unifr.ch/de/bbb/0120-2//129r> – 19 January 2024]

¹⁷² Schreiber, Drei Beiträge, 1931. 285.

¹⁷³ *Evangeliar Heinrichs d. Löwen und Mathildes von England*. ca. 1175–88. Herzog August Bibliothek, Wolfenbüttel, Cod. Guelf. 105 Noviss. 2°. f. 171v. Handschriftendatenbank. [<https://diglib.hab.de/?db=mss&list=ms&id=105-noviss-2f&lang=en> – 20 January 2024] See Fig 3.

Fig. 3.



Evangeliar Heinrichs d. Löwen und Mathildes von England. ca. 1175-88. Herzog August Bibliothek, Wolfenbüttel, Cod. Guelf. 105 Noviss. 2°. f. 171v. Krönungsbild: Wolfenbütteler Digital Library, Handschriftendatenbank [<https://diglib.hab.de/?db=mss&list=ms&id=105-noviss-2f&lang=en>; <http://diglib.hab.de/mss/105-noviss-2f/start.htm?image=171v> – 20 January 2024]