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The languages of monarchism in interwar Yugoslavia, 1918–1941: variations on a theme

Cody James Inglis

Department of History, Central European University, Vienna, Austria

ABSTRACT

Through a selection of primary sources, this article demonstrates the political and legal languages which articulated monarchist ideas in interwar Yugoslavia. Variations on the theme emerged in different periods. First, the national and so democratic character of the monarch and monarchy was a prevalent image at the end of the First World War and in the first decade of the Yugoslav state's existence. During the domestic political crises in the second half of the 1920s, the language of monarchism shifted toward discourses of stability and public order. After the declaration of the royal dictatorship in January 1929, the language of monarchism became fully invested in expressing the monarch's absolute political authority, legally inviolable character, and the resulting 'unity of state and nation'. For the political Right, the king embodied the spirit of integral Yugoslavism. While the language of monarchism could serve disparate political ideologies – as in the liberal monarchist emigration after spring 1941 – it was rather primarily linked to the political visions of the Right in the final decade of interwar Yugoslavia.

KEYWORDS

Balkans; Central Europe; interwar period; monarchism; Southeastern Europe; Yugoslavia

I.

Can a dynasty be popular, democratic, and therefore legitimate in its claim to rule executively over a given territory through the apparatus of the modern state? On 5 November 1918, a pamphlet published in Zagreb addressed this question.¹ Made public in the first weeks after the collapse of the Habsburg Empire (and, in retrospect, just before the armistice in Europe), the pamphlet emerged as one in a flurry of texts which aimed to give an answer to the newly pertinent question of state form. Regionally, would post-Habsburg successor states be republican, and so more democratic in governance? Or would they retain monarchy in some form, preserving traditional hierarchies in the clothing of the nation-state? The text's author, Srbin Sremac (literally 'A Serb from Srem'), asserted that monarchies were not inherently democratic. Republican governance could be created as a legitimate reaction to the 'vices, failures, and tyranny' of a given dynasty, much like the 'German' ones in the German Empire and Austria-Hungary.² But in particular cases, as with the Serbian Karađorđević dynasty following the First World War, 'everything is the opposite: honesty, success, strict constitutionality, and democratism (*demokratizam*) are on their side'.³

Behind the pseudonym, the pamphlet's author was the historian, archivist, and professor Aleksa Ivić (1881–1948).⁴ Ivić was born in the village of Buđanovci in Sarmatia (*ekavski*: Srem; *ijekavski*: Srijem), at that time the furthest eastern reach of the Kingdom of Croatia-Slavonia. After receiving his

CONTACT Cody James Inglis  inglis_cody-james@phd.ceu.edu

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doctorate at the University of Vienna in 1905, following studies in history and Slavic philology under the scholars Vatroslav Jagić (1838–1923) and Konstantin Jireček (1854–1918), Ivić continued his archival work in Vienna until 1910. That year, Ivić was elected to the Croatian *Sabor* from his home district.⁵ He was initially a member of the Hungarian-oriented *Narodna stranka* (People's Party), then led by the viceroy (*ban*) of Croatia-Slavonia, Nikola Tomašić (1864–1918). However, Ivić soon left the party while in office and remained as an independent representative for the rest of his term.⁶ Ivić did not run in the elections called for December 1911. Following his short term in the diet, Ivić returned to scholarly life, working at the *Zemaljski arhiv* (the Country Archive, or perhaps closer in German, the *Landesarchiv*) of Croatia-Slavonia in Zagreb from 1912 until 1919.⁷ Following the creation of the Yugoslav state,⁸ Ivić was named Professor at the Faculty of Law in Subotica/Szabadka, a position he held for the rest of the Yugoslav interwar period.

Ivić's text from late 1918, reflecting on the legitimacy and popularity of the Karađorđević dynasty as the royal embodiment of the Yugoslav state-to-be, follows from the political stances he articulated earlier in the 1910s. First came the national issue. Ivić identified as a Serb, and argued for the representative inclusion of the term 'Serbs' in the addresses and memoranda issued by the Croatian *Sabor*. The Kingdom of Croatia-Slavonia, as the other constituent realms of Austria-Hungary, was multi-ethnic, multi-lingual, and multi-denominational. Regional identities, rather than national identification, were self-evident for the predominantly rural populations in (post-)Habsburg space across much of the nineteenth century and into the interwar period.⁹ Croatia-Slavonia was no exception. Still, as the social, economic, and intellectual changes of the nineteenth century progressed, local identifications were slowly displaced by the hegemony of national ideas, propagated by nationalist activists as well as by the classificatory drive of the bureaucratizing Habsburg state.¹⁰ Among the well-educated 'nationally conscious' strata, however, national rather than regional belonging held identificatory primacy from a much earlier date. Ivić was certainly a member of this latter group. For him, the recognition of the Serbian *nation* was a pressing issue, particularly at a time when the dawn of mass politics opened up – albeit quite limited – horizons for non-noble political representation and action within the Empire. Following the 1868 Settlement between the Kingdom of Hungary and the Kingdom of Croatia-Slavonia (the *Nagodba*),¹¹ political parties in the Kingdom of Croatia-Slavonia began to draft their platforms with mass representation at the forefront. Parties that articulated class, religious, or national concerns slowly began to displace the older system of political parties in Croatia-Slavonia, which were typically centred on the patronage of individual nobles or competition among different shades of nineteenth-century liberalism.

Following the elections of 1910, the plurality of seats in the *Sabor* were awarded to the Croat-Serb Coalition, then led by the Croatian Serb Svetozar Pribičević.¹² The Coalition was initially created in 1905 to institutionalize the political platform of the 'New Course (*novi kurs*)', a set of aims to dismantle the arrangements of the 1868 *Nagodba* between the Kingdom of Hungary and the Kingdom of Croatia-Slavonia. As Nicholas Miller has pointed out, 'the New Course's directive was simple: Croatian parties would cooperate with non-Croatian parties in order to achieve some of the most basic Croatian desiderata, which included the unification of Croatia[-Slavonia – CJI] and Dalmatia and the gradual achievement of economic, then political autonomy'.¹³ To that end, the Coalition wanted to set all 'Croatian' territories on the same footing that the Kingdom of Hungary had in relation to Cisleithania, the Austrian half of the Empire comprised of the 'kingdoms and realms represented in the Imperial Council (*im Reichsrat vertretenen Königreiche und Länder*)'. Rather than state dualism, the Coalition sought a form of trialism. But the steam behind the New Course soon ran out. By 1910, the Coalition simply sought power in the *Sabor* and to use that influence to guide a civic and national rapprochement between nationally conscious Serbs and Croats on the basis of common national 'oneness' or 'unity' (*narodno jedinstvo*), the basis of modern Yugoslavism.¹⁴ Ivić, however, was a member of the People's Party (*Narodna stranka*), a nominally liberal and loyalist party which represented Hungarian-aligned interests in Croatia-Slavonia.¹⁵ Ivić was no supporter of a revision to the post-'68 constitutional arrangements. Rather, he felt that Serbian national interests could only be addressed and safeguarded within the existent

constitutional and political frame. Loyalism, then, was combined with his (liberal) Serbian nationalism to form the foundation of his political worldview.

To that end, it was the national question in Croatia which troubled him most. In his first parliamentary address in February 1911, Ivić took issue with the fact that members of the Croatian nationalist *Stranka prava* (Party of [Croatian State] Right) and its sovereigntist splinter group, the *Starčevićeva stranka prava* (Starčević's Party of Right), rejected the notion that Serbs comprised a separate nation from Croats.¹⁶ They had repeatedly and intentionally left out the terms 'Srbi' (Serbs) or 'srbski' (Serbian) from their party programmes and parliamentary memoranda. The parties 'did not want to include the name 'Serb' in their addresses. Even in the speeches themselves ... they explicitly emphasized that here, in our homeland (*domovina*), there is no Serbian nation (*srbski narod*)'. 'Representative [Stipe] Vučetić', Ivić continued, 'pointed out that Serbs, called as such here, that they are the work of propaganda, and in fact that they are the progeny of Vlachs (*vlahi*) and Aromanians (*cincari*)'. Upon hearing his name, Vučetić interjected: 'Those who are Orthodox believers are also Croats'. 'By the same principle', replied Ivić, 'I can say that you Catholics are Serbs'.¹⁷ Ivić, apparently undeterred, went on. He cited and quoted specific archival and published documentary evidence which he believed demonstrated that the early modern ethnic labels 'Vlahi', 'Rasciani', and 'Cincari' – groups present on the historical territory of Syrmia – were simply alternative names for the modern Serbian nation.¹⁸ Ivić combined historical argumentation with the language of liberal nationalism (the Romantic and positivist tropes phasing together here), arguing that historically confirmed presence on shared territory necessitated all national groups' involvement in public affairs.

But Ivić also argued from a latter-day Romantic view, using the language of bloodshed and sacrifice, a theme he would repeat seven years later. In response to interruptions made by the representatives of the *Stranka prava* against his address, by Representative Dragutin Hrvoj in particular, Ivić asked 'When you mention the blood and bones of your ancestors, are they more expensive than the blood of our Serbian ancestors and great-grandfathers? Wasn't the blood of our grandfathers, which they shed on the battlefield for homeland and dynasty, just as warm as Croatian blood?'¹⁹ Alongside territorial presence, here emerged the discourse of Serbs' monarchic patriotism and their bodily sacrifice under its aegis. Ivić would continue this line of thought, though by transferring the concept 'sacrifice' from the Habsburg to the Karađorđević dynasty at the end of the First World War.

During the collapse of the Habsburg Empire in late autumn 1918, the consolidation of new states on its territory was an uncertain affair. Workers', soldiers', peasants', and national councils were established in tiny villages and in capital cities alike, attempting to seize power locally and quickly. While many (soon to be former) Habsburg bureaucratic officials remained at their posts during this interregnum and after,²⁰ the question of sovereignty and its bearer began to frame fundamental questions about state form. The Yugoslav case was no exception.

The Corfu Declaration was signed in summer 1917 by the Serbian Prime Minister Nikola Pašić and the Croatian president of the Yugoslav Committee in London, Ante Trumbić.²¹ In the final text, an agreement was struck which stated that the future Yugoslavia would be a kingdom ruled by the Serbian Karađorđević dynasty. For Pašić and his Radical Party, that simply meant an extension of the Kingdom of Serbia to the territories inhabited by Slovenes, Croats, and Serbs within the Habsburg Empire. There was, however, dissent.²² Slovene émigré socialists in the United States, for example, drafted the alternative 'Chicago Declaration (*Chikaška izjava*)' and called for a 'federal Yugoslav republic' based closely on the American model.²³ Likewise, peasant and workers' revolts in Croatia-Slavonia – as well as in Istria and Dalmatia – took the catchword 'republic' as their popular slogan through the spring of 1919.²⁴ The question of monarchy or republic for the Yugoslav state form became a recurring debate throughout the 1920s.²⁵ It was within this context – and particularly the early, uncertain moments in late 1918 – that Ivić's pamphlet 'Republic, or the Karađorđević Dynasty?' made its argument in favour of monarchy.

'I was surprised when I saw how many supporters of a republic there were among Croats,' Ivić opened:

My surprise was all the greater because I know the past of Croatian political parties and I know that, excepting the socialists, no party has shown the slightest republican signal. On the contrary, all of their parties have emphasized Croats' dynastic loyalty [to the Habsburgs]. But now that the violent German dynasty needs to be replaced by the honest and popular Serbian dynasty, the Croats have become republicans overnight.²⁶

Ivić placed national antagonism, much in the spirit of the extreme debates he faced in the *Sabor* seven years previous, at the centre of his argument. Croats were republicans because they were anti-Serb – quite the generalization. He further argued that the republican discourse was also one of sacrifice. But in wanting to sacrifice the Serbian dynasty 'in the name of Yugoslavism', this was completely unlike the sacrifices made by 'those million people from Šumadija' or the 'innocent Syrmians and Bosnians, who died on the gallows or in [Austro-Hungarian] internment camps' during the war. To Ivić, their sacrifices were made in the name of national freedom, one guaranteed by the Karadorđevićs. The Croatian republicans demanded far too much in Ivić's view. Repudiating and deposing the Karadorđević dynasty at the moment when they 'brought us the greatest good: freedom and the state as a gift' would be impossible, nothing less than a rupture in the 'magical connection' between dynasty and nation: 'The connection between Serbia and the Karadorđevićs is consecrated in shared suffering and streams of spilled blood.'²⁷ The link with Ivić's past political pronouncements becomes clear. Dynastic loyalty was not merely individual choice, but *national imperative*, and one consecrated in blood. The combination of Romantic and biopolitical tropes in Ivić's text was a strong means to legitimize the Karadorđević dynasty's claim to executive power in interwar Yugoslavia. Still, there were other ways to conceive of legitimist discourses without looking to the opaque shroud of national mysticism. This discourse stood outside of the political mainstream of the 1920s, at that time structured by the positions of the Radical and Democratic Parties which dominated Yugoslav parliamentary politics and public life. Among these thinkers, it was rather legal arguments which legitimized dynastic, hereditary and (for the time being), constitutional monarchy in the new South Slav state.

II.

Shortly after the conclusion of the postwar treaties and settlements in Versailles, the work of 'liquidating' the 'inheritance' of the Habsburg Empire among its successor states began. The process lasted through the 1920s and '30s, and out of it a question arose in interwar Yugoslav legal circles. Was the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes a new state, or an old one? 'From the perspective of international law', the Serbian jurist Slobodan Jovanović wrote, 'the SCS [Serb, Croat, and Slovene] state is indeed an old state.' However, following the promulgation of the Vidovdan Constitution (*Vidovdanski ustav*) in 1921,²⁸ the former constitution of the Kingdom of Serbia was no longer in force. 'From the perspective of constitutional law, then, the SCS state is indeed a new state.'²⁹

The debate on the state's 'oldness' and 'newness' arose following a technical legal issue noted at the Mixed Arbitral Tribunal (MAT) in Geneva between Germany and Yugoslavia.³⁰ In the case *Katz and Klump v. Yugoslavia*, the plaintiffs argued that new states founded after the war were required to compensate foreign nationals (in this case German citizens) whose property had been 'liquidated', i.e. variously nationalized, auctioned, or sold off. Article 297(h) of the Treaty of Versailles was used to justify their argumentation.³¹ In response, one of the Yugoslav agents at the MAT, Dušan Subotić, reported that the court had rejected the plaintiffs' argument.³² According to him, a new concept had entered the language of international law following the postwar peace treaties, that of the 'new state.'³³ While new states indeed had the requirement to reimburse those individuals who had lost their private property due to the postwar liquidation of imperial capital, 'old states' did not. Those adjudicating at the MAT counted the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes as an 'old state' in this case, since it was simply the 'old Kingdom of Serbia with a new name and new territories'.³⁴

This ruling had subtle but fundamental consequences for domestic legal debates in early interwar Yugoslavia, both for the character of ‘Yugoslavia’ as a legal subject, as well as for the legitimization of the Serbian Karađorđević dynasty’s executive role. If it was the case that the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes was simply an extension of the Kingdom of Serbia – with its constitution, its state institutions, and its legal corpus – to former Habsburg territories populated by South Slavs, then certainly King Petar I Karađorđević had every legal justification to remain at the head of state. But this was not only an issue for international law. To that end, ‘Dr. Subotić opened the question of whether, from the perspective of domestic state law (*unutrašnje državno pravo*), our Kingdom is new or old,’ wrote the Slovenian legal scholar Ivan Žolger.³⁵ Put another way, while the Yugoslav-German MAT had decided that the Kingdom was ‘old’ from the perspective of international law, the question remained open vis-à-vis domestic state (public) law. A more abstract question needed to be addressed as well, namely whether the same legal subject could be, ‘in view of the same attribute [i.e. the ‘oldness’ or ‘newness’ of statehood], qualified differently from the perspective of state law versus international law.’³⁶ Žolger ultimately disagreed. The Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes had signed the Treaty between the Principal Allied and Associated Powers and the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes at Saint-Germain-en-Laye (10 September 1919),³⁷ wherein

... it is explicitly stated that the Austro-Hungarian Yugoslavs (*Jugosloveni*) united with Serbia, but *with the intention to form, to establish, to create* a new state under the name ‘the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes’; that this new state was actually *formed, established, and created*; and that it – that is, a newly established and created state – *assumed sovereignty* over the entire united territory. Therefore, our Kingdom is not a territorially expanded Serbia, because our state’s sovereignty over the Serb, Croat, and Slovene territories is not the expanded sovereignty of the former Kingdom of Serbia, but the original sovereignty of the newly created state of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes.³⁸

This idea was very much in line with the autonomist discourses which cross-cut Slovenian ideological frames at the time. By rejecting the expansion of existent Serbian sovereignty to the ‘Austro-Hungarian Yugoslavs’, Žolger simultaneously rejected the idea that Yugoslavia was preordained to be a centralized state.³⁹ And, likewise, through his rejection of the narrative of Serbian expansion or annexation, he implicitly rejected that dynastic sovereignty had also been extended to South Slavs living within the Habsburg Empire. To that end, the question of whether monarchism was a necessary principle or ideology upon which to found political sovereignty in the ‘new’ Yugoslavia was left open for Žolger. For him, it was not at all obvious that the Karađorđević dynasty had legal justification to sit on the Yugoslav throne – or that there should be a Yugoslav throne at all.

It is precisely in terms of this legal debate that the ideas propounded by Serbian jurist Slobodan Jovanović’s become salient from the perspective of the history of monarchist political thought. To recall, Jovanović argued in his *Ustavno pravo* (*Constitutional Law*) from 1924 that, from the perspective of international law, Yugoslavia was an ‘old’ – in other words, pre-existent, pre-1918 – state; from the perspective of constitutional law, however, Yugoslavia was entirely new. This followed primarily from Jovanović’s attempt to find another way out of the debate between Subotić and Žolger. The constitutional newness of the Yugoslav state was key in this regard. For Jovanović, there was a thin line to walk between accepting the continuity of seven different legal regimes – including that of the Kingdom of Serbia – and the creation of an entirely new constitution and thus a new corpus of constitutional law which was particularly Yugoslav.⁴⁰ While certain historical precedents guided intra-dynastic administration and organization (like succession, definitions of the members of the dynasty versus the wider royal family, etc.),⁴¹ the king ultimately had no ‘historical rights beyond the Constitution or above the Constitution’ given post-1918 developments.⁴²

While Jovanović did espouse a constitutional monarchism – which was really just the language of the political *status quo* in 1924 Yugoslavia – his reflections on the constitutional situation in the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes allowed for the personality of the king and the institution of kingship to be everywhere, blurring the boundaries between branches of government and thus the

separation of powers normatively baked into European liberal democracies. While ‘the Constitution does not call the ruler a “head of state” – in other words, it does not consider the ruler to be the representative head of state power in its entirety’, the king was ‘limited by the Constitution only in the performance of [the King’s] specified functions, and only to the extent that the Constitution expressly provides’.⁴³ Within those functions expressed in the Constitution, however, the King had wide powers, both executive and legislative. Indeed, even the judiciary was supposed to operate ‘on the foundation of law, but in the name of the King’.⁴⁴ While the monarchy was not omnipotent, owing to some constitutional limits, the King as personality and institution was omnipresent.

The extent of the King’s legislative and executive powers thus became an important topic of discussion. Jovanović viewed royal omnipresence in all functions of government as compatible with a separation of powers, not least because royal prerogative was theoretically limited by the Constitution and those powers shared with the National Assembly (*Narodna skupština*). ‘In any case,’ Jovanović wrote, ‘the King and the Assembly are the supreme authorities; there is not a single act of state power – neither legislative, nor executive, nor judicial – which in one way or another would not be based on their authority’.⁴⁵ Another Serbian jurist, Đorđe Tasić, was more sceptical of the details.

In autumn 1922, Tasić viewed executive power in a modern state as hierarchically subordinate to legislative power. Legislative power always preceded, in temporal terms, the formation of executive power. (Here the question of ‘newness’ and ‘oldness’ was also present). Arguing for a theory of the delegation of powers, Tasić saw executive power as derived from legislative power, which in turn drew its own authority from the well of popular sovereignty.⁴⁶ This meant that any decree which was given by the state’s executive in Yugoslavia – the King – to implement law would have to be based on the Constitution, and so neither contradict the Constitution nor the law upon which the decree was based. Ultimately, any royal decree needed to be approved by the National Assembly before entering into force.⁴⁷ But the ability to issue decrees was more fundamentally tied to the delegation of such power to the executive, as it was being formed, by the legislature. While the Karađorđević dynasty had been the *de facto* heads of state between 1 December 1918, and 28 June 1921, they were not so *de jure*, according to Tasić’s argumentation. To that end, the Constituent Assembly held primacy of power in the state in that period (theoretically, not practically). Once decretory powers had been delegated to the executive, it was allowed to function insofar as it upheld its duty to ‘enable the survival and development of state functions, and thus the state’.⁴⁸ But, in the last instance, ‘legislative authority, hierarchically older, could always withdraw [executive] decrees and could regulate the matter at hand itself, removing the need for an executive altogether’.⁴⁹

While operating theoretically within the constitutional framework given in 1921, Tasić still had reservations about the extent of executive royal power which, in practice, functioned well beyond the purview of the parliamentary system. Some months before Tasić’s article, in summer 1922, it became clear that perhaps too much power had been given to the King, possibly undermining the parliamentary process in the Yugoslav state before it had properly commenced. Could the king, for example, dissolve parliament? The answer was yes: Article 52 of the 1921 Constitution gave the monarch ‘the right to dissolve the National Assembly’.⁵⁰ The decree to dissolve parliament had to include a call for new elections to take place within three months of the decree’s date. Without a regular parliamentary electoral law, however, the King could conceivably prorogue the legislature without further recourse.⁵¹ The delegation and sharing of executive and legislative powers could easily result in the primacy of the royal executive, irrespective of whether the legislature was hierarchically superior in temporal and delegatory terms. Such a situation was not outside of the realm of possibility. The editorial note to Tasić’s article in *Misao (Thought)* – a major cultural and political journal of the Serbian (and wider Yugoslav) intelligentsia – stated that while the article had been finished and submitted before the 1922 electoral law had been passed, the topic discussed therein still had theoretical importance.

As the 1920s progressed, however, parliamentary instability became the rule rather than the exception.⁵² While the position of the monarch remained that of state executive, the legislative

power of the National Assembly diminished, racked by corruption cases, short-lived coalitions, and the constant reshuffling of cabinets. Along with a worsening economic situation in the latter half of the 1920s,⁵³ to which Yugoslavia was particularly sensitive given its overwhelmingly agrarian economic structure, the disfunction of parliament generated dissatisfaction and even disillusionment with the parliamentary democratic process. While on the Left the solution lay in an internationalist revolution and the complete democratization of the political and economic spheres, on the Right the solution lay in a mixture of charismatic leadership and integral nationalism. On the one hand, this could feed into an exclusivist and separatist stream, represented by a surprisingly diverse range of groups, including the right wings of mainstream formations like the Democratic Party (*Demokratska stranka*) and the Serbian Agrarian Workers' Party (*Zemljoradnička stranka*), or more marginal but extremist formations like the Croatian Bloc (*Hrvatski blok*) around Ante Pavelić, or the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization (*Внатрешна Македонска Револуционерна Организација*, VMRO). On the other, the more typical discourse centred on a cult of kingship based on the monarch's personal authority and a modern take on his stable hand guiding the ship of state. This, however, had its roots in the turn-of-the-century political thought of pro-Habsburg Yugoslavists in the Austro-Hungarian Empire – like Anton Korošec or Aleksa Ivić – as well as among Serbian legitimists who supported the Karađorđević dynasty following the May Coup of 1903 against the Obrenović dynasty.

With the instability of parliament, politics in interwar Yugoslavia increasingly took on extra-parliamentary forms. This wasn't limited to street protests and strikes, though these had become prevalent since the state's inception through the organizational work of the communists and agrarians. Going beyond parliament also played into the hands of those autocratic, authoritarian, and even outright fascist political thinkers who rather looked for a strong, visionary leader. Through the 1920s, however, it was unclear *who* could take the helm as leader of a mass movement which would not only take Yugoslav politics out of the parliamentary paradigm, but also create political convergence among competing class, religious, and national interests across the heterogeneous country.

III.

On 20 June 1928, in the National Assembly in Belgrade, the Serbian Radical representative Puniša Račić shot the Croatian Peasantist representatives Ivan Pernar, Đuro Basariček, Ivan Grandža, Stjepan Radić, and Pavle Radić. Pernar and Grandža were wounded, and Basariček and Pavle Radić were killed on the spot. Stjepan Radić, the leader of the Croatian peasantists, initially survived (partially in hospital care) until 8 August, when he ultimately succumbed to his wounds.⁵⁴ While Račić's act seemed to have been a spur-of-the-moment reaction to a particularly aggressive debate in the National Assembly, evidence emerged which pointed toward pre-meditation. In this moment of particularly acute parliamentary crisis, the relatively new Peasant-Democratic Coalition (*Seljačko-demokratska koalicija*) – an alliance of Radić's Croatian Peasant Party, Svetozar Pribičević's Independent Democratic Party, and Jovan Jovanović Pižon's Agrarian Workers' Union (*Savez zemljoradnika*) – seemed poised to take power from the reigning Radical Party. The assassination of Stjepan Radić offered an opportunity to do away with parliamentary instability altogether.

The Peasant-Democratic Coalition soon declared that it would no longer take its seats in the National Assembly. With Radić's death in early August 1928, clamour for the federalization of Yugoslavia grew among the Croatian opposition. Any such arrangement would have upended one of the two fundamental principles of the state's form, enshrined in the Vidovdan Constitution: the centralization of the state and its monarchist character.⁵⁵ On 1 December, a demonstration in Zagreb occurred, organized to mark the tenth anniversary of the creation of the Kingdom, but which turned into an anti-government protest. Police killed three demonstrators and wounded fifty after shooting into the crowd.⁵⁶ Later in the month, Ljubomir Davidović, leader of the Democratic Party (*Demokratska stranka*), sought an upper hand and asked his representatives in the

government to resign. Anton Korošec, minister of interior and head of the Slovene People's Party (*Slovenska ljudska stranka*), resigned on 30 December 1928. After the new year, Vladko Maček, the new leader of the Croatian Peasant Party, and Svetozar Pribičević met with the king. On 4 January 1929, Maček suggested that Aleksandar call a new constituent assembly, and reformat the internal organization of the state on strong (con)federal lines. Pribičević met with the king afterward and relayed his agreement with the Croatian demands. In the end, the king would have to 'decide whether ... to be King of the Serbs alone or the Croats as well. Should the second be [his] choice, then [he ought to] come to Zagreb and solve the Croatian question on the spot.'⁵⁷ Maček met with Aleksandar again the next day, 5 January, and further elaborated the details of his federal vision. Aleksandar held an audience with the jurist Slobodan Jovanović the same day as well. In Jovanović's view, each parliamentary faction had its own, completely opposite view on the solution to the impasse. 'Because of that,' he told the king, 'there is no possibility for any parliamentary solution which would secure the full unity of state and nation.'⁵⁸ The options were clear: either call a new constituent assembly or nullify parliament altogether. The next day, on 6 January 1929, King Aleksandar I Karađorđević opted for the latter.

Known in Yugoslav historiography as the 6 January Dictatorship (*Šestojanuarska diktatura*), the beginning of the royal dictatorship came in the form of a royal decree. 'To My Dear People (*Mome dragom narodu*)' was published in the official state administrative gazette, *Službene novine*,⁵⁹ and on placards posted around the country.⁶⁰ In the text, Aleksandar argued that 'the time has come when there can no longer be mediation between King and Nation'. The 'magical connection' between King and Nation, about which Aleksa Ivić had written a decade before, was now realized materially. Aleksandar dissolved the parliament elected in 1927, exercising the power which Article 52 of the Vidovdan Constitution had guaranteed the monarch. Of course, the constitution also required the King to call new elections. But in the same declaration, Aleksandar declared the 1921 Vidovdan Constitution null and void, removing any other constraints on royal executive power. Đorđe Tasić's concerns from 1922 had left the realm of theory and entered reality: executive power took its delegated powers and turned them back against the legislative branch.

In a set of laws which were given in the same issue of *Službene novine*, the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes was reformatted from a 'constitutional and parliamentary' monarchy to simply a 'hereditary' one.⁶¹ Likewise, the king became 'the bearer of all power in the country'. Since parliament no longer existed, it was rather the king who could 'issue and promulgate laws'. Further, the king became 'an inviolable personality' and could not 'be held responsible for anything, nor ... be sued'. The absolutist character of the monarchy was ensured. But absolutism did not necessarily exclude democracy in the realm of political thought. The main organ expounding the political Catholicism of the Slovene People's Party, *Slovenec* (*The Slovene*), rather saw the situation in the following terms:

Democracy, that precious achievement of the French Revolution, has enjoyed great success only in those countries where the people (*ljudstvo*) had firm discipline and where civic education had progressed so far that the interests of the country and the nation's welfare were the first and highest command for every citizen. ... Nowhere and at no time did a democratic regime succeed where the spirit of party blindness prevailed among the people's representatives, where party leaders sought only to gain as much popularity as possible, and where a partisan regime of the clique (*partizanski režim klikarstva*) was introduced under the guise of democracy.⁶²

Clearly, the latter description represented the reality of the pre-1929 state of affairs for the Slovene clerical camp. The former description was rather an appeal to the future. To get there, the editors encouraged their readers to engage in 'constructive work for the welfare of the people, king, and homeland', and to have 'full confidence' in the new state of affairs. 'Our confidence is all the greater', they wrote, 'because we are represented in [government] by the best son of our immediate homeland [i.e. King Aleksandar], whose actions have always been consistent, open, and honest'.⁶³ Rather than the mediation of parliamentary representatives, the editors of *Slovenec* in Ljubljana conceived of the new arrangement of power relations in precisely the mystic terms which inflected some of the earliest

expressions of Yugoslav monarchism, and which now entered into some sort of legality. The direct connection between King and Nation – that is, the Yugoslav nation rather than any one of the three ‘tribes’ – meant that the Nation’s interests were represented by the King alone, against ‘cliques’ and their concomitant ‘anarchy’.⁶⁴ The trope of the monarch as the sole representative of stability and order recurred again and again throughout this period, from January 1929 onward.

Given strict censure of the press, along with the forced dissolution of any association or party with particular class, religious, or national affiliations, the public sphere appeared completely neutralized and passive during the royal dictatorship (1929–1934). Opposition did exist, but mostly underground and on the margins of official political life.⁶⁵ Endorsement of the absolutist monarchy became something of a necessity if one wanted to remain in the newly reconstructed mainstream of Yugoslav political life, a frame which had shifted sharply to the right. While a Council of Ministers was appointed to administer the country from above, Aleksandar’s personality remained central, and the country’s new constitutional frame was likewise centred on royal authority.

Soon after the new ‘Octroyed’ (*oktroisani* or *oktroirani*) Constitution was given down on September 1931 by King Aleksandar and his Council of Ministers, the work of the National Assembly resumed. The parliament had become bicameral, featuring a lower chamber of representatives and a higher chamber, the senate. There was only a single party list, however, that of the appointed prime minister from 1929, Petar Živković. In the uncontested elections to parliament in November 1931, Živković’s list filled every seat. At the opening preparatory session, on 7 December 1931, cries of ‘Long Live the King (*Živeo Kralj!*)’ erupted at each mention of King Aleksandar’s name.⁶⁶ Indeed, Aleksandar’s version of integral Yugoslavism was on full display. The opening remarks were given by the Croat Vjekoslav Spinčić, who declared that, finally, because of Aleksandar’s actions, ‘Yugoslav thought had become the thought of our state and nation’. The king had provided ‘the final reconciliation between brothers’, and ‘pointed toward new paths’ to the future.⁶⁷ The attraction of this ‘final reconciliation’ was not limited to the traditional Right in Yugoslavia. Newer fascist and corporatist forces saw the royal dictatorship as a means to realize their own programs for the complete reconstruction of society. Not only was parliamentary democracy to be done away with completely, but there would be a complete reconstruction of the economy on new principles which would make the clash between labour and capital impossible in the first place. Some authors, like the Slovene Ciril Žebot, argued for the introduction of corporations on the Italian Fascist model as mediators between capital and labour, nation and state.⁶⁸ To this end, the role of the monarch became somewhat obsolete, and Žebot’s vision was one of those which fit into those streams on the far-right which were both corporatist and anti-monarchic, much like the Croatian *Ustaša*.⁶⁹

However radicalized the language of monarchism became, it was increasingly apparent in the second half of the 1930s that one could maintain such a political position without a king present at all. Following Aleksandar’s assassination in Marseille on 9 October 1934, and the assumption of Prince Pavle Karađorđević – Aleksandar’s cousin – along with Ivo Perović and Radenko Stanković to the collective regency, the political relations at the top of the monarchic state were rearranged, but the royal dictatorship continued. Milan Stojadinović was appointed to the premiership in 1935, ensuring that the authoritarian character of the Yugoslav state remained unchanged. Although the throne was empty (Aleksandar’s son, Petar, was still underage), the rule of the Karađorđević dynasty was unquestioned. Even on the fringe of the Right, this was the case. In the fascist political thought of Velibor Jonić – secretary-general of Dimitrije Ljotić’s Yugoslav National Movement ‘Zbor’ (*Jugoslovenski narodni pokret ‘Zbor’*)⁷⁰ – ‘national unity and the complete confluence of nation and state, as well as the monarchic state form with the Karađorđević dynasty at the helm’ was the guiding principle toward a new Yugoslavia.⁷¹ To that end, Zbor’s veiled critique of the state as it had developed during and after the 6 January Dictatorship was that it simply hadn’t gone far enough. The state had suffered from the post-1929 fall in agrarian prices and the economy’s only partial industrialization. The solution was to further solidify the singular rule of the monarch, but ensure that royal protection also extended to the countryside, to the level of the village. For Jonić, state-protected agrarian economies of scale based on traditional *zadruga* in the villages

would provide the new social basis for the imagined fascist Yugoslavia. At that level, the representative functions of parliamentary democracy would be replaced by local ‘self-government’ (*samouprava*). Decision-making would be direct and local, whereas any higher-level decisions would seemingly arise from these decisions, though more likely via decree from above. While the ideologists of Zbor attempted to create the image of a dynamic social organism, in fact the hierarchy was relatively traditional, and even calcified. At the top stood the king, mediated by a clerical (particularly Orthodox) caste which guaranteed the sanctity of the arrangement. Monarchism, then, could easily complement the fascist and corporatist political imagination.

For other authoritarian thinkers, like the Croat lawyer and former communist Mijo Radošević, the meaning of the royal dictatorship was not in its ability to rearrange domestic economic relations given the right conditions, nor in its maintenance of ‘stability’ as opposed to the parliamentary crises of the 1920s, but rather in its ability to take integral Yugoslavism out of realm of ideology and to put it into practice. Published precisely in the same period as the sharpening of the authoritarian character of the Yugoslav political sphere, Radošević’s *Osnovi savremene Jugoslavije (The Foundations of Contemporary Yugoslavia)* was published the year after Aleksandar’s assassination.⁷² Written as a historical narrative tracing the development of ‘political ideas, parties, and people in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries’, Radošević’s tome was particularly focused on the descent of the integral Yugoslav ideal and its actualization. Attracted first to social democracy in the 1910s, then appearing on the left of the Croatian communist movement during its unification in the late 1910s and early 1920s, Radošević eventually made his way to the political Right, becoming a fellow traveller of the dominant People’s Radical Party before 1929, and a full-hearted supporter of the royal dictatorship from that year onward. Through all of this, Radošević sought a camp which would permanently overcome the historical contingency of separate Slovene, Croat, and Serb nations. To that end, ‘the course of 6 January 1929 [the opening of the royal dictatorship], set the foundations of our national and state policies of Yugoslavism. Of course’, he wrote,

this course was met with resistance from those among our old, tribal-oriented party leaders. Right at the beginning, they presented this course as a short-lived episode, one which would be experienced and soon disappear. However, the laws of our national, social, and state life show that the Yugoslav course, which was first initiated in this country by Knightly (*Viteški*) King Aleksandar I the Unifier, is not a short-lived episode, but rather a work that completes the Yugoslav efforts of several generations of our best people, and that 6 January 1929, was the opening of a permanent era of the Yugoslav course in this country, an era which was formulated to be the permanent life and organization of the Yugoslav state and nation.⁷³

To that end, the language of monarchism was not simply about the legitimation of the hereditary rule of a particular dynasty. The parliamentary democratic tropes which would have existed in the late 1910s were completely missing by the mid-1930s. Indeed, by having a Yugoslav ‘national’ king, an absolutist setup could maintain its default ‘national democratic’ character. But without strong, explicit reference to the key concept, the language of monarchism was bound up with the realization of world-historical efforts and the maintenance of authority and public stability. In Radošević’s vision, the state formation before 1929 could not have realized this goal. Rather, the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes preserved tribal particularisms, and it was the authoritarian, visionary work of Aleksandar I – a modern absolutist monarch – which was needed to dissolve these structures and start anew.

IV.

Radošević was nevertheless far too optimistic in his own political imaginary. The authoritarian turn in the second half of the 1930s generated even more friction among the political and national camps in the country. In a final effort to decentralize the state and avoid an irreparable tear in the social and political fabric, the 1939 Maček-Cvetković Agreement created an autonomous Croat unit inside the country, the *Banovina Hrvatska*. It functioned for less than two years. In late 1940 and early 1941, regional pressure from Hungary, Italy, Romania, and Bulgaria, along with direct requests

from Nazi Germany, pushed the Yugoslav regency to sign the Tripartite Pact. It did so on 25 March 1941. Massive street protests ensued, organized by Yugoslav communists and other oppositional forces. Two days later, a planned coup d'état headed by General Dušan Simović and staff of the Yugoslav Air Force declared Petar II Karađorđević of age, thereby preserving monarchical authority in the country. Such a course was short-lived, however, and with the Nazi German-led invasion of the country on 6 April 1941, the Yugoslav interwar period came to a close.

The language of Yugoslav monarchism, however, continued outside of Yugoslavia. It regained a more liberal character in the Yugoslav government-in-exile in London, while a more authoritarian and traditionalist stream was preserved among Serbian Četniks and other collaborationist formations which remained on the territory of occupied Yugoslavia. In the fascist Independent State of Croatia (*Nezavisna Država Hrvatska*, NDH), a thin glaze of particularly Croatian monarchism was incorporated into the ruling ideology. The Italian Prince Aimone, Duke of Aosta, of the House of Savoy was given the title King of Croatia and named Tomislav II, after the medieval Croatian king Tomislav I. But Tomislav II never resided in the NDH, and his existence had no practical consequences for the fascist ideology and genocidal actions of the *Ustaša*-led NDH. Indeed, following the liberation of Yugoslavia and the introduction of Yugoslavia's republican-socialist constitution in November 1945, any further expression of the political or legal language of monarchism was rather limited to Yugoslav émigré circles, or reduced to a whisper and pushed to the furthest margins of the public sphere domestically. This will require further research from the history of political thought, however.

By the end of the century, and in the context of the collapse of the socialist system in Yugoslavia and the ensuing wars (1991–2001), the re-emergence of monarchist imagery also took hold, perhaps most clearly in Serbia and Montenegro. While Serbia preserved its republican constitution, members of the Karađorđević dynasty were symbolically welcomed back to the country after Slobodan Milošević had been deposed in 2001, and soon afterward were given Serbian citizenship. Serbia's republican flag was redesigned in 2004, directly including elements from the Karađorđević's dynastic coat of arms and the flag of the Kingdom of Serbia (1882–1918). Similarly, in 2004, Montenegro – as part of the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro (*Državna zajednica Srbija i Crna Gora*) – adopted its current flag, featuring monarchist symbolism derived from the flags of the Principality and then Kingdom of Montenegro (1852–1910, 1910–1918), in turn taken from the coat of arms of the Petrović-Njegoš dynasty. While political symbolism matters a great deal, republican constitutions and forms of state are still retained across the countries of the former Yugoslavia. Still, this hasn't kept monarchist political thought on the margins, and restorationist tendencies have remained in public view since the wars in the 1990s. While this return is not eternal, the tendency to identify stability, order, and democracy in different measures with a monarchic form of government is central to the contemporary political visions of Vuk Drašković, head of the Serbian Movement of Renewal (*Srpski pokret obnove*), and Alexander Karađorđević, the current 'Crown Prince of Yugoslavia'. These are, however, variations on a theme, a theme which was already played out in a modernist key with traditionalist accents in the first decades of the twentieth century.

Notes

1. Srbin Sremac [Aleksa Ivić], 'Da li republika ili dinastija Karagjorgjevića [Republic, or the Karađorđević Dynasty]?', in *Savremena knjiga* [*Contemporary Book*] (Zagreb: Dionička tiskara, 1918), 3–7. My sincere thanks to Lucija Balikić for providing me with this source.
2. *Ibid.*, 6.
3. *Ibid.*
4. This biographic sketch is adapted from Mladen Švab, 'Ivić, Aleksa', in *Hrvatski biografski leksikon* [*Croatian Biographic Lexicon*], online resource (Zagreb: Leksikografski zavod Miroslav Krleža, 2005). <https://hbl.lzmk.hr/clanak.aspx?id=8883>.

5. *Stenografski zapisnici Sabora Kraljevine Hrvatske, Slavonije i Dalmacije* [*Stenographic Notes of the Sabor of the Kingdom of Croatia, Slavonia, and Dalmatia*], vol. 5, 1910–1915, 1 (Zagreb: Kraljevska zemaljska tiskara, 1911), 15.
6. See Ivić's response to Svetozar Pribičević's question on the matter in *ibid.*, 841.
7. The *Zemaljski arhiv* was the institutional predecessor of today's Croatian State Archive (*Hrvatski državni arhiv*).
8. In late October and November 1918, this state was called the State of Slovenes, Croats, and Serbs (*Država Slovenaca, Hrvata i Srba*). On 1 December 1918, the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes (*Kraljevina Srba, Hrvata i Slovenaca*) was established in Belgrade, when the State unified with the Kingdom of Serbia. Following the implementation of King Aleksandar I Karađorđević's royal dictatorship on 6 January 1929, the country was renamed the Kingdom of Yugoslavia (*Kraljevina Jugoslavija*) in the spirit of the new regime's official ideology of integral Yugoslavism. For short, however, the state was and is still referred to as 'Yugoslavia' across all of these periods, both in contemporaneous texts from the interwar period and in historiographic literature published since.
9. See, e.g., Tara Zahra, 'Imagined Non-Communities: National Indifference as a Category of Analysis', *Slavic Review* 69 (2010): 93–119; contributions in Tara Zahra and Pieter M. Judson (eds.), 'National Indifference', special issue, *Austrian History Yearbook* 43 (2012); and Gábor Egry, *Etnicitás, identitás, politika. Magyar kisebbségek nacionalizmus és regionalizmus között Romániában és Csehszlovákiában 1918–1944* [*Ethnicity, Identity, Politics. Hungarian Minorities between Nationalism and Regionalism in Romania and Czechoslovakia, 1918–1944*] (Budapest: Napvilág, 2015), to name a few texts from contemporary historiography on the question.
10. The classic model of this process in Central Europe, still used in Habsburg and Nationalism Studies, is Miroslav Hroch, *Social Preconditions of National Revival in Europe*, trans. Ben Fowkes (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985 [1968]). On how processes of national identification were partially induced by the Habsburg state and its bureaucracy, see Wolfgang Göderle, *Zensus und Ethnizität: Zur Herstellung von Wissen über soziale Wirklichkeiten im Habsburgerreich zwischen 1848 und 1910* (Göttingen: Wallstein, 2016); *idem.*, 'Administration, Science, and the State: The 1869 Population Census in Austria-Hungary', *Austrian History Yearbook* 47 (2016): 61–88; and Rok Stergar and Tamara Scheer, 'Ethnic Boxes: The Unintended Consequences of Habsburg Bureaucratic Classification', *Nationalities Papers* 46, no. 4 (2018): 575–91.
11. On the *Nagodba*, see Pieter Judson, *The Habsburg Empire: A New History* (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press, 2016), 264–65; Mirjana Gross and Agneza Szabo, *Prema hrvatskome građanskom društvu: Društveni razvoj u civilnoj Hrvatskoj i Slavoniji šezdesetih i sedamdesetih godina 19. stoljeća* [*Toward a Croatian Civil Society: Social Development in Civil Croatia and Slavonia, 1860s – 1870s*] (Zagreb: Globus, 1992), 221–38; and Josip Šarinić, *Nagodbena Hrvatska: Postanak i osnove ustavne organizacije* [*Post-Settlement Croatia: The Origins and Foundation of Its Constitutional Organization*] (Zagreb: Nakladni zavod Matice hrvatske, 1972).
12. In English, see Nicholas J. Miller, *Between Nation and State: Serbian Politics in Croatia Before the First World War* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1998). The 1910 election was a comparative loss for the Coalition. Previously, in the elections of 1908, the Coalition was led to a majority in the diet by Frano Supilo (1870–1917).
13. *Ibid.*, 75.
14. The literature on late nineteenth-century and interwar Yugoslavism as ideology and praxis is massive. For classic introductions in English, see Ivo Banac, *The National Question in Yugoslavia: Origins, History, Politics* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984); and studies in Dejan Djokić (ed.), *Yugoslavism: Histories of a Failed Idea, 1918–1992* (London: Hurst, 2003). For updated and accessible overviews, see, e.g., Rok Stergar, 'Illyrian Autochthonism and the Beginnings of South Slav Nationalisms in the West Balkans', in *In Search of Pre-Classical Antiquity: Rediscovering Ancient Peoples in Mediterranean Europe (19th and 20th c.)*, ed. Antonio de Francesco (Leiden: Brill, 2016), 96–118; and Marie-Janine Calic, 'The South Slavic Movement and the Founding of the Yugoslav State (1878 to 1918)', Part I in *A History of Yugoslavia*, tr. Dona Geyer (West Lafayette, IN: Purdue University Press, 2019), 1–67.
15. On the background of the *Narodna stranka*'s activities in Ivić's home region, see Branko Ostajmer, *Narodna stranka u Slavoniji i Srijemu 1883–1903*. [*The People's Party in Slavonia and Sirmia, 1883–1903*] (Zagreb: Hrvatski institut za povijest, 2018). For a view of the party's intellectual background before the turn of the twentieth century, see Vera Ciliga, 'Narodna stranka i južnoslavensko pitanje (1866–1870)' [*The People's Party and the South Slavic Question (1866–1870)*], *Historijski zbornik* 17 (1964): 85–114; and *idem.*, *Slom politike Narodne stranke (1865–1880)* [*The Collapse of the Politics of the People's Party, 1865–1880*] (Zagreb: Matica hrvatska, 1970).
16. On the intellectual history of the Croatian Party of Right (*Stranka prava*) in the nineteenth century, see Mirjana Gross, *Povijest pravaške ideologije* [*A History of Croatian State-Rightist Ideology*] (Zagreb: Sveučilište u Zagrebu – Institut za hrvatsku povijest, 1973). In English, see Mirjana Gross, 'Croatian National-Integrational

- Ideologies from the End of Illyrianism to the Creation of Yugoslavia', *Austrian History Yearbook* 15/16 (1979–80): 3–33.
17. *Stenografski zapisi Sabora* 5, 1: 843.
 18. The implication behind Ivić's address here is that early modern ethnic and regional identities converged fully with modern national(ist) terminology – a key trope in modernist ethnogenetic discourses.
 19. *Ibid.*, 845.
 20. See, e.g., Julia Bavouzet, 'The Hungarian Ministry of Interior and its Civil Servants in the Post-war Turmoil', in *Hofratsdämmerung? Verwaltung und ihr Personal in den Nachfolgenstaaten der Habsburgermonarchie 1918 bis 1920*, ed. Peter Becker and Therese Garstenauer (Vienna: Böhlau, 2020), 113–136.
 21. See 'Krfska deklaracija [The Corfu Declaration]', in *Dokumenti o postanku kraljevine Srba, Hrvata i Slovenaca 1914–1919. [Documents on the Creation of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, 1914–1919]*, ed. Ferdo Šišić (Zagreb: Matica hrvatska, 1920), 96–100. The classic study on the Corfu Declaration remains Dragoslav Janković, *Jugoslovensko pitanje i Krfska deklaracija 1917. godine [The Yugoslav Question and the Corfu Declaration of 1917]* (Belgrade: Savremena administracija, 1967).
 22. See Cody J. Inglis, 'Egy "jugoszláv köztársaságért": A posztimperiális "köztársasági pillanat" és a délszlávok, 1917–1921 [For a "Yugoslav Republic": The Postimperial 'Republican Moment' and the South Slavs, 1917–1921]', *Múltunk [Our Past]* 66, 4 (2021): 42–69.
 23. For the primary text, see "Chicaška" izjava [The "Chicago" Declaration], document no. 93 in *Programi slovenskih političnih strank, organizacij in društev v letih 1890–1918: Pregled k slovenski politični zgodovini [The Programs of Slovenian Political Parties, Organizations, and Societies, 1890–1918: An Overview of Slovenian Political History]*, ed. Jurij Perovšek (Ljubljana: Inštitut za novejšo zgodovino, 2016), online resource, <https://www.sistory.si/cdn/publikacije/30001-31000/30658/doc093.html>.
 24. See, e.g., Banac, *The National Question*, 242–48. See also primary documents on revolts in the Croatian countryside compiled in Josipa Paver, ed., *Zbornik građe za povijest radničkog pokreta i KPJ 1919–1920 [A Source Collection for the History of the Workers' Movement and the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, 1919–1920]* (Sisak: Historijski arhiv, 1970). Stjepan Radić, the head of the Croatian (Republican) Peasant Party, noted that the peasantry in the countryside had first articulated demands for a republic themselves: see Stjepan Radić, 'Speech at the Night Assembly of the National Council on 24 November 1918', in *Discourses of Collective Identity in Central and Southeast Europe (1770–1945)*, vol. 3/1, *Modernism: The Creation of Nation-States*, ed. Ahmet Ersoy, Maciej Górný, and Vangelis Kechriotis (Budapest: Central European University Press, 2010), 151–60.
 25. For a synthesis of the Serbian debates, see Branka Prpa, 'Monarhija ili republika [Monarchy or Republic]', chapter 4 in *Srpski intelektualci i Jugoslavija 1918–1929 [Serbian Intellectuals and Yugoslavia, 1918–1929]* (Belgrade: Clio, 2018), 138–59. See also Maria Falina, 'Narrating Democracy in Interwar Yugoslavia: From State Creation to Its Collapse', *Journal of Modern European History* 17, 2 (2019): 196–208.
 26. Ivić, 'Da li republika ili dinastija Karagorgjevića', 3.
 27. *Ibid.*, 4–5.
 28. The first constitution of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes was named after the Serbian national feasting day (*slava*) on which the constitution was approved by the Constituent Assembly: St. Vitus Day (*Vidovdan*), 28 June 1921.
 29. Slobodan Jovanović, 'Postanak države [The Creation of the State]', chapter 1 of the introduction to *Ustavno pravo Kraljevine Srba, Hrvata i Slovenaca [Constitutional Law of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes]* (Belgrade: Geca Kon, 1924), 21.
 30. On the Tribunals, see studies in Hélène Ruiz Fabri and Michel Erpelding, eds., *The Mixed Arbitral Tribunals, 1919–1939: An Experiment in the International Adjudication of Private Rights* (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2023). See also Karl Strupp, 'The Competence of the Mixed Arbitral Courts of the Treaty of Versailles', *The American Journal of International Law* 17, no. 4 (1923): 661–90, for a study synchronous with the work of the MATs.
 31. See 'Kat and Klump v. Yugoslavia', *Annual Digest of Public International Law Cases* 3 (1929): 33–34.
 32. Dušan Subotić, 'Naša Kraljevina nije nova država [Our Kingdom Is Not a New State]', *Novi Život [New Life]* 11, no. 11 (18 November 1922): 321–25. On the members of the MAT, see Erpelding, '38. Yugoslavian-German MAT [1921–39]', in *The Mixed Arbitral Tribunals*, 580.
 33. Subotić, 'Naša Kraljevina', 321.
 34. *Ibid.*, 325.
 35. Ivan Žolger, 'Da li je naša kraljevina nova ili stara država [Is Our Kingdom a New or Old State]?', *Slovenski pravnik [Slovene Lawyer]* 37, no. 3/4 (1923): 69.
 36. *Ibid.*
 37. See the treaty's text in Snežana Trifunovska, ed., 'Treaty of Peace between the Principal Allied and Associated Powers and the Serb-Croat-Slovene State, Saint-Germain-en-Laye, 10 September 1919', document no. 67 in *Yugoslavia Through Documents: From Its Creation to Its Dissolution* (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1994), 163–70.
 38. Žolger, 'Da li je naša kraljevina nova ili stara država', 83–84. Emphasis Žolger's.

39. On the centralism versus federalism debate, see Prpa, *Srpski intelektualci*, 89–137.
40. Helmut Slapnicka, 'Die Rechtsgebiete Jugoslawiens [Yugoslavia's Legal Spaces]', in *Österreichs Recht ausserhalb Österreichs [Austria's Law Outside Austria]* (Vienna: Verlag für Geschichte und Politik), 86–87.
41. See Jovanović, *Ustavno pravo*, 307–22.
42. *Ibid.*, 332.
43. *Ibid.*
44. *Ibid.*, 333.
45. *Ibid.*
46. Đorđe Tasić, 'O uredbodavnoj moći izvršne vlasti po Vidovdanskome ustavu (Čl. 94) [On the Regulative Abilities of Executive Power According to Article 94 of the Vidovdan Constitution]', *Arhiv za pravne i društvene nauke [Annales of the Legal and Social Sciences]* 22, no. 4 (25 November 1922): 256–63, here 262.
47. See Article 94 of the 1921 Yugoslav Constitution. Available as a downloadable PDF file at: http://www.arhivyyu.gov.rs/active/sr-latin/home/glavna_navigacija/leksikon_jugoslavije/konstitutivni_akti_jugoslavije/vidovdanski_ustav.html.
48. Tasić, 'O uredbodavnoj moći', 257.
49. *Ibid.*
50. See Article 52, 1921 Yugoslav Constitution.
51. Đorđe Tasić, 'Može li Kralj raspustiti Skupštinu i pre donošenja izbornog zakona [Can the King Dissolve Parliament Even Before the Passage of the Electoral Law?]', *Misao [Thought]* 9, no. 5/6 (July 1922): 1038–40.
52. See Branislav Gligorijević, *Parlament i političke stranke u Jugoslaviji, 1919–1929 [Parliament and Political Parties in Yugoslavia, 1919–1929]* (Belgrade: Institut za savremenu istoriju, 1979).
53. See Calic, *A History of Yugoslavia*, 90–95.
54. For a description of the shooting in English, see Latinka Perović, 'Croatian MPs Assassinated in the People's Assembly: 20 June 1928', in *YU Historija*, online resource, https://yuhistorija.com/yug_first_txt01c2.html. For Yugoslav historiography, see Gligorijević, *Parlament i političke stranke*, 252ff; Zvonimir Kulundžić, *Atentat na Stjepana Radića [The Assassination of Stjepan Radić]* (Zagreb: Biblioteka 'Vremeplov', 1967) 334–96; and Ferdo Čulinović, *Jugoslavija između dva rata [Yugoslavia Between the World Wars]*, vol. 1 (Zagreb: Izdavački zavod Jugoslavenske akademije znanosti i umjetnosti, 1961), 524–31. The events were recorded 'live' in the stenographic notes of the National Assembly: see *Stenografske beleške Narodne skupštine Kraljevine Srba, Hrvata i Slovenaca. Redovan saziv za 1927/28 [Stenographic Notes of the National Assembly of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes. Regular Convocation for 1927/28]*, vol. 8, *od LXVI. do LXXXIII. redovnog sastanka [Regular Sessions 66–83]* (Belgrade: Štamparija Vladete S. Janičijevića, 1928), 531–39.
55. See, e.g., discussion in Dragoš Jevtić, 'Vidovdanski i Oktroisani ustav od 3. IX 1931 godine. Sličnosti i razlike [The Vidovdan and Octroyed Constitution of 3 September 1931. Similarities and Differences]', *Arhiv za pravne i društvene nauke [Annales of the Legal and Social Sciences]*, 1–2 (1988): 107–14.
56. Čulinović, *Jugoslavija između dva rata*, vol. 1, 531.
57. Vladko Maček, *In the Struggle for Freedom* (Pittsburgh: Penn State University Press, 1968), 122–23. Quoted in David Shepherd, 'The Royal Dictatorship in Yugoslavia, 1929–1934: As Seen from British Sources', MA thesis, Durham University, 1975, 52.
58. Čulinović, *Jugoslavija između dva rata*, 548.
59. 'Mome dragom narodu [To My Dear People]', *Službene novine [The Administrative Gazette]* 6 (6 January 1929). The Slovene-language version was published the next day as 'Mojemu dragemu narodu [To My Dear People]', *Uradni list ljubljanske in mariborski oblasti [The Administrative Gazette of the Ljubljana and Maribor Oblasts]* 3 (7 January 1929).
60. See, e.g., Aleksandar I Karadžević, *Mome dragom narodu [To My Dear People]*, 1929, poster, 64×48 cm, Narodna biblioteka Srbije [National Library of Serbia], https://digitalna.nb.rs/view/URN:NB:RS:SD_58EDA1F2F6466FBAC9BBD7E505FDAB1F.
61. 'Zakon o kraljevskoj vlasti i vrhovnoj drzavnoj upravi [Law on Royal Power and the Central State Administration]', *Službene novine [The Administrative Gazette]* 6 (6 January 1929).
62. 'Vlada zakonitosti, pravice in enakosti [A Government of Legality, Justice, and Equality]', *Slovenec [The Slovene]* 57, no. 6 (8 January 1929), 1.
63. *Ibid.*
64. Here, 'clique' was a negative term used in place of the more neutral 'party' or more nationally inflected 'tribe.'
65. See Todor Stojkov, *Opozicija u vreme šestojanuarske diktature 1929–1935. [The Opposition During the 6 January Dictatorship, 1929–1935]* (Belgrade: Institut za savremenu istoriju, 1969).
66. *Stenografske beleške Narodne skupštine Kraljevine Jugoslavije [Stenographic Notes of the National Assembly of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia]*, vol. 1, 1, 'I. prethodnih sastanak Narodne skupštine Kraljevine Jugoslavije u vanrednom sazivu držan na dan 7 decembra 1931 godine [First Preparatory Session of the National Assembly of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia Held in Extraordinary Convocation on 7 December 1931]' (Belgrade: n. p., 1932), 1.
67. *Ibid.*, 2.

68. See Ciril Žebot, *Korporativno narodno gospodarstvo: korporativizem, fašizem, korporativno narodno gospodarstvo* [*Corporative National Economy: Corporatism, Fascism, Corporative National Economy*] (Celje: Mohorjeva tiskarna, 1939).
69. Stefano Petrungaro, 'Inter-war Yugoslavia Seen Through Corporatist Glasses', in *Corporatism and Fascism: The Corporatist Wave in Europe*, ed. Antonio Costa Pinto (London: Routledge, 2017), 236–56.
70. See Mladen Stefanović, *Zbor Dimitrija Ljotića 1934–1945*. [*Dimitrije Ljotić's Zbor, 1934–1945*] (Belgrade: Narodna knjiga, 1984).
71. Velibor Jonić, *Šta hoće 'Zbor'?* [*What Does 'Zbor' Want?*] (Petrovgrad: Zbor, n. d. [~1935]), 4–5.
72. Mijo Radošević, *Osnovi savremene Jugoslavije: političke ideje, stranke i ljudi u XIX i XX veku* [*The Foundations of Contemporary Yugoslavia: Political Ideas, Parties, and People in the 19th and 20th Centuries*] (Zagreb: Štamparija Zadrudne štamparije, 1935).
73. *Ibid.*, 519.

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