

Forced Migration from Ukraine to the EU since the Outbreak of the Russian-Ukrainian war – with Focus on Hungary

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The article analyses the changing characteristics of migration from Ukraine to Hungary looking at the period between 2010 and 2023. Migration from Ukraine has undergone a number of changes during the period under study due to the socio-economic processes in Ukraine and the war that has broken out in the meantime. Of course, changes in the legal and economic characteristics of Hungary have also had an impact on migration between the two countries. The Council of the European Union has applied the Temporary Protection Directive (2001/55 EC Directive) since 4 March 2022. Since then the European Commission organises the collection and publication of data on temporary protection. The Commission has both activated the collection of statistics on persons granted temporary protection, as provided for in Article 4 of Regulation 862/2007 EC, and asked Member States to voluntarily accelerate the collection of data, with the first reference month being April 2022. The vast majority of Member States comply with the statistical data collection although with varying degrees of data coverage. The data show that migration from Ukraine has been one of the most important factors influencing the overall migration process in Hungary.

Keywords: migration, forced migration, asylum applications, temporary protection, naturalization

I. Introduction

The press informs us daily about the latest developments in the Russian-Ukrainian war. At the time of writing (end of September 2023), the war has been going on for more than 1.5 years, starting with Russia's attack on Ukraine on 24 February 2022, which some say was unexpected, while many experts have subsequently argued was predictable.

There were several signs of the start of the war, ranging from the deployment of forces near the Russian-Ukrainian border to the disruption of gas supplies from Russia to Europe, all of which could only have been signs of a military exercise, and which were intended to increase Russia's potential for blackmail. On 21 February 2022, Russian President Vladimir Putin arbitrarily recognised the separatist-controlled areas of Ukraine, including Ukraine's Luhansk region and the Donetsk region, as independent states and sent Russian military troops to these regions. This move by President Vladimir Putin was preceded by the Russian Duma's vote on 15 February 2022 to recognise these areas of Ukraine as independent.

Subsequently, on 24 February 2022, the Russian Federation launched a military offensive against Ukraine from several directions. The recognition of the Luhansk and Donetsk regions as independent states and the invasion of Ukraine was unanimously condemned by the European Union.

Since the outbreak of the war, one fourth² of Ukraine's population has been displaced, making forced migration caused by the Russian-Ukrainian war the biggest humanitarian disaster in the world today (as of September 2023). More than 11 Million Ukrainians have been forced to leave their homes and a further Millions of people are in places they cannot leave due to

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² UNHCR Operational Data Portal. <https://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/ukraine>

increased security risks or destruction of infrastructure. According to data available on 20 September 2023, almost 6.2 Million Ukrainians have sought refuge outside Ukraine, and the limited success of the war in Ukraine has also led to a significant return to Ukraine since last year as well. As of 20 September, nearly 2.5 Million people³ had sought refuge in countries neighbouring Ukraine. The war has highlighted the migration flows from Ukraine to Hungary too and, in particular, their markedly changing nature since 2010.

Since the end of February 2022, the European Council and the Council of the European Union have been meeting regularly on the issue of the Russia-Ukraine war, with EU leaders repeatedly calling on the leaders of the Russian Federation to end their aggression against Ukraine and restore Ukraine's territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence, to no avail. A total of eleven sanctions packages against the Russian Federation have been adopted since 23 February 2022.⁴

The first round of sanctions packages concerned members of the Russian Duma, as well as Vladimir Putin himself, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov and Russia's economic relations with the EU. Subsequent sanctions packages have included banning Russian flagged aircraft from the EU, restrictions on the use of the international interbank code SWIFT by Russian banks, and restrictions on the import of certain products (e.g. iron) from Russia into the EU. In June 2023 the 11th series of sanctions was introduced, the Council adopted new restrictive measures against Russia. The agreed package includes amongst others, measures to strengthen bilateral and multilateral cooperation with third countries to impede sanctions' circumvention and to prohibit the transit of goods and technology via Russia.⁵

A Main source of migration from Ukraine to Hungary

The most significant source of migration from Ukraine to Hungary is the Hungarian minority population of Transcarpathia, according to the data of the first and last Ukrainian census in 2001, 151.5 persons in Transcarpathia declared themselves as Hungarians - 158.7 thousand of them native Hungarians - which accounted for 96.8% of the total number of Hungarians⁶ in Ukraine, i.e. 156.6 thousand. During the relatively peaceful period of the 2000s, the number of Hungarians in Transcarpathia decreased by about 10 000⁷, while other authors estimate the decrease to be almost double, at 15-20 000⁸, the difference between the two figures being due to the difficulty of counting migration statistics. According to data from 2017, the number of Hungarians living in Ukraine was 130,000.⁹

However, Hungarians in Ukraine are only one of the main factors of international migration from Ukraine to Hungary. It can be said, that Ukrainian Hungarians have been the most significant driving force behind migration between the two countries, as in their case the geographical and cultural distance was not so great as to make geographical mobility and

³ Ukraine Situation Flash Update. <https://data.unhcr.org/en/situations/ukraine>

⁴ Council of the European Union Response. <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/eu-response-ukraine-invasion/>

⁵ Council of the European Union Response.

⁶ Tátrai, Patrik, Molnár, József, Molnár, D. István, Kovály, Katalin, Eröss, Ágnes, Ferenc, Viktória, and Rákóczi, Krisztián. (2018). Impact of migration processes on the number of Hungarians in Transcarpathia. (A migrációs folyamatok hatása a kárpátaljai magyarok számának alakulására). *Metszetek-Társadalomtudományi Folyóirat*, 7(1), 5-29.

⁷ Molnár, József, Molnár, D. István (2005). Population of Transcarpathia including the Hungarian minority in light of the census and population statistics. (Kárpátalja népessége és magyarsága a népszámlálási és népmozgalmi adatok tükrében). Kárpátaljai Magyar Pedagógusszövetség Tankönyv-és Taneszköztanácsa. Beregszász, 2005.

⁸ Kincses Áron, Karácsonyi Dávid (2010). Impact of emigration on the Hungarian population in Transcarpathia. (Az elvándorlás hatása a kárpátaljai magyarság helyzetére). *Földrajzi közlemények* 134, (1) 31-43.

⁹ Kovács Csaba, Rovács Barna. (2021). Hungarians in the Carpathian Basin with regard of the population census data. (Magyarok a Kárpát-medencében – a népszámlálási adatok tükrében). *Századvég*, 2021. (3) 61-83.

integration difficult. Since 2010 there have been a number of legislative and geopolitical changes that have had an impact on this migration and have made the country an attractive destination for migrants from more distant regions of Ukraine. The last decade has brought significant changes in the characteristics of international migration from Ukraine to Hungary¹⁰. On the one hand, the size of the Ukrainian community in the latter country more than doubled in the 2010s, growing faster than in Europe as a whole (244% vs. 114%)¹¹. On the other hand, together with geopolitical developments in the region and Hungarian labour market and kin-state policies, migration flows from Ukraine have undergone a significant transformation in terms of their ethnic and socio-demographic composition¹².

B Drivers of Ukrainian migration

Two groups of factors influencing migration from Ukraine can be distinguished, one of them being external events from Ukraine, which can be defined as a pull factor according to classical migration theory. The other factor can be classified as a push factor, which typically takes the form of some type of socio-economic factor, such as a political change, a war event or an environmental disaster.

In 2010, the Hungarian Parliament amended the Act LV. of 1993 on Hungarian Citizenship¹³, introducing the possibility of simplified naturalisation, and the geopolitical events since the end of 2013, first the political-social changes related to Euromaidan, and then in 2014 the annexation of Crimea to Russia, the war in Eastern Ukraine and the related economic downturn, have had a significant impact on international migration from Ukraine.

Even before the events of Euromaidan, Ukraine's economic performance had not reached its pre-1991 level, stagnating at 60-65%¹⁴ in 2014, and Ukraine is the second poorest country in Europe after Moldova in terms of GDP per capita¹⁵. Ukraine's western neighbours have also become the main destination countries for emigration, as social and cultural capital and the economic benefits derived from it play a more important role in Ukrainians' migration decisions than individual profit maximisation¹⁶.

For Ukraine, the pull factor is the change in the structure and performance of the Hungarian economy between 2013 and 2021. During this period, the Hungarian labour market showed signs of the labour shortage typical of Western European countries and to counteract this, the government first allowed the preferential employment of nationals of neighbouring countries in certain shortage occupations, and later extended this possibility to other third-country nationals (according to Article 15 (1) 26 of Government Decree 445/2013 (28.11.), the occupations in which third-country nationals may be employed without a permit were defined)¹⁷. In the early 2020s, however, migration processes turned upside down. COVID-19

¹⁰ Malynovska, Olena (2020). International Migration of Ukrainian Population Since Independence. In: Denisenko, Mikhail, Strozza, Salvatore, Light, Matthew. (eds.) *Migration from the Newly Independent States: 25 Years After the Collapse of the USSR*. Springer, 169-186.

¹¹ Based on United Nations POP/DB/MIG/Stock/Rev.2020. <https://www.un.org/development/desa/pd/content/international-migrant-stock>

¹² Gödri, Irén, Csányi, Zoltán. (2020). Immigration from the Former Soviet Union to Hungary: Economic Mobility Rooted in Historical Links and Ethnic Ties. In: Denisenko, Mikhail., Strozza, Salvatore. & Light, Matthew. (eds.) *Migration from the Newly Independent States: 25 Years After the Collapse of the USSR*. Springer, 483-510

¹³ Act LV of 1993 on Hungarian citizenship, <https://net.jogtar.hu/jogszabaly?docid=99300055.tv>

¹⁴ Kincses, Áron (2020). Geographical networks of international migration in the Carpathian Basin. (A nemzetközi vándorlás területi hálózatai a Kárpát-medencében). 2011–2017. KSH, Budapest 2020.

¹⁵ <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.KD?end=2021&locations=UA-MD-AL-GE-AM&start=2014>

¹⁶ Kincses, Áron (2020). Geographical networks of international migration in the Carpathian Basin. (A nemzetközi vándorlás területi hálózatai a Kárpát-medencében).

¹⁷ Hungarian Gazette 2016/30., (Hivatalos Értesítő 2016/30.), <http://www.kozlonyok.hu/kozlonyok/index.php?m=2&p=0200&k=12&y=2016>

resulted in a negative migration balance in the migration flows of Ukrainians (for the first time since migration flows have been measured in Hungary). Although the second year of the COVID-19 showed signs of a recovery of the pre-plague migration patterns, the Russian-Ukrainian war brought a different level of uncertainty about the future of the migration system.

II. Three determinants of Ukrainian migration to Hungary

A Factors affecting migration: Introduction of simplified naturalisation

The introduction of simplified naturalisation, the facilitation of their access to employment and the war in Ukraine were the main factors influencing migration from Ukraine to Hungary during the period under review.

The Act LV of 1993 on Hungarian Citizenship allowed for preferential naturalisation in its amended §4. In principle, Hungarian citizenship can be acquired by birth or later, after birth, by naturalisation. Act XLIV of 2010 introduced significant changes in the regulation of the acquisition of Hungarian citizenship. Under the Act, Hungarian citizenship can be acquired by naturalisation or by re-naturalisation. Naturalised persons are those who acquired Hungarian citizenship when they were born as foreign citizens, and recon naturalised persons are those whose former Hungarian citizenship has been terminated and who have become Hungarian citizens again. The simplified naturalisation procedure introduced under the Act from 1 January 2011 allows foreign citizens with Hungarian ancestry to acquire Hungarian citizenship without having to establish Hungarian residence. The legislative changes have also facilitated the naturalisation of some foreigners living in Hungary.

B Employment situation in Hungary

The labour shortage rate as a share of employment has risen from 1.5% to 2.5% in the competitive sector at the level of the economy. Signs of labour shortages in the Hungarian economy started to emerge after 2015 and the Hungarian government has taken measures to alleviate them, first by significantly easing the rules for nationals of neighbouring countries to work in Hungary.

A significant change in the employment of Ukrainian citizens in Hungary and thus in their residence in Hungary occurred in when, in order to alleviate the labour shortage in Hungary, the Ministry for National Economy issued a Notice¹⁸ simplifying the rules for the employment of third-country nationals from neighbouring countries by defining the scope of professions that may be exempted from the permit requirement.

The number of workers of non-Hungarian nationality, including Ukrainian nationals, has visibly increased in the statistics after 2016. In 2022, the number of Ukrainian citizens residing in the country for employment purposes is nine times higher than in 2011, increasing from 3,500 to 27,000 in the period in question. A particularly significant increase can be observed in 2017 and 2018.


C The impact of the war in Ukraine on migration flows

Since the outbreak of the Russian-Ukrainian war, migration experts are no longer in a position to develop sound theories on the Hungarian-Ukrainian migration system. Although sporadic statistical data on related issues such as daily border crossings and the number of applications for temporary protection in Hungary are available, they lack the depth necessary to draw more far-reaching conclusions.

¹⁸ Notice of the Ministry of National Economy (NGM Közlemény), https://net.jogtar.hu/getpdf?docid=A16K0302.NGM&targetdate=ffffff4&printTitle=NGM+k%C3%B6zlem%C3%A9ny&referer=http%3A%2F%2Fnet.jogtar.hu%2Fgen%2Fhjegy_doc.cgi%3Fdocid%3D00000001.TXT

Figure 1 shows daily border crossings from Ukraine based on the Hungarian Police border traffic statistics. From 24 February 2022 to 31 August 2023, there were a total of 6.7 Million border crossings from Ukraine, 3.4 Million across the Ukrainian-Hungarian border and 3.3 Million across Romania (originating from Ukraine). After the very high numbers in the first weeks of the war (peak of 33.6 thousand crossings on 11 March), the number of daily entries stabilised at around 10 – 15 thousand.


Figure 1: Number of border crossings from Ukraine to Hungary from 24.02.2022 to 31.08.2023¹⁹



It is important to note that these figures do not represent persons but border crossings, without reference to nationality. Furthermore, there is no information available on those leaving Hungary or returning to Ukraine, i.e. there is no evidence available to make any judgements based on these data about how many of those fleeing the war actually remain in Hungary. It is unfortunate that data by nationality is not available on the public website of the Hungarian National Police, so the information that can be drawn from this source of statistical data is relatively limited. The spikes observed are presumably due to the change in the intensity of the war and correlate with the periods when war-related curfews were imposed in Ukraine. In addition to those who left Ukraine forcibly, the flow of entrants to Hungary may of course also include e.g. those who returned to Hungary after some form of humanitarian assistance in Ukraine. In contrast to the Hungarian National Police, the national data providers of some EU Member States also publish data on persons entering Ukraine from their territories, which would presumably be available for Hungary.

¹⁹ Compiled by the author. Data source: Daily statistics published by the Hungarian National Police on its website (<https://www.police.hu>).

Figure 2: Number of border crossings from Ukraine and to Ukraine – based on data of some EU member states and of the Republic of Moldova²⁰




People arriving in Hungary from Ukraine have several options for staying which makes the understanding of statistics more difficult. Hungarian citizens from Ukraine may enter and reside in Hungary without restrictions (but are excluded from temporary protection). Data on persons who establish usual residence (registered address) in Hungary is collected by the Hungarian Central Statistical Office (HCSO). 2-3 thousand Ukrainian citizens immigrated to our country as naturalised citizens every year, but in the year of the outbreak of the war this number increased to 7000.

Ukrainian citizens holding a valid biometric travel document may stay in the country for up to 90 days, but no public data are - and will not be - available on them. Third-country nationals may also apply for a valid residence permit for short or long stays. Another option for non-Hungarian nationals coming from Ukraine is to apply for temporary protection, which allows for stays of up to 12 months, but can be extended and actually it was extended. Sporadic data on applications and decisions on temporary protection were published by the National Directorate-General for Aliens Policing (NDGAP) until end of September 2022 but Eurostat and UNHCR still publish data. HCSO publishes data on application for temporary protection and on decisions on them on a quarterly base.

By the end of August 2023, around 39,000 persons had applied for temporary protection, the vast majority of whom had already been granted temporary protection status. The number of applications for temporary protection was at its peak at the beginning of the conflict – especially in the first calendar year of the conflict and has been on a steady downward trend, with monthly applications reaching around 800 or less since the summer of 2022. It is assumed that some of the applicants for temporary protection are no longer in Hungary - some may have emigrated back to Ukraine or sought protection in another EU Member State - or at least the duration of their stay in Hungary cannot be clearly established.

²⁰ Compiled by the author. Data source: UNHCR Operational Data Portal – Ukraine Refugee Situation (<https://data.unhcr.org/en/situations/ukraine>).

Figure 3: Number of applications for temporary protection and persons granted temporary protection from February 2022 to August 2023²¹



Since the outbreak of the war and the entry into force of the Temporary Protection Directive, the National Directorate General for Aliens Policing (NDGAP)²² provided information on the evolution of the number of applications for recognition of temporary protection status - in fact, the total number of applications at any given time, as a snapshot. The information is provided in the form of a textual press release, without any simple data visualisation or format that can be easily downloaded and used by users. Another difficulty for the usability of the data is that the NDGAP only publishes status data, the frequency of the data releases being irregular rather than regular. Due to the irregular nature of the data, only cautious conclusions can be drawn from these data on the evolution of the number of applications per asylum. Unfortunately NDGAP has stopped the semi-regular publishing data from October 2022. At the end of July 2023, according to Eurostat data the number of persons with asylum status per 1,000 capita in the EU-27 was 8.9, while in Hungary it was 3.3, the fourth lowest in the EU. In the Czech Republic the same indicator was 33.²³

D Implementation of the Temporary Protection Directive

A significant step to prevent the emerging refugee crisis was the application of the Temporary Protection Directive (Directive 2001/55/EC)²⁴ to protect people displaced from Ukraine by the Russian-Ukrainian war. On 4 March 2022, the EU Council adopted Implementing Decision 2022/382 on the application of the Temporary Protection Directive. This is the first time since

²¹ Compiled by the author. Source: Demographic Tabulation Application of the Hungarian Central Statistical Office.

²² NDGAP, http://oif.gov.hu/index.php?option=com_k2&view=item&id=390:hivatal-bemutatas&Itemid=896&lang=hu

²³ Own elaboration based on Eurostat's database (<https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/main/data/database>)

²⁴ Directive 2001/55/EC, <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32001L0055>

the adoption of the Directive that it has been applied. The Hungarian Government adopted the Council Decision based on Government Decree No 86/2022 (7.III.) on emergency rules relating to persons recognised as eligible for temporary protection but before its adoption Hungary already gave protection to persons fleeing from Ukraine based on Act LXXV of 2007 on Asylum.

The creation of the Temporary Protection Directive was essentially motivated by the wars in Yugoslavia and was designed to deal with large-scale influxes of displaced persons. It is intended to operate in a situation where Member States' asylum systems are unable to cope with the volume of new cases. The Temporary Protection Directive was the first Asylum Directive adopted by the Council on the basis of Article 63(2)(a) and (b) of the Treaty establishing the European Communities, which are now an integral part of Article 78(1) and (2)(c) and (g) Treaty on Functioning of the European Union (TFEU)²⁵. The Temporary Protection Directive is part of the existing legislation of the European Union and is often considered as the third category of protection. The temporary protection category, as its name implies, creates a temporary legal status, which is accompanied by rights and benefits for the beneficiary of the protection category.

The Directive sets minimum standards for the temporary protection of asylum seekers in the event of a mass influx of forcibly displaced persons and allows, in theory, for a balanced burden-sharing between Member States. A mass influx is defined as the arrival of a large number of forcibly displaced persons from a third country or from a contiguous area involving several states. The existence of this situation must be decided by the EU Council by qualified majority. The period of protection granted by the Council is one year, renewable twice for six months. Temporary protection does not replace the granting of refugee status under the Geneva Convention, which is based on an individual asylum procedure, but only allows authorities overwhelmed by the mass influx to have a maximum of two years to carry out the procedure. The directive grants beneficiaries of temporary protection rights similar to those of recognised refugees, i.e. access to the labour market and the possibility of family reunification.

The Directive was the result of discussions between Member States starting in the early 1990s. It was necessary because Member States needed to find a solution to the critical situation caused by the influx of large numbers of asylum seekers from the former Yugoslavia, especially Bosnia and Herzegovina, and from Kosovo in the late 1990s.

At the time of the Kosovo crisis, the Council of the EU reaffirmed its position that, while international protection should be provided primarily within the region of origin, the extension of protection within the Community is also an important issue due to the large number of asylum seekers who are forced to leave their country. In 1999, the Council adopted an action plan under Article K.3 of the Treaty on European Union to establish *"projects and measures to provide practical support in relation to the reception and voluntary repatriation of refugees, displaced persons and asylum seekers, including emergency assistance to persons who have fled as a result of recent events in Kosovo."*²⁶ Pending the adoption of the directive, member states provided temporary protection to displaced persons in the framework of the UN Humanitarian Resettlement Programme and their experience there was subsequently used to negotiate and draft the Temporary Protection Directive. The purpose of the Temporary Protection Directive is twofold: on the one hand, it lays down minimum standards for the protection of displaced persons and, on the other, it helps to ensure a fair sharing of the burden between Member States. In 2011, Italy formally requested the application of the directive in order to deal with the situation caused by the large influx of asylum seekers from Tunisia, but the Council did not

²⁵ Treaty on Functioning of the European Union, <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ:C:2012:326:FULL>

²⁶ Joint Action of 26 April 1999, <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/MT/TXT/?uri=CELEX:31999F0290>

agree on the applicability of the directive, as it considered that the conditions set out in the directive were not met.

E Applications from temporary protection from Ukraine

At the time of the arrival of forcibly displaced persons in Hungary, the most urgent task of the law enforcement agencies was to set up registration points and to take care of applicants for temporary protection, in parallel with the suspension of systematic controls. In the course of providing assistance, the police set up so-called assistance points in settlements close to the Hungarian-Ukrainian border. The most important tasks were care, accommodation and transport. Accommodation for applicants for temporary protection was provided by the National Directorate General for Disaster Management. At the same time, the police made it a priority to maintain public security in order to prevent abuse of the humanitarian right. In order to register the large number of asylum seekers, it was also necessary to implement IT improvements and centralise care, during the registration process, the applicant's personal data and photograph were recorded, checked in various databases and the temporary residence certificate was issued. The process allowed the link between the national border registration system and the police case management support system to be established. As a result of these improvements, the registration of a person was reduced from 90 minutes to about 5-8 minutes. Nevertheless, as the war progressed, police experience showed that the number of abuses of asylum status increased. Persons taken under temporary protection are entitled to a residence permit issued for humanitarian purposes for the duration of the procedure and they are issued with a residence permit containing biometric data, which does not in itself entitle the holder to travel abroad. Those with temporary protection status receive free health care, and the state also covers any document translation costs, as well as the right to participate in public education and work in Hungary. At the end of July 2023, according to Eurostat data²⁷, the number of persons with asylum status per 1,000 capita in the EU-27 was 8.9, while in Hungary it was 3.3, the fourth lowest in the EU. In the Czech Republic the same indicator was 33.

III. Summary

The year 2022 is a clear break in the migration flows trend between Ukraine and Hungary. The Ukrainian-Russian war has caused the biggest humanitarian disaster in Europe since the end of World War II, and in September 2023 there is still no prospect of an end to the war. There are already many sources of data on the scale of forced migration caused by the war, but it remains to be collated into a single source or database. The evolution of the number of Ukrainian refugees in the EU after a certain period of time (typically 12 months or more) will also have a statistical impact on the population. Taking this into account, it would also be important to develop a uniform statistical data collection and publication at least for EU Member States. This is undoubtedly a difficult task, as some of the forcibly displaced persons who have fled Ukraine because of the war are not registered or registered with the national authorities, as Ukrainian citizens holding a biometric passport can stay in the EU for up to 90 days without a visa and without having to report their presence. Border traffic statistics also show a return flow, with some of the asylum seekers having already returned to Ukraine. On the one hand, the low number of applications for temporary protection (only 1% of daily border crossings) suggests that few Ukrainians wish to stay in Hungary for a longer period, on the other hand, however, the relevant data needed to draw firm conclusions on this issue are not yet available, or are incomplete in terms of quality, timeliness and depth.

²⁷ Own elaboration based on Eurostat's database: <https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/main/data/database>

There are several sources of data available on Ukrainian refugees, including national data sources such as NDGAP and the HCSO, which publishes data taken from NDGAP. NDGAP also transmits statistical data to Eurostat, which publishes them on its website. NDGAP's data publication practices are highly inconsistent. The Hungarian police also publishes border traffic statistics, but it is not possible to draw far-reaching conclusions from these data. Overall, it can be concluded that although Hungary is a de facto destination country for people fleeing Ukraine, it is not to a significant extent compared to other EU Member States.

I consider it necessary to establish the possibility of exchanging statistical data on refugees from Ukraine between national authorities and EU Member States, thus facilitating informed policy decisions in the field of asylum.

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