

The Impact of the Pandemic on Criminal Intelligence

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The global pandemic, COVID 19 and its mutations have a significant impact on the structure of crime and law enforcement, and it will have a serious impact in the near future, on the branch of the criminal service. In this article I examine the impact of a pandemic on global and domestic crime and how resilient law enforcement has been to respond to these challenges. I examine and present the changes in the structure of crime as a result of the pandemic, relying on international law enforcement professional sources. I established the trends and data on domestic crime on the basis of interviews and the analysis of statistical data.

In my research I have found that there have been changes in the qualitative and quantitative structure of crime due to the forced effects of the pandemic on society and I made suggestions for more effective law enforcement and intelligence activities.

Keywords: criminal intelligence, impact of pandemic, organised crime

I. Introduction

The historical antecedents of criminal intelligence in today's sense date back to the 18th century in Europe, based on the French model. During the War of Independence in 1848-49, national security activities also operated within the framework of law enforcement agencies. Minister of the Interior Bertalan Szemere took great care of the secret collection of information by the state police under his control.²

The scientific thinking of the time was, of course, influenced by the informant activity built and rightly hated in the era of Austrian absolutism. Nándor Pichler saw the secret police as a kind of „outgrowth” that should be excluded from the organization and operation of the public security police. Pichler explained that the police have the right to freely dispose of measures that effectively restrict individual liberty.³ In doing so, Pichler acknowledges the legitimacy of the police's discretionary secret policing measures by proportionately “restricting” civil rights. In the article on the protection and organization of the secret policing in the 43th issue of the Law Gazette of 1877, Gyula Fekete emphasized the importance of the civilian branch of the secret police. According to Fekete, it is easy to see that an agent who is unknown to criminals will notice and experience a lot that would remain a secret to a police officer appearing in uniform.

If the suspicious persons were not publicly inspected, they saw no wrongdoing in it. Secret policing was considered important primarily in the larger cities, which complemented and helped ordinary police action. Domestic and international Police Science thinkers of the era (Mohl, Stieber, Gravell) also considered it important to emphasize that secret policing is only an exceptional police tool that can be used with the utmost restraint and caution in rural areas only in particularly justified cases.

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² Boda József, A Nemzetbiztonsági Szakszolgálat helye és szerepe a rendvédelemben, *Pécsi Határőr Tudományos Közlemények*, no 13. (2012), 116.

³ Gaál Gyula – Hautzinger Zoltán (ed.): *Rendészettudományi gondolatok*, Korinek László, *Rendszerváltozás a belügyben* (Budapest: Magyar Rendészettudományi Társaság Kiadó, 2014.) 35.

In Hungary, the end of the 19th century, the foundations of modern criminal intelligence were laid within the capital's police with the formation of the Detective Corps. The detective department was first organized within the Budapest-Capital Police Department in 1885. Then, in 1886, the first internal legal regulation of criminal intelligence was issued, the Detective Code (then the Second Detective Code in 1890 and the Third Detective Code in 1893).

In the 1880s the aim of the detectives' criminal intelligence activities was to monitoring, preventing and detecting crime. In order to monitor crime, effectively prevent, interrupt and detect crime, confidential intelligence procedures were carried out, such as *surveillance, informants, covert methods of information gathering and various traps*. The latter were not detailed in the Criminal Procedure Act⁴, and the implementation of the good practice of criminal investigation was aided by the investigation order⁵ and its explanation by the prosecution. Surveillance, prevention service (presence in crime scenes) and secret police procedures formed the core of contemporary criminal intelligence. The confidentiality of criminal intelligence was justified by the nature of the assumed offenses (eg crime without victim, political nature, identity of interest between the parties, organized crime, etc.) or by obtaining information with confidence way, informants or by an effectiveness of investigation. *The purpose of the secret police proceedings was to prepare for justice.*

The second part of the investigation, the formal investigation, which was subject to legal disadvantages, was the „finding procedure”. This procedure should be use when the suspicion is already available for order an investigation. After that the „ascertaining investigation” consists of practical actions and a series of investigative acts.⁶

After the Second World War, the political system that developed for several centuries transformed the country's political system based on the civil traditions. As a result of the new, Soviet-type, ideologically based social and political transformation, the original activities and tasks of criminal intelligence have changed.

The „secret police procedures” that have been preparing for the previous judicial activity have been called secret operational activities and the state defense and state security units serving the ideological and political system have been set up on the Soviet model. The secret operational activities did not have a preparatory role for the judiciary, and the prosecutor's office supervising the legality of the investigation could not have known about them. According to the level of the regulating the secret operative activity, the secret operative activity of the Ministry of the Interior and its bodies was not supervised by the prosecution. The use of secret operational tools and methods for law enforcement purposes has become secondary to the secret operational tools and methods of state security, and secret operational activities of a law enforcement nature have focused primarily on crime against social property.

The State Security and Law Enforcement Authority decided independently on how to obtain the recorded data and information obtained by the “secret criminal procedure” later in the framework of the criminal proceedings, ie the “secret result of the proceedings”. The police were part of the state machinery of the proletarian dictatorship and therefore shared its vulnerability to the monolithic center of power.⁷

After the change of regime, following the so-called Danube-gate⁸ scandal, the Parliament enacted Act X of 1990 on the temporary regulation of the licensing of special intelligence

⁴ 1896. évi XXXIII. törvénycikk, a bűnvádi perrendtartásról

⁵ Magyar István, *A bűnügyi nyomozás tárgyában a nyomozó rendőri hatóságok és közegek részére 130,000/99. B.M. számú körrendelettel kiadott utasítás magyarázata*. (Budapest: Országos központi községi nyomda) 1900.

⁶ Miskolczy Ágost - Pinczés Zoltán, *A magyar büntetőjog gyakorlati kézikönyve a m.kir. Csendőrség számára*. (Budapest:Stádium Sajtóvállalat, 1937) 1115.

⁷ Korinek László, A rendőrség pártirányítása 1956-1989. *Rendészeti Szemle*, no 10. (2006), 55-67.

⁸ In December 1989, the State Security Service of the Ministry of the Interior conducted secret means and methods of investigation against opposition parties and organizations, despite the fact that under the new constitution adopted on October 23, 1989, this was already illegal and even unconstitutional activity.

equipment and methods to regulate the secret information gathering activities of secret services and law enforcement agencies.

After a long preparatory work, was born in 1994 The Act on the Police, which regulates the secret gathering of information for “criminal purposes” in a separate chapter (VII.), Which became a new, legal-level name for the activities called earlier “covert confidential procedures” and later „secret operational tools and methods”. With this, the prevention, detection and proof of crime has gained new, available, legally regulated opportunities, with little external control. In 2018, the time has come to transform the domestic criminal intelligence system and legal bases in order to ensure the continuity of supervision, investigations, the loss of information and the strengthening of the law.

The new Criminal Procedure Act, which entered into force on 1 July 2018, changed in system level the law enforcement model according to which the tasks of criminal intelligence remained in the Police Act, the National Tax and Customs Administration Act and the Prosecution Act. The covert methods for criminal investigation purpose are set out in the Criminal Procedure Act. The established system of procedures ensures the possibility that proactive prior detection can be applied within a short period of time before ordering an investigation, but already within the framework of criminal proceedings.⁹

II. Method

The study carries out the examined topic primarily on the professional literature related to the specific issue, the relative legal regulations and internal norms. I carried out library research and internet source analysis, focusing above all on the overview of Hungarian professional history. I compare the different theories of some outstanding researchers dealing with law enforcement on the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries, and analyse the principles of the practical investigation manuals to define function of the criminal intelligence in law enforcement. I analyse the major directives and recommendations of the EU relating to the special investigative means.

Examining the impact of the pandemic for criminal intelligence, I mainly compared the Europol analyzes and examined some foreign literature. During the analysis of the impact of the pandemic, I also examined a segment of domestic crime trends through a comparative analysis of statistical data.

III. Results and discussion

A Current modern criminal intelligence

The definition and characterization of modern criminal intelligence, including the sectors (strategic, tactical, investigative), dates back only a few years.¹⁰

Modern criminal intelligence has been carried out in order to achieve the law enforcement and criminal objectives set out in the Basic Law (protection of public security, public order and state border order, prevention and detection of criminal offenses), involving restriction of the right to respect for private and family life, private residence and correspondence, and the right to freedom, which can be characterized as a proactive intelligence and analytical activity.¹¹

⁹ Nyeste Péter-Szendrei Ferenc, *A bűnügyi hírszerzés kézikönyve*, (Budapest: Dialog Campus Kiadó, 2019).

¹⁰ Nyeste Péter, *A bűnüldözési célú titkos információgyűjtés története, rendszerspecifikus sajátosságai, szektorális elvei*, (Budapest: PhD értekezés, 2016).

¹¹ Nyeste Péter- Nagy Ivett, *A bűnügyi hírszerzés az elméletben és a gyakorlatban. Rendőrségi Tanulmányok*, no 1. (2021), 5.

Domestic criminal intelligence can basically have strategic, tactical or investigative support tasks.

In the European Union, instead of the concept of criminal intelligence, the term special investigative activities and special investigative tools can be found, and these indicate that the purpose of collecting confidential manner criminal information is to prepare and assist justice. At the same time, criminal intelligence as crime monitoring, mapping of organized criminal groups, crime prevention, and the facilitation of other law enforcement tasks under police and other laws, are used yet with appropriate control outside of criminal proceedings.

In the European Union, by Special Investigative Means (SIM) we mean those special tools and methods, with the help of which evidence or information and analyzed information can be obtained in a covered way, without the knowledge of the person concerned. Their deployment will involve a breach of the right of private right, which will have to be justified by those carrying out/ authorising the operation.¹²

The concept of special investigative tools is similarly defined in the European Union Recommendation:¹³ “special investigation techniques” means techniques applied by the competent authorities in the context of criminal investigations for the purpose of detecting and investigating serious crimes and suspects, aiming at gathering information in such a way as not to alert the target persons.

According to a report¹⁴ prepared by the European Commission's Directorate-General for Migration and Home Affairs, the special investigative tools, technical, can be divided into two parts: one part is the so-called “Legal instruments” that belong to the area of justice (e.g., witness protection), the other is “investigative tools” as well as in law enforcement operations. The report identified and examined eight special investigative tools:

- Interception of communication,
- Surveillance activity, which is not interpreted uniformly in the Member States,
- Covert investigations refer to the following investigative activities in Europe: infiltration, pseudo or test purchase, participation in controlled deliveries¹⁵,
- Controlled delivery,
- Employment of Informants, as defined by Europol,¹⁶
- Joint investigation teams,
- Witness protection,
- "Hot pursuit".

According to the report, most often measures, that Member States are in place: interception of communications, followed by surveillance tools, followed by informants, followed by the use of a covert investigations, and controlled deliveries, witness protection, joint investigation teams and "hot pursuit".

In terms of the usefulness of the measures, it is first and foremost a very useful special investigative tool the interception of communications, followed by surveillance tools and

¹² Council of Europe Office in Belgrade: *Deployment of special investigative means*. (Belgrade, 2013),12-13.

¹³ Recommendation Rec (2005) 10 of the committee of Ministers to member states on „special investigation techniques” in relation to serious crimes including acts of terrorism (2005), 2.

¹⁴ Di Nicola, Andrea – Gounev Philip – Levi Michael – Rubin Jennifer: *Study on paving the way for future policy initiatives in the field of fight against organised crime: the effectiveness of specific criminal law measures targeting organised crime*. Final report, (Brussel, February 2014), 223.

¹⁵ Di Nicola, Andrea – Gounev Philip – Levi Michael – Rubin Jennifer, *Study on paving the way for future policy initiatives in the field of fight against organised crime: the effectiveness of specific criminal law measures targeting organised crime*. Final report,(Brussel, February 2014), 266.

¹⁶ Europol, *Covert Human Intelligence Source Handling, European Union Manual on Common Criteria and Principles*, (Europol: 2012), 8.

informants, controlled deliveries, witness protection, and the line is closed by “hot pursuit” measures with case-by-case usefulness.¹⁷

Special covert investigative activities may be used in the European Union if:

- there is an available, public national legal mandate;
- there is an appropriate authorization and control procedure;
- its application is necessary and proportionate.¹⁸

The principles of application¹⁹ are necessity, proportionality (with the gravity of the offense and the least possible restriction), and the last principle is the condition of application, "threshold", meaning the connection with a criminal offense. However, this does not preclude using covered measures for the prevention and countering of a public security emergencies (eg protected personal protection, crime prevention).

The legal fixation and application of the criminal intelligence model is mainly in the Anglo-Saxon area, but the EUROPOL Manual on the Use of Covered Human Intelligence sources²⁰ also discusses in detail the rules for the use of human resources in criminal intelligence as a recommendation to law enforcement.

In addition to the English National Intelligence Model²¹, U.S. federal law also discusses in detail the principles of how criminal intelligence systems work. (Code of Federal Regulations, CFR Part 23 Criminal intelligence systems operating policies.)²² Part 23 of the law describes in detail the rules of operation of law enforcement intelligence systems, which includes the objectives, applicability, operating principles, operational guidelines, system control and audit activities.

B The impact of the pandemic on crime and criminal intelligence

The performance of law enforcement agencies has been and continues to be significantly affected by various local, regional or global challenges and emergencies. The COVID 19 virus falls into the latter category and thus has had a global impact and later versions of the pandemic are still affecting law enforcement agencies.

This global epidemic has been a challenge never seen before in modern societies.

Following the emergence of the pandemic in Europe, the primary tasks of law enforcement agencies were to apply quarantine measures, to reduce social contacts, and to apply lockdowns, border closures and border controls. These measures have fundamentally affected the normal performance of law enforcement.

Ensuring the continuity of the work of health authorities and preserving the safety of society by introducing and maintaining various restrictive and control measures was the primary task of law enforcement agencies.

At the same time, after a brief halt, organized crime saw serious opportunities in the effects of the epidemic on society. There have been significant changes in crime and crime trends that have been quiet affected by the closures.

¹⁷ Di Nicola, Andrea – Gounev Philip – Levi Michael – Rubin Jennifer, *Study on paving the way for future policy initiatives in the field of fight against organised crime: the effectiveness of specific criminal law measures targeting organised crime*. Final report, (Brussel, February 2014), 221-237.

¹⁸ Council of Europe Office in Belgrade, *Deployment of special investigative means* (Belgrade: 2013), 13.

¹⁹ Di Nicola, Andrea – Gounev Philip – Levi Michael – Rubin Jennifer, *Study on paving the way for future policy initiatives in the field of fight against organised crime: the effectiveness of specific criminal law measures targeting organised crime*. Final report, (Brussel, February 2014), 243.

²⁰ Europol, *Covert Human Intelligence Source Handling, European Union Manual on Common Criteria and Principles*, (Europol: 2012)

²¹ ACPO, *Guidance on the National Intelligence Modell*, 2005, <https://whereismydata.files.wordpress.com/2009/01/national-intelligence-model-20051.pdf>

²² *Criminal intelligence systems operating policies*, CFR Part 23. <https://www.ecfr.gov/current/title-28/chapter-1/part-23>

„More people are spending more time online throughout the day for work and leisure during the pandemic, which has greatly increased the attack vectors and surface to launch various types of cyber-attacks, fraud schemes and other activities targeting regular users. A lot of these goods are offered on online trade platforms, which have made it easier and cheaper for counterfeiters and other criminals to access a broad customer base. Creating virtual and obscuring real identities is easier online than in offline interactions, which greatly aids criminals using aliases and creating front companies online.”²³

The majority of citizens were forced to stay in their homes and forms of crime that targeted people in their homes emerged or intensified. During the pandemic, the grew in fear, frustration, anxiety of citizens making them more vulnerable to crime and criminals responding flexibly to exploiting vulnerable people.

Crime, organized crime, has invented a number of forms of fraud that exploit the above effects of a pandemic. Organized criminals against property gained access into the elderly, vulnerable people's homes with various tricks, impersonation of representatives from public authorities or medical staff who providing sanitarie products or perform a “Corona test” while stealing property from their homes.

Due to "home office" and "home study", the children and juveniles were often at home without parental supervision and this opprutnities has not been left unused by criminals. Increase in activities related to the distribution of child abuse material online and the conversations of potential offenders around the increased accessibility and vulnerability of children online due to isolation, less supervision. Online child sexual exploitation includes all acts of a sexually exploitative nature carried out against a child that have, at some stage, a connection to the online environment. There has been a continuous increase in activities related to online child sexual abuse over recent years.²⁴ The use of encrypted communication channels, tools, programs, and Darknet forums facilitates the commission of this type of crime. The perpetrators use file-sharing networks and livestreaming platforms.

The rate of domestic violence and sexual abuse crimes among citizens forced into their homes due to the pandemic has also increased in the world.

According to official statistics of the Hungarian Ministry of the Interior²⁵, the number of crimes "endangering a minor" was 779 in 2019, while in 2020 it was already 964, which means an increase of almost 24%. By September 2021, 651 such crimes had occurred.

The number of „sexual violence” offenses was 240 in 2019 and 327 in 2020, an increase of 36%. By September 2021, 172 such crimes had occurred.

The number of „sexual coercion” crimes was 56 in 2019 and 95 in 2020, an increase of 17%. By September 2021, 42 such crimes had occurred. The number of „domestic violence” crimes was 392 in 2019 and 650 in 2020, an increase of nearly 66%! By September 2021, 410 such crimes had occurred, which is already in excess of the 2019 base year!

Looking at the base year 2019, it can be stated that in 2020, people who forced into their homes due to the pandemic, lockdowns, restrictions, other stressors, and psychological difficulties,

²³ Europol, *Beyond the Pandemic - What will the criminal landscape look like after COVID-19?*, 2020, <https://www.europol.europa.eu/publications-documents/beyond-pandemic-how-covid-19-will-shape-serious-and-organised-crime-landscape-in-eu>

²⁴ Europol, *European Union Serious and Threat Assesment*, <https://www.europol.europa.eu/activities-services/main-reports/european-union-serious-and-organised-crime-threat-assessment>

²⁵ Home Ministry, *Criminal Statistic System*, 2021. https://bsr-sp.bm.hu/SitePages/ExcelMegtekinto.aspx?ExcelName=/BSRVIR/Regisztr%c3%a1lt%20b%c5%b1ncselekm%c3%a9nyek_ver20210907042323.xlsx&Token=dIEvWmZwVzI2WXMvTUpLeGFrd09YYnBvNnRFRIRGNW51eGVnWU9IR3I2Z0puN25CZ29DWkdwVKNCK3RibkplbnplRHRvUzIBV1pxT3pmZUR4ajR2aDRIVnBxOG94am9Gcmkra0Q0rk9vS2ZDNDBSaFJORVIVRWxnLzJMR1JsSXA

caused to them a serious impact and there was a significant increase in deviant behaviors at home, violent, sexual violence within the family have increased significantly.

The numbers for 2021 are more encouraging, but for some types of crime they already exceed the base year, despite the extremely high latency for these crimes.

There has been an increase in the rate of social engineering attacks, mailware, phishing emails around the COVID 19, in which perpetrators mislead victims by referring to the coronavirus epidemic by selling fake cures or medicines against the coronavirus, or by other epidemic-related fakenews.

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The rate of investment fraud exploiting economic fears of the pandemic has also increased. There is an increase in the number of incidents related to bank and loan fraud, money laundering and corruption. The real estate and construction sectors become more attractive for money laundering

According to the official statistics of the Hungarian Ministry of the Interior, the number of money laundering crimes was 188 in 2019, while in 2020 it was already 308, which means an increase of 61%. By September 2021, 168 such crimes had occurred.

The number of „fraud crimes committed using the information system” was 2,624 in 2019, compared to 3,400 in 2020, an increase of nearly 30%. By September 2021, 1,438 such crimes had occurred.

The number of crimes against the information system or data was 587 in 2019, compared to 830 in 2020, an increase of more than 41%. By September 2021, 579 such crimes had occurred. Statistics from cases in recent years show that some crimes have moved in online space independently of the pandemic, but forced home stays, lockdowns and increased use of online services during the pandemic have helped increase the number of crimes committed online.

During the pandemic, organized crime also exploited the huge demand for medical devices and hygiene products and sold counterfeit or poor quality medical devices such as masks, rubber gloves or medicines, disinfectants, some of which were actually sold, others only as part of financial fraud. Law enforcement officers identified more than 2 000 links to products related to COVID-19.²⁶

Some business sector suffering negative economic pressures such as hospitality, catering, tourism are becoming more vulnerable to criminal infiltration.²⁷

In Italy organised crime networks penetrated the healthcare system and able to divert investments originally aimed at providing financial resources, equipment and influence procurement, commercial agreement within the healthcare system.²⁸

Organized crime, taking advantage of the weakening of closures and supply chains, is vigorously present in the counterfeit and substandard foodstuff and beverage illegal market. In lack of genuine raw material, whose cost raised a lot, dishonest producers used low quality or

²⁶ Europol, *Pandemic Profiteering: How criminals exploit COVID 19 crisis*, Report,2020, <https://www.europol.europa.eu/publications-documents/pandemic-profiteering-how-criminals-exploit-covid-19-crisis>

²⁷ Europol, *Enterprising criminals - Europe's fight against global networks of financial and economic crime*, Report,2020, <https://www.europol.europa.eu/publications-documents/enterprising-criminals-%E2%80%93-europe%E2%80%99s-fight-against-global-networks-of-financial-and-economic-crime>

²⁸Global Initiative Against Organised Crime , *Coronavirus: The impact on crime and criminal networks*, 2020, <https://globalinitiative.net/analysis/crime-contagion-impact-covid-crime/>

unsuitable ingredients. Consequence has been an increase of illegal, counterfeit and potentially unsafe food on the market.²⁹

Law enforcement authorities have also achieved many successful detections during the epidemic. In both 2019 and 2020, several Darknet marketplaces were liquidated thanks to law enforcement cooperation. A coalition of law enforcement agencies across the world announced the results of a coordinated operation known as DisrupTor which targeted vendors and buyers of illicit goods on the dark web. This operation follows the takedown in May of 2019 of Wall Street Market, the world's then second largest illegal online market in the dark web.³⁰

Interpol provides global assistance to law enforcement agencies around the world by continuously updating the International Child Sexual Exploitation database. Interpol's Child Sexual Exploitation database holds more than 2.7 million images and videos and has helped identify 23,564 victims worldwide.³¹

Europol established in 2017 the Stop Child Abuse – Trace An Object initiative. This initiative invites the public to identify objects and places in the hope that it can lead to the identification of victims down the line. Since then, Europol has received 26 000 tips which have already led to the identification of ten children and the prosecution of three offenders.³²

Europol expects that the impact of the pandemic will unfold in three phases³³:

- the current and immediate short-term outlook;
- a mid-term phase which will become apparent over the upcoming weeks and months;
- a long-term perspective

In the first phase the most notable immediate impact has been in the areas of cybercrime, the trade in counterfeit and substandard goods as well as different types of frauds and schemes linked to organised property crime. There has been limited impact of the pandemic on the level of terrorist threats to the EU. Another highly visible phenomenon has been the proliferation of scams promoting fake COVID-19 test kits and treatments.³⁴

In the second phase (mid-term phase) cybercrime threats are likely to continue to be the dominant threats from serious and organised crime during the pandemic as continued lockdown and social distancing measures will only enhance the reliance on digital services to continue to work and interact.

In the third phase (long-term perspective) communities, especially vulnerable groups, tend to become more accessible to organised crime during times of crisis. Economic hardship makes communities more receptive to certain offers, such as cheaper counterfeit goods or recruitment to engage in criminal activity.

Europol's databases are updated by obligatory data uploads from Member States' authorities. Based on these, its ex-post and forward-looking analyzes are of paramount importance to the governments and law enforcement agencies of the European Member States.

²⁹ Europol, *Operation Opson IX*.-Analysis Report, 2021, <https://www.europol.europa.eu/publications-documents/operation-opson-ix-%E2%80%93-analysis-report>

³⁰ Europol, *International sting against dark web vendors leads to 179 arrests*, Press release, 2020, <https://www.europol.europa.eu/newsroom/news/international-sting-against-dark-web-vendors-leads-to-179-arrests>

³¹ Interpol, *International Child Sexual Exploitation Database*, 2021, <https://www.interpol.int/Crimes/Crimes-against-children/International-Child-Sexual-Exploitation-database>

³² Europol, *Experts meet to identify victims of child sexual abuse*, News Article, 2020, <https://www.europol.europa.eu/newsroom/news/experts-meet-to-identify-victims-of-child-sexual-abuse>

³³ Europol, *Beyond the Pandemic - What will the criminal landscape look like after COVID-19?2020*, <https://www.europol.europa.eu/newsroom/news/beyond-pandemic-what-will-criminal-landscape-look-after-covid-19>

³⁴ Europol, *European Union Serious and Threat Assessment 2021*, <https://www.europol.europa.eu/activities-services/main-reports/european-union-serious-and-organised-crime-threat-assessment>

IV. Conclusions

The presentation of the professional history development and legal framework of criminal intelligence confirmed that with the establishment of the detective body within the capital's police in the 19th century. At the end of the 19th century, the germs of criminal intelligence developed in Hungary. Law enforcement education was of a high standard, mainly through a system of courses during this period.

The purpose of secret policing was a preparation for justice before World War II, in contrast to the secret operational procedures and means created by the Soviet-style social order to provide information to the political system and to operate violent organizations.

Following the change of regime, the possibilities for secret information gathering were enshrined in law, but initially with little external control, and from 2018 onwards, the criminal intelligence system was fully integrated into criminal proceedings, with the possibility of law enforcement prevention.

In the European Union, in addition to traditional investigative methods, special investigative tools (SIM) are special tools and methods that can be used to obtain evidence or information and analyzed information in a covert manner without the knowledge of the person concerned.

The principles of application are necessity and proportionality. SIM are especially suitable for the detection of planned crimes and organized crimes.

Member States' criminal intelligence systems and procedures have been and continue to be affected by the pandemic. Mainly during the initial period of the pandemic, law enforcement agencies had to perform other tasks to reduce the health risks of the pandemic or to carry out control tasks at the state border instead of their usual tasks.

Law enforcement has greater emphasis must also be placed on monitoring, detecting new criminal trends, and preventing crime. Law enforcement agencies must increase their monitoring capabilities in online channels. The intensification of crime and organized crime online performance has entailed the importance of training investigators in cybercrime and strengthening the anti-cybercrime activities of organized crime units.

Responses to the current challenges of cybercrime include the operation of international cooperation channels 24/7, the development of virtual currency analyzes, the development of Big data, the use of Darknet operations, the use of covert investigators, covert informants, and ever closer cooperation with NGOs. and continuous organization of awareness - raising campaigns (eg ENISA, Europol, National Investigation Bureau of the Rapid Response and Special Police Force of Police of Hungary).

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