

Mercenaries and Crusaders

Mercenaries and Crusaders

Edited by ATTILA BÁRÁNY

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FOREWORD

This volume is the proceedings of an international conference „Mercenaries and Crusaders (1202–1480)” held between 22-24 June 2022 at the University of Debrecen (<https://mercenariesandcrusaders.com/>). It was organised and the proceedings have been edited under the auspices of the HUN-REN (Hungarian Research Network) – University of Debrecen Research Group “Military History of Medieval Hungary and Central Europe”. The conference was funded by National Research, Development and Innovation Fund. The volume is also sponsored by the „Hungary in Medieval Europe” project under the framework of the University of Debrecen’s Thematic Excellence Program as well as the “Sources of Medieval Hungarian Military Organization in Europe, 1301–1437” research program of the National Research, Development and Innovation Fund.

The original idea of a conference like that was brought forward years ago by Ölbéi Tamás (Université de Lorraine, Nancy-Metz – University of Debrecen) and João Nisa (Universidade de Coimbra), for which I myself and the editorial board are grateful. It is due to their efforts that the conference was to be organised in a collaboration with the Histoire et Cultures de l’Antiquité et du Moyen Âge (Université de Lorraine, Nancy-Metz) and the Centro de História da Sociedade e da Cultura (Universidade de Coimbra). I need to thank here for the members of the Organizing and Scientific Committee, Professor José Pedro Paiva (Coimbra) and Professor Guy Vottéro (Nancy), Professor Miguel Gomes Martins (Universidade Nova de Lisboa), Professor Francisco García Fitz (Universidad de Extremadura), Professor João Gouveia Monteiro (Coimbra). We are also grateful for the key-note speakers, Professor Valérie Toureille (CY Cergy Paris Université), Professor Sylvain Gouguenheim (Ecole normale supérieure de Lyon) and Professor Saul Gomes (Coimbra). Professor Toureille and Michael Depreter (Harris Manchester College, University of Oxford), László Veszprémy (Péter Pázmány Catholic University), Ágnes Maléth, Zsolt Hunyadi and István Petrovics (University of Szeged) as well as João Nisa (Universidade de Coimbra), László Pósán, Attila Györkös, Ádám Novák and Orsolya Tóth (University of Debrecen) also acted as reviewers. Due to help of João Nisa in the first place the conference was also supported by the Asociación Ibérica de Historia Militar, Cáceres, the Instituto de Estudos Medievais, the Universidade Nova de Lisboa and the Universidade de Extremadura as well as the Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia, República Portuguesa. Some scholars also gave papers in a partnership with the University of Public Service, Faculty of Military Sciences and Officer Training.

In June 2022, 52 researchers presented papers in 16 sessions. We were pleased to welcome distinguished scholars from the Polish Academy of Sciences (Kraków), Webster University Vienna, the University of Bucharest, the Europa-Universität Flensburg, Uzhhorod National University, Institute of History, Belgrade, Novosibirsk State University, the Centre for Transylvanian

Studies, Romanian Academy (Cluj), Odessa Mechnikov National University, University of Novi Sad, University of Crete (Rethymnon-Heraklyon), Cyprus Research Centre (Nicosia), Nicolaus Copernicus University (Toruń), the University of Białystok, the Jesuit University Ignatianum (Kraków), Móra Ferenc Museum (Szeged), Universitat de València, the universities of Pécs and Szeged as well as Eötvös Loránd University Budapest. Special panels were organised by the scholars of Stanford University and Queen's University (Kingston, Ontario) the Universidade de Coimbra and the Universidade Nova de Lisboa. Speakers from Canada, Greece, Albania, Ukraine, Turkey, Azerbaijan and Belarus also presented papers.

The conference explored the subject of crusaders and mercenaries from a broad perspective. It covered the armies of the Hundred Years' War, the Catalan companies, the condottieri in Florence and Genoa, mercenaries in the Balkans, the Levant, the Polish-Lithuanian kingdom, as well as the Turcopoliers of the knightly orders. The Northern Crusades, the Baltic Crusades, the Iberian Reconquista, the crusades against the heretics in Bosnia and Hussites were examined. The role of the ideological and religious background, the Holy See, the papal legates, recruitment, tactics, strategy, supply, logistics, equipment, booty, were also investigated.

The organisers placed an emphasis on mentoring. PhD students also had an opportunity to present themselves in front of prestigious representatives of medieval studies.

I would especially like to thank Sándor Ónadi, Melinda Jakab and Ádám Novák for their enormous work and all their never-ceasing efforts in the editorial process. I also do thank Zoltán Véber for his IT services all through the organization and the hosting of the website. I am also pleased to have – as usual – Balázs Bacsa “at hand” in the English language proofs.

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*Sándor Ónadi**

FROM JERUSALEM TO ASCALON: THE ROLE OF THE CLERGY IN THE LAST PHASE OF THE FIRST CRUSADE

Introduction

On July 15, 1099, the Crusaders captured Jerusalem, but this event did not guarantee the success of the campaign. It was the decisive Battle of Ascalon on August 12, 1099, that established the Latin presence in the East. During this short period, the ecclesiastical and lay leaders of the city were elected, leading to substantial tensions among the campaign leaders. Consequently, some opted not to stay in the Holy Land.

In my previous research, I focused on Adhémar of Monteil (†1098), who served as the papal legate during the campaign. After analysing the legate's activity, it became apparent that the clergy's main duty was to maintain the army's cohesion and deal with any moral crises that arose.¹ This prompted an examination of the link between the clergy and morality. The focus was on uncovering the inner, spiritual forces that motivate the troops and how clerical influence can be exerted at the most critical moments. The activities of the clergy have been grouped for clarity and the identification of patterns; this is a more effective approach than a chronological sequence. The article furthermore represents a comparative juxtaposition of the period before and after the conquest of Jerusalem.

After conducting an examination of the sources, this study will analyse the historical duties of the clergy and their comparison with the period following the conquest of Jerusalem. The main goal of this research is to outline the customary responsibilities of the clergy and the way, how duties were gradual-

* The study was funded by the University of Debrecen Thematic Excellence Program, Project no. TKP2021-NKTA-34, provided by the Ministry of Culture and Innovation of Hungary under the National Research, Development and Innovation Fund. It was also supported by the ÚNKP-23-3-II New National Excellence Program of the Ministry for Culture and Innovation From the source of the National Research, Development and Innovation Fund.

¹ I describe the low points of the campaign as a moral crisis, when the fighting spirit and enthusiasm of the army diminished to such an extent that the continuation of the campaign was in danger. As for the morale crises, it should be noted that most of them were linked to the lack of supplies, the constant threat, or the disputes between leaders. It was interesting to examine how the situation improved as a result of a ritual, despite the fact that the basic supply and safety situation did not change. Cecilia Gaposchkin called these rituals "invisible weapons". (Gaposchkin, Cecilia M., *Invisible Weapons. Liturgy and the Making of Crusade Ideology*. London, 2017.)

ly undertaken during the campaign.² Additionally, the study aims to uncover the implicit commitments of the clergy, often unrecorded but inferred through changes in the army's morale. Lastly, an effort will be made to recognise the determinants that affect the clergy's ability to function. This analysis of clerical activity inevitably intersects with the investigation of lay piety, which presents methodological challenges due to the dominant clerical perspective found in most of the existing records.³

Sources

Within the extant sources concerning the First Crusade, a pertinent differentiation can be established between firsthand accounts provided by eyewitnesses and subsequently authored works that drew upon these accounts and insights gleaned from returning pilgrims.⁴ In this contextual framework, the *De Gesta*

² Gaposchkin shows how the rite of taking up the cross has changed over time. At the beginning, the existing pilgrimage blessings (*Benedictio pere et baculi peregrinantium*) were supplemented by the blessing of the sword or the banner. Then, as the rites became more closely linked to pilgrimages/crusades to the Holy Land, references to the Holy Land multiplied. (Gaposchkin, Cecilia M., "From Pilgrimage to Crusade: The Liturgy of Departure, 1095–1300", = *Speculum* 88, 2013. 44–91. 71.) This may also be connected to the rites carried out throughout the campaign. Although we are unaware of the exact wording, we can observe which components were preserved and which were discarded throughout the campaign.

³ The question of lay piety and ecclesiastical distortion is discussed without any claim to completeness in Flori (Flori, Jean, "Jérusalem terrestre, céleste et spirituelle", In. Edgington, Susan. B. – García-Guijarro, Louis (eds.), *Jerusalem the Golden. The Origins and Impact of the First Crusade*. Turnhout, 2014. 25–50.), Gaposchkin (Gaposchkin, Invisible Weapons, 2017.), Maier (Maier, Christoph T., "Crisis, Liturgy and the Crusade in the Twelfth and Thirteenth Centuries", = *Journal of Ecclesiastical History* 48, 1997, 628–657.), Vauchez (Vauchez, André, *La Spiritualité du Moyen Âge occidental VIII^e–XIII^e siècle*. Paris, 2015.), McGinn (McGinn, Bernard, "Iter Sancti Sepulchri. The Piety of the First Crusaders", In. Lackner, Bede Karl – Philip, Kenneth Roy (eds.), *Essays on Medieval Civilization*. Austin, 1978, 33–73.), Erdmann (Erdmann, Carl, *Die Entstehung des Kreuzzugsgedankens*. Darmstadt, 2023.) and Bysted (Bysted, Ane L., *The Crusade Indulgence. Spiritual Rewards and the Theology of the Crusades, c. 1095–1216*. Leiden, 2014.)

⁴ The eyewitness testimony and its reliability within the First Crusade could be the subject of a separate essay. The problem is well summarised by Lapina (Lapina, Elizabeth, *Warfare and the Miraculous in the Chronicles of the First Crusade*. Pennsylvania, 2015. 15–36.), Spencer also rejects the adjective "eyewitnesses" itself, since he believes that these works had a cultural, literary, even propagandistic role, presenting the ideal image of the crusader in the eyes of the clergy, and relating everything to it. (Spencer, Stephen J., "Constructing the Crusader. Emotional Language in the Narratives of the First Crusade", In. Edgington, Susan. B. – García-Guijarro, Louis (eds.) *Jerusalem the Golden. The Origins and Impact of the First Crusade*. Turnhout, 2014. 173–189. 179.); MacGregor takes a similar view of the later encouraging effect of the chronicles. (MacGregor, James B., "The First Crusade in Late Medieval Exempla", = *The Historian* 68, 2006, 29–48. 32.); Yuval Harari has carried out a textual comparison of the

*Francorum et aliorum Hierosolimitanorum*⁵, along with the writings of Peter Tudebode⁶, Raymond of Aguilers⁷, and Fulcher of Chartres⁸, fall under the category of firsthand eyewitness narratives. Although Albert of Aachen did not take part in the campaign, the information he received from returning pilgrims proves to be accurate.⁹

The “new generation”¹⁰ of authors is not covered, as Kostick suggests that these works can be used to examine the way in which the clergy of northern France judged the Crusade, but the interpolations must be treated with caution.¹¹ A separate unit is the work of Ralph of Caen¹², who was commissioned by Tancred to produce his work. I have used the work of Ibn al-Athīr¹³ and Ibn

chronicles identified as eyewitnesses. (Harari, Yuval N., “Eyewitnessing in Accounts of the First Crusade: The Gesta Francorum and Other Contemporary Narratives”, In. Kedar, Benjamin. Z. – Riley-Smith, Jonathan (eds.), *Crusades*. Vol. III., London, 2004. 77–100.

⁵ The chronicle was completed between 1100 and 1101.; [Anonymous], *The Deeds of the Franks and Other Jerusalem-Bound Pilgrims/ Gesta Francorum et aliorum Hierosolimitanorum. The Earliest Chronicle of the First Crusades*. Ed. Dass, Nirmal, Plymouth, 2011. [hereinafter, Anonymous, Gesta Francorum]; *Gesta Francorum et aliorum Hierosolymitanorum*. Ed. Hagenmeyer, Heinrich, Heidelberg, 1890.

⁶ For the comparison with *Gesta Francorum* see Bull, Marcus, “The Relationship between the Gesta Francorum and Peter Tudebode’s *Historia de Hierosolymitano Itinere: The Evidence of a Hitherto Unexamined Manuscript* (St. Catharine’s College, Cambridge, 3)”, In. Kedar, Benjamin. Z. – Riley-Smith, Jonathan (eds.), *Crusades*. Vol. XI., London, 2012. 1–18.; Tudebode, Peter, *Historia de Hierosolymitano Itinere*. Transl. Hill, John H. – Hill, Laurita L., Philadelphia, 1974.; Flori, Jean, *Chroniqueurs et propagandistes: introduction critique aux sources de la première croisade*. Genève, 2010. 83–98.

⁷ Raymond of Aguilers, *Historia Francorum Qui Ceperunt Iherusalem*. Transl. Hill, John H. – Hill, Laurita L., Philadelphia, 1968. [hereinafter Raymond of Aguilers, *Historia Francorum*]

⁸ Fulcher of Chartres, *A History of the Expedition to Jerusalem 1095–1127./ Historia Hierosolymitana*. Transl. Ryan, Frances Rita, ed. Fink, Harold S., Knoxville, 1969. [hereinafter Fulcher of Chartres, *Historia Hierosolymitana*]

⁹ Albert of Aachen, *Historia Ierosolimitana. History of the Journey to Jerusalem*. Ed. Edgington, Susan B. Oxford, 2007. [hereinafter Albert of Aachen, *Historia Ierosolimitana*]; According to Morris, there may have existed a chronicle of Lorraine, from which Albert and the later author, William of Tyre, may have drawn. (Morris, Colin, “The Aims and Spirituality of the First Crusade as seen through the Eyes of Albert of Aachen”, = *Reading Medieval Studies* 16, 1990, 99–117.

¹⁰ Guibert of Nogent, Baldric de Dol, Robert the Monk.

¹¹ Kostick, Conor, “Courage and Cowardice on the First Crusade, 1096–1099”, = *War in History* 20, 2013, 32–49. 35.

¹² *The Gesta Tancredi of Ralph of Caen*. Transl. Bachrach, Bernard S. – Bachrach, David S., Aldershot, 2005. [hereinafter Ralph of Caen, *Gesta Tancredi*]

¹³ *The Chronicle of Ibn al-Athīr for the Crusading Period from al-Kamil fi’l-ta’rikh. P.1. The Year 491–541/1097–1146. The Coming of the Franks and The Muslim Response*. Transl. Richards, Donald S., London, 2006. [hereinafter The Chronicle of Ibn al-Athīr]; The chronicle was completed in 1228. (The Chronicle of Ibn al-Athīr, 3.)

al-Qalānisi¹⁴ as control sources. The research draws on letters and documents written during the campaign, with particular reference to the writings of Pope Urban II, Anselm of Ribemont¹⁵, Stephen of Blois¹⁶, the military leaders and Adhémar.¹⁷

The former role of clergy

The campaign was proclaimed by Pope Urban II (†1099) as the final act of the Council of Clermont (17–28 November 1095), and the departure was set for the feast of the Assumption of Mary on August 15.¹⁸ The cross-bearers set out, each led by a different nobleman, and assembled at Constantinople. The first great test of the united army of the Crusaders was the siege of Nicaea, which began in May 1097. Based on my research so far, the activities of the clerics can be grouped into four major categories: their actions before, during and after the encounters, caring for the poor, pacifying the divisions within the camp, and dealing with moral crises.¹⁹ In the following, I will describe these four groups after the siege and capture of Jerusalem.

Tasks related to battles

Their battle-related activity can be divided into three parts: pre-battle activity (1), when they usually offered sacrifices with the army or made morale-boosting speeches. During battles (2) they were among the soldiers, encouraging them and praying for victory. And after battles (3) they gave thanks for victory, buried the fallen and gave alms.

The spiritual fortification before the battles was provided by praying together with the army, confessing, taking communion, and ensure their martyrdom. Such is the case in the letter of Anselm of Ribemont, who, before the siege of Nicaea, writes about repentance, of taking the body and blood of Christ, and being strengthened.²⁰ During the battle of Dorylaeum, when one part of the army was surrounded by the Seljuk Sultan, Kilij Arslan, Fulcher writes of

¹⁴ *The Damascus Chronicle of the Crusades. Extracted and Translated from the Chronicle of Ibn al-Qalānisi*. Transl. Gibb, Hamilton A. R., Mineola, NY. 2002. [hereinafter *Chronicle of Ibn al-Qalānisi*]

¹⁵ A lay person who writes two letters to Manasses, Archbishop of Reims.

¹⁶ Count of Blois, son-in-law of William the Conqueror, one of the leaders.

¹⁷ Hagenmeyer, Heinrich, *Die Kreuzzugsbriefe aus den Jahren 1088–1100*. Innsbruck, 1901.

¹⁸ Hagenmeyer, *Kreuzzugsbriefe*, 1901. 137.

¹⁹ Marcus Bull notes that the mere ability of the clergy to sway the laity denotes the degree of religiosity among laypeople. (Bull, Marcus, “The Roots of Lay Enthusiasm for the First Crusade”, = *History* 254, 1993, 353–372. 367.)

²⁰ Anselm of Ribemont’s letter to Manasses II, Archbishop of Reims (Antioch, end of November 1097.) In. Hagenmeyer, *Kreuzzugsbriefe*, 1901. 144.; The pre-battle ritual, conducted immediately prior to the battle or siege, aimed to sanctify the encounter. The ritual served to purify the army through sacrifice and confession, elevating fallen soldiers to the status of martyrs. (Gaposchkin, *Invisible Weapons*, 2017. 98–99.);

priests praying among the troops, “chanting with tears”²¹, to whom soldiers ran to confess their sins before their certain death.²² Raymond of Aguilers also writes about confession during encounters. Later, Anselm confessed his sins before he fell during the siege of Arqa (February 1099).²³ While crossing the Iron Bridge in Antioch, the Crusaders were attacked. According to Albert of Aachen, Adhémar rushed there and – seeing that the soldiers were afraid – addressed them with a speech of exhortation.²⁴ The greatest challenge to spiritual strengthening was demonstrated at the battle of Antioch. On June 28, 1098, the Crusader army prepared for a crucial battle at Antioch. They were surrounded and their food was gone. According to the *Gesta*, these were the rites before the battle:

“And then finally, after three days of fasting and of going in procession from one church to another, everyone made confession of their sins, and once absolved, faithfully received in communion the Body and Blood of Christ. And then they gave alms and had masses celebrated.”²⁵

Stephen of Blois recorded that they journeyed to the city of Nicaea while blessing God. (Hagenmeyer, *Kreuzzugsbriefe*, 1901. 139.)

²¹ Spencer draws attention that crusaders’ tears were understood to be a visual manifestation of their piety. (Spencer, *Emotional Language*, 2014. 179–183.); Piroška Nagy, highlights the therapeutic benefits of all forms of weeping, be it a response to joy, sorrow, or pain. Tears, with divine assistance, are believed to cleanse the sinner of their transgressions. It is thought that due to the individual’s sincerity, God grants their prayer when said through tears. (Nagy, Piroška, “Religious Weeping as Ritual in the Medieval West. Social Analysis”, = *The International Journal of Anthropology* 48, 2004, 117–137. 123.); Receiving grace also extends to others. (Nagy, Religious Weeping, 2004. 127–128.); Ritual weeping is restricted to specific church ceremonies. By employing this symbol, Fulcher increased involvement in the campaign to a liturgical level. Payen points out that in the eleventh and twelfth centuries, the form of repentance associated with weeping was a way of reconciliation for sin, followed by readmission to the Church for forgiveness. (Payen, Jean Charles, “La pénitence dans le context culturel des XII^e et XIII^e siècles: des doctrines contritionnistes aux pénitentiels vernaculaires”, = *Revue des Sciences philosophiques et théologiques* 61, 1977, 399–428. 403.); On the meaning of tears, see also Swift, Christopher, “The Penitent Prepares: Affect, Contrition, and Tears”, In. Gertsman, Elina (ed.), *Crying in the Middle Ages. Tears of History*. London, 2012. 79–101.

²² Porges, Walter, “The Clergy, the Poor, and the Non-combatants on the First Crusade”, = *Speculum* 21, 1946, 1–23. 9.; Confession served not only as a means of attaining spiritual redemption for the sinners but also as a manner of seeking divine intervention. Payen sheds light on the collective acts of mortification, sometimes followed by general absolution, which occurred particularly during the Crusades, from the expedition of 1098–1099 onwards. (Payen, *La pénitence*, 1977. 408.)

²³ Raymond of Aguilers, *Historia Francorum*, 89.; Albert of Aachen, *Historia Ierosolimitana*, 376–378.

²⁴ Albert of Aachen, *Historia Ierosolimitana*, 192–194.

²⁵ Anonymous, *Gesta Francorum*, 84–85.

Raymond adds that those who had previously walked the streets barefoot, crying and beating their breasts, begging for God's mercy, were now celebrating enthusiastically in the streets.²⁶ Similar fasts, prayers and barefoot processions were reported before the siege of Jerusalem, which, after many attempts, finally succeeded in taking the city on July 15, 1099.²⁷

The priests played a significant role in encouraging the soldiers. When Albert of Aachen describes the siege of Nicaea, he notes that the clerics were there to teach and keep up the army's courage.²⁸ On February 9, 1098, just before a decisive battle, Albert of Aachen reports that Adhémar encouraged the troops, which led Godfrey of Bouillon to encourage the soldiers as well.²⁹ Before the battle, Bohemond of Taranto also refers to the upcoming conflict as a heavenly battle, not an earthly one, and therefore they must become "the bravest athlete of Christ".³⁰ The clerics were also present at the battle of Antioch on June 28, 1098: during the battle we can also read about the intercession of the priests: they prayed in front of the knights and sang psalms.³¹

The Crusader army besieged Maarat an-Numan in November 1098, where we read that priest prayed behind the siege towers that had been built.³² The siege dragged on and they ran out of food. Raymond reports that, despite all this, thanks to the encouragement of a priest, no one rested or doubted victory.³³

At the end of battles, the main task of the clergy was to bury the dead, but we rarely read about this, rather about acts of thanksgiving and alms-giving. Alms-giving played a role in the spiritual salvation of the deceased. We are informed by Albert of Aachen that after the burial of some knights, large amounts of alms were distributed to the poor for the spiritual salvation of the fallen ones.³⁴ Anselm of Ribemont wrote a letter to Archbishop Manasses of Reims requesting prayers, which highlights this function.³⁵

Similarly, expressing gratitude was significant for the clergy, as evident from a letter by Count Stephen of Blois. The letter recounts the army's arrival

²⁶ Raymond of Aguilers, *Historia Francorum*, 62.

²⁷ Raymond of Aguilers, *Historia Francorum*, 132–133.; Albert of Aachen, *Historia Ierosolimitana*, 413–415.; Anonymous, *Gesta Francorum*, 103.

²⁸ Albert of Aachen, *Historia Ierosolimitana*, 100–101.

²⁹ Albert of Aachen, *Historia Ierosolimitana*, 232–234.

³⁰ Anonymous, *Gesta Francorum*, 59.

³¹ Raymond of Aguilers, *Historia Francorum*, 62–63.; Fulcher of Chartres, *Historia Hierosolymitana*, 104.

³² Anonymous, *Gesta Francorum*, 94.

³³ Raymond of Aguilers, *Historia Francorum*, 78.

³⁴ Albert of Aachen, *Historia Ierosolimitana*, 112.

³⁵ Anselm of Ribemont's letter to Manasses II, Archbishop of Reims (Antioch, end of November 1097.) In: Hagenmeyer, *Kreuzzugsbriefe*, 1901. 144–146. Asking for the prayer of the absent is not a new thing. McCormick has pointed out that even Emperor Charlemagne asked for prayers before certain battles. (McCormick, Michael, "The Liturgy of War in the Early Middle Ages: Crisis, Litanies, and the Carolingian Monarchy", = *Viator* 15, 1984, 1–24. 5.

in Antioch in October 1098, and despite facing difficulties, they offered thanks and praised the Lord. We are informed of thanksgiving after battles in accounts of the conflict fought around December 28, 1097,³⁶ and after the Battle of Antioch on June 28, 1098. The victorious Franks returned to the city, celebrating with joy, and offering blessings and acclaim to the Lord. Anselm further notes that the feast of the Apostles was celebrated with great joy.³⁷ When the crusaders captured Jerusalem – after a massacre³⁸ – they proceeded to the sacred sites, where they prayed, wept with joy, and gave thanks to the Lord.³⁹

Both the pre- and post-battle components included the promise of martyrdom, which was a particular form of encouragement. According to Albert of Aachen's report on the defence of Antioch, a Lombard priest attempted to motivate the troops and guarantee their martyrdom in his address. The Anonymous account states that non-combatants, including the poorest who starved to death for the name of Christ, can also be martyred. The account emphasises that it is not limited to those who take up arms against infidels.⁴⁰

We can see how the priests encouraged the crusaders at close quarters, confessed, prayed and, if necessary, gave the last rites.⁴¹

³⁶ Stephen of Blois' second letter to his wife, Adele (Antioch, 29 March 1098.) In: Hagenmeyer, *Kreuzzugsbriefe*, 1901. 150.

³⁷ Anselm of Ribemont's second letter to Manasses II, Archbishop of Reims (Antioch, July 1098.) In: Hagenmeyer, *Kreuzzugsbriefe*, 1901. 149–152.

³⁸ Western chroniclers claim 10,000 dead (Kedar, Benjamin Z., "The Jerusalem Massacre of July 1099 in the Western Historiography of the Crusades", In: Kedar, Benjamin Z. – Riley-Smith, Jonathan – Nicholson, Helene (eds.), *Crusades*. Vol III., London, 2004. 15–75. 28–29.), while the Arab chroniclers mention 70,000. (Hirschler, Konrad, "The Jerusalem Conquest of 492/1099 in the Medieval Arabic Historiography of the Crusades: From Regional Plurality to Islamic Narrative", In: Kedar, Benjamin Z. – Phillips, Jonathan – Riley-Smith, Jonathan, (eds.), *Crusades*. Vol. XIII., London, 2014. 37–76. 40–41.); The besiegers' retaliation may have been augmented by the ridicule and reprimand inflicted by the defenders upon seeing the procession. Even the cross was not spared from their mockery. (Raymond of Aguilers, *Historia Francorum*, 123.; Murray, Alan V., "A Race Against Time – A Fight to the Death: Combatants and Civilians in the Siege and Capture of Jerusalem, 1099", In: Dowdall, Alex – Horne, John (eds.), *Civilians Under Siege from Sarajevo to Troy*. London, 2018. 163–183. 171.); Murray points out that the Crusaders could then be sure that the defenders were all non-Christians. (Murray, *Combatants and Civilians*, 2018. 175.); According to France, this degree of aggression was common in the era if the city refused to surrender. (France, John, *Victory in the East. A Military History of the First Crusade*. Cambridge, 1994. 355–356.); Buc draws attention to the biblical parallel of the Franks riding knee-deep in blood, and thus to the need to rethink the scale of the massacre. (Buc, Philippe, "La vengeance de Dieu. De l'exégèse patristique à la réforme ecclésiastique et à la première croisade", In: Barthelémy, Dominique – Bougard, François – Le Jan, Régine (eds.), *La Vengeance 400–1200*. Roma, 2006. 451–486. 483.)

³⁹ Anonymous, *Gesta Francorum*, 104.; Raymond of Aguilers, *Historia Francorum*, 128.; Fulcher of Chartres, *Historia Hierosolymitana*, 123.

⁴⁰ Anonymous, *Gesta Francorum*, 38–39.

⁴¹ Porges, *The Clergy*, 1946. 15.

Taking care of the poor

Apart from the military, the greatest challenge of the campaign was to feed the enormous mass of people. The first large-scale starvation occurred during the siege of Nicaea in May–June 1097, when, according to the Anonymous account quoted above, the poorest starved to death.⁴² The alms had both a spiritual and a physical dimension. While the spiritual aspect was essential, the physical aspect of caring for the poor was also crucial. Later, after the death of Adhémar, Anonymous describes Adhémar's ideas as a strange symbiosis between the knights and the poor. According to the bishop, the knights could not be saved without the prayers of the poor, and the poor could not survive without alms from the knights.⁴³ A similar case can be found at Maarat-an-Numan, where the clergy ordered alms-giving after the capture of the town, presumably in response to the recent disputes, and presumably also to pray for the souls of the fallen.⁴⁴

Between 4 and 31 July 1097, after a victory at Dorylaeum, the army traversed through the Anatolian desert. The journey claimed many lives due to an insufficiency of food and water.⁴⁵ There is no record of any attempt by the clergy to improve the situation of those in need during this period.

The next significant food shortage occurred during the siege of Antioch in December 1097. Although Bohemond and Robert of Flanders were sent out on a plundering raid by the commanders while the crusaders were provided with food by Syrians and Armenians, this did not resolve the issue of supply, which resulted in loss of many lives.⁴⁶ The famine affected both the wealthy and the poor.⁴⁷ In order to regulate food prices, the clergy demanded the removal of all injustice (*iniustitia*) and wickedness (*feditas*) from the army and prohibited anyone from deceiving others.⁴⁸ Allan V. Murray notes that the measures to purify the army were not only aimed at returning it to God's grace, but also had a practical purpose since even a slight difference in price could determine whether a person lived or died.⁴⁹

⁴² Upon undertaking the oath of the crusader prince, the emperor took on the responsibility of supporting the army. (Lilie, Ralph-Johannes, *Byzanz und die Kreuzfahrerstaaten. Studien zur Politik des byzantinischen Reiches gegenüber den Staaten der Kreuzfahrer in Syrien und Palästina bis zum 4. Kreuzzug 1096–1204*. München, 1981. 24–35.); It appears that alms-giving became increasingly relied upon to supplement and eventually replace this support.

⁴³ Anonymous, *Gesta Francorum*, 91. In his second letter to his wife Adele, Stephen of Blois stated that the Franks would not have survived if it had not been for the leaders' financial support and God's grace. (Hagenmeyer, *Kreuzzugsbriefe*, 1901. 150.)

⁴⁴ Raymond of Aguilers, *Historia Francorum*, 82.

⁴⁵ Anonymous, *Gesta Francorum*, 46.; Fulcher of Chartres, *Historia Hierosolymitana*, 88.; Albert of Aachen, *Historia Ierosolimitana*, 139.

⁴⁶ Anonymous, *Gesta Francorum*, 53–54, 56.

⁴⁷ Fulcher of Chartres, *Historia Hierosolymitana*, 94–95.; Albert of Aachen, *Historia Ierosolimitana*, 221.

⁴⁸ Albert of Aachen, *Historia Ierosolimitana*, 228.

⁴⁹ Murray, Alan. V., "Sex, Death and the Problem of Single Women in the Armies of the First Crusade", In. Gertwagen, Ruthy – Jeffreys, Elizabeth (eds.), *Shipping, Trade*

The following famine appears in the chronicles after the seizure of Antioch on June 3, 1098.⁵⁰ The city was captured due to the betrayal of a defender. On June 4, the vanguard of Kerbogha, the emir of Mosul, arrived. As a result, the crusaders did not get enough time to restock the city's food supplies. According to the sources, they were forced to eat their livestock, followed by their leather straps and shoe soles, due to starvation.⁵¹ Since in this instance there was nothing to distribute to the poor and we have no knowledge of any changes to in weights and measures there is no information available regarding clerical efforts to combat hunger.⁵² Ultimately, in their predicament, the army chose the only viable solution: they broke out of the city.

Probably the most severe famine during the campaign took place at the siege of Maarat an-Numan in the winter of 1098. This is the only recorded instance during the campaign when chroniclers report a famine so grave that pilgrims had to resort to human flesh.⁵³ The incident described must have had a demoralising effect on the army involved.⁵⁴ However, subsequent texts suggest they were able to overcome it. Raymond's account reports that Count Raymond,

and Crusade in the Medieval Mediterranean: Studies in Honour of John Pryor. Farnham, 2012. 255–270. 264.

⁵⁰ Before this, Albert notes that the troops were already hungry upon receiving news of Kerbogha's army.; Albert of Aachen, *Historia Ierosolimitana*, 268.

⁵¹ Anonymous, *Gesta Francorum*, 77, 81.; Albert of Aachen, *Historia Ierosolimitana*, 298–300.; Raymond of Aguilers, *Historia Francorum*, 54.

⁵² Although Albert references a speech delivered to the populace by Godfrey, Robert of Flanders, and the Bishop of Le Puy, in which they cautioned against deceiving their brothers and fleeing.; (Albert of Aachen, *Historia Ierosolimitana*, 312–314.)

⁵³ Fulcher writes that many of the crusaders "terribly tormented by the madness of starvation, cut pieces of flesh from the buttocks of Saracens lying there dead". (Fulcher of Chartres, *Historia Hierosolymitana*, 112.); Anonymous reports that the deprivation caused "others, in fact, cut their flesh as morsels which they cooked and ate." (Anonymous, *Gesta Francorum*, 95.); Both Albert and Raymond confirm this. (Albert of Aachen, *Historia Ierosolimitana*, 374.; Raymond of Aguilers, *Historia Francorum*, 81.); Sweetenham also points out that writers try to avoid the subject at first, but eventually they all admit cannibalism. (Sweetenham, Carol, "The Count and the Cannibals. The Old French Crusade Cycle as a Drama of Salvation", In: Edgington, Susan. B. – García-Guijarro, Louis (eds.), *Jerusalem the Golden. The Origins and Impact of the First Crusade*. Turnhout, 2014. 307–328. 318.); It is intriguing that subsequent writers of the campaign, like William of Tyre, used cannibalism in a different way. In his work, Bohemond is depicted as having cooked Turks in front of the defenders during the siege of Antioch. Although The Damascus Chronicle and Ibn al-Athīr also mention cannibalism during the siege of Antioch. (The Chronicle of Ibn al-Athīr, 2006. 15.; Chronicle of Ibn al-Qalānīsī, 2002. 46.)

⁵⁴ Tattersall, Jill, "Anthropophagi and Eaters of Raw Flesh in French Literature of the Crusade Period: Myth, Tradition and Reality", = *Medium Ævum* 57, 1988, 240–253. 248.; In the *Chanson d'Antioche*, the Tafurs constitute a distinct social class who consume human flesh and are hence ostracised by the wider community. They are primarily deployed for manual labour. On the Tafurs, see Sumberg, Lewis A. M., "The Tafurs and the First Crusade", = *Mediaeval Studies* 21, 1959, 224–245.

the Bishop of Orange and the Bishop of Albara, gathered the people and prayed for the army. Unfortunately, Bishop William of Orange, weakened by famine, later passed away.⁵⁵ During the siege of Arqa in February 1099, the crusaders successfully turned a relief force back, resulting in a significant haul of booty. It is assumed that, because of the influence of the clergy, a tenth of the spoils was given to the paupers.⁵⁶

Holding the Army Together

The third role of the clergy was to maintain unity within the army and prevent internal conflicts. According to Fulcher during the Asia Minor phase of the campaign, the army was coherent and fraternal despite its linguistic diversity. If any individual left behind their belongings, the rest of the group ensured they were returned to the rightful owner.⁵⁷ Overcoming initial challenges and narrowly avoiding death, unleashed emotions that brought the army together. According to Riley-Smith, it was during this campaign phase that the concept of crusader chosenness was born.⁵⁸ McCormick states that unlike in feudal society, many of the commoners (*minores*) and the poor (*pauperes*) did not fight under the banner of a single commander, but rather under different leaders. This greatly promoted the idea of collective election and belonging to the army of Christ.⁵⁹

Apart from the conflict between Baldwin and Tancred,⁶⁰ there were no significant conflict between the leaders until the conquest of Antioch. The city was taken thanks to the treachery of a defender who allowed Bohemond into the towers he was guarding. In exchange for his merit, Bohemond demanded the city of Antioch, but the leaders refused.⁶¹ Soon after, however, they received word of an approaching enemy army, so they made a deal: if the Emperor Alexios Komnenos (1081–1118) helped them, the city would be his.⁶² The emperor did not help, and the crusaders were divided over possession of the city.

⁵⁵ Anonymous, *Gesta Francorum*, 95.; Raymond of Aguilers, *Historia Francorum*, 129.

⁵⁶ Raymond of Aguilers, *Historia Francorum*, 91.; The allocation involved $\frac{1}{4}$ for the priests responsible for feeding the crowds, $\frac{1}{4}$ for the bishops and the rest for Peter the Hermit.

⁵⁷ Fulcher of Chartres, *Historia Hierosolymitana*, 88.

⁵⁸ Riley-Smith, Jonathan, *The First Crusade and the Idea of Crusading*. New York, 2003. 116.

⁵⁹ McCormick, Michael, "Liturgie et guerre des Carolingiens à la première croisade", In: *Militia Christi' e Crociate nei secoli XI–XIII*. Atti della undecima Settimana internazionale di studio Mendola, 28 agosto – 1 settembre 1989. Milano, 1992. 209–240. 213.

⁶⁰ A conflict erupted in September 1097 regarding the possession of Tarsus. (Albert of Aachen, *Historia Ierosolimitana*, 190–191.)

⁶¹ Anonymous, *Gesta Francorum*, 66.; According to Albert, Godfrey, and Robert of Flanders, who were the first to be informed of Bohemond's plan, were "rejoiced with great joy" at the news, and there was no sign of any agitation. (Albert of Aachen, *Historia Ierosolimitana*, 272.)

⁶² Anonymous, *Gesta Francorum*, 67.

These difficult circumstances led to an epidemic of plague in the city, causing both Count Raymond and Adhémar to fall ill. The chronicler Raymond of Aguilers tells us that Bohemond took the opportunity to expel the soldiers of Godfrey, Robert of Flanders, and Count Raymond from their parts of the city.⁶³ Raymond of Aguilers links the illness of the Count and the Legate to anarchy, saying: “in the absence of a judge who could or would discuss lawsuit, each person became a law unto himself”.⁶⁴ In this case, therefore, the clergy did not succeed in preventing dissension among the leaders. This can be explained by the illness of the legate and his death on August 1, 1098. In connection with his death, the *Gesta* mentions “much sorrow and immense grief and pain in the entire army of Christ” and then describes the bishop’s activities: “he was the support of the poor and the counselor of the rich. He kept the clergy in order, he preached, and he addressed the warriors”, then points to the symbiosis mentioned previously.⁶⁵ Raymond attributes the dispersion of the leaders to Adhémar, saying that “Bohemond’s return to Romania, and Godfrey’s journey to Edessa gave proof to his [Adhémar’s] usefulness to the Militia Christi and to its leaders”.⁶⁶

The march was suspended until autumn, presumably to relieve from the summer heat and the burden of siege, which the army was dissatisfied. If Albert Aachen’s account is to be believed, the pilgrims were already considering not following the leaders anymore.⁶⁷ They believed that the leaders were only after wealth and possessions, while they had left their homes for Christ and should continue their journey without them.⁶⁸

The entry may show the notable aspect of the First Crusade: control of the army begins to slip from the hands of the leaders. The orders of the secular princes no longer matter, and the army have essentially become a self-organised body whose members are driven by a common mission, a common conscience and a common oath. They seem to despise those who fight for power and wealth and forget their vows. The leaders faced a choice: either they would lead the crowd, or it would march on Jerusalem without them. We see a similar situation later, after the capture of Maarat an-Numan, when renewed disputes led the pilgrims to tear down the walls of the city, which forced the leaders to

⁶³ Raymond of Aguilers, *Historia Francorum*, 65.

⁶⁴ Raymond of Aguilers, *Historia Francorum*, 63.

⁶⁵ Anonymous, *Gesta Francorum*, 91.

⁶⁶ Raymond of Aguilers, *Historia Francorum*, 66.; Richard points out that after Adhémar’s death, the army’s supreme commander became Raymond of Saint-Gilles. (Richard, Jean, “La Papauté et la direction de la Première Croisade”, = *Journal des Savants* 2, 1960, 49–58. 52–53.)

⁶⁷ Albert of Aachen, *Historia Ierosolimitana*, 372.; Raymond also writes of dissatisfaction. (Raymond of Aguilers, *Historia Francorum*, 75.)

⁶⁸ Raymond of Aguilers, *Historia Francorum*, 75.; France observes that from that point onwards, the campaign was led by the people rather than the leaders.; France, John, “The Crisis of the First Crusade: From the Defeat of Kerbogha to the Departure from Arqa”, = *Byzantion* 40, 1970, 276–308. 293.

depart.⁶⁹ Further pressure was brought to bear during the long siege of Arqa (January–May 1099), when the army forced Count Raymond to abandon the siege by burning the camp and continuing to Jerusalem.⁷⁰

The *Gesta Francorum* reports that the dispute between Raymond of Saint-Gilles and Bohemond was tried to be controlled by the clergy, Godfrey, Robert of Flanders, and Robert of Normandy. Finally, Raymond and Bohemond promised the bishops that they would no longer disturb the road to the Holy Sepulchre.⁷¹ We have already seen two examples of similar pledge-affirming oaths initiated by the clergy.⁷²

Dealing with moral crises

Three low points in the campaign can be identified where the success of the campaign became questionable. The first of these was during the siege of Antioch. The crusaders were severely undermanned and starving, while also facing constant harassment from the defending forces. Additionally, at the battle of December 29, 1097, Adhémar's standard-bearer was killed, resulting in the loss of a valuable relic, the banner of the Blessed Mary, which was taken as war spoils.⁷³ The difficulties forced many to abandon the siege.⁷⁴ They interpreted the hardships as divine punishments for their sins. As a result of the crisis, the "a conference was held with the bishops and all the clergy who were there, and they declared that all injustice and wickedness was to be cut out from the army".⁷⁵ Raymond of Aguilers tells us that after the conference Adhémar ordered three days of fasting, prayer, almsgiving and processions, and instructed the priests to celebrate mass and repeat the psalms.⁷⁶ These rites can be identified as the

⁶⁹ Raymond of Aguilers, *Historia Francorum*, 81.; Schein, Sylvia, "Die Kreuzzüge als volkstümlich-messianische Bewegungen", = *Deutsches Archiv für Erforschung des Mittelalters* 47, 1991, 119–138. 129.

⁷⁰ Raymond of Aguilers, *Historia Francorum*, 110.; Albert of Aachen, *Historia Ierosolimitana*, 386.

⁷¹ Anonymous, *Gesta Francorum*, 92.

⁷² Porges, however, attributes the army's departure to lower-ranking members of the clergy. (Porges, *The Clergy*, 1946. 16.)

⁷³ Raymond of Aguilers, *Historia Francorum*, 34–35.; However, the loss of the standard carried significant symbolism. Besides the blessing of arms, France also had a custom of blessing its banners, which sanctified the campaigns themselves. (Gaposchkin, *Invisible Weapons*, 2017. 70.); Flori illustrates this process with the Oriflamme, which was only brought out of the Abbey of Saint Denis on prestigious events. (Flori, Jean, *Guerre sainte, jihad, croisade: Violence et religion dans le christianisme et l'islam*. Paris, 2001. 145–152.); This implies that the standard represents the collaboration between God and humankind, in which individuals work in service of God. Gaposchkin highlights the elevation of violence and homicide to a sacred level within this partnership. (Gaposchkin, *Invisible Weapons*, 2017. 72.)

⁷⁴ Desertions may be the best indicator of a moral crisis, since it meant breaking a vow.

⁷⁵ Albert of Aachen, *Historia Ierosolimitana*, 228–229.

⁷⁶ Raymond of Aguilers, *Historia Francorum*, 36.

second element in McGinn's cycle of sin-repentance-forgiveness.⁷⁷ McCormick has pointed out that these penitential rites were far from being a novelty of the First Crusade, and that the Carolingian army already had very similar liturgies.⁷⁸

The next low point of the campaign was after the capture of Antioch on June 3, 1098. On June 4, the vanguard of Kerbogha appeared and began to surround the city. Many managed to escape before the ring was closed.⁷⁹ According to the *Gesta Francorum* report "their feet and their hands were worn right down to the bone".⁸⁰ The appearance of runaways could suggest either starvation or divine punishment. Yet, only Albert mentions famine in the time leading up to the siege. The *Gesta* and Raymond reports, the Franks had looted considerable food reserves in early April.⁸¹ It is possible that the "deserters" appeared ill because of the siege lasting almost eight months or their inadequate access to food due to their lower social status. It may also be a means for the chroniclers to convey the punishment of those who violated their oaths. It is important to note that taking the cross was accompanied by a vow, which Fulcher reports on its reaffirmation in the context of the moral crisis of early January 1098.⁸² Perhaps the priests and leaders announced the punishment of fugitives to discourage others from fleeing. Raymond of Aguilers and Fulcher of Chartres also document the escape of clergymen. However, they do not provide their names, which suggests that these individuals were probably lower-ranking members of the clergy.⁸³ To prevent any further escapes, Adhémar and Bohemond closed the gates of the city.⁸⁴

The summer heat, weakening health conditions, and food shortages, as Runciman notes, it was an atmosphere in which dreams and visions thrived.⁸⁵ First, Christ appeared to Stephen, a priest from Valence. Stephen acknowledged that all victories were by Christ's grace alone. However, the Crusaders were more focused on satisfying their own desires.⁸⁶ In the vision, Jesus Christ instructed

⁷⁷ The first element is the appearance of sin, followed by some form of repentance, which restores them to the grace of God. (McGinn, *Iter Sancti Sepulchri*, 1978. 51.); These cycles are referred to as *necessitatis cause*, or *laetania proquacumque tribulatione*, in liturgical entries. (Gaposchkin, *Invisible Weapons*, 2017. 111.); McGinn notes that the implementation of a set of rituals will serve as a template for managing forthcoming crises. (McGinn, *Iter Sancti Sepulchri*, 1978. 50–52.)

⁷⁸ McCormick, *Liturgie et guerre des Carolingiens*, 1992. 219.

⁷⁹ Raymond of Aguilers, *Historia Francorum*, 49–50.

⁸⁰ Anonymous, *Gesta Francorum*, 77.

⁸¹ Albert of Aachen, *Historia Ierosolimitana*, 268.; Anonymous, *Gesta Francorum*, 66.; Raymond of Aguilers, *Historia Francorum*, 46.

⁸² Fulcher of Chartres, *Historia Hierosolymitana*, 95.

⁸³ Raymond of Aguilers, *Historia Francorum*, 57.

⁸⁴ Raymond of Aguilers, *Historia Francorum*, 56–57.

⁸⁵ Runciman, Steven, *A History of the Crusades*. Vol. I. Cambridge, 1951. 241.

⁸⁶ Anonymous, *Gesta Francorum*, 77–78.; Raymond had previously reported on the "dancing girls" who charmed the knights, and the lust within the army (Raymond of Aguilers, *Historia Francorum*, 48.), as confirmed by the accounts of Stephen of Valence

Stephen that the Crusaders should return back to Him, and daily sing the entire response, *They are assembled (Congregati sunt)* along with the verse.⁸⁷ Of greater significance than Stephen was the account of Peter Bartholomew⁸⁸, to whom St Andrew revealed the location of the Holy Lance in St Peter's Basilica through a series of visions. Upon hearing the story and even learning the discovery of an ancient spearhead, Adhémar remained sceptical. However, recognising the camp's delight regarding the relic, he refrained from expressing his doubts.⁸⁹ The army's enthusiasm is reported by all our chroniclers.⁹⁰

The army leaders reverted to the earlier year's routine: they renewed their oath to remain in the city and on the road, while the clerics engaged in several penitential rites.⁹¹ We can read about processions undertaken barefoot, fasting prior to battle, and purification. The spiritual significance of the Lance ignited the fervour of the crusaders. The events also caught the attention of Ibn al-Athīr, an Arab chronicler, who reports that "there was a monk there, of influence amongst them, who was a cunning man".⁹² The aforementioned "cunning man" referred to Peter Bartholomew, whose vision greatly influenced the army's morale.

and Fulcher. (Fulcher of Chartres, *Historia Hierosolymitana*, 101.); We know no more about the identity of the "unlawful women" (*feminus exlegibus*). Murray notes that Antioch may have had brothels, so we think that the knights' visits to these may have provoked the dislike of the priests. (Murray, *Sex, Death and the Problem of Single Women*, 2012. 260.)

⁸⁷ It begs Christ to break the power of its enemies. On the matter of leadership, Stephen's account contains an interesting element. When the Lord asked Stephen who the commander of the army was, he said that they had no commander, but they trusted Adhémar more than others. (Anonymous, *Gesta Francorum*, 78.); Stephen's vision is also described by Raymond of Aguilers. (Raymond of Aguilers, *Historia Francorum*, 56.); The Crusaders perceived their association with the Lord as a type of agreement, where they were indebted to offer service in return for different benefits. (Riley-Smith, Jonathan, "Crusading as an Act of Love", = *History. The Journal of the Historical Association* 65, 1980, 177–192. 181.; Flori, Jean, "Une ou plusieurs 'première croisade'? Le message d'Urbain II et les plus anciens pogroms d'Occident", = *Revue Historique* 285, 1991, 3–27. 16.)

⁸⁸ A pilgrim from Provence. Schein points out that the poor followed self-proclaimed charismatic leaders rather than princes. (Schein, *Die Kreuzzüge*, 1991. 121.)

⁸⁹ Raymond of Aguilers, *Historia Francorum*, 54.; France, John, "Two Types of Vision on the First Crusade: Stephen of Valence and Peter Bartholomew", In: Kedar, Benjamin Z. – Phillips, Jonathan – Riley-Smith, Jonathan (eds.), *Crusades*. Vol. V., London, 2006. 1–20. 10.; Russo points out that the authenticity of the Lance was legitimised to the doubters by the acceptance of such great leaders as Raymond of Saint-Gilles and Adhémar. (Russo, Luigi, "Il Liber di Raimondo d'Aguilers e la Sacra Lancia d'Antiochia", = *Studi Medievali* 47, 2006. 785–837. 800.)

⁹⁰ Raymond of Aguilers, *Historia Francorum*, 57.; Albert of Aachen, *Historia Ierosolimitana*, 316.; Fulcher of Chartres, *Historia Hierosolymitana*, 100.; Anonymous, *Gesta Francorum*, 83.

⁹¹ Raymond of Aguilers, *Historia Francorum*, 56.; Anonymous, *Gesta Francorum*, 84–85.

⁹² *The Chronicle of Ibn al-Athīr*, 2006. 17.

Another moral crisis was the siege of Maarat an-Numan and the subsequent events. Due to the onset of winter, the army's food supply was so depleted that some individuals reportedly resorted to cannibalism. After the city was captured, further disputes emerged among the leaders, resulting in significant numbers of soldiers leaving the camp, fed up with the leaders' bickering.⁹³ Upon sensing the crisis, the clergy reverted to their former practice: they distributed alms, prayed and set off barefoot to continue their journey with the army to Jerusalem.⁹⁴

The siege of Arqa shattered the enthusiasm of the pilgrims. Count Raymond brought Adhémar's cross from Antioch as the authenticity of the relic of the Holy Lance, which he kept, was in doubt.⁹⁵ According to the chronicler Raymond, the army was inspired by the new relic and departed for Jerusalem without the count.⁹⁶ Another clergyman, Peter Desiderius⁹⁷, rescued what was possible and informed Count Raymond about a vision advising them to progress towards Jerusalem and not to lament the abandonment of the siege of Arqa.⁹⁸ The army appears to be led by priests rather than princes, who guide them towards Jerusalem through visions. At this point in the campaign, Riley-Smith compares the crusaders to a military monastery on the move.⁹⁹

Dealing with moral crises involves turning around the interpretation of difficulties. Several of our reports testify to the fact that crusaders regard in-

⁹³ Raymond of Aguilers, *Historia Francorum*, 79.

⁹⁴ Raymond of Aguilers, *Historia Francorum*, 83–85.

⁹⁵ Peter Bartholomew, who had previously found it through visions, used his visions too conspicuously to achieve his political ambitions, and in response was subjected to a trial by fire, during which he died. (Raymond of Aguilers, *Historia Francorum*, 96–102.; Albert of Aachen, *Historia Ierosolimitana*, 378.); Besides the standard, the cross was the most important symbol of the Crusaders, accompanying them from the moment they took their vows. Gaposchkin points out that the chroniclers of the First Crusade repeatedly refer to the apotropaic and talismanic protective function of the cross. (Gaposchkin, *From Pilgrimage to Crusade*, 2013. 66.)

⁹⁶ Raymond of Aguilers, *Historia Francorum*, 110.; Albert of Aachen, *Historia Ierosolimitana*, 238.

⁹⁷ A chaplain of the Count of Die, Isoard, who argued for the authenticity of the relic in the context of the Lance trial. (Raymond of Aguilers, *Historia Francorum*, 97.); When the authenticity of the lance was questioned, Peter Bartholomew underwent a trial by fire to prove it. However, as a result of the ordeal, he succumbed to his injuries.

⁹⁸ Raymond of Aguilers, *Historia Francorum*, 111.; About the visions of Adhémar see Kostick, Conor, "The Afterlife of Bishop Adhemar of Le Puy", = *Studies in Church History* 45, 2009. 120–129.; Russo points out that the negative visions of Adhémar appear at a time when the dispute between Count Raymond and Bohemond was escalating, and Peter Bartholomew was presumably trying to weaken the nimbus of the Provençal camp. (Russo, *d'Aguilers e la Sacra Lancia*, 2006. 806.)

⁹⁹ Riley-Smith, *The First Crusade*, 2003. 84.

creasing obstacles as divine election, and thus bear them more steadfastly.¹⁰⁰ This privileged status also includes the intervention of the saints.¹⁰¹

To summarise the first section, the campaign also presented the clergy with challenges that were quite different from their activities at home. Apart from their customary responsibilities, we have identified four major areas of involvement, including tasks related to battles (1), taking care of the poor (2), reducing disunity in the army (3) and dealing with moral crises (4).

The fate of Jerusalem: electing the city's leaders

On July 15, 1099, the Crusaders captured Jerusalem, fulfilling their oath. However, the success of the campaign was not guaranteed by the occupation of the city. Following the city's fall, on July 17, an assembly was held where, according to Anonymous, alms were distributed, and prayers offered for God to choose who he would like to rule over the others and who would govern the city.¹⁰² Raymond also discusses the notion of selecting a king, but he faces a dilemma.

Even before the capture of Jerusalem, on July 4, Tancred had already caused discord within the army by planting his banner over the church of the Lord's Nativity, as if it were a temporal possession.¹⁰³ A conference was called to settle the matter and to discuss the future fate of Jerusalem. At the time, the clergy expressed their disapproval of appointing a secular leader in a place where the Lord had suffered and been crowned.¹⁰⁴ On July 22, a council convened to determine the town's future. Raymond of Aguilers' chronicle states that the clergy ultimately arrived at the decision to elect a king to "run the government, collect the taxes of the region, protect the countryside from further devastation, and to serve as a counselor to the people". It was insisted that a spiritual leader be elected before a secular ruler,¹⁰⁵ but due to potential disagreement among the clergy, this was not achieved until after Godfrey of Bouillon was elected.¹⁰⁶

¹⁰⁰ Stephen of Blois refers to these hardships as "the most holy suffering" (*sanctissima passio*). (Hagenmeyer, *Kreuzzugsbriefe*, 1901. 150.; Fulcher of Chartres, *Historia Hierosolymitana*, 96.); Payen summarises St Gregory VII's *Moralia in Job*, a popular work of the period in which suffering is seen as a sign of divine election, and which was probably known to the preachers and clergy of the Crusades. (Payen, *La pénitence*, 1977. 409.)

¹⁰¹ Russo, *d'Aguilers e la Sacra Lancia*, 2006. 794–795.

¹⁰² Anonymous, *Gesta Francorum*, 104.

¹⁰³ Raymond of Aguilers, *Historia Francorum*, 121.; Albert of Aachen, on the contrary, writes that the citizens of Bethlehem themselves asked the crusaders to march in to protect the Christian population. (Albert of Aachen, *Historia Ierosolimitana*, 398–400.)

¹⁰⁴ Raymond of Aguilers, *Historia Francorum*, 121.

¹⁰⁵ Raymond of Aguilers, *Historia Francorum*, 129.; The Orthodox patriarch, Simeon, had fled to Cyprus and is believed to have died at this time. Hamilton points out that the Crusaders may have elected a new leader without knowing of Simeon's death demonstrating their disapproval of an Orthodox patriarch leading the Latin faithful. (Hamilton, Bernard, *The Latin Church in the Crusader States: The Secular Church*. 2016, 12.)

¹⁰⁶ According to Fulcher, Godfrey did not want a crown (Fulcher of Chartres, *Historia Hierosolymitana*, 146.); Hiestand explains the lack of a royal title by the absence of

The election of the spiritual leader for the city was held on August 1. Hamilton emphasises that the lack of experienced and trained clerics among the Latins presented a challenge in managing a territory as extensive as the Patriarchate of Jerusalem.¹⁰⁷ The list of candidates is limited to Arnulf, the Bishop of Marturano¹⁰⁸, and Arnulf of Chocques¹⁰⁹, who played a prominent role in the Lance trial. Ian Robinson suggests that Adhémar's status as *legatus vicarius* did not extend to the whole army, but only to the contingent of Raymond of Saint-Gilles. Seeing the interest in the appeal, the Pope conferred on the clergymen who were marching with the northern contingents, on Alexander, chaplain to Stephen of Blois, and on Arnulf of Chocques, chaplain to Robert of Normandy, the *licentia ligandi atque solvendi*.¹¹⁰ This is supported by the account from Ralph of Caen, wherein Adhémar, on his deathbed,

an ecclesiastical dignitary who could have sanctioned the establishment of a fresh realm. (Hiestand, Rudolf, *Die päpstlichen Legaten auf den Kreuzzügen und in den Kreuzfahrerstaaten. Vom Konzil von Clermont (1095) bis zum 4. Kreuzzug*. Manuscript, 1972. 93.); Riley-Smith points out that the title *Advocatus Sancti Sepulchri*, so often cited, occurs only once in the description of Godfrey, and that in Daibert's letter to the new pope in the autumn of 1099. (Riley-Smith, Jonathan, "The Title of Godfrey of Bouillon", = *Bulletin of the Institute of Historical Research* 52, 1979. 83–86. 84.; Daibert' letter: Hagenmeyer, *Kreuzzugsbriefe*, 1901. 167–173.); Murray points out that the eyewitness chroniclers usually refer to Gottfried as princeps, the ruler of the *regnum Christi* (Murray, Alan V., *The Crusader Kingdom of Jerusalem. A Dynastic History 1099–1125*. Oxford 2000. 70.); Rowe also argues that this was a gesture of piety, in fact the title implies full royal dignity (Rowe, John G., "Paschal II and the Relation between the Spiritual and Temporal Powers in the Kingdom of Jerusalem", = *Speculum* 32, 1957. 470–501. 475.)

¹⁰⁷ Hamilton, *The Latin Church*, 2016. 12.

¹⁰⁸ A supporter of Arnulf of Chocques, who is described by Aguilers as illegitimately holding the title of Bishop of Bethlehem (Raymond of Aguilers, *Historia Francorum*, 129.)

¹⁰⁹ He took part in the campaign as chaplain to the Duke of Normandy, Robert II. Arnulf appears to have had several different names. The controversy over his birthplace is presented by David, who clarifies that he was born in the village of Chocques in the diocese of Thérouanne. (David, Charles W., *Robert Curthose. Duke of Normandy*. Cambridge, 1920. 217.)

¹¹⁰ Robinson, Ian S., *The Papacy, 1073–1198, Continuity and Innovation*. Cambridge, 1990. 155, 351–352.; Mayer, Hans Eberhard, "Zur Beurteilung Adhémar's von Le Puy", = *Deutsches Archiv für Erforschung des Mittelalters* 16, 1960, 547–552. 550–551.; This can be corroborated by the evidence that Adhémar consistently camped nearby Raymond of Saint-Gilles, both laid siege to the same portion of the wall and marched in unison. Becker refers to Adhémar as *Armeebischof*, while he places Arnulf and Alexander under his direction, since it was Adhémar who acted on behalf of the Pope and wrote two letters to the Western flock. (Becker, Alfons: *Papst Urban II. (1088–1099). Der Papst, die griechische Christenheit und der Kreuzzug*. Stuttgart, 1988. 412, 429.); Richard points out that Arnulf began acting as Patriarch of Jerusalem almost as a matter of course, which may be an indication of papal authority. (Richard, La Papauté, 1960. 54–55.)

assigns the management of the army to Arnulf of Chocques for his virtues.¹¹¹ With the exception of Raymond, Arnulf is described positively in the sources. He is presented as wise, respected, eloquent and was elected by consensus.¹¹² However, Raymond writes that he was elected “contrary to the wishes of the good clergymen”, since he was not a subdeacon, was of priestly origin¹¹³ and was repeatedly accused of greed (incontinence), so well-known that pilgrims even sang songs about him.¹¹⁴

Arnulf may have perceived a lack of legitimacy, prompting him to resort to a previously tried and tested method: the search for a highly revered relic with a reputation that could be claimed.¹¹⁵ Thus, he commanded the search for a piece of the Holy Cross, which was discovered on August 5.¹¹⁶ Arnulf’s approach was successful, as even Raymond, who was openly critical of him, describes their contentment with the relic and praise to the Lord for its acquisition.¹¹⁷

¹¹¹ Ralph of Caen, *Gesta Tancredi*, 2005. 113–114.; Later Arnulf argues that he was elected vicar to the Pope. (Ralph of Caen, *Gesta Tancredi*, 2005. 149.); Ralph’s portrait of Arnulf should be treated with some distance, since Arnulf was Ralph’s teacher and the “pre-reviewer” of the *Gesta Tancredi*. (Ralph of Caen, *Gesta Tancredi*, 2005. 20.); Richard points out that since Alexander had left the camp, Arnulf was the only one who had been appointed by the Pope. (Richard, Jean, “Quelques textes sur les premiers temps de l’Eglise latine de Jérusalem”, In. *Recueil de travaux offert à M. Clovis Brunel: Par ses amis, collègues et élèves*. Vol. II., Paris, 1955. 420–430. 423.)

¹¹² Anonymous, *Gesta Francorum*, 104.; Albert of Aachen, *Historia Ierosolimitana*, 452–454.; Hagenmeyer, *Kreuzzugsbriefe*, 1901. 175–176.

¹¹³ Foreville notes that Normandy was a unique case in the period regarding clerical celibacy, where members of the great noble families raised children who were accepted into the various orders without difficulty. (Foreville, Raymonde “Un chef de la première croisade: Arnoul Malecouronne”, = *Bulletin philologique et historique* 1953–1954, 377–390. 380.); Arnulf later requested a dispensation from Pascal II (†1118) so that he could continue to hold the episcopal office despite his origin. (Rozière, Eugène de, *Cartulaire de L’église du Saint Sépulchre de Jérusalem. Publie d’après les manuscrits du Vatican*. Paris, 1849. 11–13. No. 11.)

¹¹⁴ Raymond of Aguilers, *Historia Francorum*, 131.

¹¹⁵ The situation was similar with the Holy Lance and the cross of Adhémar. Murray also suggests that the search for the relic may have been motivated by the Patriarch’s desire for legitimacy. (Murray, Alan V., “Mighty Against the Enemies of Christ’: The Relic of the True Cross in the Armies of the Kingdom of Jerusalem”, In. France, John – Zajac, William G., *The Crusades and their Sources. Essays Presented to Bernard Hamilton*. London–New York, 1998. 217–238. 221.) Gerish points out that they often served as a sign of legitimacy or a symbol of power by creating a link between the sacred and the possessor of the relic. (Gerish, Deborah, “The True Cross and the Kings of Jerusalem”, = *The Haskins Society Journal Studies in Medieval History* 8, 1996, 137–155. 138.)

¹¹⁶ Raymond of Aguilers, *Historia Francorum*, 131.; Fulcher of Chartres, *Historia Hierosolymitana*, 123.; Albert of Aachen, *Historia Ierosolimitana*, 450–452.

¹¹⁷ Raymond of Aguilers, *Historia Francorum*, 131–132.

Debate between Raymond of Saint-Gilles and Godfrey of Bouillon

After the capture of Jerusalem, Raymond of Aguilers reports that the Bishop of Le Puy played a critical role in maintaining the cohesion of the army with “admirable acts and sermons”.¹¹⁸ Subsequently, Raymond of Saint-Gilles and Bohemond were compelled by the bishops to swear an oath of non-interference in the journey. When this happened, visions set them off again.

After his election, Godfrey began to demand the Tower of David, which had been given to Count Raymond, and this ruined their relationship. Trusting in the previous conciliatory efforts of the clergy, Raymond assigned Peter, Bishop of Albara¹¹⁹ as the overseer of the tower until a decision could be made through negotiation. However, Bishop Peter disregarded this agreement and handed over the tower to Godfrey without waiting for any discussion. When the Count accused the bishop of being a traitor, the bishop responded that he had suffered physical force.¹²⁰

As previously stated, the election of the king disregarded the earlier desires of the clergy. The chronicler, Raymond, explains how it was possible for a bishop to be threatened or abused to obtain a positive decision. He states that with the deaths of Adhémar and William, Bishop of Orange, the clergy was significantly weakened and appeared to have lost its ability to influence politics. The importance of the situation is shown by the fact that even the strongest contingent was lost when the tower was abandoned. The Count’s humiliation led him to refuse to take part in the Battle of Ascalon and decided to leave the Holy Land.¹²¹

¹¹⁸ Raymond of Aguilers, *Historia Francorum*, 129.

¹¹⁹ According to Raymond of Aguilers, Raymond of Saint-Gilles, in consultation with his chaplains, chose Peter to be Bishop of Albara. (Raymond of Aguilers, *Historia Francorum*, 73.); Tudebode adds that Peter was taken to Antioch, where he was ordained by the Byzantine Patriarch, and then ‘held councils as a replacement for Adhémar, Bishop of Le Puy. (Tudebode, *Historia*, 1974. 94.); Richard detects in this the good relations between Raymond of Saint-Gilles and the Greeks. (Richard, Jean, “Note sur l’archidiocèse d’Apamée et les conquêtes de Raymond de Saint-Gilles en Syrie du Nord”, = *Syria* 25, 1946–1948, 103–108. 105.); Unfortunately, there is very little written about Peter by his contemporaries, so we can only learn from the later chronicle of William of Tyre. If we accept the question of the legate discussed earlier, it is presumably a replacement for the ecclesiastical leader of the Provençal contingent, not the entire army. Regarding the election of bishops, Hamilton draws attention to two points: the lack of awareness of the schism of 1054, and the fact that the Franks, in their home circumstances, appointed clerics to organise the administration. (Hamilton, *The Latin Church*, 2016. 9–11.; Cowdrey, Herbert E. J., “The Reform Papacy and the Origin of the Crusades”, In: *Le Concile de Clermont de 1095 et l’appel à la Croisade. Actes du Colloque Universitaire International de Clermont Ferrand (23–25 juin 1995) organisé et publié avec le concours du Conseil Régional d’Auvergne*. (Collection de l’Ecole française de Rome, 236). Rome, 1997. 65–83. 65–69.)

¹²⁰ Raymond of Aguilers, *Historia Francorum*, 130.; Raymond of Saint-Gilles, in consultation with others, appointed Peter himself to head Albara. The fact that Peter did not take his side despite this could be seen as a betrayal.

¹²¹ Raymond of Aguilers, *Historia Francorum*, 132.

Later, Albert of Aachen informs us that the relationship between Godfrey and Raymond had deteriorated to such an extent that Godfrey rode armed to Raymond's camp, where Raymond was waiting for him, ready for battle.¹²² In the end, Robert of Flanders and other *magnificent men* managed to prevent the bloodshed within the army. Afterwards they parted in friendship.¹²³

It appears that Peter did not accurately estimate the risk of letting the tower through. As the leader of the clergy, Arnulf did not intervene to moderate the dispute between Raymond and Godfrey of Saint-Gilles.

The Battle of Ascalon

Around August 4, the Crusaders were informed that Egyptian Grand Vizier Shah-an-Shah al-Afdal was marching on Jerusalem.¹²⁴ According to Fulcher's account, the Franks swiftly marched towards Ascalon upon discovering this, bringing the recently found relic along with them.¹²⁵ Both Raymond of Aguilers and the *Gesta Francorum* confirm that clerics marched with the army along-

¹²² Duke Godfrey marched against the city of Ascalon, but Raymond of Saint-Gilles, in Albert's words, persuaded the defenders to hold out and not to surrender the city. Albert adds to Count Raymond's list of crimes, claiming that he persuaded the other princes to leave the camp. In the end, Godfrey, unsuccessful, abandoned the siege of Ascalon and marched against Arsuf, where Raymond again urged the defenders to hold out. (Albert of Aachen, *Historia Ierosolimitana*, 472.); Hill and Hill argue that Albert was biased against Godfrey and add that the city's defenders may have heard that only those whose safety was guaranteed by Raymond survived the siege of Jerusalem. (Hill, John H. – Hill, Laurita L., *Raymond IV Count of Toulouse*. New York, 1962. 138.); Ibn al-Qalānisī did not know about Raymond of Saint-Gilles' conspiracy, but he knew about the dispute: he wrote that the princes could not agree on the amount of the war claim against the city of Ascalon, and that they quarrelled over it, and ended up with nothing. (Chronicle of Ibn al-Qalānisī, 2002. 49.)

¹²³ Albert of Aachen, *Historia Ierosolimitana*, 474.

¹²⁴ Anonymous, *Gesta Francorum*, 105.; Ibn al-Athīr explains the reason for this by the behaviour of the Franks in Jerusalem. The chronicler lists at length the valuables the Franks stole from the Mosque and the number of people they killed or enslaved. (The Chronicle of Ibn al-Athīr, 2006. 22.)

¹²⁵ Fulcher of Chartres, *Historia Hierosolymitana*, 125.; Albert of Aachen, *Historia Ierosolimitana*, 454.; Murray has catalogued the mentions of the Cross as a military device during the campaigns in the Holy Land, which was carried 31 times by the patriarch (or his deputy) until its loss at Hattin in 1187. (Murray, *The Relic of the True Cross*, 1998. 222.); The relic is one of the relics of war, such as the Oriflamme or the *caroccios* in Lombardy. Voltmer, in the context of such symbols of power, underlines that the *caroccios* were important tools for understanding the abstract notion of power where it was not linked to persons, as in the Italian cities. (Voltmer, Ernst, "Nel segno del Croce: il carroccio come simbolo del potere", In: *'Militia Christi' e Crociata nei secoli XI–XIII. Atti della undecima Settimana internazionale di studio, Mendola, 28 agosto – 1 settembre 1989*. Milano, 1992. 193–207. 207.); Since these pilgrims also interpreted the question of rule in an abstract way, these symbols were just as necessary here.

side the princes.¹²⁶ The Bishop of Marturano was captured while carrying a message between Ascalon and Jerusalem, and was never seen again.¹²⁷

Before the battle, the clergy followed the earlier pattern: according to Raymond's account, before the battle the crusaders forgave one another sins of commission and omission.¹²⁸ Immediately before the battle, the army "was protected and signed with the sign of the holy cross by Arnulf, Peter and the other priests".¹²⁹ In Albert of Aachen's work, Godfrey confirmed the martyrdom of the soldiers.¹³⁰

Parallel to the battle, as in previous examples, clerics prayed for victory. We know from the Anonymous and from Raymond that Peter the Hermit stayed in Jerusalem, held a procession, distributed alms and prayed for victory with the faithful.¹³¹ Shah-an-Shah al-Afdal's army was taken by surprise by the crusaders' attack and was defeated. After the victory, the Franks returned to Jerusalem in great joy, praised God and marched to the Holy Sepulchre, where they offered thanksgiving.¹³² The two locations contain all the elements we have read before about the clergy's activities in battle: they hold a pre-battle procession, distribute alms, and pray for God to lead their troops to victory. The clerics also accompany the army and give thanks after the victory.

Summary

The Battle of Ascalon successfully repelled the threat temporarily, leading to the establishment of the Latin East. In conclusion, the clergy was able to fulfil its tasks during the campaign. Some of their battle-related activities, already part of the European wars, were fully integrated into the war liturgy of the Kingdom of Jerusalem, and some of them even spread westwards. Caring for the poor was a priority for the clergy. After the conquest of Jerusalem, we read several times about alms-giving and the distribution of the spoils. The importance of maintaining the unity within the army was so enduring

¹²⁶ Raymond of Aguilers, *Historia Francorum*, 132.; Anonymous, *Gesta Francorum*, 105.

¹²⁷ Anonymous, *Gesta Francorum*, 105.; Raymond of Aguilers, *Historia Francorum*, 129.

¹²⁸ Raymond of Aguilers, *Historia Francorum*, 134.; During a later siege at Arsuf (October–December 1099), Arnulf called on the army to confession and forgiveness, from which they drew strength. (Albert of Aachen, *Historia Ierosolimitana*, 492.)

¹²⁹ Albert of Aachen, *Historia Ierosolimitana*, 458.

¹³⁰ Albert of Aachen, *Historia Ierosolimitana*, 458–462.; Murray's statement that the Cross had become a talisman that the Kingdom of Jerusalem considered indispensable for military action, and thus in the war liturgy of the Battle of Ascalon, was later spread to Europe. (Murray, *The Relic of the True Cross*, 1998. 231.); One explanation may be that the cross piece from Constantinople was used by Urban himself in his recruitment journey, the success of which Cowdrey refers to. (Cowdrey, *The Reform Papacy*, 1997. 82–83.; Cowdrey, Herbert E. J., "Pope Urban II and the Idea of Crusade", = *Studi Medievali* 36, 1995, 721–742. 737–738.)

¹³¹ Anonymous, *Gesta Francorum*, 106.; Raymond of Aguilers, *Historia Francorum*, 133.

¹³² Anonymous, *Gesta Francorum*, 108.; Fulcher of Chartres, *Historia Hierosolymitana*, 127.; Albert of Aachen, *Historia Ierosolimitana*, 472.

that according to Ruess, it was one of the most significant activities of later legates.¹³³ Related to this, we have seen a break in the weak leadership of the Bishop of Albara. The conflict between Godfrey and Raymond of Saint-Gilles could potentially have resulted in a more severe outcome.

The clergy, as Raymond put it, had been weakened by the deaths of Adhémar and William, and as a result seemed to have lost their role in high politics. Arnulf divided the Crusader leaders because of his origin and his temperament. The conflict, which he had also mishandled, was finally resolved by Daibert, Archbishop of Pisa, who managed to reconcile Bohemond and Raymond of Saint-Gilles.¹³⁴ After his arrival in Jerusalem, on Christmas 1099, he deposed Arnulf and ascended to the patriarchal throne himself.

¹³³ Ruess, Karl, *Die Rechtliche Stellung der Päpstlichen Legaten bis Bonifaz VIII.* Paderborn, 1912. 80–81.

¹³⁴ Albert of Aachen, and Daibert himself, confirms in a letter to the Pope that he succeeded in reconciling Bohemond and the other leaders. (Albert of Aachen, *Historia Ierosolimitana*, 484.; Hagenmeyer, *Kreuzzugsbriefe*, 1901. 173.)

Benjamin Borbas

THE USE AND REUSE OF THE SPOILS OF WAR DURING THE CRUSADES (1096–1291)

Introduction

The tumultuous events of the 1096–1291 period in the Holy Land were replete with intrigue, battles, sieges, raids, and other logistically challenging undertakings. Although the Crusades are a popular topic of military historical research, the phenomena of plunder and the issue of spoils of war have received less attention.¹ This is somewhat surprising, since according to the sources, plunder and raiding played a major role in motivating soldiers, financing armies on the ground, weakening the enemy’s rear and, more often, in the quick money-making strategies of financially strapped rulers.

In the context of the capture of booty associated with the Crusades, I seek answers to the following questions: How was it possible to sustain the enthusiasm of a medieval army fighting far from home? How were its activities financed (even partially) by the war? What happened to the various movable and immovable valuables, relics, treasures, camp and military equipment, livestock, and prisoners that fell into the hands of the victors? Who were the owners of these spoils? Compared to their former function, did they assume a new purpose in the victors’ hands?

The investigation intends to trace the fate of prisoners, treasures, and valuables (armour, horses, luxury goods, etc.), as well as of church relics and artefacts that fell into the hands of Christians and Muslims during the looting, and to determine their subsequent use. My hypothesis and the research I have carried out on the subject suggest that relics and objects associated with religious rituals are the easiest to trace, since due to their considerable material value, many of them have survived to the present day and may be known from eyewitnesses’ descriptions in later periods. At the same time, the fate of livestock and weaponry following raids, sieges and battles is an equally interesting line of research, as the goods looted from the enemy may have contributed greatly to equipping Christian forces in the field and to feeding the army and the population. However, because of their everyday utility or material, they were less durable and long-lasting than various luxury items and ecclesiastical paraphernalia; therefore, their fate is more difficult to trace.

¹ Although in his recent dissertation on the logistics of the Crusades, Gregory D. Bell highlights several topics that have received little attention from historians of the period, but he does not consider either a potentially deeper the study of plunder.; O’Dell, William Donald, *Feeding Victory: The Logistics of the First Crusade 1095–1099*. Cullowhee, NC, 2020. 2.

The booty included prisoners who could be ransomed; moreover, one of the most lucrative sources of war revenue came from the redemption of high-ranking individuals. In the matter of ransom, the military orders in the Holy Land often mediated between Christian and Muslim parties to find the best conditions for the redemption of prisoners. The material and political benefits of soldiers captured during military campaigns and of important persons held hostage offer a fascinating field of investigation. The primary aim of this paper is not to give a detailed list of the different types of booty, but rather to provide an insight into the uses of the spoils of war, beyond their military use.²

Byzantine parallels

Partly because of the temporal and spatial extent of the Crusades, the crusaders who went to the Holy Land took with them European (mainly Frankish) practices, and in addition, if they found them practical, they would adopt the customs of the powers and inhabitants of the states they had permanent links with. In this context, it is worth briefly noting that the Byzantine Empire, still one of the mightiest powers in the region, and, more specifically, its efforts to provide military supplies to the Anatolian provinces, were under constant threat.

In the early and middle Byzantine period, soldiers who fought valiantly were rewarded with a share of the spoils of war. Entire military units were sometimes decorated by weapons, horses and clothing stolen or captured from the enemy. Those living on the frontiers were made to stay by promises of loot and privileges by the Byzantine government. Since these people could keep the plundered goods for themselves, not only were they interested in launching frequent raids along the borders, but also contributed to the protection of

² Papers about the later fate of spoils are Pertusi, Agostino, "Venezia e Bisanzio: 1000–1204", = *Dumbarton Oaks Papers* 33, 1979, 1–22.; Mathews, Karen, "Plunder of War or Objects of Trade? The Reuse and Reception of Andalusi Objects in Medieval Pisa", = *Journal of Medieval Iberian Studies* 4:2, 2012, 233–258.; Kyriakidis, Savvas, "The division of booty in late Byzantium (1204–1453)", = *Jahrbuch der österreichischen Byzantinistik* 59, 2010, 163–177.; Hardt, Matthias, "Gold for the coronation. The Avar booty as the basis for Charlemagne's imperial representation", In: Bratli, Terje (ed.), *The 58th International Sachsensymposium 1–5 September 2007*. (Vitark: Acta Archaeologica Nidrosiensia, 7.). Trondheim, 2009. 52–61.; Potkowski, Edward, "Nach der Schlacht von Tannenberg: Schenkungen des Königs Władysław Jagiełło an die polnischen Kirchen", In: Wenta, Jarosław – Hartmann, Sieglinde – Vollmann-Profe, Gisela (eds.), *Mittelalterliche Kultur und Literatur im Deutschordensstaat in Preußen: Leben und Nachleben*. (Sacra Bella Septentrionalia, 1.). Toruń, 2008. 157–171.; Zajac, William G., "Captured property on the First Crusade", In: Phillips, Jonathan (ed.), *The First Crusade – Origins and Impact*. Manchester, 1997. 153–180.; Jucker, Michael, "Objektraub und Beuteökonomien. Methodische Überlegungen zu Wirtschaftsformen im Krieg des Spätmittelalters", = *Geschichte in Wissenschaft und Unterricht* 65:9–10, 2014, 548–562.

the people in the interior by constantly weakening the neighbouring enemy territories. This practice is emphasised in Byzantine *panegyrics of the period*, stressing the importance of booty, and praising the commander who not only makes a lot of booty during raids but also shares it with his soldiers. Goods plundered in a raid were not given back to their rightful owners, as the possible return of the booty obtained through battle and at the cost of human and material losses would have had a negative impact on soldiers' morale and would have jeopardised the task of defending the frontier. At the same time, for the cash-strapped central government, loot was a convenient and highly motivating way of keeping mercenaries in service and retaining their loyalty.³

The thirteenth century Byzantine historian Georgios Pachymeres describes how the frontiersmen increased their wealth and gained more confidence and more courage through the raids. A further important justification for our topic is the fact that from a Byzantine perspective, the main, if not the only, reward for Turkoman mercenaries in the second half of the thirteenth century was booty.⁴

Different forms of spoils of war

1. Relics (Relic of the True Cross)

Perhaps the most famous objects brought to Europe from the Holy Land are the relics of Jesus Christ and of various saints, which were of great material and religious value.⁵ Precisely because of their preciousness, these objects of religious devotion were protected as much as possible, so that they rarely came into contact with the hostilities, and most of them were exchanged by gift, exchange or purchase. Due to their high value, they had a better chance of survival than other objects used as everyday tools or made of less durable materials. Unlike armaments, clothing, camp equipment, siege machines or warhorses, relics were not worn out over time. Therefore, artefacts that fell into foreign hands through acts of warfare and may still survive today are over-represented among the goods looted.

³ Kyriakidis, *The division of booty*, 2010. 164, 174–175.

⁴ Kyriakidis, *The division of booty*, 2010. 172–174.

⁵ In the context of relics that fell into foreign hands as booty, we should refer to the Fourth Crusade, which ended with the capture and sack of Constantinople in 1204. As a result, many relics from the East were brought to Europe. For more on the relics brought by the crusaders from the East, see Magdalino, Paul, “L'église du Phare et les reliques de la Passion à Constantinople (VII^e/VIII^e–XIII^e siècle)”, In. Durand, Jannic – Flusin, Bernard (eds.), *Byzance et les Reliques du Christ*. Paris, 2004. 15–30.; Bacci, Michele, “Relics of the Pharos Chapel: A View from the Latin West”, In. Lidov, Aleksei (ed.), *Relikvii v Vizantii i Drevnei Rusi / Eastern Christian Relics*. Moscow, 2006. 234–247.; Flusin, Bernard, “Les reliques de la Sainte Chapelle et leur passé impériale à Constantinople”, In. Durand, Jannic – Lafitte, Marie-Pierre (ed.), *Le trésor de la Sainte-Chapelle*. Paris, 2001. 20–31.

However, we do have some examples from the world of the Crusades of objects that were forcibly taken into foreign hands. The most famous is the relic of the True Cross. Containing a part of the cross of Jesus in a gold frame, it was considered the holiest relic of the Kingdom of Jerusalem. Kept in the Temple of the Holy Sepulchre, it was under the protection of the Latin Patriarch, who carried the cross into battle during the kingdom's major military campaigns.⁶ It was believed to have special power in war helping Christians triumph in battle and was placed right next to the royal standard-bearer during military engagements. However, the endangerment of the relic sparked serious controversy, and already in the early twelfth century there were several protests against its removal from the kingdom. King Balduin II of Jerusalem (1118–1131) was frequently accused of endangering the miraculous object by taking it to risky cross-border campaigns.⁷ A striking example of the use of the True Cross in battle is found in Albert of Aachen's history of the First Crusade, in which King Balduin I, "in the hope of rescue and victory", brought the treasure out and threw it into a losing battle to rekindle his soldiers' fighting fire.⁸

Crusaders visiting the Holy Land also sought the precious object with great zeal, with some of them even granted the chance to return to Europe with a piece of it. Thus, in 1110, King Balduin I of Jerusalem (1110–1118) presented a shard to King Sigurd I of Norway (1103–1130), following the Norwegians' crusade (1107–1111).⁹

Often exposed to danger, the relic could not escape its fate. In 1187, in the Battle of Hattin, a disastrous one for the Crusaders, the True Cross was seized by Saladin, Sultan of Egypt and Syria (1174–1193), and Christians

⁶ Murray, Alan V., "Mighty against the Enemies of Christ: The Relic of the True Cross in the Armies of the Kingdom of Jerusalem", In: France, John – Zajac, William G. (eds.), *The Crusades and Their Sources, Essays Presented to Bernard Hamilton*. Aldershot, 1998. 232–238.

⁷ Barber, Malcolm C., *The Crusader States*. New Haven, CT, 2012. 137.; In fact, the criticism of Balduin over the relic was motivated by domestic political conflicts. One of the two rival noble factions in the kingdom at the time, allied with the patriarch, sought to prevent the campaigns to the north – unsuccessfully – by trying to prevent the relic from leaving the kingdom.; Murray, Alan V., "Baldwin II and his nobles: Baronial factionalism and dissent in the kingdom of Jerusalem, 1118–1134", = *Nottingham Medieval Studies* 38, 1994, 60–85. 67.

⁸ Albert of Aachen, *Historia Ierosolimitana: History of the Journey to Jerusalem*. Ed. Edgington, Susan B., Oxford, 2007. 819. (Book XI. 42.)

⁹ Monachus, Theodoricus, *Historia de Antiquitate Regum Norwagiensum. An Account of the Ancient History of the Norwegian Kings*, trans. McDougall, David – McDougall, Ian, London, 1998.; Raupp, Lukas, "Importing Jerusalem – Relics of the True Cross as political legitimation in early twelfth century Denmark and Norway", In: Aavitsland, Kristin B. – Bonde, Line M. (eds.), *The Holy City. Tracing the Jerusalem Code. 1. Christian Cultures in Medieval Scandinavia (ca 1100–1536)*. Berlin, 2001. 140–165. 156–158.

never laid hands on it again.¹⁰ The Muslim historian Alī ibn al-Athīr (1160–1232/1233), who wrote about the battle, explains the significance of the relic's loss to Christians as follows:

“The Muslims captured their great cross, called the ‘True Cross’, in which they say is a piece of the wood upon which, according to them, the Messiah was crucified. This was one of the heaviest blows that could be inflicted on them and made their death and destruction certain.”¹¹

The Persian-born historian and scholar Imād al-Dīn al-Iṣfahānī (1125–1201) makes a similar assessment of the Muslim capture of the precious relic:

“Its capture was for them more important than the loss of the King and was the gravest blow that they sustained in that battle. The cross was a prize without equal, for it was the supreme object of their faith. (...) It seemed as if, once they knew of the capture of the Cross, none of them would survive that day of ill-omen.”¹²

Apart from Muslims, only Christians were more aware of the significance of the relic and the consequences of its loss. In the years and decades that followed, the True Cross was an important issue in the political, military, and diplomatic relations of the two powers. Richard I of England (1189–1199) tried to redeem it from Saladin when he came under the castle of Acre during the Third Crusade (1189–1192). The desperate Muslims even offered the True Cross relic to the Franks, in addition to the previous peace terms (surrender of the city and its appurtenances, except for the Muslim inhabitants of the city who were to leave the city in safety). The relic was also included in the final peace treaty: the Muslims agreed to its surrender, the release of five hundred unranked and one hundred prominent Christian prisoners, and an additional payment of two hundred thousand dinars.¹³ According to a contemporary Muslim account, two officials of the English king visited the Muslim camp to discuss the prisoners' case, to inspect the relic, and to make sure that it had not been sent to Baghdad

¹⁰ It is noteworthy, however, that according to Oliver of Paderborn, as he learned from the elders, when conflict with Saladin was imminent, the relic of the True Cross was cut into several pieces. Only a part of it was taken into battle and lost at Hattīn in 1187, while the other part was preserved. The crusaders are said to have left Acre for Egypt in 1217 with the relic holder containing the latter piece. Oliverus Scholasticus, “Historia Damiatina”, In. Hoogeweg, Hermann (ed.), *Die Schriften des Kölner Domscholasters, späteren Bischof von Paderborn und Cardinalbischof von S. Sabina Oliverus*. Stuttgart, 1894. 164. (Chap. II.)

¹¹ *Arab Historians of the Crusades, Translated from the Italian by E. J. Costello*. Ed. and trans. Gabrieli, Francesco, London, 2009. 74. [hereinafter Arab Historians]

¹² Arab Historians, 82.

¹³ ed-Dīn, Behā, *The Life of Saladin*. (Library of Palestine Pilgrims' Texts Society, 13.). London, 1897. 266.

in the meantime. After seeing it with their own eyes, they were overcome with awe and fell prostrate before it.¹⁴ However, despite all these preparations, the relic was not handed over, which the historian Behā ed-Dīn explains by saying that the Christians did not release the Muslim prisoners. The exchange of letters between the Sultan and the English king, from which the Muslim author quotes, is an interesting contribution to our discussion, since it mentions the relic included in the peace terms. In his letter, Saladin writes: “Lastly, as concerns the cross, its possession is a great advantage to us, and we cannot give it up except we could thereby gain some advantage to Islam.”¹⁵ A further attempt to recover the True Cross was subsequently made by Queen Tamar of Georgia (1184–1213), who offered two hundred thousand dinars for the relic, but was refused.¹⁶ After the unsuccessful attempt by the Georgian queen, the True Cross appears three more times in Behā ed-Dīn’s work as an important element in the negotiations, but never once was it handed over.¹⁷

The last confirmed mention of the relic of the True Cross dates to 1219, when the beleaguered Egyptian Sultan Al-Kamil (1218–1238) offered it to the Templars in exchange for lifting the siege of Damietta.¹⁸ It is assumed, however, that the relic last seen in Damascus and Baghdad was not actually in the possession of the Sultan. It had been taken to Damascus after Saladin’s victory at Hattīn, and the historian Abū Shāma mentions it in his chronicle narrating the triumphal entry of the victorious army into the city. The author cites a letter, preserved in another chronicle, sent by one Abd Allāh ben Ahmed el-Mokaddesi from Ascalon to Baghdad on 20 August 1187, revealing that after the victorious Battle of Hattīn, the image of Christ, captured by the Muslims, was placed on the cross upside down and carried through the city by the Qadī Ibn Abī Aṣrūn (1099/1100–1189), who had marched into Damascus.¹⁹ Two years later (June 1189), the True Cross was in Baghdad, where Saladin sent it together with a number of prisoners and treasures. Abū Shāma reports that a certain cross was buried under the gate called Bāb al-Nūbī, but in such a way that the bronze part of the cross covered with gold remained visible, so that passers-by could trample and spit on it. He notes, however, that there are different opinions about the identity of this particular cross: some identify it with the True Cross oracle the Franks ‘used’ in their campaigns, while others believe it to be a golden cross taken from the dome of the Dome of the Rock in Jerusalem.²⁰

¹⁴ ed-Dīn, *The Life of Saladin*, 1897. 270–271.

¹⁵ ed-Dīn, *The Life of Saladin*, 1897. 309.

¹⁶ ed-Dīn, *The Life of Saladin*, 1897. 334–335.

¹⁷ ed-Dīn, *The Life of Saladin*, 1897. 311, 327, 334–335.

¹⁸ Oliverus Scholasticus, *Historia Damiatina*, 1894. 222. (Chap. XXXI.)

¹⁹ Shāma, Abu, “Le Livre des Deux Jardins”, In: *Recueil des Historiens des Croisades: Historiens Orientaux*, Vols I–V. Paris, 1872–1906. Vol. IV., 286, 288.

²⁰ Shāma, *Le Livre des Deux Jardins*, 395.; Le Strange, Guy, *Baghdad: During the Abbasid Caliphate*. Oxford, 1900. 274–275.

The burial site of the cross is a significant landmark for Muslims. The Bāb al-Nūbī, or “Gate of the Nubians”, was primarily the entrance to the city of Baghdad for high-ranking visitors (princes and envoys) and, along with another gate, led to the sacred precinct (*Harīm*) within the palace complex of the Abbasid caliphs. A guest arriving at the caliph’s house had to kiss the threshold of the gate before entering the sacred precinct. In addition, the Bāb al-Nūbī hosted several public events: it was the place where criminals and sectarians were paraded, tortured, and executed.²¹ For Muslims, therefore, the gate and the space behind it were associated with ceremonial and urban rituals, administration of justice and punishment, deterrence, and sanctity. In this context, the shaming of the holy relic in Damascus and Baghdad, which had been captured from the Franks in battle, had multiple symbolic meanings, glorifying the triumph of Islam over its ‘infidel and idolatrous’ enemy. Sadly, beyond this point, we have no reliable information about the fate and whereabouts of the True Cross; the history of one of Christianity’s holiest cult objects may have been obscured for ever by the street dust kicked up by Baghdad passers-by.

Siege weapons

Naturally, the most common items among the spoils of war were the weapons and equipment captured in battles. In chronicles enumerating the various kinds of spoils won during military enterprises, they feature among the most frequent forms of loot, along with captives and animals. They were of immediate value when obtained by or sold to a third party, but due to their practical importance, their life span was limited, and we know of few – identifiable – spoils of war obtained in this manner. Nevertheless, their use and utility are not always clear due to the different ways of fighting between opposing sides. Furthermore, the historical situation and military considerations may have forced the victor to make decisions regarding the later fate of spoils, which may not always seem rational to us.

Siege engines stood out from other weapons in terms of their value, as they required a high degree of skill and a considerable amount of raw materials and labour to produce. A pertinent example is the various stone thrower siege engines. In 1219, during the Fifth Crusade (1217–1221), siege engines (including various stone throwers) were found in Damietta, which had been conquered from the Egyptians and, presumably, were later used by the crusaders: “Four trebuchets were found in Damietta, together with a great many petrariae and mangonels, (also) ballistas with very powerful bowling power;²² the number of

²¹ Seignobos, Robin, “Bāb al-Nūbī: Urban Toponymy and Nubians in Medieval Baghdad. (Notes on Medieval Nubian Toponymy, 1.)”, = *Dotawo: A Journal of Nubian Studies* 4, 2017, 225–230. 225–226.

²² The trebuchet is a counterweight stone thrower, while the petraria and the mangonel are smaller stone-throwing siege engines that use torsional energy to propel their projectiles. A ballista in this case probably means a bolt thrower.

crossbows and bows is not known, owing to their multiplicity.”²³ The vicissitudes of fortune in war are well illustrated by the fact that two years later the crusaders advancing from Damietta with their tents and mules were forced to burn perhaps the very same siege engines. The crusaders were probably fearing that these costly war machines would fall into enemy hands when, surrounded by the Muslims, they were forced to retreat.²⁴

In addition to the considerable financial investment the construction of siege engines required, they were also valuable in terms of the manpower and time needed to build them. Nevertheless, if it was deemed that they could no longer be used effectively, it was not uncommon for the victorious party to consider destroying the captured ones. The main reasons might have been the following: 1) the war machines were already seriously damaged, thus, repairing them would have taken too much time and money, or 2) under the given circumstances, dismantling and removing them from the battlefield was time-consuming or impossible. In such cases, it seemed wiser to destroy the formidable siege engines rather than allowing them to end up in the hands of a returning enemy.

The latter possibility is highlighted in an episode of the Seventh Crusade (1248–1254), told by Jean de Joinville (1224[?]-1317): “The King’s engines, which they were also to have taken care of, these they chopped in pieces. And the salted pork, which they were to have kept, because they eat no pork, instead of taking care of it, they made one pile of bacon, and another pile of dead bodies, and set fire to them.”²⁵

Despite the agreement with the king to destroy the war machines, the Saracens did not enable Louis IX of France (1226–1270) to send ships to the northern Egyptian coast, as the king had intended, and to arrange for the transport of the valuable siege equipment to Acre. The Saracens were right to suspect that this action would have no serious consequences, since the king was in no condition or military position to take satisfaction for his disloyalty. However, even at the time of the treaty, the Saracens were probably better able to persuade King Louis IX of France (1226–1270) to surrender the city peacefully, persuading him that he could keep his armies safe in Saracen hands.²⁶

The trebuchets left behind by the Franks and Byzantines in 1170 during the then unsuccessful siege of Damietta met a similar end: their stone-throwers

²³ Oliverus Scholasticus, *Historia Damiatina*, 1894. 239–240. (Chap. XXXIX.); Unless otherwise indicated, all translations of sources in this paper are by the author.

²⁴ *The Chronicle of Ibn al-Athīr for the Crusading Period from al-Kamil fi’l-Ta’rikh*, Vols I–III. [hereinafter Ibn al-Athīr], Vol. III. *The Years 589-629/1193-1231: The Ayyubids after Saladin and the Mongol Menace*, trans. Richards, Donald Sidney, London–New York, 2016. 181.

²⁵ Joinville, Jean, *The Memoirs of the Lord of Joinville: A New English Version*, trans. Bowen-Wedgwood, Ethel Kate, London, 1906. 186. (Chap. XVI.) [hereinafter Joinville]

²⁶ At the time of the peace treaty, it was stipulated that the Sultan “was to take care of all the sick that were in Damietta, and of the salted meat (since they ate no pork), and of the King’s engines, until such time as the King should be able to send and fetch all these thing” – Joinville, 149–150. (Chap. XIII.)

were burned and their equipment was plundered.²⁷ In 1291, Saracens invading Acre set fire to the Frankish war machines and barricades.²⁸ However, if the situation permitted, adversaries were happy to make use of the opponents' valuable weapons. In 1138, fleeing Byzantines left behind trebuchets and other siege engines, which then became the spoils of Atabeg Imad ad-Din Zangi (1087–1148), who pursued the rearguard.²⁹ In 1190, the Saracens defending Acre ambushed the Frankish war machines and, after killing their guards, took with them a trebuchet, ballistas, and the testudos (probably protecting the battering rams), but they were almost immediately replaced by Christians, who built new ones.³⁰

Arms and armors

In Christian and Muslim sources alike, there are numerous examples of the use of enemy weaponry. They may have been used to replace damaged weapons and armor after battles, to properly equip soldiers carrying inadequate or insufficient weapons, or (in the case of more valuable items) as a form of property. Participating soldiers laid their hands on these objects in several ways. On the one hand, victors would obtain them during combat.³¹ But on the other hand, a recurrent feature of battle accounts is the soldiers' obligation to surrender captured armaments, which later were collected and distributed in the army. Although hiding the more valuable pieces could carry severe penalties, these were frequent occurrences.

An example of the different uses of loot is seen in the aftermath of the battle in the Valley of Orontes. In 1105, the day after the Battle of Artah, Regent of Antioch (1104–1112) Tankred of Hauteville collected the armors of the defeated army of Seljuk Emir of Aleppo Ridwan, and distributed them among his soldiers, returning to Antioch triumphant.³² Victorious in 1119, Ilghazi, the Turkoman Artucid ruler of Mardin (1107–1122), sent to Islamic rulers only a small part of

²⁷ Ibn Shaddād, Bahā' al-Dīn, *The Rare and Excellent History of Saladin, or, al-Nawādir al-Sultaniyya wa'l-Mahasin al-Yusufiyya*, trans. Richards, Donald Sidney, Ashgate, 2002. 45–46.

²⁸ English: *The Templar of Tyre: Part III of the 'Deeds of the Cypriots'*, trans. Crawford, Paul, Abingdon, 2016. 114. (Chap. 501.). [hereinafter *Templar of Tyre*]; Old French: *Chronique du Templier de Tyr*, in Raynaud, Gaston (ed.), *Les Gestes des Chiprois. Recueil de Chroniques Françaises*. Paris, 1887. 252. (Chap. 501.). [hereinafter *Chronique du Templier de Tyr*]

²⁹ Ibn al-Athīr, Vol. I. *The Years 491–541/1097–1146: The Coming of the Franks and the Muslim Response*, trans. Richards, Donald Sidney, London–New York, 2016. 341.

³⁰ Ibn al-Athīr, Vol. II. *The Years 541–589/1146–1193: The Age of Nūr al-Dīn and Saladin*, trans. Richards, Donald Sidney, London–New York, 2016. 378.

³¹ See, for example, Anonymus, *Gesta Francorum et aliorum Hierosolymitanorum*. Ed. Hagenmeyer, Heinrich, Heidelberg, 1890. 499–501. (Chap. XXXIX., 20.); *The Damascus Chronicle of the Crusades: Extracted and Translated from the Chronicle of Ibn Al-Qualānisī*. Ed. and trans. Gibb, Hamilton Alexander Roskeen, Mineola, 2002. 198, 331. [hereinafter *Ibn Al-Qualānisī*]

³² Albert of Aachen, *Historia Ierosolimitana*, 2007. 705. (Book IX. Chap 47.)

the arms, presumably as war trophies, while using most of the Frankish armaments to equip his own army.³³

Similarly, the Crusader army led by Conrad III of Germany (1138–1152) was severely defeated by the army of the Sultan of Iconium at Dorylaeum in 1147, and the wealth plundered from the western knights ended up in the bazaars of Persia.³⁴

As armaments were extremely valuable and could fetch a good price, they were often sought by people who did not make their living through warfare. A story in the chronicle of the *Templar of Tyre* recounts that Saracen peasants stole weapons and clothing from Christian soldiers who had escaped from an earlier battle, but carelessly got drunk and were killed in their sleep.³⁵

An excellent example of the use of weapons acquired from the enemy is given by Albert of Aachen, who writes about knights rich in their own land but impoverished on the road to Jerusalem. Albert describes the equipment of some of the crusaders who joined the battle with the army of Kerbogha, Atabeg of Mosul, outside Antioch in 1098, who laid siege to the city:

“Any of these eminent men who had now been able to acquire a mule or a donkey or a worthless pack animal or a palfrey used it as a horse. Among them, princes who were very powerful and rich in their own land went into battle riding on a donkey. No wonder, for their own funds had long since run out and from need they had begged, and after their own weapons had been sold from want, they used Turkish weapons which were unaccustomed and incongruous in battle. Count Hartmann belonged to this number: he is said to have been rich and very noble and one of the most powerful people in the land of Swabia, but to have ridden a donkey to the battle and held merely a Turk’s round shield and sword on the day. No wonder, for he was impoverished of all things; his hauberk, helmet, and weapons had been sold and for a long time he had begged, and he had almost reached the point where he could not live by begging.”³⁶

While Albert’s comment about these lords may sound exaggerated, the figure of the crusader living off enemy spoils must have been very real for his contemporary readers. Later, Albert also points out that the impoverishment caused by the immense expenses threatened many of the crusading lords: like many others, even Gottfried Bouillon had to go into battle on a gift horse provided by Raymond IV, Count of Toulouse (1094–1105; later Count of Tripoli

³³ Arab Historians, 23.

³⁴ *Chronique de Michel le Syrien, patriarche jacobite d’Antioche 1166–1199*, Vols I–IV. Ed. Chabot, Jean-Baptiste, Paris, 1899–1910. Vol. III., 276. (Book XVII. Chap. 6.)

³⁵ English: *Templar of Tyre*, 52. (Chap. 349.); Old French: *Chronique du Templier de Tyr*, 182. (Chap. 349.)

³⁶ Albert of Aachen, *Historia Ierosolimitana*, 2007. 333. (Book IV. Chap. 54.)

(1102–1105).³⁷ It is also worth pointing out that the hostile Turkish armament was considered inferior and those who fought with it were less fit for combat, probably due to the differences between the heavy-horse Frankish and light-horse Turkish fighting styles and their equipment.

The use of weapons stolen from the enemy is also illustrated by the well-known episode of the First Crusade. In 1096, when Peter the Hermit's crusaders reached the castle of Zimony (now Zemun, Serbia) on the Hungarian-Byzantine border, they saw the insignia and weapons of Walter the Poor's defeated army hanging on the wall of the castle, which made them launch their immediate attack. These booties had been taken from the crusaders by the Hungarians and some may have been placed on the walls as a deterrent.³⁸

In 1291, besieged Christians in Acre decided to launch an all-out night raid on the Saracen camp from all sides. In the end, the raid met with disaster and eighteen Templars were killed, "but they did manage to capture a number of Saracen shields, round shields, trumpets and drums."³⁹

A no less risky way of obtaining enemy armaments is described by the Damascene Ibn al-Qalānisi (1071–1160). At the turn of 1111–1112, King Balduin I of Jerusalem laid siege to the city of Tyre with his war machines. By the beginning of February, two siege towers and their battering rams had been completed, and the attackers immediately used them in their next assault. A few weeks later, the besiegers made a breakthrough from the surrounded city and set fire near the king's smaller siege tower with the help of Greek fire, firewood, pitch, incendiary equipment. The rising winds carried the fire to the tower, which burned to the ground. The Muslim historian notes that the defenders managed to loot "many coats of mail, long shields, and other objects" from the burning Frankish siege tower before it collapsed.⁴⁰

Weapons and equipment obtained from the enemy were also used to deceive the opponent. Wearing the enemy's armaments and insignia, not only could they cross enemy territory in relative safety, but they could also take the unsuspecting population by surprise:

"When the year of the Incarnation of Christ 1267 arrived, the sultan of Babylon came up outside Acre with all his host on the second of May, carrying banners from the Temple and the Hospital, and surprised the poor ordinary folk of the plain of Acre, who had come out to work in the fields. He advanced to the gates of the city, and killed more than

³⁷ Albert of Aachen, *Historia Ierosolimitana*, 2007. 335. (Book IV. Chap. 55.); For a similar problem, see Odo of Deuil: *De Profectione Ludovici VII in Orientem*. Ed. and trans. Berry, Virginia Gingerick, New York, 1948. 138. (Book VII). [hereinafter *De Profectione Ludovici*]

³⁸ Albert of Aachen, *Historia Ierosolimitana*, 2007. 11. (Book I. Chap. 7.)

³⁹ English: *Templar of Tyre*, 107. (Chap. 491.); Old French: *Chronique du Templier de Tyr*, 245. (Chap. 491.)

⁴⁰ Ibn Al-Qalānisi, 122.

five hundred of the common people whom he had taken prisoner, and spilled the bile from every one of their bodies.”⁴¹

However, wielding the enemy’s weapons exposed soldiers to particular hazards. For example, Richard the Lionheart himself avenged the death of the French marshal and killed a Turkish soldier with a crossbow shot who “vaunting in the armour of the aforesaid Alberic Clements, which he had put on, was shewing himself, to the annoyance of our men, on the highest part of the wall, in a boastful manner.”⁴² These spoils of war were also valuable because access to the other side’s military arsenal was very difficult to obtain legally. Even in peacetime, trade with the Saracens in war-related raw materials, finished goods and, indeed, horses and armaments was severely punished. The *Assizes of the Lusignan Kingdom of Cyprus*,⁴³ punished such an act by hanging:

“Should it happen that a sailor, or a trader, whoever he might be, takes prohibited goods to Muslim countries, such as weapons and helmets, and chain mail, or spears, crossbows, or rods of iron, or bits for horses, and this can be brought to the knowledge of the marine court by the sailors or the merchants who were present there and witnessed him selling the goods, and witnessed him taking these prohibited goods to the Muslims, should what he had taken amount in value to more than one mark of silver, everything that he has should go to the ruler of the country. Furthermore, he should be sentenced by the other court, the court of the burgesses, to death by hanging, once the assessors of the marine court have taken testimonies brought before them regarding this matter. This, moreover, is what is right and lawful according to the assizes.”⁴⁴

⁴¹ English: Templar of Tyre, 52–53. (Chap. 350.); Old French: *Chronique du Templier de Tyr*, 182. (Chap. 350.)

⁴² English: *Richard of Holy Trinity. Itinerary of Richard I and others to the Holy Land* (formerly ascribed to Geoffrey de Vinsauf). Trans. A Classical Scholar and A Gentleman Well-Read in Medieval History. Cambridge–Ontario, 2001. 152. (Book III. Chap. XIII.) [hereinafter Richard of Holy Trinity]; Latin: *Itinerarium peregrinorum et gesta regis Ricardi*, In. Stubbs, William (ed.), *Chronicles and Memorials of the Reign of Richard I*. (Rolls Series, 38.). London, 1864–1865. Vol. I., 226. (Book III. Chap. XIII.) [hereinafter *Itinerarium peregrinorum*]

⁴³ A code adopted from the former Kingdom of Jerusalem but with local Cypriot laws and customs being retained. It was a collection of numerous medieval legal treatises written in Old French containing the law of the crusader Kingdom of Jerusalem and Kingdom of Cyprus.

⁴⁴ *The Assizes of the Lusignan Kingdom of Cyprus*, trans. Coureas, Nicholas, Nicosia, 2002. 267. (Article 46.); Old French: *Recueil des historiens des croisades, Lois. Assises de Jérusalem*, Vols I–II. Introduction by Beugnot, Auguste-Arthur, Paris, 1841–1843. Vol. II., 45.

Naturally, law enforcement could never be perfect, and these goods often found their way to the enemy, as inventive or risk-taking traders applied ingenious solutions to make big profits.⁴⁵

Camp equipment, means of transport and livestock

In addition to money, horses, beasts of burden, and weapons, a marching army needed proper camping equipment for the soldiers' rest and daily needs. In contemporary sources, there are numerous reports of tents being looted and taken.⁴⁶ This is not surprising, since in addition to its practical use, a well-made, decorative tent was of considerable value. In 1159, among other gifts, Byzantine Emperor Manuel I (1143–1180) presented Nūr al-Dīn⁴⁷ with a valuable tent made of brocade.⁴⁸ Joinville also mentions a very expensive chapel-shaped tent made entirely of scarlet cloth and decorated with images of the Angelic Salutation and other mysteries of the faith, sent by King Louis IX of France to the Tartars, accompanied by two Dominican friars.⁴⁹ On another occasion, King Louis received a gift of this kind from the King of Armenia, who is thought to have previously received it from the *ferrais* of the Sultan of Iconium, the person who looked after the Sultan's tents.⁵⁰

Two examples of tents looted from the enemy are worth highlighting. The first is of the use of these objects for their former purpose, while the second shows a change of more symbolic significance.

⁴⁵ Attempts at commercial boycotts to support the war effort appeared relatively late, in the mid-twelfth century, on the Christian side. However, despite all intentions, Muslim-Christian trade continued throughout the war, including, of course, weapons and munitions of war, among many other products. In this respect, there was a particularly sharp contrast between the ecclesiastical order and certain members of the political elite, who promoted a trade boycott, on the one hand, and the urban merchant class, on the other. In the long run, the merchant class, which was more market-oriented, succeeded in asserting their interests against the ecclesiastics, who argued more on religious and value grounds.; Menache, Sophia, "Papal Attempts at a Commercial Boycott of the Muslims in the Crusader Period", = *The Journal of Ecclesiastical History* 63:2, 2012, 236–259. 236, 259.; Papal bans on restricting trade between Muslims and Christians by sea and land continued to be in place in the fourteenth century, but were enforced to varying degrees, and even exemptions were granted by the papacy itself.; Christie, Niall, "Cosmopolitan Trade Centre or Bone of Contention? Alexandria and the Crusades, 487–857/1095–1453", = *Al-Masaq* 26:1, 2014, 49–61. 54.

⁴⁶ Albert of Aachen, *Historia Ierosolimitana*, 2007. 284. (Book IV. Chap. 25.), 334. (Book IV. Chap. 56.), 584. (Book VII. Chap. 70.); *Gesta obsidionis Damiate*. In: Röhricht, Reinhold (ed.), *Quinti belli sacri scriptores minores*. Geneva, 1879. 86. (Chap. XVII.) [hereinafter *Gesta obsidionis Damiate*]; Ibn Al-Qualānisī, 119.

⁴⁷ He ruled Aleppo from 1146, Damascus from 1154, and Mosul from 1171 until his death in 1174.

⁴⁸ Ibn Al-Qualānisī, 355.

⁴⁹ Joinville, 58–59. (Chap. V.), 249–250. (Chap. VI.)

⁵⁰ Joinville, 62. (Chap. V.)

The first case relates to the 1249 siege of Damietta, a major trading city captured during the Seventh Crusade, and the use of objects captured from the enemy. Continuing the work of William of Tyre, the chronicler reports that King Louis IX of France made substantial donations to the Church of Damietta and the military orders, including richly decorated and beautifully crafted tents, while others received valuable property in the city:

“Good rich tents did the king assign both to the archbishop and to the canons, and also to the Templars, the Hospitallers, the brothers of Our Lady of the Germans, the Minorites, the brothers of St James,⁵¹ of the Trinity,⁵² and others, so many that we cannot name them all. To the lords and princes of the Holy Land the king assigned rich and handsome residences within Damietta appropriate to each.”⁵³

However, as the next example shows, objects that fell into the hands of the enemy may have had a somewhat different function. The Damascene historian Abu Shāma (1203–1268) recalls the following remarkable case in the year 1217.

“In that year, Frankish prisoners were brought [to Damascus], and around each of their necks was hung the head of a slain Frank. They also brought a Frankish tent, which the Arabs had plundered in the Frankish camp near Acre, and which is said to have been used as a church. It had been erected in al-Midan al-Akhdar as-Sagir [literally the little green hippodrome, probably in the area west of the Damascus citadel] and used to prepare food for the poor. (...)”⁵⁴

Two details of the text are worth noting. Firstly, among the objects taken, the historian highlights the importance of the Christian tent formerly used as a church. Presumably, he refers to a device of a moving camp altar, which enabled the clerics following the army to perform religious rituals during campaigns.⁵⁵ However, despite its apparent former function in religious worship,

⁵¹ Probably Dominicans, called ‘of St James’ from the name of their house in Paris.; Shirley, Janet, *Crusader Syria in the Thirteenth Century: The Rothelin Continuation of the History of William of Tyre with Part of the Eracles or Acre Text*. Routledge, 2016. 89. footnote 2.

⁵² A religious order formed to buy back prisoners of war.; Shirley, Crusader Syria in the Thirteenth Century, 2016. footnote 3.

⁵³ Shirley, Crusader Syria in the Thirteenth Century, 2016. 89.

⁵⁴ Függelek. Válogatott forrásszövegek [Appendix. Selected sources], In. Laszlovszky, József – Majorossy, Judit (ed.), *Magyarország és a kereszties háborúk. Lovagrendek és emlékeik* [Hungary and the crusades. Religious military orders and their heritage]. Máriabesnyő–Gödöllő, 2006. 299.

⁵⁵ A similar church tent for camp use can be found in the work of the Muslim writer and poet Usāmah ibn Munqidh (1095–1188), who in his account of the events around Baniyas in 1140 mentions the huge tent erected by the Patriarch. The story also reveals that the old dean, who was in charge of performing church ceremonies, covered the floor with weeds and grass, but this was soon infested with insects. Usāmah, who often writes

the Muslims did not destroy the object, which was probably of great material value. Instead, they placed it in a central place in Damascus and used it as a soup kitchen for the poor. Not only did it herald the victory of the victorious Muslim armies over the ‘infidels’, but also served a charitable purpose. Thus, having fallen into the hands of the enemy, the tent that not so long before had been an important accessory for the practice of the Christian faith, took on a new function in supplying the inhabitants of a Muslim city in need.⁵⁶

Such church tents repeatedly appear in the sources. At the end of June 1113, at the Battle of al-Sannabra, the Franks raiding Syria were defeated and the enemy plundered their camp: “the Muslims captured all the tents which they [the Franks] had pitched, together with the famous church.”⁵⁷ The account of the 1126 battle between the Franks and the Turkmen also refers to a church tent:

“A body of the Turkmens became engaged with a detachment of them [the Franks] as they were on the march, and captured a rich booty in their baggage train and animals, in addition to seizing the famous church which they had in their camp.”⁵⁸

In June 1157, the troops of the Zengid ruler Nūr al-Dīn obtained similar booty: “The hands of the ‘askaris were filled with an innumerable quantity of the horses, equipment, beasts, and baggage furniture of the Franks, and their church with its famous apparatus came into the hands of the king Nūr al-Dīn.”⁵⁹

Similarly symbolic is the richly decorated Muslim pavilion that the Crusaders captured from the camp of the Emir of Kerbogha Mosul’s army after the battle of Antioch. As Albert of Aachen tells us, it “was constructed in the style of a town with turrets and walls of various colours and precious silks. The same wonderful pavilion had a street flowing away from it in which two thousand men are reported to have lived in comfort.”⁶⁰ The tent was given to Bohemund of Taranto for playing a decisive role in achieving victory, who sent the spoils of war to Bari in southern Italy. The tent was presumably a gift for the new half-finished cathedral of San Nicola in Bari, where Bohemund had last heard mass before leaving for the Holy Land. The tent, captured at the end of June, might have arrived in Bari in time for the beginning of the ecclesiastical council,

mockingly of Christians, notes that the dean, probably not considering all the possible outcomes, wanted to get rid of the insects by setting fire to the vegetation, and soon the whole tent was burnt down.; *An Arab-Syrian Gentleman And Warrior in The Period of The Crusades: Memoirs of Usāmah Ibn-Munqidh (Kitab al i'tibar)*, trans. Hitti, Philip K., New York, 1929. 116. [hereinafter Usāmah]

⁵⁶ For further examples of the seizure of enemy tents, see Usāmah, 27, 40, 105.

⁵⁷ Ibn Al-Qualānisī, 135–136.

⁵⁸ Ibn Al-Qualānisī, 176.

⁵⁹ Ibn Al-Qualānisī, 337.

⁶⁰ Albert of Aachen, *Historia Ierosolimitana*, 2007. 336. (Book IV. Chap. 56.); His description is confirmed by another chronicler, William, Archbishop of Tyre, *A History of Deeds Done Beyond the Sea*, Vols I–II. Trans. Atwater Babcock, Emily – Krey, August C., New York, 1943. Vol. II., 294. (VI. 22.) [hereinafter: William of Tyre]

which was to meet in early October, and its members could have admired the high-quality object recently captured from overseas, which could have heralded the victory of the Christian armies.⁶¹

It is also important that in addition to tents, the constantly moving army needed transport vehicles and beasts of burden. In 1219, Christians led by the Templars attacked and looted the Egyptian sultan's tents and seized his galleys, cargo ships and various boats after he had given up his attempt to relieve Damietta.⁶² There was also a constant need to replenish from the spoils the livestock exposed to heat and environmental challenges. When in 1097 the crusading army descended from the Nur Mountains (now in southern Turkey) into a nearby rocky valley, water shortages caused both man and beast to suffer from thirst, and many of the latter also fell victim.⁶³ Also, in the later course of the First Crusade and in subsequent campaigns, many horses, mules and other beasts of burden were killed by the arrows of the Seljuk horse archers,⁶⁴ and many fell to their death on the rocky cliffs of the narrow mountain paths.⁶⁵ These animals were in constant danger while they were vitally important for the transport of equipment and for avoiding delays to the army's progress.

Following the Battle of Ascalon in 1099, the crusaders captured a wealth of valuable items, as well as tents and a number of livestock, including dromedaries, camels, horses and robust donkeys capable of carrying heavy loads.⁶⁶ After battles in 1147 and 1157, Muslims captured similar numbers of livestock from the Franks.⁶⁷ There are many other examples of mules and other beasts of burden,

⁶¹ Vernon, Clare "Pseudo-Arabic and the Material Culture of the First Crusade in Norman Italy: The Sanctuary Mosaic at San Nicola in Bari", = *Open Library of Humanities* 4:1, 2018. Online document: <https://olh.openlibhums.org/article/id/4493/#B113> Accessed on 14 February 2023.; A parallel is the afterlife of the tapestry that decorated the entrance to the tent of Muhammad al-Nasir Almohad Caliph (1199–1213), captured at the Battle of Navas de Tolosa in 1212 by King Alfonso VIII of Castile (1158–1214). The object was divided in two. One part was sent to the Abbey of Burgos, while the other was sent to Rome as a gift to Innocent III, together with the Caliph's spear, flag, and a letter describing the battle. The letter was read out in public in Rome, while the flag was hung in St Peter's Basilica.; O'Callaghan, Joseph. F., *Reconquest and Crusade in Medieval Spain*. Philadelphia, 2003. 72.

⁶² *Gesta crucigerorum Rhenanorum*. In. Röhrich, Reinhold (ed.), *Quinti belli sacri scriptores minores*. Genova, 1879. 46. (Chap. VI.).

⁶³ Albert of Aachen, *Historia Ierosolimitana*, 2007. 138–140. (Book III. Chap. 1–2.)

⁶⁴ Albert of Aachen, *Historia Ierosolimitana*, 2007. (Book III. Chap. 29.), 192. (Book III. Chap. 34.); *De Profectione Ludovici*, 24. (Book II.); English: Richard of Holy Trinity, 174. (Book I. Chap. 15.); Latin: *Itinerarium peregrinorum*, Vol. I., 257. (Book IV. Chap. 15.)

⁶⁵ Albert of Aachen, *Historia Ierosolimitana*, 2007. 284. (Book IV. Chap. 23.)

⁶⁶ Albert of Aachen, *Historia Ierosolimitana*, 2007. 466. (Book VI. Chap. 47.); Anonymus, *Gesta Francorum*, 1890. 499. (Book X. Chap. 39.)

⁶⁷ Ibn Al-Qualānisī, 154–155, 331.; The Muslims also managed to obtain certain documents during the victory of 1157. Although the primary meaning of the Arabic word is 'documents', its translation is doubtful, as it could also mean female camels.; Ibn Al-Qualānisī, 331. footnote 1.

which in most cases were driven off with the herds accompanying the enemy army.⁶⁸ The camels were often loaded with valuable oriental spices and other rare goods, which also added to the value of the booty. In 1108, King Balduin I ambushed a caravan from Egypt at the Jordan, and managed to take seventeen camels loaded with oil and honey, eleven with sugar, and four with pepper and other valuables.⁶⁹ The four hundred mules and donkeys the crusaders found in the conquered city of Damietta in 1219 must have been of great use in transporting the treasures (gold and silver objects, precious stones, ornaments, cushions, carpets, and purple-dyed cloth) and the pulses they found there.⁷⁰

Warhorses

For the soldiers of the time, strong and swift horses were undoubtedly a most valuable sub-category of war booty, vital for everyday warfare. The crusaders tried to maintain and increase their horse population in several ways. Supplies were brought in from Europe by sea, using transport ships, while in the Holy Land, in addition to purchases, plundering provided the opportunity to acquire new horses.⁷¹ We have previously quoted an account by Albert of Aachen, who complained about the shortage of horses that plagued the impoverished Western princes and knights of the costly First Crusade.⁷² Bearing this in mind, we can understand the joy of the anonymous author of the *Gesta Francorum*, who tells about fifteen excellent horses given to the crusaders by the Emir of Tripoli and about the horse fairs at the crusaders' disposal.⁷³ He repeats several times the positive aspects and advantages of horse fairs offered to the Franks.⁷⁴

Besides sheepfolds, the favourite targets of various raids and ambushes were horse herds. Because of financial difficulties, in February 1157, King Balduin III

⁶⁸ Albert of Aachen, *Historia Ierosolimitana*, 2007. 520. (Book VII. Chap. 25.), 584. (Book VII. Chap. 70.), 622. (Book VIII. Chap. 31.), 858. (Book XII. Chap. 12.); *Gesta obsidionis Damiate*, 86. (Chap. XVII.)

⁶⁹ Albert of Aachen, *Historia Ierosolimitana*, 2007. 752. (Book X. Chap. 36.)

⁷⁰ *Gesta obsidionis Damiate*, 114. (Chap. LVII.)

⁷¹ Pryor, John. H., "Transportation of Horses by Sea during the Era of the Crusades: Eighth Century to 1285, Part I–II." In: France, John (ed.), *Medieval warfare 1000–1300*. Aldershot, 2006. 523–568.; Hyland, Ann: *The Medieval Warhorse From Byzantium to the Crusades*. London, 1994. 152.; The military orders (especially the Templars) played a major role in the supply of horses to the Holy Land by sea, thanks to their extensive European network, but they were also engaged in a high level of horse breeding in the Crusader states. Barber, Malcolm C., "Supplying the Crusader States: The Role of the Templars", In: France, John (ed.), *Medieval Warfare 1000–1300*. Aldershot, 2006. 585–597.

⁷² Albert of Aachen, *Historia Ierosolimitana*, 2007. 332. (Book IV. Chap. 54); On another occasion, Albert refers to the severe shortage of horses in the Ramla area when he discusses the reason for the low number of horsemen surrounding the king of Jerusalem.; Albert of Aachen, *Historia Ierosolimitana*, 2007. 708. (Book IX. Chap. 49.); On the lack of horses for sale, see further *De Profectione Ludovici*, 132. (Book. VII.)

⁷³ Anonymus, *Gesta Francorum*, 1890. 438. (Chap. XXXVI. 1.)

⁷⁴ Anonymus, *Gesta Francorum*, 1890. 263. (Chap. XVI. 1.), 430–431 (Chap. XXXIV. 4.)

(co-ruler from 1143 to 1153, and sole ruler from 1153 to 1162) went as far as to break the truce with the Atabeg of Aleppo and the Lord of Damascus, Nūr al-Dīn, to go on a raiding expedition in Palestine. On this expedition, he led his army in an attack on the Turkmen who were grazing unsuspectingly near Banias (now in Israel), and, according to contemporaries, he captured the greatest booty ever taken in Palestine.⁷⁵

“It is said that the number of captives and the amount of booty taken in this raid was never equalled in our land. A very large number of horses was distributed by lot, and in this division every individual, even those of the lowest rank, shared. Yet this deed brought no glorious or laudable renown to our people, for they had violated a treaty of peace and had maltreated, as they would, an unsuspecting people – men who relied upon the good faith of the king and who had, moreover, no means of resisting.”⁷⁶

Needless to say, no two horses were identical. The agile Arabian purebreds, the noblest type bred to perfection in the Arabian Peninsula and Egypt, were of great value to European crusaders.⁷⁷ Following a skirmish in 1104, the King of Jerusalem captured forty Arabian horses and weapons, “with which the king returned to Jaffa in *great triumph*.”⁷⁸ Also in 1106/1107, King Balduin I marched into Jerusalem with rich spoils of war: in addition to sixty-eight Arabian horses, he managed to acquire thirty-three camels and tents.⁷⁹

In 1098, the Crusaders besieging Antioch defeated a band of Muslims who had broken out of the city and returned to their own camp with precious booty, including many Arabian horses worth a great deal:

“The hardships of the encounter were rewarded by the sight of the returning masses. Some running back and forth between the tents on Arabian horses were showing their new riches to their friends, and others, sporting two or three garments of silk, were praising God, the bestower of victory and gifts, and yet others, covered with three or four shields, were happily displaying these mementoes of their triumph. While they were able to convince us with these tokens and other booty of the greatness of their battle prowess, they could give no exact information on the number of dead because the Turkish rout ended at night, and consequently the heads of the fallen enemy had not been brought to camp.”⁸⁰

⁷⁵ William of Tyre, Vol. I., 255–256.; For a Muslim perspective on the event, see also Ibn Al-Qualānisī, 327–328.

⁷⁶ William of Tyre, Vol. II., 256. (Book XVIII. Chap. 11.)

⁷⁷ For more on the differences in the character and use of European, Arabian, and Mongol horses, see Hyland, *The Medieval Warhorse*, 1994. 106–168.

⁷⁸ Albert of Aachen, *Historia Ierosolimitana*, 2007. 679. (Book IX. Chap. 31.)

⁷⁹ Albert of Aachen, *Historia Ierosolimitana*, 2007. 750. (Book X. Chap. 34.)

⁸⁰ Raimundus de Aguilers canonicus Podiensis, *Historia Francorum qui ceperunt Iherusalem*. In. *Recueil des Historiens des Croisades: Historiens Occidentaux*, Vols I–V.

It is worth pointing out that the chronicler sees the booty as an opportunity for the poor in the ranks of the Christian army to make some quick earnings. Their participation in the battle was a risky but rewarding venture.⁸¹ Some of the weapons and equipment obtained from the enemy were apparently put to practical use almost immediately, but they also had a symbolic value, perhaps because of the abundance of booty. Moreover, they testified to the extent of the victory. The author himself, Raymond d'Aguilers, speaks of some crusaders (e.g., the individuals who boasted several shields) as trophies of victory. Obviously, in everyday life, the pragmatic and symbolic value of objects captured from the enemy often complemented each other.

The agile purebreds were perfectly suited to the Arabs' favoured light horse warfare, which involved constantly tiring the enemy and persistently harrying them. However, in the long term, the only way the Muslims could compete in close combat with the Franks, who were at the forefront of heavy armoured warfare, was to acquire the large high-mounted horses the Europeans used. The need for such large war horses, the so-called 'dextrarius', can be traced in the work of Abu l-Mahasin Ibn Taghribirdi (1411–1469), a member of the military and scientific circle that flourished during the Mamluk era, who completed his work on the history of Egypt more than 150 years after the fall of Acre:

“[After the Muslim invasion of the city of Acre, the Templars retreated to a tower.] One reason for the Sultan's wrath against them, apart from their other crimes, was that when the amīr Kitbughā al-Mansuri had gone up (to receive their surrender) they had seized and killed him. They had also hamstrung their horses and destroyed everything they could, which increased the Sultan's wrath against them. The army and volunteers made a vast haul of prisoners and booty.”⁸²

Why were the Templars so cruel to their own horses? When their hamstring tendons were cut, the horses were immobilised, and given the conditions of the siege, their future recovery was highly unlikely. A horse thus injured, even if it recovered, could no longer be used in war or for tasks requiring serious physical labour; therefore, it was worthless in the eyes of the warriors. The mutilated animals probably bled to death from the large vein running through the thigh or became colicky and died within a few days due to their lack of movement.

Paris, 1844–1895. Vol. III., 249. (Chap. VIII.) [hereinafter Raimundus de Aguilers]; English: Raymond d'Aguilers, *Historia Francorum qui ceperunt Iherusalem*, trans. and notes by Hill, John Hugh – Hill, Laurita L., Philadelphia, 1968. 43. (Chap. V.) [hereinafter Raymond d'Aguilers]

⁸¹ Albert of Aachen makes a similar comment about a rich haul.; Albert of Aachen, *Historia Ierosolimitana*, 2007. 337. (Book IV. Chap. 56.)

⁸² Arab Historians, 208.; On other occasions, the Franks sought to destroy everything of value when defeat seemed inevitable. In about 1115–1116, their horses, other animals, and prisoners were destroyed when the roof of a castle set on fire by defenders fell on them and they were all burnt to death.; Usāmah, 102.

One wonders why their previous owners resorted to this cruel solution instead of killing their horses if the animals' fate was sealed and their death almost certain. Perhaps it was not by chance that writing about Christians, the Muslim historian highlights this harsh treatment, portraying the enemy as barbarians. Yet, in the story cited above, the cutting of the sinews was most probably intended to destroy the horse as a weapon and means of warfare, thus rendering it useless to the enemy. The mutilation and spectacle of these extremely valuable animals must have been more offensive, painful, and disappointing to Muslims eager for prey than their mere slaughter. This may have been one of the besieged Templars' last gestures of mockery against the Muslims who surrounded them: by looking at the large Frankish horses lying on the ground, the Saracens who had taken the city could rightly feel that they had gained possession of a very expensive but now useless weapon of excellence.⁸³

Such beasts were obtained not only by plunder⁸⁴ but also by theft, as Usāmah reports about a horse stolen from a Frankish camp, which ended up being one of the best bred, most beautiful, and fastest horses he owned.⁸⁵ Usāmah later talks about this Frankish horse, with which he repeatedly won races against the atabeg, and to whose stables he finally sent the valuable animal.⁸⁶

Horses of exceptional ability were in constant demand on both sides. This was no different for the famous Mongolian horses. There is a striking example reflecting this demand in the chronicle of the so-called *Templar of Tyre*. The chronicle is preserved in *Les Gestes des Chiprois (The Deeds of the Cypriots)*, compiled from three different sources by an anonymous author in the early fourteenth century. All three are written in Old French verse prose and deal with the history of Jerusalem and the Kingdom of Cyprus. The case is reported in the context of the Egyptian-Mongol conflict. In August 1260, the Egyptian Sultan Al-Muzaffar Qutuz (1259–1260), marching north along the coast to lead his armies against the Ilkhanate, camped in the groves surrounding the Akko. Although Qutuz had not previously made a military alliance with the Franks, he agreed with them that the latter would help supply his army with food and allow them free passage.⁸⁷ In return for logistical support, the Franks asked for a share in the spoils from the Mongols, but their hopes were dashed:

⁸³ I intend to write more about this problematic case in a later paper. For their help and ideas on this issue, I am thankful, among others, to László Bartosiewicz (Stockholm University), György Geréby (Central European University), Miklós Kószeghy (Pázmány Péter Catholic University, Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences.), Zsuzsanna Kutasi (Eötvös Loránd University Faculty of Humanities) and Lukas Makarios Grunwald (Universität Augsburg).

⁸⁴ Ibn Al-Qualānisī, 337.

⁸⁵ Usāmah, 73.

⁸⁶ Usāmah, 73–74.

⁸⁷ Runciman, Steven, *A History of the Crusades*, Vols I–III. Cambridge, 1995. Vol. III., 870.

“The Christians negotiated an agreement that the Saracens would sell them any mounts that they might take from the Tartars for a certain price which was agreed on between them. But as it turned out, once the Saracens had won, they did no such thing.”⁸⁸

We may assume that the Mongol horses were less valuable prey for the Frankish knights, who favoured heavy shock cavalry, than for the light-horse Turcoples. Furthermore, the Franks could have made a good profit from their sale.

Horses were “consumer goods” in the medieval battlefield. A heavily armed rider who fell from the saddle or whose horse was killed under him could no longer participate in the fight effectively and his chances of survival were greatly reduced. Therefore, even during a battle, it was crucial to ensure the replacement of dead horses, and a knight was expected to go into battle with two or three horses. The number of horses wounded in battle was high due to attacks by Turkish and Arab light horse archers. Therefore, a knight who lost a horse fighting for the king’s cause could claim compensation for his losses.⁸⁹ This practice (*restoir*) seems to have been established in the Kingdom of Jerusalem as early as the early twelfth century; interestingly, the first time we learn about it is from a Muslim report.⁹⁰

An illustrative and lively description of the targeted attack against Frankish horses and the code language of battle is given in the chronicle the *Templar of Tyre*, which tells of a Muslim ambush of a raiding Frankish troop in 1267:

“As they (the Franks) were making their way back towards Acre, the Saracens came from behind them and attacked a French knight, Sir Baldwin of St. George, the brother of Sir Henry of Guines. They killed his horse, whereupon Sir Robert turned and charged into the Saracens (...) [lacuna] several, and they defended themselves for such a long time that the Saracens were unable to bring them down, so finally some of the Saracens shouted to the others that they ought to strike at the ‘barley storehouses’, by which they meant to try to kill the horses. They said this in code so that none of the Franks would understand it. So all the Saracens began to attack and kill the horses, and the battle was quickly over, because when one of our men was on foot, he was as good as dead.”⁹¹

⁸⁸ English: *Templar of Tyre*, 38. (Chap. 309.); Old French: *Chronique du Templier de Tyr*, 165. (Chap. 309.)

⁸⁹ Heath, Ian, *Armies and Enemies of the Crusades, 1096–1291*. Dallas, TX, 1978. 108–109.

⁹⁰ Usāmāh, 26.; The phenomenon also appears earlier in Albert of Aachen’s chronicle in connection with the distribution of a large sum of money, although we do not know whether this was a one-off payment or an established practice. As Albert tells us, one third of the various offerings would have gone to the king with the intention to be used to maintain and reward soldiers who had previously lost their belongings and weapons.; Albert of Aachen, *Historia Ierosolimitana*, 2007. 575. (Book VII. Chap. 62.)

⁹¹ English: *Templar of Tyre*, 54. (Chap. 351.); Old French: *Chronique du Templier de Tyr*, 184. (Chap. 351.)

It is worth pointing out that the Muslims decided to launch a targeted attack on horses only as a last resort late in the battle. The Saracens, who reportedly outnumbered the Franks more than ten to one, may have initially hoped that they could overcome the smaller Frankish raiding party in hand-to-hand combat without killing the valuable animals, and thus take the enemy's horses as spoils of war.

Food and provision

One of the most basic, yet one of the most challenging needs of soldiers in the marching army was adequate food and drinking water. Having an army well-equipped with armoured soldiers, warhorses, and siege engines was of no use if they or the men who used and operated them could not be properly supplied. Men and animals were useless in battle, or at least their combat value was greatly reduced, if they lost their stamina due to lack of food or water. Moreover, deprivation led to several illnesses for those arriving from Europe, due to the unusual and harsh climatic and environmental conditions, which the weakened organism was often unable to resist. Therefore, one of the most important tasks for the leaders of the campaigns was to ensure food supplies, either from livestock brought from home or from enemy booty.

There are many examples of the latter on both sides.⁹² Without wishing to give a full list, the foodstuffs most frequently occurring among the looted valuables were: flocks of sheep and goats, barley, cereals, flour, oil, and spices.

In 1096, because of earlier damage inflicted by the crusaders, the Byzantine authorities forbade locals to sell any goods to Walter the Penniless's army. Consequently, flocks of sheep grazing in the open fields of Bulgaria would feed the food-starved crusaders.⁹³ Later, food, flocks, and horses obtained from the plundering of the castle of Zimony served Peter the Hermit's army as it marched towards the Sava River. When they reached the forests of Bulgaria, the contents of the wagons carrying goods and foodstuffs looted from Belgrade covered the army's needs, when they were spending eight days in the wasteland.⁹⁴ Learning from their previous experience, during the Second Crusade (1147–1150) Byzantine peasants would hide their livestock in the mountains to prevent them from being captured by the crusaders marching through their lands.⁹⁵

⁹² Albert of Aachen, *Historia Ierosolimitana*, 2007. 520. (Book VII. Chap. 25.), 584. (Book VII. Chap. 70.), 752. (Book X. Chap. 36.), 858 (Book XII. Chap. 12.); Matthaëus Parisiensis, monachus Sancti Albani, *Chronica Majora*, Vols I–VII. Ed. Luard, Henry Richards, London, 1872–1884. Vol. II., 104–105. [hereinafter Matthaëus Parisiensis]; Ibn Al-Qalānīsī, 239.

⁹³ Albert of Aachen, *Historia Ierosolimitana*, 2007. 10. (Book I. Chap. 6.)

⁹⁴ Albert of Aachen, *Historia Ierosolimitana*, 2007. 16–18. (Book I. Chap. 8.)

⁹⁵ De Protectione Ludovici, 106. (Chap. VI.)

In 1219, during the Fifth Crusade, barley, grain, oil, biscuits, and legumes were found in the Muslim camp besieged around Damietta and then in the rich trading city itself, which were later used to supply the army.⁹⁶

In 1249, Damietta, conquered by the armies of Louis IX of France, was the source of abundant barley, grain, and rice. The fate of these goods, however, caused great controversy and discontent. In the end, Louis took the advice of those who urged to withhold the foodstuffs acquired (to the considerable dissatisfaction of the army), as opposed to those who, in accordance with the custom of the Holy Land, would have preferred to distribute two-thirds of the spoils among the soldiers.⁹⁷

Providing food to the army was a particularly charitable and leaderly act, a way of gaining loyalty and authority. A leader was expected to act in this way and to take care of day-to-day problems. In 1239, preparing to attack Damascus, the Crusader army was resting at Jaffa when, due to supply difficulties, a detachment set off on a raiding party. The Duke of Brittany, Peter I (duke 1213–1221, regent 1221–1237), was informed that a band of Muslims would soon be passing through a certain place with flocks of herds on their way to Damascus to supply the city. The Christians who were on their way to find their prey set an ambush, taking the enemy by surprise. One interesting aspect of the story is that due to the large number of flocks, regrouping the people and animals to form the right order of battle was a huge challenge for the Muslims. The chronicler reports that the booty won by the Christians came at the right time, as starvation was already hitting the main army at Jaffa:

“Great was the delight of the rank and file when they arrived with so much livestock, for there was such a scarcity of food in the army that a man could not get his fill of bread for two pence of Tours. The count gave many of his beasts to the commanders of the host; some were very pleased and others were scornful and jealous because he had won so much plunder. (...) Poor people were helped for a time, as the count and his companions gave them plenty of meat, which had been in very short supply.”⁹⁸

⁹⁶ *Gesta obsidionis Damiate*, 86. (Chap. XVII.), 114. (Chap. LVII.); *Liber duellii christiani in obsidione Damiate exacti*. In Röhrich, Reinhold (ed.), *Quinti belli sacri scriptores minores*. Genova, 1879. 164–165. (Chap. LVII.); *Marchisio Scribae*. In *Annali Genovesi di Caffaro e de' suoi continuatori dal MCLXXIV al MCCXXIV*, Vols. I–V. Ed. Belgrano, Luigi Tomasso – Cesare Carlo Stefano Marco Imperiale di Sant' Angelo. Genova, 1890–1929. Fonti per la storia d'Italia. Scrittori. Secoli XII e XIII. Rome, 1901. Vol. II., 160.

⁹⁷ Joinville, 77–78. (Chap. VII.); In the Holy Land, moreover, it was customary for barons and victorious generals to donate a certain portion of the spoils to a religious institution as a gift after the campaign.; Smail, Raymond C., *Crusading Warfare, 1097–1193*. Cambridge, 2005. 103, note 3.

⁹⁸ Shirley, *Crusader Syria*, 2016. 42–44. (Chap. XXIII).

On another occasion, English soldiers under the command of William Longespée,⁹⁹ son of the third Earl of Salisbury, captured a Saracen caravan during the Seventh Crusade (1248–1254), looted it, and kept the food and treasures. But the French, jealous of their booty, took it from them by force, and did not return it to him, despite Longespée's promise to distribute the food to the army.¹⁰⁰

Prisoners and slaves

A special case of spoils of war were prisoners sold in slave markets or returned for ransom, occasionally earning a considerable financial profit for their captors. What is more, one of the most lucrative sources of income in war came from the redemption of high-ranking individuals. In the matter of ransom, military orders in the Holy Land often mediated between the Christian and Muslim sides in order to set the terms for captives' ransoms.¹⁰¹

As for reasons of space, a more detailed analysis of the topic of captivity and ransom in the Holy Land is not possible, our discussion is limited to a few illustrative cases highlighting the diversity of individual destinies.¹⁰²

There were vast numbers of soldiers falling into enemy hands during fighting, both on the Muslim and Christian sides. In the 1219 conquest of Damietta, around three thousand people were captured by the crusaders: some were baptised, around three hundred of the more prominent people were held hostage to ransom their own prisoners, and others were sold for very large sums.¹⁰³

While the Muslims mostly executed Christian men or killed them in battle, young children and women were usually taken to be sold for good money to merchants or in the bazaars of the East. Consequently, children were often left

⁹⁹ William Longespée (1212–1250), son of the third Earl of Salisbury of the same name fell in battle at Al-Mansura during the Seventh Crusade.

¹⁰⁰ Matthaeus Parisiensis, Vol. V., 132–133.

¹⁰¹ France, John, *Western Warfare in the Age of the Crusades, 1000–1300*. London, 2001. 229, 233.

¹⁰² For more on this topic, see Friedman, Yvonne, *Encounters between Enemies: Captivity and Ransom in the Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem*. Brill, 2002.; Binysh, Betty, "Massacre or Mutual Benefit: The Military Orders' Relations with Their Muslim Neighbours in the Latin East (1100–1300)", In: Schenk, Jochen – Carr, Mike (eds.), *The Military Orders: Culture and Conflict in the Mediterranean World*. London–New York, 2017. 30–43.; Lotan, Shlomo, "Descriptions of Fighting, Captivity, and Ransom in the Writings of Robert of Nantes, Patriarch of Jerusalem, in the Mid-Thirteenth Century", In: Nicholson, Helen J. – Burgdorf, Jochen (eds.), *The Templars, the Hospitallers and the Crusades: Essays in Homage to Alan J. Forey, The Military Religious Orders*. London–New York, 2020. 73–81.; Hunyadi, Zsolt, "Templomos és johannita lovagok a hitetlenek fogságában", In: Bárány, Attila – Pószán, László (ed.), *Száműzetés, fogság, szabadulás a középkori és korai újkor Európában* [Exile, captivity and escape in medieval and early modern Europe]. Debrecen, 2021. 19–30.

¹⁰³ Oliverus Scholasticus, *Historia Damiatina*, 1894. 236. (Chap. XXXVII.)

with their mothers and met a similar fate: they were either sold together or executed together, whether they were Muslim or Christian prisoners.¹⁰⁴

In October 1096, unarmed men accompanying the crusaders were enslaved after the army had been defeated by the Seljuks at Civetot:

“The Turks, therefore, rejoicing at the favourable outcome of their victory, slaughtered the wretched band of pilgrims (...) They took away only young girls and nuns, whose faces and figures seemed to be pleasing to their eyes, and beardless and attractive young men.”¹⁰⁵

Five years later, the crusaders and their escorts, including unmarried ladies, who had been vanquished at Mersivan and Herakleia, met a similar end.¹⁰⁶

In rare cases, we also have information about the captives' future fate. The author of the *Gesta Francorum* reports that some of the Christian prisoners served in their captors' houses, while most of them ended up in the region of Horasan (the semi-mythical home of the Saracens in the Western mind) or in the slave markets of Aleppo, Damascus, and Antioch.¹⁰⁷ The Damascene historian Al-Qualānisī, writing from the Damascus perspective quotes a letter stating that in 1136, Turkmen, in a raiding campaign that covered a hundred villages, took seven thousand Frankish prisoners. The captives arrived in the major cities in masses and filled the slave markets of Syria. Most of them were later taken to Aleppo, Diyār Bakr (Upper Mesopotamia), and Jazira (Mesopotamia).¹⁰⁸ The conquered were often subjected not only to the misery of slavery but also to the humiliation of being paraded through the city on triumphal marches, mocked, and ridiculed.¹⁰⁹ Of the children who fell into the hands of Muslims, the boys were circumcised, and the girls often became concubines or wives, and converted to Islam.¹¹⁰ The price of slaves sold on the market depended on their availability, which meant that the exchange rate varied. We know that after the 1268 fall of Antioch, the price of Christian boys and girls was as low as twelve drachmas and five drachmas respectively, constituting a significant drop from previous prices. There was an even more drastic drop after the conquest of Acre. In 1291, a girl was worth no more than one drachma in the Damascus slave market.¹¹¹

¹⁰⁴ Albert of Aachen, *Historia Ierosolimitana*, 2007. 546. (Book VII. Chap. 40.)

¹⁰⁵ Albert of Aachen, *Historia Ierosolimitana*, 2007. 42. (Book I. Chap. 21.)

¹⁰⁶ Albert of Aachen, *Historia Ierosolimitana*, 2007. 612. (Book VIII. Chap. 19–20.); For a similar example, see also Albert of Aachen, *Historia Ierosolimitana*, 2007. 622. (Book VIII. Chap. 31.)

¹⁰⁷ Anonymus, *Gesta Francorum*, 1890. 121–122. (Chap. II. 7.)

¹⁰⁸ Ibn Al-Qualānisī, 239–240.

¹⁰⁹ Ibn Al-Qualānisī, 137, 334, 337.

¹¹⁰ Raimundus de Aguilers, 288. (Chap. XVIII.); English: Raymond d'Aguilers, 109. (Chap. XIII.); In this passage, the author paraphrases a biblical passage: Joel 3:3 (4:3).

¹¹¹ Bartholomaeus de Cotton, Monachus Norwicensis, *Historia Anglicana (AD 449–1298). Neenon Ejusdem Liber de Archiepiscopis et Episcopis Angliae*. Ed. Luard, Henry Richards, London, 1859. 216–217.

The importance of the benefits to be gained from ransoms is shown by the breakup of military alliances when the distribution of spoils was not to both parties' satisfaction. In 1246, a decisive dispute over prisoners took place between the Khwarazmians, who had fled the Mongol conquest and were then living off loot and raids, and the Egyptian sultan. The conflict was that despite an earlier agreement, the Khwarazmians also demanded a share of the large ransom of the prominent Christian prisoners due to the Sultan.¹¹²

Captured members of the military orders were among the most valuable prisoners for whom a substantial ransom could be demanded. In 1265, one hundred and eighty of the Hospitallers and Templars defending Arsuf were taken captive and carried off to Egypt in chains.¹¹³ In the decades after the loss of the Holy Land, we have information about several former Templars who were captured after the fall of Acre (1291) or the Templar stronghold of Ruad (1302), but were released nine or ten years later.¹¹⁴ Others, languishing in the prisons of Cairo, held fast to their Christian faith and resisted all their captors' attempts to convert to Islam. According to a former cellmate, Matteo Zaccaria, a Genoese who had also been imprisoned in Cairo, the Sultan had learned of forty Templars who had been captured at Tortosa almost ten years earlier (1291) but had been held in common jails. According to Zaccaria,

“The Templars (...) (said) that they (would not) deny the Christian faith, but they wanted to die in that good faith of Christ, and (live) all their days there in captivity (...) rather than to do anything against the health of their souls, and that they would rather be decapitated than deny Jesus Christ.”

Refusing office, arms, wives and wealth, they chose starvation rather than death.¹¹⁵ Other prisoners kept there would send letters to Europe, stitched on shawls, asking for help in the hope of release.¹¹⁶ Some continued to live as renegades in a for-

¹¹² Matthaëus Parisiensis, Vol. IV., 537–538.

¹¹³ Minorita Erphordiensis, *Chronica minor*. Publ. Holder-Egger, Oswald, In. Waitz, Georg (ed.), *Annales aevi Suevici (Supplementa tomorum XVI et XVII). Gesta saec. XII. XIII. (Supplementa tomorum XX-XXIII)*. (Monumenta Germaniae Historica Scriptores (in Folio), 24.), Hannover, 1879. 179–204. 204.

¹¹⁴ Runciman, A History of the Crusades, 1995. Vol. III., 419.

¹¹⁵ Gilmour-Bryson, Anne, *The Trial of the Templars in Cyprus: A Complete English Edition*. Leiden–Boston–Köln, 1998. 67–68.; We only have a second-hand account of what Zaccaria tells us about the Templar trial. Percival de Mari, a Genoese who appeared before the court in Nicosia, Cyprus, recalled the story as Zaccaria had once told it to him.

¹¹⁶ Dalmazio di Rocaberti was not involved in the negotiations, as he had been released from his Cairo prison shortly before. Pope Clement IV (1265–1268) had authorised the sending of a ship to rescue him.; *Acta Aragonensia: Quellen zur deutschen, italienischen, französischen, spanischen Kirchen- und Kulturgeschichte aus der diplomatischen Korrespondenz Jaymes.II. (1291–1327)*, Vols I–III. Ed. Finke, Heinrich, Lipsce–Berlin, 1908–1922. Vol. III., 916. (Nr. 587.), 752–754. (Nr. 468.)

eign land: according to the testimony of a Nicosian knight, Lord Balian of Metre, captured in 'Babylon' in the territory of the Saracens, he met two apostate former Templars who converted to Islam and became men of the Saracens.¹¹⁷

Summary

As we have seen, the fate of livestock, food, prisoners, and war equipment gained after raids, sieges, and battles varied greatly depending on the situation, and their subsequent lives were not necessarily decided at the time of acquiring them. In the vast majority of cases, naturally, practical considerations prevailed, so that goods captured from the enemy would generally make a major contribution to the equipment of the Christian and Muslim forces in the field (armaments, horses, and siege engines), to the material wealth of victors (treasures, ransom) and to feeding the army and the population (flocks, food supplies). At the same time, however, because of their everyday utility, they were less durable and less timeless than the various luxury items and ecclesiastical paraphernalia; their fate is therefore more difficult to grasp from such a long distance in time. In other cases, pragmatic considerations may have been overridden by the desire to deter, to set an example, or to exploit the potential of symbolic uses and theatrical solutions. The public humiliation or even execution of prisoners, the parading of trophies obtained from the enemy in victory parades, and the destruction of otherwise valuable booty fell into this category used by combatants on both sides.

It is important to emphasise that the spoils of war of the period should not be thought of as an elusive, abstract concept. Instead, their individual items should be categorised to highlight their multifaceted and diverse uses. This will not only provide insights into their subsequent uses but can also offer answers as to why certain types of objects, weaponry, livestock, prominent persons, additional cultivated areas, and their populations were attractive targets, and to what extent and in what form the different types of booty strengthened or weakened the parties concerned.

The study of spoils of war as a phenomenon has several positive implications for historical research. Not only does it provide insight into the logistics, the financing of the army, and the possibilities of making a fortune from war, but it also offers a novel field of study for the increased symbolic significance of the valuables that fell into the hands of victors as a result of the sharp dividing line between the two cultures and religious differences, thus their use with modified meanings.

It is also worth emphasising that spoils of war are both a gain and a loss, depending on whether we approach the issue from the point of view of the party acquiring them or the party harmed by them. The loss of military equipment (heavy armour, cavalry, draught animals, transport vehicles, and field equipment) acquired or produced at great expense imposed a heavy financial burden on those who were subsequently forced to replace it. Even more significant and long-lasting was the damage due to the loss of living labour caused by the mass of people and animals taken by prisoner-taking raids and campaigns. It is no

¹¹⁷ Gilmour-Bryson, *Trial of the Templars in Cyprus*, 1998. 433–434.

coincidence that in the case of the Holy Land, weakening the economic hinterland through the use of spoils was one of the most characteristic means of warfare against the enemy.

The role of booty in the logistical supply of crusading armies and the crusader states that emerged should be compared with other factors. In the First Crusade, the European armies were supported by very substantial Byzantine support, supplemented by supplies from the sea¹¹⁸ and booty from the march. This is shown by the fact that even after the defeat of Kerbogha's army at Antioch (1098), the Crusaders' leaders considered the huge booty they had obtained as a temporary solution to supplying their troops: they felt it necessary to ask the Byzantine emperor for support through their envoy in order to continue the journey to Jerusalem.¹¹⁹ Later, alongside the Byzantine emperor and the fleets of the Italian city-states, the military orders played a particularly important role in overcoming logistical difficulties and in supplying and transporting men, horses, armour, and supplies to the Holy Land.¹²⁰ The rulers of the Kingdom of Jerusalem quickly recognised the importance of the military orders and their role in fulfilling logistical, economic, and military functions. Accordingly, they were rewarded with privileges that included spoils of battle.¹²¹

Obviously, the importance of booty varied according to the historical situation and affected the combat value of an army to different degrees. If we consider soldiers as individuals in terms of preserving their combat value, survival, and potential for enrichment, we see that the importance of booty increased in proportion to the duration of hostilities and the distance from the coast. Particularly noteworthy in the latter respect is the expectation that the various military leaders should create opportunities for the acquisition of booty and share it with the combatants. The recurring nature of this phenomenon in contemporary sources, the degree of its details, and the problems of distribution demonstrate its importance. For soldiers staying in the Holy Land for a long period, looting seems to have been part of everyday life and strategy, while for larger enterprises, it could be an additional (but indispensable) element of warfare.

¹¹⁸ France, John, *Victory in the East: A Military History of the First Crusade*. New York–Cambridge, 1994. 209–20.

¹¹⁹ O'Dell, *The Logistics of the First Crusade*, 2020. 69.

¹²⁰ Barber, *Supplying the Crusader States*, 2006. 585–597.; The logistical supply of the crusaders was also aided by the small and large fortresses they already had in their hands, where they could store large quantities of food and war material. The supply of these forts, especially in areas further from the coast, was mainly provided by the local population, who (together with the traders and pilgrims on the road) could find shelter in case of danger. Accordingly, the soldiers and the surrounding population were largely dependent on each other. If the population fled or if work could not be done safely in the fields, the castles had to be supplied partly from the spoils.; Molin, Kristian, "The Non-Military Functions of Crusader Fortifications, 1187-circa 1380", = *Journal of Medieval History* 23:4, 1997, 367–388. 381–382, 385–386.; Smail, *Crusading Warfare*, 2005. 204–215.

¹²¹ Smail, *Crusading Warfare*, 2005. 103.

*Attila Bárány**

RICHARD I'S RETURN FROM THE HOLY LAND

It is in a way an organic part of a historical mythology how King Richard I of England (1189–99) was taken captive in Germany, while at home, the Saxons, oppressed by the 'evil' Prince John, led by Robin Hood were awaiting the release and return of their true sovereign. Cœur de Lion was imprisoned in the dungeons of Austria and the Holy Roman Empire for over a year from the end of 1192 to early 1194. However, one feels that the question that naturally arises is still unanswered why he made his way through the Empire, why he did go directly to the 'den' of his most ardent enemy, Leopold V, Duke of Austria. What was the reason why he chose an overland way, through the Continent and did not join the rest of his army and entourage from the south of Italy? The king deterred from his navy and made a stop first at Corfu and then, sailed through the Adriatic, and landed in Friaul or Aquileian territory, a few miles away from the Babenbergs' allies. He was soon to find himself in danger near to Vienna. The „normal” way would have been to take the naval route of crusaders and pilgrims, landing in Brindisi or Messina, then sailing up again to Marseille. Duke Leopold was humiliated by the Plantagenet ruler at the siege of St. Jean d'Acre, and he swore to take a revenge. It is extraordinary that Richard was riding in disguise close to the seat of Austria, risking a lot. Might he have believed that how one “qui cor leonis dictus” would at all be taken captive by earthly hands? Yet, there has to be a real reason. He most probably did not wish to travel through Philip II's France.¹

It may in a way be explained why a scholar from Central Europe sets out to investigate the history of Cœur de Lion. One would naturally find that generations of English and German historians have already done so and unveiled all the details of Lionheart's captivity. Why would a historian in Hungary explore English and German sources? How come would he have a better knowledge? The reason lies in the fact that the Kingdom of Hungary was in a way touched in the story. There have been an informally based view, or, rather a tradition in Hungarian historiography that the great Lionheart himself reached Hungarian soil, did find shelter in the kingdom of the Árpád dynasty. When he got ashore in Dalmatia,

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¹ I partly dealt with this field at the Colloque International, *Byzanz und das Abendland Byzance et l'Occident VIII. Studia Byzantino-Occidentalia, Gallica – Italica – Graeca*, Collège Eötvös József, Budapest – ELTE, 23–25 mai 2022.

near Zara, he landed in fact in the territory of King Béla III (1172–1196), whose troops recaptured the city of Zara and her Dalmatian neighbourhood in 1181 from Byzantium. The communication with the Hungarian ruler was in a way seen normal since Béla III's second consort, Margaret Capet was the widow of the Young King, Henry, Richard's brother, and both siblings did also maintain good terms with their third sister, Mathilda, the duchess of Saxony, consort of Duke Henry the Lion.

Richard was hoping to reach the Emperor's most bitter enemies, in Saxony, the land of the Welfs – his relatives, his 'old' Plantagenet allies. He could have reached England quickly from one of the northern ports. Because of the urgency of the situation in Normandy, the king was 'impatient' to get home faster than the main army and was eager to go to war again against Philip Augustus for his ancestral lands. It would probably normally arise that the king would proceed from a Dalmatian harbour through Croatia, or, the borderlands of Slavonia and Hungary, possibly even with Hungarian aid towards Saxony. Here I will not go into detail how a Hungarian detour may have arisen – some scholars even took it for granted that Richard was in fact Hungary – since with a colleague of mine, József Laszlovszky devoted much energy to the issue in a monograph on Anglo-Hungarian relations.² Accordingly, the paper will neither oversee here in detail the theories regarding where exactly the monarch might have also landed, from Raguza through Zara to the coastline of Istria.

Duke Leopold's banner

To understand why Richard fell into captivity in Austria, we must go back to the days following the capture of Acre. One could explain the actions of Leopold V, Duke of Austria, as retaliation for a personal offense. When the victors erected their banners on the walls and towers of St. Jean d'Acre, Richard, upon seeing the banner of the Babenberg duke, had it torn down and trampled in the dust. His reasoning was that Leopold was unworthy of this honour as he had not played a significant role in the siege of the city. However, the story is more complex, with multiple interpretations, and it is uncertain whether only the personal feud between two individuals lies behind it. I have examined the accounts of several contemporary chroniclers, mostly relying on firsthand information. The narrative goes beyond a deeply offended duke seeking revenge and waiting for the King of England to return home through his duchy from the Holy Land. Many coincidences had to align for the most renowned ruler of the time to find himself almost alone, abandoning his army, and escaping on foot through the Alps. It would have been inconceivable just a few months earlier for even a lord of the Empire to set a trap

² Bárány, Attila – Laszlovszky, József – Papp-Reed, Zsuzsanna, *Angol-magyar kapcsolatok a középkorban* [Anglo-Hungarian relations in the Middle Ages]. Vol. I–II. Gödöllő-Máriabesnyő, 2008–2012. Vol. I., 186–188. In a recent volume Judit Csákó investigated the narrative sources reporting about the disguised monarch in Hungary, e.g. Albericus Trium Fontium's *Chronicon*: Csákó, Judit, *Az Árpád-kori Magyarország francia tükörben* [Árpád-age Hungary in French mirror]. Budapest, 2023. 106.

and even contemplate capturing the sovereign of England. At that time, Leopold V was not a significant enough force to carry out such a task on his own. The 'lion' was lured into the trap by more powerful players, Philip Augustus and Emperor Henry VI, and the prince's resentment served as a convenient pretext. Leopold could have easily sought retribution for the offense: he could have challenged the king to a duel on the very same day. Nevertheless, this incident escalated to such gravity that one is compelled to seek political motives behind it. It is difficult to believe that Richard the Lionheart was kept in chains for months due to such an issue. The king's adversaries were merely waiting for some pretext with which they could temporarily detain the 'English beast' for a while.

The sources are not clear how and by whom the Austrian flag was raised. In reality, the cause of the hostilities was much more rooted in the fact that the King of England himself wanted to divide the spoils according to his own rules.³ He desired almost everything for himself and his men, explicitly stating that a 'simple' duke should not expect much.⁴ However, this was not only Leopold's cause: Richard and the Plantagenets' longstanding adversary, King Philip II of France had already clashed at Messina on the way to the Holy Land on the matter of the division of the spoils.⁵ From that point, King Philip was awaiting an opportune moment to attack Normandy.⁶ The astute French king could already anticipate a conflict between the ruler of England and the other crusader leaders at Acre. Those familiar with Richard could foresee that he would seek to manipulate the distribution. Philip was already contemplating how he could turn the incident with Leopold to his advantage.

The inland route

Richard was a thoughtful, careful military planner ahead of his time. He was far-sighted in every way, so when he was planning his journey home, he considered every circumstance and he was aware of every possibility. It is quite hard to believe that the haughty monarch, who trampled on the dignity of all, was brought to the clutches of his sworn enemy, the Duke of Austria, by divine retribution after he had been caught in a storm on the borders of Austria thereby getting his just deserts.

³ Otto of Sankt Blasien, *Chronica*. In: *Die Chronik Ottos von St. Blasien und die Marbacher Annalen*. Hrsg. Schmale, Franz-Josef, Darmstadt, 1998. 15–158. 104–105.

⁴ Otto of Sankt Blasien, *Chronica*, 104.; *Chronicon Magni Presbiteri*. Monumenta Germaniae Historica [hereinafter MGH] Scriptorum in Folio [hereinafter SS] 17. Hrsg. Pertz, G. H., Hannover, 1861. 476–523. 519.; William of Newburgh, *Historia Rerum Anglicarum*. In: *Chronicles of the reigns of Stephen, Henry II and Richard I*. Vol. I–IV. Ed. Howlett, Richard. (Rerum Britannicarum medii aevi scriptores. Rolls series [hereinafter RS] 82) Vol. I–II. London, 1884–1890. Vol. I., 383.

⁵ *Itinerarium peregrinorum et gesta regis Ricardi*. In: *Chronicles and Memorials of the Reign of Richard I*. Ed. Stubbs, William. (RS, 38.) London, 1864–65. Vol. I., 164.

⁶ "peperit iniquitatem, quam contestatus est natam, dum percussit Normanniam" – *Itinerarium*, 164.; "reis de France ot envie // Qui lui dorra tote sa vie, // E la fud la guerre engendrée // Don,t Normendie fut gaste" – Ambroise, *L'Estoire de la Guerre Sainte*, publiée par Gaston Paris. Paris, 1897. 23. vv. 824–830.; William of Newburgh, *Historia*, Vol. I., 325.

Richard set sail from Acre on 9 October 1192.⁷ Most sources report that he was caught in a storm and his fleet scattered. Richard's ship drifted far away very quickly.⁸ According to the *Itinerarium*, he "had was fed up" with the stormy sea and disembarked on the first land he saw,⁹ and on the feast of Saint Martin we find him on the island of Corfu.¹⁰ However, some chroniclers suggest that it was not the storm that washed him ashore, but rather his decision to dock. Some does not even mention that a storm damaged his boat, and nor are we informed that his fleet, which was a day or two ahead of him, was also caught in a storm. It may also seem that Corfu was a detour from the outset, and the King did not take the "standard" route.¹¹ The fact that most of the fleet set sail at a different time indicates that Richard intended to go a separate way. Had a storm indeed occurred, once it had passed, the fleet could have waited for the king, even on land. It would have made sense to send a vessel back to find out what happened to the king. Corfu is not far from the ports of Italy, so it should not have been difficult to send out a few men. However, we do not have any information about this, it seems that no one in the landing fleet was interested in the whereabouts of the king. His consort, Berengaria, his sister, Joan, Queen of Sicily and the senior members of the court and the army also made their way on to Rome or England as if nothing had happened. Oddly, they were not conflicted by the fact that Richard did not get ashore in Italy. As if sources suggest that Richard's detour had been planned beforehand. The search for the king does not yet begin even when his "great ship" arrives in Brindisi in November.¹² Does no one care why the king is not on board?

Many of our sources do not mention a heavy sea tempest at all. Admittedly, Ralph of Coggeshall does speak at length about a storm, but long before the landing at Corfu. He does not however relate whether Richard was stranded because of the storm or because his boat was damaged. The monarch sailed for six weeks, "heading for Barbary", and he was even claimed to have approached Marseille at a distance of three days' voyage.¹³ If he got so close to the mainland, how did he end up later in Corfu? Something made him veer towards the Adriatic? It seems that it was not just about Richard drifting to Corfu, but that he chose the *unusual* route. The "natural" thing to do would have been to land in a well-known Italian port, either Brindisi, like most pilgrims and crusaders did, or, Messina. From the former, he could have made his way gone overland through Italy. Ralph of Cogges-

⁷ Ralph de Diceto, *Ymagines historiarum*. In: *Radulphi de Diceto decani Lundoniensis Opera Historica*. Vol. I–II. Ed. Stubbs, William. (RS, 68.) London, 1876. Vol. II., 106.

⁸ Ambroise, *L'Estoire*, 327. vv. 12200–12210.

⁹ "ex diutina tumultuantis pelagi jactatione jam pertaesus navigationis, quam citius potuit applicuit terrae primo visae" – *Itinerarium*, 442.

¹⁰ Ralph de Diceto, *Ymagines*, Vol. II., 106.

¹¹ Landon, Lionel, *The Itinerary of King Richard I*. London, 1935. 69.

¹² Schreiber, Albert, "Drei Beiträge zur Geschichte der deutschen Gefangenschaft des Königs Richard Löwenherz", = *Historische Vierteljahrschrift* 26, 1931, 268–294. 276.; Kessler, Ulrike, *Richard I. Löwenherz: König, Kreuzrer, Abenteurer*. Graz, 1995. 249.

¹³ [Ralph of Coggeshall] *Radulphi de Coggeshall Chronicon anglicanum*. Ed. Stevenson, Joseph. (RS, 66.) London, 1875. 53.

shall seems to have learned that the king decided to return home secretly through Germany, *which is why* he turns towards Corfu.¹⁴

Who or what was the King of England afraid of? Obviously, of the King of France. Richard believed that it was Philip who must have been behind his capture. Months before his return home, he had already received news of how his younger brother, John was troubling his country – into whose ears his “benevolent”, the King of France, was murmuring.¹⁵ Many persuaded Richard that it was time for him to return home.¹⁶ Philip Augustus hastened to let Emperor Henry VI know that he knew from “reliable sources” that Richard had been involved in the murder of Conrad of Montferrat.¹⁷ With this, the French who stayed there slandered the king already in the Holy Land. The King of France spent a long time persuading the emperor about the treachery of Richard. He first made an alliance with him against England in 1191,¹⁸ and then ordered throughout the Empire that Richard be arrested, even with arms, and handed over to him, dead or alive.¹⁹ According to English chroniclers, it was clearly Philip’s intrigue that turned Henry against Richard.²⁰

Richard was indeed afraid of the cunning of Philip. Arnold of Lübeck believes that he intended to return home by another route, for he feared that Philip resented his failure to marry his daughter, Alais (Alys) whom Richard had betrothed.²¹ According to Ansbert, he did not set off at the same time as his army because he was worried about the dealings of the King of France.²² Richard was also aware

¹⁴ “disposuit per Teutonicam latenter repatriare, retortisque velis, apud Covrefo insulam applicuit” – Ibid.

¹⁵ Itinerarium, 358–359.

¹⁶ Itinerarium, 126.

¹⁷ Kessler, Richard, 1995. 267–268.; Gillingham, John, “Coeur de Lion in Captivity”, = *Quaestiones mediae aevi novae* 18, 2013, 59–83. 60.

¹⁸ 4–8 December 1191: *Regesta Imperii* [hereinafter RI] IV/3,3. 3. Abteilung: *Die Regesten des Kaiserreiches unter Heinrich VI. 1165 (1190)–1197*. Nachträge und Ergänzungen, bearb. von Katrin und Gerhard Baaken†. Elektronische pdf-Resource. Mainz, 2015. [http://www.regesta-imperii.de/fileadmin/user_upload/downloads/Baaken_Heinrich_VI.pdf – 28 July 2021] no. 192.

¹⁹ RI IV/3,3. no. 193.; Roger of Hoveden, *Chronica magistri de Houdene*. Ed. Stubbs, William. (RS, 51.) London, 1868–71. Vol. III., 167.; Csendes, Peter, *Heinrich VI*. Darmstadt, 1993. 122.; Kessler, Richard, 1995. 176. note 348.; Berg, Dieter, *Richard Löwenherz*. Darmstadt, 2007. 175.

²⁰ Richard of Devizes, *Chronicon Ricardi Divisiensis de rebus gestis Ricardi Primi, Regis Angliae*. Ed. Stevenson, Joseph, London, 1838. 75.; Roger of Hoveden, *Chronica*, Vol. III., 167.; Thon, Alexander, “...wo Hochverräter gegen das Reich auf ewig dem Kerker übergeben werden. Die Gefangenschaft König Richards I. von England 1192–1194 in Österreich und Deutschland und insbesondere auf Burg Trifels”, In: Imhoff, Andreas (Hrsg.), *Politik und Kultur der Staufer*. Annweiler, 2016. 53–176. 130.

²¹ “nec reversus est via qua venerat. Timuerat enim regem Francie” – Arnold of Lübeck, *Chronica Slavorum*. MGH SS 21. Hrsg. Lappenberg, J. M., Hannover, 1869. 115–250. 149.

²² “timore regis Francie” – [Ansbert] *Historia de expeditione Friderici*. MGH SS rerum Germanicarum. N. S., 5. *Quellen zur Geschichte des Kreuzzuges Kaiser Friedrichs I*.

that several of his castles in Normandy had been seized, even though Philip II had given his word that he would not attack the lands of Richard as long as he was wearing the sign of Cross. The Pope also prohibited Philip from going to war against the Plantagenet provinces.²³ Philip Augustus approached Prince John and several barons of Normandy to take his side. There was a serious risk of an attack on England.²⁴ Obviously, had Richard not feared the King of France, he would have gone to Brindisi or Messina, and from there through Italy. Indeed the army, the entourage and Queen Berengaria did just that.²⁵ The crusaders who arrived in England by Christmas knew nothing about the King.²⁶

The natural, logical course of action would have been if Richard's ship had run into a storm, forcing him to harbour in Corfu, for example, to contact King Tancred of Sicily, so that he could cross to Apulia, even repairing the damaged ships. This would have been the normal way. They could have brought help from Brindisi. In 1191, Henry VI planned a campaign against Sicily, meaning that Tancred was dependent on the support of Richard. The Emperor also brought in the Ghibelline Pisa and Genova, and their fleets were then cruising in the western basin of the Mediterranean. Thus, if Richard had wanted to continue his journey from Brindisi or Messina to Marseille, he would have faced their galleys.

The king of England had already received news in the Holy Land, and during his voyage, that it was not advisable to dock at Marseilles or anywhere else in Provence, because if he continued his voyage by land, the Count of Toulouse, Raymond V "set his eyes on him". In 1192, the count had a confrontation with England since he wished to take advantage of Richard's absence and lay his hands on certain Plantagenet territories. He launched a war, but was repulsed as far as the walls of Toulouse. Richard would not have been safe travelling through Toulouse's sphere of influence.²⁷ Moreover, even if he got beyond Toulouse, he could not have been safe in his own provinces, for Philip Augustus II was now waging open war, and even turned some of Richard's vassals against him. Furthermore, the Capetians were more influential to east of the Rhône, in the Rhine region bordering Lorraine, Alsace and Burgundy, and the hands of the Staufs reached

Hrsg. Chroust, Anton, Hannover, 1928. 1–115. 101.

²³ Itinerarium, 224, 443.; Benedict of Peterborough, *Gesta regis Henrici Secundi Benedicti Abbatis*. Vol. I–II. Ed. Stubbs, William. (RS, 49.) London, 1867. Vol. II., 229.

²⁴ Itinerarium, 351.

²⁵ He arrived in Rome in January 1193. Roger of Hoveden, *Chronica*, Vol. III., 194, 228–229.; Ralph of Coggeshall, *Chronicon*, 52.; Landon, *Itinerary*, 1935. 69, 74.; RI IV. *Lothar III. und ältere Staufer 1125–1197*. Hrsg. Böhmer, Johann Friedrich. IV/4. *Vierte Abteilung. Papstregesten 1124–1198*. Teil 4.: 1181–1198. *Lieferung 5.: 1191–1195. Cölestin III*. Erarbeitet von Ulrich Schmidt. Köln, 2018. no. 688, 846.; Lateran, 9 April 1193: Queen Berengaria's charter: *Calendar of Documents Preserved in France 918–1206*. Ed. Round, J. Horace, London, 1899. 95. no. 278.

²⁶ Landon, *Itinerary*, 1935. 69.; Roger of Hoveden, *Chronica*, Vol. III., 194.; Kessler, Richard, 1995. 249.

²⁷ Landon, *Itinerary*, 1935. 69.; Brundage, James A., *Richard Lion Heart. A biography*. New York, 1974. 174.; Gillingham, John, *Richard I*. New York, 1978. 220.

even beyond the western frontiers of the Empire. Henry VI was not naïve either: he sensed that the King of France needed his support *now* against Richard to fulfil his long-held dream of seizing the fiefs of the Plantagenets. And the emperor was in need of support for his planned campaign in Sicily.

According to Landon, Richard had long intended to go to Marseille, but when he was approaching Tunis, fearing the Count of Toulouse and Philip II, he changed his mind and turned towards Corfu. He was also plagued by seasickness, which is why he always travelled on a massive, large ship.²⁸ The end of autumn was also approaching, and only a few ventured out to the open sea at this time. I, however, do not think that this was the only reason why he changed course and anchored in Corfu, and strongly doubt that this was the motive behind why he did not harbour in the nearby port of Brindisi. And if the sea was indeed rough on him, why did he continue on the Adriatic?

Nevertheless, the opponents of the King of England must also have been prepared for Richard landing at Brindisi, and travelling north overland across the Alps, to avoid the route through Toulouse. Even King Philip could not have expected him to turn around and sail up the Adriatic and land in Friaul (Friuli). And even if he had expected this eventuality, it would have been reasonable for Richard to pass through Venetian territory heading north-west. But the fact that he suddenly appeared in Görz (Gorizia) and Carinthia, heading for the heart of the Empire and then turned east to Vienna, astonished even the Capetian ruler, who was obviously waiting for him on the other side of the Brenner and St. Bernard passes. It is conceivable that Richard planned his journey home on this route initially, in order to circumvent the ambush of his opponents: he would go through Germany, where he would be least likely to be sought. Ralph of Coggeshall believed it was only natural that he was secretly planning to return home through Germany.²⁹ This is why he planned to switch to smaller boats to be as inconspicuous as possible.³⁰ Perhaps the storm even served him well, as it gave him the opportunity to hide in the Adriatic, while the spies of the King of France in Brindisi were waiting anxiously to see when Richard would show up.

The king arrived in Corfu on around 20 November. The island was Byzantine territory, and the king “did not want to be seen here”.³¹ The earlier conquest of Cyprus and the imprisonment of the island’s ruler, Isaac Comnenus, led to conflict between England and Constantinople, and the king may have felt that he was in danger if he was in the Byzantine sphere of influence, but it is unlikely that this alone would have led him to rapidly leave Corfu. Torn by the struggles for the throne, Byzantium was not at the height of its power, and the basileus did not really reach the western shores either. The King of England had nothing to fear from him, he had the Crusader fleet at his side. If he had drifted to the island, he

²⁸ William of Newburgh, *Historia*, Vol. I., 382.; *Itinerarium*, 442.; Brundage, Richard, 1974. 175.

²⁹ “disposuit per Teutonicam latenter repatriare” – Ralph of Coggeshall, *Chronicon*, 53.

³⁰ Gillingham, Richard, 1978. 222.

³¹ *Itinerarium*, 442.

would not have had to flee post-haste to the north along the Adriatic, deviating from the usual route. According to several chroniclers, the king and some of his men boarded one (or two, or three) pirate ships.³² Here Richard is now trying to disguise himself.³³ He wants his adversaries to think he is still with the fleet. He sets sail on the Adriatic – except in the opposite direction to his fleet. Roger of Hoveden, who is most likely the best informed, knows nothing about the storm, nor about the need to anchor in Corfu because of it, nor about any pirates. He only tells that Richard is turning back, and with some of his men is boarding three galleys coming from the Byzantine (“Romania”) coast. According to a letter of which Roger of Hoveden reports, written by Henry VI to Philip II, Richard set sail for the country of the King of France, but the tempest damaged his ship and he was shipwrecked. The emperor, however, is unaware of any pirates or any transfer to another ship(s).³⁴

Disembarkation

As to the question of where Richard disembarked after Corfu – in *Sclavonia*, Ragusa, Zara, Pola, Italy – and what happened to him, I shall seek answers in a separate forthcoming study. Here I will concentrate on his route after his landing. Several sources believe that the king was again caught in a storm and was hurled ashore on the Adriatic coast, shipwrecked. This is perhaps the most widely known and accepted theory. It seems most likely that he came ashore in Italy, in the region of Aquileia or in Istria.³⁵ Ralph of Coggeshall does not know of any further storms or other shipwrecks: the pirates put him ashore, he says, he simply landed in the Adriatic, but he does not specify where.³⁶ The *Itinerarium* succinctly tells only that after the king left Corfu, he landed and was captured in the Duchy of Austria.³⁷ Ralph of Diceto – after Richard comes ashore – can only track him in Austria.³⁸ At Gervase of Canterbury, a possible shipwreck can only be hypothetically inferred from the fact that he arrives “unluckily” on Austrian soil. He does not mention pirates, or transfers to other ships. Yet it is significant how

³² Ralph of Coggeshall, *Chronicon*, 54.

³³ “regem dissimulans, piratis crudelibus se commisit intrepidus, habitu mutato sed non animo” – *Itinerarium*, 442.; “multis se dissimulabat” – Guillaume le Breton [Guillelmi Armorici], *La Philippide* [Philippidos Libri XII]. In: *Œuvres de Rigord et de Guillaume le Breton historiens de Philippe Auguste*. Publiées ... par Delaborde, H. E. Vol. I–II. Paris, 1882–85. Vol. I., 3–385. Vol. I., 110. v. 334.

³⁴ Roger of Hoveden, *Chronica*, Vol. III., 185, 195–196.; RI IV/3,1. *Die Regesten des Kaiserreiches unter Heinrich VI. 1165 (1190)–1197*. Nach Johann Friedrich Böhmer neuarbeitet von Gerhard Baaken. Köln, 1972–79. [hereinafter RI IV/3,1.] no. 271.; Rymer, Thomas, *Foedera, conventiones, literae, et cujuscunq[ue] generis acta publica, inter reges Angliae*. I–XVI. London, 1816. I/1. 55–56.

³⁵ Roger of Hoveden, *Chronica*, Vol. III., 195.

³⁶ Ralph of Coggeshall, *Chronicon*, 54.

³⁷ *Itinerarium*, 442.

³⁸ “transisset Venetiam et Aquileiam, terram ducis Austriae subintravit. A quo captus est in Wena” – Ralph de Diceto, *Ymagines*, Vol. II., 106.

he seems to know that Richard's affairs call him to Germany.³⁹ William of Newburgh reports that his ship drifts to the northern shores of the Adriatic.⁴⁰

Of the continental sources, Ansbert writes that Richard landed on the Istrian coast and continued his journey through Friaul. What's more, he believes that this is where he parted from his wife and her entourage.⁴¹ He does not mention the stops at Görz and Friesach described by other sources, instead he immediately places the king in Austria. According to Magnus of Reichersberg, the king's ship landed near Aquileia.⁴² Both the Annals of Admont and Marbach report that he sailed directly from the Ionian Sea – without a detour to Corfu – and continued his journey through Friaul and Carinthia. (They do not know about what happened in Görz.⁴³) Of the French sources, Rigord does not mention a storm, but says that the king landed between Venice and Aquileia.⁴⁴ Guillaume le Breton knows neither of a storm nor of a shipwreck: in his case, Richard has initially turned from the Ionian Sea to the Adriatic: his plan was to return home through the Empire, “in secret”, “disguising his royal dignity”.⁴⁵ Ernoul also suggests that Richard intended to return home via Germany: he landed in the region of Aquileia and headed towards the Empire. He was not cast here by the storm, he didn't land in Corfu, and he didn't hire pirate ships.⁴⁶ The *Estoire d'Eracles* has a similar wording.⁴⁷ All this does not contradict our assumption that Richard seemed to have planned in advance to continue his journey on the mainland with a few men.

³⁹ “dispositisque rebus in Alemanniam, et in terram ducis Ostrici tristi infortunatio appulsus est” – Gervase of Canterbury: *Gervasius Cantuariensis Opera Omnia. Historical works*. In: *The Chronicle of the Reigns of Stephen, Henry II, and Richard I. Chronica*. Vol. I., 513.

⁴⁰ “inter Aquileiam et Venetiam naufragium passus” – William of Newburgh, *Historia*, Vol. I., 382.

⁴¹ “Ubi uxorem et familiam totam [...] relinquens ipse per Forum Iulii” – Ansbert, *Historia*, 101.

⁴² “proiectus est in partes vicinas Aquilegiensibus” – *Chronicon Magni Presbiteri*, 520.

⁴³ “in Ionium mare delatus, et ad terram egressus, [...] Forum Iulii et Karinthiam [...] transivit” – *Continuatio Admontensis*. MGH SS 9. Hrsg. Pertz, G. H., Hannover, 1851. 579–593. 587.; *Annales Marbacenses*. In: *Die Chronik Ottos von St. Blasien und die Marbacher Annalen*. Hrsg. Schmale, Franz-Josef, Darmstadt, 1998. 159–254. 186.; Thon, ...wo Hochverräter, 2016. 162.

⁴⁴ Rigord: *Gesta Philippi II Augusti regis Francorum. Histoire de Philippe Auguste*. Éd. Carpentier, Élisabeth – Pon, Georges – Yves Chauvin, Yves. Paris, 2006. 315–317.; Csákó, Judit, *Az Árpád-kori Magyarország a francia területen keletkezett elbeszélő kútfők tükrében*. Phd-értekezés [Árpád-age Hungary in the light of narrative sources written in French territory. Phd diss.]. Budapest, 2015. 371.; Csákó, *Az Árpád-kori*, 2023. 438.

⁴⁵ “Dissimulat regem [...] // [...] Ionie progressum denique ponto // Adria suscepit; a dextro remige lus // [...] navibus ille relictis // Imperiale [...] intrat” – Guillaume le Breton, *La Philippide*, Vol. I., 109. Vol. I., vv. 326–331.

⁴⁶ “Il ariverent priés d'Aquillé [..] si est l'entrée d'Allemagne, par devers de mer de Gresse” – *Chronique d'Ernoul et de Bernard le Trésorier*, publiée par Mas Latrie, L. de, Paris, 1871. 297.

⁴⁷ [L'Estoire d'Eracles] *L'Estoire de Eracles Empereur*. In: *Recueil des historiens des Croisades: Historiens occidentaux*. Vol. I–V. Paris, 1844–95. Vol. II., Paris, 1859. 201–202.

In disguise – the “pilgrim” and the “Templar”

Richard must have landed on around 10 December 1191.⁴⁸ The fact that the king wore a disguise is confirmed by several sources. According to the *Itinerarium*, he already disguised himself in Corfu.⁴⁹ William of Newburgh says he wanted to keep it a secret who he was.⁵⁰ At Roger of Hoveden, Richard did not want anyone to know that he was the King of England.⁵¹ Many write of a pilgrim disguise, and a fair number write of a Templar apparel,⁵² but Arnold of Lübeck writes of both.⁵³ The whole entourage disguised themselves. The fact that the ruler also took “real” Templars with him is a sign of awareness. Since they also took horses with them, they were preparing for the long overland journey through Germany.⁵⁴ Guillaume le Breton even notes that the Templar habitus provided greater security in the Empire.⁵⁵ (Admittedly, in his other, historical work, he no longer writes about a Templar disguise.⁵⁶) Anyway, friar also accompanied the king all the way.⁵⁷

Contemporary English narrative sources are well informed about the circumstances of Richard’s capture. Ralph of Coggeshall and Roger of Hoveden got first-hand information from eyewitnesses.⁵⁸ Nowhere was safe for the king to stay. News of the famous castaway spread and the search for him began immediately.⁵⁹

⁴⁸ Landon, *Itinerary*, 1935. 70.

⁴⁹ “se regem dissimulans, habito mutato sed non animo” – *Itinerarium*, 442.

⁵⁰ “pro tempore propter casus incertos [...] celans personam” – William of Newburgh, *Historia*, Vol. I., 383

⁵¹ “noluit indicare quod esset rex Angliae, sed peregrini essent: [...] vestes et omnia caetera ad similitudinem gentis terrae illius” – Roger of Hoveden, *Chronica*, Vol. III., 186.

⁵² “mutato habitu incenderet ut Templarius” – Gervase of Canterbury, *Chronica*, Vol. I., 513.; “quidam fratres Templi” – Ralph of Coggeshall, *Chronicon*, 54.

⁵³ “peregrino more nam Templariorum habitu se suosque induerat” – Arnold of Lübeck, *Chronica*, 179.

⁵⁴ “si entra en une galee la ou li Templier estoient et prist conge a sa feme et a sa maisnee. [...] avec lui en la galee por faire le prendre [...] il porquistrent chevaus asses et monterent sus et alerent par Alemaigne.” – *L’Estoire d’Eracles*, 201–202.; “Li Templier et li rois [...] pourquisent cevauceurs assés, et montèrent sus et alerent par Alemaigne.” – Ernoul, *Chronique*, 297–298.

⁵⁵ “Imperiale solum cultu Templarius intrat // Privato ut tectus habitu securior iret” – Guillaume le Breton, *La Philippide*, Vol. I., 110. vv. 331–332.; See Csákó, *Az Árpád-kori*, 2015. 306.

⁵⁶ “dissimulavit et habitu et splendore quantum potuit eminentiam regale” – Guillaume le Breton, *Gesta Philippi Augusti*. In: *Œuvres de Rigord et de Guillaume le Breton*. Vol. II., 168–333. 195.; Csákó, *Az Árpád-kori*, 2015. 306.

⁵⁷ “aussi comme je soie un Templiers” – Ernoul, *Chronique*, 296.

⁵⁸ Ralph of Coggeshall, *Chronicon*, 53–55.; Roger of Hoveden, *Chronica*, Vol. III., 198–199.; Norgate, Kate, *Richard the Lion Heart*. London, 1924. 268.; Gillingham, John, “The Kidnapped King: Richard I in Germany, 1192–1194”, = *German Historical Institute London, Bulletin* 30:1, 2008, 5–34. 19.; Thon, ...wo Hochverräter, 2016. 126. note 123.

⁵⁹ “Nam cito percrebruit insignem naufragum latere vel oberrare in terra illa. Mox nobilibus simul et populo ad vestigandum eum intentis” – William of Newburgh, *Historia*, Vol. I., 382.

The king was about to go north, through Friesach. It is possible that he deliberately chose a city belonging to the Archdiocese of Salzburg. Since he might indeed have feared Leopold, he wanted to avoid Upper Austria. If he headed straight north, he had to traverse the Pontebba Pass through Udine to reach Villach, which is a considerable distance, about 235 km, and not an easy terrain in wintertime.⁶⁰ It is therefore conceivable that he chose the lower, easier route, bypassing the Dolomites from the east, which would explain why he almost fell into the hands of Count Meinhard in the county of Görz. In this case he set off in the direction of Görz, then bypassed the more difficult terrain through Laibach (Ljubljana), Carniola and Klagenfurt, and as Berthold II of Meran was the Margrave of Carniola and Ulrich II of the House of Sponheim was the Duke of Carinthia, he did not touch the territory of the Babenbergs but made his way through Sponheim and Meranian territories. This route was not short either, about 260 km. If we take Roger of Hoveden as a benchmark, the King completed the journey in four days. This was all but impossible under the conditions of the time. Even if Richard, who was used to soldiering, must have been used to the frantic pace, the more than 80 km a day, in winter, through the Alps, over difficult passes, tested even him. Our sources agree that the king was “incessantly harassed”, and was also pursued by the family of the Margraves of Montferrat, who had estates not far away in the north of Italy and who were agitated by Philip II and held the king responsible for the death of Conrad. According to Ralph of Coggeshall, Philip found out that Richard was travelling in disguise, so he laid a trap for him.⁶¹

Word spread that a royal figure disembarked, and the Count of Görz, Meinhard II, who was indeed related to the House of Montferrat, was looking for him, and captured eight of his entourage.⁶² Richard hastily moved on in the middle of the night.⁶³ Meinhard did not pursue him, but sent spies after him and reported him to the Duke of Austria. The king was now being chased by Meinhard's brother, Engelbert III.⁶⁴ Engelbert had those *hospitia* searched where pilgrims usually stayed. He ordered that all pilgrims be stopped.⁶⁵ In the Marbach Annals, he is also involved in an armed conflict with Richard, in which several of the king's men are captured or killed, and the monarch himself is only able to flee wounded to Styria.⁶⁶

⁶⁰ Kessler, Richard, 1995. 250.

⁶¹ Ralph of Coggeshall, *Chronicon*, 53.

⁶² “Mainardus Gorzite et populus regionis [...] audito quod in terra Goritz erat, [...] insecuti sunt, [...] intendentes eum captivare. Ipso autem rege in fugam converso ceperunt de suis octo milites.” – Roger of Hoveden, *Chronica*, Vol. III., 195.; Rymer, Foedera, 1816. I/1. 55.; Broughton, Bradford B., *The Legends of King Richard Coeur de Lion*. Paris, 1966. 112.; Thon, ...wo Hochverräter, 2016. 72.

⁶³ Ralph of Coggeshall, *Chronicon*, 55.

⁶⁴ *Annales Marbacenses*, 186.; According to Rigord, Meinhard himself was chasing the king. Rigord, *Gesta*, 314.

⁶⁵ Brundage, Richard, 1974. 179.; Kessler, Richard, 1995. 251.

⁶⁶ “persecutus comes Engelhardus et cum eo pugna congressus, multis ex parte regis captis vel occisis, ipse fuga lapsus et vulneratus in Stirensem.” – *Annales Marbacenses*, 186.

Richard was then able to go to Friesach, to seek protection against the Babenbergs from Adalbert III (Vojtěch) from the house of Přemysl, Archbishop of Salzburg, who, like his brother, Duke Ottokar I, was opposing the Hohenstaufen. Both Rigord and Newburgh point out that Friesach belonged to the archdiocese of Salzburg, which seems to confirm that Richard wanted to avoid the Duchy of Austria by heading for Salzburg and expected help from the Přemysl prelate against Leopold. Despite this, Friedrich II of Pettau, Vogt of Friesach, treated him with hostility.⁶⁷ He captured several of the king's knights and he had to flee from here as well.⁶⁸ The annalist of the monastery of Marbach claims that Frederick of Pettau, the *ministerialis* of the Archbishop of Salzburg, kept on chasing Richard. He was therefore unable to move towards Salzburg. According to Magnus of Reichersberg, some of Richard's men were killed. The King managed to escape, they could not catch up with him and did not know that he had moved to Austria.⁶⁹

Richard probably set off from Friesach on 17 December. His pursuers caused the king to "run away" from here too, now with only three companions left; and he reached Vienna terribly exhausted, after travelling for three days and three nights straight.⁷⁰ They did not even stop to have a meal, only in the outskirts, where they hoped to be able to hide more easily.⁷¹ At Ansbert, several of Richard's companions were captured, and he reached the environs of Vienna with only two companions, on foot, leaving much of his goods behind and losing their horses.⁷² Leopold made preparations, he set up an ambush for the 'pilgrim', watching the roads and passes.⁷³ At Ansbert, it was the duke's spies who discovered and captured him.⁷⁴

Even if they rode in the Mürz valley, they achieved a tremendous feat by riding from Friesach to Vienna.⁷⁵ It is 260 kilometres, and if they really travelled non-stop for three or four days, and rode 85 kilometres a day, it must have been

⁶⁷ *Annales Marbacenses*, 186.

⁶⁸ Rigord, *Gesta*, 314.; William of Newburgh, *Historia*, Vol. I., 382.

⁶⁹ "occisi etiam et captivatis hominibus suis, per partes Karintiae" – *Chronicon Magni Presbiteri*, 520.

⁷⁰ "processit rex ad burgum in archiepiscopatu Salzeburgensi, qui vocatur Frisorum" – Roger of Hoveden, *Chronica*, Vol. III., 195–196.; RI IV/3,1. no. 271.; "velocibus equis ascensis, [...] properans die ac nocte venit prope Vienam et non longe ab ea, in [...] parva villa, ipse et comes suus hospitium ceperunt. [...] rex ex labore itineris fatigatus." – Roger of Hoveden, *Chronica*, 186.; Ansbert, *Historia*, 101–102.

⁷¹ Ralph of Coggeshall, *Chronicon*, 56.; Gillingham, Richard, 1978. 224.; Kessler, Richard, 1995. 251.

⁷² "a pluribus tamen cognitus et in via suis aliquibus captis, [...] rebus etiam suis perditis [...] Circa Wiennam siquidem latenter moratus, pedes" – Ansbert, *Historia*, 101–102.

⁷³ "observata strata, impositis ubique custodibus" – Roger of Hoveden, *Chronica*, Vol. III., 195–196.; RI IV/3,1. no. 271.; Rymer, *Foedera*, 1816. I/1. 55–56.; Arnold of Lübeck, *Chronica*, 179.; Volfgang, Gerhard, *Von Akkon nach Dürnstein. Herzog Leopold V. und König Richard Löwenherz*. Wels–Salzburg, 2016. 87.

⁷⁴ "per exploratores inventus et captus est" – Ansbert, *Historia*, 101–102.

⁷⁵ Gillingham, Richard, 1978. 224.; Kessler, Richard, 1995. 250.

incredibly exhausting. They had to cross the Semmering Pass.⁷⁶ Unsurprisingly, some believe that Richard had a fever of some kind, which is why they had to stop and seek some sort of shelter. We know that the monarch was ill for a long time before he set out on his journey.⁷⁷ Now even more exhausted from days and nights of vigorous riding, hunger finally forced the king to stop at an inn in just outside Vienna. He sent for food, but his servant was captured, who, to save his life, revealed who his lord was and where he was staying.⁷⁸ One is to wonder, however, if he had been galloping at full speed until now, why he stopped in the capital of his sworn enemy. Perhaps the explanation is that this was the best place to hide, in the suburbs, in the alleyways around the market at a gate of the city. Leopold himself went to apprehend him, but the king finally surrendered.⁷⁹

The Austrian annals of the time speak rather scantily of the king's captivity. The Melk, Kremsmünster and Admont annals mostly relate that the king is on his way here, and the emperor keeps an eye on the coastline to find out where he will land.⁸⁰ In contrast, contemporary German chroniclers almost bubble over with details of the monarch being forced to take shelter in a squalid hut, in an unsightly roadside cottage.⁸¹ About 15 years after the events, Otto of Sankt Blasien already wrote that the king, in order not to be recognised, was even willing to work in the kitchen in disguise as a simple servant. He cooked for himself and twirled the spit with his own hands.⁸² This motif appears many times in the sources, even after a long time.⁸³ The contemporary Pietro da Eboli, in his *Liber ad honorem Augusti*, addressed to Henry VI, also refers to the "royal

⁷⁶ Kessler, Richard, 1995. 250.

⁷⁷ Broughton, *The Legends*, 1966. 113.

⁷⁸ "in suburban" – William of Newburgh, *Historia*, Vol. I., 382.; "regem juxta Wenam, in villa viciniori" – Roger of Hoveden, *Chronica*, Vol. III., 195–196.; RI IV/3,1. no. 271.; "quandam villam nomine Ginanam" – Ralph of Coggeshall, *Chronicon*, 56.; "in quodam diversorium iuxta Viennam" – Otto of Sankt Blasien, *Chronica*, 110.; Gervase of Canterbury, *Chronica*, Vol. I., 513.; Thon, ...wo Hochverräter, 2016. 128.; Gillingham, *Coeur*, 2013. 67.; Kessler, Richard, 1995. 252.

⁷⁹ "Rex autem in hospitio suo humillime recubans [...] captus est." – Gervase of Canterbury, *Gesta regum*. In: *Opera omnia*. Vol. II., 89–90.; William of Newburgh, *Historia*, Vol. I., 383–384.

⁸⁰ *Continuation Mellicenses*. MGH SS 9. Hrsg. Pertz, G. H., Hannover, 1851. 501–535. 506.; *Continuatio Cremifacensis*. IMGH SS 9. 544–549. 548.; *Continuatio Admuntensis*. MGH SS 9. 587.

⁸¹ "Ibi captus in parvo tuguriolo prope civitatem Wiene." – *Annales Marbacenses*, 186.; "in vili hospitio [...] captus est." – Ansbert, *Historia*, 101–102.; "in domo despecta captivavit" – Roger of Hoveden, *Chronica*, Vol. III., 195–196.; RI IV/3,1. no. 271.; Görich, Knut, "Verletzte Ehre: König Richard Löwenherz als Gefangener Kaiser Heinrichs VI.", = *Historisches Jahrbuch* 123, 2003, 65–91. 65–67.; Pfaff, Carl, "Der gefangene König", = *Basler Zeitschrift für Geschichte und Altertumskunde* 71, 1971, 9–35. 10.; Kessler, Richard, 1995. 251.

⁸² "ne agnosceretur, in coctione pulmentorum per se dans operam, altile ligno affixum propria manu vertens assabat" – Otto of Sankt Blasien, *Chronica*, 110.

⁸³ Volting, Von Akkon, 2016. 88–89.

cook” who posed as a servant in ragged clothes.⁸⁴ Eboli also illustrated Richard’s capture with drawings.⁸⁵ At Magnus of Reichersberg he was found hiding in a peasant’s hut, in the kitchen, where he cooked with his own hands for himself and his companions.⁸⁶

French narrative sources adopt the kitchen motif as well. Richard put on a nasty, filthy apron before going into the kitchen and turning the capons on the spit.⁸⁷ The king dressed as a kitchen servant descends into doing menial, manual labour.⁸⁸ He is willing to take the clothes from the kitchen *garçon* in an attempt to escape.⁸⁹

The captivity

Finally, near a village next to Vienna, the Duke of Austria discovered Richard the Lionheart and captured him.⁹⁰ Richard evidently sought to avoid Vienna, but the most effective way to disappear in the crowd seemed to be entering the suburbs, as they needed to procure supplies. Hence he was found in an inn.⁹¹ The chronicles of Melk and Zwettl unanimously identify Erdberg (“Erpurch”, “Ertpurch”) as the place where the king stayed, which is today a part of Vienna but was located approximately five kilometres from the city walls at that

⁸⁴ “Turpis ad obsequium turpe minister erat. // Quid prodest versare dapes, servire culine? // Rex sub veste latens, male nam vestitus ut ospes” – [Pietro da Eboli] *Des Magisters Petrus de Ebulo Liber ad honorem Augusti*. Hrsg. Winkelmann, Eduard, Leipzig, 1874. 50–51. vv. 1047–1051.; 1074–1078.; 1081–1084.

⁸⁵ Petrus de Ebulo: *Liber ad honorem Augusti sive De rebus Siculis*. Bern, Burgerbibliothek, Cod. 120.II. 55 ff. ca. 1195 – ca. 1197. f. 129r.: “illustris Rex Anglie a Jerosolimis rediens captus presentatur augusto; Rex Anglie de morte Marchionis accusatur. Quod abnegans se ensiva manu excusaturum promit; Tandem veniam petens liber absolvitur.” Image: *e-codices - Virtuelle Handschriftenbibliothek der Schweiz*. Redigiert von Florian Mittenhuber, Februar 2018. [<https://www.e-codices.unifr.ch/de/bbb/0120-2//129r> – 19 January 2024] See Appendix. Fig 1–2.

⁸⁶ “profugus devenisset [...], occultans se in tugurio cuiusdam pauperis, et cibos propriis manibus sibi et sociis [...] in officina rustica preparans” – *Chronicon Magni Presbiteri*, 519–520.

⁸⁷ “Il prist une malvaïse cote, si le jeta en son dos pour lui desconnoistre [...] si entra en le quisine, et si s’asist pour tourner les capons au fu.” – Ernoul, *Chronique*, 298.; “Il prist une mauvaïse cote si la geta en son dos por lui desconoistre; si entra en la cuisine et sasist por torner les chapons au fue.” – *L’Estoire d’Eracles*, 201–202.

⁸⁸ “Quid prodest versare dapes, servire culine? // Quid juvat officio dominum vilescere servi? // Quid flexisse viam, vestes mutasse, suoque” – Guillaume le Breton, *La Philippide*, Vol. I., 111. vv. 343–346.; Guillaume le Breton, *Gesta*, Vol. I., 195.

⁸⁹ “Quant il se perçut, si prist la robe à un garçon, et se mist en la cuisine à tourner les chapons” – *Recits d’un ménestrel de Reims au treizième siècle*. Éd. Wailly, Natalis de, Paris, 1876. 34–35.

⁹⁰ “regem juxta Viennam in villa viciniori in domo despecta [...] captivavit et omnibus bonis suis exspoliavit” – Rigord, *Gesta*, 316.

⁹¹ Kessler, Richard, 1995. 354.; Volting, Von Akkon, 2016. 89.

time.^{92,93} Nevertheless, Erdberg, situated southeast of Vienna, provided a strategic location for those seeking to bypass the city without crossing the Danube and heading eastward. Assuming that the king intended on reaching Bohemia while circumventing the city, he could not risk crossing the Danube at its western crossings (Klosterneuburg, Tulln). Instead, it was worthwhile to continue eastward and cross at the less congested Hainburg, from where he could soon enter Bohemian territory through Marchfeld and towards Marchegg. To avoid Vienna, after reaching the Vienna Basin, Richard needed to continue eastward, as the hilly terrain to the west of the road made it impractical – especially in winter – to head directly towards Moravia, forcing him to take a detour.⁹⁴

The monarch was in a hurry, aiming to reach England as soon as possible. It is noteworthy that Richard was capable of significant riding feats. He travelled with only 2–3 companions, not with an entourage, at a fast pace, reminiscent of a charge, to which he, a ‘child of the sword’, was accustomed. Often, he lived continuously in the saddle for months. Cœur de Lion could potentially cross the Alps in just a few days at a breakneck pace – a task impossible for most.

For him, escape and hiding were integral to warfare, viewing them as a withdrawal in enemy territory. He remained unwavering in adhering to the rules of war, and even in the face of adversity. As a precaution, he exchanged his Templar attire for local merchant-appropriate clothing.⁹⁵ If recognition was a concern, it was his appearance, figure, and demeanour that posed the risk, given the challenge of concealing himself with his long beard and hair.⁹⁶

“*The Lion in Winter*” – *Dürnstein*⁹⁷

On 21 December, the king was captured and taken to Dürnstein Castle (also known as Tyernstein or Dirinstein).⁹⁸ Situated in the Wachau Gorge along the Danube, the castle was positioned on a difficult-to-reach elevation.⁹⁹ Although Leopold might have had personal reasons to seek retribution for his own grievances, the capture of the king was not justified, as neither the Duke of Austria,

⁹² Schreiber, *Drei Beiträge*, 1931. 279.; “in Erpurch prope Wiennam” – *Annales Zwetlenses*. MGH SS 9. Hrsg. Pertz, G. H., Hannover, 1851. 677–687. 679.; in Ertpurch – *Continuatio Praedicatorum Vindobonensium*. MGH SS 9. 724–732. 726.; Opll, Ferdinand, *Alte Grenzen im Wiener Raum*. Wien, 1986. 130.; Volting, Von Akkon, 2016. 87–88.

⁹³ Kessler, Richard, 1995. 251.; Thon, ...wo Hochverräter, 2016. 74.

⁹⁴ Schreiber, *Drei Beiträge*, 1931. 282ff.

⁹⁵ “mutato habitu incederet ut Templarius [...] dicerent [...] homines essent mercatoris” – Gervase of Canterbury, *Chronica*, Vol. I., 513.

⁹⁶ “ipse barbam haberet prolixam, et capillos prolixos” – Roger of Hoveden, *Chronica*, Vol. III., 186.

⁹⁷ Reference to Henry II: James Golden, *The Lion in Winter* (1966). Film version: 1968. Directed by Anthony Harvey.

⁹⁸ *Annalium Salisburgensium additamentum*. MGH SS 13. Hrsg. Wattenbach, Wilhelm Waitz, Georg, Hannover, 1881. 236–241. 240.

⁹⁹ Radulph of Coggeshall, *Chronicon*, 53.; Roger of Hoveden, *Chronica*, Vol. III., 187.; Landon, *Itinerary*, 1935. 71.; *Annales Marbacenses*, 186.; Ansbert, *Historia*, 102.

nor his liege lord was in war with England. Therefore, the capture of the king was ‘unofficial’ as per legal standards and he did not qualify as a prisoner of war under the prevailing laws.¹⁰⁰ Leopold could have challenged the king to a duel, but in reality, this option only arose after the *miles Christi* returned home, as until then he was protected by the sign of the Cross stitched onto his chest. Therefore, theoretically, he could not have laid a hand on the traveller. In her letters of complaint to Pope Celestine III, Dowager Queen Eleanor of Aquitaine emphasised that “the pilgrim of the Crucified” had been put in chains.¹⁰¹ Immediately upon learning of the king’s capture, the emperor formally ordered Leopold to release him,¹⁰² though in practice Henry VI consistently treated him as a prisoner of war,¹⁰³ asserting that the king had rightfully fallen into captivity as the “enemy of the Empire” and a “disturber of peace” (“*turbator pacis*”, “*inimicus imperii nostri*”), and is now within his jurisdiction (“*in nostra potestate*”).¹⁰⁴ Henry VI may have sensed the weakness of the accusation, as he explicitly stated in his letter to Philip that the English king was also a traitor.¹⁰⁵ According to him, he betrayed the crusading idea through the alleged assassination of Conrad of Montferrat.¹⁰⁶

Naturally, the cunning King Philip did not remain idle either. He dispatched envoys to Austria to renounce his vassalage to Richard and declare war on him. Moreover, he offered a considerable sum to ensure that Richard would be held under stricter confinement.¹⁰⁷

The English government initiated negotiations for the release of Richard almost immediately after learning of the monarch’s captivity.¹⁰⁸ The Bishop of Bath and Wells,¹⁰⁹ along with two Cistercians, the Abbots of Boxley and Rob-

¹⁰⁰ Gillingham, Coeur, 2013. 60.; Volfing, Von Akkon, 2016. 93.

¹⁰¹ “*filium meum militem Christi, [...] peregrinum Crucifixi, vinculis alligatum Imperatori vendidit*” – Rymer, Foedera, 1816. I/1. 58–59.; *Petri Blesensis Bathoniensis archidiaconi opera omnia*. Vol. I–II. Ed. Giles, J. A., Oxford, 1847. Vol. II., Epistolae, 64. no. 145.

¹⁰² Volfing, Von Akkon, 2016. 91.

¹⁰³ RI IV/3,1. no. 271.; Rymer, Foedera, 1816. I/1. 55–56.;

¹⁰⁴ Jericke, Hartmut, “Richard Löwenherz als Gefangener Kaiser Heinrichs VI. Ein Beitrag über die Hintergründe und Motive”, = *Meilungen des Historischen Vereins der Pfalz* 115, 2017, 115–139. 125.; Csendes, Heinrich, 1993. 124.; Berg, Richard, 2007. 192–196.

¹⁰⁵ RI IV/3,1. no. 271.; Rymer, Foedera, 1816. I/1. 55–56.

¹⁰⁶ Roger of Hoveden, *Chronica*, Vol. III., 195.; Gillingham, *The Kidnapped*, 2008. 16.; Norgate, Richard, 1924. 271.

¹⁰⁷ William of Newburgh, *Historia*, Vol. I., 389. Philip had vassal estates in Aquitaine, Anjou and Normandy, whose liege lord was the king of England.

¹⁰⁸ Roger of Hoveden, *Chronica*, 196–197.; Rymer, Foedera, 1816. I/1. 59.

¹⁰⁹ Roger of Hoveden, *Chronica*, Vol. III., 197.; Norgate, Richard, 1924. 275.; Kessler, Richard, 1995. 256.

ertsbridge, travelled to Germany.¹¹⁰ By the end of March, they were able to meet their sovereign in Ochsenfurt accompanied by the emperor.¹¹¹

The 'King's speech'

The extradition negotiations took place in Speyer.¹¹² In the initial days, the parties were far from reaching an agreement.¹¹³ In fact, the emperor presented his accusations: Richard allegedly hired assassins to send Conrad to his death and even organised an attempt on the life of King Philip.¹¹⁴ It is noteworthy that a significant portion of the accusations is not disclosed by German chroniclers, except for the Marbach Annals.¹¹⁵ Even German commentators found the absurd allegations of the assassination unbelievable. This notion started to gain traction when the French envoys arrived. Richard adamantly rejected the humiliating accusations.¹¹⁶ He suspected Philip Augustus was behind them and was even ready to challenge him to a duel.¹¹⁷ In an illustration of Pietro da Eboli, he immediately drew his sword to challenge those who tarnished his name.¹¹⁸

Richard marshalled a significant faction of the assembly to his cause, although they themselves already regarded the insinuation as lacking merit. It is imperative to underscore that the opposition of the Staufts had previously disagreed with the king's apprehension and had convened to hold Henry accountable for ordering the assassination of the Bishop of Liège. The imperial opposition could not pardon the killing of Albert of Leuven in November 1192, and Henry could not disentangle himself from the accusations of complicity in the crime. The emperor might have sensed the momentary shift in the situation and extended a conciliatory gesture to the English monarch.¹¹⁹ Henry found it necessary to alter his strategy: he agreed to facilitate negotiations for a settlement between the French king and England.

¹¹⁰ Roger of Hoveden, *Chronica*, Vol. III., 196–197.; Gervase of Canterbury, *Chronica*, Vol. I., 514.; Norgate, Richard, 1924. 276.; Thon, ...wo Hochverräter, 2016. 76.; Kessler, Richard, 1995. 354.

¹¹¹ RI IV/3,3. no. 222.; Roger of Hoveden, *Chronica*, Vol. III., 197–198.; Gervase of Canterbury, *Chronica*, Vol. I., 514.; Norgate, Richard, 1924. 276.; Thon, ...wo Hochverräter, 2016. 76.; Kessler, Richard, 1995. 354.; Mayer, Hans Eberhard, "A Ghost Ship called Frankenef: King Richard I's German Itinerary", = *English Historical Review* 115, 2000, No. 460/Feb: 134–144. 136–137.

¹¹² Henry VI in Speyer: RI IV/3,1. no. 285, 286.; RI IV/3,3. no. 226.

¹¹³ Roger of Hoveden, *Chronica*, Vol. III., 199.

¹¹⁴ 22 March: RI IV/3,3. no. 225.; Ralph of Coggeshall, *Chronicon*, 58.; Roger of Hoveden, *Chronica*, Vol. III., 199.; Berg, Richard, 2007. 195.

¹¹⁵ *Annales Marbacenses*, 180–182.

¹¹⁶ Roger of Hoveden, *Chronica*, Vol. III., 199.; William of Newburgh, *Historia*, Vol. I., 387–388.; Radulph of Coggeshall, *Chronicon*, 58–60.; Gillingham, *The Kidnapped*, 2008. 19.

¹¹⁷ "Arguat, armatus veniat, subeatque duellum // Me contra, si me super hoc convicere possit" – Guillaume le Breton, *La Philippide*, Vol. I., 113. vv. 398–399.

¹¹⁸ Eboli, *Liber*, 51. vv. 1074–77.

¹¹⁹ *Epistolae Cantuarienses*: In: *Chronicles and Memorials of the Reign of Richard I*. Vol. II., 361–362. no. 398.

The emperor could not afford to leave his realm with a stirred-up opposition and a captive ruler. Adolphe I, Archbishop of Cologne forged an alliance against the Emperor with Conrad I Wittelsbach, Archbishop of Mainz; Ottokar I of Bohemia and Henry the Lion, Duke of Saxony, the prince deprived of his duchy. They also joined forces with the late bishop's brother and uncle, the Dukes of Brabant and Limburg.¹²⁰ This is partially the reason why Emperor Henry had hopes that the capture of Richard would fortify the Capetian alliance, a leverage he could employ against the looming opposition. There was a risk that discontent in the Rhineland might find its way to the Welfs, who already sympathised with Richard. The opportunity presented itself, as all relevant parties convened in Speyer. There was also the concern that the agreement might fall apart, the emperor might retract, and the prisoner would be remanded to his cell. Richard, too, harboured fears that if Henry became increasingly isolated, he might surrender him to the French monarch.¹²¹ Henry the Lion perceived an opportunity to act in defence of his pilgrim brother-in-law. For Emperor Henry, increasingly divesting himself of the valuable yet cumbersome hostage it was a paramount concern. The presence of the captive could become all the more awkward. The longer he detained Richard in Germany, the opposition might eventually realise that his liberation could equip them with a strategic advantage.

In the background, agents of the English crown were already at work in the Stauf court.¹²² Hubert Walter, the Bishop of Salisbury arriving from the Holy Land to Italy, did not travel directly to England but proceeded straight to the Rhineland.¹²³ He, too, recognised the precarious nature of the English situation. On March 25, the agreement for the extradition of the king was signed.¹²⁴ Subsequently, Walter embarked on a journey towards England to facilitate the fulfilment of the conditions for the king's surrender.¹²⁵

In early April 1193, Richard was transported to Trifels Castle. While Leopold treated him as a knight who had surrendered, Emperor Henry VI already regarded him, in the contemporary sense, as a political prisoner. Trifels was inherently used as a prison, housing those deemed 'traitors' to the Empire for life.¹²⁶ Perched at a high altitude, the weather in Trifels was harsh even in April. Access, both in and out, was impossible, and the prisoners were guarded by a doubled watch. The reason for bringing Richard into such a 'genuine' dungeon might have been to

¹²⁰ Norgate, Richard, 1924. 273.; Jericke, Richard, 2017. 132.

¹²¹ Landon, Itinerary, 1935. 74.; Roger of Hoveden, *Chronica*, Vol. III., 214.; William of Newburgh, *Historia*, Vol. I., 396–397.

¹²² Roger of Hoveden, *Chronica*, Vol. III., 204.; Norgate, Richard, 1924. 277.

¹²³ William of Newburgh, *Historia*, Vol. I., 389.

¹²⁴ RI IV/3,1. no. 284.; Roger of Hoveden, *Chronica*, Vol. III., 198–199.; William of Newburgh, *Historia*, Vol. I., 388.; Ralph de Diceto, *Ymagines*, Vol. II., 106.; Norgate, Richard, 1924. 274.

¹²⁵ Landon, Itinerary, 1935. 74.

¹²⁶ Ralph of Diceto, *Ymagines*, Vol. II., 107.; Norgate, Richard, 1924. 273.; Gillingham, *The Kidnapped*, 2008. 23.; Thon, ...wo Hochverräter, 2016. 79.

deter the opposition from entertaining the idea of freeing the captive.¹²⁷ The choice of Trifels had the advantage of being centrally located in Stauf territories, close to their *ministeriales*, and not far from the courts of Speyer and Worms. Therefore, if any action were taken to rescue the king, Henry would reach it first.¹²⁸

Nevertheless, the emperor's intention was not to break his opponent in inhumane conditions. The king's capture benefited the emperor due to the alliance with Philip Augustus. With the ransom, he could have strengthened his position in Germany for a while. He wanted to remove Richard from the political stage, keeping him as far away as possible from his rivals. Until the ransom arrived, Richard was to avoid contact with both the Welfs and the Stauf-opposing prelates. The emperor may have deemed it too risky for the king to remain at the court during this period.¹²⁹

In total, out of the 411 days of his captivity, he spent approximately five weeks in an actual prison cell. According to customary law, the confinement of the royal person was a form of *libera custodia* ("sub honorabili custodia"¹³⁰; "in libera clausus custodia"¹³¹). He enjoyed certain freedoms that were not granted to other prisoners. Although William of Newburgh writes that he was chained,¹³² according to several accounts, they only put shackles on his hands, not on his feet.¹³³ He was not constantly in chains, and his hands were only bound when he was transported.¹³⁴ However, from Speyer to Trifels, Henry had him transported in chains.¹³⁵ The Salzburg Annals exaggerate when it claims that he spent the entire year in chains at Trifels.¹³⁶ The fact that the majority of sources perceived that he was treated fairly indicates that under no circumstances throughout the entire day, was he ever in chains. The shackles and the watchful guard primarily served *those* who might contemplate the king's liberation. It signalled to the adversaries of the Staufs that Richard was 'within their power'. He was not held in captiv-

¹²⁷ "ad hoc ibi specialiter in loco munitissimo constitutum, ut illuc deportarentur et perpetuo traderentur carceri quicunque fuissent contra imperium de perduellione notati" – Ralph of Diceto, *Ymagines*, Vol. II., 107.; Görich, *Verletzte*, 2003. 76.

¹²⁸ Görich, *Verletzte*, 2003. 77.

¹²⁹ Gillingham, *Richard*, 1978. 229.

¹³⁰ *Continuatio Aquicinctina*, 430.

¹³¹ [Andreas von Marchiennes] *Andree Marchianensis Historia regum Francorum*. Continuationes, Vol. I., MGH SS 26. Hrsg. Waitz, Georg, Hannover, 1882. 204–212. 212.; Görich, *Verletzte*, 2003. 74.; Pfaff, *Der gefangene König*, 1971. 14.; Norgate, *Richard*, 1924. 275.

¹³² "citra decus regium in vinculis servabatur" – William of Newburgh, *Historia*, Vol. I., 383.

¹³³ "Qui licet pedes regis in compedibus non humiliaverit, [...] quam si duris artasset in vinculis" – Ralph of Diceto, *Ymagines*, Vol. II., 106.

¹³⁴ Görich, *Verletzte*, 2003. 75.

¹³⁵ "regem sibi presentari iussit presentatumque Wormaciam asportari vinctum ferroque honustum precepit" – Otto of Sankt Blasien, *Chronica*, 110–112. Not Worms but Trifels.

¹³⁶ "regem [...] viculatum imperatori tradidit, quem imparatir toto illi anno vinctum tenuit" – *Annalium Salisburgensium additamentum*, 240.

ity but rather *in confinement*. The constant vigilance of armed guards day and night,¹³⁷ even standing watch with drawn swords around his bed at night, aimed to prevent any contact with the king.¹³⁸

It is conceivable that the emperor entertained the idea of extracting more favourable conditions from England. A suitor for Richard, King Philip II, emerged, from whom Henry hoped to secure even more than the negotiated ransom. As long as the emperor did not negotiate with the French, the king had to be kept secluded under truly strict supervision.

It seems plausible that Richard was hoping to reach the fiercest enemies of the Emperor and the Duke of Austria, in Saxony, the land of the Welfs – his relatives. As has been seen, his sister, Mathilda, was the consort of Henry the Lion, Duke of Saxony, an ‘old’ ally of the Plantagenets. From here, he would have quickly reached England on a good ship from a northern port. Hamburg and Lübeck traditionally had excellent relations with England. It is possible that this was the reason behind his landing in Corfu and sailing up the Adriatic to begin with. The urgency of the situation in Normandy made the king “impatient”, he wanted to get home faster than the main army and was eager to go to war again against Philip Augustus for the lands of his ancestors. William of Newburgh might suggest the same thing: Richard sent his sister and wife ahead, and instead of the slow, long sea voyage, or even the safer larger vessel, he boarded a fast ship and set sail with a small, lightly armed entourage.¹³⁹ He wanted to take a different route in the first place to save time. After disembarking, he was no longer exposed to the vicissitudes of nature, he held his destiny in his own hands: he wanted to ride across Europe on horseback, at breakneck speed, where no one would expect him. That would have been typical of Richard. He did not want to be delayed by the slow-moving fleet.

The easiest route to the Welfs was through the territory of their ally, Ottokar I, Duke of Bohemia. Richard was aware that the Přemysl prince was not on the best of terms with the Emperor. Perhaps his original intention was to try to reach Bohemia by bypassing Austria from the west, via the Archdiocese of Salzburg and Tyrol. This may explain why he went toward Friesach. Reaching Bohemia from Friesach through the Salzburg area did not seem impracticable. From there he only had to cross the border of the diocese of Passau and Austria. However, it is also possible that winter prevented his entry from the west, or that the roads

¹³⁷ “manu militum armatorum die noctuque vicissim vigilantium sub artissima tentus custodia” – Gervase of Canterbury, *Chronica*, Vol. I., 516.

¹³⁸ “militum et servorum turbam [...] qui eum in omnibus locis die noctuque gladiis accincti comitantur, et lectulum regis ambirent, neminem suorum cum eo pernoctare permens” – Radulph of Coggeshall, *Chronicon*, 58.; Eickels, Klaus van, *Vom inszenierten Konsens zum systematisierten Konflikt. Die englisch-französischen Beziehungen und ihre Wahrnehmung an der Wende vom Hoch- zum Spätmittelalter*. Stuttgart, 2002. 392.

¹³⁹ “cum paucis expeditioribus agiliori navigio sequebatur [...] Impatientior quippe taedii, dum lentum et morosum latissimi aspernaretur, pelagi transitum, tutiorem gravioris navigii, et suo pondere minus timentis spiritus procellarum, evectiorem recusavit” – William of Newburgh, *Historia*, Vol. I., 382.

to the north and west were blocked by the Babenbergs. Thus, the only route left open was that on which he was not expected: the one to Vienna. In that case, there was only one option: it was possible to reach Bohemia by crossing the Danube close to – but avoiding – Vienna.¹⁴⁰ This would explain why he travelled east after Friesach. Some German and French sources even state that because of the *interfectio* of the Montferrats the road through Apulia was fraught with dangers, and from the beginning the secret destination of the king was the “country” of his brother-in-law, Saxony,¹⁴¹ via Bohemia.¹⁴² He could have felt safe beyond the Moravian-Austrian border. He could have arrived quickly in Brno, from where Meissen is only a few days away. Vladislav Jindřich, the would-be Margrave of Moravia, Hermann I, Landgrave of Thuringia and Albert I, Margrave of Meissen were all opponents of the Staufs. Had Richard managed to maintain this pace, he could have already arrived in England when his opponents believed he was still sailing towards Marseille. His other ships docked in Italy only in November and his army was on its way home.¹⁴³

Emperor Henry VI began to realise that detaining the King of England in prison did not adhere to the principles of *libera* or *honestia custodia*. This situation not only failed to alleviate tensions with his adversaries but also did not enable him to extract money sooner from his valuable captive. Furthermore, the Pope had issued threats of excommunication against both Henry and the French king.¹⁴⁴ Moreover, Eleanor consistently implored Pope Celestine III to take tangible steps for the release of her crusader son.¹⁴⁵ The emperor found himself compelled to relent.¹⁴⁶

Weeks later, envoys from England succeeded in having the king spend his captivity at the imperial court in Hagenau.¹⁴⁷ The emperor was wary of allowing the case of the innocently detained pilgrim to fuel sentiments against the Stauf

¹⁴⁰ Kessler, Richard, 1995. 250.; Schreiber, Drei Beiträge, 1931. 281.

¹⁴¹ “ut secretius ad nepotem suum ducem Saxonie pervenire posset” – Annals of Anchin: [Andreas Marchianensis?] *Continuatio Aquicinctina a. 1149–1237*. MGH SS 6. Hrsg. Pertz, G. H., Hannover, 1844. 405–438. 430.; “s’en venir en tapigane de Sassoigne” – [Sarrazin] *Histoire des ducs de Normandie et des rois d’Angleterre*, publiée ... suivie de la relation du tournoi de Ham, par Sarrazin. Éd. Michel, Francisque, Paris, 1840. 87.; Kessler, Richard, 1995. 249.

¹⁴² “ad terram egressus [...] ignotus et profugus transivit [...] per Austriam fines Bohemiae intrare vellet” – *Continuatio Admuntensis*, 587.

¹⁴³ Gillingham, Richard, 1978. 223.

¹⁴⁴ RI IV/4,4,5. nos. 781, 782, 783.; RI IV/3,3. no. 293.; Roger of Hoveden, *Chronica*, Vol. III., 209.; Edbury, Peter W., “Pope Celestine III, 1191–1198. Diplomat and pastor”, In. Doran, John – Smith, Damian J. (eds.), *Celestine III, the Crusade and the Latin East*. Aldershot, 2008. 129–144. 132.

¹⁴⁵ Rymer, Foedera, 1816. I/1. 56–59.; Petrus Blesensis, *Epistolae*, Vol. II., 58–74, nos. 145, 146, 147.

¹⁴⁶ Roger of Hoveden, *Chronica*, Vol. III., 208.

¹⁴⁷ RI IV/3,3. no. 228.; Roger of Hoveden, *Chronica*, Vol. III., 205–209.; Otto of St. Blasien, *Chronica*, 58.; William of Newburgh, *Historia*, Vol. I., 388.; Ralph of Coggeshall, *Chronicon*, 58.; RI IV/3,3. no. 224.; Berg, Richard, 2007. 197.; Landon, *Itinerary*, 1935. 74.; RI IV/3,3. nos. 287, 288.

administration.¹⁴⁸ Henry, possibly due to a fear towards his imperial adversaries, embraced Richard as “*dilectus amicus noster*”, cementing an indissoluble *foedus amoris*.¹⁴⁹ Henry intervened to facilitate peace negotiations between France and England. He initiated talks with King Philip II, with a meeting scheduled for 25 June.¹⁵⁰ The lenient atmosphere was also influenced by the fact that the ‘subversive activities’ of his adversaries had not abated. The nobility of the Rhineland was almost on the brink of open rebellion, with even the abdication of the ruler being contemplated.¹⁵¹ The emperor deemed it perilous to have a hostage in captivity that promised substantial political gains.

Prince John

Henry failed to draw closer to the English-French peace he sought to negotiate.¹⁵² What was the reason for this? Prince John, ever loyal to ‘good’ Philip, stood behind it. In January 1192, long before Richard’s return from the Holy Land and when he was not even intending to leave Palestine at the time, the King of France called upon the nobles of Normandy to surrender to him the counties of Eu and Aumale, which were taken as his rightful feudal fiefs. John, who until then had only received the county of Mortain from the entire Plantagenet ‘pie’, had long been enticed by the Capet ruler to side with him and swear allegiance for all the French possessions of the House of Anjou. At that time, Dowager Queen Eleanor of Aquitaine was still able to restrain his son, John.¹⁵³ However, when the prince learned of his brother’s being taken captive in January 1193, he immediately headed to Philip. He swore allegiance and declared his brother an “enemy”.¹⁵⁴ The nobility of Normandy, however, regarded the English kings as their natural lords, showing little inclination for the Capetians. The French laid a campaign, captured the keys to Normandy, Gisors, Vexin, and Aumale.¹⁵⁵ The path to the heart of Normandy, Rouen, laid open. However, a considerable portion of the Plantagenet vassals took up arms for Normandy. Philip could not have much hope, despite his armies being stationed in castles in Normandy. John believed that based on the French successes, he could find supporters in England. He recruited followers in Southwest England but only succeeded in gaining the assistance of some scoundrels, along with Flemish and

¹⁴⁸ RI IV/3,3. no. 228.

¹⁴⁹ 19 April 1193: “ubi honorifice [...] recepti fuimus [...] Honeste autem circa, Ipsum Imperatorem moram facimus” – Rymer, *Foedera*, 1816. I/1. 60.; Roger of Hoveden, *Chronica*, Vol. III., 209.; RI IV/3,3. no. 229.; Pfaff, *Der gefangene König*, 1971. 14.; Görich, *Verletzte*, 2003. 84.

¹⁵⁰ RI IV/3,3. no. 227.; Roger of Hoveden, *Chronica*, Vol. III., 212.; Jericke, Richard, 2017. 123.

¹⁵¹ Gillingham, Richard, 1978. 225.

¹⁵² 14–20 June 1193: RI IV/3,3. no. 234.; Roger of Hoveden, *Chronica*, Vol. III., 214.

¹⁵³ Rymer, *Foedera*, 1816. I/1. 57.

¹⁵⁴ Roger of Hoveden, *Chronica*, Vol. III., 203–204.; William of Newburgh, *Historia*, Vol. I., 384.; Rymer, *Foedera*, 1816. I/1. 56.

¹⁵⁵ Roger of Hoveden, *Chronica*, Vol. III., 206, 212.; Ralph of Coggeshall, *Chronicon*, 61–62.; Rigord, *Gesta*, 318, 323.; Ambroise, *L’Estoire*, 330. vv. 12310–12312.

Welsh mercenaries paid in French money. The démarche did not succeed, as England stood firmly in support of her king.¹⁵⁶

Henry VI also disapproved of the prospect that his 'neighbour', the King of France, would increase his power by seizing Normandy. He never wished for Philip to lay his hands on the Plantagenet inheritance and gain significant political influence. While the crown of Sicily was what the emperor desired, he was not willing to let Philip, who would obtain vast territories, become a rival in the eyes of his adversaries. He was not inclined to bring about an English-French peace. The interest of the English king also demanded that Henry and Philip should not enter into a new agreement.¹⁵⁷ Therefore, Richard made an approach towards the Welfs. Thus, the planned negotiations were ultimately abandoned by the emperor. He wanted to free himself from the heavy burden as much as possible. If only the English would pay, their king would return and repel the French king, who eagerly occupied castles. Moreover, the Stauf rival base grew during the spring. The nobility of the Lower Rhine region were joined by the lords of Meissen and Thuringia, and the new star of the Welfs, Otto, emerged with renewed strength. His mother was the sister of the captive of Trifels, and his father fled to England from the Staufs as well as being himself brought up in Angevin lands. Richard was also able to influence his young nephew, the future German king, who idolised his English cousin.

The plan to hand over the captive to the King of France could not materialise either, as Philip did not have enough money, despite surpassing the English offers. He expected that with John's assistance, he could lay his hands on the Anjou territories, and the prince would gain control over larger areas. However, his troops got stuck at Gisors, and John suffered a defeat. His action was promptly crushed by the English government.¹⁵⁸ John was forced to agree to a ceasefire.¹⁵⁹

In late June 1193, the emperor finally concluded a definitive agreement with England, and they agreed on the payment of a ransom of 150,000 Cologne silver marks.¹⁶⁰ The emperor's concern about the Welfs' activation is evident in his willingness to repay one-third of this amount, 50,000 marks to Richard if he intercedes for peace with Henry the Lion, Duke Saxony.¹⁶¹ The imperial opposition could indeed be appeased by the release of Richard: Henry made peace with the relatives of the Bishop of Liège.¹⁶²

The agreement also caught the wind in the sails of the French king. He, too, was inclined towards peace. In July, they concluded a peace agreement based on the status quo.¹⁶³

¹⁵⁶ Gillingham, Richard, 1978. 227.

¹⁵⁷ Roger of Hoveden, *Chronica*, Vol. III., 214.

¹⁵⁸ William of Newburgh, *Historia*, Vol. I., 389.

¹⁵⁹ Roger of Hoveden, *Chronica*, Vol. III., 214.; Ralph of Diceto, *Ymagines*, Vol. II., 110.

¹⁶⁰ RI IV/3,1. nos. 302a, 305.; Roger of Hoveden, *Chronica*, Vol. III., 215–216.; Others put it to 140,000: Ernoul, *Chronique*, 229.; or, 200,000: Rigord, *Gesta*, 316.

¹⁶¹ Gillingham, Richard, 1978. 234.

¹⁶² 14–20 June 1193: RI IV/3,3. no. 233.

¹⁶³ *Recueil des actes du Philippe-Auguste*, Vol. I., no. 454.; *Catalogue des actes de Philippe-Auguste* par Delisle, Léopold, Paris, 1856. no. 400.; Rymer, *Foedera*, 1816. I/1.

The king was provided with quarters in the courts of Worms and Speyer. It is conceivable that he also stayed in Frankfurt, thus getting closer to the Welfs' base.¹⁶⁴ By the end of the year, a portion of the ransom, 20,000 marks, had already been delivered. The emperor was preparing on releasing the captive in January.¹⁶⁵

The return of the king

On 4 February 1194, a *generalis conventus* was held in Mainz, where Richard's release was proclaimed.¹⁶⁶ The guarantors, including two sons of Henry the Lion, surrendered themselves to the emperor.¹⁶⁷ The King of England granted various benefits to a series of imperial dignitaries who swore allegiance to him.¹⁶⁸ They constituted the opposition to the emperor. Symbolically, Richard did not take the fastest route along the Rhine from Mainz to England but via Leuven and Brussels, visiting the members of the imperial opposition.¹⁶⁹ The moral victory, if it can be phrased as such, belonged to Richard. He emerged from the captivity almost strengthened in 'soul and body'.

Richard might have had an idea in mind to find shelter in Hungary when he was either landed in Dalmatia,¹⁷⁰ or, when he was at the outskirts of Vienna, from where the Hungarian border was not far along the Danube. Here we would not take it into serious consideration since our sources do not report it at all. It seems however plausible that it was an alternative to move from Vienna with Hungarian assistance towards Moravia. Esztergom, with Queen Margaret, Young Henry's widow, who spent years and was brought up in England almost together with Richard and Mathilda, must have provided a shelter, if need be. Or, King Béla III may have assisted in Richard's way towards Saxony on the Austrian border. Guido de Bazochiis (Gui de Bazoches) in his *Chronographia* reported that Richard touched the borderlands of Hungary.¹⁷¹ Albert Schreiber did even find it realistic that Richard contemplated that he would receive a

61.; Kessler, Richard, 1995. 277–279.

¹⁶⁴ Mayer finds that the place of issue of a charter “apud Frankenef” refers to a city, as its ending was not preserved in the parchment: it might have been ‘Frankenefort’. Mayer, *A Ghost Ship*, 2000. 135–136.; See Landon, *Itinerary*, 1935. 69, 163. no. 367.

¹⁶⁵ RI IV/3. no. 328.; Roger of Hoveden, *Chronica*, Vol. III., 227.; Landon, *Itinerary*, 1935. 80.; Norgate, Richard, 1924. 283.

¹⁶⁶ RI IV/3,3. no. 240.; Ralph of Diceto, *Ymagines*, Vol. II., 113.; Roger of Hoveden, *Chronica*, Vol. III., 233.

¹⁶⁷ *Mainzer Urkundenbuch*. Bearb. Acht, Peter, Darmstadt, 1971. Bd. 2/2: 1176–1200. 975. no. 590.; Landon, *Itinerary*, 1935. 82.

¹⁶⁸ Ralph of Diceto, *Ymagines*, Vol. II., 112–113.; Gillingham, Coeur, 2013. 71, 78.; Mayer, *A Ghost Ship*, 2000. 139.

¹⁶⁹ “ad portum de Swiene” – Roger of Hoveden, *Chronica*, Vol. III., 235.

¹⁷⁰ Dalmatia may have had spread from Guillaume le Breton towards Albericus, then, a range of further sources. Csákó also report that the information was known by Anonymus *Laudunensis' Chronicon universale* as well. Csákó, *Az Árpád-kori*, 2023. 205, 261–262.

¹⁷¹ Csákó, *Az Árpád-kori*, 2023. 343.

friendly reception in Hungary,¹⁷² of which, we are still not able to be convinced in the absence of direct evidence, but it is to be seen as an alternative, a solution that might have been on the table when the Lionheart was struggling to reach his homeland through the Continent. If one takes a closer look at the figures of Duchess Mathilda and Henry the Lion on the “Krönungsbild” of the *Evangeliar Heinrichs des Löwen*,¹⁷³ the connections with the Plantagenets are obvious: the painting shows the coronation of Henry the Lion and his wife Mathilda by Christ. Behind the kneeling duchess appear are her father, King Henry II of England, her grandmother, Empress Mathilda. Christ surrounded by 8 saints close to the duchy, including Thomas Becket, Archbishop of Canterbury. If one is also to oversee the relations Béla III was maintaining with the Plantagenet court and the fact that he proposed to marry the Young King’s widow, a more complex picture is to be drawn, where the disguised pilgrim may have hoped to reach Saxony through the Hungarian borderlands.

Appendix

Fig. 1–2.



Petrus de Ebulo: *Liber ad honorem Augusti sive De rebus Siculis*. Bern, Burgerbibliothek, Cod. 120.II. 55 ff. ca. 1195 – ca. 1197. f. 129r.: e-codices - Virtuelle Handschriftenbibliothek der Schweiz / Bibliothèque virtuelle des manuscrits en Suisse. Université de Fribourg / Universität Freiburg – Schweizerische Akademie der Geistes- und Sozialwissenschaften / Académie suisse des sciences humaines et sociales. Éd./Red. Florian Mittenhuber, Februar 2018. Courtesy of Burgerbibliothek, Bern. [<https://www.e-codices.unifr.ch/de/bbb/0120-2//129r> – 19 January 2024]

¹⁷² Schreiber, *Drei Beiträge*, 1931. 285.

¹⁷³ *Evangeliar Heinrichs d. Löwen und Mathildes von England*. ca. 1175-88. Herzog August Bibliothek, Wolfenbüttel, Cod. Guelf. 105 Noviss. 2°. f. 171v. Handschriftendatenbank. [<https://diglib.hab.de/?db=mss&list=ms&id=105-noviss-2f&lang=en> – 20 January 2024] See Fig 3.

Fig. 3.



Evangeliar Heinrichs d. Löwen und Mathildes von England. ca. 1175-88. Herzog August Bibliothek, Wolfenbüttel, Cod. Guelf. 105 Noviss. 2°. f. 171v. Krönungsbild: Wolfenbütteler Digital Library, Handschriftendatenbank [https://diglib.hab.de/?db=mss&list=ms&id=105-noviss-2f&lang=en; http://diglib.hab.de/mss/105-noviss-2f/start.htm?image=171v – 20 January 2024]

Gábor Barabás

TO ERADICATE THE DEPRAVITY OF HERESY: A HUNGARIAN CRUSADE IN THE EARLY THIRTEENTH CENTURY?*

This paper is a short contribution to the history of the crusades led against so-called heretics in the first half of the thirteenth century. The topic is well known in the Western historical research, as well as in the popular culture, due to the significance of the campaigns in Southern France against the Cathars, also known as the Albigensian Crusade, in the early thirteenth century.¹ Nonetheless, the idea of a crusade to exterminate the depravity of heresy emerged in relation to other territories and local groups as well. The relationship between the Kingdom of Hungary and its southern neighbour, Bosnia offers a quite similar example, as accusations of heterodoxy played an important role in the efforts of the Hungarian rulers to assert their overlordship over the territories of Bosnia. The issue appeared as early as the outset of the thirteenth century, when accusations emerged against the Bosnian ruler, Ban Kulin claiming that he and his subjects were no true Christians. Although the monarch was able to acquit himself from the accusations due to the examination ordered by Pope Innocent III (1198–1216),² there were no military actions in order at that time, yet the controversy regarding the state of Christianity in Bosnia persisted. This study investigates the situation in the 1220s and 1230s when the idea of crusaders fighting for the cause to abolish heresy arose several times, and it seems possible that a Hungarian royal prince, Duke Coloman of Slavonia,³ even lead his armies – as a crusader – to Bosnia. The events of the campaign(s) are scarcely known; however, the preparations are tangible in the main source material, the pontifical correspondence. Therefore I will analyse the efforts made by Honorius III (1216–1227) and Gregory IX (1227–1241) in this matter,

* I am grateful to László Veszprémy and Zsolt Hunyadi for their help and advice.

¹ See recently Rist, Rebecca, *The Papacy and Crusading in Europe, 1198–1245*. New York, 2009. 45–117.; Rist, Rebecca, “Salvation and the Albigensian Crusade: Pope Innocent III and the Plenary Indulgence”, = *Reading Medieval Studies* 36, 2010, 95–112.; Smith, Thomas W., “The Interface between Papal Authority and Heresy: The Legates of Honorius III in Languedoc, 1216–1227”, In. Smith, Thomas W. (ed.), *Authority and Power in the Medieval Church c. 1000–1500*. (Europa Sacra, 24.). Turnhout, 2020, 135–144.

² It is to be underlined that Pope Innocent III ordered a formal investigation that eventually cleared Ban Kulin from the allegations. See Majnarić, Ivan, “Giovanni de Casamaris e l’abiura di Bilino Polje 1203 – Giudice delegato papale in Bosnia”, = *Review of Croatian History* 13, 2017, 29–44.

³ For Coloman see Font, Márta – Barabás, Gábor, *Coloman, King of Galicia and Duke of Slavonia (1208–1241): Medieval Central Europe and Hungarian Power*. (Beyond Medieval Europe). Leeds, 2019.

revealing the role of crusader terminology⁴. It is quite intriguing that Hungarian sources contain only indirect information regarding the crusade against Bosnian heresy, even though the notion of fighting infidels as crusaders a few years after the crusade of King Andrew II (1205–1235) must have been widely known among members of the lay and ecclesiastical elite of the Realm of St Stephen.⁵

Before analysing the relevant sources, let us take a closer look at the so-called Bosnian heresy, or in other words the issue of the *Bosnian church*, which is traditionally considered to be a dualistic teaching related to the Bogomils and the Cathars.⁶ Nonetheless, serious doubts have emerged in the historiography regarding the direct connection between the Christians of Bosnia and any dualistic teachings (such as the refusal of the lay and ecclesiastical hierarchy and the rejection of the sacraments, like baptism, the Eucharist, and marriage). The influence of the Bogomils cannot be completely excluded, but if present, it was certainly mixed with Eastern monasticism and popular beliefs as well. A reason for that is often sought in the landscape of Bosnia, which helped the locals to resist the Western Church's efforts to unify Christianity.⁷ Neverthe-

⁴ It is disputed in the historiography, which campaigns can be described as crusades. The issue at hand may lie outside of the topic by the standards of the traditionalist view, yet, in accordance with the generalist understanding the Bosnian question falls into the category of a crusade. Even, if the categorization itself is controversial. See recently Srodecki, Paul, "Crusading on the Periphery in the High Middle Ages: Main Debates, New Approaches", In: Srodecki, Paul – Kersken, Norbert (eds.), *The Expansion of the Faith: Crusading on the Frontiers of Latin Christendom in the High Middle Ages*. Turnhout, 2022, 29–52.; On the situation of Bosnia see Budak, Nevem, "Crusades and Crusading in High Medieval Dalmatia and Croatia – Failed, Abused, Imaginary", In: Srodecki, Paul – Kersken, Norbert (eds.), *The Expansion of the Faith: Crusading on the Frontiers of Latin Christendom in the High Middle Ages*. Turnhout, 2022. 89–96. 95–96.

⁵ For the relation of the Hungarian Kingdom to the crusades see: Sweeney, James Ross, "Hungary and the Crusades, 1169 – 1218", = *International History Review* 3, 1981, 467–481.; Borosy, András, "A kereszties háborúk és Magyarország [The Crusades and Hungary]", = *Hadtörténelmi Közlemények* 109, 1996, nr. 1. 3–43, and nr. 2. 11–54.; Hunyadi, Zsolt, "Úton a Szentföld felé. A Magyar Királyság szerepe a II. és III. kereszties hadjáratban [On the Way Towards the Holy Land: The Role of the Kingdom of Hungary in the Second and Third Crusades]", = *Hadtörténelmi Közlemények* 133, 2020, 750–775.

⁶ For a historiographic overview see Day, Kirsty, "Crusading against Bosnian Christians, c. 1234–1241", In: Carr, Mike – Chrissis, Nikolaos – Raccagni, Gianluca (eds.), *Crusading against Christians in the Middle Ages*. Palgrave, forthcoming; I am grateful to Kirsty Day for sending me the manuscript of her paper.

⁷ For the church and heresy of Bosnia see Runciman, Steven, *The Medieval Manichee: A Study of the Christian Dualist Heresy*. Cambridge, 1947. 63–115.; Fine, John V. A., *The Bosnian Church: A New Interpretation. A Study of the Bosnian Church and its Place in State and Society From the 13th to the 15th Centuries*. (East European Quarterly. East European Monographs). New York–London, 1975. 113–121.; Lambert, Malcolm, *The Cathars*. Oxford,

less, it seems plausible that the allegations of heterodoxy in Bosnia were at least partially of politically motivated, intending to support the Hungarian claims as overlords of the Bosnian rulers⁸ by gaining the support of the papal authority as well.⁹

The issue of the suspected heresy in Bosnia was addressed firmly by the Apostolic See. Innocent III sent his chaplain, Johannes de Casamaris, to Bosnia to conduct a proper investigation in 1202. As result of his activity there, in 1203, after a local synod, an oath (abjuration)¹⁰ was sworn before him at Bilino Polje (today Zenica, BiH) by the ban and the representatives (*priors*) of the “Christians of Bosnia” concerning their loyalty to Rome and to its liturgy and customs.¹¹

1998. 297–313.; Lorenz, Manuel, “Bogomilen, Katharer und bosnische ‘Christen’: Der Transfer dualistischer Häresien zwischen Orient und Okzident (11.–13. Jh.)”, In: Nemes, Balázs J. (ed.), *Vermitteln – Übersetzen – Begegnen: Transferphänomene im europäischen Mittelalter und in der frühen Neuzeit; interdisziplinäre Annäherungen*. (Nova mediaevalia, 9.). Göttingen, 2011. 87–136. 107–121.; Ternovác, Bálint, “A bogumil eretnekség a XI. századi Magyar Királyság déli területein [The Bogomil Heresy on the Southern Part of the Hungarian Kingdom in the Eleventh Century]”, = *Fons* 20, 2013, 501–523. 502–503.; Rabić, Nedim, “Im toten Winkel der Geschichte: Johannes von Wildeshausen als Bischof von Bosnien 1233/34–1237”, In: Heusinger, Sabine von et al. (eds.), *Die deutschen Dominikaner und Dominikanerinnen im Mittelalter*. Berlin–Boston, 2016. 53–69. 56–58.; Margetić, Lujo, “Neka pitanja abjuracije iz 1203. godine [Some Questions about the Abjuration of 1203]”, In: Šanjek, Franjo (ed.), *Fenomen “krstjani” u srednjovjekovnoj Bosni i Humu*. Sarajevo–Zagreb, 2005. 27–103. 85–90.; Slišković, Slavko, “Dominikanci i bosansko-humski krstjani [The Dominicans and the Christians of Bosnia and Hum]”, In: Šanjek, Franjo (ed.), *Fenomen “krstjani” u srednjovjekovnoj Bosni i Humu*. Sarajevo–Zagreb, 2005. 479–498. 480–484.; Day, Crusading, forthcoming; Dautović, Dženan, “Reception of John V.A. Fine Jr.’s The Bosnian Church: A New Interpretation: Interesting Sleeve of a Never Ending Historiographical Debate”, = *Studia Ceranea* 12, 2022, 399–415. 401–403.

⁸ The first Hungarian king who acted as overlord of Bosnia was Béla II (1131–1141), he even appointed his son, Ladislaus as duke of Bosnia. Nonetheless, the Hungarian control over Bosnia could have not been effectively realised during the Hungarian–Byzantine struggles in the second half of the twelfth century. For the relation between Hungary and Bosnia see *Korai magyar történeti lexikon*. Ed. Kristó, Gyula, (entry by Rokay, Péter – Takács, Miklós). Budapest, 1994. 123–124.

⁹ For the topic see Barabás, Gábor, “Heretics, Pirates, and Legates. The Bosnian Heresy, the Hungarian Kingdom, and the Popes in the Early 13th Century”, = *Specimina Nova Pars Prima Sectio Mediaevalis* 9, 2017, 35–58.

¹⁰ *Die Register Innocenz’ III.*, Vols I–XV. Ed. Hageneder, Othmar et al., Graz et al., 1964–2022. Vol. VI., no. 141.; See Majnarić, Giovanni de Casamaris, 2017. 38–39.; Majnarić, Ivan, “Tending the Flock: Clergy and a Discourse of War in the Wider Hinterland of the Eastern Adriatic during the Late Twelfth and Thirteenth Centuries”, In: Kotecki, Radosław – Maciejewski, Jacek – Ott, John S. (eds.), *Between Sword and Prayer: Warfare and Medieval Clergy in Cultural Perspective*. Leiden–Boston, MA, 2018. 435–469. 446–447.

¹¹ Runciman, The Medieval, 1947. 104.; Fine, The Bosnian Church, 1975. 126–134.; Fine, John V. A., *The Late Medieval Balkans: A Critical Survey from the Late Twelfth Century to the Ottoman Conquest*. Ann Arbor, 1987. 47.; Schmitt, Jürgen, “Balkanpolitik der Arpaden in den Jahren 1180–1241”, = *Ungarn-Jahrbuch* 17, 1989, 25–52. 31.; Lambert, The Cathars, 1998. 298.; Lorenz, Bogomilen, 2011. 114–115.

It is quite telling, that after the solemn event in Bosnia, another oath was taken, this time in Hungary, where Kulin was represented by his son and two priors of the Bosnian Christians in front of King Emeric (1196–1204) and several Hungarian prelates.¹² Therefore no military actions were ordered, even though the idea of a crusade against the heresy in Bosnia was present in a letter of Pope Innocent III sent to King Emeric of Hungary.¹³

The next pope, Honorius III, sent a legate to the region, closely to Dalmatia in 1221 to act against the – alleged – pirates of Omiš (*Almissa*) who, according to the mandate, attacked Christians on their pilgrimage and crusaders on their journeys as well.¹⁴ The agent of Honorius III, Papal Chaplain Acontius (Accontio) soon received the task of addressing the issue of the Bosnian heresy.¹⁵ The exact source of the allegations is unknown, but it is plausible that the papal chaplain himself reported the rumours he had heard regarding heterodoxy in Bosnia to the pontiff. It can be suspected that the former methods were renewed from the Hungarian side by reporting heresy in Bosnia,¹⁶ especially, because the Hungarian king and the head of the Hungarian church, Archbishop John of Esztergom, along with his suffragans and other prelates of the realm, were asked to assist in the fight against

¹² *Codex diplomaticus regni Croatiae, Dalmatiae et Slavoniae*, Vols. I–XV. Ed. Smičiklas, Tadija, Zagrabiae, 1904–1934. Vol. III., 24–25. nr. 19.; For the interpretation of the oaths see Sweeney, James Ross, *Papal-Hungarian Relations During the Pontificate of Innocent III, 1198–1216*. PhD. Diss. Cornell University, 1971. 126–132.; Fine, The Bosnian Church, 1975. 126–134.; Fine, *The Late Medieval*, 1987. 47.; Margetić, Neka pitanja abjuracije, 2005. 37–51.; Brković, Milko, “Bosansko-humski kršćani u križištu papinske i ugarske politike prema bosni i humu [The Christians of Bosnia and Hum on the Crossroad of Papal and Hungarian Politics towards Bosnia and Hum]”, In. Šanjek, Franjo (ed.), *Fenomen “krstjani” u srednjovjekovnoj Bosni i Humu*. Sarajevo–Zagreb, 2005. 129–178. 160.; Lorenz, Bogomilen, 2011. 107–121.

¹³ Although the ruler of Dioclea, Vucan, who first reported the rumours of Bosnian heresy to Innocent III, asked the pope for a military intervention led by King Emeric of Hungary. The pope turned to the Hungarian king in October of 1200 and asked him to intervene in Bosnia in accordance with the papal bull *Vergentis in senium*. *Regesta Pontificum Romanorum inde ab anno post Christum Natum MCXCVIII ad annum MCCCIV*, Vols I–II. Ed. Potthast, August, Berolini, 1874. no. 1142. [hereinafter *Regesta Pontificum Romanorum*]; See with further literature Barabás, *Heretics*, 2017. 44–48.; Majnarić, *Tending the Flock*, 2018. 446–447.

¹⁴ “cruce signatos, transfretantes in terre sancte subsidium, ad obsequium Iesu Christi, et alios christianos piratica rabie spoliando, capiunt et occidunt” – *Codex diplomaticus Hungariae ecclesiasticus ac civilis*, Vols I–XI. Ed. Fejér, Georgius, Buda, 1829–1844. Vol. III/1., 307. [hereinafter *Codex diplomaticus Hungariae*]; *Regesta Pontificum Romanorum*, no. 6587.; See Majnarić, *Tending the Flock*, 2018. 440–445.

¹⁵ *Regesta Pontificum Romanorum*, no. 6725.; *I Regesti del Pontefice Onorio III. Dall’anno 1216 all’anno 1227*, Vols. I–II. Ed. Pressutti, Pietro, Roma, 1884–1895. no. 3594. [hereinafter *I Regesti*]; See Dautović, Dženan, “Nulla spes sit ... Bosnia and the Papacy in the Thirteenth Century”, = *Specimina Nova Pars Prima Sectio Mediaevalis* 11, 2021, 97–125. 99.; Dautović, Dženan, “Historiographic controversy about the Crusades against Bosnian “heretics””, = *Journal of Balkan and Black Sea Studies* 3:4, 2020, 63–77. 65–67.

¹⁶ Dautović, *Nulla spes sit*, 2021. 98–99.

heresy in Bosnia. They were expected to encourage people to provide military help to the papal legate in exchange for the remission of their sins.¹⁷ The pope's letter to Acontius contains an quite interesting metaphor, comparing the heretics to *lamie* in daylight,¹⁸ – creatures with a human face and the body of a beast – a term used by Pope Gregory I (590–604) for heresy or hypocrisy.¹⁹

Although there is no other term in the texts referring to a crusade besides the mention of the remission of sins,²⁰ it seems to be quite likely that the idea of a sacred military campaign to the territory of Bosnia had not yet been fully formulated.²¹ Nonetheless, the historical work of Thomas the Archdeacon (Thomas of Spalato), the *Historia Salonitana*, offers additional information about the activity of Acontius. According to the text, the legate travelled to the territory of the heretics to root them out and departed in 1222.²² This statement is certainly false due to the activity of the papal chaplain in Hungary,²³ perhaps the notion of the legatine activity in Bosnia is based on later events.

¹⁷ “quatenus universi et singuli ad pestem huiusmodi abolendam, omne studium, omnemque diligentiam adhibentes, commonefaciatis subditos vestros, in remisionem eis peccaminum iniungatis, ut cum a dilecto filio magistro Acontio subdiacono et capellano nostro, Apostolice sedis legato, quem ad hoc specialiter providimus deputandum, fuerint requisiti, contra hereticos ipsos, nec non receptatores, et fautores eorum exsurgant viriliter et potenter; aliasque predicto legato impendatis ad id consilium, et auxilium opportunum” – Codex diplomaticus Hungariae, Vol. III/1., 351–352.; Regesta Pontificum Romanorum, no. 6729.; I Regesti, no. 3601.

¹⁸ “hereticos qui velut vulpecule inter sarmenta latentes, moliuntur eandem multipliciter demoliri, penitus profigemus, discutiendo etiam latibula sarmentorum, dum hereticorum receptatores et fautores non relinquimus impunitos. Cum itaque, sicut audiimus, in partibus Bosnie, tanquam in cubilibus struthionum heretici receptati, velut lamie nudatis mammis catulos suos lactent, dogmatizando palam sue pravitate errores, in enorme gregis dominici detrimentam” – *Vetera monumenta historica Hungariam sacram illustrantia*, Vols. I–II. Ed. Theiner, Augustinus, Romae, 1859–1860. Vol. I., 31. no. LXI. [hereinafter *Vetera monumenta historica*]; Cf. Dautović, *Nulla spes sit*, 2021. 98–99.

¹⁹ *Materials Toward a History of Witchcraft*. Collected by Lea, Henry Charles, Philadelphia, 1939. Vol. I., 110.

²⁰ For the crusader vow and the spiritual privileges of the crusaders see Brundage, James L., *Medieval Canon Law and the Crusaders*. Madison–Milwaukee–London, 1969. 66–114. 139–158.

²¹ Dautović, *Nulla spes sit*, 2021. 99.

²² “Interea legatus Acontius in Bosnam profectus pro exterminandis hereticis multo ibi tempore laboravit. Erat autem corpore imbecilus, sed zelo catholice fidei validus propugnator. Cum ergo forti fuisset languore correptus, ad extrema perveniens totum se domino commendavit. Ibique sue vite cursum feliciter peregit anno millesimo CCXXII” – Spalatensis, Thomae, *Historia Salonitanorum atque Spalatinorum Pontificum*. (Central European Medieval Texts, 4.). Ed. Perić, Olga et al., Budapest–New York, 2006. 190.; See Majnarić, Ivan, “Papinski poslanik Akoncije u Dalmaciji i Hrvatskoj 1219–1223. godine [Papal Envoy Acontius in Dalmatia and Croatia in 1219–1223]”, In: Čoralić, Lovorka – Slišković, Slavko (eds.), *Humanitas et litterae. Zbornik u cast Franje Šanjeka*. (Analecta Croatica Christiana, 40.). Zagreb, 2009. 79–98. 91.

²³ See Barabás, *Heretics*, 2017. 48.

No military actions were launched at the beginning of the 1220s,²⁴ but one thing seems to be certain: the allegations of heresy regarding Bosnia re-emerged after the outset of the century, and this time no examination or oath could make them go away.²⁵ The accusations seem to have originated, or at least intensified from the Hungarian side. If a key-figure must be named, it would definitely be Archbishop Ugrin of Kalocsa of the Csák kindred, a former royal chancellor, a participant of the Fifth Crusade in the entourage of King Andrew II,²⁶ one of the most important prelates of the realm in the third and fourth decades of the thirteenth century.²⁷ Two papal charters issued in May 1225 provide information on the Hungarian archbishop's agenda and the role he played in the Hungarian activity in Bosnia. Honorius III praised Ugrin for his zealous efforts to repel the heretics, and – what is even of greater importance – ordered him to preach the cross, thus a crusade against the heretics was first explicitly referred to regarding the matters of Bosnia.²⁸

The archbishop was requested to promote the idea of fighting the heresy as crusaders (*crucesignati*), and he was even authorised to absolve those who take the crosses of excommunication applied against them because of violence; however, plenary indulgence is not mentioned in the charter.²⁹ One can only formulate hypotheses regarding the origin of the idea of a crusade in Bosnia against the heretics, but the archbishop's participation in the Fifth Crusade makes it plausible that he was the initiator, or at least one of them. He must have been well aware of the benefits of fighting as a crusader. The sources do not offer enough information to confirm the theory that a military campaign was indeed realised; however, it seems likely that the prelate could expand his jurisdiction over the Bosnian territories of Usura and Sol.³⁰

²⁴ See Dautović, *Historiographic controversy*, 2020. 67–68.

²⁵ See Dautović, *Nulla spes sit*, 2021. 99.

²⁶ Barabás, Gábor, “Thirteenth-Century Hungarian Prelates at War”, In: Kotecki, Radosław – Jensen, Carsten Selch – Bennett, Stephen (eds.), *Christianity and War in Medieval East-Central Europe and Scandinavia*. Leeds, 2021, 39–56. 42–43.

²⁷ For Ugrin see Zsoldos, Attila, *The Árpáds and Their People*. (Arpadiana, 4.). Budapest, 2021. 108–109.

²⁸ “ad exhortationem bone memorie magistri Aconcii, subdiaconi et capellani nostri, apostolice sedis legati, et aliorum bonorum virorum, te viriliter accinxisti (...) predices verbum crucis, fideles contra infideles efficaciter exhortando” – *Vetera monumenta historica*, Vol. I., 55. no. CXVIII.; *Regesta Pontificum Romanorum*, no. 7407.; I *Regesti*, no. 5489.; See Dautović, *Nulla spes sit*, 2021. 100–101.

²⁹ “Et si forsitan aliqui crucesignati vel crucesignandi per violentam manuum iniunctionem vinculo fuerint excommunicationes astricti, absolventi eos iuxta formam ecclesie tibi concedimus facultatem, nisi forsitan adeo fuerit gravis et enormis excessus eorum, quod merito sint ad sedem apostolicam destinandi” – *Vetera monumenta historica*, Vol. I., 55. no. CXVIII.; *Regesta Pontificum Romanorum*, no. 7407.; I *Regesti*, no. 5489.; See Dautović, *Nulla spes sit*, 2021. 100–101.

³⁰ *Regesta Pontificum Romanorum*, no. 7407.; I *Regesti*, no. 5489.; See Majnarić, Ivan, “Some Cases of Robbing the Papal Representatives along the Eastern Adriatic Coast in the Second Half of the Twelfth and during Thirteenth Century”, = *Acta Histriae* 15, 2007,

Ugrin was supported in his endeavours by the Hungarian monarch, Andrew II as well, as another papal charter issued on the same day, on 15 May 1225, indicates it. According to the confirmation of Honorius III, which happened due to the king's petition, Ugrin was given the territories of Bosnia, Usura and Sol by the king to cleanse them from heresy.³¹ If we take all these considerations into account, it seems possible that the accusation of heresy could have been used as a tool by the Hungarian party, this time by Archbishop Ugrin, to justify the ecclesiastical and secular expansion towards Bosnia with the help of papal authority.³²

The aspirations of Ugrin are also reflected in the fact that he gained possession of the castle of Požega before 1227 to be more effective in his fight against the heretics.³³ Furthermore, the archbishop hired a member of the royal family, the nephew of Andrew II, John (Kalojan) Angelos, the son of Emperor Isaac II Angelos (1185–1195) for the sake of the fight. Yet, despite the previously received payment, he did not engage in any military action. Honorius III even empowered delegates to force John.³⁴ The outcome of this affair is unknown, but the wording of the papal letter addressed to John is of crucial importance. According to it, John was paid by Ugrin to fight the heretics with the sign of the cross.³⁵ Despite the seemingly clear contradiction between the payment and the crusader

493–506. esp. 499–502.; Bárány, Attila, “II. András balkáni külpolitikája [The Foreign Policy of Andrew II in the Balkans]”, In: Kerny, Terézia – Smohay, András (eds.), *II. András és Székesfehérvár. King Andrew II. and Székesfehérvár*. Székesfehérvár, 2012. 129–173. 159.; Barabás, Heretics, 2017. 44–45.; Dautović, Nulla spes sit, 2021. 100.; Cf. Runciman, *The Medieval*, 1947. 105–106.

³¹ *Regesta Pontificum Romanorum*, no. 7406.; I *Regesti*, no. 5490.; See Dautović, *Historiographic controversy*, 2020. 67–68.

³² See Dautović, *Nulla spes sit*, 2021. 100–101.

³³ *Regesta regum stirpis Arpadianae critico-diplomatica. Az Árpád-házi királyok okleveleinek kritikai jegyzéke*, Vols I–III/1. Ed. Szentpétery, Emericus, Budapest, 1923–1943., Vol. II/2–4. Manuscriptis Emericus Szentpétery adhibitis et completis critique digessit Iván Borsa, Budapest, 1961–1987. no. 434.; “Quanto propensius ecclesiarum desideramus augmentum, et hereticorum exterminium studiosius procuramus” – *Codex diplomaticus Hungariae*, Vol. III/2. 100.; See Koszta, László, *A kalocsai érseki tartomány kialakulása* [The Formation of the Archdiocese of Kalocsa]. (*Thesaurus Historiae Ecclesiasticae in Universitate Quinqueecclesiensi*, 2.). Pécs, 2013. 19.; *Regesta Pontificum Romanorum*, no. 7645.; I *Regesti*, no. 6158.

³⁴ *Regesta Pontificum Romanorum*, no. 7650.; Wertner, Mór, “Margit császárné fiai [The Sons of Empress Margaret]”, = *Századok* 37, 1903, 593–611. 596–597.; Runciman, *The Medieval*, 1947. 106.; For John (Kalojan) see Zsoldos, Attila, *Magyarország világi archontológiája. 1000–1301* [Lay Archontology of Hungary. 1000–1301]. Budapest, 2011. 50, 127, 161, 181, 207.; McDaniel, Gordon L., “On Hungarian-Serbian Relations in the Thirteenth Century: John Angelos and Queen Jelena”, = *Ungarn-Jahrbuch* 12, 1982–1983, 43–50. 44–45.; Majnarić, *Tending the Flock*, 2018. 447–448.

³⁵ “archiepiscopis Colocensis, quod tu, ducentis marcis receptis ab eo, crucis te signaculo insignisti, contra hereticos de Bossina pugnaturus, sed ... contra dictos hereticos hactenus procedere non curasti” – *Monumenta Romana Episcopatus Vesprimiensis – A veszprémi püspökség római oklevéltára*, Vols. I–IV. Ed. Fraknói, Vilmos, – Lukcsics, József, Budapest, 1896–1907. Vol. I., 76. no. LXXXIX.; *Regesta Pontificum Romanorum*, no. 7650.

status,³⁶ the efforts of the Archbishop of Kalocsa are evident on this issue; he was not merely interested in ecclesiastical measures, as armed intervention was definitely on the table.

The following few years were, despite Ugrin's apparent eagerness, rather calm, with no evidence of any actual interventions or further efforts of the archbishop.³⁷ The next relevant affair occurred in 1232 when the accusation reached the successor of Honorius III, Pope Gregory IX, that the bishop of Bosnia was illiterate, obtained his position through simony, and openly protected heretics, with his brother even being one of them.³⁸ The source of the accusations is unfortunately not known, as the papal charter does not refer to it at all, which is common in such cases.³⁹ Still, it seems plausible that it was Archbishop Ugrin anew, who delivered the story to the Apostolic See. This is especially likely, because the pontiff entrusted him in June 1232, alongside Bishop Stephen of Zagreb and the provost of Hajszentlőrinc, to examine the state of the bishopric and the bishop of Bosnia.⁴⁰

In May 1233, Cardinal-legate Jacob of Preneste, who was present in Hungary as the pope's agent with the full office of legation,⁴¹ performed a change of leadership in the bishopric of Bosnia,⁴² perhaps based on the aforementioned investigation. The Dominican Johannes Teutonicus (John of Wildeshausen), the later master general of the order⁴³ became the new head of the diocese,⁴⁴ thus marking

³⁶ The crusaders could occasionally get subsidies from the Church. See Brundage, *Medieval Canon Law*, 1969. 185–187.; For the theory of just war and the requirements of the indulgence of a crusader see Zey, Claudia, “Papsttum und Frieden im Mittelalter”, In: Althoff, Gerd et al. (eds.), *Frieden. Theorien, Bilder, Strategien von der Antike bis zur Gegenwart*. Dresden, 2019. 170–192. 182–183.

³⁷ Apart from the papal mandate given to him in 1232.; *Regesta Pontificum Romanorum*, no. 8942.

³⁸ “Idem enim, sicut accepimus, imperfectum suum minime recognoscens, utpote litteralis expers scientie, ac hereticorum publicus defensor; per quemdam manifestum hereticum. Simonie vitio mediante se in episcopum procuravit assumi” – *Árpádkori új okmánytár – Codex diplomaticus Arpadianus continuatus*, Vols I–XII. Ed. Wenzel, Gusztáv, Pest–Budapest, 1860–1873. Vol. I., 298–299, no. 181. [hereinafter *Árpádkori új okmánytár*]; *Regesta Pontificum Romanorum*, no. 8942.

³⁹ Dautović, *Nulla spes sit*, 2021. 103.

⁴⁰ *Regesta Pontificum Romanorum*, no. 8942.; See Fine, *The Bosnian Church*, 1975. 137–138.; Dautović, *Nulla spes sit*, 2021. 102–103.

⁴¹ Almási, Tibor, “Egy ciszterci bíboros a pápai világhatalom szolgálatában: Pecorari Jakab magyarországi legációja [A Cistercian Cardinal in the Service of the Papal Worldpower. The Hungarian Legation of Jacob of Pecorari]”, = *Magyar Egyháztörténeti Vázlatok* 5, 1993, 129–141.

⁴² See Fine, *The Bosnian Church*, 1975. 137–138.; Dautović, *Nulla spes sit*, 2021. 102–103.

⁴³ See Rabić, *Im toten*, 2016.

⁴⁴ See Ganzer, Klaus, *Papsttum und Bistumbesetzungen in der Zeit von Gregor IX. bis Bonifaz VIII. Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der päpstlichen Reservationen*. Köln–Graz, 1968. 132–133.

the beginning of the long-term activity of the Order of Preachers in Bosnia.⁴⁵ The Dominicans must have faced animosity from the very beginning in their endeavours in Bosnia, as the legate's decision likely caused tension there since the forced change conflicted with local customs.⁴⁶

The activity of the Dominicans was not the only novelty in the 1230s. The new key figure on the Hungarian side was Prince Coloman, the second son of the Hungarian monarch, Andrew II, the former king of Galicia, and by that time the duke of Slavonia.⁴⁷ He appears in the sources concerning the Bosnian situation as early as 1233 when the previous heretic accusations resurfaced vividly against towards Bosnia and its ruler.

Matthew Ninoslav, the ban of Bosnia,⁴⁸ presented himself, perhaps at least partially due to the prosecution of Legate Jacob,⁴⁹ as ready to lead his land and its church to the Catholic faith and to fight the alleged heresy there.⁵⁰ Gregory IX took him and his family under papal protection as long as he was willing to

⁴⁵ Regesta Pontificum Romanorum, no. 9211.; *Les registres de Grégoire IX*, Vols. I–IV. Ed. Auvray, Lucien, Paris, 1890–1955. no. 1375. [hereinafter *Les registres de*]; See Fine, *The Late Medieval*, 1987. 144.; Lambert, *The Cathars*, 1998. 299.; Lorenz, Bogomilen, 2011. 115–116.; Dall'Aglio, Francesco, "Crusading in a Nearer East: The Balkan Politics of Honorius III and Gregory IX (1221–1241)", In. Balard, Michel (ed.), *La Papauté et les croisades: Actes du VIIe Congrès de la Society for the Study of the Crusades and the Latin East / The Papacy and the Crusades: Proceedings of the VIIth Conference of the Society for the Study of the Crusades and the Latin East*. Farnham, 2011. 174–183. 176, 179.; Rabić, Im toten, 2016. 59–62.; Barabás, *Heretics*, 2017. 49–50.; Majnarić, *Tending the Flock*, 2018. 448–449.; Dautović, Dženan, "Vampiri, lisice i korov. "Sveta retorika" i propagandno djelovanje protiv Bosne u pismima postlateranskih papa prve polovine 13. stoljeca [Vampires, Foxes, and Weeds. "Holy Rhetoric" and Propaganda against Bosnia in the Chartres of the post-Lateran Popes in the First Half of the Thirteenth Century]", In. Duranović, Elmedina – Dedić, Enes – Rabić, Nedim (eds.), *Zbornik radova: Bosna i njeni susjedi u srednjem vijeku. Pristupi i perspective*. Sarajevo, 2019. 59–80. 68.; Rabić, Nedim, "Bosnien – zwischen Ost und West. Die Entwicklung eines Staates in Ostmitteleuropa 1050–1250", In. Klocke, Lisa – Weber, Matthias (eds.), *Das Hochmittelalter – eine vernachlässigte Epoche?: neue Forschungen zum 11–13. Jahrhundert*. Frankfurt a. M., 2020. 307–326. 321–322.; Fine, *The Bosnian Church*, 1975. 138.

⁴⁶ See Rabić, *Bosnien*, 2020. 321–322.; Fine, *The Bosnian Church*, 1975. 138.

⁴⁷ For Coloman see Font – Barabás, *Coloman*, 2019.

⁴⁸ He gained power by overthrowing the former ban, who was the successor of Ban Kulin. See Dautović, *Nulla spes sit*, 2021. 101.

⁴⁹ Dautović, *Nulla spes sit*, 2021. 103–104.

⁵⁰ "Te igitur sincere caritatis brachiis amplexantes, personam et terram tuam de Bosna, cum omnibus bonis, que in presentiarum rationabiliter possides, sub B. Petri, et nostra protectione suscipimus, et presentis scripti patrocinio communimus, districtius inhibentes, ne quis te, in fide catholica permanentem, super eadem terra, quam, sicut asseris, progenitores tui, qui fuerunt vitio heretice pravitatis infecti, ab antiquo pacifice possederunt, presumat indebite molestare" – *Vetera monumenta historica*, Vol. I., 120. no. CC.; Regesta Pontificum Romanorum, no. 9304.; *Les registres de*, no. 1521.

stick to his promises. The pope informed Duke Coloman of his decision as well,⁵¹ suggesting that Ban Ninoslav acted because of the growing Hungarian threat.

The papal goodwill towards the Bosnian ban did not last long, although the reason for this turn of events is obscure. Gregory IX began to prepare actions against Bosnian heresy, and Coloman was probably meant to be one of the key-figures of the papal plans.⁵² It is also possible, that the Hungarian prince himself accused the Bosnian ruler again, which could have led to the new state of affair.⁵³

In February 1234, the pontiff authorised a legate to act in favour of the mission against the heretics, informing the prelates and the clergy of Dalmatia, Bosnia, Serbia, and other *Slavic territories (Sclavonia)*.⁵⁴ They were called upon to support the legate and convince as many people as possible to take the cross and fight the heretics.⁵⁵ The exact results of this papal mandate are not known, nor is the activity of the legate,⁵⁶ but the crusader terminology appeared anew regarding the situation in the Balkans. The mention of holy business, the offering of indulgence and the privileges of the crusades of the Holy Land⁵⁷ clearly show

⁵¹ Regesta Pontificum Romanorum, no. 9305.; Les registres de, no. 1522.; Regesta Pontificum Romanorum, no. 9303.; Les registres de, no. 1523.; Regesta Pontificum Romanorum, no. 9304.; Les registres de, no. 1521.; *Az Árpád-házi hercegek, hercegnők és a királynék okleveleinek kritikai jegyzéke. – Regesta ducum, ducissarum stirpis Arpadianae necnon reginarum Hungariae critico-diplomatica*. Ed. Zsoldos, Attila, Budapest, 2008. no. 6. [hereinafter *Regesta ducum, ducissarum*]; See Fried, Johannes, *Der päpstliche Schutz für Laienfürsten. Die politische Geschichte des päpstlichen Schutzprivilegs für Laien (11.–13. Jahrhundert)*. Heidelberg, 1980. 288.; Fine, The Late Medieval, 1987. 143–145.; Rabić, Im toten, 2016. 63–64.; Brković, Bosansko-humski kršćani, 2005. 144.; Margetić, Neka pitanja abjuracije, 2005. 98–99.; Slišković, Dominikanci, 2005. 486–487.; Dall’Aglio, Crusading, 2011. 180.; Dautović, Vampiri, 2019. 68–69.; Fine, The Bosnian Church, 1975. 138–139.

⁵² For the historiography see Dautović, *Historiographic controversy*, 2020. 68–70.

⁵³ The investigation of Cardinal Jacob of Preeste could have had an effect on this turn of events as well. See Lorenz, Bogomilen, 2011. 116–117.; Rabić, Im toten, 2016. 63–67.; Dautović, *Nulla spes sit*, 2021. 106.

⁵⁴ The prior of the Carthusian monastery of St. Bartholomew in Trisulto. See Majnarić, *Tending the Flock*, 2018. 449.; Dautović, *Nulla spes sit*, 2021. 106.; The term *Sclavonia* used in the papal Curia referred usually not to the territory of the Hungarian Kingdom (Slavonia); See Fine, John V. A., *When Ethnicity Did Not Matter in the Balkans. A Study of Identity in Pre-Nationalist Croatia, Dalmatia and Slavonia in the Medieval and Early-Modern Periods*. Ann Arbor, 2006. 106–109.; Font – Barabás, Coloman, 2019. 76–78.

⁵⁵ “Ut autem nihil omnino desit, ad tam sanctum negocium prosequendum, universis catholicis, qui ab eodem Priore commoniti crucis assumpto caractere, ad hereticorum exterminium se accinxerint” – *Vetera monumenta historica*, Vol. I., 123, no. CCVIII.; *Regesta Pontificum Romanorum*, no. 9402.; *Les registres de*, no. 1782.

⁵⁶ See Dautović, *Nulla spes sit*, 2021. 106.

⁵⁷ “tam sanctum negocium prosequendum (...) illam indulgentiam, illudque privilegium elargimur, que accedentibus in terre sacre subsidium conceduntur” – *Vetera monumenta historica*, Vol. I., 123, no. CCVIII.; *Regesta Pontificum Romanorum*, no. 9402.; *Les registres de*, no. 1782.; See Rist, *The Papacy*, 2009. 148, 156.; For the indulgence see furthermore Rist, *Salvation*, 2010. 96, 107–108.

the escalation of the issue, with the plan to handle the situation with a crusade becoming clearly tangible.

Surprisingly, this topic is not found in the papal letter sent to the duke of Slavonia in October 1234. According to Gregory IX, Prince Coloman was to fight the dishonour of heretical depravity in *Sclavonia* to bring the light of the Catholic faith there.⁵⁸ However, neither the word “cross”, nor indulgence or any other spiritual and temporal privileges are mentioned in the letter, with only the phrase “holy work” being used. We cannot be certain why the papal charter was formulated so cautiously, but it can be assumed that the Hungarian prince’s participation in Bosnia as the leader of the crusade was not the part of the plan yet.

Recently, Dženan Dautović proposed a theory, that the term *Sclavonia*, which usually referred to every territory inhabited by Slavs in papal charters,⁵⁹ this time referred to specifically Slavonia, the territory of the Hungarian Realm. According to him, while mentioning heretics, the pope was not thinking of those in Bosnia, but rather, it reflected the tension between King Andrew II and the papacy.⁶⁰ This assumption can be supported by the fact that Duke Coloman and his wife received papal permissions with a charter issued two days after the mentioned letter, which granted them the right to attend to masses even in churches in territories placed under interdict, but only in the absence of heretics and excommunicated persons and behind closed doors.⁶¹ The reason why Coloman submitted his petition to the Apostolic See was the previous action of John of Wildeshausen, who in the summer of 1234, proclaimed interdict over Hungary because King Andrew II in fact did not follow the points of the so-called Oath (Accord) of Bereg, an agreement he made with Legate Jacob in 1233, in which he secured the rights of the Hungarian church. The bishop of Bosnia, who was given the task by the cardinal to act in case the Hungarian monarch would fail to fulfil his promises, initiated the necessary ecclesiastical censures in Hungary.⁶² It is worth mention-

⁵⁸ “ad convertendum in robore tue fortitudinis infectos macula heretice pravitatis, te versus partes Sclavonie ita magnanimitate et potenter accingas, quod alii huiusmodi sanctitatis opus animo prompto suscipiant, et sedentes in perfidie tenebris ad lucem catholice properare fidei non postponant. Sicque fiat, quod dum virtutis tue studio, favente Deo, numerus Dei filiorum augebitur, ita honor tue celsitudinis amplietur, quod et favorem Apostolice Sedis obtineas, et tandem in Beatorum collegio consquiescas” – Árpádkori új okmánytár, Vol. I., 319. no. 196.; Regesta Pontificum Romanorum, no. 9726.; Les registres de, no. 2128.; See Dautović, *Nulla spes sit*, 2021. 107.

⁵⁹ Fine, *When Ethnicity*, 2006. 71–79.; Font – Barabás, *Coloman*, 2019. 76–78.; Lorenz, *Bogomilen*, 2011. 108.

⁶⁰ See Dautović, *Nulla spes sit*, 2021. 107–108.; Coloman had a conflict around 1232 with his father as well. See Zsoldos, Attila, “Az Aranybulla megújítása 1231-ben [The Renewal of the Golden Bull in 1231]”, = *Aetas* 37:2, 2022, 5–20. 13–14.; Zsoldos, Attila, *The Golden Bull of Hungary*. Budapest, 2022. 188–189.

⁶¹ Regesta Pontificum Romanorum, no. 9728.; Les registres de, no. 2125, 2126.; See Dautović, *Nulla spes sit*, 2021. 107.

⁶² Berend, Nora, *At the Gate of Christendom: Jews, Muslims and ‘Pagans’ in Medieval Hungary, c. 1000–c. 1300*. Cambridge, 2001. 156–160.; Zsoldos, *The Golden Bull*, 2022. 199–202.

ing that according to canon law, crusaders were freed from the consequences of an interdict,⁶³ so this papal measure could be a sign for the non-crusader status of Coloman. Although this argument is far from being definitive, according to certain interpretations, the privilege applied only for crusaders on their way to the Holy Land, and one could also argue that the duke just wanted to secure the same privilege he enjoyed as a crusader for his wife too.

Parallel to the permission given to Prince Coloman, the bishop of Bosnia, John of Wildeshausen was ordered to preach against heresy within the territory of *Sclavonia* and he was even authorised to absolve those who were previously excommunicated if they died fighting the heretics.⁶⁴ Neither the word “cross” nor the plenary indulgence is to be found in the charter, unlike another diploma of Gregory IX, issued one day later, on 17 October 1234. This text was intended to arrange the papal protection of the possible crusaders.⁶⁵ Addressed to those from the Hungarian Realm willing to march against heretics under the sign of the cross,⁶⁶ they were taken under the Apostolic See’s protection due to their former petition.⁶⁷ Beside the inscription of the charter (*crucesignati*) and the mention of the cross, the passage referring to the Kingdom of Hungary has to be underlined, because it indicates clearly, that the possible crusaders were expected to come from the territories of the realm. Interestingly, the charter refers to the crusade as a pilgrimage journey, a rarity in Gregory IX’s documents.⁶⁸ The bishop of Bosnia also received a charter dated to 17 October, informing him of the crusader indulgence and privileges granted to those in the Kingdom of Hungary who were willing to fight heretics under the sign of the cross.⁶⁹ A crusade based on the Realm of St Stephen was clearly in sight.

⁶³ Brundage, *Medieval Canon Law*, 1969. 156.

⁶⁴ *Regesta Pontificum Romanorum*, no. 9737.; *Les registres de*, no. 2127.; See Rist, *The Papacy*, 2009. 155.

⁶⁵ For the temporal privileges of crusaders, especially the various types of protections see Brundage, *Medieval Canon Law*, 1969. 160–190.

⁶⁶ “dilectis filiis cruce signatis contra hereticos Slavonie in partibus Ungarie constitutis (...) Cum igitur zelo fidei ac devotionis eccensi, signo vivifice crucis assumpto, proposueritis in Slavoniam contra hereticorum perfidiam proficisci, nos vertris iustis precibus inclinati, personas vestra cum omnibus bonis, que impresentiarum rationabiliter possidetis, sub Beati Petri et nostra protectione suscipimus” – Árpádkori új okmánytár, Vol. I., 321. no. 198.; *Regesta Pontificum Romanorum*, no. 9733.; *Les registres de*, no. 2121.

⁶⁷ The bishop of Zagreb was informed of this measure as well and he was ordered to secure the papal protection. *Regesta Pontificum Romanorum*, no. 9734.; *Les registres de*, no. 2122.; See Rist, *The Papacy*, 2009. 156.

⁶⁸ “ut postquam arripueritis iter peregrinationis huiusmodi” – Árpádkori új okmánytár, Vol. I., 321. no. 198.; *Regesta Pontificum Romanorum*, no. 9733.; *Les registres de*, no. 2121.; See Rist, *The Papacy*, 2009. 148.

⁶⁹ “Universis catholicis, per regnum Hungarie constitutis, qui ad commonitionem tuam, crucis assumpto caractere, ad hereticorum exterminium se accinxerint, illam indulgentiam, illudque privilegium elargimur, que accedentibus ad terre sacre subsidium

Prince Coloman received personal protection for himself and his family⁷⁰ on the same day the mentioned papal charter was formulated, while he acted to exterminate the heretics,⁷¹ it seems likely that the duke of Slavonia was indeed eager to take actions. Notably, according to the papal charter, it was Coloman himself, who proposed the armed action against heresy as a crusader.⁷² One must remember, the duke of Slavonia was the son of Andrew II, the first and only Hungarian king who led his armies to the Holy Land, thus he was clearly following in his father's footsteps.

In my opinion, this circumstance is crucial concerning the assumed campaign's target. Given Coloman's underlined eagerness, the crusaders' petition, and the mention of Bosnia in the papal charter regarding the legate's authorization, it seems unlikely that the papal plans involved Slavonia, a certain part of the Hungarian realm. The term *Sclavonia* likely described lands inhabited by Slavs. Regardless of the planned campaign's target, the crusader terminology is almost entirely absent from the papal charters addressed to Coloman, with one exception, merely the fight against heretics is mentioned. A remarkable, yet inexplicable phenomenon.⁷³

The papal letters' outcome is difficult to determine. Some scholars believe no military action followed, while others suggest a Coloman-led campaign in 1234 or rather in 1235, resulted in the submission of Ninoslav.⁷⁴ Gregory IX's arrangement in August 1235 appears to support the assumption that some sort of campaign took place. King Andrew II secured Bosnia's rights for his son, Coloman, which, although likely theoretical, was acknowledged by the Holy See.⁷⁵

conceduntur" – Codex diplomaticus Hungariae, Vol. III/2., 397.; Regesta Pontificum Romanorum, no. 9738.; Les registres de, no. 2129.; See Rist, *The Papacy*, 2009. 156.

⁷⁰ For the protections as the crusaders' privileges see Brundage, *Medieval Canon Law*, 1969. 160–170.

⁷¹ "studio ad exterminium pravitatis heretice laborabis" – Árpádkori új okmánytár, Vol. I., 322. no. 199.; Regesta Pontificum Romanorum, no. 9735.; Les registres de, no. 2123.; The bishop of Zagreb, the ecclesiastical leader of the core-territory of the Slavonian duke, was informed about these intentions too.; Regesta Pontificum Romanorum, no. 9733–9738.; Les registres de, no. 2121–2124, 2127–2129.; See Basić, Ivan, "O pokušaju ujedinjenja zagrebačke i splitske crkve u XIII. stoljeću [Attempt for Unification of the Churches of Zagreb and Split in the Thirteenth Century]", = *Pro tempore* 3, 2006, 5–43. 34.

⁷² "Cum illustrissimum in Christo filium Colomannum regem illustrem, qui zelo fidei ac devotionis accensus signo vivifice crucis assumpto proposuit hereticos de Slavonie partibus in manu forti et brachio extento viriliter extirpare" – *Vetera monumenta historica*, Vol. I., 130, no. CCXXII.; Regesta Pontificum Romanorum, no. 9736.; Les registres de, no. 2124.

⁷³ It cannot be forgotten that the use of armed force against heretics and schismatics was rightful according to Canon Law.; Smith, *The Interface*, 2020. 137.

⁷⁴ With further literature see Rabić, *Im toten*, 2016. 61.; Dautović, *Vampiri*, 2019. 69–70.

⁷⁵ Regesta Pontificum Romanorum, no. 9986.; Les registres de, no. 2726.; See Lorenz, *Bogomilen*, 2011. 115ff; Rabić, *Im toten*, 2016. 62ff; Slišković, *Dominikanci*, 2005. 489.; Dautović, *Nulla spes sit*, 2021. 108.

This arrangement could be indeed interpreted as evidence of previous Hungarian intervention in Bosnia or as a preparation for one. However, it is peculiar that any reference to a crusade is again missing from the text.⁷⁶

Certain sources can be interpreted as indirect evidence of a campaign to Bosnia organised by Prince Coloman. For example, the papal protection granted in 1236 to Bosnian nobleman, Sibislav of Usora, the son of the former ban, Stephen, and his mother may have been intended to secure them against Ninoslav or perhaps the crusaders,⁷⁷ although it could be related the recent succession in Hungary, thus because of the changing situation in the realm.⁷⁸ Coloman received royal guarantees⁷⁹ from the new king, his older brother, Béla IV for his endeavours. Additionally, the city of Raguza (Dubrovnik) issued a decision in 1237 prohibiting their traders from travelling to Bosnia, suggesting some sort of turbulence in the region.⁸⁰ Bishop John of Wildeshausen's resignation from his office in 1238 might also be a sign of a Hungarian campaign, as it allegedly occurred due to his disapproval of Coloman's actions in Bosnia.⁸¹

Gregory IX's letter to the Dominican bishop of the Cumans in April 1238 mentions the enormous efforts of the duke of Slavonia, and in December of the same year, the pope congratulated Coloman on his successes in erasing heresy from Bosnia, for he received the remission of his sins.⁸² Despite the various indirect evidence suggesting a campaign led by the Hungarian royal prince, there is almost

⁷⁶ Pope Gregory IX wrote in September 1235 to the prelates of Hungary regarding the crusaders in the realm, the archbishops and bishops were ordered to compel the crusaders not to travel to the Holy Land prematurely. Similar letters were sent to the prelates of France, England and Germany, therefore this case was not connected to the Bosnian situation.; *Regesta Pontificum Romanorum*, no. 10228.; *Les registres de*, no. 2786–2789.; See Borosy, *A keresztes*, 1996/2, 47.

⁷⁷ *Regesta Pontificum Romanorum*, no. 10223–10226.; *Les registres de*, no. 3272–3275.; See Fried, *Der päpstliche*, 1980. 288.; Fine, *The Bosnian Church*, 1975. 140.; Lambert, *The Cathars*, 1998. 299.; Rabić, *Im toten*, 2016. 64–65.; Dautović, *Nulla spes sit*, 2021. 109.

⁷⁸ Majnarić, *Tending the Flock*, 2018. 449.

⁷⁹ The duke's brother, King Béla IV, affirmed all his rights regarding his possessions.; *Regesta regum stirpis*, no. 634, 787.

⁸⁰ Fine, *The Bosnian Church*, 1975. 140.; Dautović, *Nulla spes sit*, 2021. 110.

⁸¹ *Regesta Pontificum Romanorum*, no. 10505, 10585.; *Les registres de*, no. 4058, 4286.; See Ganzer, *Papsttum*, 1968. 132–133.; Ternovác, Bálint, "A boszniai latin püspökség története 1344-ig [History of the Latin Bishopric of Bosnia until 1344]", In: Fábián, Laura et al. (eds.), *Micae Mediaevales V. Fiatal történészek dolgozatai a középkori Magyarországról és Európáról*. Budapest, 2016. 215–228. 220.; Rabić, *Im toten*, 2016. 65–67.; Zsoldos, *Magyarország világi archontológiája*, 2011. 92.; Dautović, *Nulla spes sit*, 2021. 108–110.

⁸² "carissimus in Christo filius noster, Colomanus rex et dux Sclavorum illustris, sicut eiusdem insinuatione percepimus, terram Bosne, deletis inde pravitate heretice maculis, non absque multis laboribus deduxit ad lucem catholicae puritatis" – *Vetera monumenta historica*, Vol. I., 162, no. CCLXXXIX.; *Regesta Pontificum Romanorum*, no. 10585.; *Les registres de*, no. 4286.; "de Bosne partibus deletis pravitate heretice maculis, ibidem fulgeat lumen catholice puritatis. Super hoc siquidem, (...) et in

no definite Hungarian source, narrative text or any charter of some sort to confirm the theory. The previously stated circumstance has to be underlined again, that the texts of the papal charters sent to the Hungarian prince contains almost no explicit evidence to a crusade. Indulgences and the taking of the cross are mentioned only once, and it is primarily the eradication of heresy that is praised by Gregory IX. An already mentioned charter of King Béla IV, issued in 1244, is of key importance regarding the assumed crusade, as it states that Coloman had taken the cross before he went to Bosnia to fight the heretics there.⁸³

This relative lack of crusader terminology in the papal charters was not universal, however. For instance, in a papal charter issued also on 22 December 1238, addressed to the Benedictine abbot of Pécsvárad the crusaders of Hungary and the redemption of their vows are mentioned again.⁸⁴ This suggests that not everyone who had already taken the cross was willing to participate in the campaign(s).

While the events of Coloman's expedition remain unknown, it is merely suspected that he managed to take control over certain parts of Bosnia but could not completely crush Ninoslav's reign. Nevertheless, it cannot be disregarded that the doubt emerged in the historiography, whether Coloman actually led his army to Bosnia at all or if the papal letters' mention of his efforts was merely rhetoric, which misled later historians.⁸⁵ Croatian medievalist, Ivan Majnarić even proposed that the papal charters' reference to heretics might actually referred to piracy in Dalmatia.⁸⁶ However, in my view, the above-mentioned measures of King Andrew II and Béla IV, as well as the series of papal mandates and their wording, make it plausible that Coloman had aspirations regarding Bosnia, making one or more campaigns likely, although it remains uncertain whether they were crusades or not. Nonetheless, the wording of King Béla's charter of 1244 seems to be convincing, as it states that Coloman in fact took the cross.

In 1238, there was an intriguing shift in the papal politics, with the new bishop of Bosnia, Ponsa being authorised as a legate in his first year of office.⁸⁷

remissionem iniungimus peccaminum" – *Vetera monumenta historica*, Vol. I., 168, no. CCCI.; *Regesta Pontificum Romanorum*, no. 10688.; *Les registres de*, no. 4692.

⁸³ "cum assumpto signo crucis contra Paterinos in Boznam et in terram Rame pro nomine Christi proficisceretur" – *Árpádkori új okmánytár*, VII. 167, no. 109., *Regesta regum stirpis*, no. 634. and 787.

⁸⁴ "pro redemptione votorum cruce signatorum Ungarie contra hereticos" – *Codex diplomaticus Hungariae*, Vol. IV/1., 129.

⁸⁵ See Runciman, *The Medieval*, 1947. 106.; Fine, *The Late Medieval*, 1987. 144–145.; Lambert, *The Cathars*, 1998. 299.; Lorenz, *Bogomilen*, 2011. 116.; Rabić, *Im toten*, 2016. 61–64.; Brković, *Bosansko-humski kršćani*, 2005. 144–148, 163–164.; Margetić, *Neka pitanja abjuracije*, 2005. 100–101.; Slišković, *Dominikanci*, 2005. 487–489.; Dall'Aglio, *Crusading*, 2011. 180.; Majnarić, *Tending the Flock*, 2018. 450–451.; Dautović, *Nulla spes sit*, 2021. 112–113.

⁸⁶ Majnarić, *Tending the Flock*, 2018. 450–451.

⁸⁷ *Regesta Pontificum Romanorum*, no. 10692, 10693; *Les registres de*, no. 4691, 4693, 4694.

His task involved strengthening the structure of his bishopric, such as establishing a new cathedral and a chapter in Brdo, near Vrhbosna (modern day Sarajevo). It is assumed based on these measures, that the plan for the cathedral suggests the territory was occupied by Duke Coloman, and the initiative came from both him and the Dominicans.⁸⁸ However Bishop Ponsa's primary mission as a legate was to contain heresy. Coloman's efforts, papal protection, and the remission of sins for those combating heterodoxy are all mentioned in the text.⁸⁹ It is even assumable that due to Duke Slavonia's previous successes, Bishop Ponsa was intended to be the new leader of the ongoing fight against heresy.⁹⁰ Pope Gregory IX may have concluded that the situation in Bosnia could be managed without further lay assistance.

If there was indeed a shift in the papal politics, it did not cause a change in Coloman's behaviour. In fulfilling his tasks, Ponsa⁹¹ was supported – besides the financial measures of the pope⁹² – by the duke of Slavonia as well. He was the one who bestowed the estate of Đakovo (Hungarian Diakóvár) in the diocese of Pécs upon the bishopric, which later became the new seat of the bishopric, although it remained outside its territory.⁹³ In addition to Coloman, Ban Ninoslav surprisingly also made donations to the Bosnian bishopric,⁹⁴ possibly trying to win the pope's goodwill again to protect himself from the ongoing threat.

⁸⁸ Fine, *The Bosnian Church*, 1975. 140–141.; Dautović, *Nulla spes sit*, 2021. 111–112.

⁸⁹ “Quum igitur carissimi in Christo filii nostri, Colomanni regis illustris, ducis Sclavonie ac aliorum fidelium circumposite regionis, efficaci diligentia faciente provenerit, quod ibidem, triumphante conditoris dextera, consurgit religio Christiana (...) secundum datam tibi a Deo prudentiam, exhorteris, ut tanquam zelum Dei habentes, se viriliter et potenter accingant ad heretice pravitatis residuum de predicta diocesi penitus abolendum. (...) omnes eiusdem regni, contra hereticos dicte diocesis, suscepto propter hoc signaculo, processuros, nec non eorum familias et bona omnia, donec de ipsorum reditu certissime cognoscatur, sub protectione ac defensione sedis apostolice admittentes (...) suorum concedimus veniam peccatorum” – *Vetera monumenta historica*, Vol. I., 169–170. no. CCCVI.; *Regesta Pontificum Romanorum*, no. 10693.; *Les registres de*, no. 4691.

⁹⁰ For the role of papal legates in crusades see Smith, *The Interface*, 2020.; Smith, Thomas W., *Curia and Crusade. Pope Honorius III and the Recovery of the Holy Land: 1216–1227*. (*Outremer Studies in the Crusades and the Latin East*, 6.). Turnhout, 2017. 261–263, 268–274, 284–295.

⁹¹ See Fine, *The Bosnian Church*, 1975. 143–144.

⁹² Gregory IX gave the task to the Benedictine abbot of Pécsvárad to secure certain payments for Bishop Ponsa.; *Regesta Pontificum Romanorum*, no. 10689, 10690, RG IX. no. 4695, 4696.

⁹³ *Regesta Pontificum Romanorum*, no. 10824.; *Les registres de*, no. 4991.; See Fine, *The Late Medieval*, 1987. 144–145.; Lambert, *The Cathars*, 1998. 299.; Basić, *O pokušaju*, 2006. 34.; Lorenz, *Bogomilen*, 2011. 116.; Ternovác, *A boszniai*, 2016. 220ff; Rabić, *Im toten*, 2016. 66–67.; Brković, *Bosansko-humski kršćani*, 2005. 164–165.; Slišković, *Dominikanci*, 2005. 491–492.; Dautović, *Nulla spes sit*, 2021. 111–112.

⁹⁴ “Dux Bosnie indignum se gratia constituens, quam in eo circa ipsum Clementia Dei fecerat, quod pravitatem contemnens hereticam, ad catholicam rediit unitatem, in erroris inuium, sicut accepimus, damnabiliter est relapsus” – *Vetera monumenta*

In December 1239, the pope issued several charters after receiving news from Coloman about the recent situation in Bosnia.⁹⁵ The duke of Slavonia was praised for his efforts, the Dominicans of Bosnia were ordered to preach against heterodoxy, and the possessions of the bishopric of Bosnia were taken under papal protection.⁹⁶ Coloman remained active in the affairs of Bosnia, but there is still no trace of any crusader terminology in the papal letters, neither in those written to him nor in those that mention his name. The term “business of faith” (*negocium fidei*) was used, however, in both letters sent to the Dominicans regarding the tasks of Bishop Ponsa and the financial situation of the Bosnian bishopric.⁹⁷ This wording could also indicate that the pope considered the Dominican prelate as the new leader of the ongoing struggle in Bosnia.

There is no further source regarding Coloman’s activity in Bosnian affairs, although this is not due to a changing relation between him and Pope Gregory IX. The duke maintained cordial contact with the Apostolic See, as evidenced by discussions of the planned union of the Archbishopric of Split and the bishopric of Zagreb,⁹⁸ among other topics.

Coloman died soon afterwards from fatal wounds sustained while fighting the Mongol invaders at the Battle of Muhi in April 1241. Archbishop Ugrin of Kalocsa, another key figure in the Hungarian party also lost his life as well.⁹⁹ A few weeks later, in June, Pope Gregory IX offered indulgences and remission to the crusaders who were willing to defend Hungary in time of the invasion. Coloman’s death must have been unknown to him, as both Coloman and his brother, King Béla IV, received personal papal protections.¹⁰⁰

In conclusion, the issue of the Bosnian “heresy” was handled firmly by the Holy See, and the idea of an armed intervention emerged as early as the 1220s. The

historica, Vol. I., 169. no. CCCV.; Regesta Pontificum Romanorum, no. 10691.; Les registres de, no. 4697.

⁹⁵ Regesta ducum, ducissarum, no. 18.

⁹⁶ Regesta Pontificum Romanorum, no. 10822–10824.; Les registres de, no. 4991–4993.

⁹⁷ “Venerabili fratri nostro episcopo Bosnensi in opus huiusmodi, ac alia, que negocio fidei opportuna fuerint, convertendam, postposito difficultatis obstaculo, integre assignetis” – Vetera monumenta historica, Vol. I., 173. no. CCCXIV.; Regesta Pontificum Romanorum, no. 10832.; See Rist, *The Papacy*, 2009. 148.

⁹⁸ See with further literature Basić, *O pokušaju*, 2006.; Font – Barabás, Coloman, 2019. 96–98.

⁹⁹ Font – Barabás, Coloman, 2019. 121–124.; Barabás, *Thirteenth-Century Hungarian Prelates*, 2021. 44–47.

¹⁰⁰ Regesta Pontificum Romanorum, no. 11032, 11033, 11034.; Les registres de, no. 6057, 6058, 6059, 6062.; See Fried, *Der päpstliche*, 1980. 263–264.; Srodecki, Paul, “Fighting the ‘Eastern Plague’. Anti-Mongol Crusade Ventures in the Thirteenth Century”, In: Srodecki, Paul – Kersken, Norbert (eds.), *The Expansion of the Faith: Crusading on the Frontiers of Latin Christendom in the High Middle Ages*. Turnhout, 2022. 303–327. 312–313.

plan of a crusade was clearly on the table, regardless the question, whether the accusations of heresy were solely of political nature originated from Hungary, or the *Bosnian Christians* were indeed infected by heterodoxy of some sort. The concept of a crusade against heresy was not a novelty, but the exact impact of the Albigensian Crusade as an archetype for the Bosnian situation is unclear. It is possible that Archbishop Ugrin of Kalocsa, who participated in King Andrew II's crusade in 1217–18, introduced the idea of a crusade against heretics, this time in Bosnia, to support his claims in the region. However, the ambitious prelate was later replaced as the key figure by Prince Coloman, the second son of the Hungarian monarch, King Andrew II, who became more and more active in the 1230s. Based on the available sources, it is likely that some form of military campaign led by the duke of Slavonia took place in the second half of the 1230s, although its details remain unknown.

Certain formulations of the papal charters suggest that the idea of fighting as crusaders in Bosnia was welcomed in Hungary, including by Duke Coloman of Slavonia. He was the son of a crusader king after all. However, it is extremely intriguing that there is only one mention of taking the cross or indulgence of some sort in the apostolic letters sent to the Hungarian royal prince, even though Pope Gregory IX praised him multiple times for his actions against heresy and he was taken under papal protection as well. The single reference to Coloman as a crusader in papal sources to be found in a charter sent to Bishop Stephen of Zagreb, where the willingness of the duke of Slavonia to take the cross is mentioned. In my opinion the exact reason of this situation remains obscure, and one can only hypothesise about it. Perhaps the pontiff did not want to rely entirely on Coloman and aimed to maintain or regain the leading position of the Church. The legatine office given to Bishop Ponsa of Bosnia may be an indication of this intention. Nonetheless, King Béla IV's mentioned charter of 1244 retrospectively confirms the assumption, that Coloman indeed took the cross. One could only wonder, why his decision is almost completely missing from the papal sources.

Despite the uncertain nature of Coloman's campaigns, he ultimately died after fighting against the infidels, alongside another Hungarian key figure in Bosnian matters, Archbishop Ugrin of Kalocsa, in April 1241.

Zsolt Hunyadi

TURCOPOLES OF THE TEMPLARS AND HOSPITALLERS (THIRTEENTH–FOURTEENTH CENTURIES)

in honorem S.

The following review takes a multi-focal approach, each of which is not intended to be an exhaustive assessment. Over the last few decades, a number of studies have been published on the subject of turcoples, covering many aspects of the field of research. However, following the historiographical process, we are confronted with the fact that while our knowledge of turcoples has steadily increased, at some points it seems to be a much more complex phenomenon than previously assumed by historians. This is why the ‘delimitation’ in the title is important: we would like to survey the activities and characteristics of the turcoples that appeared in the military-religious orders, but – partly because of the specific nature of the sources – it is not possible and probably not worthwhile to separate them from the troops/armies that appeared in the Byzantine or the Frankish armies in the Holy Land or even in European territories.

When reviewing and evaluating decades of scholarly production, we must also take into account another methodological problem, which at first sight looks trivial, but what research often seems to forget its importance: namely, changes in time and space. The following overview tries to argue that it is almost impossible to formulate a definition of turcoples that is valid over time and space. A more viable approach seems to be to review the different meanings and connotations of the concept and to attempt to trace and evaluate the changes, interpreting them in their proper context.

As a preliminary approach, the most important questions raised by the literature under review are: whether the sources speak of an ethnically identifiable group or merely a separate arm; if it is an ethnically identifiable group, then they could be exclusively Muslims or locals born of intermarriages, possibly also converted prisoners; whether they can be clearly identified as light mounted archers and assigned a specific military role (e.g. reconnaissance); mercenaries or paid otherwise (e.g. whether the turcoples were mercenaries or soldiers (small fief-holders)); whether the turcoples of the military-religious orders can be historically derived from Byzantine or Crusader auxiliaries; whether there is a connection with the status of Templar *milites ad terminum* or whether they belonged to the auxiliary troops of the military-religious orders; what their status was in these corps; what was the proportion of turcoples in Christian armies and in what context: what was their military importance/value; in what way were the Turcopoliers in charge of/supervising the activities of the turcoples?

The term ‘turcopole’ and its designation appeared in the sources some time before the establishment of the military-religious orders, so it is not even conceivable that this phenomenon was an initiative of the knightly orders. In the Byzantine armies, the turcoples turned up as early as 1082 and by 1097 there were already a significant number of turcoples, while in Frankish armies their presence is recorded from 1109 at the latest. The first important milestones in modern literature¹ on their activities and role were Richard’s monographs in 1953 and Smail’s in 1956,² the latter placed the turcoples in the context of a comprehensive military history. Smail’s work became an important reference and set the framework for interpretation for a long time to come. His findings were, of course, based not only on earlier literature but also on primary sources, such as the works of William of Tyre, Raymond of Aguilers and Usāma ibn Munqidh. The source value of Albert of Aachen was still highly controversial at that time, at least much more so than a few decades later. Smail’s insights (‘recruited from the native populations (...) often the offsprings of parents of different religions’),³ while a very important milestone, also shifted the focus of research somewhat. In our view, Smail’s extrapolation of information from (nearly) contemporary narrative sources with exaggerated extrapolation distorted the picture of the turcoples for a long time. A little over a decade and a half later, he depicted a similar picture for a somewhat wider audience,⁴ but at that time the professional debate had not yet begun. Even though the monograph⁵ Riley-Smith in 1967 was an important step forward in the field of research on the military-religious orders. He went far beyond Smail’s claims and even utilised new sources in his research. Not only did he include Latin (Ambroise, Salimbene de Adam) and Muslim (Ibn Wāṣil, Ibn al-Qualānisī) sources, but also a considerable number of documents, even if he was essentially based his ideas on published source material.⁶

From the early 1980s, the number of works on the Crusades and the Latin East began to increase, bringing Turcoples back into the field of research:

¹ We do not undertake to review the entire literature, as it had been provided by some of the historians of the field. (e.g., Savvides, Alexios G. C., “Late Byzantine and Western Historiographers on Turkish Mercenaries in Greek and Latin Armies: The Turcoples/Tourkopouloi”, In. Beaton, Roderick – Roueché, Charlotte (eds.), *The Making of Byzantine History: Studies Dedicated to Donald M. Nicol*, Vol. I., Aldershot, 1993. 122–136.; Harari, Yuval, “The Military Role of the Frankish Turcoples: A Reassessment”, = *Mediterranean Historical Review* 12:1, 1997, 75–116.

² Richard, Jean, *Le Royaume Latin de Jerusalem*. Paris, 1953. 129–130.; Smail, R. C., *Crusading Warfare, 1097–1193*. Cambridge, 1956. 111–112, 179–180.

³ Smail, *Crusading Warfare*, 1956. 111.

⁴ Smail, R. C., *The Crusaders in Syria and the Holy Land*. Southampton, 1973.

⁵ Riley-Smith, Jonathan, *The Knights of St. John in Jerusalem and Cyprus, 1050–1310*. New York, 1967. (Its 2nd revised edition was published in 2012. See below.)

⁶ *Cartulaire général de l’ordre des Hospitaliers de Saint-Jean de Jérusalem*, Vols I–IV. Ed. Delaville le Roulx, Joseph, Paris, 1894–1906. [hereinafter *Cartulaire*]

‘light mounted bowmen’⁷ ‘Turcoples (sons of Turks) were recruited mainly from Muslims,’⁸ “lightly armed cavalry mostly converted Muslims, who had been given small fiefs, they formed the vanguard of the army.”⁹ An important step forward was the chronological continuation of Smail’s monograph on military history by Marshall’s work in 1992, which traced the events up to the fall of Acre in 1291. In his work, the turcoples are described as a paid military force who played an important role in the reconnaissance.¹⁰ Marshall also discussed in detail the characteristics of the turcoples of the military-religious orders.¹¹ However, an even more important advance in the latter area was Forey’s comparative study,¹² which has the important merit of showing that one should also expect to identify Turcoples far from the Holy Land, for instance in the Iberian Peninsula. At least as much impetus was given to further research by the French rule of the Templars,¹³ translated and annotated by Upton-Ward, which contains numerous articles dealing with the turcoples of the Order. Barber’s comprehensive work on the Templars¹⁴ proved to be a long-standing guide for further research on the very topic.

Partly following in the footsteps of the research on the military-religious orders, the study on the turcoples of the Byzantine and Frankish armies was also extended. Savvides’ short but very thorough summary in 1993 played a determinant role in this process and became a cornerstone of later debates.¹⁵ Savvides’ work is noteworthy in several respects: in addition to a thorough

⁷ Praver, Joshua, *Crusader Institutions*. Oxford, 1980. 492.

⁸ Hitti, Philip Khuri, “The Impact of the Crusades on Moslem Lands”, In: Hazard, Harry W. – Zacour, Norman P. (eds.), *A History of the Crusades: The Impact of the Crusades on the Near East*, Vol. V., Madison, WI, 1985. 55.

⁹ Richard, Jean, “The Political and Ecclesiastical Organization of the Crusader States”, In: Hazard, Harry W. – Zacour, Norman P. (eds.), *A History of the Crusades: The Impact of the Crusades on the Near East*, Vol. V., Madison, WI, 1985. 226.; See also Richard, Jean, “Les turcoples au service des royaumes de Jérusalem et de Chypre: Musulmans converts ou Chrétiens Orientaux?”, = *Revue des Etudes Islamiques* 54, 1986. 259–270.

¹⁰ Marshall, Christopher, *Warfare in the Latin East, 1192–1291*. Cambridge, 1992. 60.

¹¹ Marshall, *Warfare in the Latin East*, 1992. 58–60.

¹² “paid troops employed by the leading orders included turcoples, who were recruited from the native population and who were sometimes mounted and equipped with a bow”: Forey, Alan, *The Military Orders: from the Twelfth to the Early Fourteenth Centuries*. Basingstoke, 1992. 57.

¹³ “troops equipped with the bow, capable of fighting in the Eastern manner”: Upton-Ward, Judith, *The Rule of the Templars: The French Text of the Rule of the Order of the Knights Templar*. Woodbridge, 1992.

¹⁴ “light mounted troops, often recruited from the local population ... cavalry who acted both as auxiliaries and scouts”: Barber, Malcolm, *The New Knighthood: A History of the Order of the Temple*. Cambridge, 1994. 166, 189.

¹⁵ “Christianised Moslem mercenaries of Turanic (Turcophone) origins who served in the Byzantine and Oriental Frankish forces from the late eleventh century onwards (especially during the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries) the Eastern manner”: Savvides, Late Byzantine, 1993. 122.

summary of the literature to date, he has broadened the focus of research by adding Byzantine, Latin and Muslim sources and has also carried out thorough etymological analyses. His position became so influential that he wrote the glossary of Turcoples in the *Encyclopedia of the Crusades*, published in 2006.¹⁶ Of course, it is not to give the impression that this summary has brought the debate to rest, and Harari's seminal article in 1997 has explicitly revived the dispute.¹⁷ Harari seemed to cut through the Gordian knot of whether we should see the turcoples as an ethnic group or a sort of arm by recognizing that the inherently ethnically distinctive name was used by sources even when there was no manifest distinction behind it.¹⁸ But at least as significant was the recognition that the turcoples were much larger in number and, in this context, in military importance than historiography had earlier assumed.¹⁹ His data-rich study provides not only absolute figures but also proportions, and in this respect he made a major step forward in his assessment concerning the numbers of the turcoples in the military-religious orders,²⁰ which had already been attempted by Riley-Smith and Forey, but their figures were rather sporadic. The number of sources included in Harari's study has also increased considerably and, by then, the 'rehabilitation' of Albert of Aachen had turcoples mostly been completed.²¹

Harari's results were already utilised in the monograph of France in 1999,²² following in the footsteps of Smail and Marshall, while the popular study of his contemporary Nicolle, in 2001, may even seem a bit of a step backwards.²³ Nevertheless, the summary of Harari's findings by France in 2006²⁴ is now

¹⁶ Savvides, Alexios G. C., "Turcoples", In: Murray, Alan V. (ed.), *The Crusades: An Encyclopedia*. Santa Barbara, CA, 2006. 1207–1208.

¹⁷ "the Frankish Turcoples were all mounted archers, of both Frankish and native origin ... the Turcoples fulfilled vital strategic and tactical tasks: delivering messages; scouting; harassing; skirmishing; laying ambushes; comprising flying-columns; and protecting the exposed extremes of march columns (...) the Turcoples comprised about half the Frankish mounted force...": Harari, Yuval, "The Military Role of the Frankish Turcoples: A Reassessment", = *Mediterranean Historical Review* 12:1, 1997, 75–116.

¹⁸ Harari, *The Military Role*, 1997. 101–102, 106.

¹⁹ Harari, *The Military Role*, 1997. 86.

²⁰ Harari, *The Military Role*, 1997. 82.

²¹ Edgington, Susan B. "From Aachen: A New Perspective on Relations between the Crusaders and Byzantium 1095–1120", = *Medieval History* 4, 1994, 156–69.; Edgington, Susan B. "Albert of Aachen Reappraised", In: Murray, Alan V. (ed.), *From Clermont to Jerusalem: The Crusades and Crusader Societies, 1095–1500*. Turnhout, 1998. 55–67.

²² France, John, *Western Warfare in the Age of the Crusades, 1000–1300*. London, 1999. 218–221.

²³ "converts played a significant role as turcoples, mostly serving as light cavalry and some horse-archers": Nicolle, David, *The Crusades*, Oxford, 2001. 18.

²⁴ "early chroniclers say that they were the children of Christian-Turkish marriages, but this applies to Byzantine turcoples. In Outremer the turcoples were light cavalry, used as mounted archers, in reconnaissance, and to carry messages": France, John,

clearly became the mainstream of research. At the same time, research on the military-religious orders has also gained impetus, even if it has not primarily focused on the role of turcoples. One of the most important merits of these recent works was that they exceeded the hitherto often watershed year of 1291 that marked the end of the Crusading movement in the traditionalist interpretation. Anthony Luttrell's numerous studies, Demurger's monograph in 2002²⁵ and O'Malley's doctoral dissertation²⁶ published in 2005 have remarkably pushed the chronological boundaries. This was not, of course, entirely undiscovered territory, as earlier works on late medieval activity of the military-religious orders had been published, but these tended to focus on the office of the Turcopolier.²⁷ Of course, it is also appropriate to refer to those works which studied the early (pre-1291) period and which have considerably expanded our knowledge, above all Bronstein's monograph²⁸ in 2005 and that of Burgtorf's in 2008,²⁹ which is hardly comparable in richness of data to the earlier works. It is also worth mentioning those who have refined their earlier ideas in the light of more recent research.³⁰ These new findings have also found their way into the manual published in 2009 which systematised the accumulated knowledge of medieval military-religious orders.³¹

"Warfare: Outremer," In: Murray, Alan V. (ed.), *The Crusades: An Encyclopedia*. Santa Barbara, CA, 2006. 1258–1264.

²⁵ Demurger, Alain, *Moines et guerriers les ordres religieux-militaires au Moyen Âge*. Paris, 2002. 114–115, 145–146, 289, 294.

²⁶ O'Malley, Gregory, *The Knights Hospitaller of the English Langue, 1460–1565*. Oxford–New York, 2005. 304–307.

²⁷ Tipton, Charles L., "Peter Holt, Turcopolier of Rhodes and Prior of Ireland", = *Annales de l'Ordre Souverain de Malte* 22, 1964, 82–85.; Luttrell, Anthony, "English Contributions to the Hospitaller Castle at Bodrum in Turkey: 1407–1437", In: Nicholson, Helen J. (ed.), *Welfare and Warfare*. Aldershot, 1998. 163–172.

²⁸ Bronstein, Judith, *The Hospitallers and the Holy Land: Financing the Latin East, 1187–1274*. Woodbridge, 2005.

²⁹ "a label denoting origin had become a label denoting function": Burgtorf, Jochen, *The Central Convent of Hospitallers and Templars: History, Organization, and Personnel (1099/1120–1310)*. Leiden–Boston, 2008. 38.

³⁰ Riley-Smith, Jonathan, "Toward a History of Military-Religious Orders", In: Borchardt, Karl – Jaspert, Nikolas – Nicholson, Helen J. (eds.), *The Hospitallers, the Mediterranean and Europe: Festschrift for Anthony Luttrell*. Aldershot, 2007. 276–277.; Forey, Alan, "Milites ad terminum' in the Military Orders during the Twelfth and Thirteenth Centuries", In: Upton-Ward, Judi (ed.), *The Military Orders*. Vol. IV.: *On Land and by Sea*. Aldershot, 2008. 9–11.; Nicolle, David, *Knights of Jerusalem: The Crusading Order of Hospitallers, 1100–1565*. Oxford–New York, 2008. 115–116, 159, 167.; who, having known Harari's idea, has already attempted a compromise definition.; Phillips, Simon, *The Prior of the Knights Hospitaller in Late Medieval England*. Woodbridge, 2009. 12, 86.

³¹ Richard, Jean, "Turcoples", In: Jossierand, Philippe et al. (eds.), *Prier et combattre: dictionnaire européen des ordres militaires au Moyen Âge*. Paris, 2009. 937–938.; Burgtorf, Jochen, "Turcoplier", In: Jossierand et al. (eds.), *Prier et combattre*, 938–939.

While the last decade of research has not seen any new breakthroughs, there have been many remarkable advances. Riley-Smith has significantly revised his 1967 monograph,³² the younger generation of researchers has turned up,³³ and of course the doyens have also brought important new work to the table.³⁴ Among them, Alan Murray must be mentioned, who in recent years has made a number of important contributions to our knowledge of the subject.³⁵ Finally, it should also be included that the text-edition of Luttrell and O'Malley's in 2019, whose introduction provides very important contributions on the late medieval turcopoles of the Hospitallers, which also help researchers to refine the definition of the subject.³⁶

The above historiographical overview draws a rather complex picture of the turcopoles, both of the Byzantine and Frankish armies and of the troops who fought with the Knights Templar. Their tasks went far beyond scouting and raiding, as they were often also seen as messengers. Above all, they are mentioned in the sources as important troops in battles, often as vanguards, sometimes as light cavalry, sometimes as archers, and their numbers in the Crusader armies were much greater than previously assumed by historians. However, it is now known that they also played an important role in the patrols of Christian territories and coastal areas, both in the Latin states of the Levant and on the Aegean islands. By the beginning of the fifteenth century, their activities were mostly limited to the protection of the Hospitaller islands. Having these facts in mind, it is worth taking a closer look at the turcopoles of the military-religious orders to draw a more accurate picture of this rather complex group.

Both comprehensive works and publications on individual military-religious orders regularly point out that only a small proportion of the fully pro-

³² Riley-Smith, Jonathan, *The Knights Hospitaller in the Levant, c.1070–1309*. Houndmills–New York, 2012. 33, 56, 84, 150, 224.

³³ Morton, Nicholas, *The medieval military orders: 1120–1314*. London, 2014. 28, 107.; Jefferson, J. Michael, *The Templar Estates in Lincolnshire, 1185–1565: Agriculture and Economy*. Woodbridge, 2020. 206, 216, 227.

³⁴ Sarnowsky, Jürgen, “Die Ritterorden und der Krieg von St. Sabas”, = *Ordines Militares – Colloquia Torunensia Historica* 17, 2012, 77–78.; Forey, Alan, “Paid Troops in the Service of Military Orders during the Twelfth and Thirteenth Centuries”, In: Boas, Adrian J. (ed.), *The Crusader World*. New York, 2016. 84–87, 90–92.; Jaspert, Nikolas, “Military Orders at the Frontier: Permeability and Demarcation”, In: Schenk, Jochen – Michael Carr (eds.), *The Military Orders 6.2: Culture and Conflict in Western and Northern Europe*. London–New York, 2017. 11, 13–14.

³⁵ Murray, Alan V., “The Grand Designs of Gilbert of Assailly. The Order of the Hospital in the Projected Conquest of Egypt by King Amalric of Jerusalem (1168–1169)”, = *Ordines Militares. Colloquia Torunensia Historica* 20, 2015, 7–24.; Idem, “Warriors and civilians in the Crusade movement. Military identities and status in the liberation and defence of the Holy Land (1096–1204)”, = *Millars. Espai i història* 43, 2017, 115–117.

³⁶ Luttrell, Anthony – O'Malley, Gregory, *The Countryside of Hospitaller Rhodes 1306–1423. Original Texts and English Summaries*. Abingdon–New York, 2019. 11–12, 27–29.

fessed members (*fratres professi*) of the orders fought. Very often, mercenaries and other occasionally recruited knights and paid soldiers were employed for fighting against infidels. Among the Templars, the voluntary institution of *milites ad terminum*³⁷ has long been known as a solution provided for Christian knights who did not wish to serve for life but wanted to fight for the faith. The military activity of these orders in the Holy Land intensified after the Second Crusade (1147–1149). The existence of the turcoples in the Order of the Temple can be proved from 1164, decades later than such auxiliaries appeared in the Byzantine and Frankish armies. It is known from a letter of the Templar preceptor to King Louis VII of France,³⁸ in which he mentions turcoples who had fallen. A year later, 500 turcoples were promised to King Amalric of Jerusalem,³⁹ in addition to 500 knights. The exact date of their appearance in the Order cannot be reconstructed, as is whether they were paid ‘mercenaries’, perhaps receiving fiefs from the Order,⁴⁰ or whether some of them might have achieved some degree of membership in the Order.⁴¹ The fundamental problem is that the Templar rule makes numerous precise references to them, but the chronological sequence is difficult to reconstruct. What is clear, however, is that the turcoples were also involved in the service of the leadership of the Order and they did not necessarily assumed a direct military role.⁴²

Their status reflected in the Templar rule is not only somewhat obscure, but also contains some interesting elements. According to the Templar hierarchy, while the sergeants, alike the knights, were under the command of the marshal, this rule only applied in peacetime,⁴³ and in wartime they had to follow the orders of another superior, the Turcopolier.⁴⁴ An interesting aspect of the Turcopoliers’ position within the Order is that according to the Templar rules, they ate at a separate table, and its main implication is that they were not mercenaries, nor even vassals of the Order. Extrapolation, of course, should be very cautious, but it suggests that at least some of the turcoples were integrated into the order to some extent, and Stern even concluded that both the

³⁷ Forey, *Milites ad terminum*, 2008. *passim*.

³⁸ “praeter fratres clientes et turcopolos”: See Barber, Malcolm – Bate, A. Keith (eds.), *The Templars: Selected Sources*. Manchester–New York, 2002. 98.; Burgtorf, *The central convent of Hospitallers and Templars*, 2008. 37.

³⁹ Savvides, *Late Byzantine*, 1993. 129.

⁴⁰ Cf. Richard, *Les turcoples*, 1986. 264–265.; Savvides, *Late Byzantine*, 1993. 128–129.; Harari, *The Military Role*, 1997. 85.; Savvides, *Turcoples*, 2006. 1208.; Richard, *Turcoples*, 2009. 937.

⁴¹ Forey, *Paid Troops*, 2016. 86.

⁴² Upton-Ward, *The Rule of the Templars*, 1992. nos. 77, 101, 125, 169, 170–171, 179.; Upton-Ward, Judi, *The Catalan Rule of the Templars: A Critical Edition and English Translation from Barcelona, Archivo de La Corona de Aragón, Cartas Reales, MS 3344*. Woodbridge, 2003. 75–77.; Forey, *Paid Troops*, 2016. 87.

⁴³ Marshall, *Warfare in the Latin East*, 1992. 158.

⁴⁴ “All the sergeant brothers, when they are under arms, are under the command of the Turcopolier, but in peacetime they are not” Upton-Ward, *The Rule of the Templars*, 1992. no. 171.

Templar and Hospitaller turcoples were below the rank of knights but above the sergeants.⁴⁵ From the Templars' point of view, it is a perfectly rational step to give them some sort of rank and provide them with provisions rather than pay them as mercenaries. This, of course, implies serious expectations as to their religion. Those so closely attached to the order were certainly Christians or converted Muslims. However, the rule makes no reference to them or to their numbers. There is nothing surprising in this, of course, since we have no information, even approximately, on the number of knights and sergeants. We can only guess from regional studies, which have to be treated with caution, that the ratio of knights to sergeants was around 1:9. However, our sporadic data seem to confirm Harari's assertion⁴⁶ that the number of turcoples is closely correlated with the number of full members of the order. The garrison of 1,700 at the Templar stronghold of Safed, which swelled to as many as 2,200 during the siege, included 300 archers and several hundred staff stationed. In comparison, the number of knights and turcoples was 50 in the castle at the time of the Barons' Crusade (1239–1240)⁴⁷. One of the most shocking figures, however, was the battle at La Forbie (1244), a few years later, which ended in a huge loss of lives: 312 knights Templar and 324 turcoples, compared with 325 knights and 200 turcoples from the Hospitallers. Although Harari makes no reference to it, it is worth mentioning that the Templars are known to have 33 survivors, while the Hospitallers encountered 26.⁴⁸ It is not known whether their importance within the order was related to their numbers, but it is to emphasise that the former Turcopolier was elected Grand Master of the Temple in 1277.⁴⁹

It is clear from the above that there are many similar and parallel threads in the early history of the military-religious orders concerning the role and activities of the Templar and Hospitaller turcoples. This also applies to the

⁴⁵ Sterns, Indrikis, "The Teutonic Knights in the Crusader States," In: Hazard, Harry W. – Zacour, Norman P. (eds.), *A History of the Crusades: The Impact of the Crusades on the Near East*, Vol. V., Madison, WI, 1985. 338.; Harari, *The Military Role*, 1997. 92, 94.

⁴⁶ Harari, *The Military Role*, 1997. 80–82.

⁴⁷ Barber, *The New Knighthood*, 1994. 166.; Years later, when Baybars captured Safed, the fortress was defended by 80 knights and 50 turcoples.; Cf. Harari, *The Military Role*, 1997. 106.; Bronstein, *The Hospitallers*, 2005. 40.; Riley-Smith, Jonathan, *Templars and Hospitallers as Professed Religious in the Holy Land*. Notre Dame, 2010. 30.; Forey, *Paid Troops*, 2016. 85.

⁴⁸ Richard, *Turcoples*, 2009. 938.; Cf. Lotan, Shlomo, "The battle of La Forbie (1244) and its aftermath – re-examination of the Military Orders Involvement in the Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem in the mid-thirteenth century", = *Ordines Militares. Yearbook for the Study of the Military Orders* 17, 2012. 59.

⁴⁹ Burgtorf, *Turcoplier*, 2009. 939.; While this never happened with the Hospitallers.; Cf. Nicholson, Helen J., "International mobility versus the needs of the realm: The Templars and Hospitallers in the British Isles in the thirteenth and fourteenth Century", In: Burgtorf, Jochen – Nicholson, Helen (eds.), *International Mobility in the Military Orders (Twelfth to Fifteenth Centuries): Travelling on Christ's Business*. Cardiff, 2006. 87.

chronology, as the turcoples of the Order of St. John, which in any case only became militarised by the 1160s, first appeared during the Egyptian venture of King Amalric of Jerusalem in 1168/69.⁵⁰ The campaign was not only remarkable from the point of view of the turcoples, as it put the Hospitallers in serious financial difficulties and even caused a serious crisis in the leadership of the Order.⁵¹ The figures quoted in the source (500 knights and 500 turcoples) clearly indicate both the size of the auxiliary troops and their proportion to the knights.⁵² The fact that a decade later the Hospitaller turcoples stationed near Bethgibelin (Beit-Jibrin) attacked the Bedouins who were under the protection of the Templars, and presumably were tax-payers of the Order, which caused serious tension between the Orders, may be an indication of their activity and a certain independence. After another decade, following a massive defeat at the Horns of Hattín (1187) by Saladin, the knights of the military-religious orders were executed by the sultan, but no massacre of turcoples were reported, although many were taken prisoner.⁵³ This led many to recognise the turcoples as Muslims, although they certainly were not only of the turcoples of the military-religious orders, but also that of the Frankish armies.⁵⁴ Following the defeat at Hattín, and a few years after the fall of Jerusalem (1187), the Hospitaller turcoples turn up on the scenes, this time fighting at Arsur in 1191.⁵⁵ More important for research, however, is the date of 1203, when we first hear of the Hospitaller Turcopolier from a Muslim source.⁵⁶ This is also important evidence that like the office of the marshal, these dignities were not created at the General Chapter of Margat in 1206, but were merely codified there for the first time. It was not until 1248 to identify the first Turcopolier by name (Pierre de Sardines) who held this dignity in the Order.⁵⁷

⁵⁰ Smail, *Crusading Warfare*, 1956. 111, 184.; Idem, *The Crusaders in Syria*, 1973. 55.; Riley-Smith, *The Knights of St. John in Jerusalem*, 1967. 324.; Riley-Smith, *The Knights of St. John in Jerusalem*, 2012. 33.

⁵¹ Murray doubts that these turcoples were converted Muslims or even Eastern Christians. Murray, *The Grand Designs*, 2015. 15–17.; Idem, *Warriors and civilians*, 2017. 115–116.

⁵² Cf. Savvides, *Late Byzantine*, 1993. 129.; Harari, *The Military Role*, 1997. 82, 91–92.; Barber – Bate, *The Templars*, 2002. 176.; Nicolle, *Knights of Jerusalem*, 2008. 115.; Forey, Alan J., “The Participation of the Military Orders in Truces with Muslims in the Holy Land and Spain during the Twelfth and Thirteenth Centuries”, = *Ordines Militares – Colloquia Torunensia Historica* 17, 2012. 46.

⁵³ Harari, *The Military Role*, 1997. 106.; Richard, *Turcoples*, 2009. 937.

⁵⁴ Savvides, *Late Byzantine*, 1993. 129.; Cf. France, *Warfare: Outremer*, 2006. 1262.

⁵⁵ Riley-Smith, *The Knights of St. John in Jerusalem*, 1967. 324.

⁵⁶ Ibn Wāṣil mentioned a *mukaddam* of the turcoples. Riley-Smith, *The Knights of St. John in Jerusalem*, 1967. 325.; Harari, *The Military Role*, 1997. 86.; Riley-Smith, *The Knights of St. John in Jerusalem*, 2012. 150, 224.

⁵⁷ Burgtorf, *The central convent of Hospitallers and Templars*, 2008. 145.; Burgtorf, *Turcoplier*, 2009. 938.; Riley-Smith, *The Knights of St. John in Jerusalem*, 2012. 150.

The tragic outcome of the battle of 1244 at La Forbie has already been mentioned in connection with the Templars, but soon thereafter the turcoples had a separate section in Acre by 1258 at the latest, where the Hospitallers had their headquarters from 1206 after a short detour to Margat.⁵⁸ However, it is also worth pointing out that by this time the Christians faced a new threatening: the Mamlukes. In 1267, the Hospitaller Grand Master Hugh Revel concluded an agreement with the Sultan Baybars on compensation for the turcoples.⁵⁹ The text of the agreement also makes an oblique reference to the hierarchy of the order, but – as with the Templars – not much palpable pieces of information can be gained from the Hospitaller statutes (1206, 1268, 1300, 1302).⁶⁰ It has been pointed out above that from the position of Hospitaller Turcopolier never led to the rank of Grand Master,⁶¹ but it is important to note that by 1303 this office had arisen to the rank of capitular bailiff.⁶² Sometime around 1320⁶³ (or by the 1340s at the latest)⁶⁴ the practice established, namely, the Langue of England delegated the Turcopolier. These dates show that despite some scholarly opinion, the turcoples or at least that of the military-religious orders, far outlived the Fall of the Acre and that of the Holy Land in 1291. Indeed, the turcoples played a particularly important role in the Hospitaller conquest of Rhodes in 1309/10⁶⁵ and the subsequent defence of islands of the Order in the Aegean.⁶⁶

Although the number of sources increased steadily in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, and this might have created favourable research condi-

⁵⁸ Nicolle, *Knights of Jerusalem*, 2008. 115.; Sarnowsky, *Die Ritterorden*, 2012. 77–78.

⁵⁹ “The same procedure shall be followed in the case of homicide: the compensation for a knight is a knight, the compensation for a foot-soldier a foot-soldier, the compensation for a turcopole a turcopole”: Holt, P. M., *Early Mamluk Diplomacy, 1260–1290: Treaties of Baybars and Qalāwūn with Christian Rulers*. Leiden–New York, 1995. 41.; Harari, *The Military Role*, 1997. 111.; Burgtorf, *The central convent of Hospitallers and Templars*, 2008. 122.

⁶⁰ Cf. Riley-Smith, *The Knights of St. John in Jerusalem*, 1967. 278.

⁶¹ Although it could also serve as a steppingstone to certain positions. Nicholson, *International mobility versus the needs of the realm*, 2006. 90.

⁶² Cartulaire no. 4612. art. 5., no. 4617.

⁶³ Sire, Henry J. A., *The Knights of Malta*. New Haven, 1994. 105.; Nicholson, Helen, *The Knights Hospitaller*. Woodbridge, 2001. 76.; O’Malley, *The Knights Hospitallers*, 2005. 12.; Burgtorf, *The central convent of Hospitallers and Templars*, 2008. 146.

⁶⁴ Luttrell, Anthony, *The Town of Rhodes: 1306–1356*. Rhodes, 2003. 19.; Burgtorf, *Turcoplier*, 2009. 939.; Luttrell – O’Malley, *The Countryside of Hospitaller Rhodes*, 2019. 29.

⁶⁵ Savvides, *Late Byzantine*, 1993. 136.; Harari, *The Military Role*, 1997. 81, 108.

⁶⁶ Luttrell, Anthony, “The Military and Naval Organization of the Hospitallers at Rhodes, 1310–1444”, In. Idem (ed.), *The Hospitallers of Rhodes and Their Mediterranean World*. Aldershot, 1992. XIX: 136, 138.; O’Malley, *The Knights Hospitallers*, 2005. 27–29.; Idem, “British and Irish Visitors to and Residents in Rhodes, 1409–1522”, In. Borchardt, Karl – Jaspert, Nikolas – Nicholson, Helen J. (eds.), *The Hospitallers, the Mediterranean and Europe: Festschrift for Anthony Luttrell*. Aldershot, 2007. 163.

tions, especially compared to the early (pre-1291) period, but we still have to rely on rather scattered data on the status and activities of the turcoples until recently. Luttrell and O'Malley's text-edition and their explanatory notes have greatly improved the situation, even if their publications do not cover the entire Rhodian period. Nevertheless, two interim conclusions can be drawn from the available data. Firstly, the turcoples are mentioned by name at various times (1347, 1382, 1415, 1495), so that it can be concluded that both Greek and Latin names were used.⁶⁷ On the other hand, the important role of the local Greek population in the defence (early-warning system) of the islands of Dodecanese⁶⁸ is increasingly referred to as mercenaries (1334–1342,⁶⁹ 1391,⁷⁰ 1454⁷¹). If the research continues, it is likely that more light will be shed on the history of the turcoples of the Hospitaller islands up to the fall of Rhodes in 1522/23. For the time being, we have to be content with the fact that on the eve of the Ottoman siege there were 300–400 turcoples in Rhodes, which, although a considerable force compared to the number of knights, the total figures of the army reached some 16.000, including all mercenaries and auxiliary troops.⁷²

We have considered a rather diverse topic above. It is quite difficult to draw simple conclusions about the origins, role, activities and significance of the turcoples. The primary aim of this study has been to distinguish turcoples of the military-religious orders from auxiliaries that appeared in both Byzantine and Frankish armies, and it is now somewhat easier to identify some of their characteristic features. On the one hand, we have seen that from the 1160s onwards, the turcoples were not necessarily recruited on an *ad hoc* basis, but that some of them were to some extent integrated into the Orders. This also suggests in part that if they were drawn from the local population, they were

⁶⁷ Luttrell, *The Military and Naval Organization*, 136.; O'Malley, *The Knights Hospitallers*, 2005. 305.; Luttrell – O'Malley, *The Countryside of Hospitaller Rhodes*, 2019. 29.

⁶⁸ Luttrell, Anthony, "Smoke and Fire Signals at Rhodes: 1449", In. Edbury, Peter (ed.), *Politics and Power*. Aldershot, 2012. 125–129.; Hunyadi, Zsolt, "Early Warning Systems and the Hospitallers in the Eastern Mediterranean", In. Giannakopoulos, Georgios A. – Sakas, Damianos P. (eds.), *Advances on Information Processing and Management*. Piraeus, 2011. 114–117.; Heslop, Michael, "The countryside of Rhodes and its defences under the Hospitallers, 1306–1423: evidence from unpublished documents and the late medieval texts and maps of Cristoforo Buondelmonti", = *Crusades* 15, 2016. 185.

⁶⁹ "*triciples sive soldadari*": Luttrell – O'Malley, *The Countryside of Hospitaller Rhodes*, 2019. 29.

⁷⁰ "*homines centum inter tricoplos et sergentes ad stipendia solita*": Luttrell – O'Malley, *The Countryside of Hospitaller Rhodes*, 2019. 29.

⁷¹ Demurger, *Moines et guerriers les ordres religieux-militaires*, 2002. 289.

⁷² Demurger, *Moines et guerriers les ordres religieux-militaires*, 2002. 294.; For recent research on the topic, see Phillips, Simon (ed.), *The 1522 Siege of Rhodes: Causes, Course and Consequences*. (The Military Religious Orders: History, Sources, and Memory). Abingdon–New York, 2022.

in any case Christians or converted Muslims. It could also be reconstructed that they were governed by the Turcopolier, whose office was established at the beginning of the thirteenth century and became certainly one of the more prestigious religious offices by the last quarter of the century. It is difficult to exactly determine when in the period under study they served for provisions, pay or fief, but it is known that they were not necessarily directly engaged in military service. After the dissolution of the Templars in 1311–12, we can only count on the late medieval activities of the Hospitaller turcoples, but in sufficient detail mainly for the first 100 years of their activity.⁷³ The questions to answer are still numerous.

⁷³ Heslop, Michael, *Medieval Greece: Encounters between Latins, Greeks and Others in the Dodecanese and the Mani*, New York, 2021. *passim*.

Gergely Kiss

CONRAD OF URACH, PAPAL LEGATE IN THE SERVICE OF CRUSADES

The life of the Cistercian monk who was born around 1177 and died in 1227 crossed the history of the Crusades several times and was commissioned as papal legate not only to prepare the classic campaigns in the Holy Land, but also to act against the Albigensian heretics in the early thirteenth century. The present paper will examine his role and activities in these complex events, starting from his charter of 1220, during the campaign against the Albigensians.

On 5 February 1220, in the town of Carcassonne, Conradus, cardinal-bishop of Porto and St Rufina, issued a charter. In this document, the papal legate confirms that “all the lands and revenues which Amaury, duke of Narbonne, count of Toulouse, lord of Monfort and his barons have given to the Order of Jesus’ Faith in the territory of Narbonne will revert to him and to the other donors”.¹ The content of the charter is closely related to the subject of the present paper, but before going into details of the case, a brief outline of the main stages in the life of our protagonist is required.

Conrad was born around 1177 as the son of Eginon IV of Urach and Agnes of Zähringen. Two of his brothers, Bertold and Rudolf, chose the Cistercian order, and the third, Egon, became count of Freiburg. In addition to them, another brother, Bertold, and two sisters, Hildwide and Yolande, are known.²

The following are the stages of Conrad’s ecclesiastical career: dean of the St Lambert chapter of Liège (1195–1196); Cistercian monk (Villers-en-Brabant, 1199), postulated bishop (Liège, 1200), prior (Villers-en-Brabant, 1204–1209), abbot (Villers-en-Brabant, 1209–1214); abbot (Clairvaux, 1214–1217), abbot (Cîteaux, 1217–1219); cardinal-bishop (Porto et S. Rufina, 1218/1219–

¹ Archives Nationales de France. Fonds publics de l’Ancien Régime, Marine, Affaires étrangères. Trésor des Chartes. [hereinafter: ANF, Trésor des Chartes] J//337 Narbonne nr. 3. Cf. Appendix. I would like to express my gratitude to Pierre Jugie (General Curator of Cultural Heritage, National Archives of France) for his generous and friendly help.

² For the whole life and career see: <https://delegatonline.pt.e.hu/search/persondatasheet/id/203> (Accessed on 16 March 2023); Aubert, Roger, “Konrad d’Urach”, In. Baudrillart, Alfred et al. (eds.), *Dictionnaire d’histoire et de géographie ecclésiastique*. Paris, 2007. Vol. XXIX., 606.; Neininger, Falko, *Konrad von Urach (†1227) Zähringer, Zisterzienser, Kardinallegat*. Padernborn–München–Wien–Zürich, 1994. 71.; Schwarzmaier, Hans-Martin, “Konrad von Urach. Abt von Clairvaux und Cîteaux, Kardinalbischof von Porto um 1177–1227”, In. Taddey, Gerhard (ed.), *Lebensbilder aus Schwaben und Franken*. Stuttgart, 1991. 1–17. 3.; Rieckenberg, Hans Jürgen, “Konrad von Urach”, = *Neue Deutsche Biographie* 12, 1980, 551. [Online-Version]; URL: <https://www.deutschebiographie.de/pnd119169657.html#ndbcontent>.

1227); postulated archbishop of Besançon (1220); papal legate (England, 1216, France, 1219–1223, 1224; Germany, 1224–1226).³

The last decade of Conrad's career is now interesting for the present topic, that is the Crusades, when he accomplished important commissions, all of which are closely linked to the Crusades in the wider sense. This story begins with Conrad's participation in 1215 in the Fourth Lateran Council, which, needless to say, played an important role in the preparation of the Fifth Crusade. As abbot of Clairvaux, he had considerable influence within the Cistercian order, which played a major role in the papacy's policy of preparing for the Crusades since the pontificate of Pope Innocent III.⁴ It is no coincidence that two of the most important leaders of *monachi albi*, Arnaud of Cîteaux and Conrad of Clairvaux, were entrusted with such important tasks in 1216. On 6 December 1216, they were sent by Honorius III to England to make arrange between the Plantagenets and the Capetians. It is well known that after the battle of Bouvines and Roches-aux-Moines (1214), following the death of King John I of England, an expedition led by Philip II's son, the later King Louis VIII (the Lion), was launched to the island, which ultimately failed. Well, not because of the activities of the two papal nuncios, but it has less relevance for our train of events. Rather, it is the fact that the mission itself went beyond a dynastic conflict that has been going on for decades. Its significance lies in the fact that peace between the leading European dynasties was crucial to the Crusade. The papal legates were unsuccessful, but it was not due to them so to the increasingly desperate military situation that Louis finally concluded the Treaty of Lambeth in September 1217 and withdrew from England.⁵

The rest of Conrad's career was even more closely interlinked with the Crusades. Conrad, having experienced many abuses, including those affecting the

³ Clément, Ambroise, "Conrad d'Urach, légat en France et en Allemagne", = *Revue Benedictine* 22–23, 1905–1906, 232–243, 62–81, 373–391. 233.; Kartusch, Elfriede, *Das Kardinalskollegium in der Zeit von 1181–1227. Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte des Kardinalates im Mittelalter*. Wien, 1948. 119.; Schreckenstein, Karl Heinrich Roth von, "Konrad von Urach, Bischof von Porto und S. Rufina als Cardinallegat in Deutschland, 1224–1226", = *Forschungen zur deutschen Geschichte* 7, 1867, 319–393. 324.; Willi, Dominikus, *Cistercienser-Päpste, -Kardinäle und -Bischöfe*. (Cistercienser Chronik, 23–24.). Braganza, 1911–1912. 21.

⁴ Aubert, Konrad d'Urach, 2007. 606.; Clément, Conrad d'Urach, 1905–1906. 235, 237, 240.; Kartusch, Das Kardinalskollegium, 1948. 119.; Neiningner, Konrad von Urach, 1994. 96–107.; Schreckenstein, Konrad von Urach, 1867. 329.; Schwarza maier, Konrad von Urach, 1991. 7.; Willi, Cistercienser-Päpste, 1911–1912. 21.

⁵ Archivio Apostolico Vaticano. Registra Vaticana vol. 9, fol. 21r.; *Regesta pontificum Romanorum inde ab anno post Christum natum MCXCVIII ad annum MCCCIV*. Vols I–II. Ed. Potthast, August, Berolini, 1874. nr. 5382. [hereinafter Potthast]; *Regesta Honorii papae III*. Vols I–II. Ed. Pressutti, Pietro, Romae, 1888–1895. nr. 154. [hereinafter Pressutti]; Neiningner, Konrad von Urach, 1994. 113–116.; Schreckenstein, Konrad von Urach, 1867. 330.

Cistercians, travelled to Rome, where he was appointed cardinal: on 2 February 1219, Honorius III made him cardinal-bishop of Porto et S. Rufina.⁶

Shortly afterwards, he was commissioned another important delegation, this time for several years: on 13 December 1219, Honorius III sent him to Languedoc.⁷ The background of his mission is worth examining in order to better understand his selection and his activities here. For the moment, without going into details, it is enough to say that Conrad's mission was set in the context of the Languedoc heresy, a growing problem from the first decade of the 1200s onwards, and the crusade against the Albigensians.⁸ He met Simon de Montfort, a key figure in the earlier events, in person in 1216. In the same year, the Cistercian Chapter General made an important decision: it forbade members of the order, its monasteries, to act against Simon de Monfort. In the following year, Conrad was again personally involved in heresy-related efforts in the southern part of France: he was commissioned by Honorius III, together with the bishops of Meaux and Noyon, to apply ecclesiastical sanctions to "rebels" who were against Philip II, by which he meant the count's vassals in Toulouse, the Albigensians. In addition to this, they were to levy the twentieth (*vicesima*), half of which was to be used to fight the Muslims and the other half to fight the heretics in the southern part of France. These few examples alone are enough to show how closely the crusade against the Albigensians was bound up with the Cistercians.⁹

The perception that the Order of the Preaching Friars (*Ordo Fratrum Predicatorum*) founded by Domenico Guzman played the most important role in the fight against heretics in this area during this period is now rather outdated. Without wishing to diminish the role of the Order, it is important to stress, as Alex Grélois has done recently, that the Dominican Order, which had just been approved by the Pope, hardly had the necessary background,

⁶ Aubert, Konrad d'Urach, 2007. 606.; Canivez, Joseph Marie, "38. Conrad d'Urach", In. Baudrillart, Alfred et al. (eds.), *Dictionnaire d'histoire et de géographie ecclésiastique*. Paris, 1953. Vol. XIII., 504–507. 504–505.; Clément, Conrad d'Urach, 1905–1906. 242–243.; Eubel, Conrad, *Hierarchia catholica medii aevii sive summorum pontificum, S.R.E. cardinalium, ecclesiarum antistitum series. I. Ab anno 1198 usque ad annum 1431 perducta*. Münster, 1923. 5, 36.; Kartusch, Das Kardinalskollegium, 1948.; Smith, Thomas W., "The College of Cardinals under Honorius III: A Nepotistic Household?", In. Walsham, Alexandra – Doran, John – Methuen, Charlotte (eds.), *Religion and the household. Papers read at the 2012 summer meeting and the 2013 winter meeting of the Ecclesiastical History Society*. Woodbridge, 2014. 74–85. 78.

⁷ Potthast, nr. 6183.; Pressutti, nr. 2301.

⁸ For the sources, events and consequences of the crusade against the Albigensians, see generally: *La Croisade Albigeoise. Actes du Colloque Du Centre d'Etudes Cathares Carcassonne, 4, 5, et 6 Octobre 2002 Organisé Avec Le Concours Du Conseil Général de l'Aude*. Ed. Roquebert, Michel, Carcassonne, 2004.; The volume also mentions the papal legate Conrad only in passing, which is not proportion with his role in the events. *La Croisade Albigeoise*, 2002. 343.

⁹ Neiningger, Konrad von Urach, 1994. 113–116.; Schreckenstein, Konrad von Urach, 1867. 330.

either in terms of institutions or in terms of the number of friars who could be “deployed”, to successfully fight the Albigensian heretics. In addition to these measures, it should be pointed out that the Cistercians had a dense network of institutions in the region (14 abbeys and 9 nunneries, numerous grangias and houses), which provided them a base for action against heresy. The order itself had already played a major role in the fight against heresy on several occasions since the middle of the twelfth century, such as the activities of St Bernard of Clairvaux, Geoffroy of Auxerre (1145) and Henri of Marcy (1175). All this also contributed to the emergence of a particular movement among white monks, which aimed to develop the theological basis for the persuasion of heretics. It is particularly significant that the Cistercians had two such strategic centres in the region: Grandselve and Frontfroide. A monk of the latter abbey was Raoul, who preached in the crusade against the Albigensians. And let us mention the abbey of Boulbonne, which was particularly important in the Battle of Muret in 1213, as many of the deceased were buried there.¹⁰

But it would be a mistake to describe the Cistercian community as a whole as a kind of order fighting against heretics, but rather as a personal attachment and commitment of individual leaders. Especially since only a few, albeit quite important, abbeys (Grandselve, Frontfroide, Boulbonne) joined the fight against the Albigensians, or the key figures associated with them. Among these, perhaps the last to mention is Arnaud Amaury, who, as papal legate (1204–1213), was a key figure in the crusade against the Albigensians for nearly ten years and also played a role in later events as archbishop of Narbonne. As did his predecessor, Pierre de Castelnaud, a monk of Frontfroide.

But again we may mention Raoul, author of the work *Manifestatio heresis Albigensium et Lugdunensium*, or Foulquet de Marseille and Guy de Vaux-de-Cernay, who served the cause against heresy as prelates (Toulouse, Carcassonne).¹¹ Of course, all this was not a “success story”, as the protracted crusade and the atrocities that were reported as “collateral damage” clearly show. Nor can it be considered a success that many of the abbeys of the order in the region, whose patrons included several families inclined to heresy (Trencavel, Foix, Rabastens), chose to adopt a tactic of withdrawal. It is also important to note the underlying crisis in the internal development of the order, which was increasingly criticised both for the gap between the monastic idea and reality (poverty and wealth) and for the problems of its leadership (relations between Cîteaux and the other abbeys, monarchical leadership). The action against the heretics of Languedoc can therefore hardly be called a “Cistercian enterprise” which united the whole Order.

¹⁰ Grémois, Alexis, “La présence cistercienne dans les villes du Midi: un investissement limité?”, In. Théry, Julien (ed.), *Moines et religieux dans la ville. Cahiers de Fanjeaux* 44, 2009, 167–188.

¹¹ *Manifestatio haeresis albigensium et lugdunensium*, In. Dondaine, Antoine (ed.), *Archivum fratrum praedicatorum*. Rome, 1959. Vol. XXIX., 268–271.

But let us return to the involvement of Conrad of Urach. After receiving his mandate in December 1219, now *legatus a latere*, he was physically present in Languedoc from the beginning of the following year. He was certainly chosen by Honorius III because it was he who headed the abbeys of the Order in the preceding years (1214–1217, Clairvaux, 1217–1219, Cîteaux) which were most committed to the fight against heresy. Conrad was also well acquainted with Arnaud Amaury, the former driving force behind the Crusade, who was now archbishop of Narbonne and had to assist him in his work.

During the years of Conrad's legation, he received papal instructions for a number of measures which created a rather complex picture, but we will focus on the events closely related to the Crusade. Here we return to the order mentioned at the very beginning of the paper: on 5 February 1220 the papal legate confirms that all the lands and revenues given to the Order of the Faith of Jesus by the Duke of Narbonne, the Count of Toulouse, the Lord of Monfort and his barons, in the territory of Narbonne, will revert to him and to the other benefactors.¹² The supporter in question was the Lord of Monfort, Amaury, son of Simon de Monfort.¹³ In the summer of the following year, the matter was raised again, now in a broader context. At this time, Honorius III instructed Conrad to formally accept the organisation of an order of knights who, "like the Templars who were fighting the Saracens in the East, wished to fight heresy in the province of Narbonne". The Order of the Faith of Jesus was thus intended to combat heretics in the southern part of France. The legate's task was to give formal recognition, provided that an existing code of conduct was accepted by the members of the order. The Templars' rule was chosen and confirmed by Honorius III in his letter to Conrad of 16 July 1221.¹⁴

The main task of the legate was to create, strengthen and preserve unity among the main pillars of the crusade. It was in this spirit that he had to settle the dispute between Amaury, Lord of Monfort, and the Bishop of Béziers (21 August 1220), and to support the actions of the vicar appointed by Emperor Frederick II to govern the Kingdom of Arles, the Marquis William VI of Montferrat (13 December 1220), who had no real influence on events. The attempt to strengthen the legate's position served a similar purpose: before the papal order of December 1220, Honorius III had given instructions in September 1220, as mentioned above, for the followers of the archbishop of Narbonne to assist Conrad in his activity against the heretics.¹⁵

As mentioned above, the ecclesiastical society of the region was by no means hostile as a whole towards Albigensian doctrines. It is not surprising, therefore, that one of the legate's important tasks was to investigate and judge archpriests

¹² ANF, Trésor des Chartes J//337 Narbonne nr. 3. Cf. Appendix.

¹³ Schwarzmaier, Konrad von Urach, 1991. 13.; Clément, Conrad d'Urach, 1905–1906. 66–67.

¹⁴ Archivio Apostolico Vaticano. Registra Vaticana vol. 11, fol. 139r, 151r; Potthast, nr. 6463, 6698.; Pressutti, nr. 3441, 3502.; Clément, Conrad d'Urach, 1905–1906. 68–69.

¹⁵ Archivio Apostolico Vaticano. Registra Vaticana vol. 11, fol. 11r, 44r; Potthast, nr. 6335, 6439–6440.; Pressutti, nr. 2634, 2865.; Clément, Conrad d'Urach, 1905–1906. 67.

and monks who failed to act or supported heretics regardless of the religious privileges of Cistercians, Hospitallers and Templars (2 June 1221). Another important factor was the willingness of local clerical leaders to support the “cause of the crusade” (*negotium fidei*). It is not surprising, therefore, that Honorius III made the organisation of elections to fill offices in Provence explicitly depending on the legate’s permission (6 June 1221).¹⁶

And as far as the region east of the Rhône was concerned, the papal policy of allocating some of Provence’s resources to the fight against heresy was a measure to ensure the military support necessary for a successful campaign. This was the aim of the measure (2 June 1220) whereby the legate allocated a part of the taxes collected along the Languedoc side of the Rhône to Hugues des Baux, partly as compensation and partly to fight the heretics of Avignon.¹⁷

Military actions, of course, require material resources. From this point of view, the two measures of Honorius III of 10 June 1221 are particularly noteworthy, according to which Conrad could request financial contributions (*subsidium*) from all ecclesiastical institutions within his area of authority, including the exempt institutions, the Cluny congregation, the Cistercians and the Premonstratensians, for the fight against heresy (*pro fidei negotio*).¹⁸

The violence that accompanied the crusade, the mitigation of excesses, was an important means of gaining the benevolence of the local population. Conrad could not dismiss this task either. This ambition is already mentioned in a letter of command of August 1220, but it also appears in the summer of 1221, when Honorius III instructed Conrad to take action against the excesses (violence, murder) of the crusaders.¹⁹

The question is, of course, to what extent all these provisions and measures contributed to the success of the legation. As it is well known, after the death of Simon de Montfort (1218), his son Amaury tried to actively involve the Capetians in the fight against the Albigensians, and in particular against the counts of Toulouse (Raimund VI, and from 1222 onwards his son Raimund VII). By the early 1220s, the war had led to a kind of impasse, as a result of which Raimund VII entered into peace negotiations, first with Amaury, lord of Montfort, and then with Philip II himself. Conrad was actively involved in these events, as several exchanges of correspondence with the pope in October 1222 attest.²⁰ The papal legate acted as adviser to Prince Amaury of Narbonne during the negotiations. The negotiations, which were to have been held first

¹⁶ Archivio Apostolico Vaticano. Registra Vaticana vol. 11, fol. 136r, 144r; vol. 15, fol. 4v; Potthast, nr. 6462.; Pressutti, nr. 3431, 3440.; *Les registres de Grégoire IX*. Vols I–IV. Ed. Auvray, Lucien, Paris, 1890–1955. nr. 444.

¹⁷ Archivio Apostolico Vaticano. Registra Vaticana vol. 11, fol. 134r; Pressutti, nr. 3421.

¹⁸ Archivio Apostolico Vaticano. Registra Vaticana vol. 11, fol. 143r; Pressutti, nr. 3451.

¹⁹ Archivio Apostolico Vaticano. Registra Vaticana vol. 11, fol. 136r; Pressutti, nr. 3432.

²⁰ Archivio Apostolico Vaticano. Registra Vaticana vol. 12, fol. 3r; Pressutti, nr. 4114.

in Saint-Flour and then in Sens, were finally moved to Paris at the request of Philip II, but the French ruler died on 14 July 1223 and the agreement has not been concluded.²¹ This is probably the reason why, although the legate attended the king's funeral in Saint-Denis, he was then very active in the work of the chapter general to strengthen the Cistercian order internally, and returned to the papal court in the late autumn of 1223, as he felt that greater papal and French (Louis VIII) support was needed to continue the crusade.²²

This was not to be long delayed: in the spring of 1224 (probably early March or April) Honorius III entrusted Conrad with another legate's commission,²³ and again, for the first time, he went to Languedoc. However, this time the mandate was much more extensive. It was now not only a question of settling the situation in Languedoc, but also of providing the background for a much larger project. After the end of the Fifth Crusade, the launch of a new military campaign was still on the agenda and, as before, the preparations for this included attempts to bring peace to the European hinterland. It was at the beginning of 1224 that hope was rekindled when the Holy Roman Emperor Frederick II showed his willingness to take part in the Crusade. It was therefore important to win the support of Louis VIII, which also brought the Capeting-Plantagenet rivalry and the Languedoc conflict caused by the Albigenian heresy back to a resolution. It is in this context that Honorius III's letter of 4 April 1224 to Louis VIII can be understood better, in which he informs him that "Frederick II has taken the crusade vow" as is clear from the letter sent by the legate Conrad, and therefore urges the French king to press Raymond VII to act against the heretics, to secure the freedom of the Count of Amaury of Narbonne, and to receive his envoy, Conrad with confidence, who will urge him to renew the peace with England.²⁴ The latter was a reference to Louis VIII's earlier offer of February 1224 to make a ten-year peace with England as one of the conditions for launching a crusade against the Albigenians. The Albigenian crusade and the Anglo-French peace were thus linked: their success was (or rather would have been) the key to a successful campaign in the Holy Land. It was also the most sensitive point. For Louis VIII was to succeed in his campaign against his rival Henry III of Plantagenet in the Garrone valley, for which he had secured the support of Frederick II. In May 1224, the legate's situation further deteriorated: Louis VIII had simply withdrawn as a supporter of the military action

²¹ Schwarzmaier, Konrad von Urach, 1991. 13.; Zimmermann, Heinrich, *Die päpstliche Legation in der erste Hälfte des 13. Jahrhunderts. Vom Regierungsantritt Innozenz' III. bis zum Tode Gregors IX. (1198–1941)*. (Görres-Gesellschaft zur Pflege der Wissenschaft im katholischen Deutschland. Sektion für Rechts- und Sozialwissenschaft 17. Heft.). Paderborn, 1913. 76–77.; Schreckenstein, Konrad von Urach, 1867. 334.

²² Clément, Conrad d'Urach, 1905–1906. 80–81.

²³ Pixton, Paul B., *The German Episcopacy and the Implementation of the Decrees of the Fourth Lateran Council, 1216–1245 Watchmen on the Tower*. Leiden, 1994. 321.

²⁴ Archivio Apostolico Vaticano. Registra Vaticana vol. 12, fol. 178r; Potthast, nr. 7213.; Pressutti, nr. 4921.; Neinger, Konrad von Urach, 1994. 206–228.; Schwarzmaier, Konrad von Urach, 1991. 13.

against the heretics of Languedoc. Although Honorius III sought to provide Conrad financial support for the action against the Albigensian heretics, the legate's presence was effectively redundant, and from the middle of the year he was urged to move to another region, to the territory of the Holy Roman Empire.²⁵

In late May – early June 1224, he departed for the German territories.²⁶ Some papal commissions had already ordered him to take care of church affairs in Germany in early May, but he did not actually set foot on German soil until June, travelling via Maastricht to Cologne and then, following the Zülpich-Bonn route, to Nuremberg to attend a meeting convened by the German king Henry VII.²⁷ From Bavaria, he returned to the Rhineland (Ulm, Speyer) and then came back to Cologne, where he attended a meeting between Henry VII and Jean de Brienne, Regent of the Kingdom of Jerusalem, on 14 August.²⁸

This latter event provides the best insight into the purpose of Conrad's legation: to pave the way for a new crusade. The establishment of peace between the European dynasties was threatened by the continuing Anglo-French rivalry, and there was little doubt that the Capetian monarch was seeking the support of the Holy Roman emperor and the German king against the Plantagenets. By November 1224, the situation was mixed: on the one hand, the Anglo-French peace negotiations had not been successful, but on the other, the German king had been distanced from a possible French alliance. This can be seen as the most important result of the meeting held in Toul on 18 November 1224, attended by a number of German ecclesiastical and secular leaders.²⁹

In 1225, too, there were numerous measures and events in Conrad's legation which were closely connected with the preparations for the Crusade. His activities at this time were mainly directed towards the south and south-east of the empire, and in March and April he most often stayed in the Bavarian-Austrian

²⁵ Clément, Conrad d'Urach, 1905–1906. 375.

²⁶ In May he held a synod in Paris, and at the end of the same month or in the first days of June he must have been in Liège. Pixton, *The German Episcopacy*, 1994. 321–322. See also: Kartusch, *Das Kardinalskollegium*, 1948. 121.; Neining, *Konrad von Urach*, 1994. 229–272.; Schwarzmaier, *Konrad von Urach*, 1991. 13–15.; Zimmermann, *Die päpstliche Legation*, 1913. 83.

²⁷ Clément, Conrad d'Urach, 1905–1906. 376, notes 2–3.; Schreckenstein, *Konrad von Urach*, 1867. 341–342.; On 7 June Conrad convoked a synod in Cologne announcing the crusade. On 23 May 1224 Honorius III commissioned him to investigate the case of Henry Minnecke, who had been imprisoned by the Bishop of Hildesheim on charges of heresy. Minnecke refused to admit his culpability and appealed to the Pope, which is how the case came to be brought before Conrad.; Pixton, *The German Episcopacy*, 1994. 322.

²⁸ Clément, Conrad d'Urach, 1905–1906. 377.; Kartusch, *Das Kardinalskollegium*, 1948. 121.; Schreckenstein, *Konrad von Urach*, 1867. 343.; Schwarzmaier, *Konrad von Urach*, 1991. 14.; On 19 August he also intervened there to appoint the Bishop of Padernborn.; Pixton, *The German Episcopacy*, 1994. 328.

²⁹ Clément, Conrad d'Urach, 1905–1906. 378–379.; Schreckenstein, *Konrad von Urach*, 1867. 346–347.; Pixton, *The German Episcopacy*, 1994. 333, 335–336.

countryside.³⁰ In April he appeared in the territory of the Babenbergs, in Heiligenkreuz and Melk. The reason for his presence here was probably the tension between King Andrew II and Prince Béla, who had taken him back against his father's wishes and refused to dissolve his marriage to Mary of Lascaris to comply with his father's dynastic policy, and had therefore fled to Prince Leopold VI of Austria in 1223. Although peace was restored between father and son through the mediation of James, bishop of Nitra, and so Béla and Mary were able to return to Hungary, the papal legate was concerned that war should not break out between the leading secular powers in the region, which would have made the crusade impossible.³¹ The presence of the papal legate is also explained by another very important circumstance. A document of Pope Honorius III of 10 March 1225 reveals that Conrad was to negotiate concerning the matter of the Teutonic Knights. Even on 12 June, Honorius III instructed his legate to persuade the king to leave the Burzenland (Barcaság) in the hands of the knights. As it is well known, the legate's action was unsuccessful, and the knights were forced to leave the territory of the Kingdom of Hungary. Although his intercession was unsuccessful, it can hardly be regarded as anything other than an attempt to further the cause of the crusade, albeit not a very successful one.³²

With a similar aim, he travelled to Prague (June 1225) in preparation for the crusade, and then to the north-north-east part of the Empire, where he made several appeals for participation in the campaign (Meissen, Halle, Halberstadt) during August and September.³³ From there he went to Naumburg and Erfurt, and during September and October he tried to mediate in the dispute between Schwerin and Denmark.³⁴ As he had done in Prague, he now sought support for the crusade in Magdeburg, and convoked a synod in Mainz in November 1225

³⁰ Schreckenstein, Konrad von Urach, 1867. 348–349.; He passed by Hagenau, Ulm (beginning of January), Constanz (29 January), Sankt Gallen (16 February), Freising (1 March), Heiligenkreuz (1 April) to arrive in Graz (6 June). Pixton, *The German Episcopacy*, 1994. 338.

³¹ Clément, Conrad d'Urach, 1905–1906. 379–380.; Schreckenstein, Konrad von Urach, 1867. 349.; Nevertheless, Conrad also dealt with a number of disciplinary issues during his journey. Pixton, *The German Episcopacy*, 1994. 335–340.

³² Archivio Apostolico Vaticano. Registra Vaticana vol. 13, fol. 66r; Potthast, nr. 7432.; Pressutti, nr. 5531.; *Vetera monumenta historica Hungariam sacram illustrantia*. Vols I–II. Ed. Theiner, Augustinus, Romae, 1859–1860. Vol. I., 58–59.; Fraknói, Vilmos, *Magyarország egyházi és politikai összeköttetései a római Szent-székkal* [Ecclesiastical and political relations of Hungary and the Apostolic Seat]. Vol. I. 1000–1417. Budapest, 1901. 50.; Kartusch, *Das Kardinalskollegium*, 1948. 121.; Neininger, Konrad von Urach, 1994. 229–272.; Schwarzmaier, Konrad von Urach, 1991. 13–15.; Zimmermann, *Die päpstliche Legation*, 1913. 83.

³³ Neininger, Konrad von Urach, 1994. 263.; Schwarzmaier, Konrad von Urach, 1991. 14.; Schreckenstein, Konrad von Urach, 1867. 350–351.; Pixton, *The German Episcopacy*, 1994. 340–344.

³⁴ Clément, Conrad d'Urach, 1905–1906. 385.; Schreckenstein, Konrad von Urach, 1867. 354.

for the same purpose.³⁵ In January 1226, he was active in German territory and in the Low Countries. The meetings held here were aimed at establishing peace between the principalities of the Low Countries (especially between Utrecht and Geldern) in preparation for the Crusade. Then, after a brief stop-over in Swabia and Burgundy, he returned to Italy, and his embassy in Germany came to an end in May 1226.³⁶

However, his activities were still intertwined with the *negotium fidei*: he was involved in northern Italy in the preparation of Frederick II's crusade. By May 1226, he was working to persuade the Lombard cities, which were fearful of Frederick II's plans for Italy and reluctant to join a crusade.³⁷

After the death of Honorius III (18 March 1227), Conrad's name appeared among the possible candidates for the succession, as far the Chronicle of Villers suggests is, but it was Ugolino de Conti di Segni, i.e., Gregory IX, who won the papal tiara. Last but not least, the crusade and Conrad's destiny were finally interlinked at the end of the former papal legate's life. He took part in the Lombard assembly in June in preparation for Frederick II's campaign, then joined the crusading forces at Bari, but died of an epidemic on 29 (or 27, or possibly 30) September 1227, buried at Clairvaux at his own request.³⁸

To summarise what has been explained, it is important to note first of all that the crusade and Cistercian monasticism were very much bound up from the mid-twelfth century onwards. This did not mean, however, that the whole Order was united in its support either for the military enterprise in the Holy Land or for the 'holy war' against heretics. It is indisputable that Bernard of Clairvaux made important theological contributions to the legitimacy of the war against the pagans and its compatibility with Christian doctrine (cf. his pamphlet entitled "De laude novae militia"). However, it is important to point out that not all Cistercian abbeys supported the crusade with the same enthusiasm, some holding out, others remaining outright hostile, obviously depending on the advantages, disadvantages or even dangers of the *negotium fidei*. This was particularly true of the fight against the Albigensian heresy. In this region, the Order was in a strong position, but it was precisely because of its deep social roots that its support for the crusade polarised reactions. Conrad of Urach, however, came into contact with the fight against heresy and the crusade as a member and leader of the most important abbey that was an active participant in it. Not surprisingly, he soon found himself in the midst of events. Although his missions were not a resounding success, they did draw attention to several important phenomena. In particular, one of the main pillars of papal

³⁵ Schreckenstein, Konrad von Urach, 1867. 355–356.; Conrad also dealt with a number of disciplinary issues during his journey: Pixton, *The German Episcopacy*, 1994. 344–349.


³⁶ Clément, Conrad d'Urach, 1905–1906. 387.; Schreckenstein, Konrad von Urach, 1867. 357–360.

³⁷ Schreckenstein, Konrad von Urach, 1867. 360.

³⁸ Neininger, Konrad von Urach, 1994. 273–279.; Schwarzaier, Konrad von Urach, 1991. 15.

policy at the time was to bring peace between the various dynasties in order to make a success of the military enterprises in the Holy Land. This involved not only establishing peace between the Plantagenets and the Capetians, but also by taking strong action against the Albigensians of Languedoc, as well as winning over the Holy Roman Emperor, the German King, or even the ruling families of Central Europe, settling their conflicts and providing a strategic military force in the region, namely the Teutonic Knights. It is not surprising, therefore, that Conrad of Urach's career was so heavily marked by the fulfilment of his mission to promote the crusade (*negotium fidei*).

Appendix



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Text:

C[onradus] miseratione divina Portuensis et Sancte Ruffine episcopus, Apostolice Sedis legatus, universis Christi fidelibus ad quos presentes littere pervenerint, salutem in Domino. Cum nemini sua liberalitas debeat esse dampno, ad vestram universitatis noticiam duximus perveniendum quod omnes terre et redditus, quantum illustris vir A. dux Narbone, comes Tolose et dominus

Montisfortis, et tam barones sui quam milites, contulerunt vel conferent ordini Fidei Jhesu Christi, in partibus Narbone constituto, libere redibunt ad ipsum comitem et ad alios collatores. In hujus autem rei testimonium, presentes litteras sigilli nostri munimine duximus corroborandas. Actum Carcassone, anno Domini M° CC° XX°, nonas februarii.

Seal:

Seal in shape of mandorla, 50 x 34 mm.

Prelate with mitre sitting on a throne supported by animals' head, with a rising right arm blessing, and a shepherd's basket in the left hand.

SIGILL[UM] CONRADI POR[TUE]N[SIS] E[T] S[AN]C[T]E RVFINE
EPI[SCOPI] (after Douët)

Collection des sceaux. Inventaire des sceaux des Archives nationales. Vols I–III. Éd. Douët d'Arcq, Louis, Paris, 1863–1868. Vol. II., nr. 6126.

THE EPIC TALE OF PEDRO SANCHES: THE INFANT, THE MERCENARY AND THE CRUSADER.

Throughout the Middle Ages, mercenaries and crusaders were immortalised by stories celebrating their achievements. Acts of chivalry, piety, tenacity, militarism, courage and justice all contributed to the creation of various medieval narratives, which, between myths and legends, have captivated and influenced generations of academics to demystify myth from reality. It is in this context of medieval deeds that the political career of Infant¹ Pedro Sanches is set.

To paraphrase Damião Peres, an illustrious Portuguese historian, the life and deeds of Infant Pedro Sanches are a true and tireless medieval *gesta*. The figure of Pedro Sanches is remarkably delineated by outstanding attributes that encompass his royal lineage, his family connections with the monarchs of the Iberian Peninsula, his military skills and his political subtlety. These qualities gave him a remarkable versatility to operate in different kingdoms, playing a role of great importance on the Iberian and Mediterranean stage as an agent of power.

We are not the first to dedicate a study to Pedro Sanches' career. Since the 1960s, notably through António Brásio's² groundbreaking study, numerous authors from Portugal³ and Spain⁴ have subsequently enhanced the discourse with fragmented analyses of the Infant's political actions. Notwithstanding the wealth of these contributions, Pedro Sanches' political career continues to be veiled in

¹ We would like to thank Master Sofia Kinnon for her generosity for her careful reading and suggestions in translating the article. The term "infante" is of Iberian origin and is used in Spanish and Portuguese-speaking countries to denote a prince or a son of a monarch. It should be noted that this term does not have an exact English equivalent.

² Brásio, António, "O infante D. Pedro, senhor de Maiorca", = *Anais da Academia Portuguesa da História* 9, II Série, 1959, 163–240.

³ In the context of Portuguese historiographical production, besides António Brásio's study, it is imperative to acknowledge the contributions found in the works of Marques, João Francisco, "Os Mártires de Marrocos e Raimundo Lulo e a evangelização portuguesa no Norte de Africa até ao século XVI", In. *Congresso Internacional Bartolomeu Dias e a sua Época. Actas*. Porto, 1989. Vol. V., 343–368. 343–354.; Dias, Isabel, "D. Pedro Sanches e a lenda dos cinco mártires de Marrocos", In. Guardado da Silva, Carlos (ed.), *O Imaginário Medieval*. Lisboa–Torres Vedras, 2014. 121–131.

⁴ We merely reference the most significant studies: Santamaría Arández, Alvaro, "Alba del reino de Mallorca. Don Pedro de Portugal, el infante desterrado", In. Mascaró Pasarius, Josep (ed.), *Historia de Mallorca*. Vol. III., Palma de Mallorca, 1970. 1–84.; Santamaría Arández, Alvaro, "Don Pedro, infante de Portugal, señor de Mallorca (1231–1256)", In. *Baleares: Analogía de Temas*. Vol. I., Palma, 1974. 9–31.; Mateu y Llopis, Felipe, "Pedro de Portugal, Dominus regni maioricarum", = *Boletín de la Real Academia de la Historia* 173, 1976, 239–247.; Cateura Bennasser, Pau, "Las cuentas de la colonización feudal (Mallorca, 1231–1245)", = *En la España Medieval* 20, 1997, 57–141.

significant uncertainty and ambiguity, underscoring the need for more rigorous and comprehensive analysis within the context of contemporary historiography and the emergence of new diplomatic and chronicle sources⁵.

With the objective of presenting evidence concerning the facets and accomplishments of the Portuguese infant, we shall strive to address the subsequent premise, which shall function as our guiding inquiry throughout this study: Who was Pedro Sanches, the infant, the mercenary, the crusader, and the principal figure in this medieval narrative?




Fig. 1 – *Livro de Noa*. ANTT, Mosteiro de Santa Cruz de Coimbra, liv. 99, fl. 5v.

The first years of Henrique/Pedro Sanches

As recorded in the *Livro de Noa*,⁶ on the March 23, 1187 in the city of Coimbra, which was then the political epicentre of the Kingdom of Portugal, the infant Pedro Sanches was born.⁷ On his paternal side, he was the offspring of

⁵ In the last decade, the growing interest in studying the life of Pedro Sanches has led to the appearance of new studies such as Bordoy, Guillermo Rosselló, “Portugueses en la conquista de Mallorca: Pedro, infante de Portugal, i Sa’id ibn Hakam de Tavira (1229)”, In. *A Guerra e a Sociedade na Idade Média: VI Jornadas Luso-Espanholas de Estudos Medievais*. Vols I–II. Coimbra, 2009. Vol. I., 479–490.; Medina Calderón, Inés – Ferreira, João Paulo Martins, “Beyond the Border: The Aristocratic mobility between the kingdoms of Portugal and León (1157–1230)”, = *E-Journal of Portuguese History* 12, 2014, 1–48.; Medina Calderón, Inés, *Cum Magnatibus regni mei: la nobleza y la monarquía leonesas durante los reinados de Fernando II y Alfonso IX (1157–1230): La nobleza y la monarquía de Fernando II y Alfonso IX (1157–1230)*. Madrid, 2011. 230–240.

⁶ Arquivo Nacional da Torre do Tombo [hereinafter ANTT], Mosteiro de Santa Cruz de Coimbra, liv. 99, fl. 5v – “Era M.^a CC.^a XX.^a V.^a. Natus est Rex Domnus Petrus Filius Regis Sancii et Regine Domne Dulcie X.^o Kalendas Aprillis.”

⁷ All sources unanimously place the birth of Pedro Sanches in March 1187. However, the exact day is not consistent. The *Crónica de Portugal de 1419* reports that he was born on 21 March 1187 (XXI dias de março de mill ii^o xxb anos). The *Crónica de D. Sancho I*, by Rui da Pina reports that he “naceo ha vinte nove dias de Março da era de N.

Sancho I,⁸ the reigning monarch of Portugal, and the grandson of the inaugural sovereign of the Portuguese realm.⁹ Pedro's maternal lineage can be traced through Mafalda of Savoy to Dulce of Aragon, and further back to Ramon Berenguer IV, the distinguished Count of Barcelona, and Petronilla of Aragon.¹⁰

From the union of Sancho I and Dulce of Aragon, twelve births are documented,¹¹ comprising five male and seven female offsprings. The primogenital daughter, Teresa, is believed to have been born in the year 1176, a deduction drawn from the fact that her marriage was promptly consummated and proved fertile, fourteen years later with Alfonso IX of León.¹² The birth of Sancha occurred in a period spanning from 1177 to 1181,¹³ though the exact date remains uncertain. Notably, these two individuals, Sancha and Teresa, represent the sole survivors among the potential offsprings born during the first eleven years of this marriage.

In the *Livro de Noa*, there is more precise information regarding the subsequent offspring. In May 1182, the birth of a third daughter named Constance is mentioned, of whom we have no further record apart from her death.¹⁴

Senhor de mil ceto e oytenta e sete annos"; See *Crónica de Portugal de 1419*. Ed. Calado, Adelino de Almeida, Aveiro, 1998. 84. [hereinafter *Crónica de Portugal de 1419*]; Pina, Rui, *Crónica de D. Sancho I*. Lisboa, 1727. 38.

⁸ In reference to Sancho I of Portugal, see the study of Branco, Maria João, *D. Sancho I: o filho de fundador*. Lisboa, 2010.

⁹ There are several studies about Afonso Henriques, the first king of Portugal. We advise the study of Mattoso, José, *D. Afonso Henriques*. Lisboa, 2007.

¹⁰ In reference to Pedro's maternal lineage Dias see, Dias, Nuno Pizarro, "Dulce de Barcelona e Aragão ([1153–1159]–1198)", In: Marques, Maria Alegria Fernandes – Dias, Nuno Pizarro – Sá-Nogueira, Bernardo de et al., *As primeiras rainhas: Mafalda de Mouriana. Dulce de Barcelona e Aragão. Urraca de Castela. Mecia Lopes de Haro. Beatriz Afonso*. Lisboa, 2012. 107–210.

¹¹ While the majority of examined sources report that the Portuguese monarch had twelve offsprings, it is noteworthy to mention that there are records suggesting a count of fifteen children – "ffoy casado este mujto grande principe com a Rraynha Dona Doçe (...) da quall ouue XV filhos e filhas". In: Cruz, Antonio (ed.), *Anais, crónicas e memórias avulsas de Santa Cruz de Coimbra*. Porto, 1968. 101.

¹² The marriage between Teresa and Alfonso IX of León would be dissolved in 1196 by Celestine III, at which point three children had already been born. The grounds for annulment were consanguinity within a prohibited degree, as the contracting parties were both grandchildren of the first monarchs of Portugal (Afonso Henriques and Mafalda). Despite the annulment of the marriage, the offspring from the union were acknowledged by the Holy See.; See Marques, Maria Alegria, "A introdução da Ordem de Cister em Portugal", In: Idem, *Estudos sobre a Ordem de Cister em Portugal*. Coimbra, 1998. 29–73. 68, 128, n. 10.

¹³ Oliveira, Ana Rodrigues, *Rainhas medievais de Portugal. Dezassete mulheres, duas dinastias, quatro séculos de História*. Lisboa, 2010. 84, 89.

¹⁴ ANTT, Mosteiro de Santa Cruz de Coimbra, liv. 99, fl. 5v – *Era M.^a CC.^a CC.^a. Nata est filia regis Sancii et Regine Domne Dulcie Domna Costancia mense Maio.*; While there are no extant documentary records concerning Constança, it is highly probable that her death occurred prior to the formulation of king Sancho I's initial testament, a document critically dated after March 24, 1188. In that document, in addition to the

Four years later, on Saint George's Day, April 23, 1186, the first male child of the Portuguese monarchs was born, who is the heir apparent and future king Afonso II.¹⁵ As previously mentioned, on March 23, 1187, the birth of the infant Pedro Sanches was recorded, while in the following year, March 24, 1188, infant Fernando was born.¹⁶ He would become the Count of Flanders through his marriage to Joan of Constantinople in 1212. Two years later, Philip Augustus in the Battle of Bouvines captured him.¹⁷

With the exception of Constance, whose death undoubtedly occurred before March 1188, all the mentioned children, as well as six others born subsequently, are documented in various charters originating from the chancellery of Sancho I.¹⁸ By excluding forged documents and correcting date inaccuracies in some sources, we can follow the subscriptions chronologically. This gives us significant evidence of the changes within the royal family and, subsequently, Pedro Sanches.

Analysing the documentation from Sancho I's chancellery, we observe a curious and unusual name change for the second son, that is, Pedro Sanches, who in the early years of his life is referred to as Henrique. The royal records begin mentioning a son named Henrique around April 1187,¹⁹ which is roughly a year

princesses Teresa and Sancha, the infants Pedro Sanches and Fernando are mentioned. The absence of Constança's name leads us to infer that she had already passed away. Furthermore, in a letter sent to Pope Urban III, in which king Sancho I pays homage and requests protection for the Monastery of Santa Cruz in Coimbra, dated May 7, 1187, the king mentions that "et quia pater meus et mater mea et fratres necnon et filli in predicto monasterio tumulati iacent et ego ibi cum eis corpus meum sepeliri iubeo". The employment of the plural form "filli" suggests that by that date, at least two of his children had already passed away, possibly including Infanta Constança. Despite this hypothesis seeming like the most plausible, a record in the necrology of the Monastery of São Salvador de Moreira mentions "III Nonas Augusti obit Domna Constantia Infantula filia Regis Domni Sancii et Reginae Domnae Dulciae anno 1202", that corresponds to August 3, 1202.; See *Documentos de D. Sancho I (1174–1211)*. Ed. Azevedo, Rui de, Coimbra, 1979. doc. 22, 35. and doc. 30, 47–48. [hereinafter DS]; *Provas da História Genealógica da Casa Real Portuguesa*. Vol. I., Coimbra, 1946. 88–89. [hereinafter Provas da História]

¹⁵ ANTT, Mosteiro de Santa Cruz de Coimbra, liv. 99, fl. 5v – "Era M.^a CC.^a CC.^a IIII.^a. Natus est rex Alfonsus filius regis Sancii et regine Domne Dulcie in die Sancti Georgii."

¹⁶ ANTT, Mosteiro de Santa Cruz de Coimbra, liv. 99, fl. 5v-6 – "Era M.^a CC.^a XX.^a VI.^a. Natus est rex Fernandus filius regis Sancii et regine Domne Dulcie VIII Kalendas April."

¹⁷ Sivéry, Gerard, "Jeanne et Marguerite de Constantinople, comtesses de Flandre et de Hainaut au XIII siècle", In: Dessaux, Nicolas (ed.), *Jeanne de Constantinople, comtesse de Flandre et de Hainaut*. Paris, 2009. 22–25.

¹⁸ The remaining children are mentioned in the documents of Sancho I's chancellery in the following chronological order: Henrique (born on July 27, 1190 – DS, doc. 44, 68–69.), another daughter recorded as *alie filia* (born in September 1192 – DS, doc. 61, 95–96.), Raimundo (born on April 13, 1195 – DS, doc. 84, 133–137.), Mafalda (born in May 1196 – DS, doc. 92, 147–148.), and Branca and Berengária (both mentioned on December 11, 1199 – DS, doc. 122, 192–193.)

¹⁹ DS, doc. 34, 56–57.

after the birth of Afonso, who would eventually ascend to the throne as Afonso II of Portugal. Similarly, this documentation confirms the existence of another prince named Pedro after March 24, 1188, accompanied by his brother Fernando.²⁰ Therefore, we are faced with the possibility of numerous births happening in a relatively short period. The *Livro de Noa* does not include any mention of Henrique's birth, but it does record the births of infant Pedro Sanches and Fernando. In the royal chancellery Pedro is consistently referenced alongside his brother Fernando, beginning with his initial mention in Sancho I's first testament.²¹

The historical information presents a significant challenge for historians. It seems physically impossible, given the short gestation period, for a couple to have three children within the two-year span between the birth of Afonso II (April 23, 1186) and the birth of Fernando Sanches (March 24, 1188), if we rely on the accuracy of the *Livro de Noa* records.

According to Maria João Branco, various hypotheses and factors could explain this unusual occurrence. It is possible that the scribes at the Monastery of Santa Cruz in Coimbra, responsible for writing the documentation issued by the royal chancellery, would have made a mistake regarding the name of the infant they referred to as Henrique, when in reality, they were referring to Pedro, whose birth is mentioned in March 1197 in the *Livro de Noa*. Another possibility is that Pedro initially received the name Henrique and later underwent a process similar to his father's, changing his name shortly after.²²

It is reasonable to consider the hypothesis that the individual named Henrique may have been born before April 1187, while Pedro Sanches was born in March 1188. In this scenario, Fernando Sanches, mentioned in both documentation and the *Livro de Noa* as born in 1188, would necessarily have to be the twin of infant Pedro. The fact that the codex of the Monastery of Santa Cruz records the birth of both in the month of March with only one day of difference, despite a one-year gap, raises the possibility of twins.²³ It's worth noting that the hypothesis of twins has been previously considered by José Mattoso, especially in the context of the births of the infants Branca and Berengária, as an attempt to resolve the complexity surrounding two births so closely spaced.²⁴

When analysing Sancho I's first testament, written after March 24, 1188, following the birth of infant Fernando, it becomes apparent that there is no mention of infant Henrique. This appears, at the very least, unusual, especially considering that a significant portion of the document is dedicated to establishing the order of legitimate succession to the throne, as noted by Maria João Branco.²⁵

²⁰ DS, doc. 30, 47–48.

²¹ Idem.

²² Branco, D. Sancho I, 2010. 140.

²³ Branco, D. Sancho I, 2010. 140–141. and Vilar, Hermína Vasconcelos, *D. Afonso II: Um rei sem tempo*. Lisboa, 2008. 59.

²⁴ Cordeiro, Luciano, *Berengária e Leonor: Rainhas da Dinamarca*. Intr. Mattoso, José, Lisboa, 1984. ix.

²⁵ Branco, D. Sancho I, 2010. 141.

An important detail is the fact that the testament mentions which of the sons was born first when listing Sancho I's children.²⁶ This specification, which would have been unnecessary in other circumstances when simply listing the king's children in descending order, becomes crucial in the case of twins. This is because it was essential to establish and make entirely explicit which of the two sons was born first and, consequently, would have the right to inherit the throne in the event of infant Afonso's death. However, it is indeed peculiar that if the infants were twins, this fact was not explicitly mentioned in any documents or in later records. Furthermore, it would be even more unusual if Henrique were alive and his name would be omitted from his father and king's testament.²⁷ From April 1188 onwards, the documentation mentions the name of Fernando, always alongside the name of Pedro, but completely omits the name of Henrique. Henrique is not mentioned in the testament and disappears from royal records until July 1190,²⁸ when he reappears alongside his other two siblings.²⁹

According to Maria João Branco, the most plausible explanation for the complexity surrounding Henrique/Pedro is related to a possible mistake by the scribe or a name change for Sancho I's second son. It is more likely that Pedro was indeed born one year after his brother Afonso and was initially registered as Henrique by the scribes of the royal chancellery for unknown reasons. By the time Sancho I made his testament, Fernando had already been born, once again one year after his brother, and that must be the reason why, at some point between January 1188, when Henrique is still mentioned in royal documents, and the king's testament that same year, the name Henrique ceased to appear and was replaced by Pedro.³⁰ Only from July 1190 onwards does that individual who had now been definitively named Henrique began to appear in the records. According to the *Crónica de Portugal de 1419*, he was born in 1189,³¹ and his name is documented between July 1190 and November 1191.³² In the subscriptions of royal diplomas, he occupies the fourth position in the royal succession line.³³ However, his fate was short-lived, as he passed away on December 8, 1191, as recorded in the necrology of the Monastery of Santa Cruz of Coimbra.³⁴

²⁶ DS, doc. 30, 47. – “filio meo maiori regi domno Alfonso (...) filius domnus Petrus qui post eum natus est in regno. Similiter si filius meus rex domnus Petrus sine sobole migraverit mando ut filius meus minor rex domnus Fernandus habeat regnum”.

²⁷ Branco, D. Sancho I, 2010. 141.

²⁸ DS, doc. 44, 68–69.

²⁹ DS, doc. 49, 79–80.

³⁰ Branco, D. Sancho I, 2010. 141.

³¹ *Crónica de Portugal de 1419*, 1998. 84–85. – “e o iffante dom Amrique nasceo na era de mill ii^c xxbii”.

³² DS, doc. 44, 68–69. and doc. 56, 88–90.

³³ DS, doc. 54, 86–87. – “ego rex domnus Sancius una cum uxore mea regina domna Dulcia et filiis meis uidelicet rege domno Alfonso et rege domno Petro et rege domno Fernando et rege domno Anrrico”.

³⁴ *Provas da História*, 1946. 87–88.




Fig. 2 – *A rodado from the chancellery of Sancho I. ANTT, Mosteiro de Santa Cruz de Coimbra, Documentos régios, mç. 2, n.º 8.*

Pedro Sanches's presence in the Portuguese court is documented between March 1188 and December 25, 1210.³⁵ This phase of his life remains shrouded in considerable obscurity, primarily due to the scarcity of documentary sources that provide substantial insights into his childhood and adolescence. Throughout these years, Pedro Sanches is referred, alongside his siblings, in documents issued by the chancellery of Sancho I. His presence is evidenced by both the subscription and his inclusion in the *rodados*.³⁶

In October 1210, Sancho I made the decision to write his final testament.³⁷ A meticulous analysis of this document reveals that the Portuguese monarch was deeply committed to ensure harmony among his heirs and vassals, as well as the ongoing stability of the kingdom. According to Maria João Branco, it is noteworthy that Sancho I clearly demonstrated a concern for guaranteeing and defining the succession. In contrast to his first testament, in which all potential heirs were listed in ascending order, this charter does not contain such enumeration. Instead, it presents only one possible successor, and that is Afonso II.³⁸ The concern expressed by the Portuguese monarch is intrinsically related to the historical context of the Iberian Peninsula up to the end of the thirteenth century, marked by frequent disputes over the succession to the throne. Furthermore, it is important to highlight that the practice of reserv-

³⁵ DS, docs. 30. and 200, 47–48. and 306–307.

³⁶ With regard to the *rodados* used in the Portuguese chancellery, see the study of Marques, José, “A influência das bulas papais na documentação medieval portuguesa”, = *Revista da Faculdade de Letras. História* 13, 1996, 25–62.

³⁷ DS, doc. 194, 297–301.

³⁸ Branco, D. Sancho I, 2010, 327.

ing the throne for the eldest male heir was not yet completely consolidated at that time. Secondary sons often sought a share of the kingdom, either when there were legitimate reasons to question the eldest son's succession or when the latter did not honour his father's testamentary provisions.³⁹

After the drafting of the testament, Afonso II solemnly committed to following all the provisions contained therein, thus ensuring the fulfilment of the division of movable and immovable assets with his siblings. However, just two months after the testament was written, on December 29, 1210, Sancho I took additional precautions by ordering amendments to his testament. In these adjustments, he invoked the oath made by his son and appointed several prominent figures in the kingdom as responsible for ensuring the execution of the testamentary provisions. Sancho I also requested that several nobles refuse to surrender their castles until Prince Afonso fulfilled the terms of the testament. Furthermore, he appealed to Pope Innocent III, requesting that with his authority, he ensures the compliance with all the established determinations.⁴⁰

The zeal that Sancho I displayed in his testament, however, proved insufficient to prevent family dissensions that erupted immediately after his demise, leaving an indelible mark throughout the reign of Afonso II. It is within this bellicose context that Pedro Sanches embarks on his journey and exile.

The beginning of exile

After the death of Sancho I, which occurred on March 26, 1211, Afonso II (1211–1233) ascended to the Portuguese throne. The new monarch, despite the oaths previously made during his father's lifetime, immediately disregarded the testamentary clauses related to his brothers. As noted by Maria Teresa Veloso, the conduct of Afonso II did not come as a surprise, as his behaviour during his father's reign already indicated such an outcome.⁴¹ This is why Sancho I promptly sought confirmation of his testament from Pope Innocent III.⁴²

According to Alexandre Herculano, at the beginning of his reign, Afonso II promptly rejected the granting of considerable sums bequeathed to his brothers, Pedro and Fernando, in accordance with his father's testamentary provisions.⁴³ As pointed out by Damião Peres, it is imperative to conduct a metic-

³⁹ Mattoso, José, "Dois séculos de vicissitudes políticas", In. Mattoso, José (ed.), *História de Portugal*. Vol. II., Lisboa, 1993. 21–163. 106–107.

⁴⁰ DS, doc. 203, 310.

⁴¹ Veloso, Maria Teresa, "A questão entre Afonso II e suas irmãs sobre a detenção dos direitos senhoriais", In. *Revista Portuguesa de História*. Vol. XVIII., Coimbra, 1980. 201.

⁴² *Bulário Português: Inocência III (1198–1216)*. Eds. Costa, Avelino de Jesus da – Marques, Maria Alegria F., Coimbra, 1989. doc. 158 and 159, 303–304. [hereinafter *Bulário Português*]; Both bulls were issued after the death of Sancho I.

⁴³ DS, doc. 194, 297. – "Mando etiam ut filius meus infans domnus P(etrus) habeat XL morabitanos".

ulous and comparative analysis of this assumption.⁴⁴ Given the documentary sources at our disposal, there is not enough evidence to infer such deductions. In fact, it is undeniable that the relationships did not display any fraternal character, as both princes promptly chose to leave the realm.

Infant Pedro headed to the Kingdom of León, where some dissidents of the newly crowned Portuguese monarch were already present. It is plausible to infer that he sought the support of Alfonso IX, as he too had claims to the inheritance left by his former father-in-law to his children.⁴⁵ Among these heirs were Fernando, the heir to the Leonese throne, Aldonça, and Sancha, all offsprings of his annulled marriage in 1196 with Teresa. Fernando found refuge in the domains of his aunt Teresa, also known as Matilda, in the region of Flanders. It was there, in 1211, that he entered into matrimony with Joan, the daughter of Baldwin IX and heir of the aforementioned county.

The reasons that led Pedro to depart to León remain entirely unknown to us. One possible explanation could lie in the common aspiration of second-born children to seek honour, glory, and fortune in other realms that may have been inaccessible to them in Portugal.⁴⁶ However, it is important to consider that other motivations may have influenced this decision. As highlighted by Hermínia Vilar, it is plausible that discontented with Afonso II's succession, both Pedro and Fernando may have chosen to seek opportunities in foreign courts. Perhaps they aimed to pursue a path that the ascension of their brother to the throne denied them, as both seemed to aspire to the same throne that Afonso had occupied.⁴⁷ Nevertheless, the opposite scenario might have transpired as well. Upon Afonso II's assumption of the throne, his brothers could have posed a latent challenge to the exercise of authority, particularly in the absence of full consolidation. They could have served as catalysts for discontent and opposition, potentially escalating into open conflicts. In this context, considering the exile of the monarch's siblings to

⁴⁴ Peres, Damião, "História Política", In. Peres, Damião (ed.), *História de Portugal*. Porto, 1929. 173.

⁴⁵ DS, doc. 194, 299. – "Et magister et fratres Templi tenente in Tomar illos morabitanos [VI mille] quos mando dari filliis meis infanti domno P(etro) et infanti domno F(ernando) et nepoti meo infanti domno F(ernando), Prior et frates Hospitalis tenente in Beluer illos quos mando dari filiabus meis quas habeo de regina domna Dulcia et neptibus meis filiabus filie mee regine domne Th(arasie)".

⁴⁶ Veloso, Maria Teresa, *D. Afonso II: relações de Portugal com a Santa Sé durante o seu reinado*. Coimbra, 2000. 65.; *Crónica de Portugal de 1419, 1998*. 113. – "mas nom achamos esprito em nêhum lugar qual foy a rezão por que este iffante dom Pedro sayo for a do regno (...) senão que entendemos que foy a ver mundo e buscar sua vida".

⁴⁷ Vilar, D. Afonso II, 2008. 106–107.; In accordance with the analyses by José Mattoso and Leontina Ventura, it is plausible to assert that following Pedro Sanches' departure to the Leonese court, there may have been the emergence of a political faction vying for succession in favour of the infant, on the grounds that Afonso II was afflicted with leprosy.; See Mattoso, José, "A crise de 1245", In. Idem, *Portugal Medieval: novas interpretações*. Lisboa, 1992. 57–75. 61.; Ventura, Leontina, *A Nobreza De Corte De Afonso III*. Vol. II., Coimbra, 1992. 563.

foreign courts emerges as a prudent hypothesis.⁴⁸ In fact, as documented by António Brandão in his *Monarquia Lusitana*, infant Pedro had departed from Portugal and relocated to León due to perceived injustices inflicted upon him by Afonso II.⁴⁹

Although it's difficult to determine the exact date of Pedro Sanches' departure from Portugal, we have evidence through Pope Innocent III's bull *Licet cum Apostolo*, dated August 31, 1212,⁵⁰ that mentions the involvement of the infant in the invasion of the kingdom on behalf of Alfonso IX of León during the conflict between Afonso II and his sisters. It is reasonable to assume that Pedro's departure for León occurred shortly after the death of Sancho I. In his will he bequeathed the lordship of Montemor-o-Velho and Esgueira to Teresa, the former queen of León; Alenquer to Sancha; and the lordship of Bouças, Arouca, Tuias, and other properties to Mafalda.

In an attempt to consolidate royal power, in November 1211, Afonso II ordered the mobilization of the royal host with the objective of advancing towards Montemor-o-Velho, where Teresa and Sancha had taken refuge, thus compelling them to recognise the royal authority over their lordships.⁵¹

This violent intervention resulted in the involvement of Alfonso IX of León in the conflict under the pretext of aiding his former spouse and securing the inheritance entitlements of his offspring in accordance with the testament of Sancho I. Possibly in the month of January 1212, the Leonese sovereign departed from Torrafe with the intention of assisting Teresa.⁵² It is likely that the true intentions of Alfonso IX were to expand the Crown of León in order to increase his power and counteract the prominence of the Kingdom of Castile.⁵³ According to Alexandre Herculano, despite the absence of any sources confirming this hypothesis, Pedro Sanches was one of the main instigators of the

⁴⁸ Dias, Dulce de Barcelona e Aragão, 2012. 177.; Bulário Português, 1989. doc. 183, 332. – "(...) quibusdam nobilibus aduersariis regis, qui de regno expulsi fuerant ab eodem"; Regarding the Portuguese exiles in the thirteenth century, see Medina Calderón – Ferreira, *Beyond the Border*, 2014. 1–48.; David, Henrique – Pizarro, José Augusto P. de Sotto Mayor, "Nobres Portugueses em Leão e Castela (século XIII)", = *Revista de História (Porto)* 7, 1986–1987, 135–150.

⁴⁹ Brandão, António, *Monarquia Lusitana*. Vol. IV., Lisboa, 1974. fl. 77. – "(...) Infante Dom Pedro irmão del Rey de Portugal, o qual por agrauos que delle recebera, andaua desnaturalizado do Reyno".

⁵⁰ Bulário Português, 1989. doc. 183, 331–333.

⁵¹ Veloso, A questão entre Afonso II, 1980. 202–205.; Martins, Miguel Gomes Martins, "A Guerra em Portugal no reinado de Afonso II, no context de Las Navas de Tolosa", In. Díez, Carlos Estepa – Ruiz, María Antonia Carmona (eds.), *La Península Ibérica en Tiempos de Las Navas de Tolosa*. Madrid, 2014. 443–458. 445–448.

⁵² Martins, A Guerra em Portugal, 2014. 448.

⁵³ Veloso, A questão entre Afonso II, 1980, 210.; Medina Calderón, Inés, "Los tratados de paz entre León y Portugal, 1181–1219. La intervención nobiliaria en el mantenimiento de la paz", In. *A guerra e a Sociedade na Idade Média: VI Jornadas Luso-Espanholas de Estudos Medievais*. Vols I–II. Coimbra, 2009. Vol. II., 93–108. 101.

Leonese invasion, as he aimed to seize the Portuguese throne from Afonso II.⁵⁴ However, it is equally feasible to argue that the underlying purpose of this intervention was to depose the Portuguese monarch and crown infant Fernando, the son of the Leonese sovereign and Teresa, as the king of Portugal and León, due to his lineage as the grandson of Sancho I.⁵⁵

According to the itinerary established by Julio González, Alfonso IX initiate his hostilities in Portugal in March 1212,⁵⁶ entering from the north of the Douro, capturing vast portions of the Trás-os-Montes, Beira, and Alto Minho regions, and notably, successfully infiltrating the city of Coimbra⁵⁷. Along with him, were the heir to the Leonese Crown, Fernando, and the Portuguese infant Pedro Sanches.⁵⁸ Not enough sources have been preserved to enable a detailed understanding of the extent of the infant's participation in the conflict. However, in accordance with Inés Medina Calderón, during the campaign, the Leonese monarch granted Pedro Sanches control over the towns and castles he had conquered.⁵⁹

In support of Afonso II, his father-in-law, Alfonso VIII of Castile, played a decisive role by warning the Holy See of the unacceptable war between Christian kingdoms. This happened at a particularly critical moment when it was expected that these kingdoms would be united to confront the Muslims in the imminent campaign of the Battle of Las Navas de Tolosa.⁶⁰ The swift papal mediation, at the request of the



Fig. 3 – Representation of Pedro Sanches. Archivo del Reino de Mallorca, *Libro de los Reyes*, fl. 116.

⁵⁴ Herculano, Alexandre, *História de Portugal*. Vol.II., Lisboa, 1980. 212.

⁵⁵ Medina Calderón, *Los tratados de paz entre León y Portugal*, 2009. 101.

⁵⁶ González, Julio, *Alfonso IX*. Vols I–II. Madrid, 1944. Vol. I., 142–143.; Martins, A Guerra em Portugal, 2014. 453–554.

⁵⁷ Brandão, *Monarquia Lusitana*, 1974. fl. 262v–263v.; During this campaign, Alfonso IX, along with Pedro Sanches, conquered the towns of Valença, Melgaço, Freixos, Urrós, Lanhoso, Mós, Alvito, Sicoto, Castro de Lamiselo, Barroso, Vinhais, Laedra, Lampazes, Miranda, Chaves, Aguiar, and Panóias.

⁵⁸ Brandão, *Monarquia Lusitana*, 1974. fl. 77–77v.; In reference to Alfonso IX's military campaign in Portugal, see González, *Alfonso IX*, 1944. Vol. I., 145–146.; Martins, *A Guerra em Portugal*, 2014.; González, Julio, *El Reino de Castilla en la época de Alfonso VIII*. Vol. II., Madrid, 1960. 746–748.

⁵⁹ Medina Calderón, *Los tratados de paz entre León y Portugal*, 2009. 103, note 33.

⁶⁰ Dias, *Dulce de Barcelona e Aragão*, 2012. 178.; Martins, *A Guerra em Portugal*, 2014. 444–448.; Smith, Damian J., “La guerra contra los musulmanes en España «en palabras» del papa Inocencio III”, In. Ayala Martínez, Carlos de – Henriët, Patrick – Palacios Ontalva, José Santiago (eds.), *Orígenes y desarrollo de la guerra santa en la*

Castilian monarch, resulted in Pope Innocent III threatening to excommunicate the Leonese king unless he put an end to his incursions into the Portuguese kingdom.⁶¹

In November 1212,⁶² a significant meeting took place in Coimbra, arranged by the papacy and mediated by Alfonso VIII of Castile, between Afonso II of Portugal and Alfonso IX of León. The primary objective of this meeting was to bring to an end the ongoing conflict between the two Iberian kingdoms. This assembly resulted in more than just a temporary ceasefire between Portugal and León. It laid the groundwork for a definitive peace arrangement, which was scheduled to be formally signed on May 1, 1213.⁶³ This agreement not only resolved hostilities between the two kingdoms but also had implications for Pedro Sanches himself.⁶⁴ The understanding outlined that Afonso II's adversaries had the freedom to travel within the borders of the Kingdom of Portugal. However, to safeguard Afonso II from his rivals, it was also decided that Pedro Sanches must comply with the truce. This meant he had to relinquish control of all the castles and towns he had taken and ensure that his military forces didn't cause any disruptions for the Portuguese monarch.⁶⁵ The signing of this treaty meant that Pedro Sanches lost all diplomatic and military support for his claim to the Portuguese throne. With no backing and possible dissatisfaction due to a lack of support from Alfonso IX, Pedro Sanches decided to embark on a new journey, this time in North Africa.⁶⁶

Beyond the Straits of Gibraltar

The precise moment of Pedro Sanches' departure for Morocco remains uncertain, as historical sources on the infant during his time in Africa are scarce.⁶⁷ However, it is plausible that his departure occurred either in late 1212 or in the early months of the subsequent year, coinciding with the reestablishment

Península Ibérica: Palabras e imágenes para una legitimación (siglos X–XIV). Madrid, 2016. 207–218. 210.

⁶¹ Mansilla Reoyo, Demetrio, *La Documentación Pontificia hasta Inocencio III (965–1216)*. Roma, 1955. doc. 471, 501–502.

⁶² González, Alfonso IX, 1944. Vol. II., doc. 284, 383–384.; According to Julio González, the signing of a truce between Afonso II and Alfonso IX occurred on November 11, 1212.

⁶³ *Colección documental del archivo de la Catedral de León*. Vol. VI. Ed. Fernández Catón, José María, León, 1991. doc. 1825. [hereinafter *Colección documental*]

⁶⁴ Vilar, D. Afonso II, 2008. 138–140.; Martins, A Guerra em Portugal, 2014. 447.; Medina Calderón, Los tratados de paz entre León y Portugal, 2009. 102.

⁶⁵ *Colección documental*, 1991. doc. 1825.; Medina Calderón, Los tratados de paz entre León y Portugal, 2009. 102–103.; Vilar, D. Afonso II, 2008. 139–140.

⁶⁶ Martins, A Guerra em Portugal, 2014. 458.; Ventura, A Nobreza De Corte De Afonso III, 1992. 563.

⁶⁷ According to Inés Calderón Medina and João Paulo Martins Ferreira, the departure of infant Pedro is said to have taken place in 1213. However, it is worth noting that they did not provide any documentary sources or concrete evidence to support this assumption – Medina Calderón – Ferreira, *Beyond the Border*, 2014. 24.

of peace between the monarchs of Portugal and León. This assumption arises from the *Chronicas da ordem dos frades Menores*, by Friar Marcos de Sousa, that mentioned that Pedro Sanches had left the Iberian Peninsula because of the conflicts he had engaged in with his brother, Afonso II.⁶⁸

His exile is a paradigmatic case, because during the thirteenth century, a notable exodus occurred as dissidents from the Castilian and Leonese monarchies sought opportunities across the Strait of Gibraltar in North Africa, particularly as mercenaries.⁶⁹ Among these individuals were influential figures of elevated social hierarchy, such as Pedro Fernández de Castro,⁷⁰ who accompanied the infant in the invasion of Portugal in 1212.⁷¹ He travelled to Morocco late in 1213 because the peace terms that had been agreed between León and Castile earlier that year had led to his exclusion from both courts.⁷²

The information about Pedro Sanches's stay in North Africa is rather scarce. In fact, most accounts of the infant's actions have reached us through hagiographic texts. This is largely due to his noteworthy protagonism in collecting and transferring the relics of the five Franciscan martyrs to Coimbra.

According to the *Chronica XXIV Generalium Ordinis Fratrum Minorum*, the infant's stay in Morocco appears to have been in Marrakesh, at the court of Yusuf II, the Almohad caliph.⁷³ Pedro Sanches was the leader of a Christian mercenary militia headquartered in Marrakesh.⁷⁴ The infant brought with

⁶⁸ Lisboa, Marco de, *Chronicas da ordem dos frades Menores*. Lisboa, 1557. T. 1, Liv. IV, cap. IX, fl. 141.

⁶⁹ Regarding the reasons that prompted these nobles to seek other courts and engage in the life of mercenaries, see Bartlett, Robert, "Colonial Aristocracies of the High Middle Ages", In: Bartlett, Robert – MacKay, Angus (eds.), *Medieval Frontier Societies*. Oxford, 1992. 22–47. 29–31.

⁷⁰ Pedro Fernández de Castro departed from the Christian realms of the Iberian Peninsula and ventured into Muslim territories. There, he forged alliances with the Almohad dynasty and actively participated on their behalf in the pivotal Battle of Alarcos, waged in 1195. This engagement resulted in the defeat of Alfonso VIII of Castile's forces at the hands of the Muslim army. He would go on to hold various positions in the court of Alfonso IX of León. Pedro Fernández de Castro eventually passed away on August 18, 1214, in Morocco, as mentioned in the *Anales Toledano*.; See Torres Sevilla, Margarida, *Linajes nobiliarios en León y Castilla (siglos IX–XIII)*. Salamanca, 1999. 93, 109–111.; Barton, Simon, "Traitors to the Faith? Christian Mercenaries in al-Andalus and the Maghreb, c. 1100–1300", In: Collins, Roger – Goodman, Anthony (eds.), *Medieval Spain: Culture, Conflict and Coexistence*. London, 2002. 23–45. 28.; *Los Anales Toledanos I y II*. Ed. Martín-Cleto, Julio Porres, Toledo, 1993. 315.

⁷¹ García Sanjuán, Alejandro, "Mercenarios cristianos al servicio de los musulmanes en el norte de África durante el siglo XIII", In: Jiménez, Manuel González – Romero-Camacho, Isabel Montes (eds.), *La Península Ibérica entre el Mediterráneo y el Atlántico: Siglos XIII–XV*. Sevilla–Cadiz, 2006. 435– 447. 440–441.

⁷² Barton, Traitors to the Faith, 2002. 34.

⁷³ *Chronica XXIV Generalium Ordinis Fratrum Minorum*. Florence, 1897. 243. [hereinafter *Chronica XXIV Generalium*]

⁷⁴ Dufourcq, Charles-Emmanuel, *L'Espagne Catalane et le Maghrib aux XIIIe et XIVe Siècles*. Paris, 1966. 25.; Lower, Michael, "The Papacy and Christian Mercenaries of

him João Roberto, a canon from the monastery of Santa Cruz in Coimbra, to serve as the chaplain for his Christian company.⁷⁵ These mercenaries played a major role in supporting the Almohad caliphate during a period when it was facing internal dynastic conflicts and the emergence of autonomous powers, like the Marinids, in the regions around Fez in the following decades.⁷⁶

In 1219, Saint Francis of Assisi dispatched six friars on a mission to Morocco.⁷⁷ Starting their journey from the Italian peninsula, they reached the Kingdom of Aragon before proceeding to Portugal, specifically to the city of Coimbra. Continuing their voyage, they passed through Lisbon and eventually arrived in Seville, from where they embarked towards Morocco.⁷⁸ According to the *Chronica XXIV Generalium Ordinis Fratrum Minorum*, upon their arrival in Marrakesh, they fell under the authority of infant Pedro and spent the night at his residence.⁷⁹ Despite the efforts of the infant to ensure the safety of the five friars, the Franciscans unorthodox style of evangelisation led them to their martyrdom, which occurred on January 16, 1220.⁸⁰

At Pedro's request, the mortal remains of the martyrs were meticulously gathered, prepared, and, employing a combination of bribes and the infant's authority, conveyed to the Monastery of Santa Cruz of Coimbra, undertaken by his vassal Afonso Pires de Arganil.⁸¹ This act of religious devotion by the infant took on profound symbolism as an exemplar of faith for Christians, reinforcing the arduous sacrifices necessary in their struggle against Islam. It also assumed the role of a fresh manifestation of divine protection, further strengthening the determination and spirituality of the Christian commu-

Thirteenth-Century North Africa", = *Speculum* 89:3, 2014, 601–631. 608.; According to António de São Caetano in his "Breve compendio da vida, emartyrio dos cinco gloriosos Martyres, the infant was responsible for the army of Yusuf II, upon whom he relied for his troops" – São Caetano, António, *Breve compendio da vida, e martyrio dos cinco gloriosos Martyres de Marrocos*. Coimbra, 1711. 23.

⁷⁵ *Crónica de Cinco Reis de Portugal*. Ed. Magalhães Basto, Artur de, Porto, 1945. 233.; *Tratado da Vida e Martírio dos Cinco Mártires de Marrocos*. Ed. Rocha Madahil, Antonio Gomes da, Coimbra, 1928. 45.

⁷⁶ Viguera Molins, Maria Jesús, *Los reinos de taifas y las invasiones magrebíes (Al Andalus del XI al XIII)*. Madrid, 2017. 314–319.; Lower, The Papacy and Christian Mercenaries, 2014. 608.

⁷⁷ Upon their arrival in Aragon, one of the members succumbed to a severe illness and returned.; See Pacheco, Milton Pedro Dias, "Os proto-mártires de Marrocos da Ordem de São Francisco: muy suave odor de sancto martyrio", = *Revista Lusófona de Ciência das Religiões* 8:15, 2009. 85–108. 90.

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*

⁷⁹ *Tratado da Vida e Martírio dos Cinco Mártires de Marrocos*, 1928. 29.; *Chronica XXIV Generalium*, 1897. 246.

⁸⁰ *Crónica de Cinco Reis de Portugal*, 1945. 236–244.; *Tratado da Vida e Martírio dos Cinco Mártires de Marrocos*, 1928. 44–61.; *Crónica de Portugal de 1419*, 1998. 113.

⁸¹ *Livro de Linhagens do Conde D. Pedro – Portugaliae Monumenta Historica. Nova Série*. Vol. II/1–2: *Livro de Linhagens do Conde D. Pedro*. Ed. Mattoso, José, Lisboa, 1980. 1, 415.

nity.⁸² This pious initiative earned recognition from Pope Honorius III, as manifested in the papal bull *Morum et sanguinis generositas*, issued on June 2, 1221. This bull granted apostolic protection to the prince and his possessions.⁸³

At the court of Alfonso IX of León

After his expedition in Morocco, Pedro Sanches embarked on a journey that took him across the Mediterranean and brought him back to Alfonso IX's court, at least on September 23, 1223.⁸⁴ It is relevant to note that there is a possibility that his return occurred earlier, around 1220, according to some hagiographical accounts that mention the massacre of the five martyrs. However, it is crucial to acknowledge that these accounts vary significantly in their narratives.

According to the *Tratado da Vida e Martírio dos Cinco Mártires de Marrocos*, infant Pedro departed from Ceuta and followed a route that included stops in Algeciras, Tarifa, and Seville, finally landing in Galicia. From there, his journey took him to Astorga and, ultimately, to León. It is noteworthy that according to the narrative, Pedro sent the relics of the martyrs through a noble knight, Afonso Pires de Arganil, during his stay in Astorga. In this context, it is important to mention that the infant expressed a desire to personally deposit the relics in the Monastery of Santa Cruz in Coimbra. However, due to conflicts with the Portuguese monarch, he opted to remain in Leonese territory.⁸⁵ References to disagreements with Afonso II are also found in the work *Chronicas da ordem dos frades Menores*, which are used to justify Pedro Sanches' decision not to enter Portuguese soil.⁸⁶ However, if we accurately consider the chronicles that describe the relics' arrival in Coimbra, we notice a difference in the role of infant Pedro compared to what is portrayed in the hagiographic texts. According to both the *Crónica de Cinco Reis de Portugal* and the *Crónicas dos Sete Primeiros Reis de Portugal*, both these sources affirm that Pedro Sanches personally and conscientiously carried the venerated Martyrs' relics to the city of Coimbra.⁸⁷ Undoubtedly, despite the inherent uncertainty surrounding the precise itinerary undertak-

⁸² Krus, Luís, *A Conceção Nobiliárquica do Espaço Ibérico (1280–1380)*. Lisboa, 1994. 133.; Medina Calderón – Ferreira, *Beyond the Border*, 2014. 24.

⁸³ Dias, Dulce de Barcelona e Aragão, 2012. 178.; Veloso, D. Afonso II, 2000. 143.

⁸⁴ González, Alfonso IX, 1944. Vol. II., doc. 435, 550.

⁸⁵ *Tratado da Vida e Martírio dos Cinco Mártires de Marrocos*, 1928. 74. – “porq o Jffante dō Pedro nam estaua muito corrête cō el Rey dō Afõnso seu irmão, ficou na Estorga e da lij mandou as sanctas reliquias a Portugal per hu caualeyro homẽ nobre rico e pessoa de grande credito, q auia nome Affonso Pirez Darganil”.

⁸⁶ Lisboa, *Chronicas da ordem*, 1557, T. 1, Liv. IV, cap. XXI, fl. 157. – “E não sahio em Portugal pore star ainda desauindo com el Rey de Portugal seu irmão. (...) E não podendo o Iffante dom Pedro vir a Coimbra com as sanctas reliquias, da dita cidade de Astorga as mandou per hum seu caualeyro chamado Affonso Pirez Darganil”.

⁸⁷ *Crónica de Cinco Reis de Portugal*, 1945. 236. – “Quando o Iffante D. Pedro chegou a Coimbra com os Martires.; *Crónicas dos Sete Primeiros Reis de Portugal*. Ed. Silva

en by the infant, it is conceivable to deduce his presence within the Iberian Peninsula as early as the outset of 1220. Nevertheless, the exact date of his return remains shrouded in historical ambiguity.⁸⁸

It is plausible to consider that Pedro Sanches' return around 1220 can be related to various political factors unfolding in Portugal. Afonso II, in his state-centralization policy, was embroiled in conflicts with the archbishop of Braga and initiated inquiries that not only affected the Bracaraense prelate but also engendered discontent among the local nobility, which had deep-rooted connections in the northern region. According to Hermenegildo Fernandes, these centralizing policies pursued by the Portuguese monarch nurtured a sense of change, spearheaded by the figure of Pedro Sanches.⁸⁹ The infant's return aligns with a growing atmosphere of conflict and instability that characterised the Northern region of Portugal. In 1220, Martim Sanches,⁹⁰ Pedro Sanches' half-brother and a member of the high nobility, who had exhibited a penchant for the Leonese and anti-centralist cause, launched an incursion into Portugal from the North. This action was prompted by an incursion by men from Guimarães into the lands of the archbishop of Braga, resulting in Martim Sanches advancing his forces as far as Ponte de Lima.⁹¹

In the period extending from 1220, marking the return of Pedro Sanches to the Iberian Peninsula, until 1223, the year of his brother Afonso II's death, the absence of documentary references to the infant is notable, at least as far as our historical knowledge extends. As noted by Hermenegildo Fernandes, it is plausible to infer that Pedro Sanches may have resided in León during this time interval,⁹² as the Leonese court, in the twenties, was notably under the influence of Portuguese personalities who opposed the Lusitanian monarch.⁹³

Analysing the trajectory of his brother in the Leonese court, Martim Sanches, we can see that despite being the illegitimate son of the former Portuguese monarch, Sancho I, he played a significant role in Leonese politics. From January 1218, Martim Sanches was a vassal of the King of León and, from March of the same year, he managed the *tenencia* of Limia, which is located on the northern border of the Kingdom of Portugal. He then assumed

Tarouca, Carlos da, Lisboa, 1952. 206. – Emtão o Iffante as trouue a Santa Cruz de Cojnbra”.

⁸⁸ António Brásio references the Infante's presence in Iberian territory as early as January or February of 1220. However, it is essential to underscore that as previously mentioned, due to disparities in the sources, it is not feasible to ascertain the exact month of this return.; See Brásio, *O infante D. Pedro*, 1959. 172.

⁸⁹ Fernandes, Hermenegildo, *D. Sancho II: Tragédia*. Lisboa, 2010. 61.

⁹⁰ Concerning Martim Sanches *cursus honorum* in the Kingdom of León, see Medina Calderón, *Cum Magnatibus regni mei*, 2011. 232–234.

⁹¹ Medina Calderón, *Cum Magnatibus regni mei*, 2011. 233–244.; Vilar, D. Afonso II, 2008. 232–239. and Mattoso, José, “A nobreza medieval Portuguesa no contexto peninsular”, = *Revista da Faculdade de Letras: História* 15, 1998, 1019–1044. 1030–1031.

⁹² Fernandes, D. Sancho II, 2010. 61.

⁹³ Medina Calderón, *Cum Magnatibus regni mei*, 2011. 234.

the *tenencias* of Bierro⁹⁴ and Buyeza,⁹⁵ followed by Ledesma in 1219,⁹⁶ Montegro in 1220,⁹⁷ and Toronho in 1222.⁹⁸ Finally, in 1223, he took over the *tenencias* of Baronceli and Monterroso.⁹⁹ According to Hermenegildo Fernandes, it is interesting to note that the *tenencias* of Sarria, Limia, and Toronho were in the contact zone with the Portuguese kingdom and remained under Martim Sanches' control until 1227, suggesting a relatively unusual stability.¹⁰⁰ This leads us to think that Alfonso IX had an interest in keeping Martim Sanches close to his region of origin. Between December 1222, when Alfonso II was already ill, and September 1227, Martim Sanches also held the position of *alferez* of the Leonese kingdom, making him responsible for commanding the armies of the Kingdom of León in the absence of the king.¹⁰¹

It is plausible to consider that the feudal-vassal relationship between Martim Sanches and Alfonso IX may have played a significant role in the rapid political ascent of Pedro Sanches. It is relevant to note that even though there is a scarcity of information regarding the military or governmental activities of the infant in Morocco, it is reasonable to assume that such accomplishments could have substantially influenced his trajectory in the Leonese court. It should be emphasized that in December 1223, one year after the death of his brother Alfonso II and the subsequent accession to the throne of his nephew Sancho II, who actively sought to resolve conflicts in Portugal, Pedro Sanches emerged as a prominent figure. It is reasonable to infer that Alfonso IX, aware of the fragility of the Portuguese kingdom and still aspiring to a possible union between the two realms, invested significantly in Pedro Sanches. The latter was elevated to a prominent position in 1223, surpassing considerably all other nobles and members of the realm, being endowed with extensive powers that according to the analysis of Hermenegildo Fernandes, could be interpreted as a threat to the stability of Sancho II.¹⁰²

In December 1223, Pedro Sanches held the position of *tenente* in the regions of Asturias,¹⁰³ Extremadura,¹⁰⁴ León, and Traserra.¹⁰⁵ In the following year, he assumed control of the *tenencias* of Toro and Zamora¹⁰⁶ and in the subsequent years, he added Limia¹⁰⁷ to his jurisdiction. Managing these extensive

⁹⁴ González, Alfonso IX, 1944. Vol. II., doc. 360.

⁹⁵ González, Alfonso IX, 1944. Vol. II., doc. 374.

⁹⁶ González, Alfonso IX, 1944. Vol. II., doc. 389.

⁹⁷ González, Alfonso IX, 1944. Vol. II., doc. 399.

⁹⁸ González, Alfonso IX, 1944. Vol. II., doc. 417.

⁹⁹ González, Alfonso IX, 1944. Vol. II., doc. 422.

¹⁰⁰ Fernandes, D. Sancho II, 2010. 61–62.

¹⁰¹ González, Alfonso IX, 1944. Vol. II., docs. 516, 620.

¹⁰² Fernandes, D. Sancho II, 2010. 62.

¹⁰³ González, Alfonso IX, 1944. Vol. I., 349.

¹⁰⁴ González, Alfonso IX, 1944. Vol. II., doc. 437.

¹⁰⁵ González, Alfonso IX, 1944. Vol. II., doc. 436.

¹⁰⁶ González, Alfonso IX, 1944. Vol. II., doc. 443.

¹⁰⁷ Medina Calderón, *Cum Magnatibus regni mei*, 2011. 314, 335.

territories granted a considerable degree of authority, as he exercised control over the historic administrative centre of the kingdom, Asturias, as well as its political epicentre, León. Furthermore, he was responsible for safeguarding the southern borders that extended into the Islamic world, encompassing the regions of Extremadura and Tráserra.¹⁰⁸ On June 10, 1228, in addition to holding the *tenencias* of Alba, Astorga, and Salamanca, Pedro Sanches is mentioned as *assistens regis*, highlighting his role as an assistant to Alfonso IX in the administration of the Kingdom of León.¹⁰⁹

During the period when Pedro Sanches was one of the most prominent figures in the Leonese court, one of the most notable episodes of his presence on the Iberian Peninsula was his participation in the conquest of Mérida. The capture of Cáceres by Alfonso IX of León in 1227 prompted a redirection of Leonese military efforts to the south, abandoning conflicts with other Iberian kingdoms and aiming to expand their territories in the region around the Guadiana River.¹¹⁰




Fig. 4 – *Infant Pedro Sanches and Martim Sanches at the Leonese court. Archivo Histórico Nacional (Spain), Clero, Secular Regular, Car. n.12.*

In 1230, with his forces mobilised, the Leonese monarch headed southward. The first conquest was the castle of Montachez, paving the way to the Guadiana river valley. During Easter, Christian forces found themselves in front of the walls of Mérida. This city held special significance, both from a military and symbolic perspective. Militarily, capturing Mérida allowed the Leonese troops to lay siege easily to the city of Badajoz, which eventually surrendered on May 26, 1230. With the conquest of Cáceres, Mérida, and Badajoz, the Christians opened up the entire southwest for themselves, consolidating their presence in

¹⁰⁸ Fernandes, D. Sancho II, 2010. 62.

¹⁰⁹ Ventura, A Nobreza De Corte De Afonso III, 1992. 564.; Salazar y Acha, Jaime de, *La Casa del Rey de Castilla y León en la Edad Media*. Madrid, 2000. 371–372.

¹¹⁰ Mattoso, José, “D. Sancho II, o Capelo”, In. Saraiva, José Hermano (ed.), *História de Portugal*. Lisboa, 1983. 136–155. 144.

the region and posed a threat to Cordoba and Seville, the most crucial cities in al-Andalus.¹¹¹

Undoubtedly, the city of Mérida held also a significant symbolic relevance for the Leonese forces, considering the earlier transfer of the archdiocese from Emerita, once the capital of Lusitania, to Santiago de Compostela. In this context, it is noteworthy that Portuguese friars affiliated with military orders were involved in the siege of Mérida, which highlights both the historical and religious importance of the city and the role played by religious orders in the context of the military campaign undertaken.¹¹² The capture of Mérida and its spiritual significance didn't go unnoticed by the major Portuguese monastic houses. This is evidenced by the recording of Pedro Sanches' deeds in the *Chronicom Coninbricense* from Santa Cruz of Coimbra, highlighting his role in the triumphant culmination of the city's conquest.¹¹³

Towards the end of the 1220s, following nearly a decade of service to the Leonese monarch, Pedro Sanches likely felt the need to explore new horizons and expand his sphere of influence. With Alfonso IX's gradual aging, culminating in his passing on September 24, 1230, and the unavoidable ascension of the Castilian king to the throne of León, the Portuguese infant realised that his continued presence at court was uncertain. He anticipated a gradual declining of his political prominence among the Leonese nobility he had been leading.¹¹⁴

In the face of the death of infant Fernando, son of Teresa and Alfonso IX, in 1214, and the repudiation of his other son, Fernando III, who in 1217 would become king of Castile, the Leonese king was led to designate his two daughters, Sancha and Dulce, born of his first marriage to Teresa, as his successors.¹¹⁵ From the end of 1217 or the beginning of 1218, the two princesses began to reside at the Leonese court, and their names were regularly included in the lists of the diplomas issued by the chancellery.¹¹⁶ However, despite the

¹¹¹ Lomax, Derek W., *La Reconquista*. Barcelona, 1984. 186.

¹¹² Mattoso, José, *Identificação de um país: 1096–1325*. Lisboa, 1993. 38.; Correia, Fernando Branco, *Elvas na Idade Média*. Lisboa–Évora, 2013. 139–140.

¹¹³ *Portugaliae Monumenta Historica a saeculo octavo post Christum usque ad quintudencimum. Scriptores*. Vol. I. fasc. I., Lisboa, 1856. 3. – “Era MCCLXVIII dedit dominus uillam que uocatur Merida D. Alfonso Legionensi per manum infantis D. Petri, filii regis D. Sancii primi Portugalis.”

¹¹⁴ Fernandes, D. Sancho II, 2010. 232.; Medina Calderón – Ferreira, *Beyond the Border*, 2014. 25.

¹¹⁵ Rodríguez López, Ana, *La Consolidación territorial de la monarquía feudal Castellana: expansión y fronteras durante el reinado de Fernando III*. Madrid, 1994. 98–101, 115–120.

¹¹⁶ González, Alfonso IX, 1944. Vol. II., doc. 373.; Veloso, D. Afonso II, 2000. 95.; On June 13, 1219, in the peace treaty between Portugal and León, signed in Baronal, the Leonese succession was explicitly expressed in favor of Sancha and Dulce, as can be observed in the following passage: “(...) si rex Legionis premortuus fuerit regi Portugalie, rex Portugalie debet esse in eodem pacto cum filiabus regis Legionis, infatibus domna Sancia et domna Dulcia, in quo est modo cum rege Legionis, patre earum”.

monarch's desire, after his death, various oppositions to the king's succession policy began to emerge, culminating in a preference for the party favourable to the Castilian king and, ultimately, in the definitive political unification of the two Iberian kingdoms.¹¹⁷

Despite all these disputes that undoubtedly threatened Pedro Sanches' status in the Leonese court, the truth is that he remained by Alfonso IX's side until his passing. However, starting from 1228, we can observe that the Portuguese infant began to seek new opportunities where he could demonstrate his political and military skills, as well as pursue fortune and honour.

The prestige achieved by Pedro Sanches, both as a mercenary in the service of Yusuf II and as a vassal of Alfonso IX, undeniably transcended frontiers, granting him prominence among the diverse European courts. In addition to his military achievements, his connection with the Church cannot be underestimated. He not only took part in Alfonso IX's military campaigns against the Muslims but also played a crucial role in the transfer of the relics of the five martyrs from Morocco. This remarkable feat in Christendom earned him the designation of *filius illustris regis Portugalensis* bestowed by Pope Honorius III.¹¹⁸

As such, on June 4, 1229, Pope Gregory IX sent an invitation to Pedro Sanches, which, despite its illustrious apostolic origin, the infant declined.¹¹⁹ Taking advantage of the absence of Emperor Frederick II, who was in Jerusalem, where he had succeeded in entering in March of that same year, the Supreme Pontiff initiated a series of conflicts to place the southern half of Italy and Sicily, domains of Frederick, under papal guardianship.¹²⁰ Aware of Pedro Sanches' military leadership capabilities, Gregory IX invited the Portuguese infant to command the papal forces against the Lombards. The papal letter conferred upon Pedro Sanches the honour of wearing the symbols of Saint Peter, as well as enjoying all the spiritual privileges traditionally granted to Crusaders by the Holy See.¹²¹ The timing of the invitation sent by the papacy




Fig. 5 – Representation of Pedro Sanches. Archivo del Reino de Mallorca, *Libro de los Reyes*, fl. 39v.

¹¹⁷ Rodríguez López, *La Consolidación*, 1994. 170–180.

¹¹⁸ Dias, *Dulce de Barcelona e Aragão*, 2012. 178.; Veloso, *D. Afonso II*, 2000. 143.

¹¹⁹ *Monumenta Germaniae Historica. Epistolae saeculi XIII e Regestis Pontificum Romanorum selectae*. Vol. I., Berlin, 1883. doc. 389, 308.

¹²⁰ Loud, G. A., "The Papal 'Crusade' against Frederick II in 1228–1230", In: Balard, Michael (ed.), *La Papauté et les Croisades / The Papacy and the Crusades*. Abingdon, 2011. 91–103. 97–100.

¹²¹ Brásio, *O infante D. Pedro*, 1959. 173.

could not have been more evident, as the Holy Roman Emperor would return from his successes in the Holy Land on June 10, 1229, just six days before the dispatch of the letter to Pedro Sanches.¹²²

We remain unaware of the reasons that led the infant to decline the papal invitation. However, it is more likely that he did not have the necessary resources to undertake a campaign against the imperial forces. Similarly, it's possible that in Pedro Sanches' view, there wasn't a true *cause belli* for his intervention, as the crusade led by Frederick II facilitated the restoration of the city of Jerusalem and some other territories to the Kingdom of Jerusalem.

Considering that his position at the Leonese court was threatened due to the succession crisis of Alfonso IX, it is highly likely that Pedro Sanches gave preference to a safer and closer option within his sphere of influence, namely, the Iberian Peninsula. As such, in a charter dated May 6, 1228, Aurembiaix,¹²³ Countess of Urgell, entrusted her person and domains to the Order of Santiago, with the purpose that by not having a spouse, the Order would protect her domains. She also refers to the marriage agreement previously established between her and Pedro Sanches. However, at that moment, she was still uncertain whether the marriage would come to fruition – *quod est contractum inter nos et nobilem Petrum Infantem Portugaliae*.¹²⁴

Despite the promise of marriage, Pedro Sanches remained a frequent presence at the Leonese court. In addition to accompanying Alfonso IX in the conquest of the cities of Mérida and Badajoz, during the winter of 1230, the Portuguese infant played a prominent role in the Battle of Alange, in which the Leonese forces defeated the army of Seville, led by the new ruler of al-Andalus, Ibn Hūd.¹²⁵

¹²² Loud, *The Papal Crusade*, 2011. 99–103.; Abulafia, David, *Frederick II: A Medieval Emperor*. London, 1988. 198–203.

¹²³ Aurembiaix was the daughter of Count Armengol VIII (1184–1205), who spent a considerable amount of time at the Leonese court due to his enmity with the King of Aragon, Alfonso II. The possession of the County of Urgell had been lost to the Cabrera family shortly after the death of Peter II of Aragon in 1213. With the assistance of the Order of Santiago, with which she became acquainted on the same day, May 2, 1228, Aurembiaix once again received the county, this time from James I of Aragon, with whom she had a relationship of concubinage. About Aurembiaix and her relationship with Pedro Sanches, see Dias, Dulce de Barcelona e Aragão, 2012. 182.; Veloso, D. Afonso II, 2000. 68–69.; Varela-Rodríguez, M. Elisa, “Les relacions amoroses d’Elo Álvarez, Aurembiaix d’Urgell, Blanca de Antillón, Teresa Gil de Vidaure, Berenguera Alfonso, Sibilla de Saga... Amistançades, concubines o amants de Jaume I?”, In. *Jaume I: Commemoració del VIII centenari del naixement de Jaume I*. Vol. I. Ed. Ferrer Mallol, María Teresa, Barcelona, 2011. 577–598. 586–590.

¹²⁴ Provas da História, 1946. 28–29.

¹²⁵ Fernandes, D. Sancho II, 2010. 233.; García Turza, Francisco Javier, “Organización política de los reinos cristianos”, In. Álvarez Palenzuela, Vicente Ángel (ed.), *Historia de España de la Edad Media*. Madrid, 2002. 433–448. 445–446.

On August 1, 1230, Pedro Sanches appears as a witness to the transference of the castle of Montánchez made by the Leonese monarch to the Order of Santiago.¹²⁶ This donation marks the last record of his presence at the Leonese court, although he continued to serve as *mordomo* until August 18.¹²⁷ On September 24, Alfonso IX passed away, becoming the last King of Leon, following the ascent of his son, Fernando III, as the monarch of both León and Castile. This milestone marked the moment for Pedro Sanches to embark on a new phase in his journey, seeking a new oath of loyalty under the auspices of James I, the King of Aragon.

Petrus, Dei gratia regni Maioricarum dominus. At the service of Aragon

Faced with the imminent death of Alfonso IX of León, Pedro Sanches, realizing that his influence at the Leonese court could be threatened, sought to establish a new pledge with another overlord. Aware that Portugal was not an option for him, as he had been in exile since 1211, and fearing the growing Castilian influence over the Kingdom of León, the most sensible decision would be to turn to the Kingdom of Aragon, where his nephew, James I, ruled.

As mentioned earlier, even during his stay in León, Pedro Sanches had already maintained contact with the Aragonese court. In 1228, the Countess of Urgell, Aurembiaix, was mentioned as the spouse of the Portuguese infant, although the marriage had not yet been consummated.¹²⁸ To establish this prenuptial agreement, James I's consent was indispensable, since Aurembiaix could only marry with the agreement of the Aragonese king, as he had assisted her in recovering the County of Urgell.¹²⁹

In the middle of 1229, Pedro Sanches embarked on his journey towards Catalonia, a crucial moment in the reign of James I, as, since late 1228, the Crown of Aragon had been involved in preparations for the expedition that would culminate in the conquest of the island of Mallorca in 1231.¹³⁰ On June 15, 1229, the marriage contract with the Countess of Urgell was signed. Among the clauses of the contract was the transfer of the County of Urgell to the Portuguese infant, with the condition that after his death, it would be passed on to her children or those designated by the countess.¹³¹ With the marriage permission granted by the Aragonese monarch, in April 23, 1230

¹²⁶ González, Alfonso IX, 1944. Vol. II., doc. 620.

¹²⁷ González, Alfonso IX, 1944. Vol. II., doc. 632.; Medina Calderón, *Cum Magnatibus regni mei*, 2011. 285.

¹²⁸ Provas da História, 1946. 28–29.

¹²⁹ *Archivo de la Corona de Aragón* [hereinafter ACA], Cancillería, Pergaminos, Jaime I, Serie General, 357. and Varela-Rodríguez, *Les relacions amoroses*, 2011. 588.

¹³⁰ Torres Fontes, Juan, “La delimitación del sudeste peninsular: (tratados de partición de lo Reconquista)”, = *Anales de la Universidad de Murcia* 34, 1950, 669–696. 687. and Tudela y Velasco, María Isabel Pérez de, “Unión de León y Castilla: ruptura del equilibrio peninsular”, In. Álvarez Palenzuela, Vicente Ángel (ed.). *Historia de España de la Edad Media*. Madrid, 2002. 451–476. 468–471.

¹³¹ ACA, Cancillería, Pergaminos, Jaime I, Serie General, 381.

Pedro Sanches formalised his oath of fidelity to King James I, by which time he had certainly consummated his marriage to Countess Aurembiaix.¹³²

His marriage to Aurembiaix was short, for on August 11, 1231, the countess wrote her testament, designating the infant as the heir to both the county and the town of Valladolid.¹³³ Certainly, shortly after the death of his wife, on September 29 of the same year, Pedro Sanches engaged in a permutation with James I, wherein he relinquished his rights to the County of Urgell in exchange for the lifelong lordship from the newly conquered Kingdom of Mallorca and the island of Menorca.¹³⁴

It is plausible that this permute was related to Pedro Sanches' experience in the administration of frontier territories, as seen in his time in León. Additionally, the infant's ability to deal with Muslim populations, acquired during his nearly ten years in North Africa, could have played an important role.¹³⁵ With this manoeuvre of becoming the titular holder of the County of Urgell, James I could exert closer and more effective control over this significant lordship and resolve the territorial dispute that had its origins shortly after the death of Armengol VIII in 1208, involving the houses of Cabrera and Aurembiaix.¹³⁶ As a consequence of this agreement, Pedro Sanches began to be entitled in all documents until his death as *Petrus, infans Portucalensis, Dei gratia regni Maioricarum dominus*.¹³⁷ On that same day, the Aragonese monarch granted the Portuguese infant and Nunó Sanç, who was the Count of Roussillon and Cerdanya and a cousin of James I, the feudal grant of Ibiza and Formentera, provided they conquered them in the following two years.¹³⁸ This conquest would only take place on August 8, 1235, with the assistance of the Archbishop of Tarragona, Guillem de Montegrí. The cleric's intervention allowed Pope Gregory IX to grant a crusade bull for this campaign on April 24 of the same year.¹³⁹

In May 1232, Pedro Sanches disembarked for the first time on the island of Mallorca, accompanied by James I.¹⁴⁰ Although he did not directly par-

¹³² Monfar y Sors, Diego, *História de los Condes de Urgel*. Vol. I., Barcelona, 1853. 503.

¹³³ ACA, Cancillería, Pergaminos, Jaime I, Serie General, 431.

¹³⁴ ACA, Cancillería, Pergaminos, Jaime I, Serie General, 438.

¹³⁵ Ortega Villoslada, Antonio, "La "Extremadura" Mediterránea: Mallorca en el siglo XIII", In: García Fitz, Francisco – Jiménez Alcázar, Juan Francisco (eds.), *La História Peninsular en Los Espacios de Frontera: Las "Extremaduras Históricas" y la "Transierra" (siglos XI–XV)*. Murcia, 2012. 73–85. 83.

¹³⁶ Medina Calderón – Ferreira, *Beyond the Border*, 2014. 25. and Villacañas, Jose Luis, *Jaume I: El Conquistador*. Madrid, 2003. 332–334.

¹³⁷ ACA, Cancillería, Pergaminos, Jaime I, Serie General, 438. and Bordoy, Portuguesees en la conquista de Mallorca, 2009. 480.

¹³⁸ *Archivo Capitular de Mallorca* [hereinafter ACM], Pergaminos, LVI, T. IV, núm. 3 – 13763.

¹³⁹ O'Callaghan, Joseph F, *Reconquest and Crusade in Medieval Spain*. Pennsylvania, 2013. 92.

¹⁴⁰ Ortega Villoslada, Antonio, *El Reino de Mallorca y el mundo atlántico (1230–1249). Evolución político-mercantil*. La Coruña, 2008. 22–24.; Villacañas, Jaume I, 2003. 344.

ticipate in the conquest of the island, the Aragonese monarch granted the infant various properties for his personal use, as documented in the *Llibre del Repartiment de Mallorca*.¹⁴¹

Between May and December 1232, in response to the fear of a possible intervention by a Muslim naval force, James I summoned several of his vassals and hastily organised an expedition with the aim of safeguarding the defence of the island of Mallorca.¹⁴² The threat posed by the Muslim fleet undoubtedly presented a significant challenge. In March 1233, Pope Gregory IX issued an appeal to Christians, urging them to participate in a crusade aimed at repelling the Islamic forces that threatened the newly conquered Kingdom of Mallorca. This papal action was triggered in response to the explicit request of Pedro Sanches, probably made in 1232, after his arrival at the island.¹⁴³

During his governance in Mallorca, the documents are limited but we know that Pedro Sanches was involved in various acts of public governance, demonstrating his administrative role and influence in the region.¹⁴⁴ One of the most notorious was in 1233, when he participated in the signing of an agreement related to the minting of coins on the island, indicating his involvement in economic and monetary affairs.¹⁴⁵ Álvaro Campaner, in his 1879 book, informs us that the contracted coin minting did not come to fruition,¹⁴⁶ but the fact remains that the infant did mint coins in Mallorca, as demonstrated by a recent discovery



Fig. 6 – *Diner of Pedro Sanches. Museu de Mallorca*

¹⁴¹ ACM, Còdex 3.401, fls. 44v-47v.; Bordoy, *Portugueses en la conquesta de Mallorca*, 2009, 481–483.

¹⁴² Villacañas, Jaume I, 2003. 355.; Santamaría Arández, Alvaro, “La expansion politico-militar de la Corona de Aragón bajo la dirección de Jaime: Baleares”, In. Vernet Ginés, Juan (ed.), *Jaime I y su época. X Congreso de la Corona de Aragón. Ponencias*. Zaragoza, 1979. 91–146. 114, 134–136.

¹⁴³ Pérez Martínez, Lorenzo, “Corpus Documental Balear (V). Reinado de Jaime I”, In. *Fontes Rerum Balearium*. Vol. III., Palma de Mallorca, 1979. 1–48. 11. – *secundum consilium dilecti filii nobilis uiri Petri infantis, nati inclytae recordationis Regis Portugaliae*.

¹⁴⁴ About the management of the Kingdom of Mallorca by Pedro Sanches, see: Cateura Bennasser, *Las cuentas de la colonización feudal*, 1997. 57–141.; Medina Calderón – Ferreira, *Beyond the Border*, 2014. 26–27.; Brásio, *O infante D. Pedro*, 1959. 178–186.

¹⁴⁵ Campaner y Fuertes, Álvaro, *Numismática Balear*. Palma de Malloca, 1879. doc. 4, 262.

¹⁴⁶ Campaner y Fuertes, *Numismática Balear*, 1879. 103.

of a base metal coin. Its circulation appears to have been very limited, as only one specimen of this coin has survived.¹⁴⁷ Its inscription reads as follows: P DOMINVS, featuring the arms of Portugal on one side; MAIORICAE, depicting a shield with the royal Aragonese emblem on the other. This combination of inscriptions and designs on the coin reflects the infant's connection to both Portugal and Aragon, with the use of distinct heraldic symbols associated with each.

Despite the lack of information about the years Pedro Sanches spent in Mallorca, according to Alexandre Herculano, in 1236, the infant would have departed for the East to aid the Latin Empire.¹⁴⁸ The source cited is the continuation of Caesare Baronio's *Annales Ecclesiastici*, written by the Dominican Abraham Bzovsky.¹⁴⁹ In fact, in December 1235, Pope Gregory IX issued the bull *Vt Israellem veteris* to assist Emperor Jean de Brienne, who was besieged in Constantinople by John III of Nicaea and Ivan II of Bulgaria.¹⁵⁰ It is possible that after the issuance of the bull, Pedro Sanches participated in the campaign to liberate Constantinople from the siege. However, due to the lack of other sources confirming his participation in the crusade, this information raises questions about its accuracy. In fact, on August 8, 1235, Pedro Sanches completed the conquest of Ibiza, and on May 20 of the following year, we have records of his presence in Calatayud, where he paid homage to Queen Violante.¹⁵¹ Based on this evidence, it seems plausible that the infant may have travelled to Constantinople, probably in the first four months of that year, if it really occurred.¹⁵²

Pedro Sanches made a significant exchange on August 18, 1244, when he permuted his rights in the County of Urgell and the Balearic Islands for ownership of the castles and territories encompassing Morella, Sagunto, Almenara, Castellón, and Segorbe.¹⁵³ According to Nuno Pizarro Dias, it is conceivable that this particular action might be linked to the ongoing political crisis that was destabilizing the Kingdom of Portugal.¹⁵⁴ This crisis ultimately culminated in the deposition of King Sancho II on July 24, 1245, sanctioned by the

¹⁴⁷ Crusafont I Sabater, Miquel – Trilla, Emili, “Emissió monetària inèdita de Pere: senyor de Mallorca”, = *Acta Numismàtica* 35, 2005, 57–66.

¹⁴⁸ Herculano, *História de Portugal*, 1980. 489.

¹⁴⁹ *Annalium Ecclesiasticorum post illustriss et reverend Dominum D. Caesarem Baronicum*. Vol. XIII. Antverpiae: Henricum Aertssium, Regensburg, 1617. 372–373.

¹⁵⁰ Chrissis, Nikolaos G, “A Diversion that never was: Thibaut IV of Champagne, Richard of Cornwall and Pope Gregory IX's Crusading plans for Constantinople, 1235–1239”, = *Crusades* 9, 2010, 123–145. 128–131.

¹⁵¹ ACA, Cancillería, Pergaminos, Jaime I, Serie General, 676.

¹⁵² The question regarding Pedro Sanches' involvement in aiding the Latin Empire has been the subject of analysis in various studies, particularly in Santamaría Arández, *Don Pedro*, 1974. 22.; Bordoy, *Portugueses en la conquista de Mallorca*, 2009. 485.

¹⁵³ ACA, Cancillería, Pergaminos, Jaime I, Serie General, 961.

¹⁵⁴ Dias, *Dulce de Barcelona e Aragón*, 2012. 184.

papal bull *Grandi non immerito*.¹⁵⁵ If Pedro Sanches had indeed entertained ambitions in this context, he would have swiftly recognised their impracticality, given that all support, including that of the papacy and Alfonso X of Castile, had already coalesced around another candidate.¹⁵⁶ Nonetheless, due to his unquestionable prominence within the Iberian political sphere, Pope Innocent IV called upon him to make himself available to assist Afonso, Count of Boulogne, who was his nephew and would later ascend to the Portuguese throne as Afonso III.¹⁵⁷

Pedro Sanches subsequently returned to Portugal, where he resided alongside Afonso III between 1247 and 1248.¹⁵⁸ Afterward, he journeyed to Seville, where he played a crucial role in aiding Fernando III during the city's conquest. His active involvement earned him various properties, as evidenced in the *Libro Repartimento de Sevilla*.¹⁵⁹

After his return from participating in the conquest of Seville, Pedro Sanches extended his support to infant Alfonso, the son of James I, in opposing his father's testament, which had proposed the division of the Kingdom of Aragon among his siblings. This internal conflict endured until the year 1250.¹⁶⁰ On June 30, 1254, the Aragonese monarch once more conferred lordship over the city and Kingdom of Mallorca upon Pedro Sanches, a dominion that he would govern for the remainder of his days.¹⁶¹

The Last Wishes

On October 9, 1255, he issued instructions for the composition of his testament.¹⁶² This document bore the *signum* of the infant, although, regrettably, his seal has not survived the consequences of time. Nonetheless, a copy of his will dating back to 1301¹⁶³ reveals the characteristics of the infant's seal. It took the form of a pendent wax seal, featuring an architectural motif on the obverse, possibly representative of a castle, encircled by the inscription *Dei Gratia Regni Maioricarum Domini*. The reverse side exhibited the image of a knight in full

¹⁵⁵ ANTT, Bulas, mç. 3, n.º 8.

¹⁵⁶ Azevedo, Luís Gonzaga, *História de Portugal*. Vol. VI., Lisboa, 1944. 191–192.

¹⁵⁷ Brandão, Franciso, *Monarquia Lusitana*. Vol. V., Lisboa, 1976. fl. 302v–303.

¹⁵⁸ Brandão, *Monarquia Lusitana*, 1974. fl. 168 (October 4, 1247), 168v (May 1, 1248). and Herculano, *História de Portugal*, 1980. 558, note 110. (August, 2, 1248).

¹⁵⁹ González, Julio, *Repartimiento de Sevilla*. Vol. II., Madrid, 1951. 19, 229, 266.; David, Henriquel, “Os Portugueses nos Livros de ‘Repartimiento’ da Andaluzia (século XIII)”, = *Revista da Faculdade de Letras. História* 3, 1986, 51–75. 64.

¹⁶⁰ Medina Calderón – Ferreira, *Beyond the Border*, 2014. 27–28.

¹⁶¹ ACM, Pergaminos, LVI, T. IV, núm. 12 – 13772.

¹⁶² ACM, Pergaminos, LVI, T. IV, núm. 13 – 13773.

¹⁶³ Bibliothèque nationale de France, Ms Latin 9261, doc. 5. The document can be accessed by the following link – <https://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/btv1b9077741r/f12.item> (Accessed on 15 March 2023)

armour, astride a steed, surrounded by the inscription *Sigilum Domini Petri*.¹⁶⁴ Despite the seal itself having succumbed to the inexorable march of time, in the eschatocol the validation was carried out through the imposition of the heraldic *signum* of the infant, in the centre of which are the first emblems of the Portuguese royal house, five cross-shaped shields charged with bezants.

In the ensuing course of events, Pedro Sanches made a deliberate choice for his ultimate resting place within the Cathedral of Mallorca, stipulating the erection of a chapel in honour of Saint Vincent, the patron of the Portuguese monarchy. António Brandão's accounts reveal that the infant was counted among the magnates who actively supported and financially sponsored the construction of the Cathedral of Mallorca, thereby explaining the presence of Portuguese arms carved prominently in the temple.¹⁶⁵ In the *Crónica de Cinco Reis de Portugal*, in the fourteenth century, the memory of infant Pedro Sanches remained indelibly imprinted, not merely in the collective consciousness of Mallorca's population but also among the members of the cathedral chapter.¹⁶⁶




Fig. 7 – *Signum of Pedro Sanches*. ACM, Pergaminos, LVI, T. IV, núm. 12 – 13772.

The passing of Pedro Sanches, as recorded in the necrology of Santa Cruz, took place on June 10, 1256.¹⁶⁷ After 69 years filled with diverse conquests, lordships, titles, and journeys across various geographies, his last breath adds the final pieces to a true and tireless medieval saga. This is the tale we have endeavoured to recount, one that undoubtedly falls short of the authentic and full magnitude of the events. Despite all our doubts, we have managed to provide some answers to the premise that guided our study from the beginning. Never-

¹⁶⁴ According to Diego Mondar, the seal of Pedro Sanches found on the matrimonial agreement with Countess Aurembiax in 1229 was made of wax and had, on one side, his figure, armed, on horseback, holding a shield with the arms of the Kingdom of Portugal and in his right hand a lance with a little flag. On the other side, it featured a figure of a lion or wolf, which, due to being too fragmented, cannot be clearly understood. It had the inscriptions PETRI on one side and FILII SANCII on the other.; See Monfar y Sors, *História de los Condes*, 1853. 501.

¹⁶⁵ Brandão, *Monarquia Lusitana*, 1974. fl. 177.

¹⁶⁶ *Crónica de Cinco Reis de Portugal*, 1945. 228–229.

¹⁶⁷ *Biblioteca Geral da Universidade de Coimbra, Manuscritos. Cód. 1741. fls. 41.*

theless, the persistent doubts and unresolved questions continue to overshadow the certainties we have unearthed. Perhaps in the future, Portuguese and Spanish historiography will succeed in lifting the fog that continues to shroud the memory of Pedro Sanches – the infant, the mercenary, and the crusader.

Yanina Ryier

LITHUANIAN TROOPS IN THE MILITARY CAMPAIGNS OF WŁADYSŁAW ŁOKIETEK IN THE 1320S–1330S

The emergence and development of Polish-Lithuanian relations at the beginning of the fourteenth century is a controversial and poorly-studied issue. Their description is often limited to the mention of several military attacks by the Lithuanians on Polish territories. However, the situation changed after 1325, when the marriage of Władysław Łokietek's son Casimir to the daughter of the Grand Duke of Lithuania Gediminas Aldona (Anna) took place. According to historiography, it was not only a dynastic, but above all a military alliance between two neighbouring states which significantly changed the character of Polish-Lithuanian relations. The first joint military campaign took place as early as the following year, 1326. Moreover, during the next five years, there were several expeditions with Gediminas' troops taking part in them.

However, the status of Lithuanian troops in these union campaigns is quite controversial. According to the data from the narrative sources, the Lithuanians got money for their participation in those military campaigns, could be invited and sent away according to the decision of the king of Poland and were not the allies but rather the mercenaries in the events of the 20s–30s of the fourteenth century. That is why it is necessary to analyse the nature of that alliance, as well as to study the role and status of the Lithuanian troops in the military campaigns of Władysław Łokietek at that time.

When it comes to the historiography of the studied issue, it is necessary to point out that the dynastic alliance of 1325 was rather well-studied by many generations of historians. It was Adam Naruszewicz who drew the readers' attention to the marriage as an attempt of the rulers to protect their lands from the Teutonic threat. When it comes to the later historians emphasising the role of this marriage as a turning point of political and military relationships between Poland and Lithuania, one can point out Johannes Voigt, Volodymyr Antonovych, Oskar Halecki, Antoni Prochaska, as well as Stanisław Zajączkowski who was the first researcher to consider this event to be a specific historiographical issue. The further evaluation of the marriage from the political perspective was presented in the studies by Henryk Łowmiański, Marcei Kosman, Grzegorz Błaszczyk, and Stephen C. Rowell. Among those who also paid attention to this event in Polish-Lithuanian relationships and politics, have been Kazimierz Jasiński, Jan Tęgowski, Alvydas Nikžentaitis, Rimvydas Petrauskas, Darius Baronas, and others.¹ Nonetheless, the main

¹ Naruszewicz, Adam, *Historia narodu polskiego*. Vol. IV., Kraków, 1860. 334–335.; Voigt, Johannes, *Geschichte Preussens*. Vol. IV., Königsberg, 1830. 401.; Narbutt, Teodor, *Dzieje narodu litewskiego*. Vol. IV., Wilno, 1838. 561–566.; Антонович, Владимир, *Очерки истории Великого княжества Литовского до половины XV столетия* [Antonowich, Vladimir, *Ocherki istorii Velikogo kniazestva Litovskogo do*

attention of the researches was focused on the role of the marriage of Aldona and Casimir in further Polish-Lithuanian relations, as well as on the particular military conflicts (especially the dynastic ones) in the late thirteenth to the early fourteenth centuries.² At the same time, the role and status

poloviny XV stoletiya]. Kyiv, 1868. 60.; Halecki, Oskar, *Dzieje Unii Jagiellońskiej*. Vol. I., Kraków, 1919. 27–30.; Prochaska, Antoni, “Stosunki Krzyżaków z Giedyminem i Łokietkiem”, = *Kwartalnik Historyczny* 10, 1896, 1–66. 43.; Zajączkowski, Stanisław, “Przymierze polsko-litewskie 1325 r.”, = *Kwartalnik Historyczny* 40, 1926, 567–584.; Zakrzewski, Stanisław, “Wpływ sprawy ruskiej na państwo polskie w XIV w.”, = *Przegląd Historyczny* 23:1, 1921–22, 89–92.; Paszkiewicz, Henryk, *Jagiellonowie a Moskwa*. Vol. I., Warszawa, 1933. 272.; Łowmiański, Henryk, *Polityka Jagiellonów*. Poznań, 2006. 25.; Tymieniecki, Kazimierz, “The Reunion of the Kingdom, 1295–1333”, In. Reddaway, W. F. – Penson J. H. – Halecki, O. et al. (eds.), *The Cambridge History of Poland: From the origins to Sobieski (to 1696)*. Cambridge, 1950. 122.; Kosman, Marcei, “Polacy o Litwinach (do połowy XVI w.)”, = *Spółeczeństwo Polski Średniowiecznej* 3, 1985, 392, 404.; Kosman, Marcei, “Umowy międzynarodowe Litwy w XIII wieku”, = *Przegląd Historyczny* 47, 1966, 83.; Błaszczuk, Grzegorz, *Dzieje stosunków polsko-litewskich*. Vol. I., Poznań, 1998. 130.; Jasiński, Kazimierz, “Polityka małżeńska Władysława Łokietka”, In. Wroniszewski Radziminski, Andrzej – Wroniszewski, Jan (eds.), *Genealogia: rola związków rodzinnych i rodowych w życiu publicznym w Polsce średniowiecznej*. Toruń, 1996. 9–18.; Tęgowski, Jan, *Pierwsze pokolenia Giedyminowiczów*. Poznań–Wrocław, 1999. 42.; Włodarski, Bronisław, “Między Polska, Litwą a zakonem krzyżackim”, = *Zapiski Towarzystwa Naukowego w Toruniu* 16:1–4, 1950, 5–21. 13.; Nikžentaitis, Alvydas, *Gediminas*. Vilnius, 1989. 15, 37–38.; Gudavičius, Edvardas, *Kryžiaus karai Pabaltijyje ir Lietuva XIII a.* Vilnius, 1989.; Nikžentaitis, Alvydas, “Lietuvos Didžiosios Kunigaikštystės užsienio politikos veiksmų programa XIV–XV a. i puseje ir jos įgyvendinimas”, = *Lituanistica* 3, 1990, 31–40. 34.; Petrauskas, Rimvydas, “Die Außenwelt der Gediminiden: Formen und Möglichkeiten internationaler Politik der heidnischen Großfürsten Litauens in der zweiten Hälfte des 14. Jahrhunderts”, In. Flemming, Stephan – Kersken, Norbert (eds.), *Akteure mittelalterlicher Außenpolitik: Das Beispiel Ostmitteleuropa*. Marburg, 2017. 61–63.; Baronas, Darius, “Good faith and Realpolitik. Approaching the art of politics of Lithuanian rulers in the fourteenth century”, = *Studia Historica Brunensia* 66:2, 2019, 31–44. 38.; Rowell, Stephen C., *Lithuania Ascending. A pagan empire within east-central Europe 1295–1345*. Cambridge, 1994. 233.

² Prochaska, Stosunki Krzyżaków, 1896.; Baszkiewicz, Jan, *Polska czasów Łokietka*. Warszaw, 1968. 144–146.; Nowak, Tadeusz, *Władysław Łokietek – polityk i dowódca*. Warszaw, 1978. 167.; Nikodem, Jarosław, “Mazowsze w polityce litewskiej pierwszej połowy XIV w.”, In. Grabowski, Janusz – Mroczek, Rafał – Mrozowski, Przemysław (eds.), *Dziedzictwo ksiąząt mazowieckich: stan badań i postulaty badawcze. Materiały sesji naukowej zorganizowanej przez Zamek Królewski w Warszawie – Muzeum i Archiwum Głównie Akt Dawnych, 27–28 października 2016 r.* Warszaw, 2017. 326–327.; Petrauskas, Rimvydas, “The Gediminas, the Algirdis and the Jagiellonians – strips regia in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania”, In. Saviščevas, Eugenijus – Uzorka, Marijus (eds.), *Lithuania–Poland–Sweden: European Dynastic Unions and Historical-Cultural ties*. Vilnius, 2014. 37–40.; Szambelan, Zdzisław, “Najazdy ruskie na ziemię sandomierską w XIII wieku”, = *Acta Universitatis Lodzensis. Folia Historia* 36, 1989, 7–31.; Szweda, Adam, “Sprawa najazdu litewskiego na Mazowsze w 1302 r.”,

of the Lithuanian troops in the Polish military campaigns was often overlooked. Although one can find references to different aspects of the issue in more general works, a specific study is required.

As has already been mentioned before, the marriage took place in 1325. According to the Polish chronicler Marcin Bielski, Władysław Łokietek, the king of Poland, who had suffered from constant attacks of the neighbours to his lands, decided to conclude such a treaty with Lithuania and receive its military support in this way.³ Therefore, he sent Polish envoys to Gediminas' court with a proposal to give Aldona to his son and heir, Casimir. Rich gifts were promised as well. Gediminas was also interested in this dynastic alliance, which is why he gave his permission. As a result, the Lithuanian princess left for Poland accompanied by a thousand knights.⁴ After she arrived in Kraków, she was baptised and got the Christian name of Anna.⁵ The wedding ceremony took place several months later in the same royal city. The description of the wedding procedure is known mainly from Polish sources and is mentioned very briefly in the chronicles of the Teutonic Order (mostly in reference to the later military actions).⁶

In. Zielińska-Melkowska, Krystyna (ed.), *Europa Środkowa i Wschodnia w polityce Piastów*. Toruń, 1997. 84–88.; Tęgowski, Jan, "Okoliczności wstąpienia na tron halicko-wołyński Piasta mazowieckiego Bolesława Trojdenowica (Nieznane dokumenty ruskie z XIV wieku)", = *Studia Podlaskie* 18, 2009/2010, 313–328.

³ *Kronika Polska Marcina Bielskiego*. Ed. Turowski, Kazimierz Józef, Sanok, 1856. 370. [hereinafter Bielski, *Kronika Polska*]: "Widząc tedy król Łokietek zewsząd szkody swoje wielkie, to od Krzyżaków, to od margrabiów, to od Litwy, umyślił z Litwą w krewność wnieść i przeto posłał dziewosłęby do Gedymina książęca litewskiego, aby córę swoją dał jego synowi Kazimierzowi za małżonkę, na co on chętnie pozwolił".

⁴ *Jana Długosza Roczniki, czyli kroniki sławnego Królestwa Polskiego*. Vol. IX. Eds. Garbaciak, Józef – Pieradzka, Krystyna, Warszawa, 1978. 162.; Strykowski, Maciej, *Kronika polska, litewska, żmódzka i wszystkiej Rusi*. Vol. II. Ed. Malinowski, Mikołaj, Warszawa, 1846. 404.; *Kronika Polska Marcina Kromera*. Ed. Błażowskiego, Marcin z Błażowa, Sanok, 1857. 240. [hereinafter *Kronika Polska Marcina Kromera*]; Bielski, *Kronika Polska*, 1856. 370.; *Die Ältere Chronik von Oliva*, In. Hirsch, Theodor – Töppen, Max – Strehlke, Ernst (eds.), *Scriptores rerum Prussicarum* [hereinafter SRP]. Vol. V., Frankfurt am Main, 1874. 642. [hereinafter *Die Ältere Chronik von Oliva*]; *Latopis hustyński*. Ed. Suszko, Henryk, Wrocław, 2003. 205. [hereinafter *Latopis hustyński*]; Daniłowicz, Ignacy, *Scarbic dyplomatów papieskich, cesarskich, krolewskich, książęcych*. Vol. I. Ed. Sidorowicz, Jan, Wilno, 1860. 163.

⁵ *Latopis hustyński*, 2003. 205.; Bielski, *Kronika Polska*, 1856. 370.

⁶ *Rocznik Sędziwoja*, In. Bielowski, August (ed.), *Monumenta Poloniae Historiae* [hereinafter MPH]. Vol. II., Lwów, 1872. 880.; *Rocznik Małopolski*, In. Bielowski, August (ed.), MPH. Vol. II., Lwów, 1872. 190.; *Rocznik Miechowski*, In. Bielowski, August (ed.), MPH. Vol. II., Lwów, 1872. 884.; It should be emphasised that the latter source characterises the marriage as a political alliance: 16 October 1325: "*Kazimirus filius Vladyslay regis uxorem recepit de Lithuania*" / "*Pax fuit iter Poloniam et Lituaniam*".

It seems to be obvious that the marriage was not only of dynastic but mostly of political and military importance.⁷ Further events could prove this suggestion. The Lithuanian-Polish alliance of 1325 brought effects as early as the following year, 1326, when Łokietek, with the active support of Pope John XXII, organised an expedition to Brandenburg.⁸ While the latter pursued his political goals of opposition to Louis, King Władysław regarded Neumark (East Brandenburg) as the Polish territory and wanted to regain it. Gediminas took an active part in this military campaign. He showed his support to the king of Poland and sent Lithuanian troops under the command of David, a castellan of Horodno (Grodno), to help the army of Łokietek.⁹ The joining of these two armies was possible due to the treaty of the Teutonic Order with Lithuania in 1324, and with the Kingdom of Poland in 1326. The latter one was concluded on 7 February 1326. According to it, the Teutonic Order and the Duchy of Masovia gave the Lithuanians, as allies of Łokietek, a possibility to cross the Masovian territories and join the Polish army: "... ipsorum omnibus terrigenis seu subiectis et expresse cum Troydeno, Semouitho et Wankone ducibus Mazouie inuiolabiliter volumus et promittimus obseruare tempore prenotato, sic quod Lithuanos nunc in servicio nostro existentes inpedire non debent fratres prenotati, quousque ad propria reuertantur nobis seruiciis exhibitis et peractis".¹⁰

This exact document became a cause for a long-term discussion among historians on the issue of the nature of this alliance and the status of the Lithuanians in Polish military campaigns. Were they allies or mercenaries? The context of the message tells us about the fact of military cooperation between the Lithuanians and the Poles but it makes us doubt the equal status of its participants. The phrase "nunc in servicio nostro" made some historians, including S.C. Rowell, suggest the serving status of the Lithuanians in the Polish military campaigns.¹¹ According to this theory, Łokietek treated the Lithuanians not as equal allies but more as *in servicio nostro*, that is, more as a military force that can be hired and then sent home, who demanded remuneration for their services (in particular, in the form of loots obtained during campaigns) and compensa-

⁷ This was pointed out not only in the Polish chronicles, but also in the sources of the Teutonic Order. Therefore, Wigand of Marburg wrote that the main aim of the Polish and Lithuanian rulers organising the wedding of their children was "ut pacifi ce simul regna sua gubernarent". See: Wigand von Marburg, *Nowa kronika pruska*. Eds. Zonenberg, Sławomir – Kwiatkowski, Krzysztof, Toruń, 2017. 140.

⁸ *Vetera Monumentae Poloniae et Lithuaniae*. Vol. I. Ed. Theiner, Augustino, Romae, 1860. 217–218. nr. 339.; Rowell, *Lithuania Ascending*, 1994. 234.

⁹ Petri de Dusburg, "Chronicon terrae Prussiae", In. Hirsch, Theodor – Töppen, Max – Strehlke, Ernst (eds.), *SRP*. Vol. I., Leipzig, 1861. 193.; Hermann de Wartberge, "Die Chronicon Livoniae", In. Hirsch, Theodor – Töppen, Max – Strehlke, Ernst (eds.), *SRP*. Vol. II., Leipzig, 1863. 62.; See also: Rowell, *Lithuania Ascending*, 1994. 234.

¹⁰ "Dokumenty Mazowieckie", In. Ulanowski, Bolesław (ed.), *SRP*. Vol. XII: *Collectanea ex Archivo Collegii Hist. Crac.*, Vol. IV., nr. 22, Kraków, 1888. 307–308.

¹¹ Rowell, *Lithuania Ascending*, 1994. 234.

tion in case of loss of such an opportunity.¹² Nonetheless, some other historians, for example, S. Zajączkowski, A. Nikžentaitis, and G. Błaszczyk, were not so confirmed in this interpretation and highlighted first the alliance but not the service.¹³ Therefore, it seems to be crucial to refer to the other sources that could confirm or reject this statement.

Among other sources on the campaign of 1326, as well as the alliance of Władysław Łokietek and Gediminas, there are the chronicles of the Teutonic Order. Describing the military campaign against Brandenburg, Peter of Dusburg wrote that the king of Poland asked Gediminas, whose daughter had been just married to Casimir, to send him the troops. Gediminas agreed and provided the Polish army with 1200 soldiers:

“Anno domini MCCCXXVI Loteko rex Polonie rogavit Gedeminum regem Lethwinorum, cujus filiam filus ejus noviter duxerat in uxorem, ut ei aliquos armigeros de gente sua mitteret. Qui precibus jus acquiescens, MCC equites destinavit ei”.¹⁴

The message does not allow us to consider the Lithuanians to be just mercenaries, but emphasises the marriage (alliance) first of all. Similar data can be found in *Die Älttere Chronik von Oliva* (it is necessary to mention here that the author confused the names of Gediminas and Vytenis): “Et extunc rex Polonie predictus contr acta amicitia cum rege Litwinorum Viten nomie, cuius filiam filus regis Polonie duxit in uxorem, incepit impetere terram Pomeranie et terram Culmenssem et terram Michilouiensem primo iudicio spirituali”.¹⁵

Even more details one can read in *Cronica nova Prutenica* by Wigand of Marburg, who adds that the main aim of this marriage was the alliance and peace between two estates: “Post hec rex Polonorum contraxit amicitiam cum rege Wytan, liberos suos copulantes in finem, ut pacifice simul regna sua gubernarent”.¹⁶

So was the treaty of 1326 between Władysław Łokietek and the Teutonic Order the only source that made it possible to conclude that the Lithuanians were the mercenaries of the king of Poland?

As has already been mentioned, Gediminas sent the troops headed by David of Horodno to Władysław. Between 10 February and 11 March 1326, the joint army, then commanded by Łokietek (“<...> Litwanorum exercitus de terra sua egressus, cum conductu regis Cracovie, Vlodezlai, cognomento Lotket <...>”)¹⁷, invaded the lands of Brandenburg. The legates of the Pope accompanied the Lithuanian troops during the campaign to prevent the knights of the Order from

¹² Ibid.

¹³ Błaszczyk, *Dzieje stosunków polsko-litewskich*, 1998. 139.

¹⁴ Petri de Dusburg, *Chronicon terrae Prussiae*, 1861. 185.

¹⁵ *Die Älttere Chronik von Oliva*, 1874. 642.

¹⁶ Zajączkowski, *Przymierze polsko-litewskie 1325 r.*, 1926. 572.

¹⁷ “Annali Cistercensi”, In. Cerulli, Enrico (ed.), *Orientalia*. Vol. XV., Roma, 1946. 470.

attacking them.¹⁸ The united forces crossed the river of Oder (Odra), captured the lands of Frankfurt, plundered the churches and monasteries located on their way, and killed about six thousand local people.¹⁹ The Lithuanians returned from the expedition with a rich trophy. Their main loss during the campaign was the death of their leader, David of Horodno, who was killed by a Polish knight on their way back from the expedition.²⁰ When it comes to the results achieved by Łokietek, the military campaign to Brandenburg allowed him to regain the castellany of Międzyrzecz, which covered the area from the lands of the mouth of the Odra to the Warta (along with Skwierzyna and Paradyż).²¹

One should point out that the alliance was perceived controversially and even critically by the other European Christian rulers, which could be explained not only by the paganism of the Lithuanian ruler but also by the particular political and military interests of the representatives of European dynasties in those conflicts. It should be also emphasised that it was not the first and the only case of the cooperation between the Christian and pagan rulers and between the Poles and Lithuanians in particular. The preconditions for the alliance of Łokietek and Gediminas go back to the previous centuries when Polish-Lithuanian relations were forming and developing.

It should be taken into account that one of the main characteristics of Lithuanian politics was the active military activities of its rulers and nobility as well as constant campaigns of the Lithuanians against the neighbouring lands, including the Polish territory. Even though the first contacts mainly boiled down to border conflicts and invasions from both sides on the lands of their neighbours with a larger amount of Lithuanian attacks, with the development of state-

¹⁸ “Do weren bi deme koninghe van Krakowe des paveses boden; de beden de Dudeschen brodere, dat se in ereme lande de heydene scholden nicht hinderen; also was dat lut. Over in deme weghe, dar de Lettowen toghen to lande, dar volghede na van Polene en helt vormeten, de sach, dat Dawide, der Plezkower koning, de lange jare den cristenen hadde groten schaden dan, des heres was en hovetman”. See: “Annalista Thorunensis”, In: Hirsch, Theodor – Töppen, Max – Strehle, Ernst, (eds.), *SRP*. Vol. III., Leipzig, 1866. 66. [hereinafter *Annalista Thorunensis*]; Baszkiewicz, *Polska czasów Łokietka*, 1968. 144.; Rowell, *Lithuania Ascending*, 1994. 235.

¹⁹ *The Chronicle of Prussia by Nicolaus von Jeroschin: A History of the Teutonic Knights in Prussia, 1190–1331*. Transl. Fischer, Mary, London–New York, 2016. 284–285.: “The army entered near Posenau and rode at once to the city of Frankfurt, looting and burning and destroying around 140 villages and many churches. During this attack three Cistercian monasteries were destroyed and two nunneries. In addition to all the other troubles they caused they had killed or driven off with their possessions more than 6,000 Christians, who have since remained in cruel captivity”.; The similar information can be found in the chronicles by Peter of Dusburg, Jan Długosz, and others. See: Petri de Dusburg, *Chronicon terrae Prussiae*, 1861. 193.

²⁰ *Annalista Thorunensis*, 1866. 66.; Bielski, *Kronika Polska*, 1856. 370.; See also: Baszkiewicz, *Polska czasów Łokietka*, 1968. 146.

²¹ Baszkiewicz, *Polska czasów Łokietka*, 1968. 144–146.; Nowak, Władysław Łokietek – polityk i dowódca, 1978. 167.; Błaszczyk, *Dzieje stosunków polsko-litewskich*, 1998. 139.

hood in Lithuania, the nature of these contacts changed as well.²² The analysis of Lithuanian expeditions to Poland in the late thirteenth to the early fourteenth centuries allows us to distinguish several categories of their military actions: besides the attacks aimed at enriching and gaining loots and prisoners of war, or joint military campaigns with other pagan tribes, there were some expeditions that were intended to support some of the princes of Poland in their rivalry, as well as the Ruthenian princes in their battles against their western neighbours. For example, in the first half of the 40s of the thirteenth century, the Lithuanians supported Konrad I of Mazovia in his struggles for the throne of Kraków several times. According to Jan Długosz and other chroniclers, the Lithuanians were to stand on the Masovian side in 1241, 1243, 1244, and 1246.²³ Moreover,

²² It's quite difficult to say when the first Lithuanian-Polish contacts took place. The original sources, including the diplomatic documents, Polish chronicles and Ruthenian annals, as well as the chronicles of the Teutonic Order, mention Lithuanian-Polish relations in the thirteenth century very fragmentally. Only the later chronicles, including the Chronicle by Jan Długosz, contain information about the Lithuanian invasions to Poland in 1209–1211. On the basis of this information, at first Polish historians such as Stanisław Zajączkowski, Oskar Halecki, and Henryk Paszkiewicz, and later other researchers dated the first Lithuanian invasion to the Polish lands back to 1209. Here it should be emphasised that the entire thirteenth century was marked by constant conflicts between the Lithuanian and Polish principalities. The vast majority of these conflicts were caused by Lithuanian invasions on Polish lands. However, if at the beginning of the thirteenth century the military actions of the Lithuanians were sporadic and carried out irregularly, in the middle of the thirteenth century they became systematic. One of the main reasons for such increase can be found in the development of the Lithuanian state. See: Długosz, Jan, *Roczniki czyli kroniki sławnego Królestwa Polskiego*. Vols V–VI. Ed. Pieradzka, Krystyna, Warszawa, 1973. 257–261.; “Excerpta Ioannis Dlugossi e fontibus incertis”, In. Kętrzyński, Wojciech (ed.), *MPH*. Vol. IV., Lwów, 1884. 12.; Landsberg, Gabrielius, *Polacy i Litwini od 1228 do 1430. Krytyczny rzut oka wg polskich historyków*. Wilno, 1907.; Halecki, Dzieje Unii Jagiellońskiej, 1919. 15.; Zajączkowski, Przymierze polsko-litewskie 1325 r., 1926. 587–608.; Paszkiewicz, Jagiellonowie a Moskwa, 1933. 37–38.; Halecki, Dzieje Unii Jagiellońskiej, 1919. 15.; Błaszczak, Dzieje stosunków polsko-litewskich, 1998. 14.

²³ Although it is still unknown if the Lithuanians took part in all of Konrad's campaigns mentioned by Długosz, the Prince of Masovia was accompanied by the Lithuanian troops for at least three times: in 1244 during the Masovian-Ruthenian campaign against the Sandomir and Lubelska lands, in August 1245 during the battle at Jarosław and in 1246 during the Konrad's campaign against the prince of Kraków, Bolesław Wstydlivy (as a result of this campaign, the Lithuanians plundered Opatów). See: “Kronika Wielkopolska”, In. Kürbis, Brigida (ed.), *MPH*, Seria nova, Vol. VIII., Warszawa, 1970. 83, 91.; *Kronika halicko-wołyńska (Kronika Romanowiczów)*. Eds. Dąbrowski, Dariusz – Jusupović, Adrian. Kraków–Warszawa, 2017. 286.; Długosz, Jan, *Roczniki czyli kroniki sławnego Królestwa Polskiego*. Vols VII–VIII. Ed. Pieradzka, Krystyna, Warszawa, 1976. 36, 49, 55, 67–68. [hereinafter Długosz, *Roczniki*]; See also: Semkowicz, Aleksander, *Krytyczny rozbiór „Dziejów Polski” Jana Długosza (do roku 1384)*. Kraków, 1887. 262.; Włodarski, Bronisław, *Polityczne plany Konrada, księcia mazowieckiego*. Toruń, 1971. 55–60.; Powierski, Jan, “Kazimierz kujawski a początki rywalizacji o ziemie

in 1280, they took part in a joined campaign along with the princes of Rus' to the Lubelska land.²⁴

As it has been shown, depending on the circumstances, the Lithuanians could act as invaders, mercenaries, or allies of the Polish (as well as Ruthenian) princes. Lithuanian expeditions to Poland became more intense in the 70s and 80s of the thirteenth century, and they reached their apogee at the turn of the thirteen and fourteenth centuries, which was related to the military activities of Vytenis. During his reign, in 1294, the cruel attack on the land of Łęczyca took place.²⁵ According to Peter of Dusburg, who illustratively and in much detail described this campaign, heading eight hundred Lithuanians, Samogitians and Prussians, Vytenis invaded the city, the pagan army attacked its inhabitants being at the church ceremony, murdered four hundred Christians, obtained rich loot, then ravaged the entire neighbourhood. A huge number of the citizens were taken into captivity.²⁶ What is more important in the context of our research is the fact that Boleslaus II of Masovia collaborated with Vytenis. It was he who was supposed to allow the Lithuanians to pass through his lands, and later tried to prevent the Polish prince from the pursuit of the

zachodniobałtyjskie (do 1247 r.)", = *Ziemia Kujawska* 6, 1981, 5–15. 13–15.; Szambelan, *Najazdy ruskie*, 1989, 17.

²⁴ According to Jan Długosz, the Lithuanians arranged two military campaigns in the Polish lands in 1278 and 1280. During the first one they attacked Masovia, while during the next one – the Lubelska land. Nonetheless, Henryk Paszkiewicz claimed that there was only one campaign that took place in 1280. This suggestion was accepted in later studies: Długosz, *Roczniki*, 1976. 260–261, 267–269.; Paszkiewicz, *Jagiellonowie a Moskwa*, 1933. 140.; Szymczak, Jan, "Ziemie łęczycka i sieradzka terenem działań wojennych w XII i XIII w.", = *Rocznik Łódzki* 20, 1975, 199–224. 216–217.; Błaszczyk, *Dzieje stosunków polsko-litewskich*, 1998. 48.

²⁵ "Eodem anno Vithenus filius regis Lethowie cum octingentis viris intravit terram Polonie, et in die pentecostes, dum in ecclesia Lunczensi canonici et ministri altaris et alii clerici cum solempni ornate essent in processione, irruit hostiliter in eos, et in ecclesia CCCC homines cristianos trucidavit, clericos et prelates, quos voluit, captivos secum duxit, omnem ornatum, calices et alia vasa ecclesie ad illicitum usum pertrahebat in contemptum dei, ecclesiam cum sacramentis redegit in favillam, depopulataque terra circum adjacent factaque maxima strage in populo dei, tantam multitudinem deduxit captivam, quod cuilibet Lethowino in divisione cesserunt XX homines cristiani. Qui facto dum recederent, Casimirus dux Polonie dolens de suorum interitu, cum mille et octingentis viris sequutus est eos. Quod dum perciperet Bonislaus dux Masovie nescio quo ductus spiritu, treugas inter Cristianos et infidels ad certum terminum ordinavit, infra quas dum Poloni nihil timentes diversis officiis vacarent, Lethowino rupto treugarum federe, irruerunt in eos, et Casimirum ducem et totum populum peremerunt, preter unum militem, qui evasit solus, ut hec aliis nunciaret." See: Petri de Dusburg, *Chronicon terrae Prussiae*, 1861. 156–157.

²⁶ Petri de Dusburg, *Chronicon terrae Prussiae*, 1861. 157.; Długosz, *Roczniki*, 1976. 355.; More information on the issue see in: Aścik, Kazimierz, "Najazd litewski na Łęczycę w 1294 r.", = *Studia i Materiały do Historii Wojskowości* 10:1, 1964, 3–11.; Szymczak, *Ziemie łęczycka i sieradzka*, 1975. 223–224.; Błaszczyk, *Dzieje stosunków polsko-litewskich*, 1998. 53.; Nikodem, *Mazowsze w polityce litewskiej 1. połowy XIV w.*, 2017. 316.

pagans. When Casimir II of Łęczyca, ignoring Boleslaus' piece of advice, organised a chase, he was killed by the Lithuanians.²⁷ After his death, Łęczyca became a part of Władysław Łokietek's possession.²⁸ One can assume this example to be evidence of cooperation (probably, an oral agreement) between the prince of Masovia and the Grand Duke of Lithuania. Without any doubt, despite the fact that from time to time the Lithuanian troops could be mercenaries (more regarding the thirteenth century), at that time they became a subject of politics conducting agreements with other princes, although the nature of such alliances was still quite contradictory and could change easily depending on particular circumstances.²⁹

²⁷ "Eodem anno Bonislaus dux Masovie dei timore postposito, In contemptum dei et cristifidelium prejudicium non modicum et gravamen hostes fidei Lethowinos In castro suo Wisna sepiuj hospitavit, admittens, quo terram Prussie et Polonie depredarent. Nec de hoc desistere voluit, licet pluries salubriter moneretur." Petri de Dusburg, *Chronicon terrae Prussiae*, 1861. 158–159.; Moreover, the Lithuanians took part in the restoration of the Masovian Prince's castle: "Hoc anno Bonislaus dux Masowie, de quo dictum Est, dolens de subversione castri sui Wisne, assumpto sibi Lethowinorum adjutorio, reedificavit illud." Petri de Dusburg, *Chronicon terrae Prussiae*, 1861. 160.; See also: *Rocznik Traski*, In: Bielowski, August (ed.), *MPH*. Vol. II., Lwów, 1872. 852.; *Rocznik Malopolski*, In: Bielowski, August (ed.), *MPH*. Vol. II., Lwów, 1872. 186.; *Kronika Polska Marcina Kromera*, 1857. 240.; Bielski, *Kronika Polski*, 1856. 216.; *Latopis hustyiński*, 2003. 205.; *Daniłowicz, Scarbiec dyplomatów*, 1860. 128.

²⁸ *Baszkiewicz, Polska czasów Łokietka*, 1968. 63.

²⁹ The nature of this alliance is still a debatable issue among historians. While historians such as S. Zajączkowski, G. Błaszczyk, and A. Teterycz-Puzio admitted the existence of the union pointing out the mutual interest of the two rulers (although the true motives and reasons for it are still unknown, as well as all the peculiarities of its conduct), other researchers, namely, H. Paszkiewicz and later J. Nikodem were quite critical of it, pointing out that one cannot trust the information presented in the chronicles by Peter of Dusburg and Jan Długosz. The historians pointed out that the Lithuanians easily conducted and broke their temporary alliances in the thirteenth century. As a supportive argument, the death of Traidenis' daughter (1288) who had been married to Bolesław was mentioned, as well as the attacks of the Lithuanians against the Masovian lands in 1302. Nevertheless, one can agree with the latter arguments partially. As it has been mentioned before, the Lithuanians (as well as many other forces being in the process of their state development) concluded and broke the agreements easily, as they often depended on the changing circumstances. But they were still unions, though unstable and weak. Moreover, one cannot compare the documented agreements of the later period with the verbal contracts concluded due to the particular temporal needs of its participants in the early thirteenth century. For more details see in: Zajączkowski, Stanisław, "W sprawie najazdu litewskiego na Łęczycę w 1294 r.," = *Studia i Materiały do Historii Wojskowości* 12:2, 1966, 321–331. 326.; Błaszczyk, *Dzieje stosunków polsko-litewskich*, 1998. 54.; Teterycz-Puzio, Agnieszka, "Książęta mazowieccy wobec państwa litewskiego w XIII wieku – walka czy współpraca?," = *Zapiski Historyczne* 75:1, 2010, 7–30. 24–25.; Paszkiewicz, *Jagiellonowie a Moskwa*, 1933. 158.; Nikodem, *Mazowsze w polityce litewskiej 1. połowy XIV w.*, 2017. 317.; Szweida, *Sprawa najazdu litewskiego na Mazowsze w 1302 r.*, 1997. 86–87.

Therefore, by the end of the thirteenth century, the Lithuanians not only attacked Polish lands, but also took part in the internal political struggle between the princes of Poland. Their alliances were not documented and signed by the rulers. Moreover, such cooperation could be easily broken down. But it was an important element of the developing diplomatic policy between states, while the pursuit of material benefits was also of great importance for the Lithuanians. In this regard, one can assume the marriage of 1325 to be the official military union between the Kingdom of Poland and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. Of course, it was not announced as a political alliance. But it was the marriage of Aldona (Anna) and Casimir that marked the beginning of the military and – what is more important – political cooperation of the two states.

As it has already been pointed out, both the Lithuanians and the Poles had some experience in mutual contact. But even if these contacts with the princes of Masovia were rather productive, the relations with the kings of Poland were rocky enough. What factors contributed to the change in the situation? One of the most important reasons for the alliance was the threat posed by the Teutonic Order which was very active towards Lithuania and later Poland. The coronation of Władysław Łokietek seriously influenced the further development of Lithuanian-Masovian relationships. The dukes of Masovia treated it as a threat to their interests and turned towards the Teutonic Order, assuming the Teutonic knights as a kind of counterweight against the growing power of Łokietek. Such a change in the policy of the Masovian dukes forced Gediminas to adjust his foreign policy to the new realities.³⁰ Here it is necessary to emphasise that Gediminas' state was not the same as Lithuania in the mid-thirteenth century. Since that time important social and political changes took place. That is why Gediminas pursued the diplomatic, as well as the dynastic methods, to achieve his political goals. Even though the Lithuanians still plundered the attacked lands and took loots, it was not the only reason for and sequence of their military campaigns. It was his desire to conclude the agreements with the Piasts to fight against a common

³⁰ Although Gediminas kept his alliance with Masovia in 1323 (this year the Grand Duke of Lithuania attacked the Dobrzyń land to support Waclaw), the Lithuanian ruler continued to look more and more towards the king of Poland. This was manifested, inter alia, in the fact that in 1324, Gediminas organised two large scale expeditions to the Masovian land. During the first, he attacked the territories ruled by the prince of Czersk, Trojden, and the prince of Cieszyn, Kazimierz. During the next campaign, the Lithuanians commanded by the Duke of Horodno (Garta), David, invaded the territories which belonged to Siemowit II, the Duke of Wisła and Rawa, and destroyed Pułtusk. As a result of these invasions, in 1325, Siemowit II and Trojden asked the Pope to annul the Teutonian-Lithuanian peace that had been concluded two years before and extended later by the legate for four more years to enable the Teutonic knights to protect themselves against the pagan invasions. It is important to point out that Waclaw did not support the efforts of his brothers, which can lead to an assumption that in 1325 he still maintained a peaceful relationship with his father-in-law.; Kosman, Marcei, "Między Zakonem krzyżackim, Rusią i Polską (początki chrystianizacji Litwy)", = *Przegląd Zachodni* 5–6, 1987, 73–94. 83.; Rowell, Lithuania Ascending, 1994. 233.

enemy – the Teutonic Order – that made him act in the way one can observe. On the other hand, the Piasts were also interested in this alliance, seeing it as a safeguard against both Lithuanian attacks on their territories on one front and invasions from the Teutonic Order on the other. Despite the marriage of Gediminas' daughter Elżbieta and the son of the prince of Płock Bolesław II, Waclaw, that took place between 1316 and 1320, the relationships between Gediminas and the princes of Masovia began worsening, and as a result, the Grand Duke of Lithuania oriented towards the king of Poland.³¹ This shift made it possible to conduct the agreement of 1325.³²

Of course, entering into an alliance with a pagan Grand Duke could be perceived controversially by the Polish elite and other Christian rulers. It is possible, that the contacts between Gediminas and Pope John XXII in 1323, during which the issue of the conversion of Lithuania was raised, allowed Łokietek to avoid internal opposition to his plans to conclude an alliance with the pagan neighbour. Although Gediminas' conversion to Christianity did not take place, Łokietek did not abandon the idea of a dynastic alliance and implemented this plan. Taking all these data into account, one can analyse the joint campaign of 1326 to Brandenburg as a result of a military alliance. Exactly such a characteristic of this union was given to the cooperation of Łokietek and Gediminas in the agreement of the Teutonic Order and Henry VI of Wrocław from 1326 that was directed against Bolesław in Silesia and Władysław Łokietek.³³ Moreover, the events of 1326 were not the only example of the common activity by Gediminas and Łokietek.

In 1327, the war between the Kingdom of Poland and the Teutonic Order began. At first, the Lithuanians, bound by the treaty with the Order, did not interfere in this conflict. The military actions of the Polish-Lithuanian coalition against the Order took place only in 1329. Then the troops of the Teutonic knights, Czech and Silesian princes who supported them, attacked Samogitia. According to Peter of Dusburg, the invaders conquered five cities and converted about six thousand captured pagans:

³¹ It is worth noting that Aldona (Anna) was not his only daughter married to a foreign ruler. Between 1316 and 1320, Gediminas' another daughter, Elżbieta, became the wife of the Duke of Płock, Waclaw, who was the son of the Masovian ruler, Bolesław II. One more marriage was arranged with the Duke of Galicia-Volhynia, Yuri II Boleslav (Troidenowicz) from the Masovian Piast dynasty, around 1331.; See: Balzer, Oswald, *Genealogia Piastów*. Kraków, 1895. 770–771.; Grabowski, Jan, *Dynastia Piastów mazowieckich. Studia nad dziejami politycznymi Mazowsza, intytulacją i genealogią książąt*. Kraków, 2012. 76–78.; Tęgowski, Pierwsze pokolenia Giedyminowiczów, 1999. 42–43.; Шабульдо, Феликс, *Земли Юго-Западной Руси в составе Великого княжества Литовского* [Shabuldo, Feliks, *Ziemli Yugo-Zapadnoj Rusi v sostawie Wielikogo kniazestwa Litovskogo*]. Kyiv, 1987. 33–34.; Войтович, Леонтий, *Княжа доба на Русі: портрети еліти* [Voitovich, Leontiy, *Kniazha doba na Rusi: portrety elity*]. Bila Tserkva, 2006. 38.; Rowell, Lithuania Ascending, 1994. 91.

³² Rowell, Stephen C., "Pious Princesses or the Daughters of Belial: Pagan Lithuanian Dynastic Diplomacy 1279–1423", = *Medieval Prosography* 15:1, 1994, 3–80. 36–37.

³³ *Codex diplomaticus Poloniae*. Vol. IV., Varsaviae, 1887. nr. 51: "cum paganis foedera mortis compangendo".

“Anno 1329 Ioannes rex Bohemiae intravit terram Lithwanorum cum dominis de Prussia, qui expugnaverunt castrum Samaitarum cum omnibus Lithwanis, qui et baptisati purificationis unius Mariae”.³⁴

But the attack of Łokietek against the Chełmno land did not allow them to develop their success. Peter of Dusburg indicates that the action of the king of Poland was aimed at supporting Gediminas:

“Anno 1329 cum rex Bohemiae Ioannes esset cum dominis Prussiae in Lithuania, Lokethko terram Culmensem in virgilia purificationis Mariae intravit eam fere totaliter devastando et cremando”.³⁵

Without any doubt, he had his own reasons for this step. It could be the fact that the king of Bohemia John of Luxemburg, who supported the Teutonic knights, passed through Polish lands without the consent of the Piast.³⁶ In addition, the decision of Łokietek could be explained by the fact that the king of Poland wanted to take advantage of his enemy being occupied elsewhere and wanted to return the previously lost Polish lands.³⁷ But either way, this attack should have been coordinated with Gediminas. Moreover, it helped the Lithuanian ruler to contain the advance of the enemy. At first, Łokietek's attack on the Chełmno lands brought the expected effect and the Teutonic and Czech troops withdrew from Samogitia.³⁸ Ultimately, however, Łokietek's expedition ended in failure. The king of Poland was unable not only to recapture his lands, but he suffered a defeat and lost even more territories. In addition, a Czech-Teutonic alliance against an ally of pagan Lithuania was formed.³⁹

The following year showed that the Lithuanian-Polish union began to lose its importance and strength. In 1330, there was an event that accelerated the collapse of this union, which finally burst out in an argument in 1331. In September 1330, Władysław Łokietek organised an expedition to Dobrzyń and Chełmno and enlisted both Lithuanians and Hungarians.⁴⁰ The fact that Gediminas himself took part in the expedition can be evidence that the Lithuanian ruler treated the matter seriously. The allies, however, could not get on well with each other. The Hungarians did not want to fight alongside the pagan Lithuanians.⁴¹ This event shows contradictions and the unequal position of the three rulers in this military campaign. Their different perception, as well as religious and political

³⁴ Petri de Dusburg, *Chronicon terrae Prussiae*, 1861. 215.

³⁵ Petri de Dusburg, *Chronicon terrae Prussiae*, 1861. 216.

³⁶ Zajączkowski, Stanisław, *Polska a Zakon Krzyżacki w ostatnich latach Władysława Łokietka*. Lwów, 1929. 141.

³⁷ This reason was emphasised by Rowell, *Lithuania Ascending*, 1994. 241.

³⁸ Nikžentaitis, Gediminas, 1989. 43.; Błaszczuk, *Dzieje stosunków polsko-litewskich*, 1998. 140.

³⁹ Baszkiewicz, *Polska czasów Łokietka*, 1968. 149.; Błaszczuk, *Dzieje stosunków polsko-litewskich*, 1998. 142.

⁴⁰ Bielski, *Kronika Polski*, 1856. 374.

⁴¹ Baszkiewicz, *Polska czasów Łokietka*, 1968. 152.

antagonism, can be seen from the message by Wigand of Marburg: “Tres reges erant hostes ordinis, Lokut rex Polonie, Gedemyn Lithwanie paganus et rex Ungariae”.⁴² As one can see, being alongside with two Christian rulers, Gediminas lacks his royal title, which can be the reflection of a chronicler’s perception of a pagan and his status among other Christian leaders. At the same time, his mentioning along with the king of Poland and the king of Hungary makes it possible to assume the equal participation of these three rulers in the military campaign and consider Gediminas as a rightful leader, but not a mercenary. Still, the campaign was not successful enough. The behaviour of the Hungarians and the position of Łokietek, who tried to manoeuvre between Hungary and Lithuania, caused Gediminas’ indignation.⁴³ The Grand Duke of Lithuania ordered his troops to leave Łokietek’s camp and return home. Despite this fact, the king of Poland paid remuneration to the Lithuanian soldiers. This issue seems to be quite important in the context of our study. According to Wigand of Marburg, Gediminas demanded this payment only after he had been asked to leave due to his indignation:

“Quare rex paganorum commovetur cum suis, quod gratis vocatus fuisset, et irate cogerunt regem // Polonie, sibi solaria in auro, argento, panno et equis largiri, cuilibet secundum sua merita, et sic reverse sunt in patriam”.⁴⁴

Therefore, this fragment proves that it was not the issue of the payment that made Gediminas take part in this company, but the agreement with Łokietek. At the same time, having lost the opportunity to plunder the attacked lands during the campaign and in that way satisfy the warriors, he could decide to compensate his expenses. Deprived of Lithuanian support, Łokietek was unable to conquer any castle in the Chełm land. It seemed to be the end of the contact between the two leaders but it was not.

In the winter of 1331, a Łokietek’s messenger came to Gediminas again. He asked the Grand Duke of Lithuania for help and proposed to attack the Teutonic Order together. Despite the tensions that had risen during the previous campaign, Gediminas promised to support the king of Poland. Nevertheless, the joint expedition did not take place. The difficult weather conditions did not allow the Poles to arrive on time and the dissatisfied Lithuanians returned home, plundering the Polish lands on their way back.⁴⁵

⁴² Wigand von Marburg, *Nowa kronika pruska*, 2017. 156.

⁴³ “Dux Wilhemus videns, quomodo rex Lokut paganos duce re voluit contra Christianom, dixit: Si Ti utique vis cum paganis christianos impugnare, permitte nos transire in Ungariam; sed Si debeamus tecum transire, dimitte paganos ad sua et te cum pugnabimus voluntarie”. Wigand von Marburg, *Nowa kronika pruska*, 2017. 158.

⁴⁴ Wigand von Marburg, *Nowa kronika pruska*, 2017. 158.

⁴⁵ Bielski, *Kronika Polski*, 1856. 374.; Zajączkowski, *Przymierze polsko-litewskie 1325 r., 1926*. 615.; Zajączkowski, *Polska a Zakon Krzyżacki*, 1929. 161.; Nikžentaitis, *Gediminas*, 1989. 45.; Błaszczyk, *Dzieje stosunków polsko-litewskich*, 1998. 143.

This fragment, namely the information concerning the loot or money (compensation) which were gained during the attacks can be considered more supportive evidence that made it possible for some historians to consider the Lithuanian army as the mercenaries in the military campaigns of Łokietek. It was in some way confirmed by Luder von Braunschweig's letter to the Pope from late 1331, in which he complained that Łokietek maintained the Lithuanian troops to use them in the Prussian war. At the same time, in 1330, the Lithuanian army was led by Gediminas, which wouldn't have been necessary if the Lithuanians were just mercenaries. Moreover, as it has been recently shown, the payment for the service could be explained differently, namely, as compensation for breaking the agreement. One should be extremely accurate while analysing the text of the messages composed by the enemies of both Gediminas and Łokietek, as they could have reflected not only the real state of affairs but also the political and religious intentions of their authors. The data of the letter is not supported by other sources. At the same time, the chronicle of Wigand of Marburg, as well as other sources, do not refuse the existence of cooperation:

“Anno 1331 sequenti anno in die Nativitatis Marie Virginis rex Lokut Polonie concepit malum propositum vindicte cum auxilio Gedemyni, regis Lithwanorum, qui sibi condixerant, se pretacta die paratos esse. Tandem Rex Gedemyn in potenti manu intrat cum paganis terram Osterrodensem et igne vastat eam, ubi frater Detmarus, magister piscatorum, cum IX est interfectus”.⁴⁶

Moreover, the Lithuanians are not mentioned among the mercenaries that took part in a joint campaign along with the kings of Hungary and Poland in 1330.⁴⁷ They received a kind of compensation (including the loot) for their participation in the company. But it was not only mercenaries who took loots during the military campaigns in the medieval period.

The mentioned union did not survive for a long time. The events of 1331 led to the break-up of the Polish-Lithuanian alliance of 1325. The final mark in its functioning was the death of Władysław Łokietek in 1333: “... qua mortua iterum inimicie inter Polonos et Litwanos fuerunt exorte”⁴⁸, while the peace between two states – the Kingdom of Poland and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania – was de-facto kept until the death of Aldona (Anna) that took place in 1339.

As a conclusion, it should be pointed out that there is no convincing evidence for the participation of Lithuanian troops as mercenaries in the campaigns of

⁴⁶ Wigand von Marburg, *Nowa kronika pruska*, 2017. 150–152.

⁴⁷ Nicolaus von Jeroschin, *The Chronicle of Prussia*, 2016. 292: “Afterwards, in the autumn, King Łokietek brought together all the horsemen he could muster from his kingdom. He also employed many mercenaries and the king of Hungary sent him 8,000 armed men to help him. With this huge army he entered the Kulmerland in force and besieged the fortress and city of Schönsee.”

⁴⁸ Baszkiewicz, *Polska czasów Łokietka*, 1968. 153.; *Kronika Jana z Czarnkowa*. Transl. Żebrilło, Józef, ed. Kowalski, Marek D., Kraków, 2006. 13.

the king of Poland in the 20s–30s of the fourteenth century. The marriage of 1325 created an important basis for further political contacts between the two states. Their actions in the period from 1326 to 1331 unmistakably point to a military alliance between the two rulers. This union enabled the king of Poland to return some of the previously lost Polish lands in 1326. The Grand Duke of Lithuania attempted to use the alliance with Łokietek to eliminate the invasion of Samogitia by the Teutonic Order and the Czechs in 1329. The fact of taking spoils or demanding compensation for participation in a campaign was typical of the medieval world and cannot be pure proof of the mercenary nature of the Lithuanian troops in these campaigns. There is no doubt that this was a union, an agreement that was concluded in certain religious and social circumstances.

In addition to the data in the chronicles, this assumption can also be confirmed by the fact that the Pope sent his legates with Polish-Lithuanian troops to protect the Lithuanians, who were critically perceived by other neighbouring states due to the paganism of their rulers, from possible attacks by the Order. When analysing the sources that provide data on the role of Lithuanian troops and the status of their leaders in the Polish military campaigns at the period under study, one should take into account the antagonism that prevailed between the forming Grand Duchy of Lithuania and its western neighbours at that time, the negative perception of the Lithuanian rulers, which can be explained by their adherence to paganism and their active military policy, as well as certain political goals pursued by the narrators. This may explain the unequal status of these two rulers, which is reflected in the narrative sources. The Lithuanian tradition of verbal agreements, and consequently the absence of documented conditions of such unions, does not allow one to claim about the exact status of its participants. But the events, as well as the surviving signs, allow us to assume their relations as allies rather than being a customer and mercenaries in the military campaigns of Łokietek in the 1320s and the 1330s.



MERCENARIES IN MEDIEVAL SERBIAN LANDS

During the rule of Nemanjić dynasty in Serbia (1166–1371) mercenaries from different countries and of different origin were present in the Serbian army. Besides Serbia itself, there are some evidences from medieval Ragusa (Dubrovnik) on the presence of mercenary troops. The Raguzan archive is not only a first-class source for the military history of the city, but also for the main topic of this paper which is dedicated to the mercenary soldiers in the army of Serbian rulers. After the decline of the Nemanjić dynasty and the fall of the Serbian medieval empire, information in the available source material is extremely fragmentary and scarce.

The first mention of mercenaries in Serbian army is from a hagiographic source known as *The Life of Saint Symeon* (monastic name of grand Prince Stephen Nemanja) written around 1216 by his son and King of Serbia, from 1217 Stephen Nemanjić, also called Stephen the First-Crowned. When Stephen Nemanjić reconstructed the life of his father, he also wrote about Nemanja's ascension to the throne. Before becoming the grand prince of Serbia Nemanja was *udeoni knez*, i.e. a prince who ruled over only one part of the territory. Since he had behaved like an independent ruler, almost not at all acknowledging the supreme rule of his eldest brother Tihomir, Nemanja fell into conflict with Tihomir, and his other two brothers Miroslav and Stracimir. When describing this internal conflict Stephen Nemanjić writes that Nemanja's brothers hired Greeks, Franks, Ottomans and others and attacked Nemanja.¹

The problem with this source, and this particular data is the fact that this is a hagiographic writing, aimed to present Stephen Nemanja–Saint Symeon as a holy man, protected by God who himself keeps his homeland safe from all heresies and enemies. So, everything written in the *Life* serves to create an ideal portrait of a saint. Even though Stephen Nemanjić follows historical narration, and provides many important and relevant historical information, as any other hagiographic source, this one too is full of exaggerations and different topoi. For this particular information, it is important to stress that Stephen Nemanjić writes, how his brothers, coaxed by Satan, went to Greek land (i.e. Byzantium) to ask for help against Nemanja, who, on the other hand, prayed to God.²

Historical facts, on the other hand tell a slightly different story. After releasing himself from the dungeon, in which his brothers put him, Nemanja once again has usurped the throne of Serbian grand princes and in 1166 started to rule the whole country. His brothers fled to Byzantium to seek help from Emperor Manuel I Komnenos, who was the supreme ruler of Serbia. The joint

¹ Prvovenčani, Stefan, *Sabrana dela*. Transl. Juhas-Georgievaska, Lj. – Jovanović, T., Beograd–Kraljevo, 2017. 30–31.

² Prvovenčani, Stefan, *Sabrana dela*, 28–31., Juhas-Georgievaska, Lj., *Predgovor*, In. Prvovenčani, Stefan, *Sabrana dela*. xxv–xxvi, xxxviii.

army was led by Nemanja's brothers and Byzantine military leader Theodore Padeiates, but these troops were defeated by Nemanja sometime in 1168 near the village of Pantin on the river Sitnica.³ Therefore, Greeks (and other troops) in the army of the brothers of Stephen Nemanja were forces jointed by Emperor Manuel I, who sent his military commander to put an end to a rebellion of a renegade Serbian local prince. Most likely, there were no mercenaries in the army of Tihomir, Stracimir and Miroslav. They have appealed to their supreme authority – the Byzantine emperor, who wanted to subjugate the whole Serbia, and the usurpation of Stephen Nemanja caused a problem to Manuel I as well as to his brothers.

The first Serbian ruler in whose army the mercenaries are confirmed was King Milutin who ruled from 1282 to 1321, and who conquered a large part of Macedonia and under whose reign the rise of Serbian medieval state had started. The biographer of King Milutin, archbishop Daniel II, when discussing the campaign of this Serbian ruler against Byzantium in 1284, states that many soldiers joined him from the neighboring *empires*.⁴ Having in mind closer Serbian-Bulgarian relations at the time, Aleksandar Uzelac presumes that at least a part, of this army could have been comprised of mercenaries from the Second Bulgarian empire. There is also a brief note in a seventeenth century Serbian genealogy, in which one can read how Milutin's son Constantine went to hire mercenaries in Bulgaria and Greece, but *was belated*, and in the meantime, King Milutin died on 29 October 1321.⁵

Constantine was at one point designated as heir to the Serbian throne, but when King Milutin died, a civil war broke out between said Constantine and his half-brother Stephen, who eventually won and became King Stephen III, known as Dečanski, because he founded the monastery of Visoki Dečani. Gregory Tsamblak, biographer and hagiographer of Stephen Dečanski, also notes that

³ The expedition of Padiates is briefly noted by Choniatas, and this is the only mention of this Byzantine military commander, see *Nicetae Choniatae Historia*. Ed. Dieten, J-L. van, Berlin, 1975. 159.92–95.; Honijat, Nikita, *Vizantijski izvori za istoriju Naroda Jugoslavije*. Vol. IV., Ed. Kalić, J., Beograd, 2007. 147.; Kalić, Jovanka, "Srpsko-vizantijski sukob 1168. godine", = *Zbornik Filozofskog fakulteta u Beogradu* 11:1, 1970, 193–204.; Pirivatrić, Srđan, "Prilog hronologiji početka Nemanjine vlasti", = *Zbornik radova Vizantološkog instituta* 29–30, 1991, 125–136.; Komatina, Ivana, *Crkva i država u srpskim zemljama od XI do XIII veka*. Beograd, 2016. 158.; Błażej, Szeffiński, "O tajemniczym poprzedniku wielkiego żupana Serbii Stefana Nemanji, zwanym Tihomirem", = *Balkanica Posnaniensia Acta et studia* 23, 2017, 35–44.; Ottomans could have been Pechenegs, and Aleksandar Uzelac suggests that these were auxiliary troops, Uzelac, Aleksandar, "Foreign Soldiers in the Nemanjić State – A Critical Overview", = *Beogradski istorijski glasnik* 6, 2015, 69–89. 70.

⁴ Arhiepiskop Danilo i drugi, *Životi kraljeva i arhiepiskopa srpskih*. Prir. Daničić, Đ., Zagreb, 1866. 114.; Drugi, Danilo, *Žitija. Službe*. Prir. Danijel, G. Mak – Petrović, D., Beograd, 1988. 116–117.

⁵ Uzelac, Aleksandar, "Najamničke vojske kralja Stefana Uroša II Milutina", = *Vojnoistorijski glasnik* 2, 2011, 9–27. 11–13.

Constantine went to the surrounding countries to get help, i.e. to summon soldiers for the war that he eventually lost after a battle near Zvečan.⁶

Besides Bulgarians, and maybe even Greeks, there is another large group of mercenaries that is confirmed by historical sources in the army of King Milutin. These are soldiers coming from the East. Turcoples, the descendants of baptised Ottomans were also present in the Serbian army after they have separated from their previous allies, the Catalan company. These Turcoples were led by Melik, sometimes in historiography considered identical to Constantine Melek, son of the Seljuk sultan 'Izz al-Dīn Kaykāwus. The fact is that Constantine Melek was the governor of Pegai and later Berrhoia. On the other hand, there were numerous military commanders who wore the name Melek, mostly given to high-ranking officers of Ottoman aristocratic descendants. This Μελίκ is, according to Rustam Shukurov, either a second-generation Ottoman immigrant or an officer from the Byzantine army of Ottoman origin.⁷

Melek, in the words of Gregoras, with his 1000 horsemen and 500 foot soldiers became an adversary to the Byzantines, so he could have not made any agreements with them, and he went to the King of Serbia. According to their arrangement, the Ottomans of Melek's army handed over their horses and weapons to the king. They were supposed to lead a civil life in the future. Only if war required more soldiers, the number of which would be determined by the king, were they obliged to take up arms again and go to war.⁸ These Ottomans were part of Serbian army in a smaller-scale Byzantine-Serbian conflict somewhere on the border. The battle was won by the Byzantine troops. The other was a battle with Milutin's brother King Stephen Dragutin. In that civil war which lasted from 1301 to 1311, Milutin, in the last phase engaged not only these Ottomans, but also Jassic people (Yas) and Tatars, Almogavars and Catalans. Thanks to these mercenaries the troops of King Milutin achieved decisive victory over the army of Dragutin.⁹

⁶ Camblak, Grigorije, *Književni rad u Srbiji*. Prir. Petrović. D., Beograd, 1989. 62–63.; Even though it is not completely clear whether these troops are truly mercenaries, it is quite likely, since there are no confirmations that Constantine received auxiliary troops from some foreign power.

⁷ The link of Melek and Kaykāwus is made by Byzantine historian Nikephoros Gregoras, but it is not likely, since this Melek rather belonged to a later generation, and not of Kaykāwus and his soldiers. Gregoras, Nikephoros, *Rhomäische Geschichte. Historia Rhomäike*. Teil I.: Kapitel I–VII., Ed. Dieten, J-L. van, Stuttgart, 1973. IV.2 (103–104), V.5 (133–140), VII.8 (195).; *Prosopographischen Lexikons der Palaiologenzeit*. CD-Ausgabe, Wien, 2001. 17761.; Uzelac, Najamničke vojske, 2011. 13–14.; Shukurov, Rustam, *The Byzantine Turks 1204–1461*. Leiden, 2016. 187–190.

⁸ Gregoras, *Rhomäische Geschichte*, 1973. Teil I., VII. (195)

⁹ The so-called Daniel's continuer (the continuers of the work of archbishop Daniel II) provides this information, see *Danilovi nastavljaji: Danilov učenik, drugi nastavljaji Danilovog zbornika*. Prir. Danijel, G. Mak, Beograd, 1989. 89.; Uzelac, Najamničke vojske, 2011. 14–15.; The Yas were in fact Alans, and they and the Tatars could have been recruited by archbishop Daniel II, who was firstly in the Chilandar monastery on

Besides Turcoples, there were also Cumans in the army of King Milutin. Gregoras writes that being unable to successfully oppose a rebellion of Ottomans led by certain Khalil, Byzantine emperor Andronicus III asked his son-in-law Milutin for assistance. The latter sent to the emperor 2000 elite troops of horsemen; Gregoras describes these auxiliary troops of mercenaries were sent from Serbia in 1312–1313. Alongside the imperial troops these mercenaries from Serbia besieged the rebelled Ottomans, surrounded them in a ring, and the contribution of these Serbian auxiliary troops of mercenaries was undoubtedly very important, maybe even a decisive one.¹⁰ Archbishop Daniel II also knows this episode, saying that Milutin sent to his relative his own guard and they defeated the enemies, whom Daniel II calls pagans and adversaries of Christianity.¹¹ These horsemen stayed in Byzantium for some time, since at the end of 1320, Milutin sent his envoys, led by a monk named Calinicus, with an aim to seek the return of the aforementioned soldiers, who were most probably needed because of the Hungarian danger.¹² Among these soldiers there were Cumans, Tatars and Alans, and in spite of the fact that sources sometimes mix these people, those are all most likely former subjects of khan Nogai.¹³

Daniel II, continuing the *Vita* of King Milutin, writes on another help sent by Milutin to his father-in-law against the Anatolian Turks. It is unclear from Daniel's writing whether Milutin sent only mercenaries or not, since Daniel II's words are that Milutin gathered all of his army. Maybe this could mean auxiliary troops rather than just mercenaries, but also, one must not underestimate the possibility that it is the same event, the war against Ottomans of Khalil. Therefore, Daniel II could be separating one event and one joint Byzantine-Serbian war against rebelled Ottomans into two different conflicts.¹⁴

Nevertheless, the Turcoples in King Milutin's service also rebelled at one point. According to archbishop Daniel II, the reason for this mutiny was the fact that Melik was ungrateful and despicable.¹⁵ It seems that Aleksandar Uzelac was right when he noted that the true reason for this rebellion was the note by Nikephoros Gregoras that these Turcoples were supposed to hand over their weapons and live a normal life until the king summons them. This position was not something they would gladly accept, since Turcoples were professional sol-

Mount Athos and who could have had contacts with these mercenaries when they left Byzantine service. Uzelac, *Foreign soldiers*, 2015. 73, 74–75.

¹⁰ Gregoras, *Rhomäische Geschichte*, 1973. Teil I., VII.10 (200, 202–203).

¹¹ Drugi, *Žitija. Službe*, 1988. 138.

¹² This embassy is noted by John Kantakuzenos, see Kantakuzenos, Johannes, *Geschichte*. Teil I., Buch I., Eds. Fatouros, G. – Krischer, T., Stuttgart, 1986. I, 7–8 (33–34).

¹³ Uzelac, *Foreign soldiers*, 2015. 74–75 who also states that the Oriental influence can be seen in the spread of composite bows.

¹⁴ Drugi, *Žitija. Službe*, 1988. 138–140.

¹⁵ Daniel names these Ottomans *godless Persians* and writes that they have been well-received by Milutin, but were jealous and filled with envy when they saw how successful Milutin's kingdom was. Drugi, *Žitija. Službe*, 1988. 136–138.

diers, used to constant war and privileges of their status in the society where they served. But the rebellion was brutally suppressed. In the troops of King Milutin that were sent to destroy the rebelled Turcoples, a special place was held by king's personal guard, most probably the Cuman horsemen, the very same ones that were his elite troops sent to Byzantium to help his father-in-law, Emperor Andronicus III. This episode illustrates the position of foreign mercenaries in the kingdom of Milutin. They were used against each other, but the fact that they were used in so many important military operations, and that a rebellion of one group of mercenaries could endanger the whole realm, shows that they had a very significant role in the Serbian army of the time.¹⁶

There are some indications that Italians were also in the service of King Milutin, but there are no clear evidences for that. One source is a pure fictional medieval novel entitled *Fortunatus Siculus o sia L'Aventuroso Ciciliano. Romanzo storico scritto nel 1311*. This is a well-known work, whose most probable author was Bosone da Gubbio, a politician, a man of letters, with a passion for Dante Alighieri and his work, and a man with a quite exciting biography.¹⁷ In this novel there is a story of knight Ulivo de Fontana who, after the downfall of the Angevin rule over Sicily in 1282, went to the service of the King of Rascia, who is named Archai in this novel. This fictious tried to conquer Patras for twelve years, and finally, after the arrival of the Sicilian adventurous knight, the city of Patras fell and Ulivo heroically accomplished his mission at the Serbian court. With the king's permission he went on to serve the King of Lesser Armenia. Alongside Ulivo, King Archai also sends French and German mercenaries to the Armenian Christian ruler. Ulivo de Fontana is again at the service of the King of Rascia where he leads the king's whole army against Hungary.¹⁸ Even though there are some historical parallels that can be drawn between the contents of the novel and actual facts, this is after all a literary work and it does not prove anything regarding French and German mercenaries in the Serbian army.¹⁹

Furthermore, there is an inscription from a tombstone in Treviso that mentions an Italian knight in the service of King Milutin. The inscription reads "MCCCIII. die XXV. Martii Franciscus de Salomone fuit per excelsum principem et D. D. Orosium regem Rasiae militari cingulo decoratus. Egregius miles

¹⁶ Gregoras, *Rhomäische Geschichte*, 1973. Teil I, VII. (195).; Uzelac, *Najamničke vojske*, 2011. 16–17.

¹⁷ Bertolini, Paolo, "Bosone da Gubbio", In. *Dizionario Biografico degli Italiani*. Vol. XIII., 1971. [https://www.treccani.it/enciclopedia/bosone-da-gubbio_\(Dizionario-Biografico\)/](https://www.treccani.it/enciclopedia/bosone-da-gubbio_(Dizionario-Biografico)/) (Accessed on 18 July 2023)

¹⁸ *Fortunatus Siculus: Ossia L'Aventuroso Ciciliano Di Busone Da Gubbio. Romanzo Storico Scritto Nel M.CCC.XI*. Pubblicato di Nott, G. F., Firenze, 1832. 281–331.

¹⁹ Uzelac, *Najamničke vojske*, 2011. 17–19.; Uzelac, relying on older historiography, questions the authorship and the date of creation of the *Fortunatus Siculus*. On the other hand, Bertolini, analyzing the biography of Bosone da Gubbio believes that the novel was finished in 1311 and that da Gubbio is truly the author of this medieval romance, see n. 16.

qui vitam duxit honestam, laudatur meritò, qui iacet in tumulo. Nomine Franciscus Salomonis prole notatus, moribus et iuvenis floruit, atq; senex. Mille trecentenis uno quem terq. vigenis Annis sexta die morte decembris emit.”²⁰

He was a very prominent citizen of Treviso, whose brother was a bishop of the city between 1309 and 1322. He was without a doubt a knight in the service of King Milutin, but whether he was a real mercenary or not, it remains unknown. He was promoted to the rank of knight for his services, but whether he was a pure adventurer, a mercenary soldier, an envoy or a member of the court remains unknown.²¹ There were other Italian noblemen and knights who were serving the same Serbian ruler, like the Florentine *magnus miles Simon Rubeus* (Simone de Rosi), royal ambassador at the Curia of Pope Bonifacius VIII at the celebration of the first Jubilee in Rome, in 1300.²²

Undoubtedly, the most important and supported with most facts is the history of Catalan mercenaries in the Serbian army, but elsewhere in Serbian lands and the Balkans, as well. Of course, the data derive mostly from the Raguzan archives. It mentions Catalans already in 1301, when, on September 27, Ragusa hired at least seven crossbowmen for two months for a salary of five perpers a month. They were needed in a war against King Milutin. Their names were Bernardus de Cardona, Jacobus Fozar, Bernardus Martino, Raymundus Cardoner, Ferando, Petrus Remer, Jacobus de Villa Sira, and Guilelmus Patar.²³

²⁰ Burchelatus, Bartholomaeus, *Commentariorum memorabilium multiplicis historie Tarvisinae*. Tarvisii, 1616. 232–233.

²¹ Detailed analysis of the inscription and the origin of this Trevisan knight at Uzelac, Najamničke vojske, 2011. 19–21 is prone to the mercenary status of Francesco de Salomone, calling him an adventurer. But there are no sources that can confirm or deny his status in the service of King Milutin.

²² Uzelac, Aleksandar, “Papa Bonifacije VIII, *magnus miles* Simon Rosi i kralj Stefan Uroš II Milutin”, = *Beogradski istorijski glasnik* 5, 2014, 93–103.; There is another assumption of an Italian mercenary, a knight in the service of Maria Palaiologina, Serbian Queen and wife of King Stephen III Dečanski. He is mentioned in a will of a citizen of Cattaro, Thomas of Paul Thomas in 1329 as *domino Bernardo de Maçarani millite et seneschalcho officii domine principisse*. On his mention cf. Dinić, Miahilo, “Krstati groševi”, = *Zbornik radova Vizantološkog instituta* 1, 1952, 86–111. 104, 108.; Idem, “Španski najamnici u srpskoj službi”, = *Zbornik radova Vizantološkog instituta* 6, 1960, 15–28. 22–23.; Uzelac, Aleksandar, “Katalanski najamnici Stefana Dušana”, = *Vojnoistorijski glasnik* 1, 2019, 9–27. 13., n. 8.; All these mentions of Italian noblemen or knights in the service of the Serbian court can definitely point out that there were mercenaries too. But without any solid confirmation from the contemporary sources it is hard to distinguish them from different knights who were in other services of Serbian rulers, and even their wives.

²³ The document states: *Infrascripti balesteri accepti fuerunt ad soldum pro comune per duos menses, et debent habent habere unus quisque perperos v in mense* and then in *primus* after which the names of the crossbowmen are listed. That is why there can be doubt on their actual number. For the document see *Monumenta Ragusina. Libri reformationum*. Tom. V. a 1301–1336. Ed. Gelchich, J., Zagrabiae, 1897. 7. [hereinafter *Monumenta Ragusina*]; Dinić, Španski najamnici, 1960. 15.

Concerning the Catalans in the Balkan region, there is also a very interesting story written by Dalmatian chronicler Micha Madii de Barbezani from Split (Spalato).²⁴ In his work entitled *De gestis Romanorum imperatorum et summorum pontificatum* there is a mention of Catalan mercenaries in Venetian service who came to Zadar (Zara) in 1313 to fight against the rebelled city of Zadar and ban Mladen II Šubić. The leaders of the mercenary troops were “dominus Almasius et Bompaon de Catalonia, milites stipendiarii”; and Micha Madii de Barbezani writes that they had one thousand knights and one thousand infantrymen armed with long spears. However, the Catalan mercenaries changed their side, since the three months, for which they had been paid by Venetians, elapsed. Therefore, they decided to make truce with ban Mladen II Šubić, who, according to Micha Madius, paid them 5000 florins after the peace was concluded between Zadar and Venice. It is worth mentioning that the ban himself had *Teutones* in his army, which also testifies of German mercenaries among his troops.²⁵

The aforementioned data shows that Catalan mercenaries were far from unknown in the medieval Balkan region. As regards the Catalans who were serving Serbian kings there are valuable information in the Raguzan archives. During the April of 1330, several pledges were made in Raguza between Catalans and domestic citizens. Before the 16 April certain Petrus Borgognus constabilis pledged some of his belongings to Marin Sorokočević, whilst the next day Petrus Seminus constabilis hired a courier named Pobrat for a year. The guarantee for Seminus was Junije Lukarević, Raguzan envoy to Serbia. This indicates that at least some of the mentioned Catalans were indeed in the service of Serbian rulers, in that time Stephen Uroš III Dečanski (1322–1331). The cloth of Borgognus was pledged for 13 perpers and 3 grosses on 14 April, which definitely shows his presence in the city prior to that date. Lukarević was a guarantee for two more mercenaries, Petrus Lopes and Lodricus de Spura de Aragonia who pledged some jewelry to Marin Gradić on 20 April. Junije Lukarević here made warranties that two Aragonese men will pay 76 perpers to Gradić. Later in June 1330 two Spaniards were indebted to a Florentine man in Raguza for 2200 golden florins, but there is no indication that they were in the service of the Serbian ruler even though they were soldiers. More precisely Petrus ferantus is nobilis miles and Ferante was a son of a *comes*.

²⁴ Micha Madii (or Madius) was born to a patrician family of Split in 1284, and died in 1358. On his maternal side he was a descendant of the Serbian ruling family, the Nemanjić dynasty, and he held various high positions in Split. He wrote a chronicle *De gestis Romanorum imperatorum et summorum pontificatum*, and it is a very important source for the period 1290–1330.; Cf. Raukar, Tomislav, *Hrvatsko srednjovjekovlje*. Zagreb, 1997. 370.; Antoljak, Stjepan, *Hrvatska historiografija*. Zagreb, 2004. 20.; B. Halász, Éva, “Micha Madius de Barbazanis – a történetíró és spalatói nemes patricius”, = *Acta universitatis Szegediensis. Acta historica*. Tom. CXXXV. 2013. 59–70.

²⁵ Madii de Barbenzis, Micha, *De gestis Romanorum imperatorum et summorum pontificatum*, *Scriptores rerum Hungaricarum*. Ed. Schwandtner, G., Vindobonae, 1748. 639.

This can indicate that they were destined to the army of Stephen Dečanski, even though no other sources confirm this statement.²⁶

From August 1330, there are several very important documents on the largest group of Catalan mercenaries known from the Raguzan archives, that of Johannes Martinus. He is mentioned for the first time on the 4 August as *de Ponte de Partibus Yspanie*, who took an oath that he will pay the Florentine Checco Ventura 130 golden florins and provides as a pledge *ballas V predictorum armorum* which is already at the confluence of Bojana near Sveti Srđ. Ventura was even said to go to the court of the king of Serbia in order to get the money which the ruler undoubtedly owed to his mercenary soldiers. Four days later Johannes Martinus is designated as *conestabilis regis Servie et Maritime regionis*. In this document he has obliged his 13 comrades from his *consortium* to pay Gabriel Gledić 75 golden florins in a month. All of them are listed by their names and there are many interesting ones among them. A part from Martinus, the first one listed after him is “frater Odoricus Sancii de Uergaes ordinis S. Johannis yerosolimitani”, i.e. a knight from the Order of Saint John.²⁷ This is very peculiar, yet not that much astonishing, since, in the words of Paul Walden Bamford, a “mercenary condottiere, many of them Knights of Malta, were the “seadogs” of the Mediterranean between the fourteenth and the seventeenth centuries”. The decline of the Order and the change of the whole political situation in the Mediterranean brought many mercenaries from the Order to the historical scene.²⁸ Lest be forgotten that contemporaries of these mercenaries were Fra Moriale and Giovanni Moriale d’Albarno, who was a member of Order of Saint John, and besides that one of the best-known mercenary commanders of the second half of the 1340s and the first half of the 1350s until the death of Fra Moriale in 1354.²⁹ Therefore, this *lone knight* in the service of the king of Serbia is not so strange in the context of the Mediterranean history of the fourteenth century, and he could have come from Aragon, or somewhere else in the Levant and the Mediterranean. Unfortunately, no other available documents mention him. On the other hand, for Serbian medieval history, which seriously lacks contemporary sources, even this sole mention is very interesting and valuable.

²⁶ Dinić, *Španski najamnici*, 1960. 16–17.; cf. also *idem*, 25–26. for a transcription of the original Raguzan documents concerning the events from April and June. Interestingly the indenting of the two Spaniards is the longest document. Nevertheless, from the content of the document one can conclude that Petrus Ferantus, son of late Bertusoni de Liginano de Yspania and Ferante, who was the son of late Gomsalani comitis de Valle Viride de Yspania, were two businessmen.

²⁷ Dinić, *Španski najamnici*, 1960. 17, 26.; Quite interestingly, Mihailo Dinić never discusses this unique mention of a knight from a military order in the service of Serbian king Stephen Dečanski.

²⁸ Bamford, Paul Walden, “The Knights of Malta and the King of France, 1665–1700”, = *French Historical Studies* 3:4, Autumn, 1964, 429–453. 446.

²⁹ Vittozzi, Elvira, *Moriale, Giovanni, detto fra Moriale*. Dizionario Biografico degli Italiani. Vol. LXXVI., 2012. [https://www.treccani.it/enciclopedia/moriale-giovanni-detto-fra-moriale_\(Dizionario-Biografico\)](https://www.treccani.it/enciclopedia/moriale-giovanni-detto-fra-moriale_(Dizionario-Biografico)) (Accessed on 9 January 2023)

The other knights listed in this document, besides Johannes Martinus and the knight Hospitaller, were:

„Prosimene de Villa Alba de Ragona, Martinus Lupus de Coa, Garcia Gulteri de Tholedo parcium Yspanie, Rodoricus de Casseda de Navara, Ferandus Laenus de Ragona, Ferandus Alfolnso de Quintana, Botetus de cathelogna, Egidius de Lasano, Bartholomeus de Partales, Symenlopes de Ragona, Allemanus de Frasineto, Michael Navarus et totum consortium supradictorum nostrum.”³⁰

On 4 August Martinus promises to pay Ventura 15 golden florins in 20 days, and on the 15th of the same month two of his men, Prosimene de Villa Alba and Ferantus Layn (Ferandus Laenus) commit themselves to pay 5 and a half florins to *Luca marangon* and *Alegrettp marinario* in a month or even earlier “si ante pecunia nostra de rege Rasie Ragusium delata fuerit...”³¹

During the whole summer period in Raguza both *Consilium minus* and *Consilium rogatorum* had passed numerous decisions concerning the security in the city. The Raguzans strengthened the guards, appointed more captains and decided to enlarge the a city militia that took care of the city walls and the overall security of the citizens. Obviously, they were very much worried because of the presence of a large number of armed men in the city. That is why it is explicitly said that there are “magnam quantitatem forasteriorum, qui sunt in Ragusio et continuo veniunt”.³² As a consequence of this vast arrival of foreign mercenaries to Raguza, the Rector of the city ordered on 23 September “quod nullus Raguseus audeat super suo ligno conducere Ragusium vel in suo districto aliquem stipendiarium, qui recesserit a stipendio domini regis Urossi, vel qui vadat ad suum stipendium”. This strongly testifies that the mercenaries were both coming in and out of the Raguzan Republic on their way to and from Serbia where they served King Stephen Dečanski.³³

Prosimene de Villa Alba is mentioned even on 18 October when he promised to three women, namely Predraga, Milica and Mirna to pay them 58 perpers in a month, with of course a remark that the money can be paid earlier, if it arrives from the king of Serbia to either him or to one of his colleagues (consociis meis aliqua pecunia de Sclavonia deferetur). These women were preparing bread, i.e. supplied the mercenaries with food. Dalmaus de Cruce promised to the two Anconitans in the same period that he will reimburse them with 166 perpers and 8 grosses or even more, if necessary, for supporting his 15

³⁰ Dinić, Španski najamnici, 1960. 26. for the transcription of the integral document.

³¹ Dinić, Španski najamnici, 1960. 26–27. for the transcription of the integral document.

³² For the legal decisions cf. *Monumenta Ragusina. Libri reformationum*. Tom. II. a 1347–1352. 1356–1360. Additamentum a. 1301–1305, 1318. 1325–1336, Zagrabiae, 1882. 328.; *Monumenta Ragusina*, Tom V., 291, 295.; see brief summary at Dinić, Španski najamnici, 1960. 18.

³³ *Monumenta Ragusina*, Tom II., 329.

horses and servants who tended the animals.³⁴ The financial situation of the mercenaries in Ragusa is vividly depicted by another document concerning debts of the Spanish soldiers. There is a document dated 28 October, issued in Ragusa, in which one can read that Gabriel Gledić appeared with a charter from 8 August where Joahannes Martinus, frater Odoricus Sancii de Verganes “ordinis hospitalis S. Johanni Jerosolimitani cum quibusdam aliis eorum sociis” promised to return him 75 golden florins. He was apparently disappointed that he did not receive his money for almost three months and he stated that the said document “vult mictere extra civitatem”, but it is not clear where to, whether to Serbia or somewhere else. It seems that Gledić, as well as Lukarević were both included in the recruitment of mercenaries for the king of Serbia. Maybe the missions of Lukarević or the mention of sending the document about indebted by Gledić were aimed at receiving the money King Stephen Dečanski owed to both the Raguzan recruiters and the soldiers. With other documents, this one also proves that the money did not arrive from Serbia, and that Spanish mercenaries residing temporarily in Ragusa faced many problems and difficulties.³⁵

There is also a group of Spaniards in the Republic of Ragusa on 15 July 1331 when a document is issued in which only the Spanish are included. An uncle of Prosimene de Villa Alba named Petrus Sancis de Rues stated that he owes some money to Dalmao de Cruce. Witnesses present when this charter has been written were also, according to their names, of Spanish origin. The result of this internal affair remains unknown, as well as with the other issues of the Spanish mercenary community in Ragusa in 1330 and 1331.³⁶

The logical question that arises is where were these mercenaries deployed to? The cited sources mention constables; Johannes Martinus is explicitly stated as one in the service of the King. There is also one *comes* and nobilis miles, therefore all possible officers of the mercenary troops. There are recruiters too, but the destiny of the soldiers and their true number is completely unknown. In fact, only one group is mentioned in April and June in Ragusa that was part of a large-scale operation led by the king of Serbia, and that can only be the war with Bulgaria. The largest group, led by Martinus, was in Ragusa at the time and awaiting money from the Serbian ruler, who was, at the time, celebrating his victory over the Bulgarians. The other contemporary sources, particularly two Byzantine historians, Nikephoros Gregoras and John Kantakuzenos, mention mercenaries in the Serbian army in the great battle of Velbužd on 28 July 1330 where the Serbian army led by King Stephen Dečanski and his son, the young King Stephen Dušan, completely defeated the Bulgarian troops and even emperor Michael Šišman died on

³⁴ Dinić, *Španski najamnici*, 1960. 26–27. for documents from the series *Aptagi* and *Diversa cancellarie*.

³⁵ Dinić, *Španski najamnici*, 1960. 19–20, 27.

³⁶ Dinić, *Španski najamnici*, 1960. 18, 27–28.

the battlefield.³⁷ Nevertheless, the Spaniards, led by well-armed constable Johannes Martinus, were not there.³⁸

So, who were the mercenaries in the troops of King Stephen Uroš III Dečanski during the battle of Velbužd? Gregoras states that those foreign soldiers in the army of the king of Serbia are Celts (Κέλτοι) and that there was 1000 of them in the decisive battle of Velbužd.³⁹ In Byzantine sources, and in the eyes of the Byzantines the *Celts* was a name used to label different Western people, including Germans, Italians, Normans, Franks, and also Spaniards.⁴⁰ The term was applied even in the *Chronographia* of Michael Psellus to mark the people living on the West whose treasures and belongings were collected by emperor Basil II—ἀποτεθησαύριστο εἰς Κελτοὺς. In this particular place Psellus could have referred to Italy and to the population living in this region, since Basil II did lead campaigns in Italy to restore Byzantine power there.⁴¹ He is just one example, there are of course more, like for instance Anna Komnena, who interchanges the terms Franks, Normans and Celts for Western people in general, and uses the terms *Celts* and *Celtic* for Franks, Normans and Latins.⁴²

Kantakuzenos, on the other hand, uses the term *Allemani* for 300 armed mercenaries in the troops of the King of Tribals, as he names the Serbs in the well-known archaic manner of the Byzantine writers.⁴³ Already Fatouros and Krischer, who translated and edited the critical edition of the *History* of emperor-writer John VI Kantakuzenos marked that *Allemani* are in fact Catalans.⁴⁴

³⁷ Gregoras, Nikephoros, *Rhomäische Geschichte. Historia Rhomäike*. Teil II.: Kapitel VIII—XI. 2. Halbband, Ed. Dieten, J-L. van, Stuttgart, 1979. IX, 12.3 (237) comments on 327.; Kantakuzenos, Johannes, *Geschichte*. Teil II., Buch II., Eds. Fatouros, G. – Krischer, T., Stuttgart, 1986. II, 21 (76–79).

³⁸ Dinić, Španski najamnici, 1960. 19–20.

³⁹ Gregoras, *Rhomäische Geschichte*, 1979. Teil II., IX, 12.3.

⁴⁰ See interesting analysis by Chapman, Malcolm, *The Celts. The Construction of a Myth*. New York, 1992. 53–57.

⁴¹ *Michaelis Pselli Chronographia*. Band I.: Einleitung und Text. (Millennium Studies, 51.). Ed. Reinsch, von D. R., Berlin–New York, 2014. I. 31, 8.; cf. also 437 for Riensch's commentary that the term *Celts* is generally assigned to Western populations. For the Western frontier during the Empire of Basil II see Martin, Jean-Marie, "Une frontière artificielle: la Capitanate italienne", In. *Acts of the 14th International Congress of Byzantine studies. Bucharest 1971*. Vol. II., Bucharest, 1974. 379–385.; Idem, "Les Problèmes de la frontière en Italie méridionale (VIe–XIIe siècles): L'Approche historique", In. Poisson, Jean-Marie (dir.), *Castrum 4: Frontière et peuplement dans le monde méditerranéen au Moyen Âge*. Rome–Madrid, 1992. 259–276.; Falkenhausen, Vera von, "Between Two Empires: Byzantine Italy in the Reign of Basil II", In. Magdalino, P. (ed.), *Byzantium in the Year 1000*. Leiden, 2002. 135–159.; Holmes, Catherine, *Basil II and the governance of an Empire*. Oxford, 2005. 429–447.

⁴² Komnene, Anna, *Alexias*. Ed. Reinsch, D. R., Berlin–New York, 2001. I, IV, 4, I, V, 3, XII, IX, 2. (where she uses the term *Celtiberians* for Spaniards directly) and passim. See also 586 for Reinsch's remark on the term.

⁴³ Kantakuzenos, *Geschichte*, 1986. Teil II., II, 21 (78).

⁴⁴ Kantakuzenos, *Geschichte*, 1986. Teil II., II, 21 (78), 201–202.

This can be just merely a sign that the ex-Byzantine emperor was under the influence of the contemporary events of his rule, since his once ally and later enemy, the Emperor of Serbia Stephen Dušan had German mercenaries in his service or maybe he mixed Germans and Catalans who were both in Dušan's service, which will be discussed more later.

The question of the origin of the mercenaries that took part in the battle of Velbužd, therefore, remains open. Mavro Orbin in his work *Il Regno degli Slavi* published in 1601, which represents one of the most important sources for medieval Serbian history, states that there were 1300 Germans in the king's troops, whom Gregoras calls *French*. These mercenaries came from Italy, and they served many rulers. Orbin could also be on the same track as John Kantakuzenos, mislabelling Germans from the later service of Emperor Stephen Dušan, even though there are no later mentions of them at all in his work.⁴⁵ Raguzan politician, polyhistor and historian Junije Rastić wrote, leaning on Mavro Orbin that in the troops of Stephen Dečanski "ebbe certa soldatesca italiana".⁴⁶

Without any more solid evidence from the source material it is extremely difficult to establish whether those mercenaries were really Catalans. The fact that the documents from Raguzza do mention Spanish soldiers in the service of the king of Serbia, Stephen Dečanski are the only clear visible connections between the Velbužd battle and the mercenaries in the Serbian army. That is why Mihailo Dinić carefully accepted that the mercenaries in the Serbian army were really professional soldiers from the Iberian Peninsula.⁴⁷

Nevertheless, this did not end the service of Catalan mercenaries in Serbia. There are several interesting data provided by Kanzakuzenos on Catalans in the service of King and Emperor Stephen Dušan. In his *History*, the ex-Byzantine Emperor writes that in 1342, when he arrived at the court of King Stephen Dušan, and sought assistance and alliance in Serbia, he received as a help German and also Latin mercenaries who were at the Queen's service. These mercenaries helped Kantakuzenos to conquer the city of Berrhoia.⁴⁸ Even though there

⁴⁵ Orbin, Mavro, *Kraljevstvo Slovena*. Eds. Ćirković, S. – Pantić, M. – Samardžić, R. – Barišić, F., Beograd, 2006. 30. on the mercenary troops and the battle itself. For the rule of Stephen Dušan see 30–43.

⁴⁶ *Chronica Ragusina Iunii Restii, ab origine urbis usque od annum 1451 item Joannis Gundulae (1451–1484)*. Digessit Nodilo, Speratus, Zagreb, 1893. 120. on this source see Fejic, Nenad, "La Chronique Ragusaine de Junije Rastić et la politique de Venise dans la mémoire collective de Dubrovnik", In: Coulon, D. et al. (eds.), *Chemins d'outre-mer : Études d'histoire sur la Méditerranée médiévale offertes à Michel Balard*. Paris, 2004. 293–310.

⁴⁷ Dinić, Španski najamnici, 1960. 23.; This position is accepted by Bosch, Ursula Victoria, *Kaiser Andronikos III. Palaiologos. Versuch einer Darstellung der byzantinischen Geschichte in den Jahren 1321–1341*. Amsterdam, 1965. 74, n. 3.

⁴⁸ Kantakuzenos, Johannes, *Geschichte*. Teil III., Buch III., Eds. Fatouros, G. – Krischer, T., Stuttgart, 2011. III, 58 (230), 458. where editors consider German soldiers mentioned by Kantakuzenos to actually be Catalans. On the other side, they translated Latins wrongly as Italians, since in the text of Kantakuzenos they were directly named

were Germans in the service of Stephen Dušan, which is a well-known fact that will be discussed later, the mention of Latins, most probably Catalans is very important. There is another direct testimony of Kantakuzenos that a prominent Catalan mercenary commander Ioan Peralta had served him since the time he was, because of the war, in Serbia.⁴⁹ When connecting the two events, one from 1342 where Kantakuzenos sought military help from Dušan, and this later note from 1354 by John VI Kantakuzenos himself, it is most likely that Ioan Peralta was a mercenary leader who, prior to 1342, was in Serbian service, whilst after that he became a military commander in John VI's army. Peralta was a descendant of a noble family, and he most probably came to Serbia from Sicily. Peralta and his men were very loyal to Kantakuzenos, and this Catalan soldier was more than just a simple warrior. In 1346 he helped the reconstruction of the Hagia Sophia after a horrible earthquake in Constantinople. He was also present as "magno drogario uigilie domino Johanne de Peralta" when a treaty was signed between Genoa and Byzantium in 1352. This document is preserved only in Latin. Two years later, when Kantakuzenos had to abdicate, Peralta and his mercenaries remained with their lord, but his further fate remains unknown. What also remains completely unsolved is the question of the Catalan contingent in the service of Queen Helen. These mercenaries were most certainly her own guards who served at the royal court.⁵⁰

As already stated, John Kantakuzenos in his *History* explicitly mentions Germans in the army of King and Emperor Stephen Dušan. Among the military reforms introduced by this Serbian ruler, the mercenary army was the most interesting one at this point. These phenomena were present during the rule of his grandfather Milutin and father Stephen Dečanski, and it was at its peak during Stephen Dušan's rule. German mercenaries formed the core of this army, and the commander of this imperial guard was Palman of Lettinberg from Styria, from a small settlement of Litmerk in present day Slovenia. Palman and his men quite early came to the service of Stephen Dušan.⁵¹ They were first mentioned for indebtedness in Ragusa in 1333, and once again in 1335. In 1333 Palman is already named "stipendiarius domini regis Raxiae", who received the military equipment of some unnamed mercenary in order to hand it over to the King's personal physician. Besides him, who was from Lettinberg, some of his fellow soldiers men-

Λατινους. See *Joannis Cantacuzeni eximperatoris Historiarum libri IV*. Ed. Schopen, L., Vol. II., Bonnae, 1831. 354.

⁴⁹ *Joannis Cantacuzeni eximperatoris Historiarum libri IV*. Ed. Schopen, L., Vol. III., Bonnae, 1832. 301–302.

⁵⁰ Uzelac, *Katalanski najamnici*, 2019. 17–20.

⁵¹ In the meantime, by the end of 2023 and when the last corrections for this paper were made, the most comprehensive study on Palman of Lettinberg and his troops was published. see Uzelac, Aleksandar, "Palman of Letinberch and his Teutonic company" = *Istorijski časopis* 72, 2023, 145–171.

tioned in Raguzan archival sources were Dietrich from Vienna, Raf from Steier, Krafting from Waltinberg and Friedrich von Oltenburg.⁵²

In 1336 negotiations were held between the Nemanjić and Habsburg houses, and King Stephen Dušan was to marry Elisabeth, daughter of German King Friedrich the Fair and Isabelle of Aragon. In those times the relations between Stephen Dušan and his wife Helen deteriorated, she did not give her husband a male heir, and the Serbian ruler searched for a new possible bride. Diplomatic envoys were sent to Serbia, and it seems that the head of it was Prince Meinhard II from the Ortemberg family. The course of the negotiations are unknown, but Johann of Viktring, chronicler and political advisor to Duke Henry of Carinthia, wrote that Elisabeth refused to marry a schismatic king. More important from all this is that in these negotiations Palman miles Teutonicus, was also present.⁵³ During the very same year, the said Serbian ruler hired 300 foot soldiers – III centos pedites – for his bodyguard unit and the Venetian senate granted them “ad petitionem domini regis raxie” on December 6 a free passage through the Republic’s territory on their way to Serbia.⁵⁴

Palman was not only a mercenary, but a businessman as well. Sources from the Raguzan archives note that Palman on September 7, 1337, borrowed 1944 perpers from three Raguzan noblemen. Alongside Palman, there were three more men from Austria. They invested money in the trade of agricultural products, nevertheless, they did not respect the stipulations of a the contract, and their creditor, gave the right for debt collection to a citizen of Kotor, Nikola Buća. Palman mostly traded with grain, and in a contract signed on September 1, 1337, with Savin Bunić, procurator of Demetrius Menčetić, all grain should have been sold to Bunić for a price of 12 perpers per measure. The price also included the expenses of transport to Raguz.⁵⁵

Palman remained in Raguz even after the death of Emperor Stephen Dušan. The commander of the German mercenary troops is mentioned in the will of Menče Menčetić, son of Peter, who left some money to Palman—“Ancora faco di Palman, soldato che fo in Slavonia”. Palman’s nephew George was an

⁵² Dinić, Mihailo, “O vitezu Palmanu”, = *Zgodovinski časopis* 6–7, 1952–1953, 398–401.; Uzelac, Foreign soldiers, 2015. 79.

⁵³ *Johannis abbatis Victoriensis Liber certarum historiarum*. Ed. Schneider, F., Hahn, 1909. Tom. II., lib. IV–VI., 172–173, 202–203.; Ferjančić, Božidar – Ćirković, Sima, *Stefan Dušan–kralj i car (1331–1355)*. Beograd, 2006. 66–67.; Ječmenica, Dejan, “O srpsko-nemačkim vezama u srednjem veku”, In. Petrović, V. – Išić, M. (eds.), *Veliki prasak: sto godina od atentata u Sarajevu: zbornik radova sa naučnog skupa održanog 28. juna 2014. u Centru za kulturu u Požarevcu*. Požarevac, 2015. 59–60, 65.; in the meantime, in 1336 or 1337 Helen and Dušan got their son and heir to the throne Uroš, later Emperor Uroš V and their marriage crisis passed.

⁵⁴ Ljubić, Šime, *Listine o odnošajih između južnoga Slavenstva i Mletačke republike*. Vol. II., Zagreb, 1870. 11.

⁵⁵ Dinić-Knežević, Dušanka, “Nemci u srednjovekovnom Dubrovniku”, = *Anali Zavoda za povijesne znanosti JAZU u Dubrovniku* 18, 1980, 91–105. 92.

active soldier, but he is also found in indebted documents in Raguza. George borrowed five ducats on December 30, 1343, and for the debt he pledged his sword, armor, helmet and two sheets. His possessions were to be returned as soon as he pays his debt back to Toloje from Hvar, a citizen of Raguza.⁵⁶ In 1336 Palman's brother Kiaran is present alongside him in the embassy to Raguza which was to collect the annual tax paid by the Raguzans to the Serbian rulers on the occasion of the day of Saint Demetrius.⁵⁷

Another German contingent of mercenaries is mentioned by John Kantakuzenos. When he recuperated the city of Berrhoia in 1350, a group of German mercenaries defended the city.⁵⁸ This could have been another, separate corps of Germans who were in the Serbian army, or maybe they were even those Germans who were sent in 1342 to help Kantakuzenos, but, since in the meantime his relation with Emperor Stephen Dušan came to an abrupt end, they could have remained loyal to the Serbian ruler and resisted the attack of John VI.

The next mention of Palman and his German mercenaries is the only preserved information on the life of the mercenary soldiers in medieval Serbia. It is an embassy in 1354 led by Carmelite monk Peter Thomas, and written down by Philippe Mezières, his biographer and the chancellor of Cyprus. In 1354 Pope Innocent VI sent letters with these envoys to the most prominent members of the Serbian nobility, and one of them was addressed to Palman—"dilecto filio nobili viro Palmanno Theotonico, capitaneo gentis armigere, ad stipendia carissimi in Christo filii nostri Stephani regis Rassie illustris militantis".⁵⁹ In 1355 the embassy led by Peter Thomas arrived at the Serbian court where they have seen many German noblemen, and other mercenaries. Three hundred of them were Germans, led by a man whose name was Mezières forgotten when he wrote the *Vita* of Peter Thomas, but who was a loyal son of the Catholic church. Peter Thomas then held a mass for Roman Catholics at the court, and "trecentos milites et scutiferos theotonicos" attended this mass. After the mass, Emperor Stephen Dušan spoke to the captain and his men and threatened to punish them, because they went to this service, but allegedly, according to Mezières, Palman answered to the emperor that they owed him military service, but they owed their fate to God, and they rather submit to Him (God) than to man.⁶⁰ They were eventually not punished.

The last known action performed by Palman and his knights is from November 1355. They were sent to Clissa in Dalmatia in order to support Stephen Dušan's sister Helen, widow of the Dalmatian ban Mladen III Šubić,

⁵⁶ Dinić-Knežević, Nemci, 1980. 92–93.

⁵⁷ Ječmenica, O srpsko-nemačkim vezama, 2015. 66.

⁵⁸ *Joannis Cantacuzeni eximperatoris Historiarum*, IV.124–126.

⁵⁹ Schäfer, Karl Heinrich, *Deutsche Ritter und Edelknechte in Italien während des 14. Jahrhunderts*, Vols I–II. Paderborn, 1911. 157–158.

⁶⁰ Mézières, Philippe de, *Vita sancti Petri Thomae*. Ed. Smet, J., Roma, 1954. 65–70.

who tried to protect this fortress from the King of Hungary, Louis of Anjou. Palman and his men (only a certain Saxon named Oprack is mentioned by name) stood against the siege of the Hungarian army for a few months, but they were forced to surrender Clissa.⁶¹ After these events Palman seems to have never returned to Serbia. He is mentioned in Raguza in the spring of 1363.⁶²

The last data on mercenary troops in the service of Stephen Dušan there is a brief mention by Mauro Orbin. He wrote that Dušan held in his service some Ottomans, which he stationed around the city of Danj near Scutari.⁶³ They are not testified by any other source, therefore their role and position remains unknown and we only learn of their presence from this short sentence by Orbin. They definitely could have been mercenaries, but their further fate lacks any information.

For other Serbian medieval territories there is some mention on mercenaries in Raguza. After 1358, when the city became independent under the formal supreme rule of the king of Hungary, Raguzans started to hire mercenaries. Most of them were of Hungarian or Slavic (Croatian) origin, but there were Germans, too. This practice continued until the end of the medieval period, and according to the names of the mercenaries (known as *barabantes*) the vast majority of them bore Slavic, especially Croatian names and surnames (in the archives there are many designated as *Chervat*, *Chruatt*, etc.), but sporadically

⁶¹ Venetian representatives sent a letter on December 12, 1355, regarding the situation with Clissa and Scradino: "Rocha autem castris Clissii, prout vobis aliter scripsimus, tenetur per dominum Palmanum nomine domini imperatoris Raxie, suburgium autem cum porta superiore et cum saxo, quod vocatur Oprack, tenet dominus banus nomine regis Hungarie. Aliqui ex istis partibus allocuti fuerunt nobiscum asserentes, quod si vellemus aliquam pecunie quantitatem concedere domino Nicolao bano predicto, quod ipse dimitteret dicto domino Palmano totum, quod tenet de Clisscio, ut ipse Palmanus primitus tenebat, et ipse banus reverteretur ad suas partes, quas tenet pro domino rege."; Ljubić, Šime, *Listine o odnošajih između južnoga Slavenstva i Mletačke republike*. Vol. III., Zagreb, 1872. 288–289.; There is also a letter of the prince of Trogir on the situation in the besieged city, sent three days later, on December 15: "Hodie est tertia dies duo exiverunt de castro Clipsisii, et venerunt ad nos, narantes nobis ex parte domini Palmani et Mersote, sicut vobis domino Mafeo et domino Dominico socio vestro miserat, videlicet de dando castrum dominacioni nostre, etiam quod per denarios exercitus removerent, ut etiam nobis disistis, que de prescriptis scripsimus domino Dominico socio vestro, et haberemus, quod esset bonum, si posset acurere. Petierunt etiam a nobis aliquas res sibi magis necessarias, silicet oleum, sardellas, vungneta, sulsum et alia lenia, et ipsis dedimus quantum potuerunt portare et heri proto receserunt; speramus, quod intraverint hac nocte ellapssa; per quos etiam scripsimus dicto domino Palmano et Mersote, ut nobis vissum convenire, in ortamine ipsorum et suorum, oferentes ipsis totum illud, quod poteramus, ad libitum sue voluntatis."; *Ibib.* 292., see also Uzelac, *Foreign soldiers*, 2015. 80.

⁶² Ječmenica, *O srpsko-nemačkim vezama*, 2015. 66.

⁶³ Orbin, *Kraljevstvo Slovena*, 2006. 35.

there are also German and even Russian names.⁶⁴ Nothing can be said to full certainty whether there are any connections whatsoever between these Germans in the service of the Raguzan Republic and those from the Serbian court. One can maybe even think that a part of them changed their lord after the death of Stephen Dušan, but this can only be a guess. In 1403 a certain Serbian mercenary Grubač Dapčić stepped into Raguzan military service. During the War of Konavli between 1430 and 1433, Raguza also hired mercenaries from the hinterland, and from Zeta and Serbia, too, especially from Luštica (100 soldiers) and Neretva (30 archers). These Serbs were to fight against the Serbian and Bosnian troops. Raguza in this period also hired soldiers from Poljice and Apulia. There were 300 from the latter, one third of them were crossbowmen, one third were soldiers with long spears and one third with large shields.⁶⁵

After the downfall of the Nemanjić state, during the Serbian Despotate, particularly in the age of despots Stephen Lazarević and George Branković, there were sporadic mentions of mercenaries in the Serbian army. During the rule of the former, there were Hungarian, Italian and even Ottoman mercenaries. An Ottoman named Shahin even had the title of voivode, and was already in the service of Stephen's mother, Princess Milica (later known as nun Eugenia) in 1399. After 1406, Shahin served at the court of despot Stephen and he was one of despot's chief military commanders in the war with Ottoman prince Musa in 1413. Shahin is mentioned as a witness in peace treaty with Venice in 1423, and with his old title *kefalija* he is most probably mentioned in an undated document from the monastery of Prohor Pčinjski. Besides Shahin, sources document the presence of Aliyaz-bey, also witness in the peace treaty with Venice, and in 1441 in the service of George Branković stood Ibrahim. He even sued his servant Radič in Dubrovnik, who, allegedly, stole onions from Ibrahim. Ottomans were in the 12 000 strong army of duke Altoman, who led these mixed Serbian-Ottoman troops in 1452 against the Venetians in the maritime region of Zeta. During these many wars in Zeta in the age of despots, Hungarian mercenaries were also present. A thousand of them were sent by despot George, alongside 4000 horsemen in 1448–1449 and they plundered the region of Bar/Antivari and Cattaro.⁶⁶

⁶⁴ Macan, Trpimir, "Dubrovački barabanti u XVI stoljeću", = *Anali Zavoda za povijesne znanosti JAZU u Dubrovniku* 8–9, 1962, 301–323. 303–304.; Dinić-Knežević, Nemci, 1980. 93.

⁶⁵ Veselinović, Andrija, *Država srpskih despota*. Beograd, 2006. 181, 187–188.

⁶⁶ Veselinović, Država, 2006. 184–185.; Constantine the Philosopher, biographer of despot Stephen Lazarević, when describing the death of the Serbian ruler wrote that *Hungarian knights, his servants*, were desperate when they knew of their lord's death. Konstantin Filosof, *Život Stefana Lazarevića, despota srpskoga*. Ed. Jovanović, G., Beograd, 2009. 96.; Veselinović, Država, 2006. 185. thought that this was clear evidence that these Hungarians were mercenaries in the despot's service. This is possible, even though the words of the despot's biographer do not support this strongly enough, since there were many Hungarian *familiares* or *fideles* and other noblemen in the service of despot Stephen Lazarević. Therefore, this question may stay open. See Šarkić, Sđan,

The salary and formation, as well as the number of the mercenary troops is hard to determine. When Grubač Dapčić stepped into the military service of the Raguzan Republic it was strictly stipulated that he is obliged to bring 50 good soldiers, and the salary for each soldier was five perpers. A fifth of the booty was to be given to the Republic, and everything else was to be kept by the mercenaries. Raguzans were obliged to help the mercenaries repair their broken weaponry, as well as provide a physician and necessary medication for them, and also Ragusa was obliged to try to exchange the captured mercenaries for an enemy war prisoner.⁶⁷ This could have also been the model for earlier periods too, and the scarce source material can only provide guesses on their life in Serbia. Undoubtedly, there were people who were to hire mercenaries, whose salary remains unknown, but it was a quite big burden for the state treasury. Indirect testimonies from the age of King Milutin indicate that the money collected from annual taxes in Ragusa was used for the salary of the mercenaries. As it was already stated, during King Milutin there are data on the largest numbers of mercenaries, more than 3000 of different origin. Only the reforms of Stephen Dušan show a change in the status of mercenary soldiers. The Code of Stephen Dušan in article 173 promulgates that any noblemen who brings a thief to the court of the Emperor, the master of that thief would be punished in the same manner as the thief. Among the noblemen mentioned, this article clearly says *be it a Greek, German, or Serb*. German mercenaries have formed a standing army, alongside the domestic nobility trained for military service. The Code of Dušan names them those “who always stand in the emperor’s house”. They were an integral part of the all-encompassing military reforms of Stephen Dušan, who ordered large shipments of weapons from Venice, but also modernised his army in accordance with Western standards. While King Milutin used mercenaries to combat internal, domestic problems, help his relatives and strengthen his rule, his son defended Serbia with mercenaries, and Stephen Dušan with his army became the most powerful Balkan ruler.⁶⁸

“Pravni položaj stranaca u srednjovekovnoj Srbiji”, = *Zbornik radova Pravnog fakulteta u Novom Sadu* 3, 2011, 53–68. 66.

⁶⁷ Veselinović, *Država*, 2006. 187.

⁶⁸ Radojčić, Nikola, *Zakonik cara Stefana Dušana 1349. i 1354*. Beograd, 1960. 77–79.; Šarkić, *Pravni položaj*, 2011. 54.; Uzelac, *Foreign soldiers*, 2015. 80–83.; Except for Germans and their mention in the Code of Stephen Dušan, there are no other data on the legal position of mercenaries in medieval Serbia, see Šarkić, *Pravni položaj*, 2011. 66.

Ágnes Virágh*

MERCENARY UPRISINGS (1349, 1350) IN APULIA DURING THE DYNASTIC WAR OF THE ANGEVINS

In the context of the dynastic war occurring between the Neapolitan and Hungarian branches of the Angevin¹ family of Capetian origin, one of the chroniclers, namely Domenico da Gravina, characterised the mercenaries who launched an assault upon Apulia, a province of the Kingdom of Naples, in the following manner:

“(…) first they tortured Rogerone, the Count of Tricarico, and then they threw him to the ground, deprived him of his clothes, as if they were walking on a very large plank, they trampled his stomach, and after that they unmercifully beat his flesh with a burning torch so much so that his entire body bled from head to.”²

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¹ First of all, it is necessary to provide a brief definition of the terminological scope encompassed by ‘Angevins’, as its presence in Anglo-Saxon literature poses several challenges. Anglo-Saxon scholars primarily employ the term ‘Angevins’ to denote the Plantagenet rulers, specifically referring to King Henry II and his descendants during the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. This usage can lead to misconceptions, given that ‘Angevins’ is also applied to the ‘Capetian Angevins’, namely to Charles of Anjou, the brother of King Louis IX of France, and his progeny. Within this study, the term ‘Angevins’ denotes the Anjou dynasty stemming from Charles of Anjou, who ruled from 1266 in Naples, thus referred to as the Neapolitan Angevins. Furthermore, a Hungarian branch (Hungarian Angevins) also emerged within the dynasty, producing rulers from 1301 to 1387. For the intricate web of dynastic connections, refer to the works of the excellent French paleographer Émile G. Léonard, such as *Histoire de Jeanne 1^{re}, reine de Naples, comtesse de Provence (1343–1382)*, Vols I–III. Monaco–Paris, 1932–1934, and *Gli Angioini di Napoli*, trans. Liguori, Renato, Milan, 1967.; Additionally see: Zacour, Norman P., “Talleyrand. The Cardinal of Périgord (1301–1364)”, = *Transactions of the American Philosophical Society* 50:7, 1960, 1–83. provides insights into dynastic relationships. The matrimonial connections of the second ruler of the Neapolitan Angevin dynasty, Charles II’s offspring are addressed in Stephen Rhys Davies’ unpublished doctoral dissertation: *Marriage and the Politics of Friendship: The Family of Charles II of Anjou, King of Naples (1285–1309)*. London, 1998.

² da Gravina, Domenico, *Chronicon de rebus in Apulia gestis*, a cura di Sorbelli, Albano. Città di Castello, 1903–1909, 133. [hereinafter CRAG]: (….) “Rogeronum comitem Tricarici primum torturae dederunt, et eum prosternentes in terram, quasi super trabem maximam ambulantes, nudatis vestibus, ventrem suum calcibus opprimebant, et deinde urentibus viminibus ligneis carnem suam sine misericordia verberabant, et adeo quod totum corpus suum a planta pedis usque ad verticem sanguinem emanabat.” All translations are the author’s unless otherwise indicated.

In this passage the tortured captive, Rogerone, more precisely Ruggero da Sanseverino, one of a deeply honoured nobleman in the Neapolitan Kingdom,³ was taken into captivity in 1349 by the Hungarians and their German (*Theutonici*) mercenary allies, and, in the words of one of the most fearful mercenary leaders, Werner von Urslingen,⁴ the mercenaries intended to extract “a nice little ransom” from the captured nobles through beatings with branches.⁵ The mercenaries achieved their objectives: Ruggero, in a semi-conscious state, was no longer able to endure the torments (*tormenta*) and began to shout that he would give up all his possessions.⁶

The mercenaries, therefore, could have been ruthless, as the chronicler reports that they eagerly led captives to torture.⁷ On the other hand, prior to the torture, a profound restlessness permeated among the mercenaries, culminating in a rebellion. This rebellion had an intermediate episode involving the torment of captives and the collection of ransoms. In this juncture, it is advisable to allude to one of John France’s assertions, wherein he articulates that mercenaries have never possessed a commendable reputation.⁸ It is necessary to add that the members of communities who fell victim to violence perpetrated particularly by mercenaries constitute the oral sources for chroniclers, as these individuals come into direct experiential contact with mercenary groups. While the aforementioned actors can significantly contribute to the formation of a negative perception, they are not the sole contributors shaping the depiction of these warriors. Chroniclers can also seek out and incorporate descriptions from credible sources (*auctoritas*) into their texts, which portray mercenaries as warriors posing a threat to urban populations.

³ Pollastri, Sylvie, “Une famille de l’aristocratie napolitaine sous les souverains angevins. Les Sanseverino (1270–1420)”, = *Mélanges de l’École française de Rome. Moyen Âge* 103:1, 1991, 237–260.

⁴ Gárdonyi, Albert, “A középkori zsoldosintézmény és a magyarság [The Medieval Mercenary Institution and Magyars]”, = *Hadtörténelmi Közlemények* 43:1, 1942, 129–143. esp. 131–133.; Mallett, Michael, *Mercenaries and their Masters. Warfare in Renaissance Italy*. Totowa, NJ, 1974. 31–33.; Vaglianti, Francesca Maria, “Werner von Urslingen”, In. *Lexikon des Mittelalters*, Vol. IX., Stuttgart–Weimar, 1999. 4–5.; A note on the usage of personal names in the study: I consistently adhered to the preservation of original names, providing the given name in its Latin linguistic form for Hungarian names, which exhibit variations in structure and form from Western European standards. The sole exception to this practice pertains to the names of rulers and their family members, as these often possess widely recognised English equivalents. For instance, I refer to the Queen of Naples not as Giovanna or Johanna, but employ the form Joanna when alluding to her.

⁵ CRAG, 133.: „Consulo igitur, ut captivos dominos in nostris manibus resumamus et eos ad decentem recantum comprimamus eorum flagello corporeo.”

⁶ CRAG, 133.: „At ille semivivus, non potens amplius sufferre tormenta, clamabat se daturum omnia bona sua; tandem composuit in triginta tribus milibus florenorum.”

⁷ CRAG, 133.: „(...) et ansio quidem animo Theotonici vadunt captivos illos ducere ad torturam.”

⁸ France, John, “Introduction”, In. Idem (ed.), *Mercenaries and Paid Men. The Mercenary Identity in the Middle Ages*. Leiden–Boston, 2008. 1–13. 1.

The study predominantly traces the evaluation of mercenaries, with a specific emphasis on the Trecento, during which they surfaced in a more methodically structured manner, converging into meticulously organised enterprises, manifesting throughout Italy in the configuration of *societas*. To this end, I employ excerpts from Italian chronicles, which will be expounded comprehensively within the pertinent section of the investigation. Beyond the aforementioned scope, the study also addresses the inquiry into the extent to which diverse collectives that came into contact with mercenaries were capable of asserting their agency. On one hand, this encompasses entities that engaged in direct interfaces with the mercenaries, including those who contracted their services for delimited undertakings; conversely, it encompasses those who engaged with them indirectly, covering the populace through which the mercenaries traversed or the urban centres upon which they conducted assaults. Additionally, the study delves into the degree of accomplishment attained by the mercenaries as public actors themselves in the realization of their objectives. While a comprehensive examination of the subject necessitates further textual analysis, this paper presents the initial phase of a study and delves more extensively into two instances of mercenary uprisings: the Aversan (1349) and the Barlettan uprisings (1350). In the analysis of source texts, I employ the close reading method, focusing on individual passages and chronicles of specific authors, to uncover perceptions formed about mercenaries. I resort to alternative sources for explanatory purposes only when necessary. This approach enables us to trace the opinions of the southern Italians concerning the mercenary uprisings. The mercenaries featured here have been examined from a military history perspective by Stephan Selzer,⁹ a highly meticulous and scholarly endeavour, the augmentation of which with further military historical data would be scarcely feasible. Hence, I direct our attention toward the social context and mentality.

The portrayal and representation of mercenaries in the mirror of chronicles

Although not entirely a chronicle *per se*, it is worthwhile to commence the enumeration of opinions with the Florentine Niccolò Machiavelli (d. 1527), who, concerning the characterization of mercenaries, voiced an exceedingly condemnatory stance within the twelfth chapter of his political treatise, *The Prince (Il principe)*, which was written in 1513:

„Mercenaries and auxiliaries are useless and dangerous. If a prince holds on to his state by means of mercenary armies, he will never be stable or secure. Mercenaries are disunited, ambitious, undisciplined, and disloyal. They are brave with their friends; with their enemies, they are cowards. They have no fear of God, and they keep no faith

⁹ Selzer, Stephan, *Deutsche Söldner im Italien des Trecento*. Tübingen, 2001.

with men. Their ruin is deferred only so long as an attack is deferred. In peacetime you are plundered by them, in war by your enemies.”¹⁰

What renders Machiavelli’s depiction intriguing is the capacity to scrutinise it through the lens of the *longue durée*, exploring the canon rich in topoi that has evolved over time in relation to mercenaries. For instance, within the text, Machiavelli employs one of the ancient examples, the case of the ancient Carthaginians, which he likely derived from the Greek-language *auctor*, Polybius (c. 200–118 BC). Polybius, in numerous cases, discusses mercenaries hired by the Carthaginians or Punic people, and the most comprehensive portrayal is encapsulated in the following passage:

„First, its course makes it particularly easy to recognise the essential characteristics of what is commonly called ‘a truceless war’. Second, the danger Carthage faced at that time shows with exceptional clarity what precautions and safeguards should be taken by those who employ mercenary troops. Third, the war reveals the differences – the enormous differences – in temperament between a horde made up of various barbarian tribes, and people who have enjoyed the benefits of education, a code of laws, and the civilised life of a citizen-state. Fourth, and most importantly, what happened then helps to explain the Hannibalic War between Rome and Carthage. When neither historians nor those who took part in the war agree about its causes, there is educational value in presenting readers with the truest explanation.”¹¹

The antipathy towards mercenaries is clearly in Polybius’ thought: the derivation of moral lessons can occur through the delineation of the root cause of Carthaginians’ significant troubles. Similarly, Machiavelli adopted this approach, as he identified the maintenance of mercenary armies with the “present ruin of Italy”.¹² Chronicles and narrative texts, nonetheless, uniquely depict the societal reality, thus invoking scepticism about whether attributes alone, as encountered in sources, defined mercenaries. Authors frequently expound moral lessons, employing examples (*exempla*) to underscore the essence of their messages.¹³ This approach serving didactic purposes as well, intending to “dis-

¹⁰ Machiavelli, Niccolò, “Il principe”, In. Idem, *Tutte le opere, secondo l’edizione di Mario Martelli (1971)*, intr. Michele Ciliberto, coordinamento di Pier Davide Accendere, Florence–Milan, 2018. Cap. XII, 847–848. [hereinafter Machiavelli, *Tutte le opere*]; for the English translation see: Machiavelli, Niccolò, *The Prince*, trans. Peter Bondanella, intr. Maurizio Viroli. (Oxford World’s Classics). Oxford, 2005. Cap. XII, 43. [hereinafter *The Prince*]

¹¹ Polybius, *The Histories*, trans. Waterfield, Robin, intr., and notes by McGing, Brian. (Oxford World’s Classics). Oxford, 2010. Cap. 65, 57.

¹² *The Prince*, 43.

¹³ Bergqvist, Kim, “Truth and Invention in Medieval Texts: Remarks on the Historiography and Theoretical Frameworks of Conceptions of History and Literature, and Considerations for Future Research”, = *Roda da Fortuna. Revista Eletrônica sobre Antiguidade e Medievo* 2:2, 2013, 221–242.

cipline” a community based on the account provided, regardless of whether the example serves as a deterrent or a positive model.¹⁴ The efficacy of the intended notion was augmented by the textual genre-specific features, encompassing the utilization of the expansive array of rhetorical devices.

In these quotations, not only is context a crucial factor, but also the circumstances under which they originated. For instance, Machiavelli dedicated his treatise to “the magnificent” Lorenzo de’ Medici, a member of the family who, upon their return to the city situated on the coasts of the Arno River (1512) following their exile from Florence in 1494, deprived Machiavelli, a practitioner in statecraft (*arte dello stato*), of his livelihood.¹⁵ Subsequently, after the exposure of an anti-Medici conspiracy, he was even accused of collaboration. As Maurizio Viroli has clarified, *The Prince*, or as it was originally titled in Latin, *Of Principalities (De principatibus)*, is a satirical composition that elucidates all the problems represented by the Medicis, who exercised oppressive rule.¹⁶

One of the accusations brought against mercenaries is that they fight for money¹⁷ and employ harsh methods to achieve their goals, including acts that harm the civilian population, such as looting, and atrocities committed by the mercenaries against innocent urban residents. In April 1349, when the Neapolitan army and the mercenaries fighting alongside them entered the small Apulian town of Gravina (where the chronicler Domenico da Gravina also resided), the residents were compelled to make all their possessions available to the soldiers:

„Mercenaries and marauders wrought immense devastation among the townsfolk, taking their possessions through pillaging. None among the people dared to speak openly, but secretly they mourned.”¹⁸

Noteworthy is the fact that the populace refrains from openly undertaking any action, rendering them incapacitated, and individuals merely emit sub-

¹⁴ A few examples from the extensive scholarly literature pertaining to the subject are as follows: McKeon, Richard, “Rhetoric in the Middle Ages”, = *Speculum* 17:1, 1942, 1–32.; *Classical Rhetoric and Medieval Historiography*. Ed. Breisach, Ernst, Liverpool, 1985.; Knape, Joachim, “Historiography as Rhetoric”, In: Kooper, Erik (ed.), *The Medieval Chronicle*, Vol. II., Amsterdam–New York, 2002. 117–129.; Kempshall, Matthew, *Rhetoric and the Writing of History, 400–1500*. Manchester, 2011.

¹⁵ Fubini, Riccardo, “Machiavelli’s relationship with the Medicis: Machiavelli, i Medici, e la storia di Firenze nel Quattrocento”, = *Archivio Storico Italiano* 155:1, 1997, 127–141.; Cf. Machiavelli’s epistole to his patron and benefactor, the Florentine diplomat Francesco Vettori (10 December 1513), the letter was quoted in Machiavelli, *Tutte le opere*, 31.

¹⁶ *The Prince*, xiii–xiv.

¹⁷ France, John, “People against Mercenaries: The Capuchins in Southern Gaul”, = *Journal of Medieval Military History* 8, 2010, 1–22. 6.

¹⁸ CRAG, 90.: „(...) stypendyarii et malandreni sequentes dictorum exercitum dominorum magnam stragem faciebant in populum civitatis, tollendo bona eorum et disrobando. Nec quisquam populi ausus est loqui, sed in occulto clamabant.”

duced exclamations in secrecy. Furthermore, *clamor* constitutes the voice of lament directed towards someone,¹⁹ a term that is even present in scriptural texts.²⁰ This state of paralysis characterises the community of Gravina, even when news spread that in the face of imminent peril, the mercenaries continued their depredations by singling out the most beautiful virgins.²¹ The defilement of virgins holds great significance within a community. Initially, it was the barbarian groups²² that posed a threat to the communities and virgins. The most vivid illustration of this is found in the story of Saint Ursula and the eleven thousand virgins, who, according to the narrative, became martyrs due to the onslaught of the Huns attacking Cologne.²³ The legend gained traction in the tenth century, progressively gaining popularity during the fourteenth to sixteenth centuries.²⁴ Contributing to its dissemination were for instance the works of Dominican preacher and legend-writer, Jacobus de Voragine (d. 1298) in his famous work, the *Golden Legend* (Lat. *Legenda aurea*),²⁵ along with various depictions in religious art. This narrative can be juxtaposed with that of the young maidens who fell victim to the mercenaries in Gravina, underscoring the community's inherent inability to safeguard these virginal girls. The citation concludes by also indicating that the Neapolitan nobility aligned themselves with the marauders: thus, this rapacious requisitioning and aggression manifested not solely as the transgressions of the mercenaries.²⁶

¹⁹ Cf. “clamor, -is”, in *Thesaurus Linguae Latinae*, Ed. Internationale Thesaurus-Kommission, Vol. III.: c-com, Leipzig, 1906–1912. Coll. 1254–1259.

²⁰ Gen. 18.20–21: “Dixit itaque Dominus: ‘Clamor Sodomorum et Gomorrhæ multiplicatus est, et peccatum eorum aggravatum est nimis. Descendam, et videbo utrum clamorem qui venit ad me, opere compleverint; an non est ita, ut sciam.’” Vallerani, Massimo, “Modelli di verità. Le prove nei processi inquisitori”, In. Gauvard, Claude (dir.), *L'enquête au Moyen Âge*. Rome, 2004. 123–142. 125.

²¹ CRAG, 90.: “Eratque inde rumor maximus inter omnes, quoniam viri dicti exercitus mulieres quidem, virgines, praecipue pulcerimas, et divitias singulas secum tollebant (...)”.

²² The evolution of perceptions about the unfamiliar entities and groups in the Middle Ages: Goetz, Hans-Werner – Wood, Ian N., “Introduction. The Many Facets and Methodological Problems of ‘Otherness’”, In. Eidem (eds.), *‘Otherness’ in the Middle Ages*. (International Medieval Research, 25.). Turnhout, 2022. 1–35.

²³ Regarding the association between Saint Ursula and the Huns: Rady, Martyn, “Attila and the Hun Tradition in Medieval Hungarian Texts”, In. Bak, M. János – Veszprémy, László (eds.), *Studies on the Illuminated Chronicle*. Budapest, 2018. 127–138. 128–129.

²⁴ Zarri, Gabriella, “La nave di sant’Orsola”, = *Annali dell’Istituto storico italo-germanico in Trento* 19, 1993, 277–303.; Montgomery, Scott B., *St. Ursula and the Eleven Thousand Virgins of Cologne. Relics, Reliquaries and the Visual Culture of Group Sanctity in Late Medieval Europe*. Berlin, 2010.

²⁵ Ford the English edition see: Voragine, Jacobus de, *The Golden Legend: Readings on the Saints*, Vols. I–II., trans. Ryan, William Granger, New Jersey, 1993. Vol. II., 256–260.

²⁶ CRAG, 90.: “(...) nam domini ipsi nostrum exteriorum divitias abstulerunt et illi in praedam omnium concurrebant.”

The sensing of foreigners is constructed around a persistent context and body of knowledge, and it could always be substituted with the threat posed by the appearance of an unknown group exhibiting deviations in their habits to the locals. Urban communities for instance describe interactions with foreigners in this manner: the foreigners are furious and wild, often behaving like madmen who consume everything in their path.²⁷ Moreover, these descriptions direct attention to the continuation of the earlier barbarian and foreigner images.²⁸

Luigi Andrea Berto introduced the concept that unfamiliar entities perceived as adversaries could be subject to ridicule and mockery within communities, potentially augmenting the resistance against them.²⁹ This phenomenon was also evident in the case of the German company led by Werner von Urslingen. Despite Werner (or dux Guarnerius / duca Guarnieri in Italian texts) and his associates having pledged continued loyalty to the Hungarian king, enticed by a more favourable offer, they defected to the opposing faction: to Queen Johanna and Louis of Taranto.³⁰ István (Lat. Stephanus) Lackfi (son of Lack), Voivode of Transylvania (1344–1350), and leader of the Hungarian army, earnestly reproached this treachery by Werner, whom he defeated and captured in the fortress of Corneto. The narrative, of course, presents intriguing moments: the unrestrained German mercenaries entered the fortress of Corneto unsuspectingly, sleeping unclothed on their pallets, neglecting to station sentinels at the gates due to their overwhelming sense of security.³¹ Consequently, the Hungarian forces that ambushed this company easily overwhelmed through the element of surprise. The formidable leader, upon acknowledging his apprehen-

²⁷ Berto, Luigi Andrea, *The 'Other', Identity, and Memory in Early Medieval Italy*. London, 2022. 3.

²⁸ Jones, W. R., "The Image of the Barbarian in Medieval Europe", = *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 13:4, 1971, 376–407.

²⁹ Berto, *The 'Other', Identity*, 2022. 3–4, 34, 86.

³⁰ *Chronicon Dubnicense*. Ed. Florianus, M., Lipsiae, 1884. 155.: "(...) Lodovicus de Tarento (et) Johanna (...) ducem Werbernum capitaneuni soldatorum, qui a domino Rege, dum esset Neapoli, tali conditione recesserat, ut nunquam contra ipsum, nec contra populum suum insurgeret, fide se constrinxit." The author of some of the chapters is Anonymus Minorita, and based on the information found in the work, they might have been a Conventual Franciscan. The author displayed a deep familiarity with the Hungarian royal court and likely had a presence in Italy during a phase of dynastic warfare. There has been speculation that the work might not be the sole creation of a single author, but rather, two authors. The sole surviving manuscript of the text pertaining to the reign of Louis the Great of Hungary is found within the *Chronicon Dubnicense*, which consists of some compilations of Hungarian related chronicles. Spychała, Lesław, "Anonymus Minorita", In: Dunphy, Graeme (ed.), *Encyclopedia of the Medieval Chronicle*, Vols I–II. Leiden, 2010. Vol. I., 103–104.

³¹ CRAG, 55.: "(...) nuntiatum fuit eis quod dux Guarnerius [Werner von Urslingen – Á.V.] cum sua gente semotim morabatur in Corneto et quod faciliter hora nocturna, si vellent, ingredi poterant terram ipsam, quoniam dictus dux cum sua gente sic confidenter consistunt ibidem, quod quasi dubitantes de nullo, absque nocturnis excubiis dormiunt sine cura."

sion, initially declared his acquiescence to whatever actions his captors deemed appropriate. Subsequently, he entreated for mercy and clemency. In the latter scenario, he proffered his willingness to serve the Hungarian king once again.³² Another noteworthy instance was Nicola Caetani, the Count of Fondi, who, by forming an alliance with the Hungarian king and leading a rebellion against the Neapolitan crown, provided further illustration. Upon defeating the mercenaries sent against him by the Neapolitan court, he disarmed and disrobed them before sending them back to Queen Joanna in Naples.³³ Subsequently, the Neapolitans mockingly referred to this act of humiliating the mercenaries, whom the Count of Fondi dispatched with a specific message.³⁴ These jests were not associated with elaborate rituals as seen in Northern Italy³⁵; however, the release of defeated mercenaries and their temporary neutralization became a subject of ridicule, turning laughter and mockery into instruments for reinforcing the identity of communities opposed to mercenaries, especially laughter which could be in certain circumstances “an embodied kind of moral power”.³⁶

Entangled in the web of throne aspirations: the power-political context of dynastic wars

Given that the dynastic conflict between the Neapolitan and Hungarian Angevins remains relatively less explored, I will provide a brief overview of its key milestones. The nucleus of this conflict and the divisions of the family has its origins deep within a familial loss: Charles Martel as the firstborn son of Charles II, in 1295, passed away, leaving behind only a minor male heir, Caroberto. In the interest of safeguarding the realm and maintaining the power

³² CRAG, 57.: “Ecce in manibus vestris sum: facite de me quod vultis. Ubi tamen michi dignemini misereri, offero me ipsum ex nunc cum meis complicitibus vobis regio honori servire usque ad vitam.”

³³ CRAG, 32.: “(...) et siquidem stypendyarius, aut neapolitanus, aut persona sibi suspecta non esset, depositis vestibus et calciamentis omnibus in interiori parte urbis ejusdem, singulos vivos, nudos tamen, permittebat abire, cuilibet eorum cedulam scriptam dabat: ‘Ego enim sum de robba quam comes Fundi fecit de novo’. Hoc etiam faciebat in majus vituperium (...) reginae.”

³⁴ CRAG, 32.: “Abeuntibus autem singulis stypendyariis, et neapolitanis dudum equitibus ita pedes, immo quod deterius, ita nudis, singulis videntibus facti sunt in derisum; et accedentes singuli ad castrum reginae, convicti belli gagia et potalicia petierunt, et ostendentes cedulas eis factas, derisus major factus est super eos. Et a tunc quodam tempore in civitate neapolitana, et fere per totum regnum, quotiens aliquis nudus aut male indutus per neapolitanas plateas transibat, communiter dicebatur: ‘vere hic de robba comitis Fundi fuit’.”

³⁵ Varanini, Gian Maria, “I riti dell’assedio. Alcune schede dalle cronache tardomedievali italiane”, = *Reti Medievali Rivista* 8:1, 2007. Art. 14, doi: 10.6092/1593–2214/135 (Accessed on 15 August 2023)

³⁶ Jones, Peter J. A., *Laughter and Power in the Twelfth Century*. Oxford, 2019. 181.; See this furthermore in a wider context: *Laughter in the Middle Ages and Early Modern Times Epistemology of a Fundamental Human Behavior, its Meaning, and Consequences*. Ed. Classen, Albrecht, Berlin, 2010.

balance on the Italian peninsula, Charles II was succeeded on the throne by his another son, Robert (r. 1309–1343).³⁷ Some regarded this as a usurpation and echoed the illegitimacy of Robert and his lineage in several contemporary texts.³⁸ Complicating the dynastic matters further, the king had two other brothers, each with three adult sons, who also laid claim to the governance of the realm. Eventually, in 1333, it appeared that the dynastic issues were being resolved, as Robert's son, Charles of Calabria, died young in 1328, prompting him to seek a marital alliance for his elder granddaughter, Joanna of Anjou (r. 1343–1382). To this end, an agreement was reached with his cousin, Charles, who had meanwhile become the Hungarian king as Charles I (r. 1301–1342),³⁹ moreover Charles' middle son, Andrew of Hungary, arrived in the Kingdom of Naples in 1333.⁴⁰ Albeit, the members of the betrothed couple were still minors, hence the wedding did not take place until 1342.⁴¹

³⁷ Kelly, Samantha, *The New Solomon: Robert of Naples (1309–1343) and Fourteenth-Century Kingship*. (The Medieval Mediterranean: Peoples, Economies and Cultures, 400–1500, 48.). Leiden–Boston, 2003.

³⁸ During the years spanning from 1344 to 1351, contemporaries undertook the endeavour of crafting narratives focusing to Robert's 'remorseful emotions' with propagandistic intentions. Notably, this period coincided with a pronounced crisis that enveloped the Kingdom of Naples after Robert's passing. Simultaneously, Queen Joanna, who ascended the throne following Robert, confronted a scenario characterised by inadequate stability, rendering her unable to effectively counter the burgeoning aspirations directed towards the Neapolitan throne. The examination of the issue from philological and cultural-historical perspectives: Léonard, *Histoire de Jeanne 1^{re}*, 1932. Vol. I., 219–226.; Kelly, *The New Solomon*, 2003. 281.; Radaelli, Anna, "Tra finzione e realtà: La conplanca per Roberto d'Angiò, una voce per un re immaginato", = *Lecturae tropatorum* 11, 2018, 1–69.; Virágh, Ágnes, "Bölcs Róbert nápolyi király „bűntudata" [The Conscience' of Robert the Wise, King of Naples]", In. Virágh, Ágnes – Véber, Zoltán (eds.), *Metszéspontok. Tanulmányok a középkorról és a kora újkorról*. Debrecen, 2023. 90–119.; An iconographical analysis: Léglu, Catherine, "Ambivalent Visual Representations of Robert 'the Wise' in Occitan Illustrated Texts", = *Italian Studies* 72:2, 2017, 192–204.

³⁹ Charles asserted his claim to the Hungarian throne through maternal lineage: his grandmother, Mary of Hungary, was the daughter of King Stephen V of Hungary, and contrary to the other claimants to the throne, he managed to secure his power after a prolonged struggle.; Engel, Pál, *The realm of St Stephen. A history of medieval Hungary, 895–1526*, trans. Pálosfalvi, Tamás, London–New York, 2001. 128–130.; Ančić, Mladen, "Neočekivani pobjednik. Uspon Karla Roberta do vlasti / The Unlikely Winner. Charles Robert's Rise to Power", = *Miscellanea Hadriatica et Mediterranea* 7, 2020, 127–156.

⁴⁰ Teiszler, Éva, "I. Lajos király nápolyi trónigénye a diplomácia tükrében [King Louis I's Neapolitan throne claim in the mirror of diplomacy]", = *Acta Universitatis Szegediensis: Acta Historica* 136, 2015, 63–79. 64–67.; Lucherini, Vinni, "The Journey of Charles I, King of Hungary, from Visegrád to Naples (1333). It's Political Implications and Artistic Consequences", = *Hungarian Historical Review* 2:2, 2013, 341–362. esp. 345.

⁴¹ *Magyar diplomáciai emlékek az Anjou-korból* [Hungarian diplomatic records from the Angevin Era], Vols I–III. Ed. Wenzel, Gusztáv, Budapest, 1874–1876. Vol. II., 1875. 3–5 (doc. 1).

Both contemporary authors and medievalists have seen the death of Robert and the year 1343 as significant turning points.⁴² Indeed, the situation of Andrew was altered by the testament dated January 16th before the king's death, as he was only mentioned as the spouse of the queen in the text.⁴³ Since the Neapolitan court was unwilling to accept Andrew's royal title – his coronation required significant dynastic praxis, including financial resources contributed by his mother, Queen Elisabeth Piast,⁴⁴ and his elder brother, Louis I of Hungary (r. 1342–1382), and ultimately the endorsement of Pope Clement VI – he was assassinated near Aversa shortly before his coronation in 1345. Initially, King Louis and Elisabeth requested Pope Clement VI to punish those responsible for the murder, as they were convinced that Joanna was among them.⁴⁵ Thus, their aims included removing her from the throne, and according to the treaty of 1333, Louis also had a legitimate claim to the throne. Some of the culprits were condemned by the pope,⁴⁶ but Joanna's dethronement was not accepted. Consequently, Louis prepared for a campaign to claim the Neapolitan throne and led two military expeditions (1347–1348, 1350) personally into the Kingdom of Naples.⁴⁷ During his absence, Lackfi commanded the Hungarian forces between 1348 and 1350.⁴⁸

⁴² Teiszler, I. Lajos király, 2015. 64.

⁴³ *Codex Italiae Diplomaticus*, Vols I–II. Ed. Lünig, Johann Christian, Frankfurt–Leipzig, 1725–1726. Vol. II., 1726. Coll. 1101–1110.; Camera, Matteo, *Annali delle due Sicilie dall'origine e fondazione della monarchia fino a tutto il regno dell'Augusto Sovrano Carlo III. Borbone*, Vols I–II. Naples, 1841–1860. Vol. II., 1860, 498–501.; Léonard, Histoire de Jeanne 1^{re}, 1932. Vol. I., 214–226.

⁴⁴ Sággy, Marianne, “Dévotions diplomatiques. Le pèlerinage de la reine mère Elisabeth Piast à Rome”, In. Kordé, Zoltán – Petrovics, István (dir.), *La diplomatie des États Angevins aux xiii^e et xiv^e siècles / Diplomacy in the Countries of the Angevin Dynasty in the Thirteenth–Fourteenth Century. Actes du colloque international de Szeged – Visegrád – Budapest, 13–16 September 2007*, Rome–Szeged, 2010. 219–224.; Năstăsoiu, Dragoș Gh., “Patterns of Devotion and Traces of Art. The Diplomatic Journey of Queen Elizabeth Piast to Italy in 1343–1344”, = *Convivium. Exchanges and Interactions in the Arts of Medieval Europe, Byzantium, and the Mediterranean - Seminarium Kondakovianum* (Series Nova) 2:2, 2015, 99–111.

⁴⁵ Casteen, Elizabeth, *From She-Wolf to Martyr. The Reign and Disputed Reputation of Johanna I of Naples*. Ithaca–London, 2015. 1–66.

⁴⁶ Miskolczy, István, *Magyar-olasz összeköttetések az Anjouk korában. Magyar-nápolyi kapcsolatok* [Hungarian-Italo connections during the Angevin Era. Hungarian-Neapolitan relations]. Budapest, 1937. 73–86.; Musto, Ronald G., *Writing Southern Italy Before the Renaissance: Trecento Historians of the Mezzogiorno*. New York–London, 2019 [ebook version]. 246–249, 257–258.

⁴⁷ Miskolczy, Magyar-olasz, 1937. 87–116.

⁴⁸ Csukovits, Enikő, *Hungary and the Hungarians. Western Europe's View in the Middle Ages*. (Viella Historical Research, 11.). Rome, 2018. 127–134.

Mercenaries in the Kingdom of Naples during the Trecento

From the thirteenth century onwards, an increasing number of mercenaries were engaged in Italy,⁴⁹ and this trend can also be observed in the case of the Kingdom of Naples, particularly during the fourteenth century. In the dynastic war, the earliest information about the utilization of mercenaries can be found in the context of the battle of Capua (January 1348), where Domenico da Gravina's chronicle reveals that alongside Germans and Lombards fought the Hungarians, and within the Neapolitan army led by Louis of Taranto, some German, Provençal, and Catalan mercenaries were also noted.⁵⁰

As evident from the above, a diverse range of mercenaries were active within the Kingdom of Naples during this period. John France pointed out,⁵¹ that the sources often do not explicitly employ the term 'mercenarius', and various designations such as 'Catalani' or 'Theutonici' are used to refer to them. From this, it is important to note that definitive conclusions regarding origin cannot be drawn: the term 'Theutonicus' might refer to those who originated from German territories,⁵² yet it could also encompass those who fought alongside Germans in a company while originating from different regions.

Following Louis the Great's expeditions in Naples, for instance, several Hungarian warriors remained in Italy and transitioned into mercenaries. Gil Álvarez Carrillo de Albornoz (d. 1367) cardinal also hired them during the 1360s for the territorial expansion wars of the Papacy originating from Bologna.⁵³

⁴⁹ Mallett, *Mercenaries and their Masters*, 1974. 13–50.

⁵⁰ CRAG, 34.: "Erant autem in exercitu dicti comitis pro parte regis Ungariae memorati Ungari, Theotonici et Lombardi et regnicolae hujus regni. Et cum domino Lodoyco Theotonici modici, Provinciales, Catalani modici et Neapolitani pro majori parte."

⁵¹ France, *People against Mercenaries*, 2010. esp. 7–8.

⁵² DeVries, Kelly, "Medieval Mercenaries: Methodology, Definitions, and Problems", In: France, John (ed.), *Mercenaries and Paid Men. The Mercenary Identity in the Middle Ages*. Leiden–Boston, 2008. 43–60. esp. 46–54.

⁵³ The subject was initially examined by Lukcsics, Pál, "Magyar zsoldosok a pápaság szolgálatában [Hungarian mercenaries in the service of the Papacy in the fourteenth century]", = *Hadtörténelmi Közlemények* 33:1, 1932, 125–157.; Presently, Ágnes Maléth is engaged in researching this topic. In the English context, the subject is discussed in the work of Dincă, Adinel C., "Hungarian Mercenaries Serving the Pontifical State. A Vatican Source from 1362 and the Beginning of a Discussion", In: Fara, Andrea (a cura di), *Italia ed Europa centro-orientale tra Medioevo ed Età moderna. Economia, Società, Cultura*. Heidelberg, 2022. 43–54.; The primary advantage of the latter study lies in its provision of English translations of the outcomes and conclusions from the studies conducted by Pál Lukcsics and Gyula Rázsó. However, the presentation therein is confined within a considerably truncated temporal framework, primarily summarizing Hungarian research results rather than being grounded in an exhaustive source analysis. Regrettably, the inquiry is based upon a questionable and inadequately substantiated proposition, namely, the precise categorization of ethnic groups subsumed within the nomenclature 'Hungarians' (*Ungari*). The affiliation of those mercenaries labelled as 'Hungarians' remains uncertain due to factors like the ambiguity arising from identifying specific locales. Deciding whether an erstwhile

Notwithstanding, they received better payment from Florence⁵⁴ or Perugia⁵⁵: infantry (for instance referred to as *pedoni* in Florentine sources) received eight gold florins, while constables received sixteen florins. Data from archival sources, containing records of mercenaries' payments, sometimes indicate the commanders under whom soldiers served. From this, the Hungarian military historian Gyula Rázsó inferred that Hungarians often joined other companies instead of forming their own independent companies.⁵⁶

Nevertheless, the name indicating origin might have held particular significance, as it was associated with distinct reputation and attributes. For example, Hungarians were renowned as skilled chasseur with archers. Consequently, they were favoured for their distinctive combat style and weaponry in unfamiliar social and regional settings.⁵⁷ Similarly, the term *barbuta* originally denoted a specific type of German mercenaries and secondarily to those soldiers who

medieval settlement, presently situated in Hungary or in a different country which was formerly under a distinct political entity prior to 1920, housed individuals of Hungarian or other ethnic origins cannot be definitively resolved. The intricacies of identity and national allegiance did not unfold in medieval society in the same vein as they do in contemporary contexts. Similarly, Kelly DeVries, the distinguished military historian, presented compelling reasoning underscoring the futility of pursuing an exhaustive answer to this question and this topic is maybe overrepresented among scholars. DeVries, *Medieval Mercenaries*, 2008. 46.; The question is further examined from different angles: Caferro, William, "Travel, Economy, and Identity in Fourteenth-Century Italy: An Alternate Interpretation of the Mercenary System", In. Curto, Diogo R. et al. (eds.), *Florence to the Mediterranean and beyond: Essays in honour of Anthony Molho*. Florence, 2009. 363–380.

⁵⁴ The *Uscite* records belonging to the Camera del Comune within the Archivio di Stato di Firenze [hereinafter ASFir] provide a comprehensive insight into the employment of Hungarian mercenaries in Florence, documenting the sums disbursed by the city to these mercenaries. The processing of these sources is undertaken by the "The Military History of Medieval Hungary and Central Europe" Research Group of the Hungarian Research Network – University of Debrecen. To illustrate this, I present a specific example. The transcribed data, as delineated in the register, pertains to the activities of "Niccholo Chimenti, a Hungarian constable, and his eight-member contingent, in the service of Florence from March 23, 1361, for a period of four months. During this interval, they received a cumulative remuneration of 245 florins and 2 *soldi* monthly." ASFir, Camera del Comune, Scrivano di Camera, Uscita 13, fol. 33v.; The specific reference to this data can be found within the online database previously linkd by the research group under reference number 10001; <https://monumenta.militaria-hungaria.hu/monumenta-web/?locale=en> (Accessed on 08 August 2023)

⁵⁵ Conti, Marco, "Origine, profil et solde des mercenaires à Bologne (seconde moitié XIVE s.). Réflexion à partir du Liber expesarum de 1365", = *NAM (Nuova Antologia Militare)* 3:9, 2022, 327–353. 341.

⁵⁶ Rázsó, Gyula, "A zsoldosintézmény kezdetei Magyarországon a XIV. században [The beginnings of the mercenary institution in Hungary in the fourteenth century]", = *Hadtörténelmi Közlemények* 51:2, 1960, 107–143. 130.

⁵⁷ Conti, Origine, profil et solde des mercenaires, 2022. 336, 341.

possessed equipment similar to the aforementioned contingent.⁵⁸ According to Domenico da Gravina, for instance in 1348/49, such warriors were present within the company of Werner von Urslingen, as well: “Behold, amidst all these events, the aforementioned palatine [Giovanni Pipino⁵⁹ – Á.V.] arrived from the Neapolitan faction to the same location, accompanied by the German leader, Guarnieri [Werner von Urslingen – Á.V.], who brought with them more than fifteen hundred helmeted soldiers; and they entered the city of Naples, offering to engage in battle against the Hungarians in place of the queen.”⁶⁰

Here, I can only briefly indicate that the notions of good reputation (*bona fama*) and *honor* were crucial elements within medieval society. Concerning warriors, for instance, the enhancement of military merit contributed to their *bona fama*. Reputation could also be negative (*mala fama*), as highlighted by Daniel Lord Smail, Thelma Fenster, Claude Gauvard, Julien Théry, the propagation of rumours was not independent of cultivating either positive or negative reputation for someone.⁶¹ In a narrative text from the fourteenth century, the *Storie Pistoresi*, a record remains of Werner von Urslingen, and it is mentioned that the inscription on his breastplate can read: “enemy of God, mercy, and compassion”.⁶² Beyond expertise and combat tactics, thus, the character sketch of a mercenary could encompass all that falls within the categories of societal recognition and acknowledgment. As we will come to observe, the propagation of negative perceptions regarding mercenaries offered a solution for the urban communities of southern Italy, enabling them to interpret the socio-political-economic crisis underlying the warfare. Yet, the mercenaries perceived this intri-

⁵⁸ Mallett, *Mercenaries and their Masters*, 1974. 31–32.

⁵⁹ He is also referred to as the *palatinus* of Altamura in the chronicle of Domenico da Gravina, as well as the Count of Minervino. Pipino is frequently mentioned in chronicles as a figure of prominence. He is portrayed with attributes akin to a mercenary leader: consistently aligning himself with lords who could present more favourable propositions to him.

⁶⁰ CRAG, 44.: “Ecce inter haec media pervenit ibidem a romanis partibus Pallatinus jam dictus, una cum duce Guarnerio theotonico, habentes secum barbudas Theotonorum ultra mille quingentas; et ingressi civitatem Neapolis obtulerunt se pro eadem regina contra Ungaros pugnatuos.”

⁶¹ Ward, Donald, “Honor and Shame in the Middle Ages. An Open Letter to Lutz Röhrich”, In: Brednich, Rolf Wilh. – Dittmar, Jürgen (ed.), *Jahrbuch für Volksliedforschung (Festschrift für Lutz Röhrich zum 60. Geburtstag)* 27/28. Berlin, 1982/1983. 1–16.; Barbero, Alessandro, “Guerra, nobiltà, onore fra Tre e Quattrocento nella storiografia anglosassone”, = *Studi Storici* 27:1, 1986, 173–201.; Gauvard, Claude, “La Fama, une parole fondatrice”, = *Médiévales* 24, 1993, 5–13.; Henderson Stewart, Frank, *Honor*. Chicago, 1994.; Théry, Julien, “Fama: l’opinion publique comme preuve judiciaire. Aperçu sur la révolution médiévale de l’inquisiteur (xiii-xiv)”, In: Lemesle, Bruno (dir.), *La preuve en justice: de l’Antiquité à nos jours*. Rennes, 2003. 119–147.; Smail, Daniel Lord – Fenster, Thelma, “Introduction”, In: Eidem (eds.), *Fama: The Politics of Talk and Reputation in Medieval Europe*. Ithaca–London, 2003. 1–11.

⁶² *Storie Pistoresi*. (Rerum Italicarum Scriptores, 2nd series, tom. 11, pt. 5). Ed. Barbi, Silvio Adrasto, Città di Castello, 1900. 182.: *nemico di Dio, di pietà e di misericordia*.

cate crisis from a different perspective, leading their objectives and the actions meant to fulfil them into an inevitable clash with the values and goals of these communities.

The Apulian mercenary uprisings

The first revolt was directed against the Hungarians, while the second merely had indirect targets the Hungarians. A common thread in these revolts was the personal presence of István Lackfi,⁶³ who, in his capacity as regent for the king (*vicarius regis*) in 1348/49,⁶⁴ coordinated Hungarian military operations focusing on the Italian theatre. It was up to him to manage the tensions arising from the uprisings and to provide feasible solutions for the swift suppression of the revolts.

The first mutiny occurred in the summer of 1349, following a successful battle in area of Melito (present Melito di Napoli)⁶⁵ from the Hungarian perspec-

⁶³ The medieval Hungarian narrative sources depict him as one of the king's trusted associates. His role was indeed significant in the Hungarian military operations during the dynastic wars, a perspective affirmed by Apulian Domenico da Gravina, who personally met the voivode. The threatened inhabitants of Gravina also sought out the voivode's military camp in Barletta asking for assistance against the Neapolitan Anjou-Durazzo family in their struggle for independence. Recent assessments of István Lackfi's military actions in Naples have been provided by Csukovits, Enikő, "Lackfi István Apuliában [Stephen Lackfi in Apulia]", In. Dáné, Veronka – Lupescuné Makó, Mária – Sipos, Gábor (eds.), *Testimonio litterarum. Tanulmányok Jakó Zsigmond tiszteletére*. Kolozsvár, 2016. 61–68.; Csukovits, Hungary and the Hungarians, 2018. 130–131, 133–134.; During the reign of King Charles I of Hungary, Lackfi attained a significant career, his achievements have been comprehensively examined by Farkas, Csaba, "Egy udvari katonabáró I. Károly szolgálatában Lackfi István és az Anjouk Magyarországa [A royal court baron in arms. Stephen Lackfi's and the Angevin's Hungary]", In. Szanka, Brigitta et al. (eds.), *Középkortörténeti tanulmányok 10. A X. Medievisztikai PhD-konferencia (Szeged, 2017. június 7–9.) előadásai*. Szeged, 2018. 13–33.

⁶⁴ CRAG, 79.: "domino Voyvada, tamquam vicario regio (...)"; Cf. János (Lat. Johannes) Küküllei's chronicle, which is most comprehensively available in János (Lat. Johannes) Thuróczy's *Chronica Hungarorum*. Thurocz, Johannes de, *Chronica Hungarorum*, Vols I–II. Eds. Galántai, Elisabeth – Kristó, Julius, Budapest, 1985. Vol. I., [cap. 142, De reditu regis Lodowici in Hungariam], 169.: *Stephanum filium Laczk wayuodam Transsiluanum capitaneum regni (...)*. János Küküllei was a notary (*notarius*) in the the Hungarian royal chancery and the biographer of Louis the Great.; Spychała, Lesław, "Küküllei, János", In. Dunphy, Graeme (ed.), *Encyclopedia of the Medieval Chronicle*, Vols I–II. Leiden, 2010. Vol. I., 983.

⁶⁵ It is important to note that the incorrect representation of the battlefield's location in English-language scholarly literature is a result of a misconception stemming from researchers primarily consulting a limited number of Italian chronicles. These scholars often neglect to cross-reference the data with other narrative accounts of the same event and disregard topographical identification. This phenomenon can be observed, for instance, in the following cited article: Caferro, William, "Meleto, Battle of", In. Rogers, Clifford J. (ed.), *The Oxford Encyclopedia of Medieval Warfare and Military Technology*, Vols I–III. Oxford, 2010. Vol. II., 589.; The Florentine Matteo Villani had written in his

tive, in Aversa, where both the Hungarian army and the mercenaries retreated after the engagement. The passage detailing the revolt was written from a perspective contemporaneous with the Hungarian's point of view. Domenico da Gravina reported that his source, an external observer who provided him information, was an eyewitness to the revolt and the events accompanying it: this witness was a certain Michael, who served as the scribe (*secretarius*) to the voivode.⁶⁶ The root cause of the revolt was the issue of payment, since King Louis the Great had delayed payment of three months' wages, and the mercenaries demanded immediate reimbursement from István Lackfi.⁶⁷

To expedite matters, the voivode resorted to several solutions: 1) he dispatched envoys to King Louis to address the payment issue⁶⁸; 2) he offered one of his sons as a hostage for assurance⁶⁹; 3) albeit reluctantly, he agreed to participate in the collection of ransoms for the release of captives, which covered a portion of the unpaid wages. However, Lackfi's consent to the collection of ransom was not straightforward. The tone of the dialogue shifts at this juncture, as

chronicle, that the battle took place at 'Meleto', yet he also notes that the location of the battle was approximately four miles from Naples: "(...) si feciono loro più presso a Meleto, quatro miglia presso a Napoli (...)"; Villani, Matteo, *Cronica con la continuazione di Filippo Villani*, Vols I–II. Ed. Giuseppe Porta, Milan–Parma, 1994–1995. Vol. I., Book I., cap. 50, 91.; Conversely, as early as 1909, Albano Sorbelli pointed out in the critical edition of Domenico da Gravina's chronicle that only Matteo Villani referred to the place in this manner. Domenico wrote the following: "et venientes ad locum qui dicitur Malitum, infra civitatem Neapolis et Aversae". CRAG, 102.; Malitus, or in Italian, Malito, is a southern Italian settlement in Calabria, but it does not correspond to the description of being situated between Aversa and Naples. This location is farther north in Campania. Sorbelli correctly identified the location as Melito in Campania, which is also represented in modern topographical depictions as a settlement situated between the two mentioned places. Both Domenico and Matteo Villani mistakenly provided the name of the settlement, which might be attributed to their lack of local knowledge, even in the case of Domenico from Apulia, who lived far from Naples, as stated in his chronicle. The term 'Meleto' introduces further confusion: there are multiple places with this name. One is in Calabria, where there were not many clashes during the dynastic war; the main battle sites extended to the regions of Basilicata, Apulia, Campania, and Bari. The other 'Meleto' locations are northward, beyond the boundaries of the Kingdom of Naples: there are also places called 'Meleto' near Siena and Florence in Tuscany and one in the region of Marche, more precisely in the county of Ancona. However, these can be logically excluded as sites for the dynastic war battles.

⁶⁶ CRAG, 133.: "Retulit michi quidam ungarus notarius Nicolaus secretarius domini Voyvadae (...)".

⁶⁷ CRAG, 132.: "Cooperunt autem Theotonicum cum inopportunitate petere dicto domino Voyvadae gagia eis debita pro tempore praeterito mensium junii, julii et augusti, quae erant in summa ultra centum quinquaginta milia florenorum."

⁶⁸ CRAG, 132.: "Scitis quia duo expressos nuntios miserim ad dominum nostrum regem apud Ungariam, nuntiare sibi causam et pecuniam quaerere pro gagiis vestris praeteriti temporis et futuri; oportet vos sustinere usque ad nuntiorum adventum."

⁶⁹ CRAG, 132.: "De restante pecunia ponam penes vos obsidem Nicolaum filium meum vobiscum in Alamaniam deportandum, quousque satisfiat vobis per regiam majestatem."

a military leader and the king's envoy, the voivode found the mercenaries' plan disturbing: "Behold, I see that you speak as if you were traitors."⁷⁰ The term 'betrayal' is particularly notable in his response. It is beyond doubt that not only the chronicler, who seeks to convey emotion, but also Lackfi himself regarded this as an act of betrayal. From the mercenaries' perspective, however, this was merely a means by which they could swiftly resolve their financial plight.

At this juncture, the two divergent viewpoints converge on the matter of what outcomes and rules are applicable during the war. Each agent endeavours to utilise the available means to achieve their own objectives. The mercenaries' proposal appeared audacious, given the differing views held by the Hungarians and the mercenaries regarding the battle of Melito, which had resulted in the capture of Neapolitan nobles. The Hungarian stance is illuminated through 'direct speech' delivered by István Lackfi:

„Could you not admit, Lord Corrado [Konrad von Wolfurt, a German mercenary leader – Á.V.], you cannot deny that on that day, after the battle had begun, you were captured amid the conflict along with several members of your entourage due to the strength of the adversaries, and subsequently taken as a captive to Naples. From your side, the battle was lost, while our Hungarian forces launched a rear attack on the enemy, only managing to regain you and secure victory in the battle you had lost?⁷¹”

A change in dynamics in the dialogue occurred due to the mercenaries' increasing autonomy. The dialogue corresponds to accusatory speeches containing 'direct speech', which were common in the description of military actions: through this approach, the authors were able to illustrate the contrast in perceptions, objectives, and characteristics between conflicting individuals and groups.⁷² At the beginning of the narrative, Domenico introduces the revolt by describing the "arrogant people of the Germans" (*superbum genus Theotonicorum*) who, due to unpaid wages, pillaged the territory of Terra di Lavoro⁷³ (an old Italian administrative unit⁷⁴). In the protracted war, the exhausted parties had differing aims: István Lackfi aimed to gain time regarding wage payment and articulated the Hungarian in-

⁷⁰ CRAG, 132.: "Ecce video vos quasi proditorie loqui (...)."

⁷¹ CRAG, 132.: "Nonne diffiteri posses tu, domine Corrade [Konrad von Wolfurt – Á.V.], quod die commissi proelii non fuisses captus in proelio cum pluribus tuae sequelae potentia aemulorum et captivus Neapolim ferebaris et vestra parte proelium erat ammissum, nisi Ungari nostri, inimicorum ferientes a tergo, te recuperassent in pugna et ammissum per vos proelium revicissent?"

⁷² Mažeika, Rasa, "Pagans, Saints, and War Criminals: Direct Speech as a Sign of Liminal Interchanges in Latin Chronicles of the Baltic Crusades", = *Viator* 45:2, 2014, 271–288.

⁷³ CRAG, 131.: "Verumtamen superbum genus Theotonicorum acquisitas terras penitus destruebant, et sic acquisitio terrarum ipsarum sibi pro parte regis nullius erat profectus, unde posset habere pecuniam solvendorum gagiorum Theotonicis ipsis."

⁷⁴ Carfora, Clementina, "Terra di Lavoro", = *Federicana*, 2005. https://www.trecani.it/enciclopedia/terra-di-lavoro_%28Federicana%29/ (Accessed on 12 August 2023)

terpretation of the victory at Melito as a means of exerting pressure. Conversely, the mercenaries sought to receive their pay as quickly as possible and made decisions in line with that objective. In the broader context, from the Hungarian perspective, retaining the mercenaries and showing leniency toward them became important due to their planned continuation of the campaign; the hiring of mercenaries by the Neapolitans carried the risk of opponents gaining significant numerical superiority. The swift resolution of the second revolt was also deemed important by the Hungarians for similar reasons. The conflict abated only temporarily, as the mercenaries, following the acquisition of ransoms, began planning the apprehension of the voivode. One of them communicated this intention to István Lackfi, prompting his decision to withdraw from Aversa.⁷⁵

The second revolt took place in Barletta, a coastal port city of the Kingdom of Naples, in 1350, where even King Louis the Great was present.⁷⁶ In Domenico da Gravina's account, this uprising seemed more significant than the previous one; he used the term *rumor* and *rumor magnus*, referring to the clamour, for it.⁷⁷ This expression also served to describe the murmuring crowd. Unlike the previous case, the uprising here was not triggered by payment-related issues. Instead, it originated from a simple brawl in a tavern, where two German mercenaries got into a scuffle with two locals over a game of dice. In the heat of the moment, one of the mercenaries struck a local man, escalating the conflict. The situation quickly deteriorated, and the unruly crowd of mercenaries threatened the property and physical well-being of the town's residents.⁷⁸

⁷⁵ CRAG, 133.: "Erat autem in dicto exercito quidam theotonicus, cujus nominis non recordor, satis dilectus et intimus domino supradicto, qui inquirens de talibus actibus Theotonicorum, quaecumque explorabat ex illis, dicto domino referebat occulte. Et ecce quodam sero, proditoriis tractatibus consequutis, ordinaverunt Theotonici ipsi sequenti die, sub colore petendorum gagiorum, personaliter comprehendere dominum Voyvadam supradictum; quod sentiens theotonicus ille dicti domini fidelis, abiit ab ipsum dominum, nuntians sibi causam parati misterii."

⁷⁶ CRAG, 150.: "(...) rex autem in castro fortissimo morabatur."

⁷⁷ CRAG, 152.: "Contigit quodam die tunc proximo, duos brigantes pedites cum taxillis ludere cum duobus aliis civibus vitae levis civitatis ipsius, in una taberna; et, ut se[m] p[er] moris est ita ludentium, lites mutuas incoeperunt, ex quibus litibus unus duorum civium percussus fuit in facie ictu pugni ab uno brigantium Lombardorum; qui sentiens se percussus, evaginato gladio, re percussit illum qui percusserat eum pugno. Plurimi quidem brigantes socii qui astabant, videntes socium letaliter esse percussus, irruerunt super illos cives cum ensibus ferientes. Erant etenim in eadem taberna plurimi cives terrae, et tabernis aliis convicinis homines siquidem paris vitae, qui ad rumorem clamantium occurrentes, nota causa rumoris, lapidibus et gladiis irruunt in brigantes. Fugientibus itaque brigantibus ill[is], et eos sequentibus civibus dictae terrae, maxima facta est ex rumore congregatio gentium ex parte utraque; et in momento adunati sunt omnes foresterii p[e]dites parati cum armis, et aextimo ultra miliaria quatuor, et coeperunt persequi quoscumque de terra, si quos inveniebant per rugas; et ob hoc rumor magn[us] efficitur per totam civitatem eadem, campanis pulsantibus ad martellum."

⁷⁸ CRAG, 152.: "Sed brigantes pedites [the Lombards – Á.V.] advenae (...) et reliqui per rugam magnam Sellariae Baroli, lapidando domos et portas frangendo ac disrobando,

The townspeople of Barletta were also apprehensive of the marauding mercenaries in the city, and like the unity of the community of Gravina, they too found themselves powerless against the pillaging actions of the mercenaries. While the German mercenaries roamed the streets brandishing axes, marking the houses they intended to plunder, the Barlettan citizens were equally gripped by helplessness.⁷⁹ Upon learning of the news of the rebellion, King Louis reacted with seething anger and fury, clenching his teeth in agitation. Despite the attempts of those around him to dissuade him from venturing into the midst of the rebels, his temper escalated to the point where he struck some of the soldiers attempting to restrain him across the face with his gauntlets crafted from iron.⁸⁰ The manifestation of the king's rage achieved its desired effect: Konrad von Wolfurt, who displayed greater loyalty to the king, and the German mercenary leaders were unnerved by the king's vehement outburst, prompting them to personally intervene in order to quell the rebellion.⁸¹ Although they led their men out of the city, not all mercenaries accompanied them, thus inaugurating the second phase of the uprising and its subsequent violent activities.

Despite that in the second phase the residents of Barletta did not retreat to their dwellings; instead, they exhibited greater determination to protect the city, themselves, and their belongings. The effective cohesion of the community disrupted and intimidated the marauding mercenaries within the city. The unity of the urban community became intertwined with the assistance provided by István Lackfi, who encouraged those around him to expel the violent mercenaries from the city.⁸² The collective collaboration yielded results, as the

pergebant. (...) Sed nisi quia, bono fato civium eorumdem, in principio rumoris incoepti habitatores gurgi Sancti Jacobi primo, in causa salutis eorum, transitum portae dicti gurgi curribus et trabibus reclauserunt, cives omnes fuissent mactati (...)."

⁷⁹ CRAG, 152.: "(...) Theotonicis et brigantes, secures acutissimas habentes in manibus, ibant per terram signantes quilibet domum suam ut tollat exinde sibi robbam; nec erat qui defenderet domos ipsas, quamvis patroni, clausis januis, intus consisterent, sed tremebant omni quasi auxilio desperati."

⁸⁰ CRAG, 152–153.: "(...) rex retentores suos eosdem cyrothecis ferreis, quas tenebat in manibus, percutiebat in visum."

⁸¹ CRAG, 153.: "(...) videntes regem ita turbatimi, frementem dentibus contra eos eo quod essent de principalibus caporalibus Theotonicorum discurrentium civitatem, acceptis armis, exeunt dictum castrum, promittentes regi penitus talem remove remorem omnesque a terra educere Theotonicos et brigantes."

⁸² CRAG, 153.: "(...) dominus Voyvada, qui cum ipso rege etiam in castro manebat, convocatis secum omni ejus familia et nobilibus pluribus Ungaris quasi duomilibus, eques in puncto fuit armatus. Et equitans cum tam maxima comitiva, vexillo regio praecedente, quasi adhaesit viris civitatis defensoribus loci burgi, animans illos quod audacter post eum feriant in Theotonicis et brigantibus discurrentibus civitatem. Videntes autem universi Ungari quod dominus Voyvada, mandato regio, contra Theotonicos militabat, quodque mandaverat hominibus civitatis audacter irruere super illos omnes, in auxilium hominum civitatis eques fuerunt (...)."

mercenaries' actions proved to be less efficacious.⁸³ The rationale behind this can be traced to the mercenaries' objectives: 1) in Aversa, they shared a common cause in the restitution of their withheld wages, which facilitated their unity and effectiveness; 2) while the violent actions originating from the tavern were motivated by nothing more than vandalism and plunder. Among contemporary authors, few managed to genuinely unveil the motivations behind the mercenaries' uprising. One author in proximity to the Hungarian royal court, János Küküllei, described the mercenaries as rebelling after perceiving that "(...) a multitude of soldiers poured in from Hungary by ship (...). In response, the German soldiers, against the knowledge of their captain, Konrad von Wolfurt, and other superiors, committed treason and disloyalty against the king, the Hungarian forces, and the city they intended to plunder."⁸⁴ However, this explanation is misleading, as it would have been advantageous for the mercenaries if the Hungarian king's position in southern Italy remained stable, ensuring the consistent payment of their wages. Nevertheless, the narrative presented by the Hungarian royal court portrays the mercenaries as envious and avaricious warriors who tremble before the Hungarian superiority, thereby engaging in acts of vandalism and looting.

The successful defense of the city of Barletta also necessitated the presence of the king: it was his anger that impelled the loyal mercenary leaders to rein in their troops. This anger, the *ira regis*, akin to that of King Henry II of England, was eventually managed in a way that rallied the loyal barons to curtail the oppositional actions of the Canterbury Archbishop, Thomas Becket, who, due to the physical aggression of the barons, later became a martyr.⁸⁵ The wrath of kings could thus only provoke actionable responses from those individuals

⁸³ CRAG, 153.: "(...) videntes Theotonicus equites et brigantes obese non posse potentiae gentis terrae, quorum intererat toto corde pugnare contra volentes tollere eis robbam (...)."

⁸⁴ Küküllei, János [cap. 148: De prodicione facta per stipendarios], 178.: "(...) gentes sue de Hungaria per navigia ad ipsum confutuebant, et exercitus eius nimium multiplicabatur. Quod videntes Theutonici soldati absque voluntate eiusdem Corradi Wolffard eorum capitanei ac aliorum principalium prodicionem et insultum fecerunt contra regem et gentem suam Hungaricam et civitatem volentes eam spoliare."

⁸⁵ Boquet, Damien – Nagy, Piroska, *Medieval Sensibilities. A History of Emotions in the Middle Ages*, trans. Shaw, Robert, Cambridge–Medford, 2018. 171–172.; In the case of leaders, the appropriate expression and management of emotions such as anger and others could potentially enhance the efficiency of the company. In this regard, one can already speak of the 'collective emotions' of the company. Authors penning treatises for mercenaries also devoted significant attention to this topic from the fifteenth century onwards, a period that coincided with the ascension of Italian-born mercenary commanders, the condottieri. The management of emotions and passions constituted an integral component of the *ars militaria*, demanding the understanding and mastery of military commanders.; Morosini, Giulia, "From Fearful to Brave: The Shaping of Collective Emotions through Bodily Practices by the Italian Renaissance Condottieri", In: Nagy, Piroska – Bouquet, Damien – Domingues, Lidia Luisa Zanetti (dir.), *Histoire des émotions collectives: Épistémologie, émergences, expériences*. Paris, 2022. 237–258.

who were loyal to them or held some form of close association. King Louis becomes pivotal in quelling the *rumor*, as according to Domenico da Gravina, upon learning that the uprising was subsiding, he was greatly content (*ut scivit rumorem esse finitura, valde contentus factus est*), and subsequently ordered everyone to rest peacefully.⁸⁶ István Lackfi also assisted in dispelling the revolt by emerging from the fortress with the royal standard to suppress the mercenaries. These actions and examples imbued the townspeople with the necessary courage to participate in the city's defense, allowing for the realization of unity and harmony among the defenders. While the mercenaries prevailed in Aversa and achieved their objectives successfully, despite the damages caused by their revolt, in Barletta, the city's inhabitants, including those who opposed them, effectively represented their interests. Conversely, this need not necessarily be interpreted as an 'Hungarophilic' or 'filoungherese' disposition.⁸⁷ It was less about the Hungarians and more about instilling confidence in any ruler or leader from the southern Italian urban communities. These communities' issues emerged against local territorial lords, taking the form of rebellion and struggle, particularly following the death of King Robert, when they perceived that Queen Joanna's realm governed by women and children did not offer them aid.⁸⁸ Nonetheless, they envisioned their lives within the monarchy, liberated from the power of territorial feudal lords.⁸⁹ In the Hungarian ruler, who mourned the loss of his brother and vied for the Neapolitan throne, and who was sensitive to the problems of southern Italian cities, they recognised the force necessary for change. The resistance of the community documented by Domenico da Gravina likewise demonstrated that those cities could successfully represent their interests if they received support from the king and Hungarian military leaders.

⁸⁶ CRAG, 154.

⁸⁷ Cf. Capasso, Bartolommeo, *Le fonti della storia delle provincie Napolitane dal 568 al 1500*. Naples, 1902. 122.; CRAG, xviii.

⁸⁸ Simultaneously, this was paired with a 'nostalgic' lamentation, recalling the old good days under earlier kings: "O quam miserum regnum istud! quod ad regimen mulierum et infantium est deductum. O quam regnicolas singulos lugere oportet! qui dudum praeteritis annis tranquillo pacis statu gaudebant sub regno regis Roberti et progenitorum suorum." CRAG, 19.

⁸⁹ Similar to Gravina, the case of L'Aquila was presented by Buccio di Ranallo, who referred to himself as 'mezzani', as he distanced himself from the oligarchs. In his vernacular chronicle, he outlined to his fellow citizens that they must revert to a state akin to that which thrived in urban life through effective collaboration with the kings. Nevertheless, Buccio did not deem cooperation with the Hungarians as appropriate; on the contrary, he considered it detrimental.; Formentin, Vittorio, "Sfortuna di Bucciodi Ranallo", = *Lingua e Stile* 45, 2010, 185–221.

When crimes become advantageous: examples of betrayal and rapine among allies

The negative composite image of mercenaries, however, was accompanied by contradictions. In wars, the transgressions committed by warriors were not necessarily black or white; rather, they often presented the two sides of the same coin: a matter of perspective on what specific communities deemed as crimes and what they did not. Hereafter, I shall present a few examples pertaining to this. For instance, pillaging characterised not only the mercenaries; even though Domenico da Gravina consistently referred to the Lombard or German mercenaries under the terms *stypendarii*, *maladreni*, and the adverb *disrobandus* was also associated with them. Simultaneously, the Hungarians also laid waste to enemy cities, committing grave atrocities against their inhabitants.⁹⁰ From this plunder and the confiscation of wealth, the inhabitants of Gravina who became exiles and sought refuge among the Hungarians were compensated. Domenico da Gravina, for example, portrayed through dialogues prior to the Barlettan mercenary revolt how he and his associates formulated petitions, requesting land and the opportunity to start anew in a different location.⁹¹

Betrayal, of course, posed a tangible threat, especially if the adversary grew stronger due to the loss of mercenary companies. In response, emissaries were occasionally dispatched to negotiate the terms of treachery or defection. The Neapolitans gained control of one Hungarian-held fortress by employing Lombard mercenaries for its acquisition; subsequently, alongside the Hungarians, mercenaries defending the fortress comprised both groups. This established a sort of common platform among the Lombard mercenaries, yet those Lombards engaged in the defense ultimately betrayed the Hungarians.⁹² Consequently, during the protracted siege, the Neapolitans managed to break the resistance of the Hungarians.⁹³

The Hungarians were not averse to enticing rival mercenaries to their side either. This was the case with a certain Thomas, who was the son of a Hungarian named Paul (Thomas Pauli); apart from his name and lineage, little

⁹⁰ CRAG, 79.: “Eodemque die recesserat idem dominus Voyvoda de civitate Canusii quam undique praedaverant et consumpserant, et recto tramite incedentes ad terram Gaudiani, acriter militaverunt, quam subito aggredientes, similiter destruxerunt, et demum applicuerunt Cornetum.”

⁹¹ CRAG, 150–152.

⁹² CRAG, 91–92.: “(...) in castro erant nationis lombardae, ad stypendya domini regis Ungariae; quibus per quosdam Lombardos sui exercitus loqui sub fiducia faciens, ut moris est bellicorum, eis promississe dicitur magnam pecuniam et vitae praemium siquidem castrum ipsum sibi pretio resignarent.”

⁹³ CRAG, 92.: “(...) et ea nocte diligentius cogitantes dicti Lombardi, assentierunt communiter verbis parium Lombardorum, semper putando qualiter castrum darent in manibus aemulorum ex promisso thesauro. Facto itaque mane, unus illorum castrum egressus est et Lombardis tractatoribus loquuturus adhaesit, Ungaris ignorantibus, et facto simul colloquio et assecuratione recepta habendae promissae pecuniae; rediit illem lombardus referre sociis tractatum completum.”

more is known about him. He was responsible for the defense of the fortresses and strongholds largely situated within the Terra di Bari, ranging from Monte Sant'Angelo to Bari, to prevent their loss, meanwhile, István Lackfi advanced into the territory of Campania and marched against Naples. However, Thomas fell under the influence of a mercenary leader, whom chroniclers refer to as Malospirito, or in other words "Evil Spirit".⁹⁴ Malospirito is the individual who persuades Thomas to recruit mercenaries for themselves from the ranks of the mercenaries led by Giovanni Pipino, which were causing issues to the south of Barletta (in the towns of Trani, Bisceglie, Molfetta, and Giovinazzo).⁹⁵ The transition appears to be easier when the payment of wages becomes uncertain. For example, Giovanni Pipino could only provide three months' worth of wages, leading his mercenaries to understandably embrace the offer from the Hungarians.⁹⁶ These mercenaries, operating within the Terra di Bari region, obtained the necessary funds for wage payment from the relevant *magister rationalis*, Nicolaus Macziae de Manfredonia, Louis the Great's appointed treasurer was in charge of the regions of Barletta and Trani.⁹⁷ Amidst the condemning and uniform descriptions of mercenaries, the chroniclers of the Trecento do not shy away from acknowledging the challenges associated with payment and the frequency of defections and shifts in allegiance. During such periods, when payment of wages became problematic, instances of defection to the enemy side occurred in larger numbers compared to periods of balanced and punctual compensation.

Mercenary leaders could also provide valuable advice and even urge their increasingly impassioned fellow commanders to exercise patience. Werner von Urslingen served the Hungarian interests effectively for a while and together

⁹⁴ CRAG, 112.: "(...) Thomas Pauli jam dictus, operante domino Malospiritu supradicto qui in castro et civitate Andriae morabatur, post paucissimos dies venit Barolum. Et constituti ad invicem, alloquuti sunt jam dicto magistro Nicolao Macziae de Manfredonia regiae curiae magistro rationali, quod si volunt, possunt tollere Pallatino theotonicae gentis, quam tenet, partem majorem, cum quibus de facili potuerint contra eum pugnare (...)."

⁹⁵ He acquired these territories from Queen Johanna, but became avaricious, and tyrannically harassed the regions under his authority. The inhabitants of these areas sought assistance from István Lackfi in response.; Vitale, Giuliana, Giovanni Pipino, In. *Dizionario Biografico degli Italiani*, 84, 2015, https://www.treccani.it/enciclopedia/giovanni-pipino_%28Dizionario-Biografico%29/ (Accessed on 7 January 2024)

⁹⁶ CRAG, 113.: "Et quia stypendiarii multi erant, ultra quingenti, Pallatinus idem vix habebat unde posset satisfacere illis de eorum gagiis constitutis; quoniam de terris et locis quae pro domino Lodovico et regina tenebantur, juxta sibi promissum, nil recipere poterat, et sic tantis stypendyariis gagia constituta praeteritorum trium mensium dare restaverat."

⁹⁷ CRAG, 113.: "Et ecce pervenerunt Barolum Guidomagnus et Colinus comestabuli Theotonici, habentes secum socios equites centum, qui praemissa pacta sibi firmari petierunt quae expressa fuerant inter eos et militem memoratum. Quod libentius faciens dictus magister rationalis solvit ante manum dictis comestabulis Theonicis, tam pro ipsis quam pro futuris aliis, mille ducatos."

with Konrad von Wolfurt, they advised István Lackfi to exercise patience and swiftly negotiate a ceasefire,⁹⁸ although Lackfi was already poised to issue orders to the Hungarian soldiers to apprehend or penalise Giovanni Pipino, who had engaged in provocative behavior and insults directed at the Hungarian king.⁹⁹ This counsel facilitated the swift establishment of rear-guard security in the spring of 1349, enabling Lackfi to prepare for an offensive against Campania and Naples.

Finally, I would like to mention a positive example wherein the role of mercenaries could be transitioned to a different type of responsibility, that of an office conferred by the king. During the dynastic wars, Konrad von Wolfurt and his brother Ulrich von Wolfurt served as mercenary leaders contracted by the Hungarian king. Even during the Aversa uprising, they exhibited unity with their fellow mercenaries, remaining loyal to King Louis. The last payment was made within the Hungarian Kingdom, prompting the German mercenary leaders to stay in the company of the Hungarian king.¹⁰⁰ After receiving their payment, the king summoned the Wolfurts and entrusted them with certain estates in Hungary, along with the associated offices.¹⁰¹ One branch of their family integrated into Hungarian nobility under the name ‘Vöröskői’.¹⁰² While the societal perception of mercenaries was far from positive, it is not entirely justifiable to condemn them outright. Although mercenaries themselves contributed to shaping their reputation, as exemplified by Werner von Urslingen and his coat of arms, there were those among them who met violent deaths in battle or were executed. Behind their combat activities, there might have been goals akin to what the Wolfurt family ultimately achieved. The acquisition of land, wealth, and livelihood was not foreign to them; several returned to their

⁹⁸ CRAG, 71.: “Quod sentiens Corradus Lupus et Dux Guarnerius memoratus, rogaverunt eundem Voyvadam ut talis remaneret insultus, consulentes ei quod promissionem factam per Pallatinum recipiat sub fidei sacramento servandam per eum, et similem promissionem recipiat a Theotonicis caporalibus stypendyariis suis, et ipse Voyvada Pallatinum ipsum non turbet super dominio Melfictae et Juvenatii civitatum.”

⁹⁹ CRAG, 71.: “Audiens autem Voyvada taliter Pallatinum eundem superbe fuisse loquutum, cogitavit protinus intercipere ipsum, et convocato ad se quodam milite ungaro, mandavit ei ut, una cum aliis Ungaris, eundem Pallatinum et gentem capiendos circuirent.”

¹⁰⁰ Kükülle, János, [cap. 154: De reditu regis Lodowici in Hungariam], 174.: “Dimissaque ibidem gente stipendariorum Theutonicorum quattuor millium barbutarum cum Wolffardo et Conrardo [Ulrich and Konrad von Wolfurt – Á.V.] capitaneis, quia nondum erant stipendiis suis plene pagati, ad expensas ad regis rationem computandas ad Hungariam cum gaudio remeavit, et abind stipendia ipsorum complete remisit (...).”

¹⁰¹ Kükülle, János, 174.: “(...) Wolffardum et Conrardum capitaneos ad se vocavit, et pro remuneratione suorum obsequiorum largiftuis regiis donativis ipsos exaltavit. Quorum gesta et servitia in privilegiis concessis explanantur.”

¹⁰² Wertner, Mór, “Két régi család [Two old families]”, = *Turul* 10, 1890, 61–72. 69–72.

hometowns, and even their looting could sometimes serve altruistic purposes. Such was the case with Hüglin von Schöneck, who, following his retirement from active combat, built a chapel in his hometown of Basel, where he donated the relic of Saint Theobald that he had sacked from Vicenza.¹⁰³

¹⁰³ Selzer, *Deutsche Söldner*, 2001. 177.

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HUNGARIAN MERCENARIES IN THE SERVICE OF THE SIGNORIA FIORENTINA¹ (1360–1365)

“Particularly instructive is the case of Hungarian mercenaries, whose importance for the Italian soldier market has not yet been properly recognised.”²

The paper will hopefully contribute to the decades-long polemic around fourteenth century Hungarian light cavalry, although frankly it raises more questions than it answers. No such in-depth research has yet been carried out by Hungarian medievalists in Italian archives, so the details discussed below enrich the current picture of the Hungarian light cavalry with a lot of new information, both in terms of the number of Hungarian mercenaries serving in Italy, their armament, income, the tactics they used, whether operating on their own or as part of an Italian, English or German company. It will also be seen how much they were appreciated both by the experienced condottieri and by the cities and rulers. I am convinced that by systematically processing the incredible amount of sources hidden in the depths of the Italian archives, and with the help of information on Hungarian mercenaries that has hitherto been assembled in the international literature, it will be possible to shed a radically new light on the Hungarian light cavalry of the second half of the fourteenth century.

“The Sources of Medieval Hungarian Military Organisation in Europe (1301–1437)” research group

In the late twentieth and early twenty-first century, a series of comprehensive monographs by American, English, French, German and Italian authors appeared which took a holistic approach to the international mercenary companies in the military history of Trecento and Quattrocento Italy. The mercenaries who played a decisive role in shaping the politics of contemporary Italy and the ever-changing balance of power. These works, all of which are based on the theory of the ‘new military history’, have two things in common: firstly, the problem of mercenaries is never discussed *en sua, but* in the context of Italian society, and secondly, the presence of Hungarians in the service of Italian cities, rulers and international companies. Hungarian historiography has

* The study was sponsored by the National Research, Development and Innovation Office project “Sources of Medieval Hungarian Military Organization in Europe, 1301–1437”, no. K 131711.

¹ The members of the research group who took part in the research project in Florence and recorded the sources found in the archive in the database are Ágnes Virágh, Renáta Visegrádi, Ádám Novák and Tamás Ölbei.

² Selzer, Stephan, *Deutsche Söldner im Italien des Trecento*. Tübingen, 2001. 41.

been lacking a comprehensive, systematic analysis of the history of Hungarians serving as mercenaries in Italy for a century, not only in the last 20 years, but practically since the beginning of the twentieth century.

The ten members of “The Sources of the Medieval Hungarian Military Organisation in Europe (1301–1437)” research group have been working to fill this gap since 2018, when they started to prepare the current project. Researchers from the University of Debrecen participated in the creation of a growing open access MMH resource database.³ The database was created within the framework of the National Research, Development and Innovation Office project “The sources of the medieval Hungarian military organisation in Europe (1301–1437)” (NKFIH K 131711), which is being carried out by the Institute of History of the University of Debrecen. The research group is developing a special software for the operation of the online database (*Monumenta Militaria Hungariae*) containing the sources and images, which also meets the needs of art historical research.⁴

The Polemic on Hungarian Light Cavalry and their Equipment in the Literature

From the international literature, I will now highlight only two authors whose work contributed directly on our research. One of the most comprehensive works on mercenaries is the book of Stephan Selzer, who has bridged a gap left in the historiography on the German mercenaries since Karl Heinrich Schäffer.⁵ The book is indispensable in several respects: firstly, it contains sources on German mercenaries, broken down by Italian archives, with precise source identification. This is important because Hungarian mercenaries joined the German companies in the period, this greatly facilitates research on the presence of Hungarian mercenaries in Italy. On the other hand, the activities of certain mercenary captains who played an important role in Italy, such as Albert Sterz, are described in detail in the 1360s. Like Germain Butaud,⁶ he examines the composition and organisation of companies, analysing recruitment, strategy and tactics, and discusses the role of the ‘Helm und Lanze’ in mercenary warfare. It examines the actual size of the companies and the reasons for their creation, since the German companies of 1350–1370 were multiethnic organisations, and therefore he specifically discusses the role of the English Hungarians, Spaniards, French, and the Italians.

Among English-speaking authors, William Caferro occupies a unique place in the historiography of mercenary companies active in the mid-Trecento. His books and studies contain many valuable source notes on the role of Hungarians in the

³ *Monumenta Militaria Hungariae* [hereinafter MMH] <https://monumenta.militaria-hungaria.hu/monumenta-web/> (accessed on 20 December 2023)

⁴ More information about the research programme can be found on the *Memoria Hungariae* Research Group’s website and Facebook page.

⁵ Schäffer, Karl Heinrich, *Deutsche Ritter und Edelknechte in Italien während des 14. Jahrhunderts: im päpstlichen Dienste*. Vol. I–III. Paderborn, 1911–1914.

⁶ Butaud, Germain, *Les compagnies de routiers en France (1357–1393)*. Clermont-Ferrand, 2012.

multi-ethnic companies. One of William Caferro's many studies of Florence and the situation of mercenaries in Italy in the fourteenth century in general is the long-term employability of mercenaries. William Caferro confidently draws on sources in Italian archives such as those in Florence where Camera del Comune, Scrivano di Camera mercenary censuses have been fortunately preserved over successive long years. William Caferro scans the sources and analyses the nationality of each caporale, captain, senechal, how long they served the city and how long their commissions were. From this data, it is possible to draw a wide range of conclusions and even arrive at surprising results.⁷

Hungarian historiography naturally focused on Louis's campaigns in Italy and paid much less attention to the history of the Hungarians who fought in Italy in the decades following 1352.⁸ In the nineteenth century, historians focused on Nicholas Toldi in relation to the Hungarian mercenaries in Italy, just as much as the English literature focused on Sir John Hawkwood. The most important study on the subject in the first decades of the twentieth century is by Elemér Mályusz on Toldi's years in Italy.⁹ The study draws heavily on Schäffer's book and published Hungarian archival sources, but lacks archival research in Italy. Mályusz's second short study is a study of Nicholas Toldi's stay in Italy, drawing on the same literature and sources as his more detailed study. The 1926 study is actually an extended version of this 1923 one.¹⁰ Antal Pór wrote his biography of King Louis the Great based on extensive European literature, published Hungarian and Italian sources and documents.¹¹ Gyula Szekfű's book contains important information about the familiars who served as mercenaries in Italy and returned from there, and who received a royal donation.¹² Wertner published several articles related to the Hungarian presence in Italy. In one of his essays, he discussed the itinerary of Louis the Great's campaigns in Italy.¹³ In another study, he wrote about the visit of Nicholas Toldi to Florence, when Toldi came to Florence as an envoy of Louis the Great to convey the king's request for a female lion cub. He also mentions, of course, his role in the White Company.¹⁴ In another article he summarises the Hungarian campaigns of the fourteenth century, not

⁷ Caferro, William, "Continuity, Long-term Service, and Permanent Forces: A Reassessment of the Florentine Army in the Fourteenth Century", = *The Journal of Modern History* 80:2, 2008, 219–251.

⁸ Louis of Hungary returns from his Second Naples campaign.

⁹ Mályusz, Elemér, "A Toldi-monda történeti alapja" [The historical basis of the Toldi saga], = *Hadtörténeti Közlemények* 25, 1924, 3–33.

¹⁰ Mályusz, Elemér, "Toldi Miklós Olaszországban" [Toldi Miklós in Italy], = *Irodalomtörténet* 12, 1923, 17–23.

¹¹ Pór, Antal, *Nagy Lajos 1326–1382* [Louis the Great 1326–1382]. Budapest, 1892.

¹² Szekfű, Gyula, *Szerviensek és familiárisok* [Serviens and familiars]. Budapest, 1912.

¹³ Wertner, Mór, "Nagy Lajos király hadjáratai (1343–1383)" [The campaigns of King Louis the Great], = *Hadtörténeti Közlemények* 19, 1918, 59–97 and 202–271.

¹⁴ Wertner, Mór, "Adalékok Toldi Miklós életrajzához" [Additional Information on the life of Toldi Miklós], = *Akadémiai Értesítő* 24, 1913, 172–180.

only those led by the king, but also those led by one of his leading barons (e.g.: Stephen Lackfi) to Italy on royal order.¹⁵

Among the historians who had dealt with the role of the Hungarian light cavalry, there were some who had assumed its disappearance by the mid-fourteenth century. Among them was Zoltán Tóth active between the two world wars, who argued that “the Hungarian soldier had at least as much of a Western appearance as we see in the miniatures of the Illuminated Chronicle¹⁶ concerning Hungarians.”¹⁷ According to him, the difference between Western and Hungarian military technology disappeared in the fourteenth century.¹⁸ András Borosy stated that the Hungarian mercenaries consisted of two elements: the “most adventurous and less wealthy part” of the Hungarian lords with knightly arms and the warrior villain. He also articulated his doubts on the composition of the light cavalry: “How many of the latter were Hungarians and how many were Cumans¹⁹— we do not know for sure.”²⁰ János B. Szabó argued that the vast majority of the troops mentioned in Western sources did not have “the expensive, complete equipment necessary for the cavalry fighting style, but they probably had bows”, since “there are not many references in the sources about the appearance and fighting style of these troops, why should we assume that they were not similar to the light horses described by foreign chroniclers.”²¹ He concluded that this Hungarian archery was an integral part of Italian warfare.²² He based his opinion on a study on the subject by Attila Bárány, who came to this conclusion by examining English and Hungarian mercenary companies.²³ In the last twenty years he has published a series of studies on the cooperation of

¹⁵ Wertner, Mór, “Magyar hadjáratok a XIV-ik században” [Hungarian campaigns in the XIV century], = *Századok* 38, 1905, 420–451.

¹⁶ The illuminated chronicle was produced in 1358 in the international artistic style at the court of King Louis I of Hungary. The text is the most complete record of Hungary’s medieval historical tradition, dating back to the eleventh century and including the mythical past of the nation.

¹⁷ Tóth, Zoltán, “A huszárok eredetéről” [On the origin of the Hussars], = *Hadtörténelmi Közlemények* 35, 1934, 129–136.

¹⁸ Borosy, András, “A XI–XIV. századi magyar lovasságról” [About the Hungarian cavalry of the 11–14 centuries], = *Hadtörténelmi Közlemények* 9:1, 1962, 119–175.

¹⁹ Some of the privileged peoples living in the Hungarian kingdom (the Kuns, the Besenyaks, the Szeklers) were also selected to take part as mercenaries in the campaigns in Italy. The Kuns revived the old Hungarian cavalry fighting style, which can be read in Villani.

²⁰ Borosy, A XI–XIV. századi magyar lovasságról, 1962. 157.

²¹ B. Szabó, János, *A honfoglalástól a huszárokig. A középkori magyar könnyűlovasságról* [From the Hungarian Conquerors to the Hussars – Light Cavalry in Medieval Hungary]. Budapest, 2010. 119.

²² B. Szabó, János, *A középkori magyarországi könnyűlovassága, X–XVI század* [Light Cavalry of Medieval Ages in Hungarian Kingdom, 10–16th Centuries]. Máriabesnyő, 2017. 167.

²³ Bárány, Attila, “Angol-magyar zsoldoskompaniák a 14. századi Itáliában” [English-Hungarian Mercenary companies in 14th century Italy], In. Bárány, Attila – Laszlovszky,

English and Hungarian mercenaries in Italy in the second half of the fourteenth century including the great Hungarian army of 1372 and the mercenary company which was led, exceptionally by a Hungarian, János Horváti Warden of Macsó (Mačva) in 1379.²⁴ Attila Bárány rightly described the Hungarian light cavalry as a “hobelar type, light-armoured, leather breast-plate or a double leather jerkin wearing mounted warrior.”²⁵ Adinel C. Dincă has recently published an important study on Hungarian mercenaries serving in the Pontifical state in 1362, where he also concludes that “The typical Hungarian company was divided into small units, usually around 20 men and horses, all light cavalrymen and bowmen, who shot arrows from their mounts...”²⁶

The *Codice degli stipendiarii della repubblica di Firenze* from 1369, issued by the City of Florence, specified wages of the mercenaries and, in general and for each nation specifically serving Florence, the equipment and armaments they must had to have before the condotta could be launched.²⁷ As a general rule, all conestabiles, regardless of their nation of origin, were required to wear the same equipment: “First greaves and cuisses, musekins and *bracciali*,²⁸ *gorgiera*,²⁹ sleeves and gussets of mail, cuirass, barbuta and gauntlets of iron, sword, dagger, and targe. And their horses had to have bards or cruppers of iron or of mail.” Nation-specifically, an English caporalis should have had the following equipment: shin splints, cuisse, breast plate, bracelets, iron gloves, barbuta, a sword, dagger, and spear. The German, Burgundian and Italian caporales had to appear at musters with the same armour and weapons, but unlike the English, they did not have spears. Their horses had to have bards or iron cuppers of iron, or of mail. A Hungarian conestabilis and caporalis had to have *pancerone*,³⁰ iron gloves, an iron helmet, bow or spear, sword and dagger. The horsemen of a Hungarian conestabilis had to have bows and arrows, swords, daggers, and iron gloves. If they did not show up at the muster with the proper equipment, the mercenaries had to pay a penalty, again this was nation-specific: Hungarian mercenaries were fined 2 libre if they did not have the proper armour, 2 libre if they did

József – Papp, Zsuzsanna (eds.), *Angol-Magyar kapcsolatok a középkorban* [English - Hungarian Relations in the Middle Ages]. Gödöllő-Máriabesnyő, 2008. 227–243.

²⁴ Bárány, Attila, “The Communion of English and Hungarian Mercenaries in Italy”, In. Barta, János – Papp, Klára – Bárány, Attila – Györkös, Attila (eds.), *The First Millennium of Hungary in Europe*. Debrecen, 2002. 130–148.

²⁵ Bárány, The Communion, 2002. 134.

²⁶ Dincă, Adinel C., “Hungarian Mercenaries Serving the Pontifical State. A Vatican Source from 1362 and the Beginning of a Discussion”, In. Fara, Andrea (ed.), *Italia ed Europa centro orientale tra Medioevo ed Età moderna. Economia, Società, Cultura*. Heidelberg, 2022. 43–54.

²⁷ Ricotti, Ercole, *Storia delle compagnie di ventura in Italia*. Vol. II.: 1311–1327. Torino, 1845. 315–329.

²⁸ Bracelet.

²⁹ Gorget.

³⁰ Haubergeon, Chainmail

not have a bow and arrow, 1 libre³¹ for the lack of other type of equipment.³² Florentine sources detail the punishments meted out separately to infantrymen and cavalrymen for lack of armour and weapons, including bows and arrows. It turns out that bows and arrows were necessary for Hungarian mercenaries at the muster and, as János B. Szabó rightly assumed, were part of their basic equipment. The Italian sources even mention the Italian name of the bow what the Hungarians used in the middle of the fourteenth century: it was called *stambecchino*, a small flexible bow.³³

The Integration of Hungarian Mercenaries in the Companies of Adventure

Hungarian soldiers served together with mercenaries from a wide variety of nations in Italy for decades after 1352. The *Codice degli stipendiarii della repubblica di Firenze* gave an account of the origin of the foreign soldiers serving in the multiethnic companies with which the Hungarians cooperated. It mentions the Burgundians, Germans, Italians, English besides the Hungarians in the service of the city. However, in the famous Werner von Urslingen's³⁴ company Hungarian mercenaries, besides the Germans, served along Catalan soldiers as well.³⁵ Between 1360 and 1366, Hungarian mercenaries reached the Eastern Mediterranean twice as part of multiethnic armies recruited in Italy. Firstly in 1364, they were represented in the army led by the Italian condottieri Luchino dal Verme, a friend of Petrarch, who was commissioned by Venice to put down the Cretan rebellion, together with "*Alamani, Anglici, Sclavi, Italici and Ultramontani*."³⁶ Two years later, Hungarian mercenaries participated in Amadeus VI of

³¹ 1 florin of Florence worth about 2,3 libre (lira).

³² Ricotti, *Storia delle compagnie*, 1845. 315–329.

³³ Archivio di Stato di Firenze [hereinafter ASF], Dieci di balia, Deliberazioni condotte e stanziamenti, 3. f. 82r-83r.; Caferro, William, *John Hawkwood: An English Mercenary in Fourteenth-Century Italy*. Baltimore, 2006. 90.

³⁴ Werner, Duke Urslingen was probably part of the first great company that was formed in 1338/39 in Italy. His famous motto: "*Duca Guarnieri, signore della Grande Compagnia, nemico di Dio di pietà e di misericordia*." He was in service in the Naples wars of Louis I of Hungary. In the 1350s he was in the service of many rulers and city-states, such as Bologna and Giovanni Visconti, in central and northern Italy.

³⁵ Caferro, John Hawkwood, 2006. 65.

³⁶ 29 April 1364: Anjou-kori Oklevéltár. [Angevine Archives] I–XV., XVII–XXXVIII., XL., XLII., XLIV., XLVI–LI. Suppl. Editor-in-chief: Kristó, Gyula. Eds. Almási, Tibor – Blazovich, László – Géczi, Lajos – B. Halász, Éva – Kordé, Zoltán – Kófalvi, Tamás – Makk, Ferenc – Piti, Ferenc – Rábai, Krisztina – Sebők, Ferenc – Szócs, Tibor – Teiszler, Éva – Tóth, Ildikó. Szeged–Budapest, 1990–2023. n. 272.; *Magyar diplomáciai emlékek az Anjou-korból*. Ed.: Wenzel, Gusztáv. Vols I–III. Budapest, 1874–1876. (Monumenta Hungariae Historica, IV. Acta Extera. Diplomáciai emlékek, I–III.) [hereinafter MHH] 1875. 609–610. n. 445.

Savoy's³⁷ crusade to liberate Gallipoli in 1365/6 with French, Spanish, English, Italians, and Czechs.³⁸

According to the sources and research carried out so far, Hungarians first served mainly in the German-led companies in the 1350s and then besides the Germans in the English-led companies from the 1360s onwards and less often in Italian *compagnia di ventura* unless they were directly in the service of the individual Italian cities. There were only few examples of Hungarian captains in the second half of the fourteenth century between 1360 and 1366. In 1361, under the leadership of Nicholas Athinay “Nicolaum filium Johannis de Othim Comitem et Capitaneum”³⁹ a landlord of Sopron county,⁴⁰ the “Magne Societas Ungarorum” entered the service of Queen Joanna of Naples and her consort Louis of Taranto.⁴¹ Nicholas Bókai, Peter Bessenyei, Peter Erdélyi, Stephen Kozmafi, John Péterfi were asked by Egidio Albornoz in Ravenna to give their solemn oath in the name of their troops not to cause any damage to the Catholic Church in December 1362.⁴²

Two levels of integration can be observed: one is the level of banner, when whole banners joined the companies of adventure. In the period 1360–1365 this was the typical case, while the leaders of the Hungarian mercenaries were usually *conestabilis* much less often *caporalis*.⁴³ Such was the case of the Hungarian mercenary company led by Peter Nagy (Petrus de Grande), Andrew Buday (Andreasius de Buday) and Gregory Tolnay (Gregoris de Tona), which in 1362 belonged to the German *condottieri* company of Heinrich von Englingen.⁴⁴ From Elemér Mályusz and Attila Bárány's research we know that Nicholas Toldi served as a *conestabilis* under Sir John Hawkwood in 1360s as well.⁴⁵ Or, as can be seen in 1384, an English *condottiero*, John Threlkeld, who signed a contract

³⁷ He was not only an accomplished statesman, but also *athleta Christi*, model of a Christian knight as Eugene L. Cox states in the preface of his book on Amadeus of Savoy: “He was the child of an age of transition from medieval chivalry toward Machiavellian realism...” Cox, Eugene L, *The Green Count of Savoy, Amadeus VI and Transalpine Savoy in the Fourteenth-Century*. New Jersey, 1967. VIII.

³⁸ Archivio di Stato di Torino [hereinafter AST], Conto delle spese fatte nella spedizione del conte Amedeo VI in Oriente, f.22, 44, 56.; *Illustrazioni della spedizione in Oriente di Amadeo VI. (Il Conte Verde)*. Ed. Bollati di Saint-Pierre, Emanuele Federico, Torino, 1900. 64, 117, 151, 322.

³⁹ MHH, 571–578. n. 417.

⁴⁰ Rázsó, Gyula, “A zsoldosintézmény kezdetei Magyarországon” [The Begging of Mercenary System in Hungary], = *Hadtörténelmi Közlemények* 2, 1960, 107–143.

⁴¹ MHH, 571–578. n. 417.

⁴² *L'administration des États de L'Église au XIV^e siècle. Correspondance des légats et vicaires-généraux Gil Albornoz et Androin de la Roche (1353–1367)*. Eds. Glénisson, Jean – Mollat, Guillaume, Paris, 1964. 273. n. 844. [hereinafter CGAAR]

⁴³ See their role in Hungarian banners below, under the ‘Organisation of companies’.

⁴⁴ Lukcsics, Pál, “Olaszországban vitézkedő magyar lovagok jelvényei a XIV. században” [Insignia of Hungarian Knights Fighting in Italy in the 14th century], = *Turul* 45, 1931, 84–88.

⁴⁵ Bárány, The Communion, 2002. 133.

with Florence for 100 lances⁴⁶ and four months. The city specifically authorised the English captain to hire 302 Hungarian archers and integrate them into his company.⁴⁷ This is not the only reference in the Florentine archives about an English condottiero who reinforced his company with Hungarian archers. In September 1365, Sir John Hawkwood arrived in Tuscany with the newly formed Company of Saint George,⁴⁸ where he spent six months.⁴⁹ Florence, fearful of the company's plans, immediately sent envoys to "Ambrogio Visconti da melano e mess. John Acuto."⁵⁰ The Florentine ambassador, Doffo de Bardi, used every argument to convince them that Florence had always held them in high esteem and had done everything to help them, including allowing Hungarian mercenaries to leave the city's service and join the company.⁵¹

At the same time, there was another level of integration, where mercenaries individually joined a multiethnic company. There are far fewer examples of this in the archives, such as a fragmentary source from Perugia, which contains the names of 25 soldiers of the *compagnia di ventura* of two German conestabiles, Tedericus de Sonechio and Herigus de Gulfort: Hungarians are also found here, along with Germans.⁵²

Condotte, Wages, Recruitment, Employment

The Italian cities employed German mercenaries along with a large number of Hungarian companies, which were called *banderium* (banner) in contemporary sources,⁵³ it is therefore worth examining what was included in a *condotta* with a German condottiero concluded at the time, which also applied to Hungarian mercenaries.

"In 1363, two recruiters from Florence appeared in Constance, made numerous agreements with Wolfhard, Count of Veringen, and had his *condotta* sealed on 23 December."⁵⁴ The Count himself led 50 mounted men, but in the *condotta* he undertook to provide a total of 125 *barbuta*⁵⁵ for the duration of 6 months. The

⁴⁶ A lance in the middle of Trecento Italy consisted of a man-at-arms supported by a squire and a page, each with his own horse. They fought on foot, the page took care of the horses while the squire provided support for the man-at-arms.

⁴⁷ ASF, Dieci di balia, Deliberazioni condotte e stanziamenti, 2. f. 2r-2v.; Ricotti, *Storia delle Compagnie*, 1845. 329–333.

⁴⁸ Bernabò Visconti's bastard son, Ambrogio was captain-general of the company. See Fowler, Kenneth, "Sir John Hawkwood and the English condottieri in Trecento Italy", In: DeVries, Kelly (ed.), *Medieval Warfare, 1300–1450*. London–New York, 2010. 139.

⁴⁹ Caferro, John Hawkwood, 2006. 122.

⁵⁰ ASF, Signori-Carteggi, Missive I Cancelleria, 13. f. 66r.

⁵¹ Caferro, John Hawkwood, 2006. 123.

⁵² Archivio di Stato di Pisa, Miscellanea n. 47.

⁵³ ASF, Camera del Comune, Scrivano di Camera, Uscita 21. f. 40v.; MMH, 10051.

⁵⁴ Selzer, *Deutsche Söldner*, 2001. 47.

⁵⁵ Ever since German mercenaries had served in Italy, the basic unit under which they were recruited and which was also the unit of account for the *condotta* was called the *barbuta*, named after the German mercenaries' helmets. See: Selzer, *Deutsche Söldner*, 2001. 55.

count as condottiero received 200 florins per month, a total 1 200 florins. Wolfhard's obligations included having two destriers, a palfrey and two comedians who played on a whistle or a semi-drum. The leaders of the three additional banners received 50 Florentine florins a month. A caporalis led two armed men, their two horses, an unarmed servant and his smaller horse, this unit received 18 florins per month, from which nothing was deducted. An advance (*prestenza*), 1,500 Florentine florins was paid to the company of Wolfhard in the castle of Burgun.⁵⁶ After they had made the approximately 700 kilometre journey from Constance on their way to Florence, they had to stop at Padua for a muster where their service began and where they were mustered, at which point they were to be paid a monthly stipend in cash, per head, without deductions. On arrival in Florence, they had to serve the pay they had received during 24 days of the month. Once they had served the 24 days, a monthly salary was to be paid by Florence to the members of the mercenary company. One month before the expiry of the six-month condotta, Florence had to notify Wolfhard that it still required his services. In the case of a prolongation, the count of Veringen had to serve for another six months with the same pay and with the same conditions and rights as those enjoyed by mercenaries who had served the city of Florence for twenty years: for example, double pay in the event of an enemy attack or the capture of an enemy castle. If any member of Wolfhard's company lost a horse, he was compensated by Florence, from which he was obliged to buy a new horse and had eight days to equip it. During this period the soldier received full pay. If Florence did not require the Count's further services, the company was allowed free passage, tax-free, through the areas controlled by the city. After six months of service, the members of the company were required to swear that they would not act against Florence within one year, either in word or deed. Of course they had to obey the orders of the military leaders of Florence. During the period of service, the members of the company had to appear at least twice in muster. In the event of a dispute between the city and the members of the company, it was to be settled by a committee of four, to which the Count delegated two members and the leadership of Padua and Florence each contributed one member. If no agreement could be reached, a fifth German mercenary was to join. If there were any changes to Heinrich von Montfort-Tettnang's⁵⁷ treaty, they would apply to the Count.⁵⁸

Florence paid for horses killed at war. One can gain insight into the sophisticated compensation system that the city organised. The mercenary payments for certain years also included restitution for horses. In each case, the name of the mercenary is indicated, the details of his banner, the exact date of the horse's injury, the date of its death (if there is a difference between the two dates) and the evidence presented to the Florentine official, who had to approve them.

⁵⁶ Selzer, *Deutsche Söldner*, 2001. 48.

⁵⁷ German condottiero, active in Italy from the mid-1360s. He served, among others, in Florence and enjoyed a long career over two decades.

⁵⁸ ASF, Diplomatico, Riformagioni atti pubblici 23 December 1363; Selzer, *Deutsche Söldner*, 2001. Anhang III. 393–396.

Only then could the compensation be paid, and only then could the legal basis for the payment be stated, as set out in the condotta analysed above. Thus, for example, Giorgio Petri, one of the Hungarian conestabiles, was paid 12 florins for his horse, which perished in the fighting at Castelfiorentino on 14 June 1364. The importance of this type of entry cannot be over emphasised, since it is possible to learn exactly against whom the condottiero or connestabilis had fought.⁵⁹

The sources of the Florentine archives dating back to 1360–1365 include the name of the conestabiles or caporales, the duration and date of the condotta, the number of the hired banner (for Hungarians this always meant horsemen and is given in capita) and the amount per capita, as well as the amount paid to the banners at the end of the condotta.⁶⁰ With regard to the payments made to the Hungarian banner in Florence, some general conclusions can be drawn as to how a Hungarian conestabilis might have calculated his income before he took the decision to go to Florence. Although there are of course differences between individual payments, the recurrent items suggest that a Hungarian conestabilis, if he was already in the service of Florence or before he went, could foresee the amount of the pay in advance. An average Hungarian banner of 10 people, including the conestabilis himself, received 88 florins for 4 months in a condotta in 1362.⁶¹ Under the same conditions, a banner of 12 people received 104 florins,⁶² while a banner of 14 people was paid 120 florins.⁶³ These amounts are shown as standard payments in the sources. It can be estimated from the total of payments how much money the city of Florence paid to the Hungarians in each year. The estimate is an approximation of the amount paid out, as the accounting was done in several instalments and the data are sometimes incomplete or do not give the exact length of the condotta. Taking into account to the record that between May and June 1361, according to records, the city of Florence had paid a total of nearly 3,400 florins to the Hungarian banners.⁶⁴ Between November and December 1362,⁶⁵ the amount of payments increased sevenfold to approximately 24 350 florins, which, of course, in addition to the increased number of people, is also due to the fact that in 1362 condotte were concluded for an average of four months.⁶⁶ Comparing the payments between June and August

⁵⁹ ASF, Camera del Comune, Scrivano di Camera, Uscita 21. f. 40v.; MMH, 10051.

⁶⁰ ASF, Camera del Comune, Scrivano di Camera, Uscita 13. f. 33v.

⁶¹ ASF, Camera del Comune, Scrivano di Camera, Uscita 18. f. 33v, 46v, 44r, 40v, 45v, 46v, 47v, 57r.

⁶² ASF, Camera del Comune, Scrivano di Camera, Uscita 18. f. 43r, 43v, 45v, 46r, 48r, 56v, 59v.

⁶³ ASF, Camera del Comune, Scrivano di Camera, Uscita 18. f. 43v, 56r, 57r.

⁶⁴ ASF, Camera del Comune, Scrivano di Camera, Uscita 13.

⁶⁵ A large number of Hungarian mercenaries were available in Italy thanks to the arrival in Italy of a Hungarian army of about 6 000 men led by Simone della Morte.; See Csukovits, Enikő, *Magyarországról és a magyarokról. Nyugat-Európa-képe a középkorban* [The Image on Hungary and the Hungarians in Western Europe in the Middle Ages]. Budapest, 2013. 88.

⁶⁶ ASF, Camera del Comune, Scrivano di Camera, Uscita 18.

1364 with those in 1362, it is clear that despite the fact that Florence received a similar number of Hungarian banners, the income of the Hungarians fell by almost half to 13 057 florins.⁶⁷ This was due to a drastic reduction in employment: in 1364, the number of four-month condotte was the lowest, and one, two or three-month mercenary contracts were much more common.

By comparing the income of mercenaries in Florentine service with that of mercenaries in other Italian cities it is possible to determine the value of the earnings of Hungarian mercenaries in the light of those of others. In 1359, the city of Siena paid 7.5 florins per month for a barbuto when the great company of Konrad von Landau threatened their city.⁶⁸ In the early 1370s a lance in the service of Siena received 18 florins, however by 1376 it declined to 16 florins per month. In 1384, the city of Siena hired Guido d'Asciano for four months to fend off the approaching Breton threat.⁶⁹ The condottiero signed three contracts with the city: in the first contract they gave Guido 2 florins per horse per month for 477 horses, then when the city leaders learned that Sir John Hawkwood was also approaching the city they signed a new contract with Guido for 656 horses, again at 2 florins per month, but eventually the threat was considered so great that they hired 800 horses, but at 3 florins per month. All this is interesting because it shows the value of the Hungarian horsemen, for whom, as we have seen, Florence paid 2.5 to 4 times more a month than Siena to Guido d'Asciano's company members.⁷⁰ Karl Heinrich Schäffer came to the same conclusion that Hungarian mercenaries regularly earned more than Germans.⁷¹

This worth is shown by the fact that a simple farmer or an unskilled construction worker earned 9.4 soldi per day, a wool spinner of wool cloths received 12.7 soldi while a master builder earned 17.1 soldi.⁷² Hence, a Hungarian conestabilis earned about 40 soldis a day, while a cavalryman serving in his banner earned 20 soldi that meant that *a priori* they could manage their daily living more easily than most of the less qualified Florentine citizens. A Hungarian conestabilis earned almost two and a half times as much as a master builder and more than four times as much as a construction worker. Even a horseman serving in his banner earned more than a master builder and twice as much as a farmer. The daily cost of living in fourteenth century Tuscany is estimated at

⁶⁷ ASF, Camera del Comune, Scrivano di Camera, Uscita 21.

⁶⁸ Caferro, William, *The Companies of Adventure and the Decline of Siena*. Baltimore–London, 1998. 52.

⁶⁹ Guido d'Asciano was sent to Maremma where the Bretons, who controlled Bolsena and Canino, raided the countryside. He then successfully reconquered Corneto, also in Breton hands, and entrusted it to the Rector of the Patrimony Simonetto Baglioni.; See Ciucciiovino, Carlo, *La cronaca del Trecento Italiano*. Vol. IV.: 1376–1400. Roma, 2020. 421.

⁷⁰ Caferro, *The Companies of Adventure*, 1998. 53.

⁷¹ Schäffer, *Deutsche Ritter*, 1911. Vol. II., 22.

⁷² The exchange rate was fixed by William Caferro for 1390 at 1 florin 75 soldi.; Caferro, John Hawkwood, 2006. 75.

3 soldi, so a Hungarian horseman earning 20 soldi made a much easier living than a crossbowman earning 9.7 soldi or a simple foot soldier earning 3.8 soldi.⁷³

Added to this was the income from the loot, it is easy to understand why so many Hungarian mercenaries served in Trecento Italy. In some cases, the income from loot or ransoms was many times higher than that of a captain or even a simple mercenary in Italy or in France. The capture of a small town or castle could mean thousands of florins for the company, especially if locals wanted to get rid of the mercenaries quickly. Two mercenary captains could pocketed thousands of florins during Edward III's 1360 campaign in eastern France. The English army had already left Burgundy and was on its way to Paris, crossing the barony of Donzy and the county of Nevers. During this period of the campaign, two captains in particular played a prominent role: the Welshman John Wynn, the porsuant of love, and a Gascon captain, Garciot Chastel. Wynn, as commander of the fortress of Beaufort, joined the English army on the spot. He quickly captured the town of Clemency and made the inhabitants⁷⁴ pay 7 000 florins, taking hostages until the full amount was paid.⁷⁵ Garciot Chastel, having captured several castles, agreed a ransom of 5 000 florins with the local lords. The locals did everything they could to pay the amounts they had negotiated, borrowing if they had to, regardless of the consequences, because they knew that if they didn't "otherwise the said land will be completely destroyed."⁷⁶ William Caferro's research revealed that the condottieri received special gifts in addition to the amount stipulated in the contract to be paid to the company to avoid the plundering and the destruction of the contado that accompanied the presence of the companies.⁷⁷ However, Adinel C. Dincă's research in the Vatican did not reveal any similar type of records concerning Hungarian mercenaries in the 1360s.⁷⁸

William Caferro has systematically examined the bribe money paid by Siena to the passing companies from 1354 to 1399. The payments examined for this period include payments to the companies of Johann Haneken Bongard and Albert Sterz and Ambrogio Visconti, in which Hungarians were involved.⁷⁹ In his analysis, William Caferro discusses separately other benefits in addition to cash payments, including various gifts, supplies for the troops that discussed other benefits in addition to cash payments separately, wine, food and fodder

⁷³ Caferro, John Hawkwood, 2006. 75.

⁷⁴ Chérest, Aimé, *L'Archiprêtre: épisodes de la guerre de cent ans au XIVe siècle*. Paris, 1879. 87.; Luce, Siméon, *Histoire de Bertrand du Guesclin et de son époque. La jeunesse de Bertrand (1320–1364)*. Paris, 1876. 490.

⁷⁵ Petit, Ernest, *Histoire des ducs de Bourgogne de la race Capétienne Règne de Philippe de Rouve 1349–1361, La Bourgogne sous le roi Jean II 1361–1363*. Vol. IX., Dijon, 1905. 194.

⁷⁶ Archives départementales du Nord, B. 757. n. 8060.

⁷⁷ Caferro, William, *Mercenary Companies and the Decline of Siena*. Baltimore, 1998. 39.

⁷⁸ Dincă, Hungarian Mercenaries, 2022. 52.

⁷⁹ Caferro, *Mercenary Companies*, 1998. 37–38.

for horses.⁸⁰ Among the Italian chronicles of the period, the Chronicle of L'Aquila gives a detailed account of the march of the 800-strong company led by Nicholas Athinay from Naples toward the north of Italy in May 1361. There are many similarities between the Hungarian troops marching through the territory of L'Aquila and the companies arriving in Siena, but there are also significant differences. The Hungarians approached L'Aquila with essentially peaceful intentions. Before crossing, they spent two weeks in the Sulmona field, some 60 kilometres south of the town, while negotiations were under way. The town magistrate considered the Hungarian company too large and asked the Hungarian condottiero to cross the proximity of the town in two groups of two groups of 400 men, surrounded by the escort provided by the town. In return, the town agreed to supply the Hungarians with all their supplies.⁸¹ The big difference compared to all the other similar examples I have investigated in France, Germany and Spain in the middle of the fourteenth century is that the Hungarians provided hostages (60) for L'Aquila during the march. The Hungarians passed through closed gates and high city walls, under the watchful eye of guards, and without major atrocities, and crossed the territory of L'Aquila and continued their march towards Florence.⁸²

However, a similar practice can be seen in the contract of 1363 between the town of Todi and the Compagnia del Cappelletto, mentioned above. According to the agreement, the company was to stay outside the city walls for five days in the area assigned by the city. During these five days, the company sent the following as hostages to the city: the nobleman Leonardo de Frescobaldis of Florence and the caporalis Bertuccius de Sabatini of Bologna. The treaty was signed and sealed among others by one more Hungarian, Gregorius Nicolaus de Ungaria caporalis, in addition to the aforementioned Lanzilloti Ungari. The parties agreed that the city, like the company of Nicholas Athinay in L'Aquila, would supply the Compagnia del Cappelletto with forage and food. In the contract, the company undertakes, of course, not to occupy castles, not to rob the contado, not to molest the inhabitants in any way. The town also allowed the members of the company, in groups of up to 25, to enter the town of Todi and to go purchase goods in the town, but of course not to harass the local citizens in any way. If they do, they can be arrested by the city council and punished according to the town's laws. The treaty takes special care to prevent any outcasts from Todi from contacting the company, if they do, the company's leadership must turn them over to the city. Outcasts are not allowed to enter the city with members of the company. If they conspire against Todi with members of the company, the leaders of the Compagnia del Cappelletto must punish the rebels.

⁸⁰ Caferro, *Mercenary Companies*, 1998. 41–43.

⁸¹ “Che dareli facesse órgio, pane et vino.” Ranallo, Buccio di, *Cronaca Aquilana*. Ed. de Bartholomaeis, Vincenzo, Roma, 1907. 280.

⁸² “Vedevano per le mura et dentro multa gente, Passaro in granne prescia, non se fixero niente” Ranallo, *Cronaca Aquilana*, 1907. 279–280.; Ciucciovino, Carlo, *La Cronaca del Trecento Italiano*. Vol. III.: 1351–1375. Roma, 2016. 468.

The contracting parties have also undertaken that if, during the five days, one of them is attacked from outside by a third party, they will be obliged to use all their forces to come to the aid of the attacked party at their own expense.⁸³

Another income for the mercenaries was the ransom. If valuable prisoners were captured in battle, there was also a substantial income to be made: in the Battle of Brignais⁸⁴ in 1362, the companies inflicted a crushing defeat on the French royal army, and so the prisoners were a major source of revenue. The receipt of Henry de Lorny, sire of Raon serves as proof that he had received 5 500 florins from the count of Tancarville, the king's lieutenant in Burgundy, to pay for the losses, damage and ransom of several knights, mercenary captains and their troops who had served in the royal army at Brignais.⁸⁵ Of the 5 500 florins, 1 000 florins were given to the Receiver General of Burgundy, and 4 500 florins were distributed among the people mentioned in the document.⁸⁶ Of course, ransom was not only available for those captured in battle, but if a mercenary captain had the right spies, he could obtain vital information that could easily endanger the most powerful lords of the age. Such was the case of Amadeus VI, the Green Count of Savoy, who was careless only once and had to pay dearly in exchange for his release. He gave a party⁸⁷ for his friends in Lanzo while waiting for his army to fight off Robin du Pin and his company⁸⁸ and felt completely safe in Lanzo, which had no walls save for the castle, in October 1361.⁸⁹ The chroniclers identify the leaders of the routiers as "Messire Albrecht, Messire Robin Canole, Messire Jehan Agut, Messire Hennequin de Bongart, et maitre de La Nef, captaynes des compagnez des angloys."⁹⁰ Spies of the brigands had reported that the guards were not sufficiently organised. The companies surprised the young lords⁹¹ who were caught off-guard without weapons and armour.⁹² To estimate the enormity of the ransom that Amadeus VI was obliged to pay to the companies, here is a comparison: the Green Count's 180 000 florins⁹³ were only 20 000 florins less than what Prince Philip I of Rouvre agreed on with

⁸³ Leonij, Lorenzo, "La peste e la compagnia del Cappelletto", = *Archivio Storico Italiano* 4:2, 1878, 3–11.

⁸⁴ This was the last time the French Royal Army tried to stop the mercenary companies in an open battle on the border between the Holy Roman Empire and the Kingdom of France. The battle ended with the complete defeat of the royal army and brought the dominance of the great companies.

⁸⁵ Archives départementales de Côte d'Or, B 11735. Receit de Henri de Longwy, seigneur de Rahon, 26 Juin 1363.

⁸⁶ Ibid.

⁸⁷ Servion, Jean, *Geste et croniques de la mayson de Savoye*. Ed. Bollati di Saint-Pierre, Emanuele Federico, Torino, 1879. 119.

⁸⁸ Cox, The Green Count of Savoy, 1967. 158.

⁸⁹ Ibid.

⁹⁰ Servion, Geste et croniques, 1879. 119.; Cox, The Green Count of Savoy, 1967. 158.

⁹¹ Villani, Giovanni – Villani, Matteo – Villani, Filippo, *Chroniche*. Sezione Letterario-Artistica del Lloyd Austriaco Trieste, 1857. lib. X. cap. LXXXIV. 359.

⁹² Servion, Geste et croniques, 1879. 120.

⁹³ Villani – Villani – Villani, *Chroniche*, 1857. lib. X. cap. LXXXIV. 359.

King Edward III to free Burgundy of the entire English army in 1360.⁹⁴ In addition, Amadeus VI not only had to pay one of the largest Italian ransoms of the era but also had to compensate the losses of those who belonged to his retinue.⁹⁵

To gain an approximative insight into the number of Hungarian mercenaries serving in Italy between 1360 and 1365, it is worth examining the number of Hungarian banners active in Florence in 1361, 1362 and 1364. Before the arrival of the great Hungarian army led by Simon Megyesaljai Mórócz in Italy in the autumn of 1361, the city of Florence had already engaged four Hungarian *conestabilis* and two *caporalis*, each with a four-month contract, for a total of 44 horsemen. Two of the four *conestabiles*, Giorgio Ghirigori⁹⁶ and Lantialotto David⁹⁷ were employed for the whole year, while the other two *conestabiles*, Niccholo Chimenti,⁹⁸ and Stefano Litterato,⁹⁹ served for eight months, which meant that Lantialotto David's and Giorgio Ghirigori's *condotta* received two more *condotta*, while the other Hungarian *conestabilis* had one more. However, the following year brought a significant change in the number of Hungarian mercenaries employed in Florence. This was due in part to the large number of Hungarian soldiers left over from the thousands of Hungarian troops led by Simon Megyesaljai Mórócz and employed in Florence. An examination of the mercenary list for 1362 shows that there was a virtual replacement of the *conestabiles* and *caporales* except for Giorgio Ghirigori. In fact, from the William Caferro's research it is known that Gregori Ghirigori, Nicolas Chimenti, Tomaso Amerighi, Banchone Johanis served permanently in Florence for six to twelve years. Gregori Ghirigori is an exception among the Hungarian *conestabilis* because he spent twelve years in Florence first in 1361–1371 then 1389–1390.¹⁰⁰ Adinel C. Dincă, examining Vatican sources, came to similar conclusions about the Hungarian mercenaries in the service of the Holy See in the 1350s: Iohannes Iohannis,¹⁰¹ Valente Ungarus,¹⁰² Iohannes de Aram Litteratus,¹⁰³ Andreas de Secullo¹⁰⁴ appear regularly in various Vatican registers.

⁹⁴ *Traité de Trèves, entre Edoüard III. Roi d'Angleterre, Philippe duc de Bourgogne.; Histoire générale et particulière de Bourgogne, avec des notes, des dissertations et les preuves justificatives.* Vol. II., Dijon, 1761. Preuves de l'Histoire CCLXXXV. CCIII.

⁹⁵ AST, Gonans – 13 September 1364, Gio de Cavaliere, in the retinue of Amadeus VI, was captured in the fatal surprise in Lanzo by the English company, asks reimburses from Amadeus VI.

⁹⁶ ASF, Camera del Comune, Scrivano di Camera, Uscita 13. 55v.

⁹⁷ ASF, Camera del Comune, Scrivano di Camera, Uscita 13. 57r.

⁹⁸ ASF, Camera del Comune, Scrivano di Camera, Uscita 13. 33v.

⁹⁹ ASF, Camera del Comune, Scrivano di Camera, Uscita 13. 37r.

¹⁰⁰ Caferro, *Continuity, Long-Term Service*, 2008, 219–251.

¹⁰¹ Archivio Apostolico Vaticano [hereinafter AAV], Cam. Ap., Collect. 455, f.13r quoted by Dincă, *Hungarian Mercenaries*, 2022. 52.

¹⁰² AAV, Cam. Ap., Collect. 455, f.10v quoted by Dincă, *Hungarian Mercenaries*, 2022. 52.

¹⁰³ AAV, Cam. Ap., Collect. 455, f.6r quoted by Dincă, *Hungarian Mercenaries*, 2022. 52.

¹⁰⁴ AAV, Cam. Ap., Collect. 455, f.6r and 12v quoted by Dincă, *Hungarian Mercenaries*, 2022. 52.

However, the increase in numbers is not only due to the rise in the number of banners, but also to the increase in the number of Hungarian mercenaries serving in each banner: while in 1361 the average Hungarian *conestabiles* only had 8–10 horsemen, in 1362, banners of 16–21 men were common, and in 1364 banners of 20–25 men can be found in the sources. The German banners were similar in number to the Hungarian in the 1360s. Of the German banners counted by Karl Heinrich Schäffer, in 1360, the majority of the German banners, 36, numbered 20, and he found only four banners with 25 and one with 26.¹⁰⁵ In 1365, these numbers did not change significantly, but the number of soldiers serving in a Hungarian banner was close to 20, compared to an average of 10 in 1361.

In one year the number of Hungarian mercenaries serving in Florence increased fourteenfold, with 54 *conestabiles* and 638 Hungarians many of whom, as in the previous year, had their *condotta* extended. What differs from the Florentine practice of 1362 concerning the years of 1361 and 1364, is that the city of Florence, on 21 October 1362, hired seven Hungarian *conestabiles* (Giorgo de Piero Grande 18 horses,¹⁰⁶ Pagholo di Giovanni da Sala 17 horses,¹⁰⁷ Giorgio Samo 21 horses,¹⁰⁸ Niccoloso Petri with 17 horses,¹⁰⁹ Petro Ceprech 16 horses,¹¹⁰ Spano Lancelotti 16 horses,¹¹¹ Martino Biagy 15 horses,¹¹² altogether 120 horses for one-month *condotta*. In addition, Florence concluded a contract with 28 other Hungarian *conestabiles* in September and October 1362 for a regular interval of 4 months, with a total of 377 horsemen,¹¹³ broadly speaking, in two months Florence concluded a *condotta* of one to four months with 36 Hungarian *conestabiles* and their 497 horsemen. The reason behind this feverish recruitment of Hungarian light cavalry is that Florence suddenly needed a large number of new recruits because of a mercenary revolt. Of course, not only Hungarians, but also mercenaries of other nationalities were hired during this period, but the proportion of Hungarians was predominant. On 30 August 1362, Italian, German and Burgundian *condottieri* in the service of Florence, Niccolò, Count of Urbino, Ugolino dei Sabatini of Bologna, Marcolfo dei Rossi of Rimini, rebelled by demanding double pay plus a full month's pay for taking Pecciole.¹¹⁴ This was refused by the city, so the mercenaries, about a thousand of them, left the service of Florence and founded the *Compagnia del Cappelletto*. Taking advantage of the confusion, the Pisans took Ajatico, killing 25 Floren-

¹⁰⁵ Schäffer, *Deutsche Ritter*, 1911. Vol. I., 69.

¹⁰⁶ ASF, Camera del Comune, Scrivano di Camera, Uscita 18. f. 45v.; MMH, 10116.

¹⁰⁷ ASF, Camera del Comune, Scrivano di Camera, Uscita 18. f. 45v.; MMH, 10117.

¹⁰⁸ ASF, Camera del Comune, Scrivano di Camera, Uscita 18. f. 45v.; MMH, 10120.

¹⁰⁹ ASF, Camera del Comune, Scrivano di Camera, Uscita 18. f. 45v.; MMH, 10121.

¹¹⁰ ASF, Camera del Comune, Scrivano di Camera, Uscita 18. f. 46r.; MMH, 10123.

¹¹¹ ASF, Camera del Comune, Scrivano di Camera, Uscita 18. f. 46r.; MMH, 10075.

¹¹² ASF, Camera del Comune, Scrivano di Camera, Uscita 18. f. 45v.; MMH, 10115.

¹¹³ ASF, Camera del Comune, Scrivano di Camera, Uscita 18. f. 38r, 43r, 43v-r, 45v-r, 56v-r, 58r, 58v, 59v.

¹¹⁴ Villani, Matteo – Villani, Filippo, *Cronica*. Milan, 1834. Lib. 9., cap. XXIII. 365.

tine guards. The Hungarian troops took part in the ensuing *cavalcades*, which left the countryside around Pisa deserted.¹¹⁵

Florence was probably satisfied with the performance of the Hungarians, because in 1364, although it employed slightly fewer Hungarian conestabiles than in 1362, 46 in number, the larger number of banners resulted in a similar number to the number of Hungarian mercenaries compared to 1362. In two years, most of the conestabiles serving in Florence were replaced, but there were still some who were regularly in the mercenary service of Florence between 1361 and 1364. Most notably Giorgio Ghirigori, mentioned above, who, as the only conestabilis, was continuously contracted by serving in Florence were replaced, but ther Florence for four month condotte during the period under review. But there are two other Hungarian conestabiles who were in the mercenary service of Florence at that time: Stefano di Domenicho¹¹⁶ and Pagholo Giovanni da Sala.¹¹⁷

In the names there are a few references to the regions and cities of Hungary where the conestabilis originated. As the name Pasgholo Giovanni indicates, he originated from the county of Zala, but not only him but also Lancialotto Pagoli da Sala, who was in the service of Florence in 1364 at the head of a 12-man banner,¹¹⁸ or Danreagio da Sala, who served the war effort of Florence in 1362 with 15 men.¹¹⁹ Apart from the sources from Florence, mercenaries from Zala County also appear in other contemporary Italian sources. In the agreement signed by Sir John Hawkwood and the leaders of the White Company with Egidio Albornoz, papal legate, on 29 October 1366, two Hungarians are among the main officers of the Company, and immediately after the English marshals, there are also the comes Nicolaus Ungarus, i.e. Nicholas Toldi and Michael de Salla Hungarian marshal. Following the defeat of Ugolino de Montemartre, the company promised Cardinal Albornoz that they would not invade the Papal State for a year and would withdraw peacefully.¹²⁰ Nevertheless, the same reference to the county can be found in the Company of St George, which entered the service of Florence in 1365. Among the Italian, English and Hungarian conestabiles and caporales who made up the company are Petrus de Sala, Nicholaus de Sala, and Georgius de Sala.¹²¹ Zala county is the only Hungarian region specifically mentioned in the Florentine sources examined so far. The county is located in the south-western tip of the kingdom, from where the Hungarian banners had

¹¹⁵ Ciucciovino, *La cronaca*, 2016. Vol. III., 501.; Sautier, Albert, *Papst Urban V und die Söldnerkompagnien in Italien in den Jahren 1362–1367*. Zürich, 1911. 32–33.

¹¹⁶ ASF, Camera del Comune, Scrivano di Camera, Uscita 19. f. 32v.; MMH, 100384.

¹¹⁷ ASF, Camera del Comune, Scrivano di Camera, Uscita 21. f. 38r.; MMH, 10043.

¹¹⁸ ASF, Camera del Comune, Scrivano di Camera, Uscita 20. f. 63r.; MMH, 10194.

¹¹⁹ ASF, Camera del Comune, Scrivano di Camera, Uscita 18. f. 45r.; MMH, 10113.

¹²⁰ Archivio di Stato di Bologna, Archivio Albornoziano, busta 361 (46) Franceschini, Gino, “Il cardinal legato Egidio d’Albornoz e i conti di Montefeltro”; *El Cardenal Albornoz y el Colegio de España*. Ed. Verderra y Tuels, Evelio, Bologna, 1972. 663–664.; Caferro, John Hawkwood, 2006. 128.

¹²¹ MHH, 639–640. n. 476.

to travel the same distance to serve Florence as Wolfhard von Veringen and his German mercenaries from Constance. This may be a coincidence, there is no evidence that Florentine recruiters visited Hungary, but it is perhaps worth raising the possibility that many of the Hungarian conestabiles came from Zala County because the Italian theatre of war was more easily accessible from here than from other parts of the kingdom, hence the reference to the county in the Florentine sources. However, according to Hungarian medievalists, the prefix Zala in the names has a broader meaning, it probably refers not only to conestabilis from the county, but also to the place of origin of conestabilis from the wider Transdanubian region, as it was easier to understand and describe Zala in Italian than, for example, Győr or Székesfehérvár.

It is not uncommon to find similar surnames for conestabiles who were in the service of Florence at the same time, which raises the possibility that such conestabiles were related to each other, perhaps from the same *genus*, so that in some cases the service of Florence could be considered a family business. Giovanni Pagholi began his condotta with 17 horses on 15 June 1364, while Michele Pagholi, under whom 19 horses served, began his service in Florence three days later on 18 June.¹²² The same is the case for Lancelotto Niccolai and Ghirigoro Niccolai: both of them began their service on 26 October 1362. Lancelotto arrived in Florence with 14 Hungarian horses, while Ghirigoro Niccolai arrived with 15 Hungarians.¹²³ Michele and Biagio Ajuti had been given a standard contract of 4 months in August 1362,¹²⁴ or Pagholo and Stefano de Brenna, who also in 1364 concluded a four-month condotta with Florence with 15 men.¹²⁵

To sum up, an average Hungarian banner in the 1360s consisted of 10–14 people and in terms of value it must have represented 400–500 florins, based on the price of a horse of 12 florins,¹²⁶ as each of them had to have at least two horses, and the monthly salary of 8 florins. Considering the average monthly pay of 120 florins for a banner of 14 men, it is possible to estimate the considerable investment required by a conestabilis to assemble and operate a Hungarian mercenary band in Italy. Of course, here one has to look at the ratios, since the real cost of acquisition is not known. In any case, even if the conestabiles did not count on the income from the loot, it is clear that if they did not suffer any particular loss in men and horses, even a conservative estimate would show that the first four-month condotta could have already recouped the costs of the “investment” and the second four-month condotta could have been a pure profit for the members and leaders of the banner. If these estimates prove to be cor-

¹²² ASF, Camera del Comune, Scrivano di Camera, Uscita 21. f. 36v.; MMH, 10035.

¹²³ ASF, Camera del Comune, Scrivano di Camera, Uscita 18. f. 38r.; MMH, 10065.

¹²⁴ ASF, Camera del Comune, Scrivano di Camera, Uscita 18. f. 40r.; MMH, 10068.

¹²⁵ ASF, Camera del Comune, Scrivano di Camera, Uscita 21. f. 41r.; MMH, 10052.

¹²⁶ “Lorenzo Iacopi, ungaro, connestabile del comune di Firenze. In risarcimento di un cavallo di pelo non uniforme e altre caratteristiche iscritto a Jacopo Giovanni sotto la suddetta bandiera e stimato 12 fiorini d’oro.” ASF, Camera del Comune, Scrivano di Camera, Uscita 20. f. 23r.; MMH, 10139.

rect it means that the recruitment of such a banner was not a ‘cheap exercise’. Looking only at the large number of Hungarian companies serving in Florence in 1362 and 1364, one wonders how many financially strong Hungarian military entrepreneurs were active in the Italian market, and how Hungarian light horse mercenary companies were organised to undertake the Italian adventure. Another interesting finding when looking at mercenary payments is the question of losses suffered. The dangers to which the Hungarian mercenaries were exposed will be discussed later, for now it is only interesting to note that the number of soldiers serving under a *conestabilis* seems to have remained fairly stable over the years. The reason for this is not yet known. Theoretically, two answers are possible: either there were no losses, which of course can be excluded as Hungarian losses occur regularly in sources. The other possible explanation is that soldiers killed in action were replaced by *caporales* or *conestabiles* from other sources. How many men were needed and where they came from the bands that continued to serve are still unanswerable questions.

Organisation of Companies, the Role of Hungarians in International Companies

Hungarian light cavalry was part of the most important English, Italian and German companies of the 1360s. The White Company of Albert Sterz and Sir John Hawkwood has already been mentioned, as well as the Company of the Star, the Company of the Hat, the Great Company led by Konrad von Landau and possibly the Company of the Flower as well. The basic Hungarian unit of the multiethnic companies was the banner, and this was true of the administrative structure of the companies, the chain of command and for the tactics as well. As Villani’s description makes it clear, Hungarian troops fought in units of 10–15 men, the equivalent of a banner.¹²⁷ The White Company, also under the command of Albert Sterz, marched longer distances, often at night, in small units led by the *caporalis*.¹²⁸ The companies were headed by elected captains whose position depended largely on the loyalty of the *conestabilis* and *caporalis* who served under them. Thus the *conestabilis* and *caporalis* played a decisive role, as is shown by the fact that their names and seals appear regularly in the sources of the companies. The official documents relating to the Company, be it a treaty of passage, a document for the release of captured soldiers or a *condotta*, were signed by the captain, by the marshals, *caporalis* and *conestabilis* of the company and stamped with their own seals. These documents were, of course, always written in Latin, so it was an advantage for the signatories to know Latin, as there are examples of Hungarian mercenaries with Latin knowledge.¹²⁹

¹²⁷ Villani – Villani – Villani, *Chronicle*, 1857. lib. VI. cap. LIII. 203.; About the importance of the banner see Schäffer, *Deutsche Ritter*, 1911. Vol. I., 70.

¹²⁸ Caferro, *John Hawkwood*, 2006. 50.

¹²⁹ Caferro, *John Hawkwood*, 2006. 12.; 10 October 1380, *Convenzioni fatte con gli Ungheri e Giovanni Bano Maconiese, Capitano generale e Luogotenente del re d’Ungheria, a Calcinaia, su quel di Poggibonsi.*; Canestrini, Giuseppe, “Documenti per

Ambrogio Visconti, the bastard son of Bernabò Visconti brought reinforcement and provision to the weathered company of Hawkwood following his lost battle against the Germans at San Mariano on July 22, 1365.¹³⁰ The Italian Company of St George made its way to Tuscany after its formation in October 1365. Florence, fearing the consequences, preferred to buy safe passage by paying 6 000 florins. The contract was signed among others by the Hungarian conestabilis Luchas de Valco.¹³¹ Likewise, the Hungarian conestabiles of the aforementioned Heinrich von Englingen's troops also signed and sealed the charter of release on 19 January 1362.¹³² In addition to Albert Sterz, 19 caporales of the White Company signed the condotta with the Marquis of Montferrat in 1361, and four years later the contract signed by the Company with the city of Florence bore 24 seals. After the condotta was signed, it was read out and rendered by interpreters for the members of the Company, who swore for the bible to abide by it.¹³³

Within the company, one of the most important positions was that of the Marshal, who directly succeeded the Captain in rank. The marshal had a high degree of autonomy, leading his own troops within the company, who were directly subordinate to him. Each marshal was supposed to have 250 soldiers or 16 banners, in the company of the German Condottieri, Hugo von Melchingen and Hermann von Winden on the 12 October 1365.¹³⁴ If a dispute arose between individual caporales or conestabiles, the marshal had to settle it, and was also responsible for the care of the men and horses.¹³⁵ There are at least three examples of Hungarian marshals from this period: Two of the them served in the Anglo-Hungarian White Company, one is the aforementioned Michael de Salla who served as marshal under Sir John Hawkwood in 1366, the other is Ioannis Cibol from two years earlier in 1364, when Albert Sterz was still commanding the company in Italy.¹³⁶ In 1363 the Compagnia del Cappelletto had two captains and four marshals, two Italian, one German and one Hungarian.¹³⁷ His surname was Lancelot, and he was one of the marshals who signed and sealed the treaty between the company and the city of Todi a few months after the defeat at Siena. The commune paid the company 1 000 florins to redeem the city.¹³⁸

servire alla storia della milizia italiana dal XIII secolo al XVI", = *Raccolti negli archivi della Toscana Archivio Storico Italiano* 15, 1851, 72–74.

¹³⁰ Caferro, John Hawkwood, 2006. 120–122.

¹³¹ Canestrini, Documenti, 1851. 124.; Convenzioni fermate con Ambrogio di Bernabò Visconti, Capitano generale della Compagnia Italiana di San Giorgio, e con Giovanni degli Ubaldini, e altri caporali della detta Compagnia.

¹³² Lukcsics, Olaszországban vitézkedő magyar lovagok, 1931. 87.

¹³³ Caferro, John Hawkwood, 2006. 74.

¹³⁴ Selzer, Deutsche Söldner, 2001. 53.

¹³⁵ Caferro, John Hawkwood, 2006. 66.

¹³⁶ Canestrini, Documenti, 1851. 57.

¹³⁷ Grillo, Paolo, *Cavalieri e popoli in armi. Le istituzioni militari nell'Italia medievale*. Bari, 2015. e-book Location I. 3297.

¹³⁸ Leonij, La peste, 1878. 11.

Each banner was headed by a constable who could be Italian or foreign. As we have seen, the Hungarian banners were led exclusively by Hungarian conestabiles. It was up to the conestabilis to keep order within the banner, to carry out the orders given by the captains. Caporalis in the Hungarian banners, as the Florentine sources show, consisted of 2 to 4 men, and the sources seem to indicate that they were of lesser importance than in the case of other nationalities, such as English companies. It has been mentioned before, the caporalis may have been contracted by the cities, but their number is negligible compared to the number of Hungarian conestabiles.

Hungarian Mercenaries in the Strategy and Tactics of the Companies

Each nation represented by foreign mercenaries on the Italian battlefields had its own role in fourteenth century warfare. The Germans, in full armour, were the heavy cavalry attacking in wedge formation, who had to break up the enemy's lines in the first wave of the attack to make way for the troops following them.¹³⁹ The English were distinguished by their brand new three-man lance formation, their combination of archers equipped with longbows, and "their habit of dismounting to fight on foot, and being accustomed to riding at night and fighting deep into winter".¹⁴⁰

Hungarians were involved in all the conflicts in northern and central Italy in the mid-fourteenth century, either on one or on both sides. The period was defined by two wars that lasted for several years: one was the Florence-Pisa feud, the other a series of clashes between the Papal States and the Visconti of Milan. Both conflicts involved the full range of medieval warfare, from castle and city sieges to night raids, *cavalcate* to pitched battles. Hungarians took part in all types of warfare, but above all served as light cavalry in multiethnic companies. The light cavalry as a weapon was perfectly suited to the strategic ideas of the condottieri active on the Italian battlefield, since the most important feature of warfare in the second half of the fourteenth century was the avoidance of high-risk pitched battles, and the dominant manoeuvre was more of a skirmish, based on rapid manoeuvres exploiting the element of surprise.¹⁴¹ "They [The Hungarians] are masters of making war and assaulting enemies, and they do not care if they die."¹⁴²

The suitability of Hungarian mercenaries is best illustrated by the events around Treviso in the Hungarian-Venetian War of 1357/58. The Hungarian troops led by Thomas Vásári set an ambush for the Venetians. As the final act of the Hungarian War of Venice, the Venetian garrison of Treviso and the mercenaries serving there were once again ambushed by the Hungarians. In 1358, Marco Giustinian, Captain General of the Venetian army, and Giovanni da Ca' Dolfin, podestà of Treviso, together with the commanders of the garrison of

¹³⁹ Selzer, *Deutsche Söldner*, 2001. 100–101.

¹⁴⁰ Fowler, *Sir John Hawkwood*, 2010. 99.

¹⁴¹ Sautier, *Papst Urban V*, 1911. 12.

¹⁴² Villani – Villani – Villani, *Chroniche*, 1857. lib. VI. cap. XXXVII. 197.

Treviso decided to risk another raid, partly to replenish their depleted supplies and partly to strike at the Hungarian troops stationed in the area. A German mercenary named Sirampono was ordered to break out with 500 cavalry and return to Treviso with a cavalcade of extended range, gathering as much ammunition and livestock as possible, while attacking Hungarian troops if he had the opportunity.¹⁴³ A large group of Hungarians was attacked by Sirampono and after a close fight in which both sides suffered casualties, the German commander decided to retreat. The Hungarians who attacked the troops used the same fighting style as Villani had reported earlier: They harassed the enemy with arrows at close range, but avoided body to body combat, and thanks to their light armour they moved faster than knights in full iron, so they could easily escape and return to the battle with renewed strength. The increasing pressure took its toll: the enemy retreated, leaving behind hundreds of dead¹⁴⁴ and all their booty, while the Hungarians captured 200 Italians, including the German condottiero Sirampono as well. The German commander was taken to Padua, where he was imprisoned. This discouraged the Venetians from further outposts, and the Treviso garrison remained within the walls until the end of the war.¹⁴⁵

Hungarian mercenaries could be used for many different tasks: because of their speed, the Italian condottieri found them effective in cutting off the enemy from its safe rear. In 1362, during the Florence-Pisa war, Rodolfo da Camerino was put in charge of the Florentine troops and immediately decided to launch a new offensive. Leading the troops invading the Pisan territories, the Hungarians advanced ahead of the main force to Montaione, halfway between Pisa and Florence, taking prisoners. Then the main force, approaching Pisa itself, provoked the Pisans only about 300 metres from the city. In mid-July, they raided the immediate area of the city, destroying Borgo San Marco, San Casciano and Valdicaprona. Then the route of the advancing army was well marked by a succession of settlements that were sacked: Valdera, Ghezano and its surroundings, Cascina and then Sansavino.¹⁴⁶ Then, marching along the valley of the Arno, the Florentine troops made its way towards Peccioli. Not far from the town, a letter was intercepted from a Pisan merchant living in the

¹⁴³ *Cronaca carrarese*, confrontata con la redazione di Andrea Gatari, aa. 1318–1407, di Galeazzo e Bartolomeo Gatari; a cura di Antonio Medin e Guido Tolomei; Città di Castello, 1909–1929; [poi] Bologna, 1930–1931, 2 voll. In *Rerum Italicarum scriptores. Raccolta degli storici italiani dal cinquecento al millecinquecento*, ordinata da L.A. Muratori, nuova edizione riveduta, ampliata e corretta con la direzione di Giosué Carducci, Città di Castello, [poi] Bologna, 1900–1975. Vol 117. [hereinafter RIS] 17/1. 32–38. [hereinafter *Cronaca carrarese*]; Ciucciovino, *La cronaca*, 2016. Vol. III., 317.

¹⁴⁴ Matteo Villani cites 300 deaths.; Villani – Villani – Villani, *Chroniche*, 1857. lib. VIII. cap. XXIII. 252.

¹⁴⁵ Ciucciovino, *La cronaca*, 2016. Vol. III., 318.; *Cronaca carrarese*, 1909. 35.

¹⁴⁶ *Cronaca di Donato di Neri e di suo figlio Neri* (aa. 1352–1381). In *Cronache senesi*, a cura di Alessandro Lisini e Fabio Iacometti, Bologna, 1931–1939, Vol. 2. RIS 15/6. 2. 596. [hereinafter *Cronaca di Donato di Neri*]

town, indicating that the garrison had left for the Volterrano area and asking the Pisan leadership to send reinforcements to Peccioli as soon as possible. Rodolfo da Camerino immediately sent his Hungarian light cavalry to Peccioli to prevent the retreating garrison from returning to Peccioli.¹⁴⁷ The main force then followed the Hungarians and began the siege of the town. However, the siege of the town, protected by its strong walls, progressed more slowly than hoped. Eventually, the Florentines managed to demolish one of the two towers that were crucial to the defence of the town, destroying a significant part of the city walls. Thus, the castellan of Peccioli, finding no point in further resistance, surrendered and the town fell into Florentine hands.¹⁴⁸

The light armour allowed the Hungarians to move quickly even when dismounted. Although few such cases have survived in the chronicles, one has been preserved, when the German condottiero orders the Hungarian mercenaries to charge uphill on foot. On 24 July 1359, a mercenary company led by Konrad von Landau crossed a pass in the Apennines. They had agreed in advance with the local peasants to supply the troops with the food they needed, but the mercenaries did not pay for it and they tormented the peasants. The two factors together angered the locals so much that they decided to take bloody revenge. The mercenaries marching through the Scalelle Pass, which is a narrow section of the road from Biforco to Belforte in Toscana, were met by a shower of stones from the locals who had taken the top of the escarpment.¹⁴⁹ Landau immediately ordered the Hungarians, dismounting from their horses, to charge the peasants with bows and arrows, but even the Hungarian light armoured units could not reach the peasants. Several hundred German and Hungarian mercenaries were struck down by stones.¹⁵⁰

In close combat, the light armour and smaller horses of the Hungarians were of course no match for the heavy armour of the Germans. In close combat, the light armour and smaller horses of the Hungarians could of course not compete with the heavy armour of the Germans, so they were not in competition with each other, but rather complemented each other. This is why the German condottiero integrated so many Hungarian banners into their own companies.¹⁵¹

In the pitched battles, the Hungarians, according to the sources, fought exclusively on horseback in cohesive banner-sized units. The only example mentioned in the chronicles of the period is when a German condottiero explicitly forbade the Hungarians to fight in the traditional manner and tried to force them to dismount from their horses and face the attacking English infantry on foot. However, the order had disastrous consequences for Konrad von Landau. Galeazzo Visconti sent his troops led by the German condottiero against the

¹⁴⁷ Villani – Villani – Villani, *Chroniche*, 1857. lib. XI. cap. XVIII. 373–374.

¹⁴⁸ Ciucciovino, *La cronaca*, 2016. Vol. III., 495–497.

¹⁴⁹ Villani – Villani – Villani, *Chroniche*, 1857. lib. VIII. cap. LXXIII. 269.; Ciucciovino, *La cronaca*, 2016. Vol. III., 338.

¹⁵⁰ Rázsó, *A zsoldosintézmény*, 1960. 139.

¹⁵¹ Selzer, *Deutsche Söldner*, 2001. 42.

White Company, who, despite negotiations, abandoned their camp at Romagno and marched toward Briona, having plundered the countryside in 1363. Landau decided to cut off the English at the Canturino bridge and prevent them from returning to their fortified camp laden with loot. At the bridge, he ordered his army into formation and ordered the Hungarian banners under him to dismount and fight the battle. The Hungarians, however, not only disobeyed the order, distrusting the tactics, which were unusual for them, but also abandoned the Milanese troops and retreated. The German-Milanese units left on their own were unable to hold off the advancing English. Landau was wounded several times in the *mêlée* and died of his wounds in captivity.¹⁵²

In one of the most important battles of the 1360s, the German Company of the Star, led by Albert Sterz and Anichino, clashed with the English White Company at San Mariano. In the battle, fought on 22 July 1365, Hungarian mercenaries fought on both sides. The English divided the Hungarians into the vanguard with the baggage.¹⁵³

In the battle of May 7, 1363, the Florentine army of 800 Hungarian mercenaries and 800 Italian infantry led by Piero Farnese defeated the Pisan army of 600 cavalry and significant infantry. The Florentine condottiero attacked the Pisans, who had been deployed in a field unsuitable for a cavalry charge. His decision to dismount the Florentines to attack on foot proved to be a good choice in the early stages of the battle. Later, however, he brought in the cavalry, which led the Florentines to victory. According to the chronicles, the Hungarians also participated in the *mêlée* and cavalry battle as well.¹⁵⁴ Italian cities or rulers often hired Hungarian mercenaries to fight foreign mercenary companies. Johann Haneken Bongard's company in Apulia caused a lot of trouble for Louis of Durazzo, who eventually hired Nicholas Atinay's Hungarian company of 3 000 men for 36 000 florins. The treaty was concluded on 21 March 1361. The combined Neapolitan-Hungarian forces pushed the Germans back to Atella, a small town between Potenza and Melfi in the province of Basilicata, which was then besieged.¹⁵⁵ For Nicholas Athinay, this was not the only time he had to fight against a foreign company: he was hired by Galeazzo Visconti, together with a German company led by Konrad von Landau, to march against the White Company, which ravaged the Tortona region in 1361. The English devastation caused many of the locals to turn against the Visconti. The anti-Visconti rebels

¹⁵² Villani – Villani – Villani, *Chroniche*, 1857. lib. XI. cap. XVIII. 373.; Ricotti, *Storia delle compagnie*, 1845. 142.; [Pietro Azario] *Petri Azarii Liber gestorum in Lombardia*, a cura di Francesco Cognasso, Bologna, 1926–1939. RIS 16/4. 163.; Ciucciovino, *La cronaca*, 2016. Vol. III., 53.

¹⁵³ Fabretti, Ariodante, “Cronaca della città di Perugia dal 130 al 1491”, = *Archivio Storico Italiano* 16:1, 1850, 71–750. 199–200.

¹⁵⁴ Villani – Villani – Villani, *Chroniche*, 1857. lib. XI. cap. 384–385.; *Corpus Chronicorum Bononiensium*, a cura di Albano Sorbelli, Città di Castello, Bologna, 1910–1940, 4 voll. RIS 18/1. (Cronaca A.) 159–160.

¹⁵⁵ Villani – Villani – Villani, *Chroniche*, 1857. lib. X. cap. V. 348.

had to be pacified by Luchino dal Verme, who did so successfully.¹⁵⁶ In the same way, Hungarians also played their part in Siena's famous victory against the Compagnia de Cappelletto in 1363. The Siena Chronicle highlights the role of the Hungarian commander Ormanno in launching the attack.¹⁵⁷

Messer Simone della Morte and the Siege of Parma

The most memorable siege of the first half of the 1360s, which was linked to the Hungarians, took place in Parma. The attempt to take a city such as Parma proved to be the most difficult obstacle not only for the mercenary companies of the fourteenth century, but for any army of the time. The fact that the largest Hungarian army of the age, led by Simone della Morte, arrived at the walls of Bologna in mid-October 1360 was the result of the turbulent history of Italian politics and the exceptional good relations between Louis I and Pope Innocent VI. Bologna was under Visconti rule for most of the 1350s, thanks to a 1352 treaty between Clement VI and Milan.¹⁵⁸ Giovanni Visconti da Oleggio was then lord of Bologna, who finally decided to cede the city to Alborno, in exchange for Fermo and the Marca Anconitana – which he held until his death in May 1366.¹⁵⁹ Bernabò Visconti of course, was not appeased by this and did his utmost on the political and military fronts to maintain his right to Bologna. Niccolò Acciaiuoli, the grand senechal of Naples, in whom the Pope had unlimited confidence because of the gold he had brought him from the kingdom of Sicily, after a long negotiation with Bernabò, set the conditions on which he thought an agreement was possible, namely: the Church would pay Bernabò 100 000 gold florins over five years, and Acciaiuoli would be rector of Bologna for that period.¹⁶⁰ Pope Innocent VI, against Alborno's plans, was inclined to agree, as Avignon was short of money, and came up with the solution of paying the considerable sum to Milan with the help of Florence. According to the *gran siniscalco del Regno*,¹⁶¹ Bernabò would not prevent the annexation of Bologna to the Papal State if these conditions were met. However, the Signora did not go along with the idea, so an amicable solution became impossible. The last straw that made the Alborno situation dangerous was the transfer of two experienced German condottieri to the Visconti side at the end of 1359.¹⁶² The German mercenary companies, especially that of Konrad von Landau and Johann Haneken Bongard ravaged the land bringing destruction and death to Northern and Central Italy. Their deeds were immortalised in the papal request written by Innocent VI to Louis the Great, King of Hungary:

¹⁵⁶ Azario, *Liber Gestorum*, 1939. 164.

¹⁵⁷ Cronaca di Donato di Neri, 1931–1939. 602.

¹⁵⁸ Filippini, Francesco, *Il Cardinale Egidio Alborno*. Bologna, 1933. 207.

¹⁵⁹ CGAAR, n. 533. 191. concerning marquisate of Marca Anconitana n. 541. 194.

¹⁶⁰ Filippini, *Il Cardinale*, 1933. 225.

¹⁶¹ One of the seven most powerful men of the kingdom of Sicily with the task of administering the royal properties and several other duties.

¹⁶² Ricotti, *Storia delle Compagnie*, 1845. 127–128.

“the evil-doing devilish company, spreading its wings and its many powers, incited by the enemy of the human race....spits its venom like a basilisk on the land of the said parts of the Church of Italy, and kills and destroys all who look upon it, the castles he overturns, the fortresses he razes to the ground, the lands he deserts, he spares not the women with child, nor the infant in the cradle, he tears and dismembers the devoted faithful of the Church, and breaks to pieces, slaughters and devours all of the Churchmen”¹⁶³

Such a request could not be denied and Louis sent probably the biggest Hungarian mercenary army that came to Italy in the fourteenth century.¹⁶⁴ Simon Medgyesaljai Mórócz of the Pok kindred,¹⁶⁵ sheriff of three Hungarian counties, member of the high nobility of Angevin Hungary¹⁶⁶ was sent with several thousand light cavalry to Italy. Of course, the news of the arrival of the army did not remain a secret, and many people tried to get as much information as possible: a letter from the Treviso chancellery dated 24 April 1360 reveals a sense of uncertainty and an urgent desire for certain news.¹⁶⁷ However, in their reply of 29 May 1360, they could read that the Hungarian king intended to march personally to Italy with his army, although this would certainly not take place until early summer.¹⁶⁸ This news caused a great stir in Italian politics.¹⁶⁹ Francesco da Carrara, who had gathered the information, also communicated it to Venice, but everything calmed down when it became clear that the king was only sending his armies to help Albornoz for Bologna.¹⁷⁰ In preparation for the army's arrival, Louis, at least according to the *Additamentum* wrote to his old ally Francesco da Carrara in secret asking the Lord of Padua to supply the Hungarians with food and forage to help the 4 000-strong army pass through. Il Vecchio not only did everything the Hungarian king asked but received the

¹⁶³ Ludovico regi Hungariae ut legato apostolico gentes armigeras ad resistendum magnae societati mittat no. LXXV. in *Vetera Monumenta Historica Hungariam Sacram illustrantia*. Vol. II.: 1352–1526. Ed. Theiner, Augustin, Roma, 1860. 41–42.

¹⁶⁴ Villani – Villani – Villani, *Chroniche*, 1857. lib. X. cap. II. 332.

¹⁶⁵ Lukcsics, Pál, “Magyar zsoldosok a pápaság szolgálatában a XIV. században”, = *Hadtörténelmi közlemények* 33:1, 1932, 125–157.

¹⁶⁶ Bárány, Attila, “Az Anjou-kor hadtörténete”, In. Veszprémy, László (ed.), *Magyarország hadtörténete I. A kezdetektől 1526-ig*. Budapest, 2017. 175–222. 220.

¹⁶⁷ Verci, Giambatista, *Storia della Marca Trivigiana e Veronese*. Vol. XIII–XIV., Venice, 1789. 84. Documenti 1584. Da una lettera in carta comune della Cancellaria di Trivigi segnata Novelle d'Ungheria.

¹⁶⁸ Verci, *Storia della Marca Trivigiana*, 1789. 85. Documenti 1585.

¹⁶⁹ For example, Ugolino Gonzaga feared an incursion when the Hungarians, 2 000 of them, were in the proximity of Mantua.; Archivio di Stato di Mantova Copialelettere, busta 2881, libro III. n. 585. quoted by Corradi Musi, Carla, “L'eco dell' Ungheria di Luigi nell'Italia Settentrionale (sulla base di documenti dell'epoca). Testo della conferenza tenuta al V Congresso dell'Associazione per gli Studi Ungheresi in Canada. Università di Toronto, 11–13 maggio 1989”, = *Rivista di Studi Ungheresi* 5, 1990, 24–32. 27.

¹⁷⁰ Ciucciovino, *La Cronaca*, 2016. Vol. III., 422.

Hungarian captains in his palace as well.¹⁷¹ Leaving Padua, the army headed for Mantua. Research by Carla Corradi Musi in Mantua has revealed that Feltrino Gonzaga helped the Hungarian army in marching towards Bologna.¹⁷² Several letters were exchanged between Ugolino Gonzaga and the leader of the Hungarian army at the end of November 1360.¹⁷³ Finally, the Hungarians left Mantua without reports of any major atrocities.

In Bologna, on 20 September 1360, Albornoz mobilised the troops to defend the Bologna contado, as the Visconti troops had taken the castles around Bologna one after the other. They surrounded the city from three sides, threatening to cut it off from its contado.¹⁷⁴ The papal legate sent a letter¹⁷⁵ to a number of ecclesiastical and secular officials and lords.¹⁷⁶ Even so, the slowly gathering papal army could not break Visconti's increasingly stranglehold on Bologna. This situation was radically changed by the arrival of the Hungarian army. When Bernabò Visconti received the news, he was overcome, and for several days he endeavoured to appear cheerful and confident in front of third parties, minimising what had happened, yet gnawing himself implacably.¹⁷⁷ The Bolognese, taking advantage of the arrival of the Hungarians, seized the initiative and recaptured the castles in Visconti's hands which had not yet been surrendered, until the time came for Cardinal Albornoz to enter the city in all his splendour. The Cardinal, after the Hungarians had completed their task, and the suspicion of treason had been raised, thought it better to remove the army, which he considered unreliable, from the walls of Bologna, sending it north-west towards Parma.¹⁷⁸ His visit proved, if possible, even worse than that of the German's presence to the people in the regions around Modena¹⁷⁹ and Parma:

¹⁷¹ Additamenta duo ad Chronicon Cortusiorum unum ab anno MCCCLIX usque ad annum circiter MCCCLXV alterum ab anno MCCCLIV usque ad MCCCXCI. Patavina dialecto scripta ab auctoris anonymis et nunc primum evulgata e manuscripto codice Bibliothecae Estensis,; RIS 12 . col. 955–988. 984.

¹⁷² Corradi Musi, *L'eco dell' Ungheria*, 1990. 27.

¹⁷³ Corradi Musi, *L'eco dell' Ungheria*, 1990. 26. n.8

¹⁷⁴ Filippini, *Il Cardinale*, 1933. 232.

¹⁷⁵ Gathering the army. The vassals were obliged to follow their lords in war, or to provide him with men.

¹⁷⁶ Just a few names of the secular dignitaries: Enrico, Count of Corniglio, count Francesco di Dovadola, Raymond Vassal Vicomte of Calisidio, Guido di Belforte Count of Civitilla, Azzo, Count of Cornilio, Ricardo di Bagno, while among the ecclesiastical officials there were several abbots (Abbot of Triponzo, Abbot of S. Ellero de Galatea, Abbot of S. Angelo de Verghereto, etc.), Bishop of Bobbio, Bishop of Ascoli,; CGAAR, n. 560. 199.

¹⁷⁷ *Chronicon mutinense Iohannis de Bazano* [aa. 1188–1363]. a cura di Tommaso Casini. Bologna, [1916.] 2 v. RIS. 15/4. 174.

¹⁷⁸ Filippini, *Il Cardinale*, 1933. 237.

¹⁷⁹ Sgambati, Simone, *Le conndotte degli stipendiari di Bologna. Immagini dalle coprtine dei registri in Archivio di Stato*. Bologna, 2018. 8.

“And on Saturday, 21 November, the said Hungarian troop, which, as was rumoured, was composed of more than 6 000 archers, crossed the territory of Modena, from the side of the aforesaid city, raiding everything: traveling through the Parma territory, they came to those lands with strong warfare and committed ungodly deeds and captured men and women and children and tortured them cruelly and tormented them with unspeakable harsh punishments.”¹⁸⁰

Wherever Simon led his army on his *chevauchées*, he blazed a path of destruction, accompanied by a constant burning of houses, robbing and killing of peasants¹⁸¹ and other non-combatants, everywhere for “forty long days”.¹⁸² In the village of Sant’ Egidio he terrorised the locals and committed particularly cruel crimes with such zeal that he alone from among all the ‘Trecento’ foreign and Italian condottieri carried death in his name, as he was called “messer Simone della Morte” by the Italian chronicles.¹⁸³

According to Angelo Pezzana, the first time in the city’s history that the Hungarians used artillery was when they came under the city walls and started bombarding the Porta di San Michele on the south-east side of the city.¹⁸⁴ However, the cannons proved too weak against the city walls and did not seem to achieve any results. Therefore, Simon Medgyesaljai Mórócz decided to try a new tactic and, the next day at dawn, he tried to hit Porta di San Francesco, one of the weakest points of the city. In the early morning attack, he used the element of surprise to attack the guards and surprised defenders to give up. Before they could escape, however, they succeeded in alerting the city’s population: the men rushed to the gate with weapons in hand and managed to stop the Hungarians from entering in time. According to the chroniclers, the fighting between the men was so close that the Hungarians had no chance to use their arrows, and they lost time and fled through the captured gate. However, the siege, which lasted only a day and a half, did not continue after the powerful help of the Visconti gold, as the leader of the Hungarian army decided that he could not take the city of Parma.¹⁸⁵

Conclusion

This paper is a synthesis of the results of the post-Covid research period, with conclusions drawn from the first hundred or so records in the ever-growing database. The potential is demonstrated by the fact that by the time this volume has been published, the number of sources in the database will have

¹⁸⁰ Bazano, *Chronicon Mutinense*, 1916. 174.; Ciucciovino, *La Cronaca*, 2016. Vol. III., 421.

¹⁸¹ Villani – Villani – Villani, *Chroniche*, 1857. lib. X. cap. XV. 335.

¹⁸² Ciucciovino, *La Cronaca*, 2016. Vol. III., 424.

¹⁸³ *Corpus Chronicorum Bononiensium*, (Cronaca B.). 123.

¹⁸⁴ Pezzana, Angelo, *Storia della città di Parma*. Vol. I.: 1346–1400. Parma, 1838. 83.

¹⁸⁵ Azario, *Liber Gestorum*, 1939. 140–141.

reached a record thousand. However, it is not only the quantitative indicators that are growing, but also the qualitative indicators of the sources that can be researched are changing considerably. However, already now some general conclusions can already be drawn from the initial data about the Hungarian mercenaries active in Italy: it is already certain that their numbers our preliminary expectations. There were two major waves of Hungarian mercenaries in Italy in the fifties and sixties. The first is well known in the literature: the Hungarian soldiers who remained in Italy at the end of Louis I's campaigns in Naples were the first to appear in the international and Hungarian companies. Apart from the *Magna Societas Ungarorum*, Hungarians were also represented in German-led companies, mainly in southern and, to a lesser extent, central Italy. At this initial stage, i.e. 1352–1360, research has not yet provided any conclusive answers as to the number of active Hungarians, their role in the companies and the extent of their involvement. As the Florentine sources show, at least in northern Italy and most probably in central Italy, the number of Hungarian mercenaries had increased severalfold from the early 1360s. This is why I have discussed the initial phase of the presence of the Hungarian army led by Simone della Morte in Italy in detail, because the army, which numbered between 4 000 and 6 000, was the basis for the Hungarian mercenaries who arrived in the second wave. Many of them, as the Florentine sources so vividly show, stayed in Italy for a longer period, at least several months, a year or two, but there are already names, of Hungarian *connestabilis* who served in Italy for several years, even more than a decade. And Carla Corradi Musi's research in Mantua,¹⁸⁶ is in line with the findings of other Italian historians, that Hungarian mercenaries settled in Italy, like the Germans. German historiography has made much progress in the last 150 years, most recently by Stephan Selzer, in the treatment of the history of the German mercenaries of the period. Practically nothing is known about how many of the Hungarians settled in Italy, how they integrated into local society, what careers they pursued, what became of their descendants. We still do not have answers to these and many other questions, which will shape the research directions of the coming years.

From research carried out so far, it is clear that the significant presence of Hungarians in Italy just predates the arrival of the English under the leadership of Albert Sterz. It can be seen that the two nations, with their completely different traditions of warfare, complemented each other perfectly on the Italian battlefields and cooperated within the framework of multiethnic companies. However, how exactly this happened is not yet known, which is perhaps one of the most interesting mysteries of this period, at least for me. There have been many studies of English mercenaries dismounted in battle and English archers on foot, who also worked closely with them. The English probably needed Hungarian cavalry archers because there were few English archers on the Italian battlefield. However, as I have shown in the study, the

¹⁸⁶ Corradi Musi, *L'eco dell' Ungheria*, 1990. 26.

Hungarians, unlike the English cavalry archers, did not dismount at all, or at least only rarely, in battle. It is true of medieval warfare in general, and of Italian warfare in particular, that battles were the rarest form of warfare, and that raids, *chevauchées* and sieges were more typical. In this context, the cooperation between the Hungarians and the English is much more clearly understood.

I have given examples of the tasks that the Hungarians were entrusted with and how much they earned, in an international. Again, contrary to German research, we know nothing about what happened to the wealth in Hungary acquired during Italian service. Nor do we have any information on whether the Hungarians who learned the art of war at the Italian level by being integrated into the most modern military organisation of the time, the multiethnic companies, benefited from it when they returned to Hungary. The archival sources in the study, do not show how the Hungarian *banderiae* made up for their losses in battle, how they reorganised their troops. It is clear from the chronicles and the archival sources that they were captured and suffered losses, sometimes suffered losses but at least from, but at least from the sources of the Florentine archives between 1360 and 1366, the number of banners remained constant, even when they were continuously employed for a year.

Another extremely fascinating area is the question of language. In what form and language did the Hungarians, the English and the Germans communicate with each other. Albert Sterz was successful among the English because he spoke their language. We know that *condotte* were translated for the mercenaries by the Italian cities with the help of interpreters. However, there are many questions to be asked, since communication was essential in armed contact. How the Hungarians fitted into this multilingual environment is almost unknown. For the lack of space I have merely mentioned this aspect in my paper, although it is enough to think of Pietro Cambacorti and the history of the Hungarians who collaborated with him in 1362.

It is not by chance that I wrote in the introduction that despite the initial results, the study raises more questions than it answers. Answers will only be found in the years to come with the systematic approach adopted by the research team at the University of Debrecen, since the sources to be processed will probably provide enough work for years, if not decades.

László Pószán*

HUNGARIAN MERCENARIES IN THE SERVICE OF THE TEUTONIC ORDER

In late medieval European warfare, mercenaries were the dominant force and therefore this period, together with the early modern period, is often referred to as the “age of mercenaries”.¹ There was no region or corner of Europe from which men-at-arms would not have volunteered in greater or lesser numbers to become mercenaries,² and although almost all social classes were represented among them, it was primarily the nobility to whom it offered a new source of income and career opportunities.³ Climate change, economic and demographic

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¹ Blastenbrei, Peter, *Die Sforza und ihr Heer. Studien zur Struktur, Wirtschaft- und Sozialgeschichte des Söldnerwesens in der italienischen Frührenaissance*. (Heidelberger Abhandlungen zur mittleren und neueren Geschichte, NF. I.) Heidelberg, 1987.; Flower, Kenneth, *Medieval Mercenaries I: The Great Companies*. Oxford, 2001.; Janin, Hunt – Carlson, Ursula, *Mercenaries in Medieval and Renaissance Europe*. North Carolina–London, 2014.; Leeson, Peter T. – Piano, Ennio E., “The golden age of mercenaries”, = *European Review of Economic History* 25, 2021, 429–446.; Querengässer, Alexander, “Kriegswesen und Herrschaftsbildung der Wettiner im späten Mittelalter”, = *Neues Archiv für Sächsische Geschichte* 88, 2017, 55–82. 65.; Urban, William, *Medieval Mercenaries. The Business of War*. Rossendale, 2006.

² Baumann, Reinhard, “Süddeutschland als Söldnermarkt”, In: Rogger, Philippe – Hitz, Benjamin (Hrsg.), *Söldnerlandschaften, Frühneuzeitliche Gewaltmärkte im Vergleich*. Berlin, 2014. 67–84.; Fuhrer, Hans Rudolf – Eyer, Robert-Peter, “Söldner’. Ein europäisches Phänomen”, In: Fuhrer, Hans Rudolf – Eyer, Robert-Peter (Hrsg.), *Schweizer in „Fremden Diensten“. Verherrlicht und verurteilt*. Zürich, 2006. 27–48.; Jucker, Michael, “Erfolgreiche Söldnerlandschaft Eidgenossenschaft? Die Innenperspektive um 1476”, In: Rogger, Philippe – Hitz, Benjamin (Hrsg.), *Söldnerlandschaften, Frühneuzeitliche Gewaltmärkte im Vergleich*. Berlin, 2014. 85–106.; Militzer, Klaus, “Kölner Söldner im Mittelalter”, = *Fasciculi Archaeologiae Historicae* 27, 2014, 73–78.; Selzer, Stephan, *Deutsche Söldner im Italien des Trecento*. (Bibliothek des Deutschen Historischen Instituts in Rom, 98.). Tübingen, 2001.; Sikora, Michael, “Söldner: historische Annäherung an einen Kriegertypus”, = *Geschichte und Gesellschaft* 29, 2003, 210–238.; Tresp, Uwe, *Söldner aus Böhmen im Dienst deutscher Fürsten. Kriegsgeschäft und Heeresorganisation im 15. Jahrhundert*. Paderborn, 2004.; Tresp, Uwe, “Böhmen als Söldnermarkt / ‘Böhmen’ als Söldnertypus im späten Mittelalter”, In: Rogger, Philippe – Hitz, Benjamin (Hrsg.), *Söldnerlandschaften, Frühneuzeitliche Gewaltmärkte im Vergleich*. Berlin, 2014. 119–141.

³ Baumann, Reinhard, *Landsknechte. Ihre Geschichte und Kultur von späten Mittelalter bis zum Dreißigjährigen Krieg*. München, 1994.; Bursehel, Peter, *Söldner*

decline in the late Middle Ages led – albeit to varying degrees – to a decrease in the incomes of landowners everywhere. The population, diminished by the pandemics of plague, could not provide the previous level of annuities for the landlords, and the cooler weather in Europe reduced crop yields and the extent of arable lands, so that the lower classes of the nobility in the western and central parts of Europe were essentially abolished. These noble strata were no longer able to finance their military obligations from the income of their estates, hence they offered their weapons skills and combat experience to the market,⁴ and even the nobles with larger estates and more tax-paying peasants made up for their missing income in this way. For example, Jan Žižka, a Bohemian nobleman and the famous general of the Hussite wars, fought as a mercenary in 1410 in the army of the king of Poland Władysław II Jagiełło at the Battle of Grunwald.⁵ The nobles became the dominant, almost exclusive players in the so-called “mercenary market”, not only as soldiers, but also as military contractors who set up mercenary troops and organised the orders and the “jobs”.⁶ As changes in military technology in the late Middle Ages led to a significant increase in the number of armed men required to wage war, and consequently the need for forces that could be kept in arms for longer periods, the demand for mercenaries from rulers, popes or wealthy cities also increased. The fact that more soldiers were needed than before was also indicated by a new practice that spread through Europe from the fourteenth century onwards: before a battle, a large number of young men were knighted en masse. This resulted in a radical change from the chivalric culture of two centuries earlier.⁷ The first such mass knighting took place in the second third of the thirteenth century, and it

im Nordwestdeutschland des 16. und 17. Jahrhunderts: Sozialgeschichtliche Studien. (Veröffentlichungen des Max-Planck-Instituts für Geschichte, 113.). Göttingen, 1995.; Hunterbrinker, Jan Willem, “*Fromme Knechte*” und “*Garteteufel*”. *Söldner als soziale Gruppe im 16. und 17. Jahrhundert*. Konstanz, 2010.; Rázsó, Gyula, “A zsoldosság gazdasági és társadalmi előfeltételei és típusai Magyarországon a XIV–XV. században” [The Economic and Social Preconditions and Types of Mercenarism in Hungary in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries], = *Hadtörténelmi Közlemények* 9, 1962, 160–217. 176–210.

⁴ Pósán, László, “Klíímaváltozások és következményei a középkori és kora újkori Európában” [Climate Changes and their Consequences in Medieval and Early Modern Europe], = *Föld és ember, új folyam* 3, 2011, 59–69. 64.; Schneider, Joachim, *Spätmittelalterlicher deutscher Niederadel. Ein landschaftlicher Vergleich*. Stuttgart, 2003.

⁵ Tresp, Söldner aus Böhmen, 2004. 24.

⁶ Tresp, Böhmen als Söldnermarkt, 2014.; Mallett, Michael, “*Der Condottiere*”, In: Garin, Eugenio (Hrsg.), *Der Mensch der Renaissance*. Frankfurt am Main, 1990. 49–78.

⁷ Prietzel, Malte, *Kriegsführung im Mittelalter. Handlungen, Erinnerungen, Bedeutungen*. Paderborn, 2006. 247–258.; Ehler, Joachim, *Die Ritter. Geschichte und Kultur*. München, 2006. 92–105.; Cardini, Franco, “Der Krieger und der Ritter”, In: Le Goff, Jacques (Hrsg.), *Der Mensch des Mittelalters*. Frankfurt am Main, 1996. 87–129.; Prohanka, Reinhard, *Das Rittertum*. Wiesbaden, 2011. 196–210.; Kulcsár, Zsuzsanna, *Így éltek a lovagkorban* [How They Lived in the Age of Chivalry]. Budapest, 1967. 11–13.

became a widespread practice already in the fourteenth century.⁸ For instance, before the Battle of Gruenwald in 1410, nearly a thousand new knights were initiated on the Polish side.⁹ Five years later, before the Battle of Agincourt, half a thousand young Frenchmen were knighted.¹⁰

The Kingdom of Hungary was not one of those areas that produced mercenaries in significant numbers, still, mercenaries from here served in many places in late medieval Europe. The Italian states,¹¹ in particular, which were almost constantly at war with each other, offered favourable conditions and long-lasting employment to mercenaries, including Hungarians. The overwhelming majority of Hungarian mercenaries serving abroad were primarily serving there.¹² On the other hand, far fewer mercenaries from Hungary were to be found in the western European theatres of war or those north of the Alpine-Carpathian line. In this short paper, we shall attempt to give an account of the men-at-arms who served in the wars between the Teutonic Order and the Polish–Lithuanian state during the fifteenth century, and whom the sources mention.

In the fourteenth century, mercenaries were not present in great numbers neither in the army of the Teutonic Order, nor in that of Poland.¹³ Throughout the fourteenth century, a large number of knights from across Christian Europe came to the Crusades against the heathen Lithuanians in support of the

⁸ Keen, Maurice, *Chivalry*. New Haven, 1984. 6–8, 64–82.

⁹ *Cronica conflictus Wladislai regis Poloniae cum cruciferis anno 1410*. Ed. Celiehowski, Zygmunt, Poznań, 1911. 22. [Hereinafter *Cronica conflictus*]; Długossii, Joannes, *Annales seu Cronicae incliti regni Poloniae*. Tom. X–XI.: 1404–1412. Ed. Plezia, Marian, Warszawa, 1997. 99.

¹⁰ Gouguenheim, Sylvain, “Die Perspektive der Erforschung der Ritterorden im Lichte der “neuen Militärgeschichte”, = *Ordines Militares Colloquia Torunensia Historica* 18, 2013, 7–25. 12.

¹¹ For the political relations in fourteenth–fifteenth century Italy, see e.g. Romano, Ruggiero – Tenenti, Alberto, *Die Grundlegung der modernen Welt. Spätmittelalter, Renaissance, Reformation*. Frankfurt am Main, 1967. 59–63.

¹² Lukcsics, Pál, “Magyar zsoldosok a pápaság szolgálatában a XIV. században” [Hungarian Mercenaries in the Service of the Papacy in the fourteenth century], = *Hadtörténelmi Közlemények* 33, 1932, 125–157.; Lukcsics, Pál “Magyar zsoldosok Itáliában a XIV. században” [Hungarian Mercenaries in Italy in the fourteenth century], = *Turul* 42, 1928, 128–129.; E. Kovács, Péter, “Magyar zsoldosok Sienában” [Hungarian Mercenaries in Siena], In. Bárány, Attila – Dreska, Gábor – Szovák, Kornél (eds.), *Arcana tabularii. Tanulmányok Solymosi László tiszteletére*. Vol. II., Budapest–Debrecen, 2014. 521–542.

¹³ Grodecki, Roman – Zachorowski, Stanislaw – Dąbrowski, Jan, *Dzieja Polski średniowiecznej*. Kraków, 2011. 546–549.; Mühle, Eduard, *Die Piasten. Polen im Mittelalter*. München, 2011. 106–108.; Biskup, Marian, “Das Problem der Söldner in den Streitkräften des Deutschordensstaates Preußen vom Ende des 14. Jahrhunderts bis 1525”, = *Ordines Militares Colloquia Torunensia Historica* 6, 1991, 49–74. 50.

Teutonic Order.¹⁴ Königsberg, the starting point of the Lithuanian campaigns in Prussia, was considered the meeting point of European nobility.¹⁵ After the Grand Duke of Lithuania Władysław converted to Catholicism, and married the Polish Queen Hedwig, thus obtaining the Polish crown,¹⁶ the number of western knights fighting for Christianity under the banner of the Teutonic Order fell dramatically, as the justification for the Lithuanian wars – that it was against the pagans – was no longer valid. At the same time, with the establishment of the Polish-Lithuanian Union, a very unfavourable change of power occurred for the monastic knights along the Prussian borders.¹⁷ From the last quarter of the fourteenth century, the Order sought to compensate for the armed forces of European nobles who had volunteered to fight for the Teutonic Knights for longer or shorter periods with mercenaries. From the end of the 1380s, they concluded mercenary contracts for 10–15 years with Pomeranian princes and nobles, who, in return for an annual payment, undertook to go to war against Poland with a defined number of soldiers, armed with specified weapons, if necessary, and participate in the campaigns of the Order under the command of the Teutonic officers. In the event of the death of the contracting Pomeranian party, the agreement also applied to his successor until the end of the relevant timeframe.¹⁸ Although the Treaty of Kalisz signed in 1343, which ended the political and military conflict between the Teutonic Order and Poland during the first third of the fourteenth century, created a decades long peace,¹⁹ not all territorial issues were settled, and during the long period of peace, a number of new political ambitions, commercial and economic problems overshadowed the bilateral relationship on both sides.²⁰ Thus, both sides anticipated a possible war and prepared for a confrontation. From the summer of 1407, the Teutonic Order reduced the

¹⁴ Paravieini, Werner, *Die Preussenreisen des europäischen Adels*. Teil 1. (Beihefte der Francia, 17/1.). Sigmaringen, 1989.

¹⁵ Militzer, Klaus, *Die Geschichte des Deutschen Ordens*. Stuttgart, 2005. 117.

¹⁶ Hellmann, Manfred, “Die polnische-litauische Union von 1385/86” = *Jahrbücher für Geschichte von Osteuropa* NF 34, 1986, 19–34.

¹⁷ Militzer, *Geschichte des Deutschen Ordens*, 2005. 116–117.; Končius, Joseph, *Vytautas the Great, Grand Duke of Lithuania*. Miami, 1964. 24–29.; Hoenseh, Jörg K., *Geschichte Polens*. Stuttgart, 1998. 72.

¹⁸ Biskup, *Problem der Söldner*, 1991. 50.; Simiński, Rafael, “Kontakte der Familie von Kameke mit dem Deutschen Orden in Preussen um die Wende vom 14. bis zum 15. Jahrhundert. Ein Beitrag zur Funktionierung der Ritterelite des Herzogtums Pommern-Stolp im Grenzraum von Pommern und dem Deutschordensstaat”, = *Studia Maritima* 26, 2013, 5–28. 11–12.

¹⁹ *Regesta historico-diplomatica Ordinis S. Mariae Theutonicorum 1198–1525*. Pars II: *Regesta privilegiorum Ordinis S. Mariae Theutonicorum. Mit einem Anhang: Papst- und Konzilsurkunden*. Eds. Joachim, Erich – Hubatsch, Walter, Göttingen, 1948. nr. 738. [Hereinafter *Regesta* II.]

²⁰ Pósán, László, “A Német Lovagrend és a lengyel-litván állam közötti „nagy háború” (1409–1411)” [The “Great War” between the Teutonic Order and the Polish–Lithuanian State], = *Hadtörténelmi Közlemények* 124, 2011, 3–30. 4–15.

silver content of its money and sought to raise additional funds for war preparations by increasing the number of Schillings (solidus) minted. While leaving the face value unchanged, the previous silver content of the Schilling of 1.26 grams was reduced to 1.17 grams.²¹

Following the peace treaty between the Grand Dukes Vytautas of Lithuania and Vasily Dmitrievich of Moscow on 14 September 1408,²² the Polish–Lithuanian Union was able to relocate Lithuanian forces from the east to the west if necessary, should a war break out with the Teutonic Order. Certainly considering this possibility, at the end of 1408 Grand Master Ulrich von Jungingen visited the castles along the border to examine the state of the military and defensive preparations of the Order.²³ Due to the growing antagonism between the Teutonic Order and the Polish-Lithuanian Union, and the threat of war, the Knights spent more and more money on weapons, horses and military equipment. Between 1405 and 1409, 6 112 marks were spent on such purchases, an average of 1 528 marks per year.²⁴ With the possibility of an imminent war in mind, the leadership of the Teutonic Order decided in the spring of 1409 to hire a larger number of mercenaries, and during the summer they sent out commissioners to recruit mercenaries.²⁵ An internal servant of the Grand Master, a certain Nammyr, and Kunze, a servant of the Master of the Hospital and the Commander of Elblag, were given the task of conducting consultations and negotiations in Stettin, Meissen, Thuringia, Braunschweig and Lüneburg to enable recruitment.²⁶ The other recruiting delegation, consisting of Gottschalk Hitfeld and Martin Kropp, citizens of Thorn, set off for Silesia.²⁷ In the Pomeranian and German territories, a “pike” was hired for 24 gold florins per month, and in Silesia for 20 gold florins per month.²⁸ In late medieval mercenary warfare, a “pike” (Spieß) was the smallest military unit, usually consisting of an armoured cavalryman, a crossbowman and a lightly armoured footman. Several (8–12) pikes formed a company or *rota* (24–36 people), and 8–10 rotas formed a larger team, which was usually led

²¹ Volckart, Oliver, *Die Münzpolitik im Ordensland und Herzogtum Preußen von 1370 bis 1550*. (Deutsches Historisches Institut Warschau. Quellen und Studien 4.). Wiesbaden, 1996. 62.; Waschinski, Emil, *Die Münz- und Währungspolitik des Deutschen Ordens in Preußen, ihre historischen Probleme und seltenen Gepräge*. Göttingen, 1952. 94, 235.

²² Spuler, Bertold, “Die Aussenpolitik der Goldenen Horde. Die Horde als Großmacht in Osteuropa und Vorderasien”, = *Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas* 5, 1940, 315–316.

²³ Plehn, Hans, *Geschichte des Kreises Strassburg in Westpreußen*. Leipzig, 1900. 74.

²⁴ Sarnowsky, Jürgen, *Die Wirtschaftsführung des Deutschen Ordens in Preußen (1382–1454)*. Köln, 1993. 400.

²⁵ Biskup, Problem der Söldner, 1991. 51.

²⁶ Ekdahl, Sven, “Soldtruppen des Deutschen Ordens im Krieg gegen Polen 1409”, = *Fasciculi Archaeologiae Historicae* 15, 2002, 47–64. 52.

²⁷ Kwiatkowski, Krzysztof, “Neue Quellen aus dem Kreis des Deutschen Ordens zum Krieg von 1409–1411”, = *Zapiski Historyczne* 75, 2010, 67–112. 80.

²⁸ Ekdahl, Soldtruppen, 2002. 52.; Kwiatkowski, Neue Quellen, 2010. 80.

by a captain.²⁹ The monthly wages of the armed men hired by the Teutonic Order show that wars that involved the employment of mercenaries were very costly, therefore such troops were hired for short periods, usually for a few weeks or months, depending on the needs of the moment. When mercenaries were contracted, it was necessary to agree not only on the amount of the salary, but also on the amount of money that could be spent on equipment and on transportation to the assembly point, what kind of provisions they would receive, and it was usually also stipulated in the contract that in case the mercenary was captured, the contractor would either buy him out or exchange him.³⁰ Since the cost of a mercenary army was very high, in 1409 the Teutonic Order tried to recruit soldiers mainly from Silesia, where the monthly cost of a pike was 4 gold florins less than in the German or Pomeranian principalities. However, in order to get this price, the Grand Master had to promise to keep the mercenaries in service for six months. This was a surprisingly long time in those days (and, from the mercenaries' point of view, several months of steady earnings).³¹ This was probably the reason why the majority of the mercenaries fighting under the banner of the Teutonic Order in 1409 came from Silesia, and only a much smaller proportion of them came from Lusatia, Saxony, Neumark or the Pomeranian dukedoms. In August 1409, 800 paid pikes (2 400 soldiers) were in the service of the Teutonic Order.³²

The prerequisite for mercenary recruitment was always set by the provincial governor of the territory concerned, because only he could authorise or prohibit it. His consent was needed to enable the local nobles and armed men to serve under a foreign banner.³³ Despite the fact that King Sigismund of Luxembourg, the King of Hungary, in the escalating situation between the Teutonic Order and the Polish–Lithuanian state, did not simply side with the Knights – in line with his plans to win the imperial crown – but acted as their clear defender,³⁴ since the support of the Teutonic Order was widespread among the lords and ecclesiastical dignitaries in the Empire (the Teutonic Order offered many second-, or third-born sons of noble families career opportunities in the Order),³⁵ it appears that he did not give permission to recruit mercenaries in his own country. Indeed, there is no trace in the sources that

²⁹ Ekdahl, *Soldtruppen*, 2002. 52.

³⁰ Ekdahl, *Soldtruppen*, 2002. 49.

³¹ Ekdahl, *Soldtruppen*, 2002. 52.

³² Ekdahl, Sven, *Das Soldbuch des Deutschen Ordens 1410/1411*. Teil II: Indices mit personengeschichtlichen Kommentaren. Köln–Weimar–Wien, 2010. 5. [Hereinafter *Soldbuch II*.]

³³ Ekdahl, *Soldtruppen*, 2002. 50.

³⁴ *Regesta Historico-diplomatica Ordinis S. Mariae Theutonicorum 1198–1525*. Pars I.: *Index Tabularii Ordinis S. Mariae Theutonicorum*. Regesten zum Ordensbriefarchivs. Vols I–III. Eds. Joachim, Erich – Hubatsch, Walther, Göttingen, 1948–1973. nr. 1233. [Hereinafter *Regesta I*.]

³⁵ Hoensch, Jörg K., “König/Kaiser Sigismund, der Deutsche Orden und Polen-Litauen”, = *Zeitschrift für Ostmitteleuropa-Forschung* 46, 1977, 1–44. 11.

armed men from Hungary joined the Order under its banner, nor that he let anyone from his court or his entourage go to Prussia to fight there. By the spring of 1409, there were increasing reports of the parties preparing for war.³⁶ During the first two months of the summer, there were some last-ditch attempts to avoid war and reach a diplomatic settlement, but all of these have failed. In these weeks, however, the first mercenary troops hired by the Teutonic Order arrived in Prussia.³⁷ Having considered the situation, the Grand Master finally decided to go to war, and on 6 August 1409 he declared war on Poland.³⁸ Ten days later, the army of the Order crossed the Prussian–Polish border in several places and broke into Poland. The main army, led by Grand Master Ulrich von Jungingen, crossed the river Drwęca at Brodnica, entered the province of Dobrzyń, where in two weeks they captured several towns and castles and plundered a large part of the territory. On the same day, mercenaries from Neumark also attacked the northern part of Greater Poland, in the area of Wałcz. A third army of the Teutonic Order entered the Polish province of Kujawy from Pomerelia and on 28 August captured the town of Bydgoszcz, which was of strategic importance. The Fourth Army, led by Friedrich von Zollern, Commander of Ostróda, and Marquard von Salzburg, Commander of Brandenburg – (Usakovo, attacked Mazovia, where they ravaged for three days before returning to Prussia.³⁹ The Polish high command may have been taken by surprise by the multi-directional, rapid offensive of the Teutonic Order, and for a time there was uncertainty as to the main direction of the attack. It was not until the autumn of 1409 that King Władysław II Jagiełło was able to raise an army capable of a counterattack. At the end of September, he laid siege to the city Bydgoszcz in the province of Kujawy, which had been occupied by the mercenaries of the Order, and he recaptured it on 6 October.⁴⁰ When Władysław began the siege of Bydgoszcz, the Grand Master also marched his army into Kujawy. Although he could not prevent the capture of the city, he was able to hinder the advancement of the Polish army. The two armies faced each other for a while, and then, presumably in order to prepare more thoroughly for war, the parties concluded a truce on 8 October for three quarters of a year, ending at sundown on

³⁶ Regesta I., nr. 1048, 1056, 1073.

³⁷ Długosii, *Annales*, 1997. Tom. X., 27–46.; Biskup, Marian, “Z badań nad ‘Wielką Wojną’ z Zakonem Krzyżackim”, = *Kwartalnik Historyczny* 66, 1959, 671–715.

³⁸ Nowak, Zenon Hubert, “Akt rozpoczynający ‘Wielką Wojnę’. List wypowiedni w mistrza Ulryka von Jingenen z 6 sierpnia 1409 roku”, = *Kommunikaty Mazursko-Warmińskie* 20, 1976, 79–85.

³⁹ Johann von Posilge, *Chronik des Landes Preußen*. Hrsg. Hirsch, Theodor – Toeppen, Max – Strehlke, Ernst, In. *Scriptores rerum Prussicarum*. Bd. III., Leipzig, 1866. 79–388. 301–303. [Hereinafter Posilge, SRP III.]; Kutowski, Ernst, “Zur Geschichte der Söldner in den Heeren des Deutschordensstaates in Preußen bis zum ersten Thorner Frieden 1.2.1411.”, = *Oberländische Geschichtsblätter* 14, 1912, 407–522. 435.; Ekdahl, Soldtruppen, 2002. 47–49.

⁴⁰ Posilge, SRP III., 312.; Kutowski, *Geschichte der Söldner*, 1912. 458–459.

24 June 1410. They agreed that any disputes between them during the armistice would be arbitrated by the brother of Sigismund of Luxemburg, Wenceslaus IV, King of Bohemia.⁴¹ After the ceasefire came into effect, the Teutonic Order dismissed its mercenaries, who therefore served for an average of two and a half months. To ensure that the King of Bohemia would rule in favour of the knights, a later record from January 1411 states that the Grand Master promised 60 000 gold florins.⁴² This was approximately two thirds of what he paid the mercenaries, which amounted to a total of 45 996 marks, and 1 Prussian mark was equivalent to 2 gold florins at the time.⁴³ The Grand Master's offer to Wenceslaus showed that the Teutonic Order considered a possible political settlement of the conflict to be easier and more rewarding, especially after having demonstrated its military power during the military actions of August, September and early October. Regardless of this, however, he sought to further strengthen the position of the Order and with it the pressure on Wladyslaw, and on 20 December 1409 he concluded a clearly military alliance with Sigismund of Luxemburg in Buda. The King of Hungary undertook to take armed Hungarian action against Poland only in the case that King Wladyslaw would have pagans and schismatics (i.e. Tatars and Lithuanians who had not yet converted to Christianity, as well as Orthodox Russians and Ruthenians) in his army.⁴⁴ This alliance threatened Poland with a two-front war, with an attack by the Teutonic Order in the north and Hungary in the south. After the conclusion of the contract, the Teutonic Order paid 40 000 gold florins to Sigismund. The payment was formally linked to Neumark, which the knights held as a pledge,⁴⁵ but in reality, it had nothing to do with the contract of bailment concluded in 1402. At the time the Teutonic Order paid 63 200 Hungarian gold florins for the pledge of the province, which in turn could be redeemed at any time by the pledger Sigismund of Luxemburg for the same price.⁴⁶ Thus, the Neumark pledge had no expiration date nor any other provision for the extension of the pledge, so from this point of view, nothing justified the payment of 40 000 gold florins, which was by all means a rather substantial amount. Two months later, on 2 March 1410, the Treasury of the Grand Master again paid the 40 000 gold florins to the King of Hungary, referring to the Neumark pledge once more.⁴⁷ Apparently, that – 80 000 gold florins – was the price of the military treaty against Poland. For this, the Teutonic Order paid almost as much as it spent on mercenaries in 1409.

⁴¹ *Die Staatsverträge des Deutschen Ordens in Preußen im 15. Jahrhundert*. Bd. I.: 1398–1437. Hrsg. Weise, Erich, Königsberg, 1939. nr. 74. [Hereinafter *Staatsverträge I.*]

⁴² *Geheimes Staatsarchiv Preußischer Kulturbesitz*, XX. Hauptabteilung, Historisches Staatsarchiv, Deutschordensbriefarchiv. nr. 1629. [Hereinafter *OBA*]

⁴³ *Das Marienburger Treßlerbuch der Jahre 1399–1409*. Hrsg. Joachim, Erich, Königsberg, 1896. 599. [Hereinafter *MTB*]; Ekdahl, *Soldtruppen*, 2002. 63.

⁴⁴ *Staatsverträge I.*, nr. 77, 78.

⁴⁵ *MTB*, 598.

⁴⁶ *Staatsverträge I.*, nr. 15.

⁴⁷ *Regesta II.*, nr. 1647.

At the same time, Sigismund also demonstrated his commitment to the monastic knights by inviting the ambassadors of the Order who arrived in Hungary, Werner von Tettingen, Master of the Hospital and Commander of Elblag, and Albrecht von Schwarzburg, Commander of Toruń, to the christening of his daughter.⁴⁸

Naturally, the negotiations and embassies between the Order and the King of Hungary were not kept secret from the King of Poland, therefore, at the same time as the talks took place in Buda, he met his cousin, the Grand Duke of Lithuania Vytautas, in Brest-Litovsk, and discussed the campaign against Prussia after the expiration of the armistice.⁴⁹ Thus the threat of a possible war on two fronts – contrary to the expectation of the Teutonic Order – did not make Władysław cautious and seek an agreement, but rather enhanced his determination. As expected, in February 1410, King Wenceslaus of Bohemia ruled in favour of the Teutonic Knights,⁵⁰ further inflaming the tension on both sides. Information about the Polish and Lithuanian military preparations was coming almost constantly to the headquarters of the Grand Master in Malbork from various officials of the Order.⁵¹ In the more distant courts of Europe, the outbreak of a war between the Teutonic Order and Poland was taken for granted, and many noblemen travelled to Prussia to support the Order as Christian knights. On 10 February 1410, for example, the French heir to the throne wrote a letter to Ulrich von Jungingen, in which he commended to the attention of the Grand Master the French nobles Laurentius de Jardo, Karolus de Escoutevilla and Albertus de Vallequiervilla, who were going to Prussia to fight the pagans and heathens.⁵² According to an earlier report in January, the nobility of France, the German Low Lands and the Rhineland also supported the Teutonic Order against King Władysław.⁵³ Sigismund, in the hope of being elected as Holy Roman Emperor, this time did not forbid his nobles to take up arms and, if they wished, go to Prussia and fight for the Teutonic Order. He gave another sign of his support to the Knights: he sent envoys to Malbork, who signed an agreement on 31 March 1410 that the parties would not conclude a separate peace with Poland without the knowledge and consent of the other.⁵⁴

With the armistice deadline of 24 June in mind, Grand Master Ulrich von Jungingen began recruiting mercenaries in the early spring of 1410 and planned to launch a surprise attack on Poland well before then, on 1 June.⁵⁵ He was thinking of a rapid, multipronged offensive similar to the one that

⁴⁸ Regesta I., nr. 1175.

⁴⁹ Długossii, *Annales*, 1997. Tom. X., 43–44.

⁵⁰ *Staatsverträge I.*, nr. 80.

⁵¹ Regesta I., 1251, 1258, 1271.

⁵² Regesta I., nr. 1253.

⁵³ Regesta I., nr. 1242, 1243.

⁵⁴ *Staatsverträge I.*, nr. 81.

⁵⁵ Ekdahl, Sven, “Diplomatie und Söldnerwerbung vor der Schlacht bei Žalgiris”, = *Lietuvos Istorijos Stidijos* 25, 2010, 48–61. 53.; Ekdahl, Sven, “Der 1. Thorner Frieden

brought success the previous year. By the beginning of May, 600 pikes (1 800 mercenaries) had secretly arrived in Prussia, and by the end of the month, a much larger number was expected than the planned number for the start of the attack. The military plan of the Grand Master was that the Teutonic Order would attack Poland from the north and the troops of Sigismund of Luxemburg from the south at the same time, and quickly bring Władysław to his knees, but the King of Hungary did not envisage a large-scale war with Poland.⁵⁶ In order to avoid armed confrontation, Sigismund tried to bring the situation to the negotiating table, and in mid-April he met with the Grand Duke of Lithuania Vytautas at Kežmarok, to whom – as the possible candidate for the title of Holy Roman emperor – he offered a crown, thus attempting to break up the Polish–Lithuanian union before the hostilities began.⁵⁷ However, the only actual result of the meeting in Kežmarok was that the King of Hungary and the Grand Duke agreed to meet again before the end of the armistice on 17 June and negotiate in Toruń, Prussia.⁵⁸ The fact that in mid-June, a few days before the armistice was due to expire, the parties were still negotiating with each other was clearly the incentive of Sigismund of Luxemburg. On 11 May, the envoy of the sovereign, Christoph von Gersdorff, a member of a noble family from Upper Lusatia who was in the service of the King of Hungary, informed the Grand Master and asked him to stop the deployment of the troops of the Teutonic Order and the preparations for the attack planned for 1 June.⁵⁹ In view of the planned negotiations in Toruń, and in order to preserve the goodwill of Sigismund, Ulrich von Jungingen cancelled the surprise attack on Poland and even suspended the hiring of mercenaries. There were no such steps on the Polish side, that is, mercenaries were enlisted in full force. Thus, those from Bohemia and Moravia who wanted to enlist under the banner of the Teutonic Order in the hope of earning a decent sum now went to King Władysław in order to earn any money at all.⁶⁰ In addition, a considerable number of the mercenary troops, which were already committed to the Teutonic Order, arrived in Prussia a few weeks late due to the decree of the Grand Master and were unable to participate in the

(1411) im Spiegel der Söldnerfrage”, = *Ordines Militares Colloquia Torunensia Historica* 18, 2013, 67–79. 70.

⁵⁶ Ekdahl, *Diplomatie*, 2010. 53.

⁵⁷ Długossii, *Annales*, 1997. Tom. XI., 55.; *Codex epistolaris Vitoldi Magni Ducis Lithuaniae*. Tom. I.: 1376–1430. Ed. Prochaska, Anton, Cracoviae, 1882. nr. 1358.; Giedré, Mickūnaitė, *Making a Great Ruler: Grand Duke Vytautas of Lithuania*. Budapest, 2006. 66–72.

⁵⁸ Ekdahl, *Der 1. Thorner Frieden*, 2013. 70.

⁵⁹ OBA, nr. 1276.

⁶⁰ Ekdahl, Sven, “Polnische Söldnerwerbungen vor der Schlacht bei Tannenberg (Grunwald)”, In: Ławrynowicz, Olgierd – Maik, Jerzy – Nowakowski, Piotr A. (eds.), *Non sensistis gladios. Studia ofiarowane Marianowi Glaskowi w 70 rocznicę urodzin*. Łódź, 2011. 121–134.

great battle of Gruenwald on 15 July. Their absence played a major role in the outcome of the battle.⁶¹

Following the meeting in Kežmarok, the King of Poland issued a letter of passage for Sigismund and his 1 500-strong entourage to travel through Poland to the planned meeting in Thorn on 17 June.⁶² In doing so, he wanted to signal that the Polish side is preparing for the talks and will do its utmost to ensure their success. In Prussia, serious preparations were made to welcome and cater for the expected distinguished guests. For example, the city council of Thorn reported to the Grand Master already on 18 May what sorts and how much food and drink would be stored in the warehouses during the stay of the Hungarian king and his entourage.⁶³ On 17 June, however, only the Grand Master, his entourage and the envoys of the King of Hungary appeared in the rich merchant town near the Prussian–Polish border. Neither the King of Poland nor the Grand Duke of Lithuania came, and despite his earlier promise, neither did Sigismund of Luxemburg. The death of Emperor Ruprecht on 8 May 1410 must have played a major role in this, and therefore the attention of Sigismund was turned to the question of his election as King of Germany. The death of King Rupert on 8 May 1410 must have played a significant role in this, and therefore the attention of Sigismund was turned to the question of his election as King of the Romans.⁶⁴ Consequently, the peace negotiations in Thorn immediately came to a standstill, causing a serious diplomatic setback for the Teutonic Order and completely disrupting the war plans and military preparations of the Grand Master. The case of the negotiations in Toruń, scheduled for the last minute before the armistice expired, was used by the Polish–Lithuanian side to mislead and deceive the Teutonic Order. Therefore, the last chance for a peaceful conflict resolution was lost.⁶⁵ Sigismund, who was an excellent diplomat, probably foresaw that his absence as a possible mediator between the parties at the planned final peace talks would not help the agreement, so the Hungarian delegation to Thorn essentially carried a message to the King of Poland, thereby also making a serious gesture to his ally, the Teutonic Order. The King of Hungary addressed a kind of ultimatum to King Władysław II Jagiełło,⁶⁶ but it was not a Hungarian declaration of war (as Jan Długosz stated in his chronicle),⁶⁷ because Sigismund intervened in the conflict between the Teutonic Order and the Polish–Lithuanian state – based on the ideal of universal imperial supremacy – as the governor of the Empire,

⁶¹ Ekdahl, *Der 1. Thorner Frieden*, 2013. 70.

⁶² *Codex diplomaticus regni Poloniae et magni ducatus Litvaniae in quo pacta, foedera, tractatus pacis*. Tom. I. Ed. Dogiel, Matthias, Vilnae, 1758. nr. 6.

⁶³ *Regesta I.*, nr. 1280.

⁶⁴ Pószán, László, *Magyarország és a Német Lovagrend a középkorban* [Hungary and the Teutonic Order in the Middle Ages]. Debrecen, 2019. 214–215.

⁶⁵ Ekdahl, *Diplomatie*, 2010. 55.

⁶⁶ *Zsigmondkori oklevéltár II. (1400–1410)* [Royal Archives of the Age of Sigismund]. Ed. Mályusz, Elemér, Budapest, 1958. nr. 7709. [Hereinafter ZsO II.]

⁶⁷ Długossii, *Annales*, 1997. Tom. XI., 78–80.

and not as the ruler of Hungary. Like the previous emperors, he adopted the view that the Teutonic Order belonged to the Empire, that it was part of it, and that two centuries earlier it had been sent by the Emperor and the Pope to the land of the pagan Prussians to defend Christianity.⁶⁸ In a letter dated 17 June, Sigismund called on Władysław to respect the arbitrations of King Wenceslaus, otherwise he, as the *vicarius* and future ruler of the Empire, would provide assistance to the Teutonic Order.⁶⁹ So far, as the ally of the Knights he only acted as the King of Hungary, but with this letter, he spoke of them as imperial subjects threatened by Poland and Lithuania, and whose help was a fundamental duty of the ruler of the Empire. He was essentially trying to prevent any actual military confrontation by an even more powerful means of political pressure, but his words about helping the Order could of course be interpreted as a declaration of war.⁷⁰ Despite the fact that he issued the letter as the governor of the Empire, Sigismund's letter (which was obviously written earlier, but dated 17 June) was not brought to the King of Poland by German envoys, but by the two most powerful lords of Hungary at the time, Miklós Garai, Palatine of Hungary, and Stiborici Stibor, Voivode of Transylvania, accompanied by 200 armed horsemen. He also entrusted them with the task of convincing the parties to extend the ceasefire. Christoph von Gersdorff, who had already visited Prussia in the service of Sigismund, was also a member of the delegation.⁷¹ Following the failure of the meeting at Toruń, and King Władysław's refusal to accept a peaceful settlement and an extension of the armistice, the 200 cavalymen who formed the Hungarian delegation joined the army of the Teutonic Order, which was allied with Sigismund, and went to war on their side, after Władysław II Jagiełło announced the outbreak of the war in Wolbórz on the day the armistice expired (24 June). On 15 July 1410, the main forces of the Teutonic Order led by the Grand Master clashed with the Polish–Lithuanian army in the triangle formed by the villages of Grunwald, Tannenberg and Ludwigsdorf. The day-long battle ended with the crushing defeat of the Teutonic Order.⁷²

⁶⁸ Pósán, László, "... quod terra ipsa sub monarchia imperii est." *Az Imperium Romanum és a Német Lovagrend állama a középkorban* [The Imperium Romanum and the State of the Teutonic Order in the Middle Ages], In: Frank, Tibor (ed.), *Németföldről Németországba. Magyar kutatók tanulmányai a német történelemről* [From the Low Lands to Germany. Studies of Hungarian Researchers on German History]. (Magyar kutatók az egyetemes történelemről, 3.). Budapest, 2012. 17–38. 32.

⁶⁹ ZsO II., nr. 7709.

⁷⁰ Ekdahl, Sven, "Das Ultimatum Sigismunds von Luxemburg an Władysław Jagiełło vom 17. Juni 1410. Eine Inhaltsanalyse", = *Fasciculi Archaeologiae Historicae* 27, 2014, 49–55. 52.

⁷¹ *Cronica conflictus*, 16.; Długossii, *Annales*, 1997. Tom. XI., 59.

⁷² Ekdahl, Sven, *Die Schlacht bei Tannenberg 1410*. (Berliner Historische Studien, 8/1.). Berlin, 1982.; Ekdahl, Sven, "Tannenberg / Grünwald – ein politisches Symbol in Deutschland und Polen", = *Journal of Baltic Studies* 22, 1991, 271–324.; Evans, Geoffrey, *Tannenberg 1410–1414*. London, 1970.; Krollmann, Christian, *Die Schlacht*

The fact that 200 Hungarian cavalymen marched with the army of the Teutonic Order had no military significance, but its symbolic message may have been important. Palatine Garai and Voivode Stibor, as Hungarian barons, rode towards the Polish–Lithuanian army under the banner of their sovereign, depicting a black eagle against a gold background, while the court knight of Sigismund, Christoph von Gersdorff and his horsemen joined the troops of the Teutonic Order under the imperial triangular banner depicting a white cross on a red background.⁷³ Although the Hungarian cavalymen led by Garai and Stibor went with the army of the Order to Tannenberg, the site of the great clash between the two armies, they apparently did not take part in the battle. Neither of the barons was killed in action (where many high-ranking officials of the Teutonic Order, including the Grand Master himself, were slain), nor were they taken captive, in fact, they were able to return to Hungary unharmed. It is probably safe to assume that the Hungarian contingent left the battlefield without a fight. The vast majority of the contemporaries believed that they abandoned the Order of the Knights and fled.⁷⁴ Knight Christoph von Gersdorff, however, participated in the battle with his 40 men and was taken prisoner by the Polish forces.⁷⁵ According to the list of the Knights of the Order of the Knights captured in battle, *Christoferum de Hungar*, who was considered “Hungarian”, fell into captivity along with Konrad, the Duke of Oels, and Prince Kazimir of Pomerania.⁷⁶ The treasury of the Grand Master later paid him 50 gold florins for the inconvenience of his captivity.⁷⁷ The participation of Christoph von Gersdorff in the Battle of Tannenberg proves that Sigismund allowed his knights in his personal service who belonged to his court to fight on the side of the Teutonic Order, at their own will. This personal freedom of choice, however, was not at all given to the barons – Palatine Garai and Voivode Stibor – who held national offices. Their behaviour at Grunwald was not a matter of courage or cowardice, but of following the orders and expectations of Sigismund. This was perhaps also indicated by the fact that the Hungarian dignitaries and the horsemen of Christoph von Gersdorff carried different banners when the army of the Teutonic Order marched. The soldiers of Palatine Garai were under the banner of Sigismund, and Christoph von Gersdorff was clearly carrying one of the most important symbols of the Empire of which the Teutonic Order was a part.

bei Tannenberg. Ihre Ursachen und ihre Folgen. Königsberg, 1910.; Kuczyński, Stefan Maria, *Wielka wojna z Zakonem Krzyżackim w latach 1409–1411.* Warszawa, 1966.; Kuczyński, Stefan Maria, *Bitwa pod Grunwaldem.* Katowice, 1985.

⁷³ Długosii, *Annales*, 1997. Tom. XI., 101.

⁷⁴ Ekdahl, Sven, *Die „Banderia Prutenorum” des Jan Długosz – eine Quelle zur Schlacht bei Tannenberg 1410. Untersuchungen zu Aufbau, Entstehung und Quellenwert der Handschrift. Mit einem Anhang: Farbige Abbildungen der 56 Banner, Transkription und Erläuterungen des Textes.* Göttingen, 1976. 176–177.

⁷⁵ Długosii, *Annales*, 1997. Tom. XI., 113.

⁷⁶ OBA, nr. 1616.

⁷⁷ *Soldbuch II.*, 82, 128–130.

Apart from Christoph von Gersdorff and his 40 men-at-arms, we know of only one mercenary from Hungary in July and August 1410. There was a soldier named *Kasscha* in the rota of Nickel von Schrank of Silesia, who was leading a pike, and he must have come from north-eastern Hungary, from the city of Košice or its surroundings. The company to which he belonged was part of a larger mercenary force led by the brothers Wenzel von Dohna and Benes von Dohna, and he was contracted to the Teutonic Order for five weeks from 25 June 1410.⁷⁸ This group, including this soldier named *Kasscha*, took part in the battle of Grunwald. The Hungarian-born mercenary did not perish, nor was he taken prisoner by the Polish, but he apparently went with the units that retreated from the battlefield to Malbork and defended the headquarters of the Teutonic Order against the besieging Polish army.⁷⁹ Given that *Kasscha* fought alongside Silesian mercenaries, it is likely that he was also German-speaking or at least he spoke the language. According to a letter dated 4 January 1411, the magistrate or castellan (*advocatus, Voigt*) of the province of Neumark under the pledge of the Teutonic Order was called Engelhard Kassow or Cassaw.⁸⁰ Judging by the name, it is conceivable that this official of the Order was also from the northeast of Hungary, perhaps from the area around Košice, like the aforementioned mercenary.

In addition to the large number of Prussian secular landowners, townspeople and mercenaries, a third of the members of the Teutonic Order also lost their lives in the great battle of 15 July 1410. The number of those who were captured was also considerable.⁸¹ The remainder of the army of the Teutonic Order fled towards Malbork. The commander of Świecie, Heinrich von Paluen, who was leading a reinforcement to the main army, learned of the defeat from the retreating soldiers. He immediately turned his troops around and rushed to the defence of the seat of the Teutonic state. On 18 July, he was already in Malbork, which means that his troops travelled a distance of around 110–120 kilometres with remarkable speed.⁸² Heinrich von Plauen, who took over the military affairs of the Teutonic state from the fallen Grand Master and the main officers of the Order, put the defence of Malbork above all else. It was more than just a symbolic act; the outcome of the war depended on the fate of Malbork, as the King of Poland was planning (and the knights had already received news of this long before)⁸³ to take Malbork, acquire the legendary treasury of the knights and use it to remunerate the large number of mercenaries he

⁷⁸ Soldbuch II., 37

⁷⁹ Soldbuch II., 128.

⁸⁰ Regesta I., nr. 1474.; Heckmann, Dieter, *Amtsträger des Deutschen Ordens*. Toruń, 2020. 396.

⁸¹ Militzer, *Geschichte des Deutschen Ordens*, 2005. 144.

⁸² Pelech, Markian, "Heinrich von Plauen", In: Arnold, Udo (Hrsg.), *Die Hochmeister des Deutschen Ordens 1190–1994*. (Quellen und Studien zur Geschichte des Deutschen Ordens, 40.). Marburg, 1998. 114–118.; Font, Márta, *A Német Lovagrend alkonya* [The Twilight of the Teutonic Order]. Pécs, 1997. 135.

⁸³ Regesta I., nr. 1073, 1251, 1291.

took into his service.⁸⁴ If the Teutonic Order wanted to continue the war after the defeat at Gruenwald, the treasury at Malbork was also a key element in their strategy. The siege of the castle began on 25 July. Its walls were defended by some 3 000 mercenaries, part of them escaped from Gruenwald and others came from East Pomerania. In addition to the soldiers, the western side of the castle, facing the Nogat River, was guarded by 400 crossbowmen, who provided a link between Malbork and the outside world with their barges and boats. These river sailors, the so-called “ship’s children” (*Schiffskinder*), received a very high salary of 1 mark (2 gold florins) a week.⁸⁵ On 2 August 1410, Sigismund of Luxemburg, as the Vicar of the Empire and claimant to the imperial crown, allowed the Teutonic Order to mint Hungarian-style gold coins to help finance war expenses and recruit mercenaries.⁸⁶ The approval was necessary because in the Holy Roman Empire, a prince could only mint gold coins with the permission of the emperor.⁸⁷ The siege of Marienburg was still in progress when, in August 1410, the Teutonic Order’s Chief Steward (*magnus procurator*, *Großschäffer*) in Königsberg travelled to Bohemia to recruit 4 000 pikes (i.e. 12 000 mercenaries).⁸⁸ These numbers demonstrate that in possession of the treasury, the Teutonic Order had the financial resources to continue the war, and also explains why it was so important for Władysław to acquire it. After nine weeks of unsuccessful siege, the Polish army, facing increasing supply problems, was finally forced to abandon the castle and withdraw from Prussia. News of a possible Hungarian attack on southern Poland may also have played a part in this move. As a matter of fact, at the end of September 1410, on the orders of Sigismund, Voivode Stibor broke into southern Poland with 12 banderia, raided the countryside as far as the area around Stary Sącz, and then returned to Hungary. In response, Polish troops also made incursions into Upper Hungary.⁸⁹ At the end of September 1410, at the same time as the Hungarian attack on southern Poland, the Teutonic Order launched a counter-attack with the newly recruited mercenary troops and broke into Kuyavia. However, in the battle of Koronowo (10 October 1410) it was defeated once again, and many knights and mercenaries were captured by Poland.⁹⁰ Some of these captured

⁸⁴ Ekdahl, *Der 1. Thorner Frieden*, 2013. 71–73.

⁸⁵ Ekdahl, Sven, “‘Schiffskinder’ im Kriegsdienst des Deutschen Ordens. Ein Überblick über die Werbungen von Seeleuten durch den Deutschen Orden von der Schlacht bei Tannenberg bis zum Brester Frieden (1410–1435)”, = *Acta Visbiensia* 4, 1973, 239–274. 250–251.

⁸⁶ *Regesta* II., nr. 1672.

⁸⁷ Nau, Elisabeth, *Epochen der Geldgeschichte*. Stuttgart, 1972. 49.

⁸⁸ Biskup, *Problem der Söldner*, 1991. 54.

⁸⁹ Sroka, A, Stanisław, “Wojska węgierskie u granic Polski w 1410 roku”, = *Studia Historyczne* 53, 2010, 335–345.; Dvořáková, Daniela, *A lovag és királya. Stiborici Stibor és Luxemburgi Zsigmond* [The Knight and his King. Stibor Stiborici and Sigismund of Luxemburg]. [Bratislava] Pozsony, 2009. 287.

⁹⁰ Kutowski, *Geschichte der Söldner*, 1912. 486–487.; Spieralski, Zdzisław, “Bitwa pod Koronowem 10. 10. 1410”, In: Tomczak, Andrzej (ed.), *Bitwa pod Koronowem 10. X.*

mercenaries had previously served as knights of the court or as men-at-arms in the service of Sigismund of Luxembourg, that is, they came to Prussia from Hungary to fight alongside the Teutonic Order. Most of them were of Silesian origin, but there were also Bohemians, Moravians and even Hungarians.

Mercenaries from Hungary, who fought alongside the Teutonic Order and were captured near Koronowo:

Hannus Behme / Behem joined the Order in September 1410, but not alone, he led a pike. Prior to that he was part of the mercenary team led by Captain Nickel von Loeben, who served Sigismund. According to the mercenary payroll, he received payment from the knights from 22 September to 20 October 1410. He was captured at the battle of Koronowo on 10 October 1410, from which he was released relatively quickly, presumably through a prisoner exchange, since by the end of the year he was again on the mercenary list of the Teutonic Order.⁹¹ His service in Prussia came to an end on 5 February 1411 with the conclusion of the war between the Teutonic Order and Poland. In addition to his pay, he received 5 marks as compensation from the Grand Master for his grievances and the time he spent in captivity.⁹²

The Moravian *Hans Boskowitz* was also a member of the troop of Nickel von Loeben, serving Sigismund, and with the approval of the king, he joined the army of the Teutonic Order in September 1410. He did not go alone either, he was accompanied to Prussia by his four cavalymen. He was also taken prisoner in the battle of Koronowo and also received 5 marks in compensation.⁹³

Hannus Schaw belonged to the court of Sigismund as well, and within it to the mercenary troop of Captain Nickel von Loeben. He left Hungary in September 1410 and went to Prussia to serve as a mercenary of the Teutonic Order. He too was captured in the battle of 10 October 1410, and was also paid 5 marks in compensation by the treasury of the Grand Master.⁹⁴

Similarly, a Bohemian nobleman, *Hronko Tluxa*, served at the court of Sigismund before becoming a mercenary of the Teutonic Order, and was also taken as a Polish prisoner at the Battle of Koronowo.⁹⁵

Another Bohemian nobleman, *Raczko Bubna*, was also a knight at the court of Sigismund, but he had more armed men than the mercenaries mentioned above, for after his capture at Koronowo, the Teutonic Order paid him 25 marks and 190 gold florins in compensation.⁹⁶

Jan Tannenberg was in a similar situation, who also commanded more than one or two pikes. He became a Prussian mercenary from a knight of the court of

1410. Bydgoszcz, 1961. 47–67. 66–67.

⁹¹ Soldbuch II., 106–107., 115.

⁹² Soldbuch II., 24–25.

⁹³ Soldbuch II., 43.

⁹⁴ Soldbuch II., 269.

⁹⁵ Soldbuch II., 326.

⁹⁶ Soldbuch II., 47.

Sigismund, and the like others, he was captured at the battle of Koronowo, for which the Grand Master paid him 25 marks in reparations, and then 62 English Nobels to compensate for the cost of arms and horses.⁹⁷ This amounts to nearly 41.5 Prussian marks.⁹⁸

The soldier listed as *Hans Ruzska / Ruske* in the mercenary register of the Teutonic Order was most probably the same as a lesser nobleman named János (János Ruzska) from the village of Ruzska in Abaúj County in north-eastern Hungary, who also went to Prussia as a mercenary in the autumn of 1410. He was a member of a mercenary unit led by one Hans Stolzenberg. He himself was not, but his brother William was a knight at the court of the King of Hungary.⁹⁹

Since each of them joined forces with several other soldiers under the banner of the Teutonic Knights (some with at least a dozen), around 3–4 dozen – or even more – mercenaries went from Hungary to Prussia in September 1410. Given the similarities in the timing and circumstances of their service, we cannot rule out the possibility that in addition to the permission of Sigismund, this may have required his effective cooperation as well.

Georg von Czettritz, also of Silesian origin, came into contact with Sigismund of Luxemburg more than a decade before the Polish–Teutonic war. He participated in his Crusade and the Battle of Nicopolis, but he was not admitted to the court of the King of Hungary instead he returned to Silesia after the Crusade. From there he entered the mercenary service of the Teutonic Order, where he served for many years until 1417. He did not take part in the battle of Gruenwald, but he did participate in the defence of Malbork. He was the commander of a fairly substantial mercenary force of 93 pikes. His brothers, Heinrich and Hermann, also earned their living as mercenary captains of the Teutonic Order. Thus, apart from his participation in the Nicopolitan campaign, Georg von Czettritz had no connection with Hungary.¹⁰⁰

In terms of its connection to Hungary, the career of the captain of another Silesian mercenary company, on the other hand, was the opposite of what has been outlined above. *Heinz von Stosch* lived his life as a mercenary of the Teutonic Order between 1410 and 1413, and only then did he enter the service of the King of Hungary.¹⁰¹ According to a letter written by Sigismund to the Grand Master on 20 July 1418, the emperor made use of his services mainly for diplomatic missions. (Also senden wir zu dir den strengen Henrich Stoschen, ritter, unsern diener und lieben getruen, entwerter diß brifes).¹⁰²

In the late autumn of 1410, more mercenaries arrived from Bohemia, Silesia and the German principalities, so by mid-December Heintich von Plauen (who

⁹⁷ Soldbuch II., 322.

⁹⁸ Pószán, László, *A Német Lovagrend pénzügypolitikája* [The Financial Policy of the Teutonic Order]. Debrecen, 2000. 98.

⁹⁹ Soldbuch II., 261.

¹⁰⁰ Soldbuch II., 55.

¹⁰¹ Soldbuch II., 316–317.

¹⁰² OBA, nr. 2763.

was elected Grand Master on 9 November after the successful defence of Malbork)¹⁰³ had a nearly 8 000-strong mercenary army.¹⁰⁴ The military balance of power was thus restored, which resulted in an armistice between Poland and the Teutonic Order on 9 December 1410.¹⁰⁵ However, the war was not over, and one month after the conclusion of the ceasefire, on 13 January 1411, the Grand Master raised the pay from 11 marks (22 gold florins) per pike to 12 marks (24 gold florins) to ensure the continued supply of mercenaries.¹⁰⁶ At the same time, King Władysław was having increasing problems paying his mercenaries. In the late autumn of 1410, mercenary captains fighting under the Polish banner were even considering leaving the Polish army for the absence of their payment.¹⁰⁷ In the early part of November 1410, a mercenary captain from Lusatia, Wolfhart von der Horke, informed the leadership of the Teutonic Order that 4 000 mercenaries in Polish service were at bay in Bohemia because they had not yet received any money.¹⁰⁸ David Rosenfeld, a citizen of Wrocław, informed the Grand Master on 8 January 1411 that the army of the King of Poland had only a few “guests” left in it, i.e. foreign mercenaries.¹⁰⁹ The action taken by Heinrich von Plauen on 13 January threatened to turn the mercenaries in Polish service over to the Teutonic Order. This circumstance must certainly have played an important role in the fact that the belligerent parties finally concluded a peace treaty in Thorn on 1 February 1411.¹¹⁰ The fact that the day before the signing of the peace treaty, the Teutonic Order signed the reparation claim of King Władysław for 100 000 Schocks Bohemian groats, showed that despite the victorious battles of Gruenwald and Koronowo, the Polish–Lithuanian army did not manage to obtain any substantial spoils of war, and the unpaid mercenaries were already beginning to demand land for the lack of payment. The King of Poland was in dire need of money.¹¹¹ According to the law of war and the norms of chivalry of the time, if Christian forces were at war with each other, a valid peace treaty required the release of prisoners of war by both sides without any ransom or other preconditions.¹¹² Hence, the demand of Władysław that the Teutonic Order shall pay reparation for the prisoners and the Prussian castles and towns that had fallen into Polish hands was not included in the Thorn peace treaty, but was included in the promissory note signed the day before the

¹⁰³ Heckmann, *Amtsträger*, 2020. 151.

¹⁰⁴ Biskup, *Problem der Söldner*, 1991. 54–55.

¹⁰⁵ *Regesta I.*, nr. 1414.

¹⁰⁶ Kwiatkowski, *Neue Quellen*, 2010. nr. 29.

¹⁰⁷ Ekdahl, *Polnische Söldnerwerbungen*, 2011. 164.

¹⁰⁸ Ekdahl, *Polnische Söldnerwerbungen*, 2011. 129–130.

¹⁰⁹ Ekdahl, *Der 1. Thorner Frieden*, 2013. 79.

¹¹⁰ *Staatsverträge I.*, nr. 84.

¹¹¹ Ekdahl, *Der 1. Thorner Frieden*, 2013. 75.

¹¹² Brunner, Otto, *Land und Herrschaft. Grundfragen der territorialen Verfassungsgeschichte Österreichs im Mittelalter*. Wien, 1965. 106.

conclusion of the peace.¹¹³ At the time, 60 groats were counted as 1 Schock,¹¹⁴ i.e. the Polish claim was worth 6 000 000 groats. According to the payrolls, the Teutonic Order spent a total of 226 000 Prussian marks on its mercenaries in the war between 1409 and 1411 (the actual amount may be higher, since many mercenaries were not mentioned in the payrolls). Generally, 1 Schock Bohemian groat was taken as the equivalent of 1.5 Prussian marks.¹¹⁵ The Polish reparation claim thus amounted to 150 000 marks, which was less than the amount the Order paid for the mercenaries.

The agreement between Sigismund of Luxemburg and the Teutonic Order on 31 March 1410, in which the contracting parties undertook not to conclude a separate peace treaty with King Władysław without the agreement of the other, was seriously damaged by the Treaty of Toruń, because the Grand Master concluded it without the knowledge of the Hungarian monarch. This meant that the state of war between Hungary and Poland continued even after 1 February 1411. Already after the armistice of 9 December 1410, Sigismund foresightedly deployed a considerable military force of 1 100 pikes (3 300 men) on the Hungarian–Polish border. It was unsuitable for a major attack, but adequate for border defence. The mercenary troops sent here were expected to serve for two or three months.¹¹⁶ The Peace of Thorn undoubtedly caused some loss of trust between the King of Hungary and the Teutonic Order, but their previous positions did not change substantially. It soon became apparent that the peace treaty did not resolve the conflicts that led to the war, but essentially preserved them, and thus raised the possibility of a new war from the outset.¹¹⁷ Perhaps this may have contributed to the fact that in early December 1411 Sigismund of Luxemburg, as the ruler of the Empire, forbade anyone from giving any support to Poland from Bohemia, Moravia or Silesia, or recruiting mercenaries for Kraków in these countries and provinces.¹¹⁸ The failure of the Peace of Thorn to bring about real peace was proved more than anything else by the outbreak of another war between Poland and the Teutonic Order two years later, in Sep-

¹¹³ Pelech, Markian, “Der Verpflichtungsbrief des Hochmeisters Heinrich van Plauen bezüglich der Bezahlung von 100 000 Schock Böhmischer Groschen an den König von Polen vom 31. Januar 1411.” = *Preußenland* 17, 1979, 55–64.

¹¹⁴ Pószán, A Német Lovagrend pénzügypolitikája, 2000. 96.

¹¹⁵ Staatsverträge I., nr. 15, 17.

¹¹⁶ Mályusz, Elemér, *Zsigmond király uralma Magyarországon* [The Reign of King Sigismund in Hungary]. Budapest, 1984. 84.

¹¹⁷ Pószán, László, “Sigismund von Luxemburg und der erste Frieden von Thorn”, In: Czaja, Roman – Mühle, Eduard – Radzimiński, Andrzej (Hrsg.), *Konfliktbewältigung und Friedensstiftung im Mittelalter*. Toruń, 2012. 123–133. 130.; Sieradzan, Wiesław, “Der Thorner Frieden von 1411 und die Prozesse zwischen dem Deutschen Orden und Polen als Beispiel der Bewältigung zwischenstaatlicher Konflikte im Spätmittelalter”, In: Czaja, Roman – Mühle, Eduard – Radzimiński, Andrzej (Hrsg.), *Konfliktbewältigung und Friedensstiftung im Mittelalter*. Toruń, 2012. 135–149. 141.

¹¹⁸ Regesta I., nr. 1592.

tember 1413, which was followed by further wars.¹¹⁹ Occasionally, there were one or two mercenaries from Hungary under the banner of the Teutonic Order in these battles that took place in the later decades of the fifteenth century. In 1454, for example, in the 13-years war¹²⁰ between the Teutonic Order, the Polish–Lithuanian state and the Prussian orders, there was a soldier named *Petr von Lewocza* among the mercenaries of the Order, who, judging by his name, probably came from the town of Levoča (or its surroundings) in north-eastern Hungary.¹²¹ Later sources of the war, from the mid-1460s, mention a mercenary in the service of the Order named *Niclas aus Krompach*, who is also believed to have come to Prussia to join the army of the Teutonic Order from the town of Krompachy in north-eastern Hungary.¹²²

¹¹⁹ Boockmann, Hartmut, *Johannes Falkenberg, der Deutsche Orden und die polnische Politik. Untersuchungen zur politische Theorie des späten Mittelalters*. Göttingen, 1975. 101–103.; Militzer, *Geschichte des Deutschen Ordens*, 2005. 146.; Nöbel, Wilhelm, *Michael Küchmeister. Hochmeister des Deutschen Ordens 1414–1422*. (Quellen und Studien zur Geschichte des Deutschen Ordens, 5.). Bad Godesberg, 1969. 79–80.

¹²⁰ On the 13-years war, see Czaja, Roman, “A lengyel-litván állam és a Német Lovagrend közötti tizenhárom éves háború (1454–1466)” [The Thirteen-year War between the Polish–Lithuanian State and the Teutonic Order], In. Pósán, László – Veszprémy, László (eds.), *Elfeledett háborúk. Középkori csaták és várostromok (6–16. század)*. Budapest, 2016. 113–126.; Pósán, László, “A Német Lovagrend államának széthullása – a 13 éves háború” [The Collapse of the Teutonic Order – the 13-years War], In. Kovács, Zoltán – Püski, Levente (eds.), *Emlékkönyv L. Nagy Zsuzsa 80. születésnapjára*. Debrecen, 2010. 271–286.; Biskup, Marian, *Trzynastoletnia wojna z Zakonem Krzyżackim 1454–1466*. Warszawa, 1967.

¹²¹ Regesta I., nr. 12910.

¹²² Regesta II., nr. 3207.

Ferenc Sebők

MERCENARIES IN CHARTERS OF THE ANGEVIN ERA BETWEEN 1342–1366

My study concerns the issue of Hungarian mercenaries in the fourteenth century, especially in the middle and second part of this period. Historiography discovered long ago that mercenaries were employed in European kingdoms and in the Holy Land as well during the period of the medieval millennium. At the same time, it is also true that not all paid soldiers can be regarded as mercenaries, so it is necessary to define who can be considered as such a mercenary, and who belongs to the category of paid soldiers. It is obvious that soldiers who belonged to the retinue of feudal lords, received land donations, weapons, victuals, horses, armour, arms and sometimes even money for their services, but they still cannot be considered mercenaries in that sense of those warriors who sold their services from time to time to different employers, who served as soldiers as a way of life, who performed this as a profession¹, which provided the possibility to make money, even get rich, as it is demonstrated by several mercenary careers from the fourteenth century, the best known example being that of Sir John Hawkwood, who started his military service as a simple archer and later became a *condottieri* himself.²

Hungarian historiography in the last century also examined the role of mercenaries in Hungarian military history, especially in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. However, the studies and textbooks dealing with the fourteenth century developments focused on the military achievements of Hungarian mercenaries abroad,³ mainly in Italy, as King Louis I led two campaigns to the Kingdom of Naples, and a relatively rich narrative source material⁴ survived from this period. As a result, the deeds of the Hungarian army and the king's foreign mercenaries are quite well-documented and known by historical scholarship. The same is true for the Hungarian mercenaries, who stayed in Italy after the king's two campaigns, or went there later with the specific aim of

¹ Contamine, Philippe, *War in the Middle Ages*. Cambridge, MA, 1993. 98–99. (Translation of Contamine, Philippe, *La Guerre au moyen âge*. Paris, 1980.)

² Fowler, Kenneth, *Medieval Mercenaries*. Vol. I. The Great Companies. Oxford, 2001. 15.

³ Hóman, Bálint – Szekfű, Gyula, *Magyar történet* [Hungarian History]. Vol. II., Budapest, 1939. 190–199.; Engel, Pál – Kristó, Gyula – Kubinyi, András, *Magyarország története 1301–1526* [History of Hungary 1301–1526]. Budapest, 1998. 64–68.; Engel, Pál, *The Realm of Saint Stephen*. London, 2001. *passim*.

⁴ Eg. Johannes de Thurocz, *Chronica Hungarorum*. I. Textus. Eds. Galántai, Elisabeth – Kristó, Julius, Budapest 1985. 168–178. (This part of the chronicle was written by John Küküllei, chaplain of King Louis I.) [hereinafter Küküllei].

-serving there as mercenaries,⁵ and who became members of different mercenary companies, the *Magna Societas Hungarorum*, the *Alba Societas*, etc. I should rather concentrate this time on how the consequences of mercenary service are reflected in the charters of the period. What can we learn about Hungarian mercenaries from contemporary charters? What information is preserved in them, from which we might draw certain conclusions?

In order to obtain information concerning the above-mentioned issues, the *Anjou-kori oklevéltár* [Documenta res Hungaricas tempore regum Andegavensium illustrantia] serves an excellent tool.⁶ The volumes of this series contain the excerpts of all surviving charters relating to the history of Hungary from 1301 till 1387. Though the series has not been completed yet, almost the entire reign of King Charles I and more than two decades of the reign of Louis I are covered, which provides exceptionally advantageous opportunities for researching this period. In my study, I am going to reflect on information preserved in the charters dating from the first half of Louis I's reign.

The period under review now is from 1342 to 1366, as the corresponding volumes of the above-mentioned series are either published (partly by myself), or under research, so we possess a relatively rich pool of information concerning, among a lot of other things, mercenary service as well. But we have to bear in mind that charters are legal documents, so the nature of the information preserved by them is special in character, and we cannot expect from them descriptions of battles, details about armament, flags, ways of warfare and things like that. The question is what type of material can they provide for historians.

I divided the information found about mercenaries in charters into seven categories: 1. information in connection with payment for military services, 2. reference to weapons, 3. recruitment of Hungarian mercenaries, 4. layers of society as pools for mercenary recruitment, 5. mercenary contracts, 6. criminal acts perpetrated by mercenaries, 7. dangers of mercenary service. I should like to focus on information provided by hitherto unpublished charters as well as on published ones, and also on some pieces of historical evidence, which might be interesting from one viewpoint or another⁷.

⁵ *Nagy Képes milleniumi hadtörténet* [Illustrated Millennial Military History]. Ed. Rácz, Árpád, Budapest, 2000. 55–59. (This part was written by Kristó, Gyula.); *Magyarország hadtörténete I.* [The Military History of Hungary I.]. Budapest, 2017. 206–209. (This part was written by Bárány, Attila.)

⁶ *Anjou-kori oklevéltár. Documenta res Hungaricas tempore regum Andegavensium illustrantia.* [Documents of the Angevin Era.] I–XV., XVII–XXXVIII., XL., XLII., XLIV., XLVI–LI. Editor-in-chief Kristó Gyula, Ed. Almási, Tibor – Blazovich, László – Géczy, Lajos – B. Halász, Éva – Kordé, Zoltán – Kőfalvi, Tamás – Makk, Ferenc – Piti, Ferenc – Rábai, Krisztina – Sebők, Ferenc – Szócs, Tibor – Teiszler, Éva – Tóth, Ildikó. Budapest–Szeged, 1990–2023. [hereinafter AOKlt.]

⁷ Hereinafter I will refer to archival evidence published in volumes of the above-mentioned series, but for convenience's sake I will provide the reader with information about the accessibility of archival material, as it is available on the Internet in order to facilitate research into this topic and other related issues. Therefore, I will provide the

Let me draw the readers' attention first to that phenomenon, which seems to be a natural feature concerning the employment of mercenaries by the king of Hungary. In the first decade of King Louis' rule, historical sources refer to mercenaries in the context that the king of Hungary levied tax to employ either foreign or Hungarian mercenaries⁸ even before his campaigns in Italy. There is also evidence⁹ that Hungarian mercenaries served in Italy preceding the king's above-mentioned undertakings. These soldiers must have begun their service in Naples as members of prince Andrew's retinue, who arrived in Italy to safeguard the interests of Louis' younger brother, but remained there even after his death in 1345¹⁰. The number of these references grew during the time of the Neapolitan wars, because the king was aware of the fact that most of his troops coming to Italy from Hungary were unaccustomed to the type of warfare that prevailed in mid-fourteenth century Italy. Therefore, the king hired¹¹ foreign mercenaries, mainly German troops, while he was also ready to allow Hungarian soldiers to serve in Italy.¹² However, by the end of the king's wars in Italy, the number of references to mercenaries coming from the subjects of the king of Hungary began to multiply.¹³ Pope Innocent VI in 1359 asked for soldiers from King Louis I to help keep the *Magna Societas* at bay,¹⁴ which was pillaging Italy in that year. This clearly reflects the tendency that Hungarian soldiers having served in Italy adopted in growing numbers the way of life of professional mercenaries,¹⁵ which is also represented by the fact that Venice began to recruit mercenaries from the territories under the

archival reference numbers of the source material beginning with the letters DL if they are available in the Hungarian National Archive in their original form, and beginning with DF if just the photocopies of the charters are available, the originals of which can be found in other archives in Hungary or abroad. Nevertheless, the photocopies are also accessible online. The website where researchers can access these documents, referring to the archival reference numbers I will provide, can be found here: <https://archives.hungaricana.hu/hu/charters/>

⁸ DF 262 189. AOkt. XXVII. no. 197. This is published in Fejér, György, *Codex diplomaticus ecclesiasticus ac civilis*. Vols. I–XI. Buda, 1829–1844. Vol. IX/1., 109–111.

⁹ AOkt. XXX. no. 54. The charter is published in *Magyar diplomáciai emlékek az Anjou korból*. Ed. Wenzel, Gusztáv. I–III. Budapest, 1874–1876. [Monuments of Hungarian Diplomacy in the Angevin Era]. Vol. II., 1875. 135–137.

¹⁰ Küküllei, 168.

¹¹ DF 291 869. AOkt. XXXI. no. 569. The charter is published in Wenzel, Magyar diplomáciai emlékek, 1875. 227–228.

¹² AOkt. XXXI. no. 764. The charter is published in Wenzel, Magyar diplomáciai emlékek, 1875. 230.

¹³ DF 292 248., DF 292 249. AOkt. XXXVI. no. 83, 109, 126. These are published in Theiner, Augustinus (ed.), *Vetera monumenta historica Hungariam sacram illustrantia*. Vols. I–II. Romae, 1859–1860. Vol. I., 805–806, 808–809, 807–808.

¹⁴ Theiner, *Vetera monumenta*, 1860. Vol. II., 41–42.

¹⁵ AOkt. XLVII. no. 613 and 654. These are published in Ljubić, Šime, *Listine o odnosajih između južnoga slavenstva i mletačke republike*. Vols. I–X. Zagreb, 1868–1891. Vol. IV., 58, 59–60.

rule of King Louis I. A charter issued in Venice mentions Hungarian mercenaries¹⁶, their pay and the damage they caused, as well as the mercenaries of the king of Hungary. In fact, mercenary activity, though it involved certain dangers¹⁷ as we shall see shortly, became attractive for enterprising members of the Hungarian military community.¹⁸ Mercenary service became so popular that Dalmatian cities had to regulate the issue by decree (in case of Trogir) that no one should undertake mercenary service elsewhere than under the king of Hungary,¹⁹ while Dubrovnik ruled that nobody should accept mercenary payment from abroad.²⁰ A good example of becoming rich and influential partly due to mercenary service is the career of Nicholas Toldi, who started his activities as a member of the retinue of Simon, son of Mauritius, *comes Posoniensis*, who later became *vicecomes* of the same county, then he served in Italy together with English mercenaries²¹ and accumulated a certain amount of wealth as a result of his military career.

An interesting insight into the conditions among which members of a mercenary company served in Italy is provided by a surviving mercenary contract²² from 1365. According to it, the *Societas Alba* would field 5 thousand well-equipped cavalrymen and one thousand infantrymen for six months in the service of the Neapolitan Kingdom in return for 160 thousand golden florins. In addition, all captives, captured weapons and loot would belong to the mercenary company. In the same year, Pope Urban V attempted to facilitate the removal of raging mercenary companies from western Europe, especially from Italy by putting forward a proposal²³ to send them to the Holy Land with

¹⁶ AOkt. XLVIII. no. 272. This is published in Wenzel, *Magyar diplomáciai emlékek*, 1875. 609–611. and Ljubić, *Listine o odnosajih*, 1874. Vol. IV., 69–70.

¹⁷ DF 218 565. AOkt. XLVIII. no. 57. This is published in Kostrenčić, Marko – Smičiklas, Tadija, *Codex diplomaticus regni Croatiae, Dalmatiae ac Slavoniae*. Vols. I–XVII. Zagrabiae, 1904–1981. Vol. XIII., 331–335.; DF 266 778. AOkt. XLVIII. no. 852.

¹⁸ DF 243 800. and DF 243 801. AOkt. XLVIII. no. 136. (The charter survived in two copies.)

¹⁹ AOkt. XLVIII. no. 195. This is published by Rački, Franjo, *Starine Jugoslavenske Akademije Znanosti i Umjetnosti*. Vols. I–XL. Zagreb, 1869–1939. Vol. XIII., 237.

²⁰ AOkt. XLVIII. no. 215 and 841. These are published in Ljubić, *Listine o odnosajih*, 1874. Vol. IV., 65–66.; Kostrenčić – Smičiklas, *Codex diplomaticus*, 1915. Vol. XIII., 352.; Gelchich, József, *Ragusa Magyarország és Magyarország összeköttetéseinek oklevéltára. Diplomatarium relationum rei publicae Ragusinae cum regno Hungariae*. Budapest, 1887. 697.; *Monumenta Ragusina*. Vols. I–V. Zagrabiae, 1879–1897. Vol. IV., 31.

²¹ AOkt. XLIX. no. 19. This is published in Wenzel, *Magyar diplomáciai emlékek*, 1875. 625.

²² AOkt. XLIX. no. 32. and 33. They are published in Theiner, *Vetera monumenta*, 1860. Vol. II., 419–425.; Wenzel, *Magyar diplomáciai emlékek*, 1875. 626–627. (excerpt only) and Theiner, *Vetera monumenta*, 1860. Vol. II., 425–426.

²³ AOkt. XLIX. no. 293, 294, 304. These are published in Raynaldi, Odorico, *Annales ecclesiastici: denuo et accurati*. Vols. I–XXXVII. Paris, 1880–. Vol. XXIV., 104–105.; *Lettres secrètes et curiales du pape Urbain V: 1362–1370: se rapportant à la France*. Vols. I–IV. Eds. Le Cacheux, Paul – Mollat, Guillaume, Paris, 1902–1955. no. 1822.

the financial contribution of certain European rulers, as they meant a serious threat to Christianity. Hungarian mercenaries served in the *Sanctus Georgius* company²⁴ as well in 1365. In the same year the pope acknowledged the reception of a substantial loan, which was provided to remove mercenaries, among them Hungarians, from Italy.²⁵

However, Hungarian mercenaries were employed not only in Italy, but also in other theatres of war. We have evidence²⁶ from 1364 about a campaign to Bosnia in the previous year, when the king had provided a nobleman with money, from which he contributed 40 florins and an additional horse to a man called Valentine, son of Ladislaus, to participate in the campaign, but he failed to show up, though he retained the money and the horse. The nobleman was ready to testify this under oath.²⁷

Turning our attention to specific examples of information on weapons and conditions of service, first I should like to refer to a very interesting charter, which is not completely in connection with mercenary service, but the circumstances mentioned in it suggest, in my view, that the man most probably wanted to become a mercenary, perhaps abroad. The charter²⁸ dates from March 31, 1348, so the events mentioned in it must have taken place shortly before, that is, the period which coincides with King Louis' first Italian campaign. A certain member of the lesser nobility complained to Queen Elizabeth, King Louis's mother, that another lesser nobleman's serf, called Andrew, was handed over to his brother for service, and he undertook warranty for him. However, this Andrew, instead of serving his new master faithfully, stole from him a horse, a sword, a bow with quiver and 8 marks in ready cash, the latter being quite a substantial sum of money worth 32 golden florins. Though the source does not connect this theft directly to mercenary service, in my opinion the motif for it, considering the circumstances, might have been a strong urge to flee abroad and become a mercenary. It is worth bearing in mind that this Andrew came from the lower class of society, being a serf himself.

Another interesting example can be quoted from the same year, and it illustrates a different aspect of our investigation. Again, there is no specific reference to the mercenary way of life, and we can only conclude that the man represented in the charter might have had some connections with mercenary service. The charter dates from December 20, 1348, and it was released by the *vice-*

[hereinafter Urbain V]; Urbain V no. 1823.; Theiner, *Vetera monumenta*, 1860. Vol. II., 428–429.; Wenzel, *Magyar diplomáciai emlékek*, 1875. 634–636.; Urbain V no. 1843.; *Chroniques de Jean Froissart*. Ed. Luce, Siméon. Vols. I–XV. Paris, 1869–1975. Vol. I., 6. 503–504.

²⁴ AOklt. XLIX. no. 465. and 470. These are published in Wenzel, *Magyar diplomáciai emlékek*, 1875. 639–641.

²⁵ AOklt. XLIX. no. 548. This published in Urbain V no. 15558.

²⁶ DL 77 325. AOklt. XLVIII. no. 395.

²⁷ DL 77 328. AOklt. XLVIII. no. 660.

²⁸ DL 83 250. AOklt. XXXII. no. 143.

comes of Szabolcs county²⁹. According to it a man called *Kantur dictus* Stephen pawned a breastplate till January 10, 1349, for one mark's worth of baize. The interesting thing about it is that in the charter the *notarius* had originally written the old Hungarian equivalent of breastplate being "*vosmel*" meaning literally "a chest made of iron", then he crossed it out, and wrote the word "*pancył*", which is the contemporary form of "*páncél*" (armour) coming from the German "*Panzer*". My conclusion is the following: this man who pawned the breastplate might have been a member of the lesser nobility who served in Italy in the previous year and the first part of the year in question, either as a mercenary, or as a member of a retinue, because plate armour in the first part of the fourteenth century was relatively rare in Hungary, only rich aristocrats could afford it, but they were highly unlikely to pawn such a valuable piece of their armour, so our man was most probably a mercenary or a retinue member, who obtained it in the Italian war, but being in need, he must have been forced to pawn it.

The 1360s were the highlight of Hungarian mercenaries serving in Italy. By that time, certain enterprising members of Hungarian society were willing to undertake sacrifices, on the one hand, to become mercenaries with a view of becoming rich in this way, while, on the other hand, they and their family members were well aware of the dangers of mercenary life. Let me illustrate my contention with two examples.

In the first example a knight called Peter, who would be engaged in the king's service in Italy (*partes Transmarines*), on August 27, 1360, received 1000 golden florins from a noble lady and her father, and he pawned certain land possessions of his to them as a security for the repayment of the money in case he would not return. The charter³⁰ does not provide any pieces of information about in what capacity he would serve the king in Italy, but being a knight, we might presume that after fulfilling his services on behalf of his king he had plans of serving there as a mercenary.

My second example is more specific in this respect. It dates from September 1st, also 1360.³¹ A noble woman, called Claire, turned up in the chapter of Eger, and she donated her land possessions, which she had inherited from her mother, to her husband, with the exception of those parts which her mother had left in her testament to her son – Claire's brother –, Simon, who currently served abroad as a mercenary. However, she also announced that in the event of her brother's death as a mercenary, she would donate his land possessions to her husband as well.

These examples shed clear light on the fact that people, preparing to serve abroad either in the king's service in an unknown capacity, or as a mercenary, and also their family members were well aware of the dangers of mercenary service, and made arrangement for the events of their not returning alive.

²⁹ DL 51 498. AOkt. XXXII. no. 913.

³⁰ DF 229 863. AOkt. XLIV. no. 853.

³¹ DL 64 170. AOkt. XLIV. no. 877.

This can be further supported by a charter³² according to which a murderer spread news about his victim, namely that the person in question had become a mercenary. This suggests that society was prone to believe that if somebody disappeared from his community, he might have become a mercenary, and if he did not return, they accepted the fact that he must have died during service.

In the last part I should like to provide the readers with a few pieces of information about the social strata from which the Hungarian mercenary supply in the fourteenth century came. We have already mentioned a man, who stole weapons from his master, probably with an eye of becoming a mercenary abroad. This man was a serf. A charter³³ from 1365 informs us that Luke *dictus Soldus* was a citizen of Esztergom, *soldus* being the contemporary Hungarian equivalent of mercenary. This information suggests that town-dwellers also undertook the way of life of mercenaries. My earlier examples concerning Nicholas Toldi, and the knight who obtained a loan of 1000 golden florins, as well as the nobleman from *Szabolcs* county show that from the privileged classes, down to the level of serfs, all layers of society participated in the mercenary business. Some of them managed to rise to higher levels of society this way, or at least managed to pile up material wealth, but others who got accustomed to the free lifestyle of mercenary companies, ended up as criminals after returning to Hungary. We have evidence³⁴ from 1366 about people in *Szabolcs* county bearing the nickname “*Soldus*” who were declared criminals for theft and robbery, which shows that some of these people, after giving up their mercenary lifestyle, could not adapt to the more peaceful circumstances in Hungary and continued to use the methods which they had got accustomed to as mercenaries.

As a conclusion of my paper I should like to draw a parallel with the fourteenth century developments in European warfare and the response of Hungarian military community. The history of western European warfare, especially after the truce agreement of Brétigny in 1360, can be characterised as the highlight of the great companies,³⁵ which predominantly affected Italy. Members of the Hungarian military community drawn from all parts of society participated in this activity, and for several decades Hungarian mercenaries served side by

³² DL 41 584. AOkl. XLVIII. no. 576. This published in *A zichi és vásonkeői gróf Zichy család idősb ágának okmánytára. Codex diplomaticus domus senioris comitum Zichy de Zich et Vásonkeő*. Vols. I–XII. Eds. Nagy, Imre – Nagy, Iván – Véghely, Dezső – Kammerer, Ernő – Döry, Ferencz, Pest–Budapest, 1871–1931. Vol. VI., 9–10.

³³ DF 236 357. AOkl. XLIX. no. 433. This published in Katona, Stephanus, *Historia critica regum Hungariae*. Vols. I–XLII. Pestini–Budaë, 1779–1817. Vol. X., 356–359.; Fejér, *Codex diplomaticus*, 1834. Vol. IX/3., 470–488.; Densușianu, Nicolae – Hurmuzaki, Eudoxiu, *Documente privitoare la istoria Românilor*. Vol. I/1–2. București, 1887–1890. Vol. I/2., 100–109.

³⁴ DL 52 096. and DF 263 394. AOkl. L. no. 738, 746. The latter is published by Piti, Ferenc, “Kont Miklós nádor levelesítő okiratai 1366-ból”, [The Proscription Charters of Palatine Miklós Kont from 1366] = *Acta Universitatis Szegediensis Acta Historica* 132, 2011, 51–57. 52–54.

³⁵ Fowler, *Medieval Mercenaries*, 2001. 24–43.

side with warriors from various European nations, Germans, English, Italians, etc. This fact contributed to a gradual transformation of warfare in central Europe as well. Hungarian soldiers, while fighting abroad and serving side by side with their fellow western European warriors, obtained new weapons and learnt about the new ways of fighting while serving side by side with their fellow western European warriors. The number of published sources concerning Hungarian mercenaries will probably rise in the near future, so research into this section of military history is worth continuing.

Nicholas Coureas

KING JAMES II OF CYPRUS AND HIS MULTICULTURAL MERCENARIES

Introduction


In this paper I will discuss the recruitment of mercenaries practised by James, the illegitimate son of King John II (1432–1458) of Cyprus and how he used them to seize power in the civil war between the years 1460–1464 between him and his half-sister Queen Charlotte, daughter of King John II and lawful queen of Cyprus. With the assistance of his mercenaries James prevailed by 1464, obtaining papal recognition as King James II by 1466. His mercenaries were religiously and ethnically diverse, consisting of Catalans, Neapolitans, Sicilians, Frenchmen, Greeks from the Aegean area and even Circassian Muslims. These who acquired the greatest power and influence following his victory, however, were the Catalans, Neapolitans, and Sicilians, some of whom unsuccessfully tried to prevent the Venetian take-over of Cyprus following King James's death in 1473. The paper will also explain why the Catalans, some of whom knew James before the civil war, became the most powerful from among the various groups. The source materials for this paper are two chronicles, the first written in medieval Cypriot Greek in the early sixteenth century by George Boustronios, the second written in Venetian Italian by Florio Bustron in the second half of the sixteenth century, as well as documents from the royal finance office, the *secrète*, covering the years 1468–1469. Among other things, these sources records grants of land and income throughout Cyprus King James made to the mercenaries who had helped him win the civil war, and provide information on their geographical origins and religious affiliations.

James, the Greek, Circassian, Armenian, and Mamluk Mercenaries

In his attempt to unseat Queen Charlotte, the daughter and legitimate heir of King John II of Cyprus, James encountered considerable obstacles. As the illegitimate son of a union between the king and his Greek mistress Maria of Patras, he lacked the support most Cypriot nobles and knights, who supported the queen.¹ To overcome this obstacle, he solicited and acquired the support of the Mamluk sultan, Cyprus having come under Mamluk suzerainty following the Mamluk invasion of 1426 and the crushing defeat of the Cypriot forces at

¹ Boustronios, George, *A Narrative of the Chronicle of Cyprus, 1456–1489*. Transl. Coureas, N., Nicosia, 2005. §50.; Bustron, Florio, "Chronique de l'île de Chypre", In. Mas Latrie, René (ed.), *Collection des documents inédits sur l'histoire de France, Mélanges historiques*. Vol. V., Paris, 1886. 396–397.; Hill, George, *A History of Cyprus*. Vols I–IV. Cambridge, 1940–1952. Vol. III., 1948. 574–575.

the battle of Khirokitia.² But he also needed mercenaries and as postulant of the Latin archbishopric of Cyprus he enjoyed the incomes of the archbishopric, which he must have used later on to recruit them. The mercenaries he recruited into his service, some of whom deserted Queen Charlotte to come over to his side, were heterogenous confessionally and culturally. They included, Frenchmen, Catalans, Sicilians, Neapolitans, Greeks, Armenians and even Circassian Muslims. Among them, however, the most powerful group and that closest to James, who defeated Queen Charlotte by 1464, managing to capture Kerynia from her forces as well as Famagusta from the Genoese, who had taken it during their invasion of Cyprus in 1373 and had retained it, were those originating from Catalonia, Italy, and Sicily. Mercenaries from all the ethnic groups mentioned above were rewarded following James's victory in 1464 with fiefs granted between the years 1464 and 1468 and sometimes earlier. In 1466, moreover, Pope Paul II recognised him formally as King James II of Cyprus, following an application from James supported by King Ferrante of Naples, the son of King Alfonso V of Aragon.³ The support from Ferrante is also a factor that explains why the highest offices and the greatest number of fiefs James granted were to mercenaries from Catalonia, Italy, and Sicily.



² Darrag, Ahmed, *L'Égypte sous le règne de Barsbay 825–841/1422–1438*. Damascus, 1961. 239–267.

³ Bustron, Chronique, 1886. 417–424. c 631, 1159.

Before discussing the reasons why Catalans, Neapolitans and Sicilians became pre-eminent among James's supporters, a word on the mercenaries from other ethnic and religious groups is in order. James's mother Maria of Patras was Greek and Greeks from outside Cyprus were among the mercenaries he recruited. Two of them, Constantine, and Stephen, were from the Aegean Island of Chios, the under Genoese rule. James rewarded Stephen by appointing him governor of Chrysokhou in north-west Cyprus. Another, Demetrios de Coron, was clearly from the town of Coron in the south-west Peloponnese. Benedetto was another mercenary from the Peloponnese, although his name indicates that he was ethnically Italian, possibly from either Coron or Modon, the two Venetian enclaves in the peninsula.⁴ Other Greek mercenaries of James whom he rewarded with fiefs following his victory over Queen Charlotte in 1464 were Nicolas Scarnachiotis, Nicolas Sgouros, and George Romanites, although their places of origin are not recorded. According to Florio Bustron, who wrote in the later sixteenth century and was related to George Boustronios, a partisan and a contemporary of James, the king granted fiefs 'to many foreigners, Catalans and Spaniards, some of whom became grand and noble men; and thereby he reduced the Cypriot knights to his obedience'.⁵ This passage makes clear that in granting fiefs to the mercenaries who had supported him, with Catalans and Spaniards mentioned specifically, James was creating a powerbase to overawe the traditional Cypriot nobility that had supported Queen Charlotte, the last legitimate member of the Lusignan dynasty, who following her defeat went into exile, firstly on Hospitaller Rhodes and then in Rome, where she remained until her death in 1487.⁶

James was involved in the assassination of Thomas, the chamberlain of the kingdom of Cyprus and a foster brother of Queen Helena of Cyprus, the wife of King John II and mother of Queen Charlotte. This had been accomplished by two Sicilian cutthroats in James's service. Afterwards James departed for Rhodes in the summer of 1457, leaving Nicosia via the Armenian quarter. On returning to Cyprus in March 1458 he likewise entered Nicosia through the Armenian quarter, calming them when they became agitated prior to recognising him.⁷ Two Armenians are recorded as having served James. One of them named David is recorded in the *Livre des Remembrances*, the single surviving register of acts recorded in the royal chancery from James's reign, as being in his service. An act dated 14 January 1464 records that the king gave orders for David to be kept in his service with the same salary as previously.⁸ Another Armenian in James's service was Peter, implicated after James's

⁴ Boustronios, Narrative, 2005. §§71, 85, 112, 208, 235.; Bustron, Chronique, 1886. 422.; *Le livre des remembrances de la secrète du royaume de Chypre (1468–1469)*. Ed. Richard, Jean, Nicosia, 1983. nos. 48, 51, 60, 97, 105.

⁵ Bustron, Chronique, 1886. 417, 420–421 and 423.

⁶ Edbury, Peter, "The Last Lusignans (1432–1489): A Political History", = *Epeterida Kentrou Epistemonikon Ereunon* 36, 2013, 147–234. 196.

⁷ Boustronios, Narrative, 2005. §§4, 7–9.

⁸ *Le livre des remembrances*, 1983. no. 110.

death in March 1473 in the murder of Andrea Corner, uncle of James's wife, the widowed Queen Catherine, which took place in November 1473. He was detained in connection with the flight of Archbishop Louis and other prominent Catalans who had to flee Cyprus in January 1474 following a failed coup against Queen Catherine and her Venetian supporters. He confessed to assassinating Andrea Corner on 9 February 1474 after being tortured and he was hanged on 10 February.⁹ The fact that only two Armenians are recorded as serving James perhaps reflects the small size of the Armenian community on Cyprus.

The most exotic group of mercenaries serving James in confessional terms were the Circassians, converted Muslims originating from the eastern shores of the Black Sea and forming the dominant group among the Mamluks of Egypt and Syria during the fifteenth century. The Mamluk recorded as the earliest supporter of James was Nasar Hous, whose name appears to be a corruption of the Arabic *nazir al-juyush*, inspector of the army. He was on Cyprus with James in late December 1458, accompanying him during his second departure, when he sailed from Salines to Egypt on board the caravel of a Venetian named Nicolo Galimberto, whom James later granted as a fief the village of Polemidhia in the district of Limassol. Once in Egypt Nasar Hous took part in the negotiations between James's envoys and the emissaries of Sultan al-Zahir Jakmak on account of his knowledge of Arabic. Following James's arrival in Cyprus at the head of the Mamluk invasion fleet in September 1460, Nasar Hous was sent early in 1461 with others to the district of Paphos, where they persuaded the local garrison commander, Sir James Mahes, to deliver the city to James's forces, although later Sir James delivered Paphos to Queen Charlotte's forces. After this Nasar Hous disappears from record.¹⁰

Following his second departure from Cyprus for Egypt James remained there until September 1460. While in Egypt, he had persuaded the Mamluk sultan Inal to support his candidature to the throne of Cyprus by offering to double the annual tribute paid to the Mamluk sultans since 1426.¹¹ A Mamluk force under the command of the emir Janibek assisted James during the civil war against Queen Charlotte. Nevertheless, James had Janibek and many of the Mamluks massacred in 1464 after capturing Famagusta because these Mamluks had been kidnapping Cypriot youths and were forcing them to convert to Islam, according to the Mamluk historian Yusuf ibn Taghribirdi.¹² James maintained individual Circassian Mamluks in his service and rewarded some of them with fiefs. One of them, named John the Circassian, was given various fiefs after James won the civil war in 1464. Arrested by the

⁹ Boustronios, Narrative, 2005. §§210, 221, 223.

¹⁰ Boustronios, Narrative, 2005. p. 49 and §§36, 41, 68.; Bustron, Chronique, 1886. 401.; Hill, History, 1948. 552 note 1.

¹¹ Boustronios, Narrative, 2005. §§41–42 and 89.; Bustron, Chronique, 1886. 392–394.

¹² Boustronios, Narrative, 2005. §§41–45, 56, 59, 68, 77, 85, 88.; Bustron, Chronique, 1886. 395–396, 398–400, 404, 414, 416–417.; Edbury, The Last Lusignans, 2013. 182–184, 187, 193–194.

Venetians serving Queen Catherine in March 1474, after James's death, he was subsequently released, his confiscated property restored to him. According to the chronicler George Boustronios, James kept two Circassian Mamluks in his company, James whom had had christened himself and Curcuma 'who was a valiant man, and he loved him'. In 1464 or some years afterwards James granted Curcuma the fief of Mamonia in the district of Paphos. At this time, he granted the villages of Comi and Yeri as fiefs to another Circassian Mamluk named Taghribirdi. Those Circassians not bearing Christian names had clearly retained their Muslim faith.¹³ James, however, could not be too dependent on the services of the Circassians for political reasons. Their Muslim faith and their behaviour on Cyprus discredited James among his subjects but also in the eyes of Roman Catholic Europe, and in particular the papacy. This made the Catalan and Sicilian mercenaries even more valuable.¹⁴

James, the Savoyard, Catalan and Sicilian mercenaries

It has been observed that European mercenaries were more effective agents of state power abroad than at home. Outside Western Europe, in North Africa for example, the European mercenaries' services were welcomed. Being Christians, they could serve Muslim rulers but they could not overthrow and supplant them. Conversely, within Western Europe mercenary violence impeded the ascendancy of kings over local forces of autonomy.¹⁵ On Cyprus, as will be seen below, Western European mercenaries likewise proved effective agents of autonomy, but for very different reasons. Cyprus had a majority population of Greeks and eastern Christians, and a Roman Catholic ruling class. Therefore, Western European mercenaries buttressed the rule of this ruling class without compromising its legitimacy in the eyes of Roman Catholic Europe, and the papacy in particular.

Both James and his sister Queen Charlotte employed mercenaries from Western Europe, and it seems that soldiers from Savoy initially hired by Queen Charlotte entered James's service. Queen Charlotte's husband was Louis of Savoy, and Savoyard soldiers arrived with him on Cyprus in 1459, on the eve of the civil war. Savoyard soldiers in Louis's service had been captured by James's forces in September 1460 and detained at the fortress of Sivouri, half way between Famagusta and Nicosia. In November 1460 James issued orders for their release, and in all probability brought them to Nicosia, recruiting them into his service.¹⁶ James also rewarded Florentines

¹³ Boustronios, Narrative, 2005. §§88, 253–254, 260.; Bustron, Chronique, 1886. 416, 418–420, 448.

¹⁴ Edbury, *The Last Lusignans*, 2013. 188.

¹⁵ Lower, Michael, "New Wars, Old Wars, and Medieval Wars: European Mercenaries as State Actors in Europe and North Africa, ca. 1100–1500," = *Mediterranean Studies* 25, 2017, 35–52. 35–38, 41, 43–44.

¹⁶ Boustronios, Narrative, 2005. §§40, 42, 44, 49, 57.; Bustron, Chronique, 1886. 392, 394–396.

with fiefs. Among those James rewarded with fiefs and incomes between the years 1464–1468 was Mario Squarzulupi, consul of the Florentines, granted the fiefs of Marin and Psematismenos. It is worth noting that when departing from Cyprus for Rhodes, an Aegean Island under Hospitaller rule since 1306, in the summer of 1457 James first went to Salines, near present-day Larnaca, to board a caravel belonging to the Catalan John Tafur, but then decided to board a Florentine galley encountered on the way for greater safety. The skipper of this galley welcomed James on board, ‘handing the galley to him as though it had been his’, and James thereby reached Famagusta. Once his arrival there became known to King John II, however, he ordered Sir Bernard Rousset, the admiral of Cyprus, to make representations so that James would be forced to disembark from this galley.¹⁷

The skipper of the galley in question, Bernardo de Casteliono, is recorded as defending his action in a notarial deed of the Genoese notary Antonio de Folieta dated 19 February 1458. On being reproached by the orator serving King John II of Cyprus for arriving in arriving on board a galley in papal service and welcoming James on board, even though the latter had been planning to leave Cyprus without his father’s permission, and demanding James’s return, Bernardo responded as follows; he stated that James alighted on board his galley from Tafur’s caravel, not from Cypriot soil, the galley having been in the waters off Paphos at the time. Furthermore, James had granted Bernardo a safe conduct issued by Petrus Maneli, who had been captain of the galley while Bernardo was ill. Having confirmed the safe-conduct, Bernardo had no intention of breaking his word. It had been up to James to remain on board the galley or to alight from it wherever he wished. He added that he could do nothing on board the galley contrary to James’s wishes, given that the soldiers and crew on board had promised fealty and obedience to James. This early Florentine assistance offered to James was continued. In the summer of 1461 James’s envoys visited Florence and received a favourable reception, with James obtaining recognition as king of Cyprus. Once he won the civil war James granted Florence commercial privileges, receiving in return assurances that Florentine ships sailing to the eastern Mediterranean would call at Cyprus. This background explains explain the fiefs on Cyprus James granted between the years 1464–1468 to Mario Squarzulupi, the consul of Florence, after winning the civil war.¹⁸

Arguing in the same vein, it was the assistance James received from Catalans prior to invading Cyprus with a Mamluk fleet in September 1460 to wrest the island from Queen Charlotte that helps explain subsequent Catalan predominance among his supporters. James left Cyprus for Rhodes in the autumn of 1457 on board the caravel belonging to the Catalan John Tafur,

¹⁷ Boustronios, *Narrative*, 2005. §7.; Bustron, *Chronique*, 1886. 375–376, 419.

¹⁸ *Gènes et l’Outre-Mer: Actes notariés rédigés à Chypre par le notaire Antonius Folieta (1445–1448)*. Ed. Balard, Michel – Balletto, Laura – Otten-Froux, Catherine, Nicosia, 2016. no. 215.; Hill, *History*, 1948. 575, 578–579, 630.

later transferring on board the abovementioned Florentine galley which brought him there.¹⁹ At this time Catalan influence on Hospitaller Rhodes was strong. Two Catalans, Antony Fluvia and Pere Ramon Zacosta, served as Grand Masters of the Order between the years 1421–1437 and 1461–1467 respectively. Numerous Catalan merchants used Rhodes as a trading entrepôt for the transport of goods to and from Alexandria and nearby Anatolia, while Catalan pirates used the island to practice piracy throughout the eastern Mediterranean. The Order welcomed such activity because the booty gained was brought to Rhodes Town and sold there.²⁰ James sojourned on Rhodes for five months, and when he left Rhodes to return to Cyprus secretly, early in 1458, he armed two galleys, the Florentine galley mentioned earlier and another one belonging to the Catalan John Balarca. He also armed two caravels, one belonging to John Tafur and another to John Perez Fabriges, a notorious Catalan pirate.²¹

James Zaplana was another Catalan pirate James recruited into his service. Early in 1461 his ship was wrecked off the Karpass Peninsula of Cyprus while he was practising piracy on behalf of the Genoese in Famagusta, besieged at the time by James's forces. Following his capture by Alessandro Tarantin, the *bailli* of the area, he was taken to Famagusta and brought before James, who won him over to his side. He was well rewarded for serving James. Following the latter victory over Queen Charlotte in 1464 he was granted five villages as fiefs. By early 1468 he had become chief purveyor of the kingdom and head of the *secrète*, the office administering the royal estate and the king's finances, also becoming governor of the royal treasury sometime before 3 December 1471.²² One observes here that James may have first encountered James Zaplana or other members of his family even before leaving Rhodes. James Zaplana's uncle Raphael was a Hospitaller, becoming *bailli* on Rhodes in December 1433 and draper of the Order, an important office, from September 1434 until September 1439. James Zaplana's brother Nicholas, another Hospitaller, became Grand Preceptor of the Hospitaller estates on Cyprus in November 1471.²³

John Tafur was likewise rewarded richly for supporting James against Queen Charlotte. He became titular count of Tripoli and captain of Famagusta after James's victory, being granted seven villages as fiefs in the grants James

¹⁹ Boustronios, *Narrative*, 2005. §7.; Bustron, *Chronique*, 1886. 375.

²⁰ Ashtor, Eliyahu, *Levant Trade in the Later Middle Ages*. Princeton, 1983. 364–365.; Coulon, Damien, *Barcelone et la Grand Commerce d'Orient au Moyen Âge*. Madrid–Barcelona, 2004. 174–175, 209–210.

²¹ Boustronios, *Narrative*, 2005. §9.; Bustron, *Chronique*, 1886. 376.

²² Boustronios, *Narrative*, 2005. §71.; Bustron, *Chronique*, 1886. 403–404, 418.; *Livre des remembrances*, 1983. nos. 69, 159, 160–165 and Appendix I, Document II.

²³ Coureas, Nicholas, "Between Hospitaller Rhodes and Lusignan Cyprus: The Case of the Zaplana Family", = *Ordines Militares* 19, 2014, 143–156. 144, 154–155.

conferred as king of Cyprus between the years 1454–1458.²⁴ As for John Perez Fabriges, he was granted eight villages as fiefs following James's victory, also becoming the count of Jaffa, the highest barony in the kingdom of Cyprus at the time. James, moreover, had the new county of Karpass created in 1472 especially for John Perez Fabriges, having it designated the principal county of the kingdom instead of Jaffa. John's brother Louis Perez Fabriges became the Latin archbishop of Nicosia in 1471.²⁵ It is noteworthy that John Perez Fabriges is mentioned several times as a pirate in the inquest conducted by the Genoese in September and October 1459 regarding the tenure in office of Napoleone Lomellini, the captain of Genoese Famagusta from May 1457 to September 1459. James is also mentioned in these proceedings as wishing to enter Famagusta, with one of Napoleone's accusers, the burgess Antoniotus de Frevante, stating that during the time of the postulant, that is James, pirates could enter the city freely, a charge that Napoleone denied.²⁶ Whether James encountered John Perez Fabriges in Famagusta, however, is not known.

Louis Alberic, a nephew of James Zaplana, was likewise rewarded by James. The chronicler George Boustronios specifically states that King James II honoured him when he arrived in Cyprus 'on account of his regard for Sir James [Zaplana] his uncle, granting him an income of 1.000 ducats a year'.²⁷ Louis is not recorded as serving James as a mercenary during the civil war of 1460–1464 and is not recorded among those given fiefs between the years 1464–1468. Nevertheless, he furnishes an example of someone who benefited through associating with a prominent mercenary in James's service. Sir John Arognon, another Catalan benefiting from James's largesse, is recorded as being a poor man but from a good family on his arrival in Cyprus. King James II 'conferred many benefits upon him and married him to Lady Margaret, the daughter of Franceschin de Bandes, giving him a fine income.' He is recorded as being granted two villages as fiefs and 200 measures of wine in the grants between the years 1464–1468, an instance of a grant of both estates and incomes in kind that is not isolated instance. His wife Margaret, moreover, originating from one of the oldest burgess families on Cyprus was likewise granted two villages as fiefs by King James II, proof that his supporters included burgesses who were duly rewarded.²⁸ Spanish mercenaries from outside Catalonia served in James's forces during the civil war and were duly rewarded by him. Among them were Peter d'Avila, who perhaps originated from the

²⁴ Boustronios, *Narrative*, 2005, §§7, 9, 98.; Bustron, *Chronique*, 1886. 375–376, 422, 433.; *Le livre des remembrances*, 1983. no. 185.

²⁵ Boustronios, *Narrative*, 2005. §§82, 96, 98.; Bustron, *Chronique*, 1886. 407, 418, 432–433.; *Le livre des remembrances*, 1983. no. 210–213.

²⁶ *Une enquête à Chypre au XVe siècle : Le syndicamentum de Napoleone Lomellini, capitaine génois de Famagouste (1459)*. Ed. Otten-Froux, Catherine, Nicosia, 2000. 137, 143, 150, 152, 155, 161, 171, 179–180.

²⁷ Boustronios, *Narrative*, 2005. §131.

²⁸ Boustronios, *Narrative*, 2005. §110 and note 248.; Bustron, *Chronique*, 1886. 421–422.; *Le livre des remembrances*, 1983. nos. 158, 185.

town of Avila in Castille north-west of Madrid. Mentioned first among those to whom King James II granted fiefs between the years 1464–1468, he also became constable of Cyprus after the king's death. Benedict from Cartagena in Murcia, who initially with his galley assisted the Genoese during the siege of Famagusta, subsequently declared for James. James granted him two villages and 150 measures of wine between the years 1444–1468. A certain Nicholas of Castille, granted along with others an allowance of grain, wine and rural estates in the same period, was probably also a mercenary, although he is not recorded as having fought for James during the civil war.²⁹

Developments taking place in the western and central Mediterranean prior to the outbreak of the civil war on Cyprus between the adherents of Queen Charlotte and her half-brother James impacted on the origins of the mercenaries that the latter recruited. As a result of King Alfonso V of Aragon's protracted but successful wars between the years 1423–1432, the kingdom of Naples and Sicily came under the rule of Aragon.³⁰ This is reflected on Cyprus, Neapolitans, Sicilians, and Maltese being among the mercenaries hired and later rewarded by James. Prominent among the Sicilians was Peter de Naves and his brother Sor, both of whom initially served Queen Charlotte but later went over to James. It was Peter Naves, whom Queen Charlotte had appointed as commander of the garrison of Paphos, who delivered the harbour town to King James, probably at the end of 1462, following negotiations with Sir John Mistachiel, the previous captain of Paphos who had himself switched sides from Queen Charlotte to James. In return for surrendering Paphos, James granted Peter Naves 'a considerable income.'³¹ Peter's brother Sor de Naves, who continued serving Queen Charlotte, being appointed commander of the besieged Kyrenia garrison, surrendered the town to James following negotiations leading to his marriage to James's illegitimate daughter Charlotte. This probably occurred in the autumn of 1464. James additionally appointed Sor de Naves constable of Cyprus, granting him the customs dues of Kyrenia, gardens in the village of Kythraea and eleven other villages as fiefs. Domenico de Messina was another Sicilian awarded seven villages as fiefs in the grants of King James II between the years 1464–1468. He is not recorded in the chronicles as a mercenary, but it is difficult otherwise to explain why he received such a generous grant.³²

²⁹ Boustronios, *Narrative*, 2005. §§77, 93, 98.; Bustron, *Chronique*, 1886. 417, 422.; *Le livre des remembrances*, 1983. nos. 36, 78, 122, 124, 126, 152, 176, 180, 226.

³⁰ Ryder, Alan, *Alfonso the Magnanimous King of Aragon, Naples and Sicily 1396–1458*. Oxford, 1990. 195–251.; Abulafia, David, *The Western Mediterranean Kingdoms 1200–1500*. Harlow, 1997. 195–222.

³¹ Boustronios, *Narrative*, 2005. §§72 and 85.; Bustron, *Chronique*, 1886. 404–405, 410.; Hill, *History*, 1948. 572–573.

³² Boustronios, *Narrative*, 2005. §§50–51, 75, 77, 85, 87.; Bustron, *Chronique*, 1886. 396–397, 406, 409, 411, 418, 424.; *Le livre des remembrances*, 1983. no. 179.; Hill, *History*, 1948. 592–594.

Rizzo de Marino and Nicholas de Morabit were another two Sicilian mercenaries who rose to prominence in James's service. Both are recorded as supporting him from late 1458 onwards. Along with others, they planned the unsuccessful attempt on 15 December 1458 to send 85 armed men to the royal court to assassinate nobles supporting the queen, including the constable and the admiral of Cyprus. Likewise, both accompanied James when he departed from Cyprus a second time in late December 1458 to go to Cairo. James bestowed rewards on them even before returning to Cyprus with a Mamluk invasion fleet in September 1460. As soon as the Mamluk sultan al-Zahir Jakmak announced his support for James's candidature as king, James had Nicholas de Morabit knighted and appointed viscount of Nicosia, with Rizzo de Marino likewise knighted and appointed chamberlain of Cyprus. Nicholas Morabit was also enfeoffed with the village of Nisou and its dependencies, while Rizzo was enfeoffed with the village of Yenagra.³³ Nicholas de Morabit, mentioned as fighting with James and successfully escaping with him from an ambush organised by the forces of Queen Charlotte's husband Louis of Savoy in April 1461, received from James another three small villages, two extensive vineyards and was also appointed marshal of Cyprus. Sometime before James's death in July 1473, moreover, he had become the commander of the garrison at Paphos. As for Rizzo, in December 1460 he sailed to the Karpass Peninsula, capturing there a galley commanded by a Genoese skipper who had been in James's service but had then gone over to Genoese besieged in Famagusta. Rizzo also seized 25 hundredweight of soap, much grain, and other things on board this galley, sending the renegade Genoese skipper to Famaguta where James had him hanged. Besides, Yenagra, Rizzo received three additional villages in the grants James made between the years 1464–1468 as well as estates near the village of Lefkoniko. Florio Bustron, writing in the late sixteenth century, also refers to him as a Neapolitan and as captain of Famagusta, but this is not corroborated in other sources.³⁴

Another person from Italy entering James's service and acquiring high office under him was Muzio Costanzo. His exact place of origin is uncertain, for whereas George Boustronios, the chronicler contemporary to James, refers to him as a Sicilian, Florio Bustron writing in the second half of the sixteenth century initially calls him Sicilian. Then, however, he devotes two pages to the historical antecedents of the Costanzo family, maintaining that they were originally Neapolitan, going back to the early twelfth century, although he might have invented or embellished this genealogy to ingratiate himself with this family, still prominent on Venetian Cyprus, or because he was connected

³³ Boustronios, *Narrative*, 2005. §§29, 36 and 44.; Bustron, *Chronique*, 1886. 388, 390, 394–395.

³⁴ Boustronios, *Narrative*, 2005. §§59 and 62.; Bustron, *Chronique*, 1886. 400, 404–406, 415, 418.; *Le livre des remembrances*, 1983. nos. 147–151, 154–156, 166–169, 171, 173, 175, 177, 185–185.

to them in some manner.³⁵ According to both these chroniclers Muzio arrived with his galley in October 1461 at the port of Paphos. James, on being alerted to his arrival, rode there in person, initially having his galley impounded but after a few days persuading him to join his cause, giving him a great income and various villages including Aglandja near Nicosia, although the two chronicles do not always name the same villages. Muzio also received urban properties, these being houses in Nicosia formerly belonging to a Genoese named Benedetto Pallavicini. In addition, he had him married to Anne, the daughter of Sir Thomas de Verni, who hailed from one of the oldest noble Frankish families on Cyprus. Muzio de Costanzo, mentioned as regent of the kingdom at the time of King James's death in July 1473, was also nominated as one of the executors in the will the king drew up on or shortly after 27 March 1473, just a few months prior to his death.³⁶

The elevation to high offices of state of the Western European mercenaries serving James, discussed in the foregoing pages, has previous parallels in North Africa. The twelfth century Almoravid caliph Ali bin Yusuf bin Tashfin (r. 1106–1143) employed Christian soldiers from Iberia whom he had initially captured in war as chamberlains in his private apartments and as commanders of military units. Almoravid mercenaries of Western European origin also served as tax-collectors in the rural Maghrib. Likewise, the thirteenth century Almohad caliph Abu al-Ula al-Mamun (r.1227–1232) used 500 Castilian mercenaries to seize power in Marrakesh and then employed them as his palace guard. The North Africa Marinid, Hafsids and Al-Wadid dynasties employed Iberian mercenaries to fulfil diplomatic missions to the rulers of the kingdom of Aragon during the later thirteenth and fourteenth centuries on several occasions. The mercenaries employed in this capacity developed political relationships that strengthened the North African dynasties that employed them.³⁷

James of Malta was another notable mercenary serving under James during the civil war, Malta at this time being part of the kingdom of Sicily and therefore under Aragonese rule. The chronicler George Boustronios states that he arrived on Cyprus 'barefoot and dressed in a sackcloth, and chancing upon a crossbow he too went along with the others to the forces assembled before Famagusta and fashioned some weapons.' Apparently helped by Peter d'Avila, he won James's favour in 1470 by exposing to him a plot to assassinate him hatched by some of his nobles. On learning of this plot James had the nobles apprehended and beheaded, with George Boustronios's own son Demetrios being among them. James of Malta was granted the estate of St Andronicos of Corycos and the customs dues of the fruit market in the grants James made between the years 1464–1468. In March 1468 King James II

³⁵ Boustronios, *Narrative*, 2005. §83.; Bustron, *Chronique*, 1886. 407–409.

³⁶ Boustronios, *Narrative*, 2005. §§84 and 102.; Bustron, *Chronique*, 1886. 418, 433.; *Le livre des remembrances*, 1983. 214–215.

³⁷ Lower, *New Wars, Old Wars*, 2017. 46.

also appointed him governor of the region of Pendaria in north-west Cyprus. He was replaced in October of the same year but reappointed in February 1469. These were perhaps the estates near the village of Kythraea that were later confiscated from him under Queen Catherine because he was considered a traitor by then, perhaps suspected of collusion with the Catalans and Sicilians who had tried to overthrow Queen Catherine. If so, by March 1474 he had been cleared of suspicion, the queen having granted him permission to remain on Cyprus. In mid-May 1474 he quarrelled with Peter d'Avila, challenging him to a duel, although the issue was eventually resolved peaceably.³⁸

In 1466 James secured papal recognition as King James II from the Venetian pope Paul II and in July 1468 he was married by proxy to Catherine Corner, a Venetian from an aristocratic family that had extensive sugar plantations on Cyprus since the late fourteenth century. The Venetian Senate welcomed this marriage, inducing James to donate Cyprus to Venice were he not to have a legitimate heir by Catherine and adopting her as the daughter of St Mark, patron Saint of Venice, thereby acquiring a legal claim to Cyprus. Despite machinations by King Ferrante, the son of King Alfonso V of Aragon and the ruler of the former Kingdom of Naples and Sicily, and his Catalan proxies on Cyprus to annul this marriage, as well as James's own prevarications, it went ahead. Catherine arrived in Famagusta at the end of 1472 and was married in person to James.³⁹ Nevertheless, James agreed to King Ferrante's proposal for a marriage between his illegitimate son Alonzo to James's illegitimate daughter Charla. James also appointed as executors to his will the Catalans John Tafur and John Perez Fabriges, the Aragonese Sir John Arognon, the Sicilian Rizzo de Marino, and the Spaniard Peter d'Avila. Only one Venetian, Sir Andrea Corner, auditor of Cyprus and uncle of Queen Catherine, was appointed auditor, an indication that James sought to distance himself from the Venetians.⁴⁰

Matters came to a head in the months following James's death. A faction largely led by the Catalans and Sicilians in James's service, including John Perez Fabriges, his nephew Louis Alberic and Rizzo de Marino, attempted to seize power by engineering the murder of her uncle Andrea Corner and placing Queen Catherine under house arrest. But they were forced to flee Cyprus in January 1474 after the arrival of a Venetian fleet in Famagusta numbering ten galleys on 23 November 1473.⁴¹ With the imposition of Venetian control, John Tafur was sent to Venice in February 1474 on board a galley, although he managed to escape when this galley was intercepted by a ship belonging

³⁸ Boustronios, *Narrative*, 2005. §§93–95, 189, 194, 252, 275.; *Bustron, Chronique*, 1886. 422, 424, 426–427, 430, 448.; *Le livre des remembrances*, 1983. nos. 8, 78, 122.

³⁹ Boustronios, *Narrative*, 2005. §§96 and note 225 and §97.; *Bustron, Chronique*, 1886. 432–433.; Hill, *History*, 1948. 631–641.

⁴⁰ Boustronios, *Narrative*, 2005. §§98, 115 and note 260 and §152.; *Bustron, Chronique*, 1886. 433 and 436–437.; Hill, *History*, 1948. 642 and 652.

⁴¹ Boustronios, *Narrative*, 2005. §§153–176.; *Bustron, Chronique*, 1886. 438–446.; Hill, *History*, 1948. 671–687.

to a friend of his, making his way to Naples. Peter d' Avila was exiled in May 1474 to Venice, where he wrote a letter in October 1480 to the Council of Ten requesting permission to return to Spain with his family. But not all of James's partisans were punished. Nicholas Morabit, loyal to Queen Catherine when James's supporters tried to seize power, retained the office of viscount well into her reign. Likewise, Muzio de Constanzo retained the office of admiral until his death in August 1479, his descendants on Cyprus maintaining their estates and marrying into the Cypriot nobility.⁴²

Conclusion

To conclude, one can say that James's early connections with Catalans from 1457 onwards explains the prominence Catalan mercenaries had in his service in relation to other ethnic groups. Besides, the incorporation of Naples and Sicily into the kingdom of Aragon under King Alfonso V created a common political space facilitating James's recruitment of Sicilians and Neapolitans. One further consideration must be stressed. James needed to create a new class of nobles as a counterweight to the traditional noble class on Cyprus, most of whom supported Queen Charlotte as the legitimate heir of King John II. Since Cyprus, despite having a majority population of Greeks and Eastern Christians, was a Roman Catholic kingdom in which only members of the Roman Catholic faith could be ennobled, it was easier for Catalans and Sicilians than for Greeks, Circassian Muslims and Armenians to acquire noble status. James acquired and retained power chiefly with the help of Catalan and Sicilian mercenaries. After his death, however, those rebelling against the imposition of Venetian control had to flee Cyprus, with the island remaining under Venice until the Ottoman conquest of 1570.

⁴² Boustronios, *Narrative*, 2005. §§228 and note 398 and §§262, 264, 268, 270 and 277.; Bustron, *Chronique*, 1886. 441, 443, 447, 453.; Hill, *History*, 1948. 657 note 3, 678–679 and 731 note 2.; *Le livre des remembrances*, 1983. no. 159 note 1.



Imre Solt Varga

THE 1420 ANTI-HUSSITE CRUSADE OF SIGISMUND OF LUXEMBURG: A CASE STUDY

Introduction

In the latter half of the twentieth century, a revised military historical approach arose, coined “*New Military History*”. This methodology deems military history to encompass more than just events, having an additional emphasis on military logistics, army mentality and its influence on the economy.

This study specifically aims to depict the Hungarian perspective of the campaign initiated in the summer of 1420. The text explores the size of the armies, their funding, the routes they took and the clothing of the Hungarians. However, due to the limited space of the study and the lack of coverage of the subject, the historical events are presented briefly.

It is noteworthy to ask about the standing of the national literature, how my research outcomes differ from the previous studies, the Hungarian army’s strength and the sum of money spent on their hired soldiers. From where did the army obtain their funding? What route did they take and what was the rationale behind their decision? These are among the questions that I aim to address in the following discussion.

Historiographic overview

In terms of sources, I primarily relied on local and accessible international sources for my research. Examples of the aforementioned include the digitised content of the Diplomatic Archives¹ and the Diplomatic Photographic Collection², as well as the Sigismund period’s documentary archives that encompass these.³ Other notable international sources are the *Monumenta Vaticana*, volume VII/1,⁴

¹ Magyar Nemzeti Levéltár Országos Levéltár Diplomatikai Levéltár (MNL OL DL) [hereinafter DL]

² Magyar Nemzeti Levéltár Országos Levéltár Diplomatikai Fényképgyűjtemény (MNL OL DF) [hereinafter DF]

³ *Zsigmondkori Oklevéltár VII. (1419–1420)*. Eds. Mályusz, Elemér – Borsa, Iván, Budapest, 2001. (Magyar Országos Levéltár kiadványai, II. Forráskiadványok) 37. [hereinafter ZsO VII.]; *Zsigmondkori Oklevéltár VIII. (1421)*. Eds. Borsa, Iván – C. Tóth, Norbert, Budapest, 2003. (Magyar Országos Levéltár kiadványai, II. Forráskiadványok) 39. [hereinafter ZsO VIII.]; *Zsigmondkori Oklevéltár XII. (1425)*. Eds. C. Tóth, Norbert – Lakatos, Bálint, Budapest, 2013. (Magyar Országos Levéltár kiadványai, II. Forráskiadványok) 52. [hereinafter ZsO XII.]

⁴ *Acta Martini V. pontificis romani, Pars 1, Monumenta Vaticana res gestas Bohemicas illustrantia*, Tom. VII. Ed. Eršil, Jaroslav, Prague, 1996. [hereinafter MV VII/1.]

the *Fontes rerum Bohemicarum*, volume V,⁵ and the *Urkundliche Beiträge*, volume I.⁶ Additionally, Eberhard Windecke's *Denkwürdigkeiten* serves as a source.⁷

In terms of historical works, I examined domestic volumes, and I am continuously reviewing available international textbooks and materials that were obtained. Noteworthy examples of the former include Pál Tóth-Szabó's monograph *A cseh–huszita mozgalmak és uralom története Magyarországon*⁸ [The history of Czech-Hussite movements and power in Hungary] and František Palacký's *Geschichte von Böhmen*.⁹ Additionally, various Hungarian historians offered insights into the Hussite wars. János B. Szabó and Dominik Tóth wrote on the fighting methods used by the Hussites in many of their studies, while László Veszprémy analysed the role played by Sigismund during the initial campaign. The works of Australian historian Thomas A. Fudge and Czech historian Petr Čornej stand out as they researched the Hussite wars for several decades.

Background to the campaign

Although King Wenceslas IV of Bohemia passed away on August 16, 1419, the launch of a joint campaign against the Hussites had already been discussed at an earlier meeting between Sigismund and Vladislaus II Jagiello in Kassa (now Košice, Slovakia) between February 21 and 24, 1419.¹⁰ Sigismund was able to make a final decision in favour of the campaign when the people of Prague imposed conditions on his coronation.¹¹ Whilst Sigismund had a legitimate claim to the throne, he found the imposition of conditions to be offensive. However, as a Christian monarch and a champion of preventing schism, he could not engage in negotiations with heretics.

On March 15, 1420, the Imperial Diet of Vratislav (now Wrocław, Poland) issued a decree mandating the return of the Hussites to the Catholic faith, with a potential anti-Hussite campaign in the case of any resistance.¹² A papal bull,

⁵ *Fontes rerum Bohemicarum*, Tom. V. / *Prameny dějin českých. Díl V.* Ed. Emler, Josef – Gebaur, Jan – Goll, Jaroslav, Prague, 1893. [hereinafter FRB V.]

⁶ *Urkundliche Beiträge zur Geschichte des Hussitenkrieges vom Jahre 1419 an*, Band I. Ed. Palacký, František, Prague, 1873. [hereinafter UB I.]

⁷ *Eberhard Windeckes Denkwürdigkeiten zur Geschichte des Zeitalter Kaiser Sigmund*. Ed. Altmann, Wilhelm, Berlin, 1893. [hereinafter Windecke]

⁸ Tóth-Szabó, Pál, *A cseh-huszita mozgalmak és uralom története Magyarországon*. Budapest, 1917.

⁹ Palacký, František, *Geschichte von Böhmen. Größtentheils nach Urkunden und Handschriften*, Band III. Abt. 2. (Der Hussitenkrieg, von 1419–1431.), Prague, 1851.

¹⁰ C. Tóth, Norbert, “Zsigmond magyar és II. Ulászló lengyel király személyes találkozási a lublói béke után (1412–1424)”, = *Történelmi Szemle* 56:3, 2014, 347–348.

¹¹ See: Four articles of Prague. UB I. 33.; Veszprémy, László, “Zsigmond és a husziták küzdelmének első éve. A hadvezér és diplomata konfliktusa”, In. Bárány, Attila – Pósnán, László (eds.), *Causa unionis, causa fidei, causa reformationis in capite et membris*. *Tanulmányok a konstanzi zsinat 600. évfordulója alkalmából*. Debrecen, 2014. 445.

¹² UB I. 22. The letter was addressed by Sigismund to the citizens of Bautzen.; ZsO VII. 351.

issued on March 1 by Martin V, declared the Hussites as heretics and proclaimed a crusade against them, while also offering forgiveness to all those who partook in the crusade.¹³

However, the decision had already been made by Sigismund much earlier. In a letter dated January 21, 1420 in Vratislav, the ambassadors of the city of Strassburg reported that “Sigismund intends to go and punish the Hussites.”¹⁴ In his letter of March 15, 1420, to the citizens of Bautzen, mentioned earlier, Sigismund went even further, declaring that with God’s help, he would completely eradicate the wrongdoers.¹⁵

The size of the Hungarian army

The army’s numerical strength can be estimated through records of lawsuits and donations. The command of the army was shared between Pipo Ozorai, Count of Temes, and Palatine Nicholas Garai.¹⁶ Additional participants included Emeric Pálóci, Secret Chancellor,¹⁷ John Perényi, who later became the Count of Ugo-csa,¹⁸ and Nicholas Várdai, who later served as Queen’s Master of the Horse.¹⁹ According to my hypothesis, Ladislaus Tamási, who held the title of Master of the Doorkeepers, as well as Henry, who later became Master of the Doorkeepers, George of Bazin, former Count of Pozsony (Pressburg, today Bratislava, Slovakia), Stephen Rozgonyi, who later became the Count of Temes and George Rozgonyi, who later served as Judge of the Royal Court and Dezsó Garai, Ban of Mačva, Ladislaus Tamási, Master of the Doorkeepers, Henry, a would-be Master of the Doorkeepers, with George of Bazin, a former Count of Pozsony (Pressburg, today Bratislava, Slovakia), Stephen Rozgonyi, who later became the Count of Temes and George Rozgonyi, who served as Judge of the Royal Court afterwards as well as Dezsó Garai, Ban of Mačva probably joined Sigismund with their banderia after autumn.²⁰

¹³ MV VII/1. 247. Reg.: “Omnes et singuli reges, duces, (...) comites ceterique christiani nominis zelatores excitantur, út ad Wiklefistarum, Hussitarum et ceterorum haeticorum eorundem fautorum, receptatorum et defensorum exterminium potenter atque viriliter se accingant.”; ZsO VII. 332.

¹⁴ *Deutsche Reichstagsakten unter Kaiser Sigmund*. Abt. 1. (1410–1420). Ed. Kerler, Dietrich, Munich, 1878. 407. Reg.: „(...) des Königs Absicht zur Bestrafung der Hussiten nach Prag...”; ZsO VII. 304.

¹⁵ UB I. 22. „(...) den mit gotes Hilfe gantzlich uszczuietten vnd zu tilgen, Vnser kungriche zu Behem dauon zu reynigen...”; ZsO VII. 351.

¹⁶ Mályusz, Elemér, *Zsigmond király uralma Magyarországon*. Budapest, 1984. 97–98.

¹⁷ ZsO VIII. 105.; DL 8919.

¹⁸ ZsO VII. 504.; DL 10978.

¹⁹ ZsO VII. 487. “(...) prefatus Nicolaus de Warada in regno nostro Bohemie (...)”; DL 79631.

²⁰ Mályusz, Zsigmond király uralma, 1984. 98.; Tóth-Szabó, Cseh-huszita mozgalmak, 1917. 61–62.

Although they received donations in 1421, partly for their involvement in the Hussite Wars,²¹ there was a gap of over six months between the summer operations and the donations. Additionally, no domestic source mentions their participation before or during the campaign. However, this information alone does not provide sufficient reason to assume that they did not take part in the siege of Prague. My hypothesis is reinforced by the document dated no later than September 1420, which mentions all participants, a distinction not shared by others.²² Furthermore, the justifications refer to the summer campaign. During and immediately after the siege, Sigismund bestowed honours upon exceptional army members²³ or those acting on their behalf, as evidenced by his letters.²⁴

Based on the information presented, it can be inferred that the participants listed by Pál Tóth-Szabó were the only ones involved in the siege of Prague during the summer of 1420, as documented in the accompanying table. It is important to maintain objectivity and clarity in academic writing, avoiding personal opinions and emotive language. Furthermore, adherence to conventional structures and formal language is vital for achieving credibility and precision in such texts.

²¹ For example, in his charter of October 5, in Nagyszombat (today: Trnava, Slovakia), Sigismund appointed Stephen Rozgonyi as Count of Pozsony for his merits. (“...ac in praedicti regni Bohemiae, ubi a Wicleffistis seu Bohemis haereticis, (...) in conflictu cum eis per nostros fideles ante civitatem nostram Neuburg appellatam, commisso aliud vulnus in tua facie, per cuiusdam cuspidis ictum, cuius similiter cicatrix etiam pronunc cuilibet intuenti patet evidenter...”). *Codex diplomaticus Hungariae ecclesiasticus ac civilis*, Tomi X. Vol. 6. Ed. Fejér, Georgius, Buda, 1844. 403–405. [hereinafter CDH X/6.]; See also: ZsO VIII. 318.; DL 11145.; In a charter dated September 12, at Udvard, the King granted the estate of Kápolnásvinye and other partial estates to Ladislaus and Henry Tamási for similar reasons. ZsO VIII. 281.; See also: *Hazai okmánytár. Codex Diplomaticus Patrius*, Tom. III. Eds. Nagy, Imre – Paur, Iván – Ráth, Károly – Véghely, Dezső, Győr, 1866. 319–322.; In his charter dated April 5, at Brno, the King grants several estates (Gwze, Alch, Zerdahel etc.) to Stephen Kompolt of Nána and his son, the late Peter, for similar merits. Peter was killed in the battle of Vyšehrad on November 1, 1420. ZsO VIII. 123.; See also: DL 39206.; Sigismund, in his charter of March 15, at Uherské Hradiště, donated the estates of Ancient, Bodon, Seprős etc. to George of Nécspál and his son Ladislaus for the same reason. ZsO VIII. 105.; See also: CDH X/6. 395–399.

²² At John Perényi’s request, Sigismund approved one of John’s earlier estate-exchanges, as he had fought valiantly “nuper ante civitatem nostram Pragensem contra plurimos nostros hostiles emulos abintus nobis repugnantes et rebellantes”. ZsO VII 504.

²³ For example, in a charter dated July 23, at Prague, Sigismund granted the estate of Középpaty to Simon Középpaty and his relatives. ZsO VII. 457.; *Hazai okmánytár. Codex Diplomaticus Patrius*, Tom. II. Eds. Nagy, Imre – Paur, Iván – Ráth, Károly – Véghely, Dezső, Győr, 1865. 224.

²⁴ Sigismund postpones the trial of Ladislaus Töttös and Michael Bólyi, as the latter was in the royal service as a familiar of Pipo Ozorai. ZsO VII. 460.; DL 79627.

Person	Office	Source	Estimated size of possible banner (lance)	Basis of estimation
Nicholas Garai	Palatine	DL 10953.; ZsO VII. 455.	250	Decreta Regni Hungariae
Pipo Ozorai (Filippo Scollari)	Count of Temes	UB I. 46; ZsO VII. 477.	250	Decreta Regni Hungariae
Emeric Pálóci	Secret Chancellor	DL 8919.; ZsO VII. 105.	100	Own estimation based on DRH
John Perényi	later Count of Ugocsa	DL 10978.; ZsO VII. 504.	60	Decreta Regni Hungariae
Nicholas Várdai	later Master of the Horse of the Queen	DL 79631.; ZsO VII. 487.	30	Own estimation
All:	-	-	690	-

Fig. 1: The most significant members of the Hungarian army of 1420 with the estimated number of their banners.

Sigismund's military regulations of 1415–1417 and a military regulation of 1432–1433, published in the *Decreta Regni Hungariae* [hereinafter DRH],²⁵ comprise a military draft. The draft serves as a census showing the size of the banderia of a specific dignity, national official, or notable baronial family required to appear in the king's army.²⁶ He divided these banderia according to where they were located territorially. For example, the counties and officials in Northern Hungary and Transdanubia were more inclined to march against the Hussites. While these were drafts – hence never gained legal force – their formulation could have been preceded by a census, meaning the numbers were based on the realistic balance of forces of the time. It should be noted that not all counties or significant noble families/individuals were included in the drafts, but they do provide a reasonable basis for a model calculation.

An important aspect of the model estimation is that in the absence of specific data, I utilised the number of participating nobles as a reference point, specifically the number of the DRH military draft, based on their rank. In instances where the military draft does not specify the size of a particular person's, family's or office's banderium, I made my own estimations. These estimates were calculated based on two factors. Firstly, I verified whether the certificate displayed the pre-

²⁵ 1415–17: *Constitutio prelatibus et baronibus regni Hungariae destinatarum*, DL 56715.; In: Döry, Franciscus – Bónis, Georgius – Bácskai, Vera (eds.), *Decreta Regni Hungariae 1301–1457*. Budapest, 1976.

²⁶ DRH 397–430.

cise size of the banderium.²⁷ Secondly, I searched for any prior or current offices held by the given person or his family. In case neither he nor a family member had held an office, I refrained from including an accompanying banderium as it is probable that he belonged to a baronial family.

I have an own estimation only for Michael Várdai,²⁸ considering his later appointment as the Queen's Master of the Horse and count of various counties. However, the Várdai family was not among the old baronial families and were regarded as *homo novus*.²⁹

In certain cases the table displays estimates. The DRH, in fact, did not present the size of baronial and various office-related banderia as a fact; rather, it established a kind of target number, meaning the reality almost certainly differed from this. Furthermore, it is crucial to note that these target numbers referred not to offensive but defensive wars.³⁰ One illustrative instance is the banderium led by Pipo Ozorai, Count of Temes. The DRH register of 1415–1417 reveals the capacity of Pipo Ozorai to deploy a significant number of lances, approximately 1,200, equivalent to 3,600–4,800 people as there were 3–4 men per lance.³¹ The vast size of the baronial banderia could be under the control of Sigismund's commander-in-chief, primarily to fortify the Kingdom of Hungary against the Ottomans.³² However, in the event of an offensive campaign, the banderium of Pipo Ozorai, Count of Temes, could be a small fraction of the size prescribed by the draft. For instance, the *Magyarország hadtörténete I.* [Military History of Hungary] volume lists several incidents where Pipo Ozorai led a significant number of soldiers, such as 300–400, 700 or 1,200 men.³³ However, the same work acknowledges that a more plausible estimate lies between 300 and 700 men. Based on this information, I calculated that Ozorai commanded a military unit of 250 cavalry lances, each consisting of 4 soldiers, for a total of 1,000.

Assuming an average of four persons per lance and based on the provided data, the maximum number of Hungarian nobles is estimated to be around 690 lances,³⁴ equal to approximately 2,760 individuals. Additionally, it is necessary to consider the king's banderium which, according to the DRH, the king was obliged

²⁷ For familiares, I did not count banderia, as they were automatically counted to the overlord.

²⁸ See the first figure.

²⁹ Engel, Pál, *Magyar középkori adattár*. Arcanum Digitéka, 2001. (Virtual Repository.)

³⁰ DRH 417–418.

³¹ DRH 398.

³² DRH 398.; This is also mentioned to in the decree text, “pro defensione regni Hungarie”, which intends to defend the Kingdom of Hungary.

³³ Bárány, Attila – B. Szabó, János – Veszprémy, László, “A késő középkor hadtörténete (1387–1490)”, In. Hermann, Róbert (ed.), *Magyarország hadtörténete I.: A kezdetektől 1526-ig*. Budapest, 2017. 240.

³⁴ See Fig. 1.

to provide in case of requirement if necessary,³⁵ which, according to Norbert C. Tóth's estimation, meant about 400 men.³⁶

Therefore, the maximum number of soldiers in the Hungarian army is assumed to be roughly 3,000, with a possibility of it being even less. While it was previously believed that the number of soldiers was much higher, current estimates suggest that 2–3,000 soldiers is a more realistic figure. This lower number is supported by the lack of a general noble uprising,³⁷ meaning a significant Hungarian army cannot be relied upon.

The number of imperial and Hussite armies in the summer of 1420

No precise data exists regarding the imperial army. Vavřinec z Březové suggests that the total number was 150,000, including the Hungarians.³⁸ Tóth-Szabó reports an army of at least 100,000 men,³⁹ likely utilizing the same sources as Palacký. Windecke estimates the number of the royal army to be 80,000.⁴⁰ However, these estimates are greatly exaggerated. While Veszprémy indicates that the Hungarian army consisted of 10,000 men, the reality is that it could have been no more than 3,000.⁴¹

Apart from the chalice nobles,⁴² the only other Hungarian source mentioned by name is that of Margrave Wilhelm of Meissen.⁴³ However, numerous other imperial barons and nobles also participated.⁴⁴ Sigismund sent a letter on July 1, 1420 to Oldřich (II) z Rožmberk, in which he informed him that Johann von Neuhaus had been dispatched to the Austrian princes – Albert Habsburg of Austria and Ernest of Styria – with a message to send troops to aid Oldřich in defeating the Taborites.⁴⁵ Prince Albert of Austria was encamped under Tábor until July 9

³⁵ DRH 420–422.; According to the draft, the King (“Regia maiestas”) had to send a banderium to protect different areas, such as Temes and Severin, or Transylvania. However, on page 422, against the Hussites, this is not clearly described, only “Et si deo placebit/ regia maiestas personaliter ...” is mentioned. It can be assumed that if the king is present, a bandiera would also be present even if there is no record of it.

³⁶ C. Tóth, Norbert, “Az 1395-ös lengyel betörés. (A lengyel-magyar kapcsolatok egy epizódja.)”, In. Neumann, Tibor – Rácz, György (eds.), “*Honoris causa.*” *Tanulmányok Engel Pál emlékére.* Piliscsaba–Budapest, 2008. 461.

³⁷ Tóth-Szabó, Cseh-huszita mozgalmak, 1917. 56.

³⁸ FRB V. 384.

³⁹ Tóth-Szabó, Cseh-huszita mozgalmak, 1917. 59.

⁴⁰ Windecke 110.; According to the surviving manuscript of Eberhard Windecke, “in the above-mentioned [1420] year, King Sigismund of Rome marched on the city of Prague with a considerable force, estimated at more than eighty thousand men-at-arms.”

⁴¹ Veszprémy, Zsigmond és a husziták, 2014. 449.

⁴² ZsO VII. 431.; UB I. 31.; Oldřich (II) z Rožmberk (Ulrich von Rosenberg in the regesta) possibly played a crucial role in supporting Sigismund based on primary domestic sources, with his name appearing on multiple occasions, and even leading the siege of Tábor.

⁴³ ZsO VII. 395.; UB I. 28.

⁴⁴ Čornej, Petr, *Jan Žižka. Život a doba husitského válečníka.* Prague, 2019. 277.

⁴⁵ ZsO VII. 443.; UB I. 32.

before arriving in Prague.⁴⁶ Alongside the Hungarians and Austrians, a significant number of crusaders from the Empire joined their forces.⁴⁷ On July 5, 1420, Sigismund addressed King Vladislaus II Jagiello in Prague stating he gathered a sizeable army to conquer the Hussites and invited the King of Poland to participate in the campaign.⁴⁸ It is unclear what Sigismund meant by a considerable number. Čornej assessed the overall crusading force at 30–35,000, with one-third being comprised of Hungarians.⁴⁹ In the preceding chapter I estimated the number of Hungarians to be no more than 3,000. Even if I am incorrect and account for Tóth-Szabó's numbers of Hungarians, the total force would not surpass 6,000.⁵⁰ Based on these statistics, similar to Čornej, I can cautiously make an estimation. It is likely that the combined forces of the Hungarian, royalist Bohemian, and imperial *banderia* did not surpass 30,000 soldiers.

The size of the Hussite army cannot be precisely determined, but an estimation feasible through extant data. Excluding the garrisons of Palacký Tábor and Prague, the forces of Hussite leader Jan Žižka were estimated by Palacký to be around 9,000; however, this appears to be an exaggeration.⁵¹ On March 20, when Jan Žižka abandoned Plzeň due to the siege, Palacký could have only had 400 troops.⁵² Although approximately four months elapsed between the Battle of Sutoměř on March 25 and the Battle of Vítkov Hill, it is unlikely that the Hussite army saw any significant reinforcements. Čornej reports that Žižka's troop numbers never surpassed 2,000.⁵³ During the summer of 1420, we may estimate an even smaller *banderia*, particularly when we consider the significance of the data provided by the source detailing the Battle of Sutoměř. The number of defenders within the city was increased by citizens and city guards from Prague, in addition to thousands of Hussites pouring into the city from the countryside.⁵⁴ However, it remains impossible to estimate the exact number of defenders. Čornej approximates that Žižka's *banderium*, alongside the citizens and Hussites, amounted to nearly 10,000.⁵⁵ As I concur with this approach,⁵⁶ I accept Čornej's estimations at face value rather than forming my own.

⁴⁶ Čornej, Jan Žižka, 2019. 272, 275.

⁴⁷ Tóth-Szabó, *Cseh-huszita mozgalmak*, 1917. 59.

⁴⁸ *ZsO VII*. 447.

⁴⁹ Čornej, Jan Žižka, 2019. 276.

⁵⁰ Furthermore, the total number of troops intended for defensive campaigns is utilised in these calculations. In the case of an offensive campaign, it is advisable to have two thirds of the actual numbers in the DRH. Therefore, the number of Hungarians could not exceed 6,000.

⁵¹ Palacký, *Geschichte von Böhmen*, 1851. 112.

⁵² Palacký, *Geschichte von Böhmen*, 1851. 87.

⁵³ Čornej, Jan Žižka, 2019. 438.

⁵⁴ Čornej, Jan Žižka, 2019. 262.; *FRB V*. 372–373.; Vavřinec z Březové overstates the number of Hussites from the countryside, with Čornej stating that only 2,000 came to Prague from Žatec, Louny and Slaný.

⁵⁵ Čornej, Jan Žižka, 2019. 278.

⁵⁶ Čornej, Jan Žižka, 2019, 278.; Čornej assumed that in 1340, Bruges, a city of approximately 35,000 inhabitants, mobilised around 7,000 men for war due to an imminent

Financing the campaign

The economic context of the campaign bears significance not only in terms of war expenditure accounting but also serves as a measure of army size by listing further royal revenues through special taxes and pledging royal estates.

The monthly salary of a lance in the early Hungarian Kingdom ranged from 10 to 20 golden florins⁵⁷ subject to its composition and number.⁵⁸ The monthly payment of a Hungarian army consisting of 690 lances, of which 590 were noble and 100 royal, amounted to 6,900–13,800 golden florins. The campaign began on May 2 when Sigismund departed from Svídnice, and it lasted until the start of August, as per Sigismund's itinerary.⁵⁹ During this period, the payment for the army was at least 20,700 golden florins, if a lower remuneration is employed. The army stayed in Bohemia with Sigismund, and at least part of it,⁶⁰ such as Pipo of Ozorai's banderium, consumed additional funds.

However, Sigismund's extra revenue was not significant. On April 17, 1420, Sigismund offered some silver objects to the citizens of Vratislav in exchange for 1177 forints.⁶¹ No royal property was pledged before or during the summer campaign. The taxes of the free royal towns could also be counted on. On July 1, 1420, Smilo of Leuchtenburg, Castellan of Sopron, received the annual tax of 400 golden florins for the King on Saint George's Day in Sopron.⁶² The charter did not specify whether this amount was intended to be utilised by the King to combat the Hussites or transferred to Bohemia. Therefore, the only feasible option for the King to obtain additional funds was to pledge silverware, at least concerning Hungarian resources. Of course, Sigismund employed additional means of payment, such as the aforementioned donations of property.

Even if we consider city taxes and land donations as an alternative means of payment, they cannot be equivalent to the full payment of the army, let alone including food expenses. We can assume that the payment of the army at the end of the summer campaign was not made from Hungarian funds. It is possible that a portion of the payment was only given in the subsequent months, or from a source in Bohemia. According to Stanislav Bárta, already in the spring of 1420, Sigismund commenced pledging the estates of the Bohemian Church.⁶³ For instance,

threat. Čornej allows for more flexibility, stating that Prague, with a population of less than 30,000, could arm at most one-sixth of its population, which totals to less than 5,000 men.

⁵⁷ C. Tóth, *Lengyel betörés*, 2008. 465–466.

⁵⁸ Bárány et al., *Késő középkor*, 2017. 239–242.; Tóth, Dominik, "Mennyibe kerülhetett egy zsoldos fenntartása a középkor végi Magyarországon?", = *Seregszemle* 16:1, 2018, 134–137.

⁵⁹ Engel, Pál – C. Tóth, Norbert, *Itineraria regum et reginarum Hungariae (1382–1438)*. Budapest, 2005. 105–106.

⁶⁰ ZsO VII 460.; DL 79627.

⁶¹ ZsO VII. 376.; DF 288581.

⁶² ZsO VII. 443.; DF 202186.

⁶³ Bárta, Stanislav, "Institut zástavy ve finanční politice Zikmunda Lucemburského vůči české šlechtě (1420–1437)", In. Elbel, Petr – Jan, Libor – Jurok, Jiří (eds.), *Z počátků husitské revoluce*. Brno, 2019. 255–257.

on August 22, 1420, the King pledged church estates to Vilém Švihovský (III) of Rýzmburk for 1,271 schokk.⁶⁴ Bárta asserts that Sigismund utilised this sum for the Bohemian noble *banderia*,⁶⁵ but it remains uncertain if he also used the funds to pay the mercenaries of the Hungarian army.

The itinerary of the royal army

Modern historiography is acquainted with the stages of the Summer Campaign, and its analysis is essential to discussing operations and understanding strategic decisions. To support my study, I consulted Palacký's work, Sigismund's itinerary, and Čornej's monograph.

According to Palacký, the army departed from Svídnice, passed through Kladsko (now Klodsko, Poland) and Náchod, and arrived at Jaroměř, Hradec Králové, and subsequently at Kutná Hora.⁶⁶ Although the sources upon which the route was planned are unknown, some data correspond to the Engel – C. Tóth itinerary.⁶⁷ However, it is my belief that the Hungarian army did not follow this route. From Svídnice to Hradec Králové, one of the two shortest routes is the one described by Palacký, while the other is the route via Kamenná Hora (now Kamienna Góra, Poland), Trutnov, Dvůr Králové nad Labem, Jaroměř and then to Hradec Králové.⁶⁸

As both routes possessed similar hydrographic and topographical features, neither was favoured due to environmental conditions. Therefore, the decision to select one of the two tracks had to be based on alternative criteria.

A crucial element was the distance between the routes, with the red route being approximately 120 km and the orange route being 140–145 km, subject to fluctuations caused by road conditions. Furthermore, the troop movements of late medieval Hungarian armies were also heavily influenced by the surrounding conditions. A regiment of cavalry could readily cover 30–40 kilometres per day. Conversely, 15–25 kilometres per day was a practical estimate for a mixed army.⁶⁹ Given the greater number of Silesian infantry, as well as conceivably additional royalist Bohemian *banderia*, the latter distance appears more probable.⁷⁰

⁶⁴ Bárta, *Institut zástavy*, 2019. 255.; The schokk is a historical unit of measurement. In late medieval Central Europe, one schokk was equal to 60 Bohemian groschen. In the given example, 1271 schokks were equivalent to 76,260 Bohemian groschen.

⁶⁵ Bárta, *Institut zástavy*, 2019. 256.; The pledge was commonly issued in conjunction with the mercenary contract.

⁶⁶ Palacký, *Geschichte von Böhmen*, 1851. 104.

⁶⁷ Čornej, Jan Žižka, 2019. 253.; Čornej adopts a similar approach, however, a source is not provided.

⁶⁸ See both itineraries in Fig. 2.

⁶⁹ Bárány et al., *Késő középkor*, 2017. 74, 47.; The distance covered may vary depending on the road conditions, army composition, and whether the territory they pass through is hostile or allied. It is important to consider these factors when determining the estimated distance of the journey.

⁷⁰ Čornej, Jan Žižka, 2019. 266.




Fig. 2: Possible pathways of the Hungarian army during Sigismund's first anti-Hussite crusade, in the summer of 1420. (Ed. Imre Solt Varga)

The sluggish pace is also guaranteed by Sigismund's affliction with apoplexy;⁷¹ even travelling swiftly in a coach could have been extremely discomforting. King Sigismund was accompanied by Queen Barbara of Hungary,⁷² possibly contributing to the slower progress. It is likely that the army's priority was to ensure the safety of the royal couple rather than achieving maximum marching speed.

Based on these factors, it can be assumed that the daily distance covered by the army was no more than 20 kilometers.⁷³ The fact that the army completed the Svídnice-Hrádec Králové route in six days confirms this assumption.⁷⁴ Additionally, the shorter distance of the red route by approximately 20–25 kilometres might be a crucial determinant.

Another reason for the significance of the routes is the presence of dowry towns along the red way, like Trutnov and Dvůr Králové nad Labem, similar to Jaroměř and Hradec Králové. These towns were under the ownership of the respective Bohemian queens and after King Wenceslas IV's passing, they legally became the property of Sigismund's wife rather than his widow, Sophia. Queen Sophia relinquished her title and all associated privileges, including control over the dowry towns, between December 27 and 29, 1419, in Brno.⁷⁵ These towns served as

⁷¹ ZsO VII. 449.; UB I. 38.

⁷² Čornej, Jan Žižka, 2019. 256.

⁷³ Bárány et al., *Késő Középkor*, 2017. 258–259.

⁷⁴ Engel – C. Tóth, *Itineraria*, 2005. 105–106.; The army left Svídnice on May 2 and was already in Hradec Králové on May 8.

⁷⁵ Palacký, *Geschichte von Böhmen*, 1851. 77.; Tóth-Szabó, *Cseh-huszita mozgalmak*, 1917. 56–57.

a temporary supply for the army and as a source of funds for Sigismund in the event of an exceptional tax collection. The king needed this to finance the army. Therefore, it was of paramount importance for a number of reasons to secure the dowry towns, a task that Sigismund could not overlook.

Sigismund departed for Kutná Hora after Hrádec Králové. In a letter, dated around Kutná Hora on May 13, 1420, Sigismund sent for William, Margrave of Meissen. The letter mentioned that the King and his troops were preparing to capture the town and requested William to join them as soon as possible.⁷⁶ After Kutná Hora, Sigismund marched to Prague⁷⁷ and then arrived in Mělník on May 27, 1420,⁷⁸ where he unified his forces with William's banderium.⁷⁹

The itinerary of the summer campaign is established: the army marched from Mělník to Prague, then to Vyšehrad and Zbraslav. The objective was to capture and maintain control of Prague and to crown Sigismund. This necessitated the occupation and fortification of towns in the vicinity of Prague.

Identical to the towns located in eastern Bohemia mentioned earlier, Mělník was also a dowry town.⁸⁰ Consequently, the Hungarian army arrived in Mělník on May 27, 1420⁸¹ for both strategic reasons and food supplies. Palacký notes that on May 24, 1420, the Hungarians hastily retreated from Prague upon hearing that armed men from Žatec were approaching.⁸² Although the exact circumstances are unclear, it is probable that Sigismund abandoned his siege equipment and supplies during this period. Three days later, on May 27, the monarch was identified in Mělník.⁸³ According to a document dated July 9 in Nuremberg, Sigismund's army camped near Prague on June 30, 1420, with provisions during the siege.⁸⁴ In other words, Sigismund was able to acquire food once more, and it is possible that the neighbouring towns, including Mělník, might have played a significant role in this.

Events affecting the Hungarian army

On May 2, Sigismund departed from Svídnice accompanied by the Hungarian army,⁸⁵ as well as the Silesians and the royalist Bohemians, towards Hrádec Králové.⁸⁶ According to a charter dating to May 13, 1420, presumably between

⁷⁶ ZsO VII. 395.; UB I. 28.

⁷⁷ FRB V. 373.

⁷⁸ Engel – C. Tóth, *Itineraria*, 2005. 105–106.

⁷⁹ Czech historians concur that securing the towns to the north of Prague held strategic significance for the following siege. Kavka, František, *Poslední Lucemburk na českém trůně*. Prague, 1998. 60.

⁸⁰ Čornej, Jan Žižka, 2019. 266.

⁸¹ Engel – C. Tóth, *Itineraria*, 2005. 105–106.

⁸² Palacký, *Geschichte von Böhmen*, 1851. 114.

⁸³ Engel – C. Tóth, *Itineraria*, 2005. 105–106.

⁸⁴ ZsO VII. 449.; UB I. 38.

⁸⁵ Twentieth century Czech historiography inaccurately recorded that the army departed from Svídnice on April 30 and arrived at Hrádec Králové on May 3. Kavka, *Poslední Lucemburk*, 1998. 52.

⁸⁶ Čornej, Jan Žižka, 2019. 266.

May 8 and 10 (the exact date is unknown), Sigismund requested a joint effort with Count William of Meissen in Kutná Hora “to eradicate the Wycliphists”.⁸⁷ However, it was not until the end of May that the royal army encountered the Count of Meissen’s banderium near Mělník.⁸⁸ At that time, the royal army was comprised solely of Hungarians, Bohemians, and Silesians.⁸⁹

Around the same time, in late May, the city of Tábor was already under siege, led by Oldřich (II) z Rožmberka.⁹⁰ A letter from Sigismund, dated May 31, 1420, implored Oldřich to take Tábor quickly or retreat to Prague.⁹¹ This letter indicates that either Sigismund’s forces were inadequate to besiege Prague or that he lacked the necessary siege equipment.⁹² On June 20, Sigismund journeyed from Zbraslav to Točnick⁹³ to rendezvous with the representatives of Oldřich. He urged Oldřich through these envoys to arrive as soon as possible at Prague.⁹⁴

On June 29, the initial crusaders reached Sigismund’s camp⁹⁵ as noted by sources “from the west, south and north”.⁹⁶ Both domestic and international sources agree that the siege of Prague started on June 30.⁹⁷ The most significant confrontation occurred on July 14 when the crusaders attacked. Due to Žižka’s careful planning,⁹⁸ the defenders successfully thwarted the crusaders’ attempt to storm the city and the newly fortified Vítkov Hill. The Hungarians participated in the conflict, but it is unclear if they attacked the town or Vítkov Hill. Evidence such as a donation letter to Palatine Nicholas Garai on July 20 confirms this.⁹⁹

After the attack on July 14, there was no widespread assault against the city nor Vítkov Hill.¹⁰⁰ The battle had few casualties, but it highlighted that the city could only be seized through a siege. The siege was halted by the mid-July harvest and supply issues to the castle.¹⁰¹ As a result, Sigismund commanded for the siege to end, due to dwindling prospects of success. Hradčany had already been

⁸⁷ ZsO VII. 395.; UB I. 28.

⁸⁸ I assume that this was the initial imperial corps to unite with the king.

⁸⁹ Palacký, *Geschichte von Böhmen*, 1851. 110.

⁹⁰ Čornej, *Jan Žižka*, 2019. 272.

⁹¹ ZsO VII. 409.; UB I. 30.

⁹² Palacký, *Geschichte von Böhmen*, 1851. 112.; According to the above, the crusaders left them around Žatec on May 24.

⁹³ Engel – C. Tóth, *Itineraria*, 2005. 106.

⁹⁴ ZsO VII. 431.; UB I. 31.

⁹⁵ Čornej, *Jan Žižka*, 2019. 272.

⁹⁶ Palacký, *Geschichte von Böhmen*, 1851. 122.

⁹⁷ Tóth-Szabó, *Cseh-husziták mozgalma*, 1917. 59.; Palacký, *Geschichte von Böhmen*, 1851. 125.; ZsO VII. 449.; UB I. 39.

⁹⁸ Čornej, *Jan Žižka*, 2019. 274.

⁹⁹ ZsO VII. 455.; The charter states “ipsam nostram civitatem Pragensem in/ contemptum”. DL 10953.; Vavřinec z Březové’s chronicle does not specify the precise objective of the Hungarian attack, but he does provide a detailed account of the targets of the Saxons and the Meissen. FRB V. 387–388.

¹⁰⁰ Čornej, *Jan Žižka*, 2019. 288.

¹⁰¹ Čornej, *Jan Žižka*, 2019. 288.; This evidence indicates that the size of the Crusader army was not too significant since they could not impede the delivery of food to the city.

taken by Sigismund, enabling him to be crowned King of Bohemia on July 28 in Saint Vitus Cathedral, without any resistance from Conrad of Vechta, Archbishop of Prague.¹⁰² He left behind a significant guard, including Hungarians such as Simon Csögi¹⁰³ and Michael Nagymihályi, in order to protect Hradčany.¹⁰⁴ The Hungarian troops withdrew alongside the majority of the royal army to Kutná Hora in early August.¹⁰⁵ This brought an end to the summer campaign for the Hungarian army and ushered in preparations for the forthcoming fighting in the autumn.

Conclusion

The primary objective of my study is to evaluate the preceding perspectives of domestic historiography in the context of modern, contemporary methodological knowledge. At present, I am scrutinizing the period and the global sources and literature, with particular emphasis on the Czech Republic. Hence, the purpose of my dissertation is not to rectify the work of my forerunners, but simply to pose several inquiries for which I endeavored to discover the answers.

The size of the army, its funding, and the revision of its route are all based on hypotheses. Further research is required to refute or support these.

It is safe to assume that the size of the Hungarian army was not nearly as large as previously believed, even if we count all the Hungarian barons and their banderia listed by Pál Tóth-Szabó. The military regiment data from DRH does not suggest an army of anywhere near 4–6,000. The estimated remuneration for the army depends on the estimated number of soldiers, but the sources and methods used by Sigismund to arrive at this amount are more crucial. I stated a few alternatives to this in my study, all of which are uncertain.

While I intend to continue researching the topic to answer these questions, the available resources may hinder my progress. Methodological background and a database are under development. It is anticipated that the hypotheses for the current study will be refined with a more detailed set of questions and answers by the conclusion of the doctoral programme.

¹⁰² Tóth-Szabó, *Cseh-huszita mozgalmak*, 1917. 61.

¹⁰³ On the February 8, 1421, Sigismund issued a charter to Simon Csögi for his valor in defending Prague. The charter was granted in Litoměřice. ZsO VII. 48.; DL 79654.

¹⁰⁴ On March 15, 1421, Sigismund issued a charter to Mihály Nagymihályi in recognition of his merits in defending Prague, during a ceremony that took place in Uherské Hradiště. ZsO VII. 105.; DL 8919.; Based on the charter, Mihály Nagymihályi served under the leadership of Imre Pálóci. As there are no records of other Hungarian nobles doing the same, it can be inferred that Imre Pálóci was the head of the Hungarian group that remained in Prague.

¹⁰⁵ Čornej, Jan Žižka, 2019. 291.

Ádám Novák*

OPPORTUNITIES AND CHALLENGES IN RESEARCHING THE POLITICAL AND MILITARY HISTORY OF THE UPPER REGIONS

Introduction

For the events of the 1440–1450s, contemporaries used the phrase “tempora distorbiorum”. Translated and used as “troubled times”, the adjective referred primarily to the unpredictable legal system. This could have developed in the absence of a solid, legitimate royal power. There was no force that would hold the subjects accountable to the text of the law. It was not the first time this happened in Hungarian history. After the extinction of the House of Árpád, the first decade and a half of the fourteenth century was like this until the victory of Charles I at Rozhanovce. The death of Louis I, but even more so the period following the assassination of King Charles II. Such was the period of the uprisings against Sigismund in 1401 and 1403. The problem was triggered by the premature death of King Albert without a living male heir in 1439, and then deepened by the dual king election, which raised the question of legitimacy. The minority of Ladislaus V, the guardianship of King Frederick of Germany, and the death of Władysław I at Varna led to an unresolvable crisis. The situation was not facilitated by the ambition and lust for power of more influential lords such as János Hunyadi, Ulrik Cillei, Miklós Újlaki or László Garai, nor by the advance of the Ottoman Empire. This period was finally brought to an end by the sudden death of the legitimate and already of age László V, and the accession and the early years of the reign of the extremely talented Mátyás Hunyadi.

Problem statement

Researchers of today may feel that the historiography of the last two centuries has been of no use at all in understanding the period and dispelling the “confusion”. For centuries, the publication of a small number of important, but often misinterpreted or superficially studied, sources provided those concerned with the history of the period with irrefutable cornerstones. The documentary archives of the publishers of mainly political historical sources, such as István Katona,¹ György

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¹ Katona, Stephanus, *Historia regum stirpis mixtae*. Tom. VI. Ord. XIII. 1440–1457. Pest, 1790.

Pray,² Károly Wagner,³ József Teleki,⁴ František Palacký,⁵ and Joseph Chmel,⁶ have satisfied many researchers and have been used as a basis for exploring a wide range of social historical, and even more so military historical issues. The chronological exploration of sources, such as the Charter Archive of the Sigismund period, was avoided. The case was not helped by the work of national romantic and nationalist historiographers either.⁷ They often interpreted the sources in a biased, distorted and often incorrect way. On top of this lay the Marxist ideology-driven research, which approached the issue from the perspective of class struggle.⁸ New studies and monographs were published in the last decades, but the results of individual workshops were rarely synthesised. At least, we do not see the complementarity of works written in the national languages of the Carpathian Basin, and the results in Slovak, Czech, Serbian, Romanian, Croatian are rarely incorporated into studies in Hungarian, and vice versa. I believe that this is a mistake, and we need to channel the achievements of historians from different nations to create a more coherent picture.

This phenomenon is particularly striking when the researcher examines the military history of the Upper Regions (*partes superiores*) in the 1440s and 1450s. There is a centuries-old tradition of examining Husitism through the lenses of religious history, theology and ethnogenesis, from the emergence of Jan Hus until the 1470s. Slovak historiography pointed out that this approach neglects the periodization and interpretation of the Hussite movements.⁹ For a long time, the military events in the Moravian territories were examined as part of the same permanent process as the history of the Upper Regions 20–30 years later. The stories of Jan Žižka, a Taborite fight for religious freedom and independence,

² Georgius, Pray, *Annales regum Hungariae ab anno Christi CMXCVII ad annum MDLXIV*, Pars III. Vindobonae, 1766.

³ Wagner, Carl, *Analecta Scepusii sacri et profani*, Pars I–V. Vienna, 1774–1778.; Wagner, Carl, *Diplomatarium comitatus Srosiensis. Posonii–Cassoviae*, 1780.

⁴ Teleki, József, *Hunyadiak kora Magyarországon. Okmánytár X*. Pest, 1853.

⁵ Palacký, František, *Archiv český čili staré písemné památky české i moravské*, Vols I–VI. Praze, 1840–1872.

⁶ Chmel, Joseph, *Materialien zur österreichischen Geschichte: aus Archiven und Bibliotheken*, Vols I–II. Linz–Wien, 1832–1838.

⁷ As an example from the Hungarian side we can perhaps mention Szerémi, József – Erneyei, József, *A Majthényiak és a Felvidék*. Budapest, 1912.; And on the Slovak side Špirko, Jozef, *Husiti, jiskrovci a bratříci v dejinách Spiša (1431–1462)*. Levoča, 1937.

⁸ Relevant examples from Slovak literature can be found in Matúš Kučera's historiographical introduction: Kučera, Matúš, "Slovenská historiografia o otázkach husitstva a husitizmu", In: Kaczarová, Iveta (ed.), *Husiti na Slovensku. Zborník referátov z konferencie [6.9.2001] pri príležitosti 550. výročia bitky pri Lučenci*. Lučenec, 2004. 6–27. [hereinafter *Husiti na Slovensku*]; Such as, for example: Macek, Josef, *Husitské revoluční hnutí*. Praha, 1952.; Varsik, Branislav, *Husitské revolučné hnutie a Slovensko*. Bratislava, 1965.

⁹ Matúš Kučera also drew attention to this: Kučera, Slovenská historiografia, 2004. 19–23.

and Jan Jiškra and his fellow soldiers living off the sword cannot be treated as similar movements.

During the 1440s the country was divided into two political parties, along the support of László V and Władysław I. Later, the civil war was prolonged and, following the deaths of the parties' leaders – first Queen Elizabeth and then King Władysław I – it became a series of politically-clothed atrocities.¹⁰ Not exclusively, but a significant role in this was played by mercenaries, *bratři*/brothers, companies of Czech and Polish origin operating in the Upper Regions.¹¹ We tend to see the power of both Jiškra and other mercenaries as continuous and solid throughout the entire period. This, however, was far from the case, as balance of power and the network of relations were constantly changing. Earlier historiography wrongly placed both the Hungarian sovereigns and the foreign mercenaries in the same party, in the same league, on the same side.¹² This theory is contradicted, however, by the fact that mercenary leaders were hardly moved by loyalty to Protestant religion, or to any king or lord. In most cases, they are people who put their swords on the market, seeking their own prosperity, who, although they share a common language and origin, have worked for their own success.¹³ Thus we cannot speak of a Bohemian Hussite mass, nor of a unified mercenary army.¹⁴

In the early twentieth century, historians addressing the problem, such as József Ernyei, József Szerémi,¹⁵ Pál Tóth-Szabó,¹⁶ Jozef Špirko¹⁷ or Václav Chaloupecký,¹⁸ ignored this. They wrote their works on the basis of a rich and extensive source base, but their approach was not suited to providing an objective picture of the history of the period. They often contain erroneous conclusions and represent biased views. In my view, in order to get a more accurate picture of the history of the period, these works need to be deconstructed, we need to go deep down to the

¹⁰ Tringli, István, *Az újkor hajnala*. Budapest, 2003. 13.

¹¹ János Thuróczy, in chapter 244 of his work, specifically discusses them. Thuróczy, János, *A magyarok krónikája*. Eds. Bellus, Ibolya – Kristó, Gyula, Budapest, 2001. 299–300.

¹² On the criticism of the league system: Pálosfalvi, Tamás, “Tettes vagy áldozat? Hunyadi László halála”, = *Századok* 149, 2015, 383–441. 385–386.

¹³ As the chronicler put it in describing the circumstances of the period: “And those who did not have enough domestic troops to deploy against the enemy took foreign mercenaries”. Bellus – Kristó, Thuróczy, 2001. 272.

¹⁴ István Tringli interpreted the activities of the mercenaries in his review. Tringli, István, “Novák Ádám: A terebesi Perényi család története a 15. század közepéig”, = *Turul* 94, 2021, 190–191. 191.

¹⁵ Szerémi – Ernyei, *A Majthényiak*, 1912.

¹⁶ Tóth-Szabó, Pál, *A cseh-huszita mozgalmak és uralom története Magyarországon*. Budapest, 1917.; Despite the fact that it is more than a hundred years old, it is still referred to as basic literature in Hungarian. As far as we know today, it contains many errors, its structure is confusing, and although it has provided a lot of new data, its sources are often no longer traceable.

¹⁷ Špirko, Husiti, jiskrovci, 1937.

¹⁸ Chaloupecký, Václav, *Středověké Listy ze Slovenska*. Bratislava–Praha, 1937.

level of the sources. As regards the narrative sources, the works of Jan Długosz,¹⁹ János Thuróczy²⁰ and Antonio Bonfini²¹ should be treated with thorough criticism. Owing thanks to the work of Béla Iványi, the archives of the cities of Bardejov and Prešov contain references to relevant sources in several places,²² and for thematic research we should turn to minor urban materials such as Sabinov,²³ Levoča, Kežmarok, Kremnica, Banská Štiavnica, but the archives of Košice also contain previously unpublished documents and letters.²⁴ Furthermore, it is also worth processing the *narratio* material of the royal donation charters, where further data fragments can be found in connection to the event and military history. It would also be desirable to process the documents of the curia, conventions, and the chapters, but it is unlikely that this will be accomplished within the framework of a comprehensive project. In the last decades, István Tringli,²⁵ Tamás Pálosfalvi²⁶

¹⁹ Its latest Latin edition: *Ioannis Dlugossii Annales seu Cronicae incliti Regni Poloniae*. Ed. Dabrowski, Jan, Vol. XI–XII., Varsavie, 2001–2003.; Its latest Polish edition: *Jana Długosza Roczniki czyli Kroniki sławnego Królestwa Polskiego. Ks. 11(1431–1444)–12(1445–1461)*. Eds. Gawęda, Stanisław et al., Warszawa, 2009. [hereinafter *Jana Długosza Ks. 11–12.*]; The Polish chronicler gives a detailed account of the events in the Upper Regions Ks. 12. 93–95. (Hunyadi’s campaign against Jiškra in 1449); 135–136. (Hunyadi’s campaign against Jiškra in 1451, the Battle of Lučenec).

²⁰ The events of the Upper Regions are discussed by Thuróczy in chapters 229, 243–244 and partly in 259. *Bellus – Kristó, Thuróczy*, 2001. 274–275, 297–300, 326–327.; Its Latin edition: Galántai, Elisabeth – Kristó, Julius, *Johannes de Thurocz: Chronica Hungarorum*. I. Textus. (Bibliotheca scriptorum medii recentisque aevorum. Series nova, 7.) Budapest, 1985.

²¹ Latin edition: *Antonius de Bonifinis: Rerum Ungaricarum decades*. Ed. Főgel, József – Iványi, Béla – Juhász, László, Vols VI., Lipsiae – Budapestini, 1936–1941. Decas III. Liber IV. 328–342.; Liber V. 1–15, 91–119, 143–153.; Liber VII. 193–224.; Liber X. 204–251.; Hungarian edition: *Antonio Bonfini: Magyar történelem tizedei*, trans. Kulcsár, Péter, ed. S. Varga, Katalin, Budapest, 1995. III. Tom. IV. 325–345.; Tom. V. 1–20, 90–120, 140–155., Tom. VII. 195–225.; Tom. X. 205–255.

²² Iványi, Béla, *Bártfa szabad királyi város levéltára 1319–1526*. Budapest, 1910.; Iványi, Béla: *Eperjes szabad királyi város levéltára 1245–1526*. Szeged, 1931.

²³ As it became known through the research of Tünde Veres, only fragments of the medieval material of the archives of the city of Sabinov were included in the Diplomatic Photo Collection, and no charter publication or registers were produced from them. Veres, Tünde, “Kisszeben szabad királyi város Chramer György bírászkodása idején (1446–1447)”, = *Történeti Tanulmányok* 26, 2018, 113–126. 114.

²⁴ And it would also be desirable to prepare a repertory of the diplomas already published.

²⁵ Tringli, Az újkor hajnala, 2003.

²⁶ Pálosfalvi, Tamás, “Ján Jiškra és a felvidéki városok”, In. Dangl, Vojtech – Varga, J. János (eds.), *Armáda, mesto, spoločnosť od 15. storočia do roku 1918. Vojenská, politická, hospodárske aspekty a súvislosti. Hadsereg, város, társadalom a 15. századtól 1918-ig. Katonai, politikai, gazdasági aspektusok és összefüggések*. Bratislava, 2002. 31–41.; Pálosfalvi, Tamás, “A Rozgonyiak és a polgárháború”, = *Századok* 137, 2003, 897–928.; Pálosfalvi, Tettes vagy áldozat, 2015.; Pálosfalvi, Tamás, “Koronázástól koronázásig:

and Dominik Tóth²⁷ have made a number of pioneering contributions in Hungarian regarding this period, while František Oslanský,²⁸ Martin Rady,²⁹ Jiří Jurok,³⁰ David Papajík,³¹ Daniela Dvořáková,³² and Michal Faist³³ have done likewise in Czech, Slovak or English.³⁴ I have also attempted to do so in my monograph on the career of János Perényi, and in my studies examining some of the conflicts of the “troubled times”.³⁵

In my opinion, it is better if the subject of the study is not a movement, an army or a party – and certainly not an ideology – but individuals. A better way to reconstruct the military history of the period is to compile a prosopographical data set built up from small fragments of information on the key figures. Such prosopographical descriptions are founded on archontology and itineraries.

A korona elrablása és hazatérése (1440–1464)”, In. Pálffy, Géza (ed.), *A Szent Korona hazatér: A magyar korona tizenegy külföldi útja (1205–1978)*. Budapest, 2018. 125–166.

²⁷ Tóth, Dominik, “A huszita típusú szekérvár gazdasági szempontú vizsgálata a 15. századi Magyar Királyságban”, = *Katonai Logisztika* 30, 2022, 244–267.; Turcsányi, Károly – Tóth, Dominik, “A huszita harci szekerek harci tulajdonságainak értelmezése, a szekérvár mobilitásának vizsgálata”, = *Katonai Logisztika* 31, 2023, 221–235.

²⁸ Oslanský, František, “Ján Jiškra z Brandýsa a Slovensko”, = *Historické štúdie* 36, 1995, 49–67.; Oslanský, František, “The Role of John Jiškra in the History of Slovakia”, = *Human Affairs* 6, 1996, 19–33.; Oslanský, František, “Portrét Jána Jiškru z Brandýsa”, In. *Husiti na Slovensku*, 79–88.

²⁹ Rady, Martyn, “Jiškra, Hussitism and Slovakia”, In. Doležalová, Eva – Pánek, Jaroslav (eds.), *Confession and nation in the era of reformations. Central Europe in comparative perspective*. Prague, 2010. 59–77.

³⁰ Jurok, Jiří, “Čeští Husité a Antihusité z Moravy v Polsku ve 14.-15. Století”, = *Średniowiecze Polskie i Powszechnie* 3, 2004, 209–229.; Jurok, Jiří, “Čeští Husitští a Katoličtí Kondotiéri z Moravy Na Slovensku v 15. Století (Období Husitství)”, = *Vojenská História. Časopis Pre Vojenskú Históriu, Múzejníctvo a Archívniectvo* 9:3, 2005, 3–25.; Jurok, Jiří, “Čeští Husitští a Katoličtí Kondotiéri z Moravy Na Slovensku v 15. Století (Období Bratříku)”, = *Vojenská História. Časopis Pre Vojenskú Históriu, Múzejníctvo a Archívniectvo* 9:4, 2005, 3–15.

³¹ Papajík, David, “Jan Čapek Ze Sán cseh nemes és szerepe a magyar koronaért folytatott harcban (1440–1443)”, = *Aetas* 28, 2013, 128–136.; Papajík, David, *Jan Čapek ze Sán: jezdec na konec světa: vojevůdce, kondotier a zbohatlík 15. století*. (Edice Osobnosti českých a moravských dějin, 10.). České Budějovice, 2011.

³² Dvořáková, Daniela, “Alžbeta Luxemburská, Žigmundova dcéra, v rokoh 1438–1442”, = *Historie – Otázky – Problémy* 3, 2011, 143–159.; Dvořáková, Daniela, *Pod vládou ženy. Rytier bez krále. I. část, (1437–1442) Pankrác zo Sv. Mikuláša a jeho doba*. Budmerice, 2021.

³³ Faist, Michal, “Jan Jiškra z Brandýsa: zachránce uherského trůnu Ladislava Pohrobka 1440–1445”, = *Historica – Sborník Prací Historických* 36, 2014, 13–38.; Faist, Michal, “Jan Jiškra z Brandýsa na vrcholu moci 1445–1451”, = *Historica – Sborník Prací Historických* 38, 2015, 43–67.

³⁴ See also: *Husiti a bratříci na Slovensku*. Ed. Žarnovský, Peter, Červený Kláštor–Kežmarok–Stará Lubovňa, 2016.

³⁵ Novák, Ádám, *A terebesi Perényi család története a 15. század közepéig*. Debrecen, 2020.; Novák, Ádám, “Hadi események és résztvevői a felső részeken 1440 és 1445 között – Azok a bizonyos ‘zavaros idők’”, In. Pósnán, László – Veszprémy, László (eds.), *Elfeledett háborúk. Középkori csaták és várostromok (6–16. század)*. Budapest, 2016. 310–330.

The necessity of this is perfectly illustrated by one – by no means singular – flaw in Pál Tóth-Szabó's paper, which is considered a fundamental work. In one place he writes that after the successful defence of Košice in 1441, Jan Jiškra marched with his troops towards Rožňava, despite the fact that the sources clearly point in the direction of Spiš, where the cities of Levoča and Kežmarok were taken by his mercenaries.³⁶ Although Tóth-Szabó refers to the Polish historian Długosz, the contemporary chronicler also puts the military action in Gemer to another year.³⁷ Without a clear record of the whereabouts of the greatest and best-documented mercenary, Jan Jiškra, it is difficult to estimate the number of his forces, the mercenaries accompanying him, as well as his objectives.

And Jan Jiškra is the person regarding whom we have the most sources of all. Even the contemporary Aeneas Sylvius Piccolomini wrote about him in his *De viris illustribus*³⁸ A number of charters about him have been preserved in the treasurer cities of the Upper Regions, and also in Austrian and Czech archives. It is therefore no wonder that several works have been published about his life recently.³⁹ We nevertheless know that many of the soldiers who first arrived with him, served him, and later became active on their own, played a decisive role in shaping the events. Among the most famous are Jan Talafús z Ostrova, Martin Valgatha, Petr Aksamit, Petr Komorovszky and Mikuláš Brcála z Dobré. Alongside them we find many soldiers and even financiers in the sources about whom little is known in our historiography. There is also a serious problem in navigating the literature, and the inexperienced reader is greatly misled by the inconsistent spelling of the names. István Tringli has already pointed out that the name of Jan Jiškra is referred to as “Giskra” in Hungarian historiography, mainly following the Latin model of Pál Tóth-Szabó, although the correct transcription of the name of the Moravian mercenary would be “Jiškra”.⁴⁰ The same phenomenon can be observed with regard to the names of most mercenaries. In my opinion, Hungarianising their names based on turn-of-the-century tradi-

³⁶ Tóth-Szabó, *A cseh huszita*, 1917. 192.

³⁷ Jana Długosza Ks. 11., 300.

³⁸ Its Latin and English edition: Cotta-Schönberg, Michael von, *De Viris Illustribus and other biographical writings of Enea Silvio Piccolomini (Pope Pius II)*. Ed. and trans. Cotta-Schönberg, Michael von. Generis, s. l. [Chişinău], 2021. Jan Jiškra: 513–521. (269–275).

³⁹ Kwiatkowski, Saturnin, *Jan Giskra z Brandysu: rys biograficzny z XV. wieku*. Lwów, 1886.; Vach, Miloslav, “Jan Jiškra z Brandýsa a Jeho Předkové”, = *Časopis Společnosti Přátel Starožitnosti* 57, 1949, 175–184.; Vach, Miloslav, “Jan Jiškra z Brandýsa a Politický Zápas Habsburků s Jagellovci o Uhry v Letech 1440–1442”, = *Historické Štúdie* 3, 1957, 172–227.; Jurok, Čeští Husitští, 2005B, 3–9.; Faist, Jan Jiškra z Brandýsa, 2014.; Faist, Jan Jiškra z Brandýsa, 2015, 43–67.; Oslanský, Ján Jiškra, 2015.; A modern adaptation of these works has not yet been made in Hungarian, and the 1903 work of Pál Tóth-Szabó is still often cited: Tóth-Szabó, Pál, “Giskra, Különös Tekintettel Abaujmegyére”, = *Értekezések a Történeti Tudományok Köréből*, 19, 1900–1903, 305–372.

⁴⁰ Tringli, *Az újkor hajnala*, 2003. 44.

tions is a harmful habit. Therefore, we need to develop a unified, comprehensive and consistent approach to naming.

The purpose of this paper, in addition to the problem outlined in the paragraphs above, is to sketch a literary overview, which is presented in the footnotes above. In addition, in the remaining two subsections of this paper, I will give two examples of what can be achieved by the research challenges outlined above. The first is the material for a thematic source study, which lists a specific type of charter, from which a wide range of public-, military-, economic historical and prosopographical data can be extracted. The so-called poly-sigillic charters that I have been researching are a very characteristic and valuable source type of the period. A number of charters and letters have survived documenting the activities of Jiškra and his associates, testifying to various pledges, peace terms and commitments. I was able to list 19 such documents that are in their original form. These are kept in the archives of Budapest, Sopron, Kremnica, Levoča, Košice, and Bardejov. I provide a brief list of their descriptions and publication data. In the second subsection, I will present the biography of a lesser-known mercenary general, Mikuláš Brcála z Dobré, and point out what the collection of data on a single individual can add to the overall picture.

Poly-sigillic charters

One of the values of the poly-sigillic charters, in addition to what they contain, is the mere fact that the actors mentioned were negotiating together at a given place and time. The quality and quantity of the cash flows recorded in these transactions may be an interesting addition. Alongside the negotiating and deal-making parties, guarantors have also appeared in most cases, which enables us to obtain more information about them. Many of these have been preserved in their original form and also bear a seal, which allows us to attach “faces” to the persons.⁴¹ In the list below I give the location and archival reference number of the original charters. I also refer to the medieval digital database of the Hungarian National Archives (*Collectio Diplomatica Hungarica*),⁴² where I give references to the Diplomatic Photo Collection (DF) or the Diplomatic Archives (DL). The photos and seals of the latter are also available in the online Hungaricana database.⁴³ All but one (Sopron Archives) of the dip-

⁴¹ It should be noted that many sources of this type survived not in the original form, but as transcriptions or copies. The collection and registration of these is no less an important area of research, although of course no seals survived on these. Two examples: 30 November 1444, Košice. Jan Jiškra and his companions conclude a peace treaty with the Polish envoys for two years. *Monumenta medii aevi historica res gestas Poloniae illustrantia. Pomniki dziejowe wieków srednich do objasnienia rzeczy polskich sluzace*. Tom. I–XIX. Cracoviae, 1874–1927. II. Pars altera, Nr. 2. 1–4.; 28 March 1450 Mezókövesd. János Hunyadi and the lords conclude a truce with Jiškra. DF 252 476. folio 8r-9v.

⁴² <https://adatbazisokonline.mnl.gov.hu/adatbazis/dldf> (Accessed on 31 August 2023)

⁴³ <https://archives.hungaricana.hu/hu/charters/> (Accessed on 31 August 2023)

lomatic documents recorded in the Diplomatic Photo Collection can be studied only on microfilm format, so I have registered and provided the record number of the photos of the diplomatic documents kept in Kremnica, Košice, Levoča, and Bardejov in the Monumenta Militaria Hungariae (MMH) database.⁴⁴ I also attempted to locate the in extenso publications of the charters, and when successful, I included the details of their publication, and in some cases provided additional literary references.

Around 3 July 1441 – *No place of issue.* László Cseh Lévai, the *ispán* (*comes*) of Bars county, and his companions, mentioned by name, make a deal with the captain of Zvolen and Kremnica, Haskó Schellendorf, to free Imre Simonyi. The left side of the Latin language charter, in the form of a patent, is slightly damaged, making it impossible to determine the date and place of issue, and several of the underpressed seals have also been lost permanently. The charter is authenticated with at least sixteen seals, most of which are worn away.⁴⁵

9 October 1441 – *Szécsény.* László Szécsényi, *ispán* of Nógrád and Hont and his named companions conclude a truce with Haskó Schellendorf, captain of Zvolen and Kremnica, and his companions until the day of St George (24 April 1442). A total of twelve seals, which are now heavily worn, were pressed in two rows under the text of the Latin-language patent.⁴⁶

17 September 1442 – *Hollókő.* The nobility of the counties of Nógrád and Hont, and their representatives, listed by name, conclude a truce with Jan Jiškra and his companions until the day of St George (24 April 1443). A total of five seals were pressed in two rows under the text of the Latin-language patent, which are now heavily worn.⁴⁷

25 August 1443 – *Camp under Spišská Nová Ves.* Simon Rozgonyi, bishop of Eger, and his companions give a letter of asylum to the judges of the city of Levoča. The charter is badly damaged and torn. Originally, at least nine seals were pressed in two rows under the text of the Latin-language patent.

⁴⁴ <https://monumenta.militaria-hungaria.hu/monumenta-web/> (Accessed on 31 August 2023)

⁴⁵ DL 13 633. Cited by: Tóth-Szabó, *A cseh-huszita*, 1917. 194.

⁴⁶ Štátny archív v Banskej Bystrici, pracovisko Archív Kremnica, Magistrát mesta Kremnice, Vol. I. Fons 26. Fasc. 1. Nr. 12A.; DF 249 795. Published by: Botka, Tivadar, *Bars vármegye hajdan és most. I. Regesták és okmányok. II. osztály. Latin okmányok.* Pest, 1868. 94–95.; Cited by: Szerémi – Ernyei, *A Majthényiak*, 1912. 404–405.; For a list of names see Novák, *Hadi események*, 2016. 321–322.; See also Becaniová, Kristína – Ezrová, Adriana – Malovcová, Božena, “Regesty listín Jána Jiskru z Brandýsa”, In. *Husiti na Slovensku*, 141–152. Nr. 9.; Images: MMH 30001–30014.

⁴⁷ Štátny archív v Banskej Bystrici, pracovisko Archív Kremnica, Magistrát mesta Kremnice, Tom. I. Fons 26. Fasc. 1. Nr. 14/15C.; DF 249 997. Published by: Tóth-Szabó, *A cseh-huszita*, 1917. 378–380. Cited by: Szerémi – Ernyei, *A Majthényiak*, 1912. 405–406.; For a list of names see Novák, *Hadi események*, 2016. 321–322.; See also Becaniová – Ezrová – Malovcová, *Regesty listín*, 2001. Nr. 11.; Images: MMH 30015–30017.

Traces of eight seals can be seen in the first row. The sealing order is specific in this case. From the red wax seal of Rozgonyi, the seals move outwards in a concentric circle according to the order of the *intitulatio*.⁴⁸

17 November 1444 – Košice. The agreement between Jan Jiškra, the ispán of Šariš, and the commissioners of the cities of the Upper Regions on reparations for the damage caused by the fighting. The charter was written in German, issued in a privileged form, with the seals of Jiškra and his mercenary commanders, as well as those of the city commissioners.⁴⁹

7 January 1445 – No place of issue. János Csaholyi and his fellow noblemen from Szabolcs County conclude a treaty to avert the threat from János Perényi and Jan Jiškra and elect János Lókös Kállai and Bereck Pazonyi as their representatives. Latin language charter in the form of a patent with five fragmentary seals in natural wax at the bottom.⁵⁰

8 July 1445 – Seňa. The captains of the Upper Regions, represented by Jan Jiškra, and a number of regional magnates, county and city delegates pass resolutions to restore order. All of the twenty-two seals pressed under the text of the Latin-language charter, issued in the form of a patent, are worn away.⁵¹

2 December 1445 – Zvolen. Jan Jiškra's letter of pledge to Jan Makovec z Senic regarding a debt of three horses and two hundred forints, which he promises to repay by Pentecost. There are four seals, two fragmentary and two intact, at the bottom of the document, which was issued in Czech and in a privileged form.⁵²

4 May 1449 – Kremnica. Jan Jiškra, captain of King Ladislaus V, makes peace with Pongrác Szentmiklósi on behalf of his companions and the cities allied to him. Originally there were five seals in a row at the bottom of the charter – today four are intact – which was issued in Czech, in a privileged form.⁵³

⁴⁸ Spišský archív v Levoči, Lőcse város levéltára, Lőcse város tanácsa: Oklevelek II.1. Nr. 1; DF 282 582. Cited by: Novák, Hadi események, 2016. 324.; Images: MMH 30018–30019.

⁴⁹ Archív mesta Košice, Supplementum Schramianum Nr. 19178.; DF 271 267. The diploma and its seals are to be published soon in a separate publication.; Images: MMH 30020–30027.

⁵⁰ DL 55 295.

⁵¹ Archív mesta Košice, Collectio Schwartzbachiana Nr. 235.; DF 270 275. Published by: Teleki, Hunyadiak kora, 1853. 164–169.; Images: MMH 30028–30029.

⁵² Štátny archív v Banskej Bystrici, pracovisko Archív Kremnica, Magistrát mesta Kremnice, Tom. I. Fons 37. Fasc. 1. Nr. 8.; DF 250 168. Published by: Chaloupecký, Středověké Listy, 1937. 23–24. Cited by: Tóth-Szabó, A cseh-huszita, 1917. 216–217.; See also Becaniová – Ezrová – Malovcová, Regesty listín, 2001. Nr. 14.; Images: MMH 30030–30034.

⁵³ Štátny archív v Banskej Bystrici, pracovisko Archív Kremnica, Magistrát mesta Kremnice, Tom. I. Fons 26. Fasc. 1. Nr. 15C.; DF 250 001. Published by: Chaloupecký, Středověké Listy, 1937. 32–34.; Cited by: Szerémi – Ernyei, A Majthényiak, 1912. 419–

28 March 1450 – *Mezőkövesd*. János Hunyadi and the lords order Nógrád County to collect the extraordinary tax. Nine seals were originally pressed under the text of the document, which was written in Latin and in the form of a patent, but all of them are now completely worn away.⁵⁴

31 March 1450 – *Košice*. Jan Jiškra, captain of King Ladislaus V, confirms the peace treaty with the lords. Four seals were affixed to the bottom of the document, which was written in Latin and in a privileged form, the first of which was torn off, and the others are severely damaged and broken.⁵⁵

5 October 1450 – *Košice*. Jan Jiškra, captain of King Ladislaus V., and Pál Modrár conclude a pledge agreement for the estates of Velká Ida, Szikszó and Abaujvár. At the bottom of the document, issued in Latin in privileged form, there were once eleven seals hanging from addressed parchment strips, today five of these can be analysed in smaller or larger details.⁵⁶

20 September 1451 – *near Szentlőrinc*. The lords call on the city council of Bardejov not to cooperate with Jiškra. There were once five seals impressed on closure of the Latin missilis, but all of them are now worn away.⁵⁷

27 September 1451 – *Buda*. Letter from the lords of the country to the councils of the cities of Košice, Levoča, Bardejov and Prešov, informing them of Jiškra's movements and asking them not to cooperate with him. Eight seals were pressed in two rows on the closure of the Latin missilis, which are heavily worn and damaged.⁵⁸

27 October 1451 – *Krupina*. The lords of the country elevate Jodok of Kassó, ancestor of the Justh family of Nepaly, to the peerage of the country. Four seals were affixed to the bottom of the charter, which was issued in Latin in a privileged form.⁵⁹

24 August 1452 – *Kremnica*. János Hunyadi and his fellow vow-takers conclude a peace treaty with Jiškra. Originally, there were seven seals at the

420.; See also Becaniová – Ezrová – Malovcová, *Regesty listín*, 2001. Nr. 19.; Images: MMH 30035–30041.

⁵⁴ DL 73 005. Published by: Jászay, Pál, “Hunyadi János kormányzó levele Nógrád vármegyéhez”, = *Tudománytár* 10, 1841, 128–129.; Hungarian translation: Schneider, Miklós, *Nógrádi évszázadok. Olvasókönyv a megye történetéhez*. Salgótarján, 1976. 18–19.

⁵⁵ Archív mesta Košice, *Collectio Schwartzbachiana* Nr. 294.; DF 270 290. Published by: Teleki, Hunyadiak kora, 1853. 256–258.; Images: MMH 30042–30046.

⁵⁶ DL 14 405.

⁵⁷ Štátny archív v Prešove, pracovisko Archív Bardejov, Bártfa szabad királyi város levéltára Nr. 661.; DF 213 347. Published by: Tóth-Szabó, *A cseh-huszita*, 1917. 394–395.; Images: MMH 30047–30048.

⁵⁸ Štátny archív v Prešove, pracovisko Archív Bardejov, Bártfa szabad királyi város levéltára Nr. 662. DF 213 348. Published by: Tóth-Szabó, *A cseh-huszita*, 1917. 395–396.; Images: MMH 30049–30051.

⁵⁹ DL 63 157. Published by: Borsa, Iván, *A Justh család levéltára 1274–1525*. (Magyar Országos Levéltár kiadványai, II. Forráskiadványok 20.). Budapest, 1991. 152.

bottom of the document, which was issued in Latin in a privileged form, but today only two remain intact.⁶⁰

6 December 1452 – *Kremnica*. Peter Jung, debtor, citizen of Kremnica, and Pál Korlow, guarantor, oblige themselves and their heirs to pay their debt of 30 marks of fine silver to Jodok Kassó, captain of Víglaš, by the day of St. George (24 April 1453). The German-language patent was authenticated with three seals below the text, all of which are still intact.⁶¹

22 November 1454 – *Trebišov*. The orders of the Upper Regions levy an extraordinary war tax of a quarter forint per parcel to protect the region, and elect Osvát Rozgonyi as captain. Eight seals were pressed in a single row under the Latin-language patent, all of which have now worn away.⁶²

22 June 1455 – *Zvolen*. In exchange for his debts, Jan Jiškra, ispán of Šariš, gives Jan Stanz the income from the Sopron thirtieth. Three seals were once affixed to the bottom of the German-language charter written in a privileged form, two of which are still intact, including the seal of Herman von Zwierzetiz, who appears several times beside Jiškra.⁶³

15 July 1456 – *Zemplín*. The treaty of the lords of the upper regions with Košice and Jan Talafús z Ostrova. Seven seals were pressed in a single row under the text of the Latin-language patent, most of which are still intact.⁶⁴

Deputy to Jiškra, captain of Kežmarok: Mikuláš Brcál z Dobré

In the sources and in the literature, a person often appears who presumably arrived with Jiškra in 1440 to the Upper Regions and acted as a leading mercenary commander, especially in the region of Spiš. Jan Długoss referred to him as Berczal when describing the Battle of Lučenec.⁶⁵ Wagner already pointed out that the Polish chronicler mentions a false first name, in his list he was listed as Nicolaus V Berchal de Dobra.⁶⁶ József Teleki translated the name in

⁶⁰ Štátny archív v Banskej Bystrici, pracovisko Archív Banská Štiavnica, Selmečbánya város levéltára: Selmečbánya város tanácsa: Az Országos Levéltár által visszaadott oklevelek és iratok, Fasc. 2. Nr. 959.; DF 235 587. Published by: Szitnyai, József, “A körmöczbányai békekötés 1452-ben”, = *Magyar Történelmi Tár* 32, 1884, 594–612.; The copy issued by the Hunyadi survived in its original form, and Jiškra’s version survived as a copy, which was also published by Szitnyai.; Images MMH 30052–30054.

⁶¹ DL 63 160. Published by: Borsa, A Justh család, 1991. 155.

⁶² DL 31 664. Published by: Ipolyi, Arnold – Nagy, Imre – Véghegy, Dezső, *Hazai okmánytár. Codex diplomaticus patrius VII*. Budapest, 1880. 470–475.

⁶³ Magyar Nemzeti Levéltár Győr-Moson-Sopron Vármegye Soproni Levéltára, Sopron város (Diplomatarium) Nr. 1393.; DF 203 028. Published by: Házi, Jenő, *Sopron szabad királyi város története. I. rész, 4. kötet, Oklevelek és levelek 1453-tól 1459-ig*. Sopron, 1925. 72–73.

⁶⁴ Archív mesta Košice, Collectio Schwartzbachiana Nr. 279.; DF 270 319. Published by: Teleki, Hunyadiak kora, 1853. 528–529.; Images: MMH 30055–30063.

⁶⁵ In the Latin original, in the recent Polish edition Jana Długosza Ks. 12., 136.

⁶⁶ Wagner, *Analecta Scepusii, Pars III*, 1778. 217.

the Latin source as Miklós Dobrai Barczal.⁶⁷ Pál Tóth-Szabó gives the name as Miklós Dobrai Bertsal,⁶⁸ and later as Miklós Dobrai Brcsal.⁶⁹ In Czech and Slovak literature the name is found as Brcál,⁷⁰ and Brcal.⁷¹ Following Jiří Jurok, I prefer to give the name as Mikuláš Brcál z Dobré,⁷² and in the following I will give a prosopographical description.

Brcál,⁷³ who was of Silesian origin, first appeared in the sources in 1440, when, according to the account book of the city of Košice, several payments were made to the mercenary commander (*hauptmann*), sometimes in connection with the castle of Šariš, other times in connection with Rožňava, then in connection with Kežmarok.⁷⁴ Brcál was Jiškra's guarantor on 17 November 1444, when he negotiated the amount of the pledge with his creditors in Košice.⁷⁵ Presumably, one of the seals could be associated with him. Although the circumscription of the circular seal, approximately 25 mm in diameter, is uncertain, but the circular seal field shows a shield with a multi-spoked wagon wheel. In this agreement, he is only listed as a guarantor and without an office. A week later, however, during the negotiations with the Polish and Hungarian lords, he was already the captain of Kežmarok.⁷⁶ Kežmarok, an important city within Spiš, was acquired by Jiškra from Miklós Perényi in October 1441. This allowed him to control the two most important cities in Spiš in addition to Levoča. In 1443, the mercenaries took control of the castles of Richnava and Spiš, bringing the whole of Spiš under the influence of Jiškra, and from the end of 1444 under the authority of Brcál.

In 1445, Brcál negotiated at Seňa on behalf of Jiškra, the newly elected captain-general, acting quasi as the deputy to the captain.⁷⁷ Scattered records from 1445 and 1447 show that he was in Spiš.⁷⁸ He joined Jiškra in 1449, when he concluded the peace treaty with Pongrác Szentmiklósi.⁷⁹ On 5 Oc-

⁶⁷ Teleki, *Hunyadiak kora*, 1853. 169.

⁶⁸ Tóth-Szabó, *Giskra*, 1903. 312, 334, 342.

⁶⁹ Tóth-Szabó, *A cseh huszita*, 1917. 183, 205, 214, 234, 239, 249, 316, 326.

⁷⁰ Chaloupecký, *Středověké*, 1937. 45, 54, 55.

⁷¹ Špirko, *Husiti, jiskrovci*, 1937. 43, 52, 59, 60, 62.

⁷² Jurok, *Čeští Husitští*, 2005B. 12.

⁷³ Jurok, *Čeští Husitští*, 2005B. 12.

⁷⁴ Kemény, Lajos, *Kassa város régi számadáskönyvei 1431–1533*. Kassa, 1892. 23.: "Nicclao/Nicclos/Nicclas Berzal".

⁷⁵ See above the already mentioned poly-sigillic charter dated 17 November 1444. His seal is in the appendix (Nr. 1.). See also Kemény, *Kassa város*, 1982. 27.

⁷⁶ *Monumenta mediaevi historica res gestas Poloniae illustrantia. Pomniki dziejowe wieków srednich do objasnienia rzeczy polskich sluzace*, Tom. I–XIX. Cracoviae, 1874–1927. II. Pars altera, Nr. 2. 1–4.

⁷⁷ See above the already mentioned poly-sigillic charter dated 8 July 1445. Unfortunately, his seal was also lost along with the others.

⁷⁸ 9 October 1445, Kežmarok. DF 213 121. Published by: Iványi, *Bártfa*, 1910. 431.; 6 December 1447, Spišský hrad. DF 250 019.

⁷⁹ See above the already mentioned poly-sigillic charter of 4 May 1449. Unfortunately his seal is lost.

tober 1450, he was already writing his letters as captain of Spiš.⁸⁰ In 1451 János Hunyadi again marched with an army against Jiškra.⁸¹ Jiškra asked Brcál for help, but he did not stand by Jiškra.⁸² Even so, Jiškra was victorious at the Battle of Lučenec on 7 September 1451.⁸³ It seems that from this point on Brcál acted independently of Jiškra, and continued to sign his letters as captain of Spiš, his last such letter dates from September 1453.⁸⁴ After that the name Brcál does not appear in the sources for a long time. In 1460, however, Martin Brcál, together with Bartošem z Hertvíkovic, dated several letters as captains of Kežmarok.⁸⁵ The two persons are often mentioned as one in the literature, although I am convinced that they are two separate persons. According to Chaloupecký, Martin could have been the brother of Mikuláš, while Jurok thinks the two are the same. In my opinion, the former is more likely to be right. If we examine the seals of the two captains' charters issued on 8 June 1460, we can see that they also show the same coat of arms (a wagon wheel with spokes in a shield), but in a quatrefoil seal field as a complete coat of arms (escutcheon, helmet, crest, mantling), with a circumscription on both sides of the seal field.⁸⁶ I believe that we are not dealing with a change of seal, but with the seal of another person. This is confirmed by the consistent use of the names; up to 1453 Mikuláš was always referred to as "Nicolaus", while Martin's name was always used the same way.⁸⁷

Therefore, we can observe that the Silesian mercenary Mikuláš Brcál z Dobré arrived in the Upper Regions in the company of Jiškra, rose steadily in the ranks until he disappeared from the sources as the captain of Spiš after 1453, and transferred the captaincy of Kežmarok to his relative Martin, who later served King Matthias.⁸⁸

Summary

In my paper, I endeavoured to point out that the military and event history of the Upper Regions is not as well researched as it might seem at first glance. A comprehensive, modern synthesis of the history of events has not been made, there is no chronological aid, no charter repository, neither is there a charter

⁸⁰ DF 213 309. Published by: Chaloupecký, *Středověké Listy*, 1937. 55.

⁸¹ Tóth-Szabó, *A cseh-huszita*, 1917. 249–253.

⁸² Chaloupecký, *Středověké Listy*, 1937. 54–55.

⁸³ Drenko, Jozef, "Kláštor a bitka pri Lučenci r. 1451", In: *Husiti na Slovensku*, 89–101.; Klinda, Jozef, *Jan Jiskra z Brandýsa a Bitka pri Lučenci*. Lučenec, 2018.

⁸⁴ DL 14 576.; DF 271 388–89.; DF 271 402.

⁸⁵ Chaloupecký, *Středověké Listy*, 1937. 45–46.; Iványi, Bártfa, 1910. 619–620.; DF 281 747.

⁸⁶ Štátny archív v Prešove – pracovisko Archív Poprad, Késmárk város levéltára, Késmárk város tanácsa, Pergamen oklevelek Nr. 57.; DF 281 747. See it in the appendix. Nr. 2. belong to Bartošem z Hertvíkovic, Nr. 3. belong to Mikuláš Brcál z Dobré.

⁸⁷ For Mikuláš, see the references above. For Martin see: Tóth-Szabó, *A cseh-huszita*, 1917. 439–440.; Furthermore, Martin's wife Katalin made a will in 1495: DL 62 619.

⁸⁸ Tóth-Szabó, *A cseh-huszita*, 1917. 323.; Iványi, Bártfa, 1910. 1217.; DF 213 909.

archive. In order to learn more about the mercenaries and military events that took place in the Upper Regions in the 1440s–50s, it is first necessary to compile these aids. In this study, I listed the relevant poly-sigillic charters, and made available the photos of those not found in the Hungaricana online system in the database run by our Research Group, making them available to anyone for research. In the future, I intend to continue the fundamental research along these lines, and compile a prosopographical description of most mercenary captains in Hungarian and English. I also set myself the goal of compiling a comprehensive chronology of the events between 1440 and 1462, centred on the military history of the Upper Regions.

Appendix



Nr. 1. Seal of Mikuláš Brcál z Dobré form 1444.



Nr. 2. Seal of Bartošem z Hertvíkovic from 1460.



Nr. 3. Seal of Martin Brcál z Dobré form 1460.



Saul António Gomes

THE IDEA OF CRUSADE IN PORTUGAL THROUGH THE FIFTEENTH CENTURY

1 - It was a privilege to be able to speak at the University of Debrecen, in a country that shares with mine, Portugal, and with the city I come from, Coimbra, some important historical events: Renaissance writers wrote that it was Clarimundo, an alleged former Emperor of Hungary, the ancestral ancestor of the kings of Portugal;¹ one of the most beautiful devotions of the Portuguese religious imagination concerns the miracle of the roses of Queen Saint Isabel of Portugal, inspired by that of her great-aunt, Isabel of Hungary;² Pedro, Duke of Coimbra, received, in 1418, from Sigismund, the March of Treviso and, between 1425 and 1428, he was in the court of Sigismund, fighting the Turks;³ in 1451, Leonor, sister of King Afonso V, married Emperor Frederick III in Rome...⁴

The genesis of Portugal's history is linked to the historical process of the so-called Christian reconquest (*Reconquista*) of the territories seized by Muslims, in the Iberian Peninsula, after the eighth century. It was the idea of reconquering territories that had already been Christian that motivated and legitimised the crusade war carried out in Hispania since the High Middle Ages. The first king of Portugal, after solving problems that implied his succession, settled in the city of Coimbra, around 1130. It was from here that he would set off to conquer Lisbon, in 1147, with the support of the local bishops and the emerging military orders – namely the Knights Templar, the Hospitallers and the Hispanic orders of Santiago and Calatrava/Avis – together with part of

¹ Paixão, Rosário, “Chronica do Emperador Clarimundo, Donde os Reys de Portugal descendem (1522): Factos e Fantasia na construção de uma identidade”, In: Barreira, C. F. (ed.), *Luz, cor e ouro: Estudos sobre manuscritos iluminados*. Lisboa, 2016. 293–306.

² Toipa, Helena Costa, *Rainha Santa Isabel. Fontes para o seu Estudo*. Coimbra, 2020.

³ Tovar, Conde de, *Portugal e Veneza na Idade Média (até 1495)*. Coimbra, 1933.; Rogers, Francis M., *The Travels of the Infante Dom Pedro of Portugal*. Cambridge, MA, 1961.; Marques, A. H. de Oliveira, *Nova História de Portugal*. Vol. IV. Portugal na crise dos séculos XIV e XV. Dir. Serrão, Joel – Marques, A. H. de Oliveira, Lisboa, 1987. 322, 545–546.; Moreno, Humberto Baquero, “O Infante D. Pedro, da Regência a Alfarrobeira”, In: Moreno, Humberto Baquero, *O Infante D. Pedro, Duque de Coimbra: itinerários e ensaios históricos*. Porto, 1997. 11–23.

⁴ Cordeiro, Luciano, *Portugueses fora de Portugal. Uma sobrinha do Infante, Imperatriz da Alemanha e Rainha da Hungria*. Lisboa, 1894.; Coelho, Maria Helena da Cruz, “A política matrimonial da dinastia de Avis: Leonor e Frederico III da Alemanha”, = *Revista Portuguesa de História* 36:1, 2002–2003, 41–70.; Costa, António Martins, “O casamento de Leonor e Frederico III (1451–1452) e as relações entre Portugal e o Sacro Império nos finais da Idade Média”, = *Medievalista online* 24, 2018. URL: <http://journals.openedition.org/medievalista/1703>; DOI: <https://doi.org/10.4000/medievalista.1703> (Accessed on 3 January 2024)

the nobility of Entre Douro e Minho (northern Portugal), the urban cavalry of the medieval towns and villages and many knights and mercenaries. Also, we cannot overlook the contribution given by the great crusades that sought the Holy Land. His successors, always with the support of the Western crusaders, would conquer Silves, in 1189, Alcácer do Sal, in 1217 and finally, in 1249, – especially with the decisive intervention of the knights of Santiago – the kingdom of Algarve.⁵

Although Afonso Henriques, the first King of Portugal, liked to call himself “grandson of the great Emperor Alfonso from Hispaniarum”, that is, of Alfonso VI of León, recognizing the same imperial title to his cousin, Alfonso VII, the truth is that the Portuguese kings, like the other Christian kings of the medieval Iberian Peninsula, will not recognise themselves as vassals of the Emperor of the Romans. However, they would soon become “milites Sancti Petri”, that is, knights obedient to the popes, and to the vicars of Christ they would remain faithful and obedient in later centuries.⁶ In the creation of the Kingdom of Portugal, the ideals of the medieval Western Crusade effectively prevailed, as well as the legal frameworks on just war (“quod bellum sit justum”) set out in Cause 23 of Gratian’s Decree.⁷

The cross was the first symbol of the arms and flag of the kings of Portugal and the kingdom as well, since, in this case, the arms of the kingdom were those of the royal family. The cross, symbol of the struggle for the expansion of the Christian Faith and affirmation of the legitimacy of the war of reconquest, will remain at the heart of the flag of the Portuguese nation until today, surviving the various changes that the new political regimes, namely the Republic, in 1910, brought about.⁸

Portugal is a country surrounded by an Atlantic coast and a land border with Spain and the country’s capital, Lisbon, was in the Middle Ages mainly a commercial port city. The castle was built later, perhaps at the initiative of King Sancho I (1185–1211).⁹ Corsairs and pirates infested the Portuguese maritime

⁵ Mattoso, José, *Identificação de um País. Ensaio sobre as origens de Portugal. 1096–1325*. Vol. I. – Oposição, Vol. II. – Composição. Lisboa, 1985.; Sousa, Bernardo Vasconcelos e, “Idade Média (Séculos XI–XV)”, In. Ramos, Rui – Vasconcelos e Sousa, Bernardo – Gonçalo Monteiro, Nuno (eds.), *História de Portugal*. Lisboa, 2009. 17–196.; Oliveira, António Resende – Monteiro, João Gouveia, *Portugal Medieval. Do Condado ao Império (1096–1495)*. Lisboa, 2023. 30 and following.

⁶ Almeida, Fortunato de, *História da Igreja em Portugal*. Nova edição preparada por Damião Peres. Vol. I., Porto, 1967. 83–87.; Erdmann, Carl, *O Papado e Portugal no primeiro século da história portuguesa*. Coimbra, 1935.

⁷ *Corpus Iuris Canonici*. Vol. II. Decretum Gratiani. II pars, causa XXIII. Ed. Friedberg, Aemilius, Lipsiae, 1922. col. 889 and following.; Erdmann, Carl, *A Ideia de Cruzada em Portugal*. Coimbra, 1940.; Costa, António Domingues Sousa, “O factor religioso, razão jurídica dos descobrimentos portugueses”, In. *Actas. Congresso Internacional de Historia dos Descobrimentos*. Vol. IV., Lisboa, 1961. 99–138. 107–108.

⁸ Seixas, Miguel Metelo de, *Quinas Castelos. Sinais de Portugal*. Lisboa, 2019.

⁹ Silva, Manuel Fialho, *Mutação Urbana na Lisboa Medieval: das Taijas a D. Dinis*. Lisboa, 2022.

coast for many centuries. In 1319 the Portuguese king hired Manuel Pessanha, a Genoese and privateer, to organise the country's royal naval fleet.¹⁰ In the fifteenth century, lords such as the *Infantes* Pedro and Henrique, of which we will speak today, brought privateers to work for them, about whom we know little, although it must be recognised that in large part, they must have been foreigners and “mercenaries”.¹¹

Portuguese historiography has long discussed the reasons why, in 1415, the King of Portugal decided to conquer Ceuta. It is a debate still in fashion today. A significant part of historians consider the conquest of this Moroccan stronghold to be the beginning of the Portuguese Atlantic maritime expansion; others, however, contest this view, arguing that Ceuta prolongs the spirit of the reconquest and crusade in the Hispanic manner that characterised the composition of the kingdom of Portugal and the Algarves, which ended, as has been said, in 1249. However, we should point out that Ceuta was a conquest and not a reconquest, which clearly differentiates it in relation to the entire Portuguese historical process prior to this date. It's an open debate.¹²

2 - In 1401, Manuel II Palaeologus, while in Paris, sent a gift to João I, King of Portugal and the Algarve. This gift, a set of sacred relics supposedly of Jesus Christ, such as fragments of his robes and his crown of thorns, among others from the apostles, was accompanied by a letter of greeting to the Portuguese monarch. It was a gesture that affirmed the communion of the two sovereigns in the same Christian Faith, but it also had a clear political connotation, as it resulted in an appeal, by the Byzantine Emperor, to the involvement of the Portuguese Crown in the defence of the Christian borders of the Byzantine Empire, against Ottoman threats and military advances.¹³

King João I did not respond with any financial or military support, in addition to the due response that the courtesy and diplomacy of the time justified to the contact of Emperor Emanuel II. The problem of Muslim expansion in Eastern Europe, however, was not ignored by the royal court and other political, secular, and ecclesiastical elites in the Kingdom of Portugal and the Algarve. In the immediate years, two sons of the monarch, *Infante* Afonso, between 1406 and 1411, and *Infante* Pedro, between 1425 and 1428, made long journeys that took them to Hungary and perhaps Poland, having visited emperor Sigismund's court and, alongside him, fought against the Turks. It is possible that on their

¹⁰ Vairo, Giulia Rossi, “O genovês Micer Manuel Pessanha, Almirante d'El-Rei D. Dinis”, = *Medievalista online* 13, 2013. URL: <http://journals.openedition.org/medievalista/577>; DOI: <https://doi.org/10.4000/medievalista.577>. (Accessed on 3 January 2024)

¹¹ Marques, Nova História de Portugal, 1987. Vol. IV., 358–364, 542–543.

¹² Synthetic views and updated historiographical assessments on this issue can be read at *As Décadas de Ceuta (1385–1460)*. Eds. Coelho, M. H. da Cruz – Homem, A. Luís de Carvalho, Lisboa, 2018.

¹³ The donation of the relics to the Portuguese king is mentioned in the work of de Sousa, Frei Luís, *História de S. Domingos*. Introduction and review by Almeida, Lopes de. Vol. I., Porto, 1977. part 1, cap. XVII. 645–648.

return to Portugal, they also visited some places in the Holy Land. Of the good relations with the German-Roman Empire and with the Kingdom of Hungary, the donation, by Sigismund, to Infante Pedro, in 1418, of the March of Treviso, which requires recognizing that at that time, there were contacts between the Portuguese Crown and Emperor Sigismund, perhaps with the aim of attracting the Portuguese to the cause of Christianity against the Ottomans.¹⁴

The Portuguese Crown integrated, in a general way and depending on the conjunctures that were taking shape, the framework of the political and military responses of the other European monarchies against the Turkish advances, in the East, and in the Muslim Mediterranean. It did not, however, follow the model of military conquest and the affirmation of commercial interests in the Mediterranean, led, for example, by Afonso V, the Magnanimous, of Aragon – maternal uncle, if not a model ruler, of the Portuguese king as well called Afonso V – because Portugal will focus rather on the conquests of fortified towns in Morocco, in the western Maghreb, already in the Atlantic, whose port head was Ceuta, a city submitted to the lordship of King João I in the year 1415. And unlike Afonso V of Aragon, who between 1424 and 1432, would bet on assaults and looting against Tunis and Djerba, without settling in these strongholds, preferring Sicily and Naples over them, the Portuguese Crown preferred the conquest of walled towns, such as the aforementioned Ceuta, but also Ksar es-Seghir, Asilah and Tangier and, after 1471, a negotiating policy of establishing protectorates, trading posts and building permits for fortresses, with the intention of keeping these territories subject to their sovereignty.¹⁵

It should be noted, in passing, that there seems to have been greater convergence and proximity of interests and activities between Portugal and Aragon, in terms of the “crusade”, than between Portugal and Castile – in fact, these kingdoms were repeatedly divergent, competing and conflicting, throughout the fifteenth century, an issue that would culminate in the Luso-Castilian War of 1476–1479 –, whose problems of neighbourhood and independence resulted in a peace treaty that was intended to be definitive, in 1422, but found a reason for constant belligerence between the two Crowns in the dispute regarding the possession of the Canary Islands. The Canaries, however, were not the only issue of constant diplomatic conflict, and cyclically armed as well, that opposed Portugal to Castile: the dispute for the monopoly of Atlantic navigations and trade to the south of that archipelago, weighed significantly in this historical and geostrategic framework, leading Portugal to take possession of the islands of Madeira and Porto Santo, in 1419–1420, a few years after the conquest of Ceuta, and, a few years later, of the Azores Islands.¹⁶

¹⁴ Marques, *Nova História de Portugal*, 1987. Vol. IV., 322, 545–546.

¹⁵ Marques, *Nova História de Portugal*, 1987. Vol. IV., 530 and following.

¹⁶ The scientific relevance of the article by Luís Albuquerque, “Canárias, Ilhas das”, in Serrão, Joel (ed.), *Dicionário de História de Portugal*. Vol. I., Lisboa, 1979. 454–455.; See also Marques, A. H. de Oliveira, “A expansão quatrocentista”, in Serrão, Joel – Marques, A. H. de Oliveira (eds.), *Nova história da expansão portuguesa*. Vol. II., Lisboa, 1998. 34–51. et passim.

On the 1st of June 1416, a Monday, the envoys of the most serene king of Portugal and the Algarve, two knights, Fernando de Castro and Álvaro Gonçalves de Ataíde, and two other officials, Gil Martins and Vasco Peres, both of them lawyers (*Doutores em Leis*), arrived at the council of Constance. They were also accompanied by Master António Martins, the king's secretary, all of whom headed the Portuguese entourage made up of about 40 knights. On the following Friday, June 5th, Gil Martins, going up to the ambo, greeted the councillors and the King's secretary, António or Antão Martins (most likely the future Bishop of Porto and later Cardinal D. Antão Martins de Chaves), published the proxies or mandates documenting them as ambassadors.¹⁷

The summons to the Council (1414–1418) had also been sent to King João I, by Antipope John XXIII, a pope considered legitimate in Portugal and with the approval of most prelates of the kingdom, having been previously designated as ambassadors Fernando (III) da Guerra, the king's nephew, bishop of Algarve and later archbishop of Braga, and the Cardinal of Lisbon, João Afonso da Azambuja, elevated to the cardinal title by John XXIII.¹⁸

The two major objectives of the Council of Constance were, as is well known, the question of the union of the Church and the condemnation of the Hussite heresies and the doctrine of John Wicliff. But it also constituted a testing ground, in which the Byzantine Emperor, Emanuel II, and the “always augustus rex Romanorum”, Sigismund, strongly committed themselves to find a unity of Christianity that would allow facing the Ottoman advances.¹⁹ The recent conquest of the Saracens of Ceuta, carried out in August 1415, highly valued and applauded by the council members, introduced a note of optimism in the face of the concerns regarding the Turks.

It should be noted that the presence of the kingdoms of Hispania, in this Council, was the target of the attention and diligent diplomatic action of Sigismund. Some hesitations and even an apparent lack of interest in the Council, however, seems to have been on the part of the Portuguese king, who preferred to give priority to the organization of the fleet that would conquer the city of Ceuta.

¹⁷ Costa, António Domingues de Sousa, *O Infante D. Henrique na expansão portuguesa. (Do início do reinado de D. Duarte até à morte do Infante Santo)*, [Separata] *Itinerarium* 5, 1959, 7–14.; Costa, António Domingues de Sousa, *Monumenta Portugaliae Vaticana. III-1. A Península Ibérica e o Cisma do Ocidente. Repercussão do Cisma na Nacionalidade Portuguesa do século XIV e XV. (Introdução aos vol. III/2 e IV de Súplicas do pontificado de Martinho V)*. Braga–Porto, 1982. 689–874.; Costa, António Domingues de Sousa, “Canonistarum doctrina de Judeis et Saracenis tempore Concilii Constantiensis”, = *Antonianum* 40, 1965. fasc. 1. 3–70.

¹⁸ Almeida, *História da Igreja*, 1967. Vol. I., 292–297, 467–468, 485, 499.; Fontes, João Luís Inglês, “João Afonso Esteves de Azambuja (1402–1415)”, In. Fontes, João Luís Inglês (ed.), *Bispos e Arcebispos de Lisboa*. Lisboa, 2018. 471–484.

¹⁹ *Conciliorum Oecumenicorum Decreta*. Ed. Alberigo, Giuseppe et al., Bologna, 2002. 403–404.

“Sed ad classem et armatam, quam ob nostri redemptoris et eius ecclesie obsequium sui que gloriosi nominis amplificacionem parare inceperat, summis studiis attendere curavit. Cum qua, ut altissimo placuit, civitatem Cepta nuncupatam, ad cuius portum applicuit, feliciter debellavit, adeo quod dampnati Macumeti nomine ad ea eiecto et exstirpato Christus hodie in ea colitur et adoratur, quod universal ecclesie totique populo christiano ad ingens gaudium et leticiam merito cedere debet, quoniam per eandem civitatem mari terraque potem, que portus et clavis est tocius Africe, omnipotens suis christicolis aperuit viam, ut per eam ad animarum suarum salutem gradients against eosdem Saracens bene valeant operari.”²⁰

The Council praised the achievement of the Portuguese king (“Magnificus et largus et quod est super omnia gloriosum, christiane fidei propugnator ferventissimus et invictus. Pro qua etiam fide propria sponte mari et committens et Maurorum terra ingressus urbem eorum amplissimam expugnavit egitque, ut, ubi impurus adorabatur Machometus, ibi redentor noster glorificetur Christus. Beate itaque universa regni Portugalensis terra, cuius rex hic idem ipse rex nobilis est.”), by the mouth of Francisco Zabarella, Cardinal Deacon of *Santi Cosma e Damiano*, in Rome.²¹

Two documents relevant to the question that brings us here are linked to the Council of Constance.

The first is a missing document, but cited by Gomes Eanes de Zurara, author of the so-called *Crónica da Tomada de Ceuta*. He says that before the capture of Ceuta, the Franciscan Friar João de Xira, who was with the fleet, published the crusade bull that had been granted by John XXIII, today considered antipope, but at that time considered by the Portuguese as legitimate. Days before, Friar João de Xira had already preached before the king and the army, appealing to the surrender of the combatants to the Christian cause against the infidels. After reading the bull of indulgences and forgiveness of sins to those who fought or died in battle, granted at the request of the king, the Franciscan friar would make a comment, on his own initiative, by which the death of the enemy of the Faith was justified:

“Friends, you must bear in mind that the life of these infidels is not among us by virtue of their own strength, only by the will of the Lord God, who is pleased to give them a place so they give us toil and hardships, so that we, afflicted and toiled by the power of so vile enemies, may know the many errors that we have committed against Him, and let us turn to Him out of true penance. And we, thus returned to the true path, may receive effort, and help from Him to destroy them. Up to this point they were borne by His great piety, not without prodigious hidden judgment. (...)”²²

²⁰ *Acta Concilii Constanciensis*. Ed. Hollnsteiner, Johannes – Finke, Heinrich. Vol. II., Münster, 1923. 301.

²¹ *Acta Concilii Constanciensis*, 1923. 302–303.

²² Zurara, Gomes Eanes de, *Crónica da Conquista de Ceuta*. Ed. Esteves Pereira, Francisco Maria, Lisboa, 1915. cap. 53. 161–162.

The conquest was God's service and the "memory of it would last forever among men", showing that "the memory of this will last and will be put in writings, whose treasury will be carried to many parts in remembrance of your good deeds."²³ The Franciscan friar João de Xira, as can be seen, gave expression to some of the rituals typical of the catechetical and spiritual components of the crusade, generally consisting of religious ceremonials of prayer, devotion to relics, imposition of the cross, procession, preaching around the legitimacy of the war to extirpate the infidel and publication of indulgent concessions that favoured Christian combatants.

The second document that is important to consider is the so-called Book of Heralds (*Livro de Arautos*), composed on the occasion of the Portuguese embassy sent to Constance, therefore, in 1416, in which we can find, for the first time, the legend of Ourique and the apparition of Christ to King Afonso Henriques, promising him victory in the important battle ahead. The legend of Ourique, associated with the battle of this name, in 1139, is a copy of Constantine's dream by the Milvian Bridge: Christ announces to him, in a dream, victory over his enemies if he had the Christian insignia painted on his soldiers' shields and helmets.²⁴ What this legend, appropriated by the Portuguese at the end of the 14th or beginning of the fifteenth century, ends up presupposing, as centuries later the great Jesuit preacher Fr. António Vieira would do as well, is that it was Christ himself who founded Portugal and, in affirmation of this memory, some Christian symbols, such as the cross and the five wounds of Christ, would become part of the Portuguese royal arms.²⁵

This vision of Portugal as a kingdom instituted by Jesus Christ will remain a true dogma in the historical consciousness of the Portuguese until the nineteenth century. It became a motto that greatly favoured the context of the beliefs whose statements guided the Portuguese in the battles and wars that were fought in the conquests in Morocco and in the other overseas territories that came to compose the Portuguese maritime empire.

The justification by Faith and its catechesis of the Portuguese conquests in Africa, in the fifteenth century, was an argument that met the financing needs that the Crown faced to maintain the expansionist process. Effectively, because of the crusade and the expansion of the Faith, the Church became collaborative, opening up to Portuguese monarchs the possibility of using ecclesiastical goods and income to continue and maintain their conquests.²⁶ In 1418, Martin V granted King João I, during his lifetime, through the bull *Rex regum*, the

²³ Zurara, *Crónica da Conquista de Ceuta*. 1915. cap. 53. 162.

²⁴ *Livro de Arautos. De Ministerio Armorum, Scrip. Anno MMCCCXVI, ms. Lat. 28, J. Rylands Library (Manchester). Estudo Codicológico, Histórico, Literário, Linguístico. Texto crítico e tradução*. Ed. Nascimento, Aires Augusto, Lisboa, 1977. 256–258.

²⁵ Buescu, Ana Isabel Carvalhão, *O milagre de Ourique e a história de Portugal de Alexandre Herculano: uma polémica oitocentista*. Lisboa, 1987.

²⁶ Santarém, Visconde de, *Quadro Elementar das relações políticas e diplomáticas de Portugal co as diversas potências do mundo desde o princípio da monarchia portugueza até aos nossos dias*. Vol. IX., Lisboa, 1864. 403.; Costa, O Infante D. Henrique, 1959. 5–9, 25.

possibility of resorting to Church goods precisely to support the expeditions and maintenance of Ceuta. This bull would be renewed by Eugenius IV, in 1436, when the Portuguese were preparing the conquest of Tangier and, shortly after, by King Afonso V, in January 1443, then ruling the kingdom, as we know, the *Infante* Pedro, uncle and father-in-law of the young sovereign.²⁷

It is effectively known that in 1419, King João I obtained from the Church an annual subsidy of nine thousand gold florins on the ecclesiastical incomes of Portugal, for the defence and maintenance of people in the great city of Ceuta. Earlier, in February 1416, the king had ordered the collection of royalties and income from the master of Santiago, the archbishopric of Lisbon and other bishoprics and the apostolic chamber for the expenses of the city of Ceuta, appointing the *Infante* Henrique to lead this process.²⁸

The financing of the crusade will be professionalised, however, by introducing the sale, on a permanent basis, of indulgences to support the crusade, and by multiplying the bureaucratic channels for controlling this source of income. It is known that the Portuguese Crown found in the control of military religious orders established in Portugal other forms of aid for the war in Africa, by handing over the respective governments to royal *infantes*, namely the Order of Christ, entrusted to the care of *Infante* D. Henrique, in 1420.

Africa and the war against the Saracens, but not the Turks, were, since then and throughout the fifteenth century, the main ambitions of the Portuguese Crown. The maritime explorations of the coast of Africa and the Atlantic, as well as the Portuguese attempts to conquer the Canaries, particularly between the years 1418 and 1434, aired again in Basel, in 1436, and were repeated at other times while the *Infante* Henrique lived (d. 1460), will be understood within this narrative of the expansionist historical process of Portugal.²⁹

From the beginning of his reign, in 1433, King Duarte asked, inside and outside the kingdom, opinions on the problem of continuing the war in Africa, understood or not as a “just war”. It was important for King Duarte to collect opinions on “whether it was just, right and reasonable to [make] war against the Moors of the land of Africa in the parts of Belamarin, or would it be better for you to enjoy and rule your lands and kingdoms and to excuse them from the evils that follow war”.³⁰

The *Infante* Pedro would manifest himself against the continuation of the war in Africa, “now and at no time”, he wrote, “Your Grace must not interfere in this war in Africa, in order to seek to gain more than what was won”. As early as 1426, in fact, in the well-known letter from Bruges, the enlightened *Infante* called for a solution to the problem of Ceuta, “a drain of men and money”.

²⁷ *Monumenta Henricina*. Vol. II. (1411–1424). Ed. Diniz, António Joaquim Dias, Coimbra, 1960. 278, 288.

²⁸ Costa, O Infante D. Henrique, 1959. 8–10.

²⁹ De Witte, Charles-Martial, *Les bulles pontificales et l'expansion portugaise au XVe siècle*, extrait de la Revue d'histoire ecclésiastique t. 48 (1953), t. 49 (1954), t. 51 (1958), t. 53 (1958). Louvain, 1958. 686–718.; Marques, A expansão quatrocentista, 1998. 58–61.

³⁰ Costa, O Infante D. Henrique, 1959. 33 and following.

Wanting to remain neutral, another infante, also brother of the king, *Infante João*, ended up opposing the war, advising “wisdom”.³¹

Infante Henrique, brother of those mentioned, expressed an entirely opposite opinion, considering that the war against the infidel was legitimate when, failing peaceful means, it was necessary to recover for the Christians the lands formerly occupied by them. He would write, in his will, that for having favoured maritime navigations along the coast of Africa:

“Passing the said *Cabo de Naam em diamte* [Cape Chaunar] and waging great wars, some receiving death and others placed in great dangers, it pleased Our Lord to give me certain information and wisdom of those parts, from the said cape passing through all the land of Berberia and Nubia and also through the land of Guinea well over three hundred leagues. Hence until now, both in the beginning of the war and later in the way of dealing with merchandise and ransoms, a very large number of infidel captives have come to Christendom, of whom, giving great praise to Our Lord, the greater part is returned to their holy faith.”³²

Another royal *infante*, Afonso, Count of Barcelos, by letter dated May 19, 1433, sided with *Infante* Henrique in justifying the war, whether in Africa or in Granada. The Count of Arraiolos, son of the aforementioned Count of Barcelos, supported the war on the part of Castile against Granada, but was opposed to a war in Morocco, which he did not consider to be a service of God, nor a benefit for the kingdom. The Count of Ourém, his brother, said he was ready to fight against Granada, and the Portuguese king should unite himself with that of Castile for that purpose; he was not in favour, however, of a war in Africa, which he considered not to be the service of God, but risky and useless for the kingdom.³³

Opinions were also requested from jurisconsults and Roman jurists, namely António de Pratovecchio and Antonio de Rosellis. Pratovecchio argued that the war of the Portuguese against the Saracens would be invasive and illicit, unless authorised by the supreme judge of Christendom, the pope. On the other hand, Antonio de Rosellis argued that such a war was legitimate, even without the authority of a superior judge, because the Saracens held such lands by violent and continued occupation.³⁴

It will be the war against the infidels, in Africa, that will guide the policy of the Portuguese Crown, in a general way, throughout the fifteenth century. In 1436, at the Council of Basel, the issue of the Canaries caused Portugal and Castile to diverge strongly. King D. Duarte ended up choosing Tangier as a target. On September 8, 1436, a new crusade bull was issued, *Rex regum*,

³¹ D. Duarte, *Livro dos Conselhos de El-Rei D. Duarte (Livro da Cartuxa)*. Edição diplomática. Transcript Dias, João José Alves. Review Marques, A. H. de Oliveira – Rodrigues, Teresa F., Lisboa, 1982. 27–39.

³² *Monumenta Henricina*. Vol. XIII. (1456–1460). Ed. Diniz, António Joaquim Dias, Coimbra, 1972. doc. 68. 116–118.

³³ D. Duarte, *Livro dos Conselhos*, 1927. 43–49, 65–70.

³⁴ Costa, O Infante D. Henrique, 1959. 34.

requested by the king from the pope, which was published in Lisbon on July 12, 1437, in the context of a great ceremonial: it was organised a procession, in which the king took part, and where a relic of the *lignum crucis*, offered by the pope to the king the previous year, was carried to the door of the cathedral, where the *Infantes* Henrique and Fernando, the Count of Arraiolos and their troops awaited. The army would embark the following month, with mass and procession, as usual. The king, unlike his father and his successor, did not embark, handing over command of the expedition to his brother Henrique. The unfavourable results for Portugal are well known.³⁵

The Tangier disaster brought back the problem of returning Ceuta to the Muslims to the order of the day. The matter was debated in the Cortes of Leiria, in January 1438, but without a clear resolution on the part of the king, which favoured the side of those who advocated the continuity of Ceuta in the hands of Christians. This winning position came at a high price, as Fernando, the youngest of the sons of King João I, detained in Morocco as a guarantee that Portugal would deliver Ceuta, died in captivity in 1443. The royal family lost one of his own, but ultimately it gained another saint on the altars, and since then Fernando was considered a martyr and a saint, receiving the honours of a holy man, although this devotion never received papal approval.³⁶

The Portuguese court did not miss the problems of the Ottoman attacks on the borders of Christendom in Eastern Europe. The island of Rhodes, seat of the Order of the Knights Hospitaller, with so much influence in Portugal, saw the aggression of the Mamluks of Egypt increase in 1443 and 1444. In 1448, Pope Nicholas V granted indulgences for a crusade to avenge the defeat of Varna. In this year of 1448, Pedro, Duke of Coimbra, ended his long regency at the head of the kingdom of Portugal. In May of the following year, he raised an ill-prepared army, in a utopian “crusade” against his enemies, walking against the well-organised and disciplined armies of the king, who waited for him on the outskirts of Lisbon, imposing a humiliating defeat on the former regent.³⁷

It will also be a legacy of the diplomacy of this regent the approximation of Portugal to the imperial throne of Frederick III, a diplomatic activity that resulted in the marriage, in 1451, of the king’s sister with the emperor of the Romans. The Portuguese royal family was influential in some European courts, namely in Burgundy, with the Lancastrians in England, in Aragon, in the Empire, as we have seen, and in the Holy See itself.³⁸

³⁵ Santos, Domingos Maurício Gomes dos, *D. Duarte e as responsabilidades de Tânger (1433–1438)*. Lisboa, 1960.

³⁶ Fontes, João Luís Inglês, *Percursos e Memória: Do Infante D. Fernando ao Infante Santo*. Cascais, 2000.; Rebelo, António Manuel Ribeiro, *Martyrium et gesta Infantis Domini Fernandi: a biografia latina de D. Fernando, o Infante Santo*. Lisboa, 2007.

³⁷ Moreno, Humberto Baquero, *A Batalha de Alfarrobeira. Antecedentes e significado histórico*. Vol. I–II. Coimbra, 1979–1980.

³⁸ Coelho, A política matrimonial, 2002–2003.; Costa, O casamento de Leonor e Frederico III, 2018.

Pope Nicholas V did not ignore the kingdom, granting Portugal several apostolic privileges that met the political interests of military and political expansion, *pro fidei*, on the coast of Africa. In 1452, the pope granted *Infante* Henrique the privilege of appointing twelve minor benefices in the domains of the King of Portugal, similarly to the privileges of the pope's servants, recalling, in this bull, the "graves et multiplices labores quos... pro labore et increase fidei... ac defensione civitatis Ceptensis... prompto animo exitit".³⁹ Another bull, from the same year, gave three years of plenary indulgences to the faithful who contributed to the defence of Ceuta. On the 18th of June of that year, by the papal letter *Dum several*, Nicholas V granted King Afonso V the authority to attack, conquer and subjugate the Saracens, pagans and other infidels enemies of Christ, to take possession of their territories and goods, to submit their people into servitude and to transfer their territories.

Afonso V of Portugal committed himself seriously to the task of aiding Constantinople:

"And in May 1453, the Grand Turk called Mafamede seized the noble city of Constantinople, in Greece, head of the Empire in the East, and the city of Pera (...). [Calistus III, a Valencian, summons and incites the Christian kings] among whom was King Afonso (...) he accepted that enterprise with a promise to serve God in that war with twelve thousand men for a year at his expense, for the execution of which, in making ships and buying weapons, and in other things needed to such a long voyage, made countless expenses, not without great regrets on the part of the people of the Kingdom. And finally, the king gave up on that trip, both because he would need a lot of money for it, and because Pope Calistus died, which caused the Christian princes to also give up."⁴⁰

Perhaps as an incentive and a demonstration of satisfaction, the Pope granted the King of Portugal, in the Easter of 1454, the Golden Rose, an important distinction also granted, in 1449, to the Doge of Genoa and, in 1451, to the King of Aragon.⁴¹

On January 8, 1455, Nicholas V signed the *Romanus pontifex* constitution, one of the most important in the history of Portugal and the genesis of its future maritime empire. The preamble of the bull recalls that it is the Pope's mission to encourage the salvation of souls, going on to enunciate, certainly based on Portuguese information, the work carried out by the Infante Henrique since 1419, his Catholic spirit and his virtue as a soldier of Christ, defender and fighter of the Faith, carrying far away the glorious name of Christ, populating the islands of Madeira and the Azores, trying to evangelise the Canaries and

³⁹ De Witte, *Les bulles pontificales*, 1958. 423.

⁴⁰ Pina, Rui de, *Crónica de D. Afonso V*, In. *Crónicas de Rui de Pina*. Introd. and rev. by Almeida, M. Lopes, Porto, 1977. cap. 153. 805–808.

⁴¹ De Witte, *Les bulles pontificales*, 1958. 450–451.

circumnavigate Africa in order to reach the Indians, submitting and converting pagans, a legacy that legitimised the Pope's recognition to the king of Portugal's monopoly of navigation, commerce and fishing from the city of Ceuta to the south.⁴²

Calistus III, elected in Rome on April 8, 1455, defended the crusade with renewed vigour. Encouraged by Belgrade's victory, he sought to assemble a large armed naval fleet. The Portuguese ambassadors sent to Rome to render obedience to the new pope, Friar Afonso Velho, a Dominican, Master in Theology, confessor and adviser to *Infante* Henrique, João de Meneses, a nobleman, and Nuno Fernandes Tinoco, a jurist, spread the word that the King of Portugal intended to arm a considerable number of ships for the expedition against the Turks, with the monarch wishing to participate personally in that expedition.⁴³ Pleased with the Portuguese reaction, Calistus III sent to Portugal through his legate *a latere* to the bishop of Silves, D. Álvaro Afonso, to preach the crusade here.

Chronicler Rui de Pina narrated:

“In the year 1457, a Portuguese Bishop of Silves, a man of good knowledge and great authority, came to these Kingdoms as a delegate of Pope Calistus, who brought the Crusade against the Turks to the king, with great and pious graces and pardons from the Apostolic See, just as on the case others went to other kingdoms and provinces of Christians. And the king, because his real condition was for honourable deeds, very inclined, considering the obligation he was in, by the offer and equipment, that he had already done that he hadn't fulfilled, seeing himself in a better mood and with less insults (...) in him with great joy and much devotion, and with all the important people of the Kingdom he accepted the said Crusade. In which he offered to serve with the said twelve thousand men for a year at his expense, as he had previously promised, for which he had many weapons that he had bought and ships that he had ordered to be made, and so many other things for such continuation, very necessary and essential.

And believing that all the other Christian kings and princes with themselves, their people and forces would help like him in this holy purpose, he immediately sent Martim Mendes Berredo, a nobleman of his house, and to him very trusted, to King D. Afonso from Naples, his uncle, so that he would know and be informed of many things that he had given them for his advice (...). But the said Berredo did not find in Naples, or in Italy, that perception or desire that he fulfilled for such an undertaking, nor like the king cared for, of which he soon warned the king.”⁴⁴

⁴² *Monumenta Henricina*. Vol. XII. (1454–1456). Ed. Diniz, António Joaquim Dias, Coimbra, 1971. doc. 36. 71–79.

⁴³ De Witte, *Les bulles pontificales*, 1958. 825.

⁴⁴ Pina, *Crónica de D. Afonso V*, 1977. cap. 158. 814–815.

In 1461, after the death of *Infante* Henrique, King Afonso V asked the Pope to grant the Order of Christ to himself, which he was granted, with the argument of using its income in the war against the Saracens of Africa. In 1463–1464, a naval expedition against Tangier ended in disaster with numerous losses of Portuguese life and prisoners. Seven years later, the king prepared a new army against Asilah and Tangier, cities which he took, together with Larache, on August 24, 1471, with great ceremonies commemorating this triumph. In this expedition participated “multe ecclesiastice personae”, who took up arms, wounding, mutilating, and killing, being absolved from the penalty of excommunication, by the bull *Sedes apostolica*, of August 21, 1472.⁴⁵

Some of these ecclesiastics were bishops and important personalities. Cases, for example, of the professors of Theology in Bologna, João Martins and João Aranha, authors of canonical and catechetical texts and bishops, both incidentally, from Safim, in Africa.⁴⁶ Other important theoretical contributions, namely in matters of defence of the Faith, are due to authors of the regular clergy, such as Friar André do Prado, confessor of *Infante* Henrique and author of an extensive treatise entitled *Horologium Fidei*, in which *Infante* Henrique himself appears to explain Christian doctrine.⁴⁷ Of the scholars of the Portuguese university, and of their contribution to the questions that concern us, little can be ascertained due to the practically total loss of the medieval archive of that institution.

The kings of Portugal, at that time, were also interested in controversial and apologetic literature, as was the case with King Duarte, in whose library there was a work, in Portuguese, entitled *Livro da Corte Imperial*, which has survived to our days.⁴⁸ In its pages a dialogue takes place in the form of a controversy between a Christian, a Jew and a Muslim, which results in the triumph of the Christian Faith. In the Portuguese chronicles, especially those of Gomes Eanes de Zurara, there are chapters that are equally illuminating on issues involving the war against the infidels, and its demonstration, and on other major issues such as the right to reduce gentiles to slavery.⁴⁹

Before, and in later times, there were multiple concessions, on the part of the Church, of tithes and income from the same to help the Portuguese fight against the infidels. Also, for those years, ecclesiastical incomes were charged to be sent to Rome, in support of the crusade against the Turks, although without much effect. And the Portuguese clergy pressed for such collections of taxes to decrease or even finished.

Elected in August 1471, Pope Sixtus IV negotiated a new general crusade against the Turks, asking for the support of the Iberian kingdoms, admitting

⁴⁵ De Witte, *Les bulles pontificales*, 1958. 5–46.

⁴⁶ Costa, A. Domingues de Sousa, “João Martins e João Aranha, Professores de Teologia em Bolonha e Bispos de Safim na África”, = *Antonianum* 48, 1973, 300–342.

⁴⁷ Prado, André do, *Horologium Fidei – Diálogo com o Infante D. Henrique*. Translation, introduction and notes by Nascimento, Aires A., Lisboa, 1995.

⁴⁸ *Corte Enperial*. Ed. Calado, Adelino de Almeida, Aveiro, 2000.

⁴⁹ Vd. Costa, *O factor religioso*, 1961.

a reduction in the contribution. In turn, Afonso V signed a twenty-year peace treaty with the new sultan of Fez, Mohammed ech-Cheikh. Afonso V tried to install, in Morocco, houses of the military orders, namely in Ceuta, but without any success. Still in 1472, Sixtus IV elevated Tangier, Asilah and Ksar es-Seghir to episcopal cities. In that year, João Martins was also appointed Bishop of Safim, authorizing the foundation of a Franciscan convent in Tangier.

In 1477, in France, where he had gone to ask for the support of Louis XI, for the war against Castile, Afonso V, in a moment of crisis, abdicated the throne, and started a journey to Jerusalem, where he wanted to serve God and end his days. But it was a mystical crisis, of a new utopian crusader, that lasted only a few days. The monarch would return to Portugal, reassuming the throne.

The governance of the kingdom, in the following months and until the death of Afonso V, would be controlled by his successor, Prince João II, who negotiated, with Sixtus IV, to obtain new favours for the business of “things from Africa”. Afonso V would also assist in the preparation of a third expedition against the Turks, this time in connection with the siege of Otranto.

“And since in the year 1480, the army of the Grand Turk with its captains passed through Italy, in the Kingdom of Naples, and by force took, in Puglia, the city of Taranto, with other towns and castles, with great and pious damage from Christians. And Afonso, Duke of Calabria, son of the King of Naples, was already besieging the city to collect it. Pope Sixtus IV (...) sent for help to all Christian kings and princes, for which he granted certain benefits that he ordered to be given by the clergy (...). They sent for the said expulsion of Taranto and resistance to the Turk, the bishop of Évora, Garcia de Meneses, with a great fleet and many and very noble people of his kingdoms (...).”⁵⁰

Both this armada and the previous one, from 1457, need more accurate studies.

In conclusion, as I have tried to demonstrate throughout this paper, the meaning of “crusade” in medieval Portugal, in general, and in the Quattrocento, in particular, assumes plural semantic values. Its main tendency will be the one that concerns the expansion of the Christian Faith through the conquest of territories to the infidels, as well as to Gentiles, in the context of what was understood and discussed, in those times, as a just war because it was service of God.

For the legal justification of the right of conquest and Christianization of territories in Africa, especially in the western Maghreb, the Portuguese permanently relied on the support and spiritual and canonical blessing of the popes, the only sovereign authority that Portuguese kings recognised and in general, except in some critical moments, they accepted it as a governance imperative.

The numerous bulls of indulgence, granted by them to Portugal throughout the fifteenth century, legitimised these conquests, integrating them into the general categories of the Crusades of Christianity in general. In the 1450s

⁵⁰ Pina, *Crónica de D. Afonso V*, 1977. cap. 210. 877–878.

and later in the 1480s, King Alfonso V, known precisely as Africanus, for his conquests in Morocco, faithfully responded to papal appeals to help Constantinople, first, and then Otranto. These expeditions took on a somewhat different nature from the African conquests, due to their central geography and Mediterranean scenario. As has been said, they were unsuccessful, except for the 1457 expedition, which eventually led Afonso V to conquer the Moroccan fortified city of Ksar es-Seghir.⁵¹

In the African conquests of the Portuguese foreigners were frequently integrated, some of them looking for social ascension to the nobility; others, already knights in their countries of origin, sought the glory and exaltation of the Cross. In the armadas that took the armies of the kings of Portugal to Ceuta and to the other North African strongholds, mercenaries naturally participated, but sources are not very generous in information on the subject.

Finally, it should be recognised that if Portugal assumed some singularity in the process of the "crusades" of the late Middle Ages, it never failed to integrate itself into the framework of the historical evolution of the other monarchies of the West, with which it maintained political and economic relations and shared relevant problems of European expansion.

⁵¹ See De Witte, *Les bulles pontificales*, 1958. 809ff.



Valérie Toureille

VIOLENCES DE GUERRE ET RÉFORME DE L'ARMÉE ROYALE FRANÇAISE AU XV^E SIÈCLE

La folie du roi Charles VI, la guerre civile et la cession du royaume de France au roi anglais par le traité de Troyes en mai 1420 conduisirent le royaume de France vers une crise politique majeure, sans doute l'une des plus graves qu'il ait connues au Moyen Âge. Cette crise se traduit par de nombreux désordres dans un espace-temps où la concurrence entre deux autorités politiques laissait prospérer des hommes de guerre qui se vendaient aux plus offrants.

L'intervention de Jeanne d'Arc en 1429 avait permis au jeune Charles VII, par le sacre, de stabiliser sa position, mais la reconquête du royaume était loin d'être achevée. Elle reposait sur une armée hétérogène formée par l'addition de fidélités personnelles ou stipendiées. Les capitaines qui encadraient l'ost royal mettaient leur compagnie de gens d'arme au service du roi, sans vraiment les contrôler. Surtout, les sujets du royaume continuaient de vivre dans une insécurité chronique, menacés de razzias et d'incendies aussi bien par les armées ennemies qu'amies. Mal soldés, ou de manière irrégulière, les gens de guerre vivaient sur le pays, comme les armées médiévales avaient usage de le faire, c'est-à-dire sur les ressources des populations civiles. Le problème de l'encadrement des armées n'était pas nouveau au XV^e siècle, mais il a connu des points de crispation et d'accélération.¹ La guerre civile, qui s'est superposée au conflit franco-anglais, a sans nul doute augmenté le degré de violence au sein de la population civile, confrontée à une mobilisation plus importante de gens de guerre. Dans le cadre de ces armées non-institutionnelles, plusieurs profils de combattants pouvaient co-exister, sans compter que leurs statuts étaient aussi interchangeables, les capitaines au service du roi de France pouvant à l'occasion vendre leur service armé, comme mercenaire, à un autre seigneur.

Ce phénomène est particulièrement saillant sur les zones frontières, là encore en raison d'un éloignement du pouvoir royal, et de la concurrence de pouvoirs locaux. Sur les marches du royaume avaient ainsi proliféré des hommes de guerre, plus ou moins organisés sous l'autorité d'un capitaine, parfois en rupture de ban. Dès 1431, Charles VII avait tenté de juguler cette violence armée en condamnant

¹ Les premières ordonnances sur les gens de guerre apparaissent après la défaite de Crécy (1346), mais également en 1361 et en 1374 (ordonnance de Charles V sur la cavalerie). On peut citer encore des ordonnances au début du XV^e siècle (1405, 1410, 1413). La première vague de désordres des gens de guerre est liée aux lendemains du traité de Brétigny-Calais en 1360, lorsqu'il s'est agi de « casser les troupes », c'est-à-dire de les démobiliser. Les hommes de guerre ont continué à vivre sur le plat-pays formant ce que l'on a nommé « les Grandes Compagnies », in *Routiers et mercenaires durant la guerre de Cent Ans. Hommage à Jonathan Sumption*. Eds. Pépin, G. – Lainé, F. – Boutouille, F., Bordeaux, 2016. ; Butaud, Germain, *Les compagnies de routiers en France (1357–1393)*. Clermont-Ferrand, 2012.

le pillage commis par ses capitaines,² mais cette injonction royale était demeurée sans effet. Non seulement le problème des bandes de routiers restait entier, mais l'année 1435 allait amplifier la violence des hommes de guerre sur les populations civiles.

I-La paix d'Arras et la multiplication des désordres

A-Négociations et traité

Après de longues négociations, le 20 septembre 1435 à Arras, Charles VII signait un accord de paix avec le duc de Bourgogne, Philippe le Bon. L'ambition du roi était d'éteindre la guerre civile et de rassembler ses forces contre ses principaux ennemis: les Anglais. Celui qui avait mené les négociations était Arthur de Richemont, le connétable de France, dont les liens familiaux avec la Bourgogne, présidaient depuis longtemps aux négociations de toutes sortes entre le roi et le duc. Contre les dispositions légales du traité de Troyes, le connétable était parvenu à amener Philippe le Bon à la table des négociations pour signer la paix et mettre fin à plusieurs décennies de guerre civile. Il est vrai que la mort du duc de Bedford, le puissant régent, avait facilité ce rapprochement. Cette victoire diplomatique était-elle pour autant une victoire politique ?³

Si le connétable avait joué un rôle déterminant dans les tractations de paix, sa position politique était loin d'être assurée au sein du conseil royal. Richemont avait longtemps été tenu à distance, précisément en raison de ses attaches familiales avec la Bourgogne (il était marié à Marguerite de Bourgogne, fille aînée de Jean sans Peur), mais également avec l'Angleterre (sa mère s'était remariée au roi anglais Henry IV), sans oublier le duc de Bretagne, dont il était le frère, lequel jouait toujours un rôle équivoque entre les deux belligérants du conflit franco-anglais.⁴

Tout cela laissait craindre un agent double, dont le roi lui-même sembla se méfier un temps. Les capitaines armagnacs ne le tenaient pas en grande estime et sa position de connétable fut plus d'une fois remise en cause. Il ne fut d'ailleurs pas présent aux côtés des Français lors de la libération d'Orléans (mai 1429). Et s'il apporta des renforts militaires à la bataille de Patay, le 18 juin 1429, il ne fut pas admis à suivre l'armée royale pour accompagner le roi lors du sacre.⁵ Cependant, les échecs de Jeanne d'Arc ramenèrent le roi vers la voie, qui avait toujours eu sa préférence: celle de la diplomatie. Et c'est à ce moment-là que

² Le 28 mars 1431 : Ordonnance pour la répression des pillages, oppressions et excès des gens de guerre dans le Poitou et les provinces voisines, Archives Nationales de France (après ANF), X2a 20, fol. 31. ; Guérin, Paul, *Archives historiques du Poitou*. Poitiers, 1881–1958. 29. 1–7.

³ Vaughan, Richard, *Philip the Good. The apogee of Burgundy*. Londres, 1970. ; Schnerb, Bertrand, *Les Armagnacs et les Bourguignons. La maudite guerre*. Paris, 1988. ; Lecuppre-Desjardin, Elodie, *Le royaume inachevé des ducs de Bourgogne (XIV^e-XV^e siècles)*. Paris, 2016.

⁴ Cosneau, Eugène, *Le connétable de Richemont (Artur de Bretagne)*. Paris, 1886.

⁵ Toureille, Valérie, *Jeanne d'Arc*. Paris, 2020.

Richemont retrouva progressivement sa place auprès de Charles VII, après la disgrâce du favori, et son ennemi juré, Georges de la Trémoille.⁶

Pour avancer ses pions face aux Anglais, le roi Charles avait absolument besoin de neutraliser l'alliance anglo-bourguignonne. Et c'est précisément Richemont qui parvint à réconcilier les anciens ennemis. C'est encore lui qui dut rassembler les capitaines dans un semblant de discipline pour ramener le roi dans Paris. Richemont devait donc se battre sur tous les fronts: conduire l'armée du roi, et se faire respecter par les capitaines qui en constituaient l'armature. Le connétable entra en campagne quelques mois seulement après la signature en février 1436. Il reprit d'abord position en Ile-de-France, avant d'investir Paris, le 13 avril 1436. La première urgence était de restaurer un gouvernement centralisé, scindé par les nécessités de la guerre durant de longues années. Paris redevenait la capitale administrative du royaume.⁷ Pourtant, Charles VII dut attendre plus d'un an avant de faire son entrée solennelle dans la ville, le 12 novembre 1437.⁸

B-Un dispositif militaire mal contrôlé

Cette étape importante ne résolvait pas le problème de la discipline de l'armée royale. La paix des princes ne satisfaisait pas ceux qui avaient bataillé pour le roi contre les Bourguignons depuis 1407,⁹ et certains Armagnacs ressentait d'ailleurs le traité comme une véritable humiliation pour leur parti.

Loin d'apporter la paix, le traité d'Arras entraîna la réapparition d'un problème récurrent: celui des armées démobilisées. Le traité d'Arras ralluma les vieilles querelles entre Armagnacs et Bourguignons, en particulier pour tous ceux qui ne voulaient pas déposer les armes. La décennie 1435–1444 fut ainsi marquée par une recrudescence des violences des gens de guerre sur les territoires frontaliers de la Bourgogne. Dans cet intervalle, plusieurs capitaines français reprirent leur vie d'aventure pour aller guerroyer là où le butin était facile et les contrats mercenaires nombreux. Combattants aux marges de la guerre, ils devinrent des combattants des marges de la paix. Ils entretenirent une série de guerres privées, nourries de pillages et d'exactions, comme s'ils ignoraient que la paix fût signée.¹⁰ Habitude de la force et force de l'habitude.

Aux yeux des chroniqueurs, la situation, déjà difficile, devint dramatique après 1435 : razzias, incendies et viols se multipliaient à l'initiative d'un plus

⁶ Contamine, Philippe, *Charles VII*. Paris, 2017.

⁷ La chancellerie et la Chambre des comptes de Bourges, ainsi que le Parlement et la cour des aides de Poitiers furent immédiatement transférés.

⁸ Le roi restaure aussi la charge d'historiographe à Saint-Denis abandonnée en 1418 et la confie à Jean Chartier, Bibliothèque de France (après BNF), lat. 5959, fol. 186. ; *Chronique de Charles VII*. Ed. Vallet de Viriville, A., Paris, 1858. 1. 25.

⁹ Assassinat de Louis d'Orléans à Paris le 23 novembre 1407, par les hommes de Jean sans Peur, Schnerb, Bertrand, *Les Armagnacs et les Bourguignons* ; Bonenfant, Paul, *Du meurtre de Montreuil au traité de Troyes*. Publications de l'Académie royale de Belgique, Bruxelles, 1958.

¹⁰ Toureille, Valérie, « Robert de Sarrebrück ou les dernières heures de l'Écorcherie », In. *Annuaire-Bulletin de la Société de l'histoire de France*. 2016. 83–96.

grand nombre de troupes licenciées. Enguerrand de Monstrelet, un chroniqueur bourguignon, évoque clairement le contexte :

« les François se assemblèrent avec plusieurs de leurs gens sur les marches de Santhers et d'Amiennois, et pillèrent en plusieurs lieux les pays audit duc, et de ceulx qui avoient tenu son parti ».¹¹

Monstrelet insiste bien sur ce point de rupture et le paradoxe de la situation :

« Non obstant la paix d'Arras faite, les François et Bourguignons, vers les marches de Beauvoisis, Vermandois, Santhers, Laonnois, Champagne et Rethelois, faisoient moult souvent de grandes entreprinses les ungs contre les aultres, et prenoient querelles non raisonnables l'un contre l'autre. Pour quoy il advenoit moult de fois que les pays dessusditz estoient courus, pillés, et avoient autant, et plus a souffrir comme par avant la dessudicte paix d'Arras ».¹²

Plusieurs expressions doivent être soulignées. La « querelle », qui peut être comprise comme une dénomination de la guerre privée, est dénoncée comme déraisonnable au sens littéral du terme, c'est-à-dire qu'elle est contraire à la raison, ce qui peut signifier aussi qu'elle est contraire au droit. Ces hommes de guerre sont accusés d'avoir « couru et pillé », expression consacrée du brigandage des routiers, sur les zones frontalières (« sur les marches ») qui forment des zones de prédation par excellence. Surtout, le chroniqueur parle d'une résurgence de la violence, plus grande encore que dans le cadre d'une guerre ouverte. Le paradoxe est également renforcé par la condamnation de Monstrelet qui renvoie dos à dos les capitaines français et bourguignons coupables des mêmes excès. Il est vrai que la concentration des bandes armées était particulièrement dense au nord du royaume de France, sur les frontières de la Bourgogne. Rien que pour le duché de Bourgogne, les assemblées d'États se réunirent 15 fois entre 1436 et 1443 et verser 80 000 livres pour se protéger des pillages des bandes armées.¹³ Dès octobre 1435, quelques semaines seulement après la signature du traité d'Arras, la garnison royale de Langres lançait à sa propre initiative une expédition punitive sur les terres d'un seigneur bourguignon.¹⁴

Les chroniqueurs bourguignons n'étaient pas les seuls à condamner de semblables actions de la part des hommes de guerre. Jean Chartier, l'historiographe officiel de la couronne de France, fait état de la même situation. Il précise que

¹¹ *Chronique d'Enguerrand de Monstrelet, en deux livres avec pièces justificatives 1400-1444*. Ed. Douët d'Arcq, L., 6 vol., Paris, 1858. 5. 199.

¹² *Idem*.

¹³ De Fréminville, Joseph, *Les Écorcheurs en Bourgogne (1435-1445). Étude sur les compagnies franches au XV^e siècle*. Dijon, 1887. 90. ; Canat, Marcel, *Documents inédits pour servir à l'histoire de Bourgogne*. t. I, Chalon-sur-Saône, 1863. 197-485.

¹⁴ Un village fut incendié, les habitants soumis à rançon et emmenés pour partie en otage ; Tuetey, Alexandre, *Les Écorcheurs sous Charles VII. Épisodes de la vie militaire de la France au XV^e siècle d'après des documents inédits*. 2 vol., Montbéliard, 1874. 1. 17.

le noyau dur des troupes était bien constitué des garnisons de Champagne « où ils dommagèrent grandement le pais ». Cet espace, à la confluence de plusieurs frontières entre Bourgogne, Lorraine et France, a particulièrement souffert du passage des troupes armées. On peut estimer qu'entre la fin du XIV^e siècle et le milieu du XV^e siècle, la population de la Champagne (méridionale) a été réduite de moitié en raison de cette insécurité chronique.¹⁵

La concentration de bandes de routiers, dans les années 1435–1440, est difficile à chiffrer, mais le bailli bourguignon du Hainaut fournit une estimation. Il déclara, en 1439, qu'ils étaient entre 6 à 7000 au nord de Reims.¹⁶ Même si le chiffre peut paraître exagéré, il donne cependant l'ampleur du phénomène et du problème. Dans cette situation chaotique, certains capitaines français n'hésitèrent pas à monnayer à prix d'or ce que le traité accordait de droit au duc de Bourgogne. Philippe le Bon avait ainsi dû racheter « a grande somme de monnoie » le départ de la Hire (Etienne de Vignolles) et de ses hommes pour libérer la frontière picarde.¹⁷ Mais d'autres capitaines, moins contrôlables, se distinguèrent par les « maux innumérables », qu'ils semèrent sur leur passage. Deux hommes d'armes, mercenaires, étaient visés par ces dénonciations: le bâtard Alexandre de Bourbon et Rodrigue de Villandrando, tous deux connus pour avoir servi dans l'armée du roi.¹⁸

A la fin de l'été 1437, plusieurs bandes s'installèrent aux frontières de la Champagne et de la Lorraine, peut-être à l'initiative d'un puissant seigneur lorrain : Robert de Sarrebrück.¹⁹ Le duché, âprement contesté, présentait une opportunité de butins.²⁰ Le duc de Bar et de Lorraine, René d'Anjou, s'en plaignit bientôt au roi, son beau-frère. Le 30 décembre 1437, Charles VII défendit à ses troupes de chevaucher dans le Barrois et leur demanda de relâcher tous leurs prisonniers et de quitter le pays.²¹ Mais, le mandement du roi eut peu d'effet. Dès le début de l'année suivante, Robert de Sarrebrück, qui ne cachait pas sa connivence avec les routiers, se jeta sur le Pays messin, entraînant avec lui le bâtard de Vertus, le Grand et le Petit Estrac et Charles de Cervoles:

¹⁵ Entre la fin du XIV^e siècle et le milieu du XV^e siècle, la population de Champagne méridionale a été réduite d'environ 60%, Fossier, Robert, « Remarques sur les mouvements de populations en Champagne méridionale au xv^e siècle », = *Bibliothèque de l'École des Chartes* 122, 1964, 177–215.

¹⁶ Fossier, Remarques sur les mouvements, 1964. 177–215.

¹⁷ Chronique d'Enguerran de Monstrelet, 1858. 5. 127.

¹⁸ Quicherat, Jules, *Rodrigue de Villandrando. L'un des combattants pour l'indépendance française au XV^e siècle*. Paris, 1879.

¹⁹ Tuetey, Les Écorcheurs, 1874. 1. 64.

²⁰ La querelle qui opposait René d'Anjou à Antoine de Vaudémont pour la succession du duché de Lorraine attira nombre de routiers ; Rivière, Christophe, *Une principauté d'Empire face au royaume. Le duché de Lorraine sous le règne de Charles II (1390–1431)*. Turnhout, 2019.

²¹ BNF, Lorraine 200, fol. 26, n° 126. : Lettre de cachet de Charles VII à Robert de Baudricourt, bailli de Chaumont, et lettre à Etienne de Vignole, dit La Hire, bailli de Vermandois.

Un chroniqueur lorrain évoque longuement les dévastations commises durant cet épisode. Philippe de Vigneulles écrit :

« En celle meisme année, le XXIII^e jour de décembre, et durant que celle maudicte guerre des Anglois duroit toujours en France, vinrent et arivaient XVI^c (1600) hommes d'armes ou Vault de Mets. Lesquelles, cellon la Mer des Istoire, ce estoient longuement tenus en Champaigne ; et ce appelloient, cellon le parler des païssans, les Escourcheurs de France ».²²

Plusieurs chroniqueurs rassemblent des capitaines français sous ce même terme. Une dénomination péjorative qui illustre bien les méfaits d'une partie des hommes de guerre, ceux qui dépouillent leur victime jusqu'à leur chemise.²³ On trouve plus volontiers cette terminologie sous la plume des Bourguignons, qui la reprennent du langage populaire, celui des populations civiles soumises aux violences de ces gens de guerre, que l'on compare à des bouchers. Ainsi Monstrelet précise : qu'« *on les nommoit en commun langaige, les escorcheurs* »²⁴. C'est un autre chroniqueur bourguignon, Olivier de la Marche, qui offre la synthèse la plus pertinente sur le profil et les objectifs de ces routiers :

« Tout le tournoyement du royaume de France estoit pleine de places et de forteresses, dont les gardes vivoient de rapine et de proye : et par le milieu du royaume et des païs voisins s'assemblerent toutes manieres de gens de compagnies que l'on nommoient escorcheurs, et chevauchoient et aloyent de pais en pais, et de marche en marche, querant victuailles et aventure pour vivre et pour gaignier, sans regarder n'espargnier les pais du roy de France, du duc de Bourgogne, ne d'autres princes du royaume. Mais leur estoit la proye et le butin tout un, et tout d'une querelle ».²⁵

Les informations sur ces bandes et leurs modalités d'action sont presque toutes ici synthétisées. Il s'agit de capitaines français, à la tête de compagnies mouvantes, avec un seul objectif : « la proie et le butin sont tout un ». Ni ami, ni ennemi. Si d'illustres capitaines français participèrent de ces violences et se trouvèrent aussi dénoncés comme « Écorcheurs »,²⁶ des capitaines bourguignons

²² *La chronique de Philippe de Vigneulles*. Éd. Bruneau, Ch., Metz, 4 vol. (1927–1933). 2. 237.

²³ Chronique d'Enguerran de Monstrelet, 1858. 5, 318. ; Toureille, Valérie, « De la qualification des Écorcheurs pendant la guerre de Cent Ans », In. Bourquin, L. – Hamon, Ph. – Hugon, A. – Lagadec, Y. (dir.), *La politique par les armes. Conflits internationaux et politisation (XV^e–XIX^e s.)*. Rennes, 2014. 169–182.

²⁴ Chronique d'Enguerran de Monstrelet, 1858. 5. 318.

²⁵ *Mémoires d'Olivier de la Marche*. Éd. Beaune, H. – d'Arbaumont, J. pour la Société de l'Histoire de France, 3 vol., Paris, 1883. 2. 289–290.

²⁶ Olivier de la Marche décline l'identité de plusieurs d'entre eux, dont certains prestigieux : « *et furent les capitaines principaux, le bastard de Bourbon, Brusac, Geoffroy de Saint-Belin, Lestrac, le batard d'Armignac, Rodrigues de Villandras (...) et combien*

coupables des mêmes excès furent qualifiés de « retondeurs » pour avoir employé les mêmes méthodes.²⁷

Pour juguler cette violence, le connétable chercha à mobiliser ces capitaines dans plusieurs opérations militaires : les sièges de Montereau, Bray, Château-Landon, Nemours en 1437, mais le répit fut de courte durée. Ces mêmes capitaines se jetèrent à nouveau dans une vie d'aventures faite de pillages.

C-L'inflation des doléances

L'année 1438 marque un point culminant dans ces violences armées. Le connétable de Richemont, voulant faire un exemple, fit saisir l'ancien bailli de Montargis, Bouzon de Fages, qui terrorisait les campagnes autour de Troyes.²⁸ L'homme d'armes fut condamné à être noyé. À la même date, un capitaine écossais, Bouays de Glavy, « *qui faisoit tous les maulx qu'on pourroit dire* », fut également confronté à la justice du prévôt des maréchaux et aussitôt pendu.²⁹ L'autorité du connétable cependant restait fragile. Le capitaine de Compiègne, Guillaume de Flavy, n'avait pas hésité à enlever et séquestrer le maréchal Pierre de Rochefort, qu'il laissa mourir en prison pour une sombre histoire de vengeance personnelle. Et Richemont qui s'était déplacé en personne pour négocier avec le capitaine, ne parvint pas à le soumettre à son autorité.³⁰

Face à la multiplication des désordres, le 5 avril 1438, une ordonnance royale fut publiée contre « les malfaiteurs du royaume ». Richemont choisit alors l'un des plus fidèles combattants du roi, Ambroise de Loré, capitaine de Paris, pour le secourir dans cette tâche, aux côtés du prévôt des Maréchaux. C'est ainsi que Loré fit arrêter Robinot Lhermite, un lieutenant du capitaine Guillaume de Flavy, auquel il fit trancher la tête aux Halles à Paris.³¹

Il fallait faire des exemples pour faire taire toutes les récriminations qui affluaient de toutes parts, des princes, des villes, mais aussi de certains conseillers, comme Jean Jouvenel.³² C'est ainsi qu'à la suite des plaintes du duc Philippe le

que Poton de Saintreilles (Xaintrailles) et la Hire fussent deux des principaux et des plus renommés capitaines du parti des Franchois, toutes fois ils furent de ce pillage et de celle escorcherie », Mémoires d'Olivier de la Marche, 1883. 2. 289.

²⁷ En particulier, le bâtard de Neufchâtel et le bâtard de Vergy, Mémoires d'Olivier de la Marche, 1883. 2. 242. ; Chronique d'Enguerran de Monstrelet, 1858. 5, 318. ; Toureille, Valérie, « Deux Armagnacs aux confins du royaume : Robert de Sarrebrück et Robert de Baudricourt », = *Revue du Nord* 4 : 402, 2013, 977–1001.

²⁸ ANF, X1a 1482, fol. 74–75.

²⁹ Ou Bouzon de Failles, Gruel, Guillaume, *Chronique d'Arthur de Richemont, connétable de France, duc de Bretagne par Guillaume Gruel*. Éd. Le Vavasseur, A., Paris, 1890. 139–140.

³⁰ Ibidem.

³¹ Chartier, Chronique de Charles VII, 1858. 1. 243–245. Voir également l'exemple de Forte-Épice, redoutable routier armagnac qui avait emprisonné le bailli de Troyes et refusait de répondre aux injonctions du connétable, Cosneau, *Le connétable*, 1886. 283.

³² Juvenal des Ursins, Jean, *Écrits politiques de Jean Juvenal des Ursins* par Lewis, P. S., Paris, 1978–1985. 1. 320–371.

Bon, le roi envoya une nouvelle injonction au mercenaire Rodrigue de Villandrando, qui du Languedoc s'était déplacé aux marges de la Bourgogne :

« Notre très chier et très amé frère et cousin le duc de Bourgoigne nous a humblement exposé que depuis ung an ença, vous et pluseurs d'entre vous vous estes transportéz en la duchié de Bourgoigne et autres ses païs, terres et seignories, où vous avez fait ou par vos gens souffert faire mauix et dommaiges irréparables, tant en prinse, mutilacion de plusieurs des hommes dudit duchié et autres païs environ, efforcemens de femmes, boutemens de feuz, prises d'abbayes, prises aussi de bestial gros et menu, rançonemens de grant partie des diz païs à grans sommes de deniers et autrement en plusieurs manieres, et ce oultre, et par-dessus notre deffense (...)Par ces presentes donnons congié et licence à nostre dit frere et cousin et à ses gens, serviteurs, officiers et subgiez des diz païs et autres, et a chascun par soy, d'eulx assembler pour resister par force et puissance d'armes ». ³³

Le roi achevait son mandement en qualifiant l'ancien mercenaire de hors-la-loi. Il autorisait le duc, mais aussi tous ses sujets, à utiliser la force armée contre Villandrando et ses hommes. En fait, Charles VII partageait la même inquiétude que son cousin, le duc de Bourgogne. Le problème de l'indiscipline des gens de guerre risquait à terme de menacer la gouvernance de son royaume, son économie, comme il remettait en cause sa souveraineté et sa capacité à apparaître comme le garant de l'ordre public au sein de son propre royaume.

Le 15 septembre 1438, Charles VII envoya cette fois un commandement à plusieurs de ses capitaines, en leur faisant défense d'utiliser toutes formes de violence contre les sujets du duc de Bourgogne : Xaintrailles, le sire de Brusac, le bâtard de Bourbon, le bâtard d'Harcourt, le bâtard de Vertus, Antoine de Chabannes, Floquet, Blanchefort, le bâtard de Culant, le bâtard de Sorbier, Florimont, Rodrigue de Villandrando et « *tous autres chevaliers, escuiers, capitaine de gens d'armes et de trait et autres gens de guerre estant, et qui ou temps advenir, seront en nostre service, ausquels ces présentes seront montrées et à leurs lieutenans* ». ³⁴

Il est vrai que le roi peinait à se faire entendre, dès lors que la cour demeurait déchirée entre les factions. ³⁵ Si « l'empereur de brigands », Rodrigue de Villandrando avait finalement quitté le royaume de France, la situation demeurait critique. Et la réitération des mandements royaux apparaissait comme le signe de son inefficacité.

³³ Quicherat, Rodrigue de Villandrando, 1879. 307.

³⁴ Lettre publiée par Tuetey, Les Écorcheurs, 1874. 2. 39–41.

³⁵ En 1437, il avait surmonté un premier complot. Deux conseillers montrés comme des réformateurs, Martin Gouge et Christophe d'Harcourt avaient été écartés, Boudet, Marcellin, « Charles VII à Saint-Flour et le prélude de la Praguerie », = *Annales du Midi* 6, 1894, 301–327. ; Contamine, Charles VII, 2017. 252.

II-La Pragmatique Sanction, le 2 novembre 1439

A-Contexte de l'ordonnance

Dès les premiers mois de l'année 1439, les dévastations reprirent de plus belle. En Champagne, le bâtard de Bourbon s'empara du château de La Mothe (au sud de Troyes), après avoir pillé au passage l'abbaye de Morimond, à la frontière des Vosges.³⁶ Plus au sud, la situation n'était guère plus favorable. Lorsque qu'au printemps 1439, Charles VII traversa son royaume jusqu'à Limoges en passant par Lyon et Riom, il ne put que constater *de visu* les effets désastreux provoqués par la violence permanente des routiers. En octobre 1439, le roi fut contraint de réunir les représentants des trois ordres pour lever de nouveaux impôts afin de payer les troupes. L'assemblée qui se tint alors à Orléans se transforma rapidement, comme de coutume, en tribune politique.³⁷

Les populations ne pouvaient pas à la fois supporter le poids de la fiscalité pour solder les gens de guerre et subir dans le même temps leurs exactions. L'exaspération des populations, et en particulier celle des représentants des bonnes villes, était à son comble. Les représentants firent entendre avec force leurs doléances contre « toutes pilleries » exercées sur les populations par des seigneurs locaux ou des capitaines sans scrupule. On demanda instamment au roi de chasser les « larrons » des rangs de son armée et de rétablir la justice dans son royaume. Le 2 novembre 1439, prenait fin la réunion des trois états. Elle se concluait par la publication d'une ordonnance dite d'Orléans, en raison du lieu où elle fut négociée et rédigée. Le dispositif légal montait d'un cran.

B-Légiférer contre les excès des gens de guerre

L'ordonnance, publiée le 2 novembre 1439, fut également nommée « Pragmatique sanction ». Le principal instigateur de cette loi était encore une fois le connétable, Arthur de Richemont. Son préambule soulignait, comme souvent, le contexte et les motivations qui avaient présidé à sa rédaction :

« Pour obvier et porter remède à faire cesser les grands excez et pilleries faites et commises par les gens de guerre, qui par longtemps ont vescu et vivent sur le peuple sans ordre de justice, ainsi que bien au long a esté dit et remonstré au roy par les gens des Trois estats de son royaume, de présent estant assemblez en ceste ville d'Orléans, le roy par l'advis et delibération des seigneurs de son sang (...) considerans la pauvreté, oppression et destruction de son peuple ainsi destruit et foullé par lesdites pilleries,

³⁶ Abbé Dubois, *Histoire de l'abbaye de Morimond*. Dijon, 1852. 301.

³⁷ Hebert, Michel, *La voix du peuple. Une histoire des assemblées au Moyen Âge*. Paris, PUF, 2018. ; *Political Representation. Communities, Ideas and Institutions in Europe (c. 1200-c. 1690)*. Dir. Damen, Mario – Haemers, Jelle – Mann, Alastair J. (« Later Medieval Europe », 15.). Leiden – Boston, 2018.

lesquelles choses ont esté et sont à sa tres grande desplaisance et n'est pas son intention de les tollerer ne soustenir en aucune manière ».³⁸

Une autre mention de l'ordonnance évoque : « *les desolations, maux, pilleries et meurtres, rebellions, roberies, ravissemens et rançonnemens qui estoient perpétrés et faits sous ombre de la guerre* ». La dernière expression est sans doute la plus révélatrice du contexte et du cadre d'action de ces routiers. Sous prétexte de faire la guerre du roi, certains capitaines utilisaient la force armée « sous ombre de combattre leur ennemis » pour multiplier les actes de prédation à l'encontre des populations civiles. Les représentants des trois États demandèrent instamment au roi « *que ceste dolente pillerie puisse cesser au bien et allegement du poure peuple* » et que *soient choisis des capitaines « convenables et suffisans (...) pour le fait de la guerre du roi »*.³⁹

Le remède résidait dans les 47 articles de l'ordonnance sur les gens de guerre. Le volume exceptionnel de ce texte est à la mesure du problème. L'article 1 partait d'un constat : les gens de guerre, sans licence, s'étaient répandus à travers le royaume causant des dégâts sans nombre :

« Pour ce que grand multitude de capitaines se sont mis sus de leur auctorité et ont assemblé grand nombre de gens d'armes et de traict sans congé et licence du roy, dont grands maux et inconveniens sont advenus ».

L'article 3 soulignait les peines encourues pour une incrimination désormais placée sous le sceau de la lèse-majesté :

« Defend le roi à tous, sur peine d'encourir crime de lèse-majesté, c'est assavoir sur peine d'estre depouillé, déboutté et privé à toujours lui et sa posterité de tous honneurs et offices publiques et des droicts et prerogatives de noblesse et de confiscation de corps et de biens ».

Toute action conduite avec l'usage de la force armée, sans licence du roi, était dénoncée comme une atteinte à l'autorité du roi et à ses prérogatives régaliennes. La peine encourue n'était pas la peine de mort, mais la déchéance de noblesse et la confiscation de tous les biens du coupable, ainsi que ceux destinés à ses héritiers. L'article 4 confirmait que toute guerre était dorénavant la guerre du roi : les capitaines et leurs hommes ne pouvaient plus se regrouper spontanément en compagnie, sans mandement royal. L'ordonnance soulignait le droit exclusif du roi à lever des troupes armées.⁴⁰

³⁸ *Ordonnances des Rois de France de la troisième race (ORF)*. Paris, 1788. vol. 13. 306.

³⁹ *Chronique de Mathieu d'Escouchy*. Éd. du Fresne de Beaucourt, G., Paris, 3 vol., 1863–1864, t. III (P.J.) 20–21.

⁴⁰ Le 2 novembre 1439. Sur le détail voir Bessey, Valérie, *Construire l'armée française : textes fondateurs des institutions militaires, tome 1, De la France des premiers Valois à la fin du règne de François Ier*. Turnhout, 2006.

L'article 16 déclinait à la fois les crimes reprochés aux hommes de guerre et la répression encourue par les officiers royaux :

« Défend le roi (...) que aucun de quelque estat ou condition qu'il soit, ne coure ou discoure par voies, chemins, champs ou ailleurs pour piller, rober et destrousser les passans et allans les chemins et ne guette chemins, ne voies et ne destrousse, ne robe les passans les chemins, ne les habitans en leurs maisons, soient gens d'Eglise, nobles, bourgeois, marchans, laboureurs, gens de mestier, ou autres gens de quelque estat ou condition qu'ils soient ; et mande, commande et enjoint le roy à tous seneschaux, baillis, prevosts et autres justiciers de son royaume et à tous nobles hommes et autres, que incontinent que aucuns scauront tels robeurs, pilleurs et guetteurs de chemins estre sur le pays, que ils les prennent et aillent à l'encontre d'eux a assemblée de gens d'armes et autrement, comme ils feroient contre les ennemis, et les prennent et amenant à justice ».

L'ordonnance considérait clairement ces hommes de guerre comme des « ennemis » et des « délinquans », de vulgaires criminels de droit commun : des « pillers et guetteurs de chemins ». L'ordonnance rendait également responsables les capitaines des exactions commises par leurs hommes et les exposait à des poursuites judiciaires, sans pouvoir prétendre au pardon du roi.

Les nobles avaient encore le droit de détenir des garnisons pour leurs châteaux, mais ne pouvaient de leur propre autorité s'arroger les pouvoirs d'un capitaine, et courir le plat pays sous prétexte de combattre l'ennemi. Autrement dit, nul ne pouvait à l'avenir faire la guerre au nom du roi, sans son autorité, et sans s'exposer au crime de lèse-majesté. Charles VII accordait d'ailleurs le « droit de suite » à tous ses officiers, afin que les délinquans ne puissent pas jouer sur les limites de juridiction pour leur échapper. Plus largement, le roi autorisait quiconque à recourir à la force armée contres ces bandes mercenaires, sans risque d'être poursuivi par la justice. Ceux qui se saisiraient des routiers pouvaient d'ailleurs, comme un droit de prise, conserver leurs chevaux et harnais.

Au-delà de la répression, l'ordonnance mettait en place une armée nouvelle par la création de compagnies sous la responsabilité de capitaines choisis par le roi. Ainsi le prévoyait l'article 26 :

« ordonne le roy que les capitaines et gens de guerre seront mis et establis en garnison es places des frontières sur les ennemis, qui leur seront ordonnez par le roy, et illec demeureront et se tiendront et defend le roy à tous capitaines et gens de guerre que aucun ne se départe, ne a laisser en la forteresse et garnison où il sera mis et establi, sans le mandement et ordonnance du roy, et qu'ils ne aucun d'eux ne aille vivre sur le pays en quelque maniere que ce soit, et sur lesdictes peines de crime de leze-Majesté »

L'armée royale était donc restructurée, du moins sur le papier. Le roi devait nommer un nombre limité de capitaines, dotés d'un effectif déterminé. Les capitaines et leur compagnie devaient être installés dans des garnisons aux frontières, avec l'obligation d'y demeurer sans troubler les populations civiles alentour, « *sans aller vivre sur le pais* ». Dans le même mouvement, les capitaines qui s'étaient emparés de places-fortes étaient aussi dans l'obligation de les rendre aux officiers royaux. La remise en ordre du royaume passait également par la lutte contre la tyrannie de seigneurs locaux, qui étaient aussi accusés d'augmenter les impositions royales pour les détourner à des fins privées.

C-Un impossible remède ?

Quelques semaines plus tard, en décembre 1439, à Angers, le roi désignait son fils, le dauphin Louis, comme son lieutenant pour le Poitou, la Saintonge et l'Aunis. Il lui donnait mandement de débarrasser le royaume des routiers :

« faire vider et de partir d'iceulx [pays] toutes manieres de gens de guerre qu'il y trouvera vivans sur les champs et les autres estans ès chasteaux, forteresses, églises et autres places fortes, pillans et robans ».

Il devait également punir ceux qui s'étaient opposés à la levée des tailles, qui avaient exigé des rançons et commis toutes sortes d'exactions sur les populations civiles.⁴¹

Cependant la mesure se heurtait aux nécessités de la guerre et aux impératifs militaires. Le roi avait besoin de tous ses combattants. Et la poursuite de la guerre exigeait une participation de tous les capitaines. Le siège d'Avranches, en Normandie, allait être un test. Le connétable rassembla les troupes royales en novembre 1439. Jean d'Alençon lui apporta son appui, avec son réseau de fidélités militaires, mais l'opération se solda par un échec retentissant. Ces routiers, de l'avis de tous, n'étaient bons qu'à piller. Pire, ils avaient pris la fuite devant l'ennemi pourtant en minorité. Cette défaite conforta Richemont dans son opinion : il était impossible de poursuivre la guerre avec des troupes aussi hétéroclites et indisciplinées. La déroute d'Avranches, d'une certaine manière, désignait toujours le même problème.

Le Héraut Berry évoque le retour de l'expédition en décembre 1439 devant le conseil du roi. Charles VII, après avoir reçu et blâmé ses capitaines à Angers, réunit son conseil qui « *advisa que a tenir tant de gens sur les champs vivans en destruisant son peuple, se n'estoit que toute destruction, et regardé que a chacun combatant failloit avoir dix chevaulx de baccage et de fretin comme paiges, fammes, vallez et toute telle maniere de coquinaille qui n'estoient bons que a destruire le pouvre peuple* ». ⁴²

⁴¹ ANF, K 65, n°11.

⁴² *Les chroniques du roi Charles VII par Gilles le Bouvier dit le Héraut Berry*. Ed. Courteault, H. – Cellier, L., Paris, 1979. 212–213.

Il fallait à toutes forces que le roi enfin consente à « *mettre ordre a la pillerie que si longuement avoit duré en ce royaume : c'est assavoir lesdiz capitaines [qui] avoient fait serment au roy de nettoier leurs compaignies* »,⁴³ comme le souligne Mathieu d'Escouchy. En fait, deux obstacles se dressaient encore face à l'application de cette ordonnance et à l'éradication de cette « *coquinaille* ». Ils étaient de deux natures différentes : l'une militaire, l'autre politique.

La Pragmatique sanction suscita la colère de l'aristocratie militaire. Dans ses rangs figuraient des princes qui nourrissaient désormais un profond ressentiment à l'égard de ce roi ingrat (« Charles le Bien servi »), qu'ils avaient assisté durant ses guerres, et qui entendait les écarter du gouvernement et de l'armée. En effet, au-delà de la mise au pas des capitaines, qui n'avaient pas l'intention de cesser leurs exactions, se posait la question cruciale du monopole de la force armée revendiquée par le roi. Ainsi naquit la Praguerie.

III-Révolte, répression et réforme

A-La Praguerie

La Pragmatique sanction de 1439 déclencha la première grande fronde féodale du Moyen Âge dans le royaume de France.⁴⁴ Il s'agissait d'une révolte armée, qui allait se doubler d'une contestation politique. L'héritier de la couronne, le dauphin Louis, poussé par de grands féodaux, tenta même de déposer son père, le roi. Aussi, Charles VII et son connétable durent-ils, dans cette même période, combattre sur un double front : mater les révoltés et pacifier le territoire, en extirpant tous les éléments indisciplinés de l'armée. En 1440, les chroniqueurs se firent l'écho de cette révolte nobiliaire, qu'ils qualifient de « querelle », « discordes » ou bien encore « division ». Ainsi le rapporte la chronique Martiniane:

« L'an mil CCCC quarante, le roy saichant veritablement que monseigneur le daulphin avoit entrepris d'avoir le gourvernement du royaulme de France et mettre le roy son père quasi en tutelle, et ne vouloit croire le conseil de Monseigneur de la Marche, auquel le roy l'avoit baillé pour le gouverner, mais dist audit seigneur de la Marche qu'il ne seroit point subject à luy, comme il avoit esté, mais luy sembloit qu'il feroit bien le prouffit du royaulme de France. Si se aida en icelle compaignie du duc de Bourbon, du duc d'Allençon, de Anthoyne de Chabannes, conte de Dampmartin, Jehan de la Roche seneschal du Poitou, de messire Pierre d'Amboyse, seigneur de Chaulmont. Et tout ce venu à la cognoissance du roy assembla très grosse armée

⁴³ Chronique de Mathieu d'Escouchy, 1864. 3, pièces justificatives, 8–9.

⁴⁴ Favreau, Robert, « La Praguerie en Poitou », = *Bibliothèque de l'École des Chartes* 129 : 2, 1971, 277–301. ; Lecuppre-Desjardin, Elodie – Toureille, Valérie, « Servir ou trahir – La Praguerie : la réaction des féodaux face aux innovations politiques », = *Publication du Centre Européen d'Études Bourguignonnes* 60, 2020, Rencontres de Prague (19–22 septembre 2019), 7–20.

pour aller deffaire son filz le daulphin et ses gens, lesquelz ils nommoient les Pragoys ». ⁴⁵

Deux princes (les ducs de Bourbon et d'Alençon), déjà compromis dans le complot de 1437, incitèrent le prince Louis à se révolter contre son père. L'ambition était de chasser les réformateurs autour du conseil royal, à commencer par le connétable, Arthur de Richemont. Plusieurs princes et capitaines de premier plan, mécontents de la politique de Charles VII, se joignirent au complot. Dans les rangs des révoltés figuraient ainsi le duc de Bourbon, mais également le maréchal de la Fayette et le bâtard d'Orléans, deux compagnons d'armes de Jeanne d'Arc. S'y trouvait encore le grand ennemi du connétable : Georges de la Trémoille. Les insurgés se réunirent en février 1440. Les routiers que le roi n'avait pas retenus dans ses nouvelles Compagnies d'ordonnance formaient une armée pour les rebelles. Même certains de ceux qui avaient obtenu une compagnie trahirent le roi pour rejoindre leurs anciens frères d'armes. Ce fut le cas des frères Antoine et Jacques de Chabannes, du bâtard de Bourbon, des deux Blanchefort.

Le connétable mobilisa rapidement ses renforts, venus de Bretagne. Des hommes sur la fidélité desquels il pouvait compter. Dans le même temps, le roi écrivit à toutes les bonnes villes du royaume pour défendre d'aider le Dauphin et ses complices. Dans le même temps, il dépêcha l'un de ses meilleurs capitaines, Xaintrailles, pour ramener ses anciens frères d'armes dans l'obéissance du roi. Enguerrand de Monstrelet rapporte que « *Charles fist grand assamblée de nobles hommes et aultres gens de guerre, pour aler au pays de Bourbonnois, destruire et subjuguier le duc de Bourbon et ses pays, lequel a sa grand desplaisance avoit séduit et emmené son fils le Daulfin* ». ⁴⁶ Acculé par les troupes royales, le duc Jean d'Alençon alla même jusqu'à solliciter l'appui des Anglais ! Mais ils déclinèrent l'offre et laissèrent les Français s'entredéchirer. ⁴⁷ Une partie des gens de guerre qui s'étaient compromis dans ces opérations militaires furent exécutés, d'autres perdirent leurs offices. Les plus nobles ou les plus réputés obtinrent le pardon du roi. Mais le Dauphin, le duc de Bourbon et le duc d'Alençon durent faire amende honorable auprès du roi. À la fin de l'été 1440, la révolte était mâtée, le roi avait démontré sa capacité à se faire obéir.

B-Pacification et répression

L'année 1441 allait être marquée par de nouvelles opérations militaires conduites par le connétable de l'armée royale. Il s'agissait de pacifier enfin la Champagne. Le roi se déplaça à nouveau sur le terrain avec Arthur de Richemont.

⁴⁵ *Chronique martiniane*. Édition critique d'une interpolation originale pour le règne de Charles VII restituée à Jean Le Clerc [par] Pierre Champion, Paris, 1907. 40–41. *Comment le roy Charles assembla grosse armée de gens pour aller deffaire le Daulphin son filz et se gens qu'il appelloit les Pragoys*.

⁴⁶ Chronique d'Enguerran de Monstrelet, 1858. 5. 410–416.

⁴⁷ Favreau, *La Praguerie en Poitou*, 1971. 277–301.

Il traversa toute la Champagne pour rejoindre la Lorraine, où sévissaient encore les routiers. Charles VII était ainsi passé par Troyes, Bar-sur-Aube, Langres, pour atteindre la châtellenie royale de Vaucouleurs « *pour oster les pilleries qui s'y faisoient et pour mettre ordre sur les gens d'armes* », dit Guillaume Gruel, l'historiographe du connétable.⁴⁸

Philippe de Vigneulles, un chroniqueur lorrain, rappelle les détails de cette campagne militaire :

« Aucy, en ce tampts, le roy de France alla en Champaigne pour expeller et faire cesser les maulx et pilleries que les gens d'armes y faisoient ; desquelles il fist faire justice. Et entre les aultres, fit noyer le bastard de Bourbon a Bar sur Aube ; et plusieurs aultres capitaines en furent déposés. Et fut a cest heure ordre mise en leur paiement, affin qu'il ne pillasse le pouvre peuple ». ⁴⁹

Une nouvelle fois, le connétable de Richemont allait rendre une justice exemplaire. Il choisit la Champagne, maintes fois dévastée par les routiers. Richemont convoqua le bâtard Alexandre de Bourbon à Bar-sur-Aube. L'homme était tristement célèbre pour tous les crimes dont on l'accusait. Il avait combattu d'ailleurs aux côtés de Rodrigue de Villandrando. De surcroît, l'homme s'était compromis dans la Praguerie. Le bâtard de Bourbon fut arrêté sur le champ par le prévôt des maréchaux. Après avoir été ficelé dans un sac, il fut jeté dans l'Aube. Une peine capitale que le connétable réservait aux pillards :⁵⁰

« en ladite année, le roy Charles de France, accompagné de son filz daulphin, du conestable de France, de messire Charles d'Anjou, de Anthoine de Chabannes et autres capitaines s'en alla en Champaigne, auquel pays se mirent en son obeissance. Et de là s'en alla à Bar sur Aube où vint devers luy le bastard de Bourbon, lequel par aucunes causes par luy commises envers le roy, fut jetté en ung sac en la rivière, et depuis fut mis en terre sainte. La cause pourquoy le bastard fut jetté en la riviere fut pour ce qu'il avoit esté de la Praguerie contre le roy ». ⁵¹

Outre le bâtard de Bourbon, dix ou douze de ses capitaines furent décapités, d'autres valets furent pendus.⁵²

Le seigneur de Commercy, Robert de Sarrebrück, un autre compagnon d'arme du bâtard de Bourbon, fut contraint de faire soumission au connétable.

⁴⁸ Gruel, *Chronique d'Arthur de Richemont*, 1890. 216. ; Cosneau, *Le connétable*, 1886. 316.

⁴⁹ La chronique de Philippe de Vigneulles, 1929. 2. 265.

⁵⁰ D'autres hommes furent exécutés ce jour-là : 8 de ses compagnons furent pendus, et 10 ou 12 capitaines exécutés.

⁵¹ *Chronique Martinienne*, 46–47.

⁵² Petit-Dutaillis, Charles, *Charles VII, Louis XI et les premières années de Charles VIII (1422–1492)*. Paris, 1911. 108.

Si l'homme n'avait failli à sa fidélité au roi, elle n'effaçait pas certaines rébellions. Le roi, en personne, s'était déplacé pour rencontrer ce grand seigneur lorrain à Bar-sur-Aube. Il bénéficia d'une lettre d'abolition pour tous les crimes commis (« *pillerie, roberie, larrecins, sacrilèges, efforcement de femmes* » et pour avoir « *courru jus noz pais et subgiez* »). Toutefois, la docilité du capitaine devait être complète. À l'hiver 1441, le seigneur de Commercy dut s'humilier publiquement en faisant amende honorable devant le Dauphin, le connétable, l'amiral de France, le trésorier du roi et d'autres grands seigneurs.⁵³

Il est important de souligner que c'est en Lorraine, sur cette frontière où les désordres des routiers avaient été les plus aigus, que Charles VII avait pris soin de rappeler qu'il était interdit sur peine de corps et de biens « aux compagnies et routtes » de commettre les moindres désordres.⁵⁴ Pour le roi de France, la neutralisation des éléments indisciplinés de l'armée devait être conduite sans état d'âme, quelle que fût la loyauté initiale de ces hommes de guerre. Le connétable qui les tenait en grande haine, tenait aussi sa revanche contre tous ces capitaines armagnacs qui narguaient depuis longtemps son autorité.

Au Moyen Âge, le pouvoir du prince s'équilibrait entre châtement et miséricorde. Après la répression, le roi déversa un flot d'amnisties, dont bénéficièrent plusieurs autres capitaines de premier plan comme La Hire et Poton de Xaintrailles. Ces amnisties étaient censées ménager ses meilleurs capitaines comme les susceptibilités des grands féodaux.⁵⁵ C'est ainsi que Charles VII octroya son pardon en juin 1443 à Antoine de Vaudémont pour les « destrousses, emprisonnemens, ravicemens de femmes et d'église, meurtres, destruction de lieux par feu et autres maulx » et crimes commis par ses gens lors de la guerre de succession de Lorraine, car il était temps de pacifier aussi cette alliance avant qu'il ne lance une offensive vers l'Empire.⁵⁶

Cependant, malgré ces exécutions menées d'une main de fer par le connétable, les courses des routiers recommencèrent en 1443 avec plus de vigueur encore sur la frontière orientale du royaume. Mais le roi fut pris à nouveau dans la même contradiction. Est-il en capacité de se priver d'une partie de sa force armée, ou continuer d'utiliser les éléments les plus violents et les moins disciplinés pour l'expédition de Metz ?

⁵³ Lettre d'abolition, signée à Vaucouleurs le 1^{er} mars 1441. Toureille, Valérie, *Robert de Sarrebrück ou l'honneur d'un écorcheur*. Rennes, 2014. L'auteur insiste aussi sur sa fonction d'entrepreneur de guerre, dans la mesure où la pratique du rançonnement serait une source de revenu assumée.

⁵⁴ Tuetey, Les Écorcheurs, 1874. 1. 81. ; Digot, Auguste, *Histoire de la Lorraine*. Nancy, 1856. 3. 65. (il cite une lettre du 8 mars 1441, d'après les papiers du président LeFebvre).

⁵⁵ ANF, JJ 184, n°602, fol. 407 v°-408. Pour des lettres d'abolition générale, le bâtard de Vergy dut payer au roi 4000 florins d'or. Cela concernait le meurtre de Vaulterin de Thuillière, *ibid.* JJ 178, n°15, fol. 10.

⁵⁶ Toureille, Robert de Sarrebrück, 2014. 140.

C-L'éradication des Écorcheurs et l'instauration d'une armée permanente

De nouveaux désordres se multiplièrent en Lorraine à l'occasion de l'expédition que le roi commandita indirectement contre la ville impériale de Metz. Un chroniqueur, le chanoine de Saint-Thiébaud, évoque l'expédition lancée en mai 1443 par le seigneur de Commercy, à la tête de 2500 routiers,⁵⁷ à ses côtés figuraient plusieurs de ses fidèles lieutenants, dont Le Rouçin et Pierre Regnault,⁵⁸ le frère bâtard de La Hire.⁵⁹ Philippe de Vigneulles en témoigne également à sa manière :

« Puis, en ce meisme moix de may, vinrent les Escourcheurs de France ou Vaulx de Wessey, environ deux mil. Et d'iceulx estoit cappitanne Pier Regnault, frere de la Hiere, et le Roussin, avec le seigneur Robert de Commercy ; et firent plusieurs grant mal autour de Cheminat ». ⁶⁰

Les années 1443–1444 correspondent précisément aux derniers excès des capitaines français. En 1444, un nouvel acte diplomatique allait redistribuer les cartes du jeu politique. Le 28 mai, la trêve de Tours, signée entre Français et Anglais, allait permettre à Charles VII de concentrer ses forces et de consolider son pouvoir. Il fallait en finir avec le problème de la discipline des armées et disposer enfin d'un outil militaire efficace. Les bandes autonomes ou mercenaires constituaient plus que jamais un danger pour le royaume dès lors qu'on s'acheminait vers la paix. Jean Jouvenel distilla ses conseils au roi, montrant la voie à suivre pour se débarrasser de ces bandes de routiers. Il fallait « faire demourer en estrainges terres » tous les soldats sans emploi.⁶¹ Le roi saisit l'opportunité pour répondre à l'aide demandée par l'Empereur, Frédéric III, afin d'organiser une vaste expédition en Allemagne. Le choix de Charles VII fut à la fois de les employer sur des terrains extérieurs et de les neutraliser individuellement par des lettres de rémission. Le roi fit rassembler ses troupes en Champagne et en Lorraine. Il en confia le commandement à son fils, Louis. Cependant, le jeune

⁵⁷ Vaxy, commune de Moselle, arrondissement de Château-Salins. Autrefois Vaxey. *La Chronique du doyen de Saint-Thiébaud de Metz*, In. Dom [Augustin] Calmet, *Histoire de Lorraine*, 7 vol., Nancy, 1745-1757, vol. 4, preuves du 2^e vol., col. 244–247. ; Giuliano, Gérard, « Insécurité et mise en défense du village en Lorraine médiévale », In. Desplat, Ch. (dir.), *Les villageois : Face à la guerre (XIV^e - XVIII^e siècle)*. Toulouse, 2002. 35–52. 46. En 1443, les habitants de Jouy-aux-Arches se retranchèrent avec leurs biens sur les vestiges de l'aqueduc romain pour échapper aux hommes de Robert de Sarrebrück, Huguenin, J.-F. (éd.), *Les Chroniques de la ville de Metz recueillies, mises en ordre et publiées pour la première fois*, Metz, 1838, 215 et 238.

⁵⁸ Pierre Renauld, frère bâtard de La Hire, combattait pour Robert de Sarrebrück en 1443 contre Metz (Val de Vexey), Toureille, Robert de Sarrebrück, 2014. 144–145.

⁵⁹ *Chronique du doyen de Saint-Thiébaud*, col. 244–247.

⁶⁰ La chronique de Philippe de Vigneulles, 1929. 2. 272.

⁶¹ BNF, ms Fr. 5022, fol. 26, cité par Marot, Pierre, « L'expédition de Charles VII à Metz (1444–1445). Documents inédits », = *Bibliothèque de l'École des chartes* 102, 1941, 109–155. 115.

homme, en froid avec son père depuis la Praguerie, se montrait peu attentif aux prescriptions mises en place par le connétable pour limiter les désordres des hommes de guerre. Les troupes royales furent envoyées sur un double front : à la fois devant la ville de Metz, et dans les cantons Suisses.⁶² Des échanges de courriers entre Metz et Strasbourg fournissent une description assez exacte de ce déploiement de force. Une lettre de Hans Bruck du 8 août, envoyée depuis Strasbourg, donne une idée des troupes mobilisées autour de Robert de Sarrebrück. Ce dernier, dit-on, chevauchait à la tête de quinze cents cavaliers, aux couleurs de leur seigneur et capitaine, ornés de la croix armagnaque :

« Dans ce nombre trois cents portaient le même costume, mi-parti rouge et gris, orné d'une grande croix blanche au milieu du dos et sur la poitrine ». ⁶³

Le dauphin Louis rejoignit les troupes royales qui firent jonction à Langres, le 7 juillet 1444.⁶⁴ Il y reçut les ambassadeurs de l'Empereur. Nous connaissons les principaux capitaines qui accompagnaient l'héritier du trône outre le seigneur de Commercy, figuraient des chevaliers comme le maréchal Philippe de Culant et plusieurs autres comme Jean et Louis de Bueil, Robert d'Estouteville, les sires d'Albret, Antoine de Chabannes (le même qui avait défié Richemont quelques mois plus tôt) ; mais aussi des écuyers qui avaient déjà combattu ensemble : Jean de Blanchefort, Paul L'Estrac, Joachim Rouault.⁶⁵ L'ancienne fraternité d'armes des Écorcheurs s'était reformée. Au-delà, des milliers d'anciens soudards avaient répondu présents. L'armée, qui comptait environ 20 000 hommes, accueillait aussi pour l'occasion un capitaine gallois Mathieu Gough avec sa compagnie.⁶⁶ Robert de Sarrebrück envoya au Dauphin sa propre artillerie à poudre : deux bombardes pour l'accompagner dans l'expédition.⁶⁷ La confrontation avec les confédérés suisses fut brutale. 2000, peut-être 4000 d'entre eux périrent lors de la bataille de la Birse,⁶⁸ le 26 août 1444. Ils obtinrent cependant la victoire, à la Pyrrhus. Mais Frédéric III n'honora pas ses promesses de rétribution, aussi le reste des Écorcheurs se jeta-t-il sur la plaine de la Saône pour se payer en retour. Les nobles de la Comté de Bourgogne levèrent alors une armée, placée sous les ordres de Thibaut de Neuchâtel et de

⁶² Toureille, Robert de Sarrebrück, 2014. 140.

⁶³ BNF, Lorraine 293, fol. 29. Robert de Sarrebrück se faisait accompagner de ses deux fils richement équipés et de trois chevaucheurs à sa livrée, avec onze étalons harnachés de noir. Lettre du 8 août 1444. Original allemand, *Archives de la ville de Strasbourg, Correspondance politique*, AA 178, évoquée par Tuetey, *Les Écorcheurs*, 1874. 1. 157.

⁶⁴ Kendall, Paul-Murray, *Louis XI*. Fayard, 1974. 72 et s. : « Devenu prince des coupe-jarrets, le Dauphin arriva à Langres le 20 juillet à la tête de mille cavaliers. Il venait d'avoir 21 ans » ; Mémoires d'Olivier de la Marche, 1883. 2. 62.

⁶⁵ Vallet de Viriville, Auguste, *Histoire de Charles VII*. Paris, 1865. 3. 25 et suiv.

⁶⁶ Un contingent anglais participa également à cette expédition.

⁶⁷ Tuetey, *Les Écorcheurs*, 1874. 1. 155-156.

⁶⁸ Bataille de la Birse (26 août 1444), Vallet de Viriville, *Histoire de Charles VII*, 1865. 3. 27.

Jean de Fribourg pour les combattre. Ceux qui étaient saisis étaient livrés sans autre formalité à la main du bourreau, ou bien liés de corde deux à deux ou par trois et jetés dans la rivière. La Saône et le Doubs étaient remplis de cadavres au point, dit-on, que les pêcheurs s'en plaignaient.⁶⁹

Nombre d'Écorcheurs périrent dans la bataille ou dans cette répression, ce qui permit au roi d'entreprendre la dispersion des autres. La sélection ayant déjà été opérée *de facto*, Charles VII pouvait faire entrer les meilleurs et les plus honorables hommes d'armes dans sa future armée permanente. Le roi s'était installé en Lorraine, à Nancy. À côté des nombreuses festivités qui égailèrent la cour,⁷⁰ le roi travailla intensément, aidé de son chambellan Pierre de Brezé et de son connétable. Il consolida les bases de son administration et posa celles de sa future armée.

C'est ainsi que fut promulguée une grande ordonnance de réforme qui devait déterminer les missions de la nouvelle armée royale. Elle fixait le nombre de capitaines, ainsi que les noms de ceux qui auraient en charge les Compagnies. Cette célèbre ordonnance rédigée à Nancy entre janvier et avril 1445 a malheureusement été perdue.⁷¹ Nous la connaissons de manière indirecte par d'autres sources, en particulier la célèbre ordonnance de Louppy-le-Châtel datée du 26 mai 1445.

Cette ordonnance affirmait avec plus de force encore le droit absolu du roi à lever des troupes et instaurait les premières compagnies d'ordonnance permanentes.⁷² Il y avait désormais des troupes qui étaient soldées toute l'année, en temps de paix, comme en temps de guerre et qui devaient demeurer en garnison. Le roi institua aussi un contingent qui pouvait être levé et soldé lorsque la nécessité l'imposait pour une campagne et pour une durée déterminée. On allait bientôt distinguer deux corps armés : Grande et Petite ordonnances ou Ordinaire et Extraordinaire des guerres. Le corps des francs-archers devait aussi être réorganisé en 1448.⁷³

⁶⁹ Mémoires d'Olivier de la Marche, 1883. 1. 247.

⁷⁰ On célébra aussi le mariage de la fille de René d'Anjou, Yolande, avec Ferry, comte de Vaudémont, qui devait ramener la paix en Lorraine et éteindre la querelle de la succession au duché, Vallet de Viriville, *Histoire de Charles VII*, 1865. 2. 56–67. ; Dom Calmet, *Histoire de Lorraine*, 2. 831. ; Preuves p. xviii. ; Chartier, *Chronique de Charles VII*, 1858. 2. 43.

⁷¹ Péquignot, Stéphane, « De la France à Barcelone. Une version catalane de l'« ordonnance perdue » de Charles VII sur les gens d'armes (1445) », = *Revue Historique* 4 : 676, 2015, 793–830.

⁷² Voir l'ordonnance d'Orléans de 22 décembre 1438, la « Pragmatique sanction ». Petit-Dutaillis, Charles VII, 1911. 107. et suiv., chapitre « Réformes militaires. Fin de la guerre de Cent Ans » ; Cosneau, Le connétable, 1886. 395. et suiv. Sur la réforme de l'armée, voir aussi : Vallet de Viriville, *Histoire de Charles VII*, 1865. 2. 56. et s. La réorganisation militaire avait été mise en discussion dans le Conseil du roi, lors de son séjour à Nancy, au commencement de l'année 1445. Le roi était présent à Nancy quelques jours plus tôt. Il s'y trouvait le 7 mai et y demeura quelques jours ; *Chronique de Mathieu d'Escouchy*, 1863. 1, note n° 2. 42.

⁷³ Ordonnance de Montils-lez-Tours, 28 avril 1448, *ORF*, vol. 14, 1–5.

Au total, tant par son action militaire que par son œuvre législative, Charles VII avait réussi à restaurer l'autorité royale. Il avait, dans le même intervalle, réussi à imposer une fiscalité pérenne qui allait lui permettre d'entretenir une armée. Pour les populations civiles, l'impôt permanent était le prix à payer pour assurer la sécurité. Le roi disposait désormais à côté de son parc d'artillerie,⁷⁴ d'une armée en ordre de marche pour achever la reconquête territoriale. Elle fut marquée par deux victoires successives celle de Formigny en Normandie (1450) et de Castillon en Guyenne en 1453.

Si le roi avait consolidé son autorité, restauré ses institutions, et recouvré ses frontières, il avait aussi appris à gouverner avec des hommes nouveaux, qui souvent lui devaient leur ascension sociale, ce qui n'était pas au goût de l'ancienne noblesse. Au seuil de la guerre de Cent Ans, les grands féodaux n'entendaient pas se laisser écarter du gouvernement du royaume, ni se voir confisquer leur droit à user des armes. La Praguerie était un coup d'état manqué, mais elle marquait la première grande révolte nobiliaire, la première d'une succession de frondes qui allaient monter crescendo jusqu'au XVII^e siècle face à la progression de l'absolutisme royal.

⁷⁴ Crouy-Chanel, Emmanuel de, *Le canon : Moyen Âge-Renaissance*. Paris, 2020.

Attila Györkös*

HOLY WAR AND ETERNAL PEACE. CRUSADING IDEA AND THE FRANCO-HUNGARIAN RELATIONS IN THE 1450S–1460S

The Crusade against the Infidels after the Fall of Constantinople in 1453 has been a recurring idea in European public opinion. It found favourable resonance primarily in regions directly affected, such as Hungary, Venice, and the Balkan states, as well as at the papal court and in Burgundy. France, which had just concluded the Hundred Years' War, initially showed no interest or capability to participate in such a joint action.¹ However, in the late 1450s and early 1460s, it increasingly expressed its intention to join the European coalition. This study aims to examine the reasons that shaped the anti-Ottoman visions of King Charles VII and King Louis XI between the victory at Belgrade and the failed Papal Crusade of 1464. Was there a genuine basis for French participation in any international cooperation, or were their declarations merely rhetorical flourishes serving different dynastic interests?

While the Duchy of Burgundy had been a committed supporter of anti-Ottoman efforts since the late fourteenth century, and after the solemn oath of the 1454 Oath of the Pheasant, Philip the Good repeatedly promised support for the fight against the Infidels – for instance, at various imperial assemblies or after the siege of Belgrade² – it was only in 1457 that we find the first clear sign of such commitment from the French monarch. Significantly, this commitment had a Hungarian – or more precisely, a Central European – dimension.

The planned marriage between King Ladislaus the Posthumous (King of Hungary, Bohemia and Archduke of Austria, d. 1458) and Magdalena of France held the prospect of a joint Habsburg-Valois action against the Infidels. This was the most crucial reason for Hungary to accept the alliance. Archbishop István Várdai of Kalocsa (Hungary), leader of a massive seven-hundred-member delegation that travelled to France to sign the marriage contract, expressed

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¹ Bárány, Attila, “Magyarország és a kései kereszties hadjáratok”, In: Laszlovszky, József – Majorossy, Judit – Zsengellér, József (eds.), *Magyarország és a kereszties háborúk*. Máriabesnyő–Gödöllő, 2006. 156–157.

² Schnerb, Bertrand, *L'État bourguignon*. Paris, 2005. 314–318.; Vaughan, Richard, *Philip the Good. The Apogee of Burgundy*. Woodbridge, 2002. 334–372.; Paviot, Jacques, *Les ducs de Bourgogne, la croisade et l'Orient (fin XIV^e siècle – XV^e siècle)*. Paris, 2003. 117–177.

this sentiment in his welcoming speech to King Charles VII on November 18, 1457. He depicted the two monarchs as defenders of the faith, addressing the French king as follows: “You are the pillar of Christianity, and my sovereign lord is its shield; you are the Christian home, and my sovereign lord is its protective wall.”³

Contemporary French chroniclers also saw this as one of the motivations for establishing the alliance. According to Thomas Basin: “From him [Ladislaus], one could hope the most that together with the other Christian rulers, especially if he could unite his forces with the power of the French king, he would drive out the Turkish emperor from Greece and other European territories occupied by the Turks, this bloodthirsty wild beast.”⁴ Jean Chartier, approaching the question from another angle, stated: “the most Christian French king, desiring to disturb his enemies, especially the Turks, the Saracens, and other enemies of the Christian faith, formed an alliance with the King of Hungary.”⁵

However, we must not forget that there was another, less noble goal in establishing Habsburg-Valois relations: the acquisition of the Duchy of Luxemburg, which was occupied by Duke Philip the Good but also claimed by the French monarch and the Czech crown, as well as ensuring the defense of Habsburg possessions in Upper Alsace.

Mathieu d’Escouchy, a chronicler who served in the Burgundian court, did not hide his opinion on the matter: “The marriage was very unpleasant for the Duke of Burgundy, as he was at war with the aforementioned Ladislaus over the Duchy of Luxemburg. And it seemed to him that due to the aforementioned treaty, King Charles would provide assistance and support to King Ladislaus, which could cause great harm to him, his lands, and his subjects.”⁶ Thomas Basin, quoted earlier, also did not overlook the significance of this matter: “The death of the Bohemian king [Ladislaus in November 1457] favoured the Duke of Burgundy: it freed him from a formidable enemy, whose alliance the

³ *Mémoires de Jacques Du Clercq, sur le règne de Philippe le Bon, duc de Bourgogne*. Ed. Reiffenberg, Frédéric de, Bruxelles, 1839. 105–106.; Eckhardt, Sándor, “Várdai István beszéde a francia király előtt”, = *Egyetemes Philologiai Közlöny* 62, 1938, 101–104.; Csernus, Sándor, “Lancelot király és Magyarország, mint a Kereszténység védőbástyája”, In. Jankovics, József (ed.), *A magyar művelődés és a Kereszténység*. Budapest–Szeged, 1988. 580–596.

⁴ Csernus, Sándor, *A középkori francia nyelvű történetírás és Magyarország (13–15. század)*. Budapest, 1999. 242.

⁵ “le tres chrestien roy de France, affectant de insulter ses ennemys et par spécial les Turcs, Sarrasins et autres estans contre la foy chrestienne, fist alliance avecque le roy de Hongrie (...)”: *Chronique de Charles VII par Jean Chartier*. Ed. Viriville, Valet de, Paris, 1858. III. 74.

⁶ “[le mariage] estoit chose bien desplaisante au duc de Bourgoingne, pour ce qu’il faisoit guerre audit Roy Lancelot, pour la duchié de Luxembourg: car bien lui sambloit que, par le moien d’icellui traictié, le Roy Charles bailleroit ayde et confort audit Roy Lancelot, qui lui pooit porter à grant préjudice, et à ses pays et subgez.”: In *Chronique de Mathieu d’Escouchy*. Ed. Beaucourt, Gaston du Fresne de, Paris, 1863. II. 354–355.

King of France so greatly desired, in order to take revenge on the Duke of Burgundy with the help of such a great ally.”⁷

The marriage proposal of 1457 appears to have a dual purpose: it seems that the French kingdom, which was not directly exposed to the Turkish threat, could only be nominally involved in the anti-Turkish alliance if its abstract and fundamentally non-interest-based cause could be linked to concrete benefits. The question is whether in the later years, when broader international coalitions are formed, there will be a genuine French commitment to the fight against the Infidels.

Aeneas Sylvius Piccolomini, who was well-versed in Central European affairs and the Turkish threat, mobilised unprecedented energies for the expulsion of the Infidels when he ascended to the throne of Saint Peter in 1458 as Pope Pius II. In 1459, he convened a congress in Mantua, where Christian rulers were supposed to coordinate their policies and make commitments to support a future crusade. However, the meeting ended in failure. Few princes attended in person, and those who did sent envoys with few substantial proposals.⁸ Mantua essentially became a forum where countries, while proclaiming their anti-Turkish commitment, sought to assert their own often conflicting political interests.

The situation was no different for France. When envoys of King Charles VII arrived in the Italian city, two long-standing unresolved issues were immediately brought to the table, instead of the announced program. The Pope urged the repeal of the Pragmatic Sanction introduced in 1438,⁹ while the French envoys sought ecclesiastical recognition for King Charles's brother-in-law, René of Anjou's claim to the throne of Naples. The relevance of the latter question stemmed from the fact that in 1458, Ferdinand, the illegitimate son of Alfonso of Aragon, ascended to the throne of the Kingdom of Naples in southern Italy, and he later became the father-in-law of Matthias. His rule was not recognised by Pope Callixtus III but was eventually acknowledged by his successor, Pope Pius II.¹⁰

The French-supported Anjou family, harbouring ambitions for the Neapolitan throne, immediately sought to overthrow the new ruler. René sent troops to Southern Italy, and after the relative calm following the 1454 Treaty of Lodi, the Italian peninsula once again became divided in the power struggle. While Florence, ruled by the Medicis, pursued a pro-French policy, it did not intervene directly. Venice remained neutral, and Milan committed itself to the side of the Neapolitans and, in alignment with the Pope, dispatched troops.¹¹ As neither

⁷ Csernus, *A középkori francia*, 1999. 242.

⁸ *II. Piusz pápa feljegyzései*. Eds. Bellus, Ibolya – Boronkai, Iván, Budapest, 2001. II/1. (cap. 3.14.) 120. [hereinafter *Feljegyzések*]

⁹ The Pragmatic Sanction, accepted in 1437 (and codified in 1438 in Bourges), abolished the *annates* and restored the elective nature of ecclesiastical offices in France, which the popes never accepted. See: *Dictionnaire Encyclopédique du Moyen Age*. Ed. Vauchez, André, Paris, 1997. II. 1248 (article of Jean-Louis Gazzaniga).

¹⁰ Setton, Kenneth Meyer, *The Papacy and the Levant, 1204–1571*. Philadelphia, 1978. 204–205.

¹¹ Favier, Jean, *Le roi René*. Paris, 2008. 407–413.

Pius nor Charles VII were willing to concede on the contentious issues, French participation in the future crusade was scarcely discussed. The envoys cited that as long as there was a threat of an English attack, they could not undertake foreign action.¹²

Despite the French and other Western powers' lack of interest, the Pope did not give up on his long-term goals. Following the failure in Mantua, he increased his efforts to create a European coalition against the Infidels. In his famous letter to Mehmed II in 1461, he called on the Sultan to convert to Christianity,¹³ but he also took more realistic steps. After extensive work, by 1463, the outline of an alliance had emerged, which could be considered a smaller European coalition. This alliance included Venice and Hungary, both deeply interested in the fight against the Turks, and also Burgundy. The Pope sought to involve France in this alliance, a kingdom which was undergoing significant changes.

After the death of Charles VII in 1461, his son Louis XI adopted a more conciliatory tone towards Rome. His decisions following his accession to the throne could be interpreted as a break from his father's policies, although, as we will see, certain elements remained constant in French aspirations. Three months after his coronation, on November 27, Louis XI abolished the Pragmatic Sanction, which had asserted the liberties of the Gallican Church. However, he still sought papal support for the ambitions of René of Anjou. Pope Pius was content with the gesture and rewarded the French envoy, Jean Jouffroy, Bishop of Arras, and the king's relative, Louis d'Albret, with cardinal hats. As an encouragement for the crusade, the Pope also sent a sword to Louis XI.¹⁴ While the appointments increased French influence in the Curia, they did not fully satisfy the king's demands. The rejection of the Anjou ambitions led to the king's threat to recall his prelates from Rome.¹⁵

The Pope did not back down, so the French monarch had to choose a different tactic to achieve his goals. Taking advantage of the fact that several states sent ambassadors to him for introductory visits, Louis engaged in negotiations with the Italian powers during the autumn and winter. He attempted to persuade Florence to abandon its neutrality, and Milan to withdraw its troops from Naples, from Venice, he expected to exert pressure on Milan and the Papacy in accordance with French interests.¹⁶

¹² Feljegyzések, II/1. (cap. 3.40.) 146–151.

¹³ Babinger, Franz, *Mehmed the Conqueror and his Time*. Princeton, 1978. 199.; Nótári, Tamás, "Aeneas Sylvius Piccolomini és a defensio imperii Christiani gondolata", = *Jogelméleti Szemle* 4, 2003. Online: <http://jesz.ajk.elte.hu/notari16.html> (Accessed on 31 August 2023)

¹⁴ Feljegyzések, II/2. (cap. 7.10.) 322.; *Lettres de Louis XI, roi de France*. Eds. Vaesen, Joseph – Charavay, Etienne, Paris, 1900. II. 41–43. (No. XXVIII.) [hereinafter *Lettres de Louis XI...*]; Philip the Good, Duke of Burgundy, received a similar sword. Paviot, Les ducs de Bourgogne, 2003. 160.

¹⁵ Feljegyzések, II/2. (cap. 8.7.) 356–358.

¹⁶ Louis XI tried every diplomatic means to win over the three Italian states: he offered a marriage between Anjou René's son, John of Calabria, and the daughter of

Venice's position also underwent a change in these years. At the Mantua Congress, they initially pursued a rejectionist policy regarding the anti-Ottoman coalition, fearing conflict with the Sultan and to protect their Mediterranean interests. However, the Ottoman empire's advances in Asia and its attacks in Greece prompted a shift in their stance.¹⁷ From this point on, the Venetian Republic financially supported the Hungarian king¹⁸ and attempted to involve France in the organization of the crusade. The negotiations of the Signoria's envoys in 1461 vividly illustrate this shift: while the first envoy instructions on October 12 prioritised Italian affairs, later directives increasingly emphasised action against the Turks.¹⁹

Despite lengthy negotiations, the two Venetian diplomats were unsuccessful. Opposing the idea of a crusade would not have been beneficial for the ruler who bore the title of the "Most Christian King". Therefore, the French monarch did not completely rule out a war against the pagans. Nonetheless, he explained that such an action could only be carried out on two fronts: firstly, from Hungary, which was made impossible due to the conflict between the Emperor and Matthias Corvinus, and secondly, by sea, from Albania. For the latter, he would need control over the ports of Genoa and Naples. In other words, all anti-Turkish efforts were linked to the resolution of French interests in Italian affairs.

However, the Republic of Venice aimed to maintain its neutrality in the affairs of Naples and Genoa, and as a result, the negotiations ended in failure. Milan also rejected the French proposal,²⁰ and Florence was unwilling to support the strengthening of any foreign power in Italy.²¹

Louis XI had to try a different approach. In an attempt to soften Pope Pius, in March 1462, he offered 40,000 cavalry and 30,000 infantry troops for the fight against the Turks in exchange for support for René's rights.²² But the credibility of his commitment was undermined when it became known to the Venetians

the Duke of Milan, Hippolita Maria Sforza. (Kendall, Paul Murray, *Louis XI*. Paris, 1974. 490.); He declared that he did not support the aspirations of the House of Orléans for the Milanese throne, and he knighted the Florentine envoy, Piero de'Pazzi, and the Venetian emissary, Bernardo Giustiniani. This information is derived from the report of the Florentine envoys on January 11, 1462. In Desjardins, Abel, *Négociations diplomatiques de la France avec la Toscane*. Paris, 1859. I. 126.

¹⁷ Setton, *The Papacy*, 1978. 240–241.

¹⁸ In the spring of 1462, Venice allocated 3,000 ducats per month in support of the Hungarian king and promised an additional 16,000 gold. Teke, Zsuzsa, "Az itáliai államok és Mátyás", In: Rázsó, Gyula – V. Molnár, László (eds.), *Hunyadi Mátyás. Emlékkönyv Mátyás király halálának 500. évfordulójára*. Budapest, 1990. 246–248.

¹⁹ Perret, Paul Michel, *La première ambassade vénitienne à Louis XI. 12 octobre – mai 1462*. Paris, 1891.

²⁰ Perret, *La première ambassade*, 1891. notes 7. and 3.

²¹ The instructions given to the Florentine envoys on October 20, 1461, and the report provided by the envoys at the end of their mission on March 13–14, 1462. Desjardins, *Négociations diplomatiques*, 1859. I. 114, 127–133.

²² Mandell, Creighton, *A History of the Papacy from the Great Schism to the Sack of Rome*. New York, 1897. III. 278.

that he would only provide a maximum of 10,000 soldiers for the operation.²³ Nevertheless, for the Pope, recognizing the Anjou claims would have been too high a price for uncertain military assistance, so he rejected the proposal.

The French embassy coincided with the appearance of Poděbrady's envoys in Rome, who were determined to, albeit unsuccessfully, reaffirm the Prague Compactata that guaranteed the freedom of the Czech church. An interesting situation arose because one of the leading proponents of conciliarism, Piccolomini, as Pope Pius, no longer recognised the decisions made at the Council of Basel. The Pope cleverly used this as a tactical move to present the French monarch as an example to the Czechs. He portrayed the French king as someone willing to accept the authority of the Holy See by abolishing the Pragmatic Sanction. In reality, it seems that in Rome, both the disappointed French and Czech policies found common ground at this point.²⁴

George of Poděbrady sought to break out of the political isolation stifling his country and embarked on a grand diplomatic manoeuvre. His envoy and trusted representative, the Frenchman Antoine Marini, proposed a large European coalition-based crusade in which the Bohemian king would have played a leading role. As Poděbrady's relations with Frederick III, the Holy Roman Emperor, had deteriorated by this time, the Czech ruler sought closer ties with Poland and then France. He also counted on Hungary as a natural ally since Matthias' wife was his daughter. To achieve his goal, Marini explored potential European powers one by one: in August 1462, he negotiated with Venice,²⁵ interested in the fight against the Turks, and in October, he engaged with the French king, who, due to his growing animosity toward Rome, appeared to be an ideal partner for Czech politics.

However, Louis XI did not want to sever ties with the Pope but rather exert pressure on him. Additionally, the Czech connections raised suspicions at the Burgundian court that the 1457 coalition might be revived, and the issue of Luxemburg could resurface. The French king did promise assistance in the fight

²³ The letter from Venice to his Papal envoy on March 19, 1462. "Regiam Majestatem Franchorum sperandum est et pro suo naturali more et persuasionibus V. S. inductam si non plures saltem X milia pugnatorum ad hanc expeditionem missuram esse." In: *Magyar diplomáciai emlékek Mátyás király korából*. Eds. Nagy, Iván – Nyáry, Albert, Budapest, 1875. I. (No. 77.) 120. [hereinafter MDE].

²⁴ Our intuition is reinforced by the fact that the Czech envoy negotiating in Rome at this time, Zdenek Kostka, will lead the French delegation two years later, which initiates the Peace Plan. According to Macek, Antoine Marini, the later engine of Franco-Bohemian relations, also took part in the 1462 Roman negotiations, where he may have become acquainted with the French anti-papal sentiments. Macek, Josef, "Le mouvement conciliaire, Louis XI et Georges de Podebrady", = *Historica* 15, 1967, 23–24.; Pius's memoirs do not mention Marini's presence. *Feljegyzések, II/2.* (cap. 7. 15.) 328–330.

²⁵ The minutes of the Venetian Council dated August 9, 1462. MDE, I. (No. 111.) 178–179.

against the Turks,²⁶ but tried to reassure Philip the Good as well.²⁷ Marini's negotiations in November with the Burgundian court were not as successful. The Duke did commit to the fight against the Turks once more, but he wanted to lead the campaign himself, was suspicious of Poděbrady, and considered the Papal alliance indispensable for the success of the action.²⁸

Furthermore, it seems that Marini acted independently during the negotiations. While in Venice, he appeared only as a representative of the Bohemian king, but at the French court, he negotiated on behalf of the Polish ruler and Matthias as well – all of this apparently without the knowledge of the Hungarian court.²⁹ However, the diplomatic manoeuvres did not help. XI. Louis's energies were tied up in repurchasing the cities in the Somme region that had previously been pledged to Burgundy in the 1435 Arras Treaty. The transaction, which took place in the autumn of 1463, did not go smoothly. Although Duke Philip the Good was inclined to agree, partly to allocate the more than 400,000 écu received from it for financing a crusade, his son, the future Charles the Bold, firmly rejected the offer. These negotiations reignited tensions between the two states, stemming in part from their previous strained relationship.

Moreover, another critical French diplomatic endeavour concerning Naples also took a wrong turn. In the summer of that year, the Anjou forces suffered several defeats in southern Italy, weakening Louis's arguments in favour of the René faction in Rome. The other front, involving Aragon, showed more promise:

²⁶ Venice learned about the French stance regarding the anti-Turkish coalition from the returning Marini's report, which seemed positive to them at the time. In the same document, they informed the French about the danger threatening Hungary. The State Council's letter dated March 17, 1463, addressed to King Louis XI. MDE, I. (No. 124.) 197–198.

²⁷ King Louis XI's letter to Duke Philip the Good of Burgundy, dated October 12, 1462, in which he declares that he will not act against the interests of Burgundy: "Si vous avons bien voulu escrire ces choses, afin que en soiez adverty, et aussy pour vous acertener que se ledit roy de Behaigne vouloit parler ou faire mention dudit duché de Luxembourg, ou d'autre chose quelconque qui vous peust fournir à prejudice, nous n'y entendrons en quelque maniere, mais vous en edvertirons.": *Lettres de Louis XI ...*, (No. LII.) 83.; The question became important because negotiations between the French and Burgundians were already underway for the repurchase of the Somme River towns (see below), and a precondition for this was that Louis would renounce his claims to Luxembourg, which he did on November 25th. Lavissee, Ernest, *Histoire de France illustrée*. Paris, 1911. IV./2. 340. note 1.

²⁸ Paviot, *Les ducs de Bourgogne*, 2003. 161–162.

²⁹ In the Venetian minutes of August 9, 1462, which have already been mentioned, the following statement can be found: "Spectabili militi domino Antonis Gallico, oratori Serenissimi D. Regis Bohemie qui ad presentiam nostram venit (...)": MDE, I. (No. 111.) 178.; However, Louis XI writes about the same matter as follows: "le roy de Behaigne nous a puis nagueres escript, par homme propre qu'il a envoyé devers nous, que, se nostre plaisir estoit, luy et les rois de Hongrie et de Poulaine desireroient bien avoir aliance et confederation avec nous, principalement pour l'exclusion des ennemys de la foy chrestienne.": *Lettres de Louis XI...*, (No. LII.) 82–83.

the French crown's intervention in the succession disputes on the Iberian Peninsula led to the occupation of Roussillon and Cerdagne territories, although not without considerable difficulty.³⁰ However, Louis was troubled by the end of Lancaster rule in England, known as the Wars of the Roses. His fears of a potential new English invasion grew.³¹ These commitments seriously constrained France's manoeuvrability.

In the meantime, Pius continued to work on the envisioned Christian alliance. In early spring of 1463, he first sent a legate to Burgundy and then aimed to involve Hungary and once again, specifically, France in the crusade.³² On July 19th, he successfully brokered the Peace of Wiener Neustadt between the Holy Roman Emperor and the Hungarian ruler, which was a prerequisite for the anti-Ottoman action on Matthias' part.³³ Thanks to this agree, on September 12th, Venice and Hungary formed an alliance. They agreed that the Republic would attack the Peloponnese Peninsula, while Matthias would focus on Bosnia. The Signoria also provided financial assistance to the Hungarian ruler.³⁴

In the autumn, another positive turn of events occurred in the planned war effort: the Hungarian-Venetian coalition was supplemented by an offer from Burgundy. In September 1463, Guillaume Fillastre, the envoy of the Duke, promised 6,000 soldiers.³⁵ On October 19th, he signed a three-year alliance with the Holy See and Venice. The Duke himself announced in late December that he would set off for the East in the following May.³⁶

Although Philip the Good's commitment can be considered sincere, his illness and resistance from his advisers raised doubts about his actual participation in the anti-Turkish campaigns. King Louis XI himself made the release of his vassal contingent on the outcome of peace negotiations with the English Crown.³⁷ Convincing the French proved to be a tough nut to crack. When Niccolò Canale, the Venetian envoy, encouraged the king to participate in the coalition in the autumn of 1463, he received evasive responses. While the French king declared in November that he was willing to equip 12 warships worth 300,000 ducats for

³⁰ Heers, Jacques, *Louis XI*. Paris, 2003. 58–59.

³¹ Henry VI of Lancaster's wife, Margaret of Anjou (a distant cousin of Louis XI), sought refuge in France and then, with the help of Louis, attempted to regain her husband's throne. Gillingham, John, *A Rózsák háborúja*. Budapest, 1985. 178–179.; The French monarch in 1462–1463 implemented defensive measures along the entire western coast, fearing a potential English invasion. See *Lettres de Louis XI...*, (Nos. XLII–LII.) 67–83.; Favier, Jean, *Louis XI*. Paris, 2001. 442–444.

³² *Feljegyzések*, II/2. (cap. 12.14–16.) 548–50.; The Pope sent Teodoro Lelli, Bishop of Feltre, to France, and Domenico de Lucca, Bishop of Torcello, to Hungary, and they also held negotiations in Venice. MDE, I. (No. 128.) 204–205.

³³ Kubinyi, András, *Mátyás király*. Budapest, 2001. 51–52.

³⁴ The total sum was determined at 4,000 ducats per month in January 1464, later increased to 6,000 ducats. Teke, *Az itáliai államok*, 1990. 248. and note 20.

³⁵ Creighton, *A History of the Papacy*, 1897. III. 315–316.

³⁶ Schnerb, *L'État*, 2005. 314.; Setton, *The Papacy*, 1978. 249.

³⁷ Paviot, *Les ducs de Bourgogne*, 2003. 162.

the enterprise and in his December letter to Florence stated that the transfer of Genoa, over which he now had only nominal control, to Milan was justified by the peace in Italy and the cooperation against the Turks,³⁸ he did not consider the elderly Burgundian duke suitable for participation in the campaign. He believed that Philip the Good would die on the way, so it would be better if he gave the money allocated for the crusade to Matthias Corvinus.³⁹ The king was sceptical about the war itself, but he criticized its implementation, especially. The death of the Burgundian ruler would have brought to power in his country the French-averse forces represented by his son (the future Charles the Bold), which was not in the interest of Louis XI.

It appears that the personal behaviour of the Signoria's envoy did not contribute to winning French support. His lengthy negotiations at the French court aroused suspicion rather than facilitating persuasion. On April 22, 1464, for instance, Louis XI stated in written instructions to his Roman envoys that the entire anti-Turkish action merely served the selfish interests of the Venetians, and they would be the only beneficiaries of its success.⁴⁰ He was equally outraged by the Pope's Neapolitan politics. In May, he expressed his fear that Canale wanted to poison him, "because every great plot seems like a small matter in the eyes of the Venetians."⁴¹

The contrasts and suspicions were at work elsewhere as well. The Venetians, while signalling their commitment to the anti-Turkish alliance, harboured doubts about the Pope's true intentions. This suspicion is evident in a letter from the Doge Cristoforo Moro on November 12, 1463, in which he wrote to Pope Pius II that he would only be willing to engage in the battle against the Infidels if it were done jointly with him and the Burgundians.⁴² The fear of going to war alone is also seen a few months later when the Signoria informed its envoy to France that the success of the entire crusade depended on Hungary.⁴³ On the same day, the Republic informed its envoy in Hungary that negotiations with France were progressing well, and Louis promised 10,000 soldiers for four months if they

³⁸ "Quod profecto Italiae paci ac faciliori contra Theucrum (sic!) expeditioni quam plurimum conducere arbitrabimur.": December 24, 1463. *Lettres de Louis XI...*, (No. CIX) 177.

³⁹ "Gli dise che forsa meglio seria de fare spendere li soy dinari in lo re de Ungaria.": Report of Maletta, the Milanese envoy, on November 23, 1463. Mandrot, Bernard de, *Dépêches des ambassadeurs milanais en France sous Louis XI et Francesco Sforza*. Paris, 1916. I. 325.

⁴⁰ We know Louis's statements from Alberico Maletta, the Milanese envoy's report on April 27, 1464. "Poy fa dire el Re che questa impresa non era honorevolle al papa nè al duca de Bergogna et farla con Veneziani mercadanti insolenti et popolari, li quali non fano questa guerra per reverentio de Dio, ma per suo proprio (...)": Mandrot, *Dépêches des ambassadeurs*, 1919. II. 94.

⁴¹ May 26, 1464. "che ogni grandissimo tradimento parira piccolo ad Venesani.": Mandrot, *Dépêches des ambassadeurs*, 1919. II. 151.

⁴² Setton, *The Papacy*, 1978. 266 and note 122.

⁴³ Letter from Venice on March 2, 1464, to his envoy, Niccolò Canale. See: Setton, *The Papacy*, 1978. 267–268.

could secure the Anglo-French peace.⁴⁴ It appears that the Venetians wanted to secure the support of both powers by assuring their rulers that the other state had already committed.

In reality, the French king displayed strong aversion to the campaign in his entire demeanor. It is indicative that the Duke of Milan had to apologise for his participation in the coalition. In his letter to King Louis dated April 18, Francesco Sforza explained that the planned Papal-Burgundian action did not contradict the interests of France but served to save Hungary and thereby Italy.⁴⁵ Similarly, when in May, Angelo de Rieti, the Papal Legate, sought 60,000 ducats of aid for the Hungarian king from the tithe,⁴⁶ Louis refused to grant the tithe exemption.

Among the treaties concluded in the autumn of 1463, only the Venetian-Hungarian one proved effective. While Matthias launched a campaign into Bosnia, retaking Jajce and surrounding strongholds, Venice seized almost the entire Peloponnese and the island of Lesbos.

During this time, Poděbrady's diplomacy also became active. His envoy, Marini, negotiated in Hungary in the spring of 1464. Here, he presented the commonly referred to the "Eternal Peace" Plan of the Bohemian king, envisioning a European forum where members would hold regular consultations to maintain peace among themselves and to drive the Turks out.⁴⁷ The proposal conspicuously excluded the Pope and the Holy Roman Emperor, aiming to increase the influence of the French monarch in European politics.⁴⁸ The Hungarian royal council was indeed outraged that Marini had negotiated with the

⁴⁴ The Venetian Council's letter of authorization to their envoy in Hungary on March 2, 1464. "Habemus quoque apud serenissimum regem Franchorum unum oratorem nostrum, qui litteris suis dierum 27 et 29 januarii decursi significavit nobis optimam mentem et dispositionem majestatis sue, que optulerat X mille bellatores armatos et bonarum gentium ad hanc sanctam expeditionem; sed necessere fore commemorabat, quod vel concordia, vel treugue sequerentur inter Serenitatem Suam et Regem Anglie (...)": MDE, I. (No. 163) 270.; The same is confirmed by Alberico Maletta, the Milanese envoy's report from France on April 27, 1464: "Et seguendo questa pace tra questi duy regnami, se farà tale possanza per laquale certamente el Turcho (...) et ch'el Re de Franza sarà contento pagare a sue proprie spese X^m combatanti per IIII mesi (...)": Mandrot, *Dépêches des ambassadeurs*, 1919. II. 94.

⁴⁵ Mandrot, *Dépêches des ambassadeurs*, 1919. II. 36–37.

⁴⁶ Report of the Milanese envoy from the French court on May 12, 1464: "D. Angelo rechiedo ch'el Re voglia essere contento lassare tore LX^m ducati de questa decima per dare al re de Ungaria.": Mandrot, *Dépêches des ambassadeurs*, 1919. II. 133.

⁴⁷ Experts in the history of the European Union consider this document an important precursor to the formation of continental unity, e.g., Bóka, Éva, *Az európai egység gondolat fejlődéstörténete*. Budapest, 2001.; Németh, István, *Európa-tervek 1300–1945. Visszapillantás a jövőbe*. Budapest, 2001.; Zourek, Jaroslav, "Le projet du roi tchèque George de Podiebrad", = *Annuaire français de droit international* 10, 1964, 14–37.

⁴⁸ Therefore, researchers in the field of medieval diplomatic history generally interpret the proposal as the Bohemian king's attempt to break free from the political vacuum that was suffocating his country. Fraknói, Vilmos, *Hunyadi Mátyás király*. Budapest,

French on behalf of Matthias two years earlier. However, they agreed to let the envoy represent both the Hungarian king and the king of Poland alongside King Louis XI.⁴⁹

King Louis XI was indeed ambivalent about the Czech proposal because his prelates rejected forming an alliance with the Utraquist ruler. He didn't want to break with the Pope and including Luxemburg in the agreement would have also offended Burgundian interests. Taking into account the stance of the clergy, Louis ultimately rejected the plan that omitted the Pope and the Emperor but, in the summer of 1464, a general non-binding Franco-Bohemian friendship agreement was signed.⁵⁰

In this way, we can witness the formation of two major European coalitions under the pretext of anti-Ottoman cooperation: one led by the Pope, consisting of Venice and Burgundy, and the other, excluding the Pope, composed of Czechs, French, and Poles. Both emphasised the expulsion of the pagans in their rhetoric, but only the first coalition materialised, and military activity was expected from it. Matthias, driven by the idea of the widest possible alliance, maintained relations with both groups, although it is unclear to what extent he was aware of the Czech plan's true, anti-Papal objectives. Despite the grand promises of their allies, when Pope Pius took to the field in the summer of 1464, he practically had only the support of the Venetians. The Republic sent about a dozen galleys to the meeting announced in Ancona, under the personal command of Doge Cristoforo Moro. Philip the Good's fleet arrived late. The Burgundian navy, led by the illegitimate children of Philip, received the news in Marseilles on August 15 that the Pope had died. The French monarch failed to fulfil any of his earlier promises.

Pope Pius was succeeded by Pietro Barbo, a Venetian by origin, who took the name Pope Paul II. He aimed to continue the fight against the Turks. Organizing this effort, he entrusted the French Cardinal Guillaume d'Estouteville and Cardinal Carvajal with the revenue from the Tolfa alum mines and, in theory, the church tax levied for the Crusades. However, the Italian states did not provide the support expected by the Pope,⁵¹ and other Western powers politely evaded his call for assistance.

1890. 139–140.; *Tervezet a Kereszténység leendő békéjéről*. (Documenta Historica, 39.) Ed. Karáth, Tamás, Szeged, 1998. [hereinafter Karáth].

⁴⁹ The only edition of the letter testifying to this problem: *Epistolae Matthiae Corvini regis*. Ed. Kelcz, Imre, Cassovia, 1743. (No. LXII.) 138–140. See also: Karáth, 1998. 16–18.

⁵⁰ The meeting between the Czech envoys and the French king took place on June 30th. According to a travel report prepared by one of the delegation members, the French king specifically requested that in the alliance to be concluded, the title of Luxemburg, which was claimed by both the Czech crown and Burgundy, should not be among Poděbrady's titles. The English edition of the text: *Diary of an Embassy from King of George of Bohemia to King Louis XI of France*. Ed. Wratislaw, A. H., London, 1871. 33, 49–52.

⁵¹ MDE, II. (No. 167.) 230–237.; Letter of Pope Paul II regarding expected aid from the Italian states at the turn of 1464–1465. Incorrectly dated to 1471. See also: Setton, *The Papacy*, 1978. 275. note 14.

Matthias received 40,000 ducats from the Pius treasury “pro subventionem sancte expeditionis adversus impium Turcum” (for the support of the holy expedition against the impious Turks),⁵² and later, he received additional aid from the Pope in 1465–1466. He defended his Bosnian conquests from a Turkish counterattack. The Venetians continued their struggle until 1479, but the Burgundian ships did not participate in the fight against the Infidels, apart from a minor conflict against Berber pirates besieging Ceuta.⁵³

With the death of Pius, the anti-Turkish coalitions fell apart. Matthias broke ties with the Bohemian king, Venice withdrew its financial support from him, and a conflict arose between them over the matter of Senj.⁵⁴ The Burgundians also gave up on the crusade because Charles the Bold, who exercised power on behalf of his father, focused on French politics. Concurrently, the Bohemian king’s visions of broad European cooperation also faded away.⁵⁵

The relationship between King Louis XI and Matthias did not break entirely. In early 1465, the Hungarian ruler still expressed hope that the French king would participate in a reformed anti-Turkish alliance,⁵⁶ but he was disappointed. Louis was no longer in a position to support any international actions, as he was preoccupied with the War of the Public Weal, a conflict against significant regional barons. So when his envoy, a certain Knight George, visited the Hungarian court during his Central European tour, he could only reassure Matthias of Louis’s friendly intentions, without offering more substantial support.⁵⁷

Summary

In the 1450s and 1460s, the containment of the Ottoman Empire appeared as a European concern, leading to various plans and initiatives. The Oath of the Pheasant and Pope Pius II’s call for the conversion of Mehmed II to Christianity fell within the realm of romantic ideals of the time. The Mantua Congress and the Pope’s later efforts for alliance-building set more realistic goals. Venice, Hungary, and Burgundy, later led by the dreams of his prince, took the expulsion of the Infidels from the continent seriously, given the threat posed by the Ottomans. However, France, which was strengthening after the Hundred Years’ War and seeking its place in the Western European power structure, became too committed to its own immediate political goals to seriously support abstract plans like the expulsion of the Turks. Declarations of intent in this direction served only to neutralise its adversaries or to more effectively assert own interests. As we have seen, they did not contribute materially or militarily to the realization of the crusading idea.

⁵² Setton, *The Papacy*, 1978. 272.

⁵³ Schnerb, *L’État*, 2005. 316–317.

⁵⁴ Teke, *Az itáliei államok*, 1990. 250–251.

⁵⁵ Németh, *Európa-tervek*, 2001. 52.; Karáth, 1998. 18.

⁵⁶ *Mátyás király levelei*. Ed. Fraknói, Vilmos, Budapest, 1893. I. (No. 49.) 64–65. [hereinafter MKL].

⁵⁷ The letter itself is not known, only the Hungarian response dated December 2, 1465. MKL, (No. 95.) 130–131.

Zoltán Véber*

HUNGARIANS AND THE CRUSADE FROM THE FALL OF CONSTANTINOPLE TO THE REGENSBURG REICHSTAG

The fall of Constantinople in 1453 to the Ottoman Empire had a significant impact on the European public opinion, prompting the two prominent leaders of the Christian world, Pope Nicholas V and Emperor Frederick III, to collaboratively orchestrate a crusade with the aim of recapturing the city. The news reached Rome in July 1453, prompting an immediate response from the Pope. His primary objective was to establish peace in Italy, and he promptly dispatched legates to Venice, King Alfonso V of Naples, as well as the opposing parties of Milan and Florence.¹ On September 10th, he appointed six cardinals to lead a committee tasked with addressing the Turkish threat.² On September 30th, he promulgated the crusading bull titled “Etsi ecclesia Christi,” in which the Pope implored all Christian rulers to defend Christianity.³ In addition to these actions, the Pope also dispatched legates to European courts to encourage monarchs to participate in the crusade.

Simultaneously, Holy Roman Emperor Frederick III embarked on active organizational endeavours. He established communication with the Pontiff and convened an imperial assembly, extending invitations not only to the German princely states but also to other sovereigns of the Christian realm. The purpose was to collaboratively formulate the intricate specifics of the envisaged crusade.⁴ The prospect of broadening the geographical scope of the crusade beyond the confines of Europe appeared auspicious: emissaries from the Karamanid principality materialised in October 1453 at the respective courts of Emperor

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¹ Setton, Kenneth, *The Papacy and the Levant (1205–1571)*. Vol. II. The Fifteenth Century. Philadelphia, 1978. 140.; The Pope’s initiative proved successful, and subsequently, the conflict referred to as the “Wars in Lombardy” was concluded by the Treaty of Lodi on April 9, 1454. Ibid.

² Nowak, Jessika, *Ein Kardinal im Zeitalter der Renaissance*. Tübingen, 2011. 128.

³ The text of the bull can be found in: *Deutsche Reichstagsakten unter Kaiser Friedrich III*. Vol. V./1.: 1453–1454. Eds. Weigel, Helmut – Grüneisen, Henny, Göttingen, 1969. 59. [hereinafter DRTA]; and in English translation: *The Crusade of 1456. Texts and Documentation in Translation*. Ed. Mixson, James D., Toronto–Buffalo–London, 2022. 39.

⁴ The text of the invitation can be found in: DRTA 96.

Frederick III in Vienna and King Ladislaus Posthumous in Prague. These envoys conveyed intelligence concerning an impending Turkish incursion targeting Hungary,⁵ concurrently proffering their willingness to cooperate with the Christian coalition. In conjunction with this, a meticulously devised military strategy was proffered.⁶

The previously unprecedented collaboration, which commenced with great promise, ultimately failed to materialise. During the Reichstag convened in Regensburg in April 1454, Emperor Frederick III was conspicuously absent, and only a few nations were represented. Consequently, an agreement on the specifics of the crusade could not be reached, resulting in its postponement to an autumn Reichstag.⁷ Aeneas Silvius Piccolomini, the Bishop of Siena, who served as the secretary and diplomat of Emperor Frederick III, attributed significant responsibility for this state of affairs to the Hungarians. His assertion was based on the claim that the Emperor's absence from the assembly was due to threats from Hungarian captain-general, John Hunyadi.⁸ Despite the invitation, the Hungarians refrained from sending envoys to Regensburg, in spite of being in the utmost peril in the impending situation.⁹ In my study, I endeavour to address the question of why, despite initially indicating their intention to participate, the Hungarians ultimately abstained from engaging in the organization of the crusade that was launched with an exceptional display of cooperation. By focusing on this particular turning point, I seek to provide a more thus holistic understanding of the complex dynamics surrounding the crusading effort at the time.

The 1453 crusade has been the subject of extensive research, involving renowned historians such as Ludwig Pastor,¹⁰ Kenneth Setton,¹¹ and Norman Housley.¹² These scholars have meticulously analysed the events surrounding the organization of the crusade, with a particular focus on the activities of the papacy and the empire. However, their works have only tangentially addressed Hungary's role. In a separate study, János M. Bak dedicated attention to Hungary's involvement in the 15th-century crusades, yet he did not extensively cover the events between 1453 and 1454.¹³

⁵ *Der Briefwechsel des Eneas Silvius Piccolomini* (Fontes Rerum Austriacarum II/LXVIII). Ed. Wolkan, Rudolf, Vienna, 1918. 348, 361. [hereinafter *Der Briefwechsel*]

⁶ The military plan can be found in: DRTA 45.

⁷ Setton, *The Papacy*, 1978. 151–152.

⁸ *Der Briefwechsel*, 1918. 459.

⁹ *Der Briefwechsel*, 1918. 495.

¹⁰ Pastor, Ludwig, *The History of the Popes from the Close of the Middle Ages*. Vols I–V. Transl. Antobus, Frederick Ignatius, London, 1891–1900.

¹¹ Setton, *The Papacy*, 1978.

¹² Housley, Norman, *The Later Crusades, 1274–1580. From Lyons to Alcazar*, Oxford, 1992.; Housley, Norman, *Religious Warfare in Europe, 1400–1536*. Oxford, 2002.; Housley, Norman, *Crusading and the Ottoman Threat, 1453–1505*. Oxford, 2013.

¹³ Bak, János, “Hungary and Crusading in the Fifteenth Century”, In. Housley, Norman (ed.), *Crusading in the Fifteenth Century. Message and Impact*. Basingstoke,

The focal point of my research focuses on the source collection titled *Deutsche Reichstagsakten (1453–1454)*, which encompasses nearly the entire spectrum of German-related materials concerning the fall of Constantinople and the crusade occurring between this event and the Regensburg Imperial Diet.¹⁴ Within this collection, besides German sources, a comprehensive array of papal and Hungarian sources can be found, which hold significant importance from the perspective of my research. Among the German sources, there are the correspondences led by Aeneas Silvius Piccolomini.¹⁵ He served as the secretary and diplomat to Emperor Frederick III, leveraging his distinguished position and Hungarian affiliations to provide abundant information on the subject. Furthermore, of notable significance is the correspondence of John Vitéz of Zredna, who acted as the chancellor of Ladislaus V and spearheaded diplomatic exchanges on behalf of the Hungarian ruler.¹⁶ His correspondence offers supplementary insights for my study. To ensure the comprehensiveness of my research, both published and unpublished¹⁷ Hungarian sources will be integrated, aiming to construct the most comprehensive depiction of the events. In the context of John Hunyadi's Italian diplomatic connections, I will also consider the Venetian and Milanese sources published within the study titled *Relazioni di Giovanni di Hunedoara con l'Italia negli anni 1452–1453* by Francisc Pall, which provides Venetian and Milanese sources within the framework of Hunyadi's Italian interactions.¹⁸

As a result of the 1396 Battle of Nicopolis defeat, it became evident to the rulers of the Kingdom of Hungary that there was insufficient capacity within the realm to undertake a *passagium generale* against the Ottoman Empire. Consequently, efforts were redirected towards the bolstering of border defences and the engagement in defensive *passagium particular*.¹⁹ Hungary assumed the role of the “bulwark and shield of Christianity” within the phraseology of Hungarian monarchs during this juncture, a designation that would persist throughout subsequent centuries.²⁰ The strategic shift was instigated by the actions of John Hunyadi, who once again adopted an aggressive stance against

2004. 116–127.

¹⁴ DRTA

¹⁵ *Der Briefwechsel*, 1918.

¹⁶ *Johannes de Zredna Vitéz. Opera quae supersunt*. Ed. Boronkai, Iván, Budapest, 1980. [hereinafter Johannes de Zredna Vitéz]

¹⁷ Hungarian National Archives, Budapest. Pre-Mohács Collection. Medieval Charters (DL) and Collection of Photocopies (DF) (<https://archive.hungaricana.hu/en/charters/>) [hereinafter DL or DF].

¹⁸ Pall, Francisc, “Relazioni di Giovanni di Hunedoara con l'Italia negli anni 1452–1453. II. Documenti”, = *Revue des études Sud-Est européennes* 13, 1975, 559–594.

¹⁹ Bárány, Attila, “Magyarország és a kései kereszties hadjáratok”, In. Laszlovszky, József (ed.), *Magyarország és a kereszties háborúk. Lovagrendek és emlékeik*. Budapest, 2006. 148.

²⁰ Bak, Hungary and Crusading, 2004. 118.

the Ottomans.²¹ His victories in the early 1440s rekindled hope within European public sentiment that the expulsion of the Turks from the Balkans was a plausible endeavour.

During the reign of King Vladislaus, Hunyadi led two campaigns against the Ottomans, followed by an additional one during his tenure as governor. Although he recognised the disparity between the opposing factions after the defeat at the Battle of Kosovo Polje in 1448, which necessitated a transition to a defensive strategy, his rhetoric and diplomacy remained focused on the formation of an anti-Turkish alliance. Hence, it is perplexing that the Hungarians abstained from participating in the Regensburg Imperial Diet convened in 1453 to deliberate on the proposed crusade, especially considering the context of their prior campaigns where the establishment of a broad international coalition appeared viable.

In Hunyadi's previous campaigns, aside from support from the Holy See, only 1–2 countries provided tangible assistance. However, in the present context, one of the principal organisers was Emperor Frederick III, with whom the Hungarians had engaged in warfare during their earlier campaigns, leading to the necessity of leaving troops within the nation due to the emperor's involvement. Moreover, it would have been in the Hungarians' vital interest to partake in the crusade of 1453, particularly as reports surfaced indicating that the Ottoman objective in 1454 was the assault on Belgrade.²²

Our investigation should commence with the immediate precursor to the Crusade, the siege of Constantinople. Hungary's general-captain, Hunyadi, was apprised of the city's siege while he was stationed in the southern region of Transylvania, presumably awaiting news.²³ However, he was unable to dispatch armed assistance to the city; nevertheless, according to Greek sources, he attempted through diplomatic means to impede the city's fall. Concurrently, his presence in Transylvania might have contributed to the spreading rumour in the Turkish camp that the Hungarians were advancing towards Constantinople with a substantial cavalry and infantry force to liberate the city.²⁴ The diplomatic initiative did not prove successful, marking the downfall of the last significant impediment between the Ottoman Empire and the Kingdom of Hungary.

²¹ For the most recent summary of John Hunyadi's campaigns, consult: Pálosfalvi, Tamás, *From Nicopolis to Mohács*. Leiden, 2018. 99–187.

²² *A zichi és vásonkeői gróf Zichy-család idősb ágának okmánytára. Codex diplomaticus domus senioris comitum Zichy de Zich et Vasonkeo*. Vols I–XII. Eds. Nagy, Imre – Nagy, Iván – Véghely, Dezső – Kammerer, Ernő – Lukcsics, Pál, Pest–Budapest, 1872–1931. XII. 237–239. [hereinafter Zichy].

²³ 4 May: Lipova, DL 14 683; 17–20 May: Timișoara DL 85 897, 31 646; 27 May: Caransebeș, *Krassó vármegye története. III. Oklevéltár*. Ed. Pesthy, Frigyes, Budapest, 1882. 395.; 31 May – 1 Jun: Hațeg, Mihályi, János, *Máramarosi diplomák a XIV. és XV. századból*. Máramaros-Sziget, 1900. 365–367.; 4 Jun: Hunedoara, DL 240 063.

²⁴ Kapitánffy, István, *Hungarobyzantina. Bizánc és a görögség középkori magyarországi forrásokban*. Budapest, 2003. 99–119.; Spremić, Momčilo, *Despot Djuradj Brankovic i Njegovo Doba*. Beograd, 1994. 402.

The Sultan, having conquered the Byzantine capital, decided to restore the territorial heritage of the Byzantine Emperors. He issued ultimatums to all the countries that had previously been part of this Empire. Among others, he sent envoys to Moldavia, Kaffa and Chios, and in these messages he also mentioned that he would arrive in Rome in less than two years.²⁵ The Sultan also made demands on the Serbian despot Đurađ Branković, despite the fact that he had provided auxiliary troops for the siege of Constantinople.²⁶ A letter from a Trau (Trogir) humanist, Johannes Sobote (Ivan Sobota), dated 24 July 1453, tells us that Mehmed II demanded from the despot two towns in the north of Serbia, on the Hungarian border, Golubac and Smederevo, from where he could easily launch an attack against the Hungarians.²⁷ These open threats provoked a forced reaction from the Hungarians. Subsequently, the most important task became to prepare for the imminent Turkish attack.

In 1452, the Duke of Milan, Francesco Sforza, approached John Hunyadi and Ulrich of Cilli with an offer for a military alliance against Venice.²⁸ The purpose of the negotiations was for the Hungarians to join the Lombard War on the side of Milan and Florence, opening a new front in Friuli. According to the agreement, the Hungarians were supposed to lead at least 12,000 cavalymen into Italy in exchange for appropriate payment. After winning the war with Hungarian assistance, Sforza would turn against the Ottomans.²⁹ After more than a year of negotiations, the Florentine-Milanese envoy departed from Milan on June 27 to finalise the contract.³⁰ At that time, they were still unaware of the fall of Constantinople. By the time the envoys reached Vienna, they found themselves in changed circumstances, and thus, due to the Turkish threat, Hunyadi and his associates withdrew from finalizing the contract.

Prior to the proclamation of the crusader bull, the Hungarian king convened an assembly on August 31, 1453, in Pressburg (Pozsony, Bratislava) where one

²⁵ Pilat, Liviu – Ovidiu, Cristea, *The Ottoman Threat and Crusading on the eastern of Christendom during the 15th Century*. Leiden–Boston, 2017. 123.

²⁶ The Sultan requested assistance troops from the Serbian despot for the campaign against the Karamanids. The 1500 Serbian cavalry were ultimately deployed against Constantinople. Once they realised that they were not being deployed against Karaman, they wanted to return home, but they were threatened with death if they did so.; Spremić, Despot Djurdj, 1994. 402–403.; Mihailović, Konstantin, *The Memoirs of a Janissary*. Transl. Stoltz, Benjamin, Ann Arbor, MI, 1975. 46.

²⁷ “quod gravius longe, imperator Teucorum a Georgio despote petit, ut duo oppida sibi tradat: Golumbac et Smedrovo, oppida munitissima, ex quibus facillimus aditus in Panoniam est Georgius despotus vehementer trepidat.” – Rački, Franjo, “Prilozi za sbirku srbskih i bosanskih listina”, In. *Rad Jugoslavenska akademija znanosti i umjetnosti*. Vol. I. Zagreb, 1867, 151–152.

²⁸ Pall, Francisc, “Relazioni di Giovanni di Hunedoara con l’Italia negli anni 1452–1453. I. Documenti inediti preceduti da una studio”, = *Revue des études Sud-Est européennes* 13, 1975, 453–478. 454.

²⁹ Pall, Relazioni, 1975. I. 460.

³⁰ Pall, Relazioni, 1975. I. 468.

of the main objectives was to discuss defence against the Turks.³¹ Unfortunately, there are no surviving sources detailing the results of this assembly, leading us to infer that significant decisions on the matter were likely not reached. One possible explanation for this could be the absence of John Hunyadi, the central figure in the fight against the Turks, who was not present at the gathering. The general-captain only set out from Transylvania to Hungary on September 24, where he concluded a *bonam et optimam* peace with Vladislav II, the Voivode of Wallachia.³² The conflict between them had arisen the previous year due to disputes over the possession of the Transylvanian fortresses of Fogaras (Făgăraș) and Omlás (Amlaș, both Romania) which were part of Vladislaus' Hungarian fiefs but were sought after by Hunyadi.³³ While the dispute between the voivode and Hunyadi would resurface in the following years, the loss of Constantinople temporarily reconciled the two parties.

In October, Hunyadi joined the king, who arrived in Prague with a large entourage, where he was crowned on October 28.³⁴ It was at this time that the Karamanid envoy Ladislaus Posthumous arrived at the court of Prague,³⁵ who reported on the future Turkish invasion³⁶ and came up with a realistic war plan. According to the plan, both the Karamans and the Christians would launch simultaneous attacks against the Ottomans, necessitating a division of their forces. The Christian forces would be composed of three armies: 15–20 thousand Hungarians stationed along the Danube; Skanderbeg with 30 thousand Albanian and Italian soldiers advancing slowly towards Greece; and a fleet of 40–50 galleys patrolling between Thessalonica and Constantinople. The Karamans believed that such a large Christian force could easily defeat the remaining Ottoman army in Europe, offering various potential methods for victory.³⁷ From the Hungarian side, the plan seemed realistic, as an army specified

³¹ Mályusz, Elemér, “A magyar rendi állam Hunyadi korában. I.”, = *Századok* 91, 1957, 47–123. 96. Footnote 220.; Information about the objectives of the assembly can be obtained from a letter by Aeneas Silvius Piccolomini: “rex Hungarie in Posonio conventum regni habet; tria ibi tractantur: de modo expellendi latrones, qui regnum infestant, de pace cum cesare firmanda ac de modis inveniendis, per quos Turchorum furor ne ulterius serpat comprimi possit.” – Der Briefwechsel, 1918. 241.

³² *Documenta Romaniae Historica. D. Relații între Țările Române*. Vol. I. (1222–1456). Eds. Pascu, Ștefan – Cihodaru, Constantin – Gündisch, Konrad G. – Mioc, Damaschin – Pervain, Viorica, Bucharest, 1977. 436.

³³ Lukács, Antal, “John Hunyadi and the Duchy of Făgăraș”, In. Dumitran, Ana – Mádly, Loránd – Simon, Alexandru (eds.), *Extincta est lucerna orbis. John Hunyadi and his Time*. Cluj-Napoca, 2009. 211–216.

³⁴ Held, Jospeh, *Hunyadi: Legend and Reality*. New York, 1985. 148.; Elekes, Lajos, *Hunyadi*. Budapest, 1952. 412.

³⁵ Der Briefwechsel, 1918. 348.

³⁶ “(...) orator quidam Caramanni, qui se dicit Turchorum inimicum, quamvis sit ipse Turchus, hortatusque est magnopere cesarem, ut exercitum contra Turchum prepararet, quem venturum prope diem in Hungariam asserit.” – Der Briefwechsel, 1918. 361.

³⁷ DRTA 44–46.

in the plan could be fielded by the Kingdom of Hungary along with its vassals. However, the establishment of the other two armies encountered obstacles. The addition of Italian forces was necessary to supplement the Albanian contingent, and the formation of the galleys could only be provided by the Italian states. The Wars in Lombardy, mentioned earlier, affected almost all the Italian states, including the Kingdom of Naples and Venice, from which the greatest numbers of galleys and soldiers could be expected. No sources have survived regarding the Hungarian reaction to the plan, but indirect information offers some insights. On November 14, 1453, Hunyadi requested permission from the Venetian Senate to travel to Venice and other parts of Italy with a retinue of 300 men.³⁸ While the exact purpose of Hunyadi's visit is not mentioned in the source, later information reveals that it was aimed at fostering peace and reconciliation in Italy with his numerous entourage. The Venetians accepted Hunyadi's request, although the specifics of their response are not documented.³⁹

A few days after the arrival of the Hungarian envoy in Venice, the Venetian Senate made a decision that diverged completely from Hunyadi's plan. In contrast to Hunyadi's peace intentions, they sought to involve the Hungarian captain general in the Wars in Lombardy, as previously attempted by the Milanese-Florentine alliance.⁴⁰ To achieve their goal, they dispatched envoys to Hungary. We will return to the results of this embassy in due course.

After the coronation of King Ladislaus V, John Hunyadi spent an additional two months in Prague and only returned to Hungary towards the end of the year. Although he was no longer the governor, he continued to wield significant power as the chief captain of the country and the manager of royal revenues.⁴¹ Consequently, with the likely consent of the king, in January 1454, to avert the anticipated Turkish attack, he called for a diet where the total mobilization of the country's armed forces was decreed. This plan has been a very heavy burden for the country, and therefore the text of the law itself promises that no such unusual measures will ever be taken in the future, only because of the certainty of a Turkish attack.⁴²

³⁸ "Quod illustri domino Johanni de Hunyad, supremo capitaneo regie Maiestatis in regno Hungarie, qui sicut nobis expeni 281 fecit, personaliter venire disposuit Venetias et ad alie partes Italie, fiat salvusconductus in plena, valida et honorabili forma pro eo cum personis III c., tam equestribus quam pedestribus et omnibus rebus et bonis suis, sicut a nostro dominio requisivit." – Pall, *Relazioni*, 1975. II. 588.

³⁹ *Ibid.*

⁴⁰ "(...) et apertissime videatur, quod solum et unicum remedium sit habere aliquem notabilem et dignum favorem ultramontanorum sintque temptanda omnia et specialiter sperare possit de favore illustris domini Jani, gubernatoris regni Hungarie." – Pall, *Relazioni*, 1975. II. 589.

⁴¹ Elekes, Hunyadi, 1952. 422.

⁴² Mályusz, *A magyar rendi állam*, 1957. 97.; *Online Decreta Regni Mediaevalis Hungariae. The Laws of the Medieval Kingdom of Hungary*. Ed. Bak, János, Budapest. 2019. [hereinafter *Online Decreta Regni*]

Concurrently with the parliament, the Venetian envoy arrived to engage Hunyadi, seeking to involve the Hungarians in the Wars in Lombardy. The content of the message is discerned from the envoy's instructions: he was to convey to Hunyadi that Venice also held great interest in the Ottoman issue and was prepared to offer assistance against them, contingent upon the resolution of the war.⁴³ Given their awareness that the Hungarians still held a truce with the Turks, they requested their military aid against the Milanese-Florentine alliance.⁴⁴ According to the plan, Hunyadi was initially expected to provide 5,000 to 6,000 cavalry to Italy, with the possibility of this number rising to 10,000 in a subsequent phase, for which substantial payment was pledged.⁴⁵ It is evident that the Venetians did not consider the peace advocated by Hunyadi and the Pope; instead, they aimed to secure Hungarian military support, much like Francesco Sforza had sought against the Venetians earlier. Conceiving the Italian peace as impractical, Hunyadi did not opt for the realization of Karaman's military plan at the Hungarian assembly. Instead, the intention was to raise a sizable army for the country's defence. Ultimately, Hunyadi declined the Venetian offer, citing the impending Turkish threat. Instead, he reiterated his offer to personally travel to Italy with 300 cavalry to mediate peace, now openly expressing this stance, in contrast to the previous source.⁴⁶ The Venetian Senate, however, diplomatically rejected Hunyadi's proposal, citing the Pope's involvement as the mediator and the presence of Venetian envoys in Rome for those negotiations.⁴⁷

At the same time as the Hungarian Diet, the papal legate Johannes de Castiglione arrived in Prague to discuss the crusade with the Hungarian king.⁴⁸ The cardinals and the Pope deemed the assistance of the Hungarians

⁴³ "(...) la conservation del qual felicia et prosperità contra gli perfidi Turchi in vero non manco desideremo che la propria salute e bene del stato nostro. La perfidia et rabia deli qual Turchi ad voler esser fugada et extincta, certa cosa è principalmente a questo esser de bixogno gli favori et forze si de quelle parte come etiam gli nostri, in la qual materia sempre se troveremo per honor de dio et ben de la xristiana religion ottimamente disposti. E' vero che al presente nui havemo considerato i termeni e condition dele cose nostre de Lombardia per la guerra che nui havemo, la qual ne è pur molto grave." – Pall, *Relazioni*, 1975. II. 591.

⁴⁴ "Havemo etiamdio considerato che quello reame e parte de li sono in triegue et sufferentie cum Turchi. Per le qual caxon et azoché piú expedita et liberamente quando fosse el tempo possiamo attender cum ogni nostro poter contra i perfidi Turchi, havessamo gratissimo et in singularissima complacentia che ala excellentia del pref ato signor Janus piacesse personalmente conferirsse agli favori nostri, cum quel più numero de zente piacesse ad la excellentia sua." – *Ibid.*

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*

⁴⁶ "Et dicemo che dapoiché la illustre signoria sua personalmente cum le forze e zentedarme soe, per le cose de li occorente, non vede poter descender a queste parte, ma, cum la persona e cum III c. cavali solamente é contenta venire et interponerse dela pace etc." – Pall, *Relazioni*, 1975. II. 593–594.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*

⁴⁸ Nowak, *Ein Kardinal*, 2011. 142.

particularly significant. This is attested by the memorandum prepared by the cardinals, which formed the basis for the Crusader bull. The text stated that if the papacy only concerned itself with its own safety and did not provide aid to the enemies of the Turks, then apart from the Hungarians, no one else would remain to whom the Turks' opponents could later turn. However, the Hungarians lacked sufficient strength against the Turks, so if they did not receive assistance from the Pope, they would become their adversaries.⁴⁹ Perhaps precisely for this reason, the same memorandum also highlights that the utmost attention should be directed towards the envoys in Hungary.⁵⁰

The legate conveyed the Pope's decision to finance the campaign by opening "both treasuries",⁵¹ granting spiritual indulgences and promising material support in the form of monetary aid. He made significant preparations for organizing the crusade against the Turks and sought the participation of the Hungarians.⁵² The king gave his consent to the crusade, but the final decision required the approval of the Hungarian estates. For this purpose, a meeting was convened in February 1454, which ultimately took place in March in Buda.⁵³ The legate himself was present at this assembly.

The sources do not provide information about the course of the assembly; however, based on the royal propositions and subsequent developments following the deliberations, we can somewhat reconstruct it. What decision was reached regarding the original purpose of the assembly, the Crusade? From the royal propositions, we know that the present estates were to determine how the Hungarians should participate in the Crusade⁵⁴ and with what forces, as well as to select the envoy who would inform the Pope of the decisions made during the deliberations.⁵⁵ Negotiations concerning the Crusade did not yield results in the end. According to the legate, the Hungarians are very zealous about the Turkish issue, but they still have an 11-month truce

⁴⁹ "Nulli populi propinqui hosti remanent, quorum opera et ope uti possumus, nisi forte deus Ungaros interea conservabit, quorum tantillae potentia difficillimum et impossibile esset exprimere inimicum, qui etiam inimici nostri, ut credendum est, habituri sunt, si se ita solos ab omnibus nostris destitutos viderent." – DRTA 66.

⁵⁰ "Quamquam vero in deliberatione publicanda sint nominandi reges ordine suo, ad quos mittetur: Romanorum, Francie, Hispanie, Anglie, tamen oportebit esse accuratorem legationem ad regem Hungarie missam (...)" – DRTA 67.

⁵¹ "et quod effuso largissime utroque thesauro sibi credito," – Johannes de Zredna Vitéz, 1980. 190.

⁵² DRTA 77–80.

⁵³ Johannes de Zredna Vitéz, 1980. 190.; Mályusz, *A magyar rendi állam*, 1957. 97–98.

⁵⁴ "(...) ut domini nunc presentes de omni intencione eorum ac modo et ordine quibus contra Turcos secundum requisicionem domini pape procedere volunt esse possint, dominum Regem ex nunc clare abhinc informent." – Birk, Ernest, *Beiträge zur Geschichte der Königin Elisabeth von Ungern und ihres Sohnes König Ladislaus. 1440–1457*. (Quellen und Forschungen zur Vaterländischen Geschichte, Literatur und Kunst). Wien, 1849. 246.

⁵⁵ "(...) ut pro parte Regni Hungariae statim eligantur et nominentur Nuncij qui pro re premissa profecturi sunt (...)" – Ibid.

with them, which is why they are not taking any measures.⁵⁶ The reference to the truce is particularly interesting because neither the King in Prague nor Hunyadi in the previous January diet mentioned the truce, and they were already preparing for the assured Turkish attack.⁵⁷ On February 14, Piccolomini still thought that the Hungarians would send envoys to the Regensburg assembly. Furthermore, even before the start of the March assembly, in a letter dated March 1, Hunyadi writes about raising an army against the Ottomans.⁵⁸ Why could Hunyadi's and the Hungarian estates' standpoint change so quickly? As we know, on March 16, Johannes de Castiglione, the papal legate, first reports of the truce and the passivity of the Hungarians. Thus, it is my assumption that sometime in the first week of March, the Hungarians received information that altered their standpoint. This is reinforced by the fact that during the March assembly, they eventually resorted to imposing taxes, which equated to abandoning the large army scheme that was under preparation January on.⁵⁹ Where could this information have come from? While we cannot provide a definite answer to this question, we can propose a hypothesis based on indirect information that can be incorporated into the subsequent course of events.

A letter dated May 31, 1454, from Đurađ Branković, the Serbian despot, has survived, providing insights into his earlier diplomatic efforts. According to this letter, the despot had previously sent envoys to Hunyadi and other barons in Buda. The envoy met with Hunyadi, who entrusted the envoy with negotiating a ceasefire.⁶⁰ The joint mention of the barons, and Hunyadi in the letter could suggest that Branković dispatched his familiaris to one of the diets, of which there were two held in Buda at the time. The possibility of his attendance at an assembly is supported by the fact that Branković was a Hungarian vassal with significant fiefs in the country, implying that he might have received invitations to attend such assemblies. It's important to note that the despot had considerable influence in the Ottoman court, serving as a communication conduit between the Ottomans and Christians. This role ex-

⁵⁶ "ait Hungaros ad rem Turchorum fervidos esse, quamvis habent inducias cum his ad menses undecim." – Der Briefwechsel, 1918. 457.; This was reported to Piccolomini by the papal nuncio who was present at the negotiations.

⁵⁷ "(...) quomodo perfidissimus imperator Turcorum potentissima paganorum coadunatione solito multiplicata in finale exterminium firma intentione machinatur hoc regnum nostrum Hungarie subintrare" – Online Decreta Regni, 2019. 621.

⁵⁸ Hunyadi, in the name of the King, exempted the town of Pressburg from participating in the campaign against the Turks.; Mályusz, *A magyar rendi állam*, 1957. 118–119.; DF 242 465.

⁵⁹ Mályusz, *A magyar rendi állam*, 1957. 118–119.

⁶⁰ "(...) miseramus Budam ad eandem et alios barones egregium Ludovicum familiarem nostrum specialem, eoque tunc intimaverat nobis magnificus Johannes de Hunyad comes perpetuus Bistriciensis, filius noster, ut laboraremus, qualiter possemus inducere imperatorem Turcarum ad componendas Trewgas pacis cum serenissimo domino Ladislao rege etc. et prefatis dominis baronibus." – Zichy XII. 237–239.

tended beyond the Hungarians, as he facilitated negotiations between various Western Balkan states and the Sultan.⁶¹ Based on the information previously mentioned, the January diet can be excluded. Since news about the existing truce and the Hungarian reluctance to engage in war as a consequence, on March 16, or, it is more likely that in the early days of March Hunyadi received information from Branković's envoy that prompted the Hungarians to abandon the ambitious plan proposed in January and citing the ongoing truce, they declined to participate in the crusade. This information might have pertained to the Sultan's openness to extending the truce established in 1451, which was set to expire in autumn 1454. By adhering to the existing truce, it seems the Sultan would not initiate any military actions in the year 1454. The hypothesis is supported by Hunyadi's message to the Emperor in April that there would be peace in 1454, and that the Sultan was not planning an attack.⁶² This is also confirmed by a letter of 15 May from Oswald Wenzel, mayor of Hermannstadt (Sibiu, Romania) to the city of Vienna, informing the city that Turkish merchants were visiting the fairs in Wallachia in large numbers, from which he concludes that the Ottomans would not attack that year.⁶³

The aim of the Ottoman Sultan with may have been, in my opinion, to conceal his upcoming campaign against Serbia in the summer of 1454. Thus, he disinformed the Serbian despot with the purpose of preventing both him and the Hungarians from preparing for the Turkish attack.

It seems that the information had the desired effect. Trusting in the extension of the ceasefire and the ongoing 11-month truce, the Hungarians declined participation in the organization of the crusade. They may have feared that their involvement in planning the crusade could be interpreted by the Sultan as a breach of the ceasefire, potentially jeopardizing the extension of the treaty. Additionally, due to the negative experiences from previous crusades, they might not have had full confidence in its success. Consequently, the Hungarians did not participate in the Regensburg Reichstag. Hunyadi considered the Turkish issue closed and, leaving the assembly, he moved with his army to the western part of the country to address the depredations of Nabuchodo-

⁶¹ Spremić, Despot Djuradj, 1994. 366, 372–373.

⁶² “Quies hoc anno erit, exinde totis sese conatibus in Christianos agitabunt.” – DRTA 132.

⁶³ “(...) auch hab ich vernomen von aienem mein ausspeher dem wolczeglauben ist, der erst vor vier tagen von den lannden übergepirg herkömen ist von der spehung, wy dy tuerken, gleich oder nahent in als grosser menig, als dy Walachen selbst daselbs in den steten der jarmeerkt vnd anderswo vmbvaren kaufmanschaft treiben, darumb, wy wol wir glauben vnd auch hoffen, daz dy türken den frid, der da zwischen in vnd dem wirdigen kunig reich ze Vngernn vnd lannden, dy zu dem künig reich gehören (...)” – *Urkundenbuch zur Geschichte der Deutschen in Siebenbürgen*. Eds. Zimmermann, Franz – Werner, Carl – Müller, Georg – Gündisch, Gustav. Vols. I–VII. Hermannstadt–Bucharest, 1892–1991. no. 2785. [hereinafter *Urkundenbuch*]

nozor Ankenreuter (Nankenreiter), the mercenary leader of the Cilli family in the western regions of Hungary.⁶⁴

Ultimately, the Hungarian trust in the armistice and its extension proved unfounded. The Sultan, as put by Hunyadi, “breaking the armistice and peace,” laid siege to the Serbian capital, Smederevo, during the summer.⁶⁵ Subsequently, the Hungarian stance underwent a complete transformation. Realizing the deteriorating situation, they fully engaged in organizing the crusade, dispatching envoys to European royal courts, and Hungarian representatives appeared at the Reichstag in Frankfurt and Wiener Neustadt.⁶⁶

Although the Sultan besieged the Serbian capital, he ultimately failed to capture it. Following this, Hunyadi penetrated into Serbia and defeated a significant number of Turkish forces left as rear-guard at Kruševac. Subsequently, he ventured deep into Ottoman territory, plundering and burning the settlements that lay in his path.⁶⁷

Thus, the true reason behind Hungary’s initial lack of participation in organizing the crusade until the attack on Serbia can be attributed to several factors. After 1448, Hunyadi came to realise that the Kingdom of Hungary alone, or with limited foreign assistance, could not defeat the Ottoman Empire. He was sceptical of the feasibility of a complete European alliance, which later proved to be accurate. Therefore, upon receiving information that the Ottomans would not attack in 1454 and given the opportunity to negotiate a new ceasefire, Hunyadi did not risk jeopardizing the potential for a new armistice by openly committing to the crusade.

The news brought by the Serbian despot was most likely part of Ottoman disinformation tactics. These tactics aimed to prevent the unity of Christian countries by generating conflicts or proposing favourable peace offers. Using such tactics, the Ottomans managed to thwart the Christian coalition in events like the 1444 conflict.⁶⁸ Another telling example is their successful prevention of Bosnia’s assistance to Hunyadi’s campaign through the generation of internal conflicts in 1448.⁶⁹ Their role in the war between Ragusa and the Duke of St. Sava between 1451 and 1454 serves as yet another example of their strategy in action.⁷⁰ In light of these findings, it can be argued that Hun-

⁶⁴ Nógrády, Árpád, “Csepreg ostroma és Sárvár bevétele 1454-ben”, = *Vasi Szemle* 6, 2010, 685–97.

⁶⁵ DF 258 541. 85.

⁶⁶ Albert Vetési served as an envoy on behalf of the Hungarian king and Hunyadi, traveling to Venice, Rome, and later to the Holy Roman Empire: Fraknói, Vilmos, *Mátyás király magyar diplomatái*. Budapest, 1898. 36–37.; Hungarian envoys at the Reichstag in Frankfurt and Wiener Neustadt: Setton, *The Papacy*, 1978. 158.

⁶⁷ Spremić, Despot Djurdj, 1994. 419–422.

⁶⁸ Engel, Pál, “János Hunyadi and the Peace ‘of Szeged’”, = *Acta Orientalia Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae* 47, 1994, 241–57.

⁶⁹ Filipović, Emir O., *Bosansko kraljevstvo i Osmansko carstvo (1386–1463)*. Sarajevo, 2019. 354–356.

⁷⁰ Ćirković, Sima, *Herceg Stefan Vukcic Kosaca i njegovo doba*. Beograd 1964.

gary's initial absence from crusade organization can be attributed to Ottoman misinformation. The Ottomans effectively exploited the uncertainty and hesitation among Christian countries to create divisions and prevent their united response to the threat.

In conclusion, it is worthwhile to thoroughly examine whether the ceasefire of 1451 that Hunyadi referred to was indeed still in effect, or if the Hungarian authorities utilised it as a pretext for their abstention from participating in the crusade. The ceasefire, established on November 24, 1451, for a duration of three years, was brokered between the new Ottoman Sultan Mehmed II and the Hungarian governor John Hunyadi.⁷¹ The pivotal question arises: after King Ladislaus V regained his freedom from Emperor Frederick III at the end of 1452 and Hunyadi resigned from his governorship in January 1453, did the ceasefire continue to be binding? Sima Ćirković's 1971 study postulates that the ceasefire ceased with the King's ascension to the throne and, subsequently, the Hungarians employed it later on merely to substantiate their passivity during the Siege of Constantinople and the period of the crusade.⁷² Ćirković's argument finds support in the resolutions of the early 1454 assembly, and he interprets Hunyadi's wartime decisions in January as integral to the crusade. This analysis is drawn from the realm of public wartime policy and leads to the conclusion that the leaders of Hungary perceived the ceasefire as no longer in effect. While this study does not claim to deliver a definitive answer to the question, it endeavours to re-evaluate Ćirković's hypothesis by incorporating new sources.

Given that the ceasefire was specifically negotiated between Governor John Hunyadi and Sultan Mehmed II, it is plausible to infer that due to the changing leadership, the Hungarian side deemed it necessary to send an envoy to establish whether the new Sultan upheld the pre-existing peace. This decision to dispatch an envoy was not influenced by King Ladislaus V's communication to the Pope on January 16, 1453, affirming the continued ceasefire with the Ottomans.⁷³ On March 6, news reached Ragusa of a Hungarian envoy heading to the Ottoman court, with a request for inclusion or confirmation of the existing or newly established ceasefire. This letter suggests that the Hungarian envoys were sent to Constantinople to either validate the prior peace or negotiate a new one on behalf of the King.

⁷¹ *Acte și fragmente privitoare la istoria românilor*. Vol. III. Ed. Iorga, Nicolae, Bucharest, 1897. 23–27.

⁷² Ćirković, Sima, "Despot Đurađ Branković i ugarsko-turski pregovori 1454. godine", In. *Glas. SANU* 280/15. 1971. 103–112.

⁷³ "[...] potissime tractatus quidam treugarum in nostra absentia cum Teucrorum imperatore habiti, recto nobis impedimento obsistunt, quominus huic nostro desiderio celeriter satisfieri valeat (...)". In the letter, the Hungarian king, referring to the ongoing truce, his recent assumption of the throne, and the disordered state of his realms, declines the Pope's request for assistance to Constantinople.; Johannes de Zredna Vitéz, 1980. 176.

The Hungarian envoy arrived in Constantinople during the Siege of Constantinople. Byzantine historians offer differing interpretations of the negotiations, yet they generally concur that the discussions centred around the ongoing ceasefire. According to Doukas, the Hungarian envoy arrived bearing a message from Hunyadi, which can be summarised as follows:

“I have surrendered the rule to my lord. Henceforth, I am no longer responsible for keeping my promises. Take back the documents which you gave me and return those which I gave you, and do as you like with the king of Hungary”⁷⁴

During the siege, Sphrantzes, who was present in the city, is unaware whether the envoys arrived from the king or from Hunyadi:

“The Hungarians, however, did dispatch an embassy with the following message to the sultan: “Assuming that you had a peace treaty with the City, we also concluded the treaty with you. Otherwise, we will annul our treaty.” The embassy arrived almost a week before the Turks launched their final assault. If they took the City, they planned to give them the following response: “The City is ours now; depart and be our friends or enemies, according to your wishes.” This is exactly what happened, and the Hungarians received the above answer. If, on the other hand, the City had held out, the Turks would have lifted the siege and responded as follows: “Because of our affection for you and because of the terms of our treaty, we have lifted the siege.” The sultan would then have arranged a treaty with us, we heard, because he said repeatedly: “If I prove unable to conquer the City, I will conclude a peace treaty immediately and observe its terms faithfully until the day I die.”⁷⁵

As we can read above, according to Doukas, the truce ended at the initiative of Hunyadi; however, he does not inform us whether any envoy arrived on behalf of the king to negotiate the truce. Sphrantzes only informs us about the negotiations, but he does not mention the final outcome and only suggests that the sultan left the question open.

After this point, for almost a year, our sources are silent about the truce until the report of the Papal legate at the Hungarian Diet. However, after March 1454, we have several sources that prove the existence of the truce: In April, Hunyadi writes to the emperor that there will be peace this year;⁷⁶ In May, Oswald Wenzel writes hoping that the Turks will maintain peace;⁷⁷ in early August, King Ladislaus V writes to Serbian Despot George Brank-

⁷⁴ Doukas, *Decline and Fall of Byzantium to the Ottoman Turks: An Annotated Translation of “Historia Turco-Byzantina” 1341–1462*. Transl. Magoulias, Harry J., Detroit, 1975. 216–217.

⁷⁵ *The Fall of the Byzantine Empire: A Chronicle by George Sphrantzes, 1401–1477*. Transl. Philippides, Marios, Amherst, MA, 1980. 73.

⁷⁶ DRTA 132.

⁷⁷ Urkundenbuch, no. 2785.

ović about the violated truce.⁷⁸ On November 11, in his letter to Emperor Frederick III, Hunyadi interprets the Turkish attack on Serbia as a breach of the truce.⁷⁹ Then, at the 1455 Reichstag in Wiener Neustadt, the Hungarian envoy explains the earlier passivity with the existence of the armistice.⁸⁰ Based on these sources, we can assume that the truce did not cease. But then why do the sources remain silent about it for almost a year, and why did they assume the Turkish attack until March 1454? In my opinion, we can outline two possible explanations:

First, the Hungarian envoys received a positive response from the sultan about maintaining the truce. However, upon receiving news of the fall of Constantinople, learning about ultimatums sent to Moldavia and Serbia, and hearing reports from the Karamanid envoy about Turkish attacks, the Hungarians started preparing for a Turkish assault. The breach of the truce was not unprecedented: in 1444, Hunyadi and the Hungarian king broke the peace with the Turks, so their fear was not unfounded.⁸¹ Then, when Branković brought favourable news in March 1454 that the sultan would uphold the truce and not attack, they completely halted preparations aimed at repelling an attack.

The other possible explanation is that the sultan did not respond to the Hungarian envoy's request, leaving the Hungarians uncertain. As a result, the Hungarians expected an attack, which lasted until March 1454.

Summary

According to the hypothesis posited in this paper, the Hungarians ceased their military preparations due to Ottoman disinformation. Consequently, they did not provide a positive response to the papal legate and abstained from participating in the Regensburg imperial assembly. Additionally, for the same reason, they revoked the mobilization order of January 1454. The Ottomans only partially achieved their objectives in this regard. The Hungarian abstention significantly obstructed the formation of the Crusade, although their attack on Serbia in 1454 did not attain its goals due to Hunyadi's swift response.

To substantiate my hypothesis, an examination of Hungarian diplomatic actions, particularly those of John Hunyadi, subsequent to the fall of Constantinople, was conducted, which effectively illustrated the impact of Ottoman disinformation. Finally, I re-evaluated Čirković's assertion that the

⁷⁸ Johannes de Zredna Vitéz, 1980. 196.

⁷⁹ "(...) dominus et imperator Turcorum violata fide sua paganissima ruptaque truga et pace (...)": DF 258 541. 85.

⁸⁰ "nostris gentibus (...) antea, propter indutias quas cum Turcis habebamus, non licuisset pugnare, nunc autem, quando eas ultimus nuper clausit dies, libenter auxilium et operam nostram pollicemur, (...)" – *Notes et extraits pour servir à l'histoire des croisades au XVe siècle*. Vol. IV. (1453–1476). Ed. Iorga, Nicolae, Bucharest, 1915. 109.

⁸¹ Engel, János Hunyadi, 1994. 241–57.

truce established by Hunyadi and Sultan Mehmed II in 1451 ceased with the ascension of King Ladislaus V. Based on my assumption, the truce continued to persist and was not merely invoked by the Hungarians later to rationalise their passivity.

Alexandru Simon

GIOVANNI MARIO FILELFO AND MICHAEL MARULLUS AT THE HUMANIST FRONTIERS OF THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE: “INTERNATIONAL” AND “NATIONAL” CRUSADING AFTER 1453

Few treatises have attracted the attention received by Giovanni Mario Filelfo's († 1480) *Amyris* (c.1476).¹ Few errant warrior poets have enjoyed the fame bestowed upon Michael <Tarchaniota> Marullus († 1500).² By warfare and verse, the two “seekers” shared the Eastern reigns of Matthias Corvinus and Mehmed II precisely in the mid-1470s.³ Albeit this, Giovanni Mario Filelfo's *Amyris* (its aim and its impact) and Michael⁴ Marullus (his career and his messages) were seldom viewed and analyzed together.⁵ Rather evidently, their official careers

¹ Since, in modern European historiography, the 1850s. (e.g. Favre, Guillaume, “Vie de Jean-Marius Filelfo”, In: Favre, Guillaume, *Mélanges d'histoire littéraire*. Vol. I. Ed. Adert, Jacques, Geneva, 1856. 9–221. Appendix [2], “Notice sur Amyris”, 176–218. 177–178.); In Romanian historiography, Giovanni Mario Filelfo remained a marginal figure. (except for Iorga, Nicolae, *Studii istorice asupra Chiliei și Cetății Albe*. Bucharest, 1899. 143.; Pippidi, Andrei, “1475: atacul otoman asupra Cetății Albe”, = *Analele Putnei* 7, 2011, 29–36.) For *Amyris* in Hungarian historiography, see for instance the entries in Orbán, Áron, *The Role of Astrology in the Poetry of Janus Pannonius*. (PhD Thesis – Central European University). Budapest, 2012. 31, 86. (the Pannonius-Filelfo(s) “connection” is worth a closer look)

² Since, in Romanian historiography, the 1930s. (Marcu, Alexandru, “Umanistul Marullo Tarchaniota în părțile nostre către 1470–1480”, = *Studii Italiene* 6, 1939, 159–164.); In European, and American, historiography, since well before. (e.g. Hole, Charles, *A Brief Biographical Dictionary*. Ed. Wheeler, William A., New York, 1866. Letter M, 271.); For Hungary, though (or precisely because of it), alike *Amyris*, Marullus' verses attracted attention already in the 1800s, we cite Szabics, Imre, “A trubadúrlíra és Balassi Bálint szerelmi költészete”, = *Irodalomtörténeti Közlemények* 100: 5–6, 1996, 543–581. 547.

³ For the anti-Ottoman regional context in the 1460–1470s: Pálosfálvi, Tamás, *From Nicopolis to Mohács: A History of Hungarian-Ottoman Warfare. 1389–1526*. Leiden–Boston, 2018. 211–218.; Pilat, Liviu – Cristea, Ovidiu, *The Ottoman Threat and Crusading on the Eastern Border of Christendom during the 15th Century*. Leiden–Boston, 2017 [2018]. 160–164.

⁴ We use the names' English form because of disputed origin and belonging of Marullus.

⁵ See in particular Haskell, Yasmin, “The Tristia of a Greek Refugee: Michael Marullus and the Politics of Latin Subjectivity after the Fall of Constantinople (1453)”, = *Proceedings of the Cambridge Philological Society* 44, 1998, 110–136. 120 (note 38), 126 (note 62).; Jovanović, Neven, “Dubrovnik in the Corpus of Eastern Adriatic Humanist Laudationes urbium”, = *Dubrovnik Annals* 16, 2012, 23–36. 29, 30 (note 23), 35 (note 37).

did not give grounds for such togetherness.⁶ Quite obviously, their backgrounds and their paths were most similar.⁷

Giovanni Mario (usually named Gianmario) Filelfo (1426–1480) was the son of the reputed *Philorhomaïos anthropos*⁸ Francesco Filelfo (1398–1481).⁹ Self-proclaimed *Costantinopolitanus*, Michael Marullus

„found safe haven on the Ragusan and the Venetian shores of the Adriatic after the Ottoman conquests of Byzantium (1453) and of the Morea (1460).¹⁰ History has it that both Marullus and Filelfo Jr. were to return to the East,¹¹ where Gianmario, at least, had certainly been born to a Byzantine mother, in Genoese Pera.¹² Michael and Gianmario served as mercenaries with the sword (Marullus)¹³ and with the feather (Filelfo Jr.).¹⁴ Both the armed bard and the political literate then refuted – in written above – all their masters: Dracula allegedly, in the case of Michael Marullus,¹⁵ and Mehmed II (via a wealthy merchant from Ancona named Othman Lillo Ferducci¹⁶), in Gianmario Filelfo’s

⁶ E.g. Enenkel, Karl, *Die Erfindung des Menschen: Die Autobiographik des frühneuzeitlichen Humanismus von Petrarca bis Lipsius*. Berlin–New York, 2008. 194–195, 368–428.

⁷ The Raugsa (Dubrovnik) connection is – perhaps – the most striking one, at this stage.

⁸ On the “title”, see Obolensky, Dimtri, “A *Philorhomaïos Anthropos*: Metropolitan Cyprian of Kiev and All Russia (1375-1406)”, = *Dumbarton Oaks Papers* 32, 1978, 77–98.

⁹ “(...) a clearing house for Greek intellectuals in Quattrocento Italy, second in this role only to Cardinal Bessarion (...)”; Monfasani, John, “Filelfo and the Byzantines”, In: De Keyser, Jeroen (ed.), *Francesco Filelfo: Man of Letter*. Leiden–Boston, 2019. 13–21. 21.

¹⁰ See Birher, Andreas, “Gefährliche *Urbanitas* by Michael Marullus”, = *Frühmittelalterliche Studien* 45, 2011, 277–294.; Birher, Andreas, “Der Feind als Held. Türkische Heroen in der italienischen Renaissance: Gian Mario Filelfo’s Amyris im Kontext turkophiler Schriften des 15. Jahrhunderts”, In: Aurnhammer, Achim – Pfister, Manfred (eds.), *Heroen und Heroisierungen in der Renaissance*. Wiesbaden, 2013. 165–180. Especially 172–174.

¹¹ After the conclusion of Church Union at the Council of Ferrara-Florence (1439), Filelfo Sr. sent his son to Constantinople to further his education, with little success. Gianmario was recalled to Italy in 1441. Marullus’ return to the East was an even more traumatic experience. (For the context, see also Bisaha, Nancy, *Creating East and West: Renaissance Humanists and the Ottoman Turks*. Philadelphia, PA, 2004. 89–92, 210, note 179.)

¹² For a good overview of Filelfo Jr.’s extended family and “international” career, Pignatti, Franco, “Giovanni Mario Filelfo”, In: *Dizionario Biografico degli Italiani* 47, 1997, sub voce.

¹³ Once again, if we are to fully trust Marullus’ own words. People usually did trust him.

¹⁴ As condottieri, or as gladiators, a concept which is not at all a novelty. (Nisard, Charles, *Les gladiateurs de la république des lettres aux XV^e, XVI^e et XVII^e siècles*. Vols I–II. Paris, 1860.)

¹⁵ See also Simon, Alexandru, “Imperator et dux: On the Churches and the Fortresses of Dracula”, = *Studia Antiqua et Archaeologica* 27, suppl., 2021, 31–60. 32, 41.

¹⁶ <https://www.dailysabah.com/arts/academics-discover-550-year-old-italian-epic-poem-for-sultan-mehmed/news>. Additional comments are most likely not required in this case.

case.¹⁷ Last but not least, Filelfo Jr.'s and Marullus' verses were meant to serve both the poetic ear of the audience,¹⁸ as well – if this is at all true¹⁹ – the taste of the same audience for political innuendo,²⁰ which is certainly not the same.”²¹

Destiny at the Border

Filelfo Jr.'s *Amyris* started as a panegyric for Mehmed II²² and ended as a crusader appeal to the sceptical duke of Milan, Galeazzo Maria Sforza.²³ The “schizoid” product draws therefore attention upon the forces that the Alexan-

¹⁷ Pop, Ioan-Aurel – Simon, Alexandru, “Francesco Filelfo și soarta *Daciilor* în secolul al XV-lea”, In. Zahariuc, Petronel – Rădvan, Laurențiu – Pilat, Liviu (eds.), *Istoria ca pasiune. Studii oferite profesorului Alexandru-Florin Platon la 65 de ani*. Iași, 2022. 145–161. 150.

¹⁸ Marullus was obviously a poet. But the same applies for both Filelfos, who were laurel poets/poets laureate. For Verona, who commissioned him *ad legendum et docendum studia humanitatis* (1467), Filelfo Jr. was *miles, doctor et poeta laureatus*.; (Biadego, Giuseppe, “Dante e l’umanesimo Veronese”, = *Nuovo Archivio Veneto* 10, 1905, 391–427. 408, 426.)

¹⁹ This could be deemed true in the case of Sforza Milan and its relation with chiefly Filelfo Sr. (with reference also to a well-known “Hunyadi/Corvinus humanist”, see De Keyser, Jeroen, *Francesco Filelfo and Francesco Sforza. Critical Edition of Filelfo’s Sphortias, De Genuensium deditione, Oratio parentalis, and his Polemical Exchange with Galeotto Marzio*. Hildesheim, 2015. 301–370.); Filelfo Jr. was closer by nature to the errant ways of Marullus, which led to an open break between father and son in early 1473. (Frassica, Pietro, “I Filelfo: due generazioni di umanisti”, In. *Francesco Filelfo nel quinto centenario della morte*. Padua, 1986. 515–527.); *Amyris*, written prior to mid-1476, may have been a result of this break.

²⁰ With focus on the issue of “origins”, Meserve, Margaret, *Empires of Islam in Renaissance Historical Thought*. Cambridge, MA, 2008. 72–74.; Malcom, Noel, *Useful Enemies: Islam and the Ottoman Empire in Western Political Thought, 1450–1750*. Oxford, 2019. 20–21.

²¹ For the implications this distinction, with focus on *Amyris*, see also Schwoebel, Robert, *The Shadow of the Crescent. The Renaissance Image of the Turk. 1453–1517*. Nieuwkoop, 1967. 148–149.; Hankins, James, “Renaissance Crusaders: Humanist Crusader Literature in the Age of Mehmed II”, = *Dumbarton Oaks Papers* 49, 1995, 111–207. 141–142.

²² Meserve, *Empires of Islam*, 2008. 42.; A dedicatory letter by Ferducci to Mehmed precedes Filelfo Jr.’s treatise, that was concluded however after the death of the Anconitan patron.

²³ Otherwise, Galeazzo Maria Sforza was not a “fan” of crusading. (e.g. Motta, Emilio, “Un ambasciatore tartaro a Venezia, 1476”, = *Ateneo Veneto* 19, 1889, 145–153.); In return, he kept a watchful eye on the events in the East, because of their impact on Italian affairs. This makes the Milanese archives probably the greatest surviving Italian repository on pro- and anti-Ottoman activities after 1453.; (See for instance Pop, Ioan-Aurel, “The Romanians from Moldavia at the Jubilee in Rome (1475)”, = *Il Mar Nero* 9–10, 2019–2020, 163–170.)

der-bound sultan²⁴ had to face in his march towards destiny.²⁵ These enemies were chiefly the Hungarians and the Wallachians in the context of the mid-1470s, when *Amyris* was written,²⁶ after Mehmed's triumph over previously Christendom's greatest hope, the Muslim Turkmen khan, Usun Hassan,²⁷ and after the Ottoman conquest of Genoese Caffa in the Crimea.²⁸

A selection from *Amyris* might be useful. (1) Apollo [!] predicted to Mehmed II that he would vanquish the Bosnians, the Serbians, the Hungarians, the Persians, Usun Hassan himself, and even the descendants of the Rome, the Wallachians "(...) Quin etiam audebis Persarum vertere regem / inque fugam Persas, non obsistente Casane. / Quin etiam Vlachos – licet olim semine Romae, / quale colonorum solet indurescere corpus, / et fieri, ut patria est, Vlachos, de stirpe Quiritum, / sed Scythicae factos patriae de lege colonos. (...) Continuo Vlachi, Romana colonia quondam, / in Scythica composita gelu, coniungere certant / foedera cum populis Hunnis et Pannone rege (...)."²⁹ (2) Without mentioning

²⁴ In this otherwise well-researched medieval question, see also Gatward Cevizli, Antonia, "Bellini, Bronze and Bombards: Sultan Mehmed II's Requests Reconsidered", = *Renaissance Studies* 28, 2014, 748–765.; Fang Ng, Su, *Alexander the Great from Britain to Southeast Asia: Peripheral Empires in the Global Renaissance*. Oxford, 2019. 50, 61.

²⁵ In spite of its manifold problems (revealed throughout time): Babinger, Franz, *Mehmed der Eroberer und seine Zeit: Weltenstürmer einer Zeitenwende*. Munich, 1953. 332–338.

²⁶ "In sum", the selection below could read: in the Scythian cold, the descendants of the Romans (of Quirinus himself), the Wallachians follow the king of the <peoples of the> Huns and [!] of the Pannonians (i.e. even the Roman colonists follow the descendants of the Scythians) against Mehmed II in the conflict north of the Black Sea. Another source could be relevant. According to Sixtus IV instructions for Luca de Tollentis, bishop of Šibenik, sent to Charles the Bold, duke of Burgundy (February 25, 1476), "(...) cum pluribus adiacentibus civitatibus expugnavit et elatus ingenti victoria terra marique formidabiles exercitus classesque praeparat. Unde non solum Ungaris et Valacchis Marique Helespontico ac ipsi Italiae, sed universo Christiano populo excidium clademque extremam minantur (...)" ; (Artner, Edgar, *Magyarország mint a nyugati keresztény művelődés védőbástyája. A Vatikáni Levéltárnak azok az okiratai, melyek őseinknek a Keletről Európát fenyegető veszedelmek ellen kifejtett erőfeszítéseire vonatkoznak (cca. 1214–1606)*. Ed. Szovák, Kornél et al., Budapest, 2004. 111–112. No. 101.)

²⁷ Woods, John E., *The Aqqyunlu: Clan, Confederation, Empire*. Salt Lake City, UT, 1999. 114–116.; Dąbrowska, Małgorzata, "Uzun Hassan's Project of Alliance with the Polish King", In. Dąbrowska, Małgorzata, *Hidden Secrets: Late Byzantium in the Western and Polish Context*. Łódź, 2017. 211–232.; (Usun even offered support against Matthias to Casimir IV Jagiello).

²⁸ On the Ottoman conquest of Caffa, see Schmieder, Felicitas, "At the End of the World and in the Throats of Our Enemies: Latin Europeans in Late Medieval Asia", In. Krötzel, Christian – Mustakallio, Katariina – Tamminen, Miikka (eds.), *Negotiation, Collaboration and Conflict in Ancient and Medieval Communities*. New York, 2022. 275–296. 283–284.

²⁹ Last published in *Amyris. De vita et gestis Mahometi Turcorum imperatoris*. Ed. Manetti, Aldo, Bologna, 1978. 79–80. [hereinafter Filelfo, *Amyris*]; A translation would

the crushing defeat suffered by the Ottomans against Stephen III of Moldova in January 1475 (even the “miracle of Belgrade” of July 1456 had been forgotten),³⁰ Filelfo Jr. focused on the Ottoman conquest of Caffa (June 1475) and subsequent (failed) attack on Cetatea Alba (*Maurocastro*) led by Mehmed, who had also concluded a six months truce with Venice “(...) Foedera at interea qui temptavere Scytharum / finibus adiuti, Romana colonia quondam, / Valachorum populi solo sub rege sedentes, Danubii ad fines coguntur perdere terram / quae Moncastra novo cepit de nomine nomen, / namque simul Capham statuit Mahomettus adire / subdereque armipotens, Genuae ne quando iuventus / cum Scythicis unita viris commixtaque Vlachis / Hunnorum possit cum rege nocere, gravesque / aerumnas Turcis sine defensore parare (...)”³¹

Filelfo Jr.’s words were quite in line with the anti-Ottoman messages of Filelfo Sr., with whom he was at odds since 1473 the latest.³² The latter however had the ear of Galeazzo Maria Sforza, to whom Filelfo Jr. turned at the end of *Amyris* through a most pathetic anti-Ottoman exhortation.³³

read: “(...) Moreover, you will dare to change the King of the Persians, and the Persians will flee, notwithstanding <Usun> Hassan. Moreover, the same with the Wallachians, although once the seed of Rome, the body of such colonists hardens so that it matches the homeland, the Wallachians, from the kindred of Quirinus, but legally turned to Scythian colonists in their homeland (...)”. Based on Sabin words and mythology, following his deification, the founder of Rome, Romulus was also named *Quirinus*, name used for the god of war, also as, in a more Roman manner, *Janus Quirinus*. (Lajoie, Patrice, “Quirinus, un ancien dieu tonnante? Nouvelles hypothèses sur son étymologie et sa nature primitive”, = *Revue de l’Histoire des Religions* 227, 2010, 175–194.); In fifteenth century Italy, the most famous *Janus* was John (i.e. János) Hunyadi (e.g. Iorga, Nicolae, *Acte și fragmente privitoare la istoria românilor*. Vol. III., Bucharest, 1899. 37.: “(...) Un gran contrario di questo re e perche essendo lui disceso da Janus, il qual non era Ungaro nobile, ma Valacho, non di troppo gentil parentella (...)”; from the – erroneously – so-called *Landus* report).

³⁰ As already noticed by Pippidi, 1475: atacul otoman asupra Cetății Albe, 2011. 32.

³¹ Filelfo, *Amyris*, 1978. 196–197.; A translation could read: “(...) For indeed, at the same time, Mehmed decided to come to Caffa and subdue it by the force of arms so that the youth of Genoa, united with the Scythians, and mixed with the Wallachians of the Huns [!], could not, together with their king [Matthias], cause great damage to the defenceless [!] Turks (...)”; Mehmed II had in fact a special interest in the (eventually captured) young boys from Caffa. Stephen III made good use of it. (Simon, Alexandru, “How to Finance a Greek Rite Athlete: Rome, Venice and Stephen III of Moldavia (1470s–1490s)”, In: Baloup, Daniel – Doumerc, Bernard (eds.), *Partir en croisade à la fin du Moyen Âge. Financement et logistique*. Toulouse, 2015. 307–329.)

³² The previously cited lines, “(...) continuo Vlachi, Romana colonia quondam, in Scythica composita gelu, coniungere certant foedera cum populis Hunnis et Pannone rege (...)” (Filelfo, *Amyris*, 1978. 191), seem to have written also to spite his father, who in his polemic with Marzio had ushered the otherwise rather famous words: “(...) Non gelidae montes Daciae, non caelifer Atlas, cum dicat eiusmodi syllabam a Iuvenale nostro produci; qui ait: Et qui vulturibus servabat viscera Dacis (...)”. (Last edited by De Keyser, Francesco Filelfo and Francesco Sforza, 2015. 327.)

³³ Text last published in Filelfo, *Amyris*, 1978. 367–368. (See also the comments of Manetti at 22.)

From the letter sent by Francesco Filelfo to Cicco Simonetta, Galeazzo Maria Sforza's trusted councilor and administrator:³⁴

(...) Sanctissimus D<ominus> noster Sistus, Pontifex Maximus, / omni studio diligentiaque incumbit ad exigendas pecunias, quas mittat ad Matthiam, / Hungariae regem, quo se tueatur ab impetu ferociaque Turcorum. Ii enim nullum tempus reliquum / faciunt, quomodo Balacchos primo, dein Hungaros, opprimant (...). Praeterea Stephanum Vaivodam, qui Moldaviae dominatur, habere paratus copias / militum octoginta milium eumque brevi ad futurum cum opus fuerit. Moldaviam appellant / vulgo Balacchiam Superiore, quae et ipsa in Scythia est, et alias atque alias gentes / complectitur in primisquam et Alanos et Gotthos, populos sane ferocissimos. Gotthos vero et Ge / tas eosdem esse (...) (Rome, 18 February 1476).³⁵

The Milanese duke was – mildly put – skeptical³⁶ when it came to Matthias Corvinus, in particular, and Stephen III of Moldavia, the main figures of anti-Ottoman crusading in 1475–1476.³⁷ Yet, for both Filelfos that did not seem to be major impediment, even if – additionally – almost the entire year 1476 was marked by Italian disputes over the collection and especially the distribution of anti-Ottoman funds.³⁸ While working on *Amyris*, in 1475, Filelfo Jr. had no troubles in praising

³⁴ See chiefly *I Diari di Cicco Simonetta (1473–1476 e 1478)*. Vol. I. Ed. Natale, Alfio-Rosario, Milan, 1962.; (Most relevant for the insightful politics and conduct of the famed Milanese)

³⁵ Biblioteca Trivulziana, Codices, Ms. 873, f. 510^v. (Listed as Ep. 43.23. in Filelfo, *Collected Letters*. Vols I–IV. Ed. De Keyser, Jeroen, Alessandria, 2018.); A translation could read: “(...) Our Most Holy Lord Sixtus, the Supreme Pontiff, does his utmost to request money to send to Matthias, King of Hungary, so that he can defend from the attack and the savagery [i.e. ferocity as well] of the Turks. For they do not allow him any respite, so that they first subdue the Wallachians and then the Hungarians. (...) Stephen Voivode, who rules over Moldavia, has prepared armed forces of 80,000 soldiers, who will soon be at his side [i.e. at Matthias' side], if needed. Moldavia is commonly named Upper Wallachia, and it is situated in Scythia and encompasses different kinds of people, chiefly the Alans and the Goths, obviously most savage [i.e. bellicose too] people. For Goths and Getes are one and the same (...)”. (In relation to the Crimea and Caffa, see therefore Vasiliev, Aleksandr A., *The Goths in the Crimea*. Cambridge, MA, 1936. 241, 245, 260.)

³⁶ Jan Długosz even had it that the duke was the only one unduped by Matthias' crusader lies.; (*Annales seu cronici incliti Regni Poloniae (Jan Długosii Senioris Canonici Cracoviensis Opera omnia, XI–XIV)*. Vol. IV. Ed. Przewdziecki, Alexander, Krakow, 1887. 627.)

³⁷ Housley, Norman, *Crusading and the Ottoman Threat. 1453–1505*. Oxford, 2012. 32–34.

³⁸ Recently: Pop, Ioan-Aurel – Simon, Alexandru, “Crusading in the Time of the Plague: The Arbitrage of Foligno (September 1476)”, = *Revue Roumaine d'Histoire*, 60, 2021 [2022], 43–61.

Sigismondo Malatesta († 1469)³⁹ for his anti-Ottoman commitment during the still ongoing war between Venice and the Porte (1463–1479).⁴⁰ Filelfo, the younger certainly, was apparently as adaptable as the Italian statesmen he, and his father, served.⁴¹ Galeazzo Maria Sforza was however assassinated before he could change his mind.⁴²

In spite of the fact that he, unlike Michael Marullus, had certainly been born on the Bosphorus, in 1426, in a different age,⁴³ as the son of the already famous scholar and political advisor Francesco Filelfo and of his Byzantine wife Theodora, of the resourceful Chrysoloras,⁴⁴ but possibly because he, Filelfo Jr., failed to reach the glory and the influence of Filelfo Sr., Cardinal Bessarion's (†1472) "deputy" for Greeks who had fled fallen Byzantium,⁴⁵ Gianmario Filelfo did not retract his anti-Greek and pro-Turk words, not even after urging Galeazzo Maria Sforza to lead the war against Mehmed.⁴⁶ For Filelfo Jr., the Ottoman conquest of Greek Constantinople had been and was just.⁴⁷ The Turks were the vengeful descend-

³⁹ Malatesta had otherwise no problems in promoting paganism and an entente with Mehmed II, but before the outbreak of the Venetian-Ottoman War.; (e.g. Gatward Cevizli, Antonia, "Mehmed II, Malatesta and Matteo De' Pasti: A Match of Mutual Benefit between the Terrible Turk and a Citizen of Hell", = *Renaissance Studies* 31, 2017, 43–65.)

⁴⁰ See D'Elia, Anthony F., "Genealogy and the Limits of Panegyric: Turks and Huns in Fifteenth-Century Epithalamia", = *The Sixteenth Century Journal* 34, 2003, 973–991. 988.; Filelfo Sr.'s arch-enemy, Pius II, had Malatesta canonized to Hell (1462).

⁴¹ Filelfo Jr. did manage to spend most of his life in the well-paid proximity of important figures, especially from Milan, Venice and Mantua.; (Luzio, Alessandro – Renier, Rodolfo, "I Filelfo e l'umanesimo alla corte dei Gonzaga", = *Giornale Storico della Letteratura Italiana* 16, 1890, 119–127. 207–209.; especially Pignatti, Giovanni Mario Filelfo, 1997. sub voce)

⁴² Adam, Rudolf Georg, *Francesco Filelfo at the Court of Milan (1439–1481): A Contribution to the Study of Humanism in Northern Italy*. Vol. I., (PhD Thesis – University of Oxford). Oxford, 1974. 47–60.; Filelfo Sr. turned against the murdered Galeazzo (26 December 1476).

⁴³ In this respect, see Papacostea, Șerban, "Un humaniste italien au service de Byzance en Europe Centrale au XV^e siècle", = *Études Byzantines et Post-Byzantines* 5, 2006, 365–375.

⁴⁴ Ganchou, Thierry, "Les ultimae voluntates de Manuel et Iōannēs Chrysolōras et le séjour de Francesco Filelfo à Constantinople", = *Bizantinistica*, 7, 2005, 195–285.

⁴⁵ With emphasis on the years after Bessarion's death (1472), see Meserve, Margaret, "Nestor Denied: Francesco Filelfo's Advice to Princes on the Crusade against the Turks", = *Osiris* 25, 2010, 47–65.; Filelfo Sr. however still had an important political audience in Rome and – above-all – in Milan.; (See also Fumagalli, Edoardo, "Francesco Filelfo e il re di Dacia", = *Bullettino dell'Istituto Storico Italiano per il Medio Evo* 110, 2008, 117–130.)

⁴⁶ The initial parts of the manuscript were left completely unaltered by Giovanni Mario.

⁴⁷ See also Koder, Johannes, "Romaioi and Teukroi, Hellenes and Barbaroi, Europe and Asia: Mehmed the Conqueror – Kayser-i Rum and Sulṭān al-barrayn wa-l-bahrayn", In. *Athens Dialogues*. Athens, 2010. 1–29. (available at <http://athensdialogues.chs.harvard.edu>); Peters, Christian, "Claiming and Contesting Trojan Ancestry on Both Sides of the Bosphorus: Epic Answers to an Ethnographic Dispute in Quattrocento Humanist Poetry",

ants of the Trojans, a view quite commonly held in the Italian Peninsula, chiefly after spring 1453.⁴⁸

Fate in the Wilderness

Though in the end he turned against Mehmed, Gianmario Filelfo did not write his lyrics for the Cross.⁴⁹ Michael Marullus too never claimed to have served the Cross during his years “in the wilderness”.⁵⁰ He had fought in fact for his survival.⁵¹ This makes Marullus’ Eastern Renaissance “tunes”, quite rightfully deemed depressed or suicidal,⁵² even more remarkable.⁵³

“(…) **Ep.II.32. Ad Neaeram.**⁵⁴ (...) Iamque nigrescebant prima languine mala / Iunctaque erat lustris altera bruma tribus, / Cum fato rapiente vagus Scythiamque per altam / Auferor et gelidi per loca vasta Getae (...)”⁵⁵

In. Enenkel, Karl – Ottenheim, Konrad Adriaan (eds.), *The Quest for an Appropriate Past in Literature, Art and Architecture*. Leiden–Boston, 2019. 15–46. 26–36.

⁴⁸ In this respect, in relation to *Amyris*’ as well, see also Szilágyi, Emőke Rita, “Teucrisive turci: History of an Ideologically Laden Designation in Fifteenth-Century Latin Works”, In. Fodor, Pál – Ács, Pál (eds.), *Identity and Culture in Ottoman Hungary*. Berlin, 2017. 327–346. 337–338.; Passages from *Amyris* were included also in the “infamous” Philipp Anton Déthier volume (XXII, 1) in the *Monumenta Hungariae Historica* series.; (See also Eldem, Edhem, “The Archaeology of a Photograph: Philipp Anton Dethier and his Group for the History of Greek Art”, = *Jahrbuch des Deutschen Archäologischen Instituts* 127–128, 2012–2013, 499–530. 504, note 14, with additional literature.)

⁴⁹ In fact, one could associate Filelfo Jr. with Paganism, as in the most infamous case of Sigismondo Malatesta, praised by Gianmario.; (D’Elia, Anthony, *Pagan Virtue in a Christian World: Sigismondo Malatesta and the Italian Renaissance*. Cambridge, MA, 2016. 102, 113.)

⁵⁰ Siniosoglou, Niketas, “Love and Exile in Michael Marullus Tarchaniota: Geographical Exile, Spiritual Homelessness, in Receptions of Hellenism in Early Modern Europe”, In. Constantinidou, Natasha – Lamers, Han (eds.), *Receptions of Hellenism in Early Modern Europe, 15–17th Centuries*. Leiden–Boston, 2019. 233–259. 237, 249–250.

⁵¹ Stojanović, Vedran, “Michael Marullus Tarchaniota’s De laudibus Rhacusae and his Early Years”, In. Siedina, Giovanna (ed.), *Essays on the Spread of Humanistic and Renaissance Literary Civilization in the Slavic World (15th–17th Century)*. Florence, 2020. 53–73.

⁵² E.g. the explicit title of Enenkel’s chapter “Todessehnsucht am Schwarzen Meer: Michael Marules’ lyrische Autobiographik im „Exilgedicht” (*De exilio suo*; 1489/90; 1497) und anderen Gedichten” in his *Die Erfindung des Menschen*, 368–428. 389–395.

⁵³ Cseh, Zoltán, “Michael Tarchaniota Marullus. Μιχαήλ Μάρουλλος Ταρχανειώτης (Egy második generációs migráns költő a reneszánsz Itáliában)”, In. Németh, Zoltán – Roguska, Magdalena (eds.), *Transzkulturalizmus és bilingvizmus az irodalomban / Transzkulturalizmus a bilingvizmus v literature*. Nitra, 2018. 19–38. 25–29 (for an overview).

⁵⁴ *Neaera* was Marullus’ “absent girlfriend”. (Haskell, *The Tristia*, 1998. 111, 126, note 63.)

⁵⁵ Republished and translated in Marullus, Michael, *Poems (The I Tatti Renaissance Library, LIV)*. Ed. Fantazzi, Charles, Cambridge, MA, 2012. 81, 83: “(...) My cheeks

(...) **Ep.II.37. *De exilio suo.*** Quid iuvat hostiles totiens fugisse catenas / Atque animam fatis eripuisse suis? / Non ut cognati restarem sanguinis unus / Crudelis patriae qui superesse velim, / Nec quia non animus lucis contemptor abunde est / Et velit exilium vertere posse nece, / Sed ne progenies servire antiqua Marulli / Cogerer indigno tractus ab hoste puer. / Si procul a patria Scythico deprensus in orbe, / Heu facinus, Bessi iussa superba fero / Imperiumque ferox patior dominumque potentem, / Nec nisi libertas nomen inane mea est, / Vtilius fuerat duro servire tyranno / Cumque mea patria cuncta dolenda pati. (...).⁵⁶

Most of his early life (1453/1458/1460–1475/1477)⁵⁷ is “known” through Michael Marullus’ own words, to be found in epigrams first published in a basically “pro-

were already growing dark with soft down and I had reached the age of sixteen when in the grip of fate I was carried off to wander through the depths of Scythia and the desolate wastes of frozen Thrace [!] (...).”; The obvious error makes may be due to the location(s) of the *Getes* (see below).

⁵⁶ Republished and translated in Marullus, *Poems*, 2012. 131, 133: “(...) What good it is to have escaped enemy bondage so many times and rescued my life from the fate that awaited it? Not that I should be the only one left of my line and should wish heartlessly to survive the fall of my native land, nor that I do not thoroughly despise the light of day and would gladly exchange exile for a violent death, but so that I, offspring of the ancient line of Marulli dragged off by a lowly enemy, would not be forced to be a slave. If far from my native land, captured in the region of Scythia – cruel fate! – I endure the harsh rule of a Bessian and submit to the fierce authority of a powerful warlord, and liberty is nothing more than an empty name, it would have been better to serve a cruel tyrant and suffer every torment with my native country (...).”; We must not accept that the Bessi had lived not in the *Scythian lands*, north of the Black Sea, but south of the Lower Danube. Some of them were re-settled by the Romans in Scythia Minor (later Dobrudja), as recorded also by Ovid, and in Dacia. As a result, the Byzantine Kekaumenos (1075/1078) even viewed the Dacians and the Bessi as the “joint-ancestors” of the Vlachs/Wallachians.; (For an overview: Dimitrov, Dimitar, “Christianity among the Thracians: Sources and Problems”, = *Studia Academica Šumenensia* 7, 2020, 187–208. Especially 197–198.)

⁵⁷ The Constantinopolitanus Michael Marullus, an unformed fetus, according to himself, at the time of the Ottoman conquest of Byzantium (29 May 1453), was certainly a member of the Academy of Giovanni Pontano in Naples in the late 1470s, in which laid part of the seeds of the ill-fated rebellion of the barons against King Ferdinand of Aragon (1485), the father-in-law of Matthias Corvinus since the mid-1470s; (Coppini, Donatella, “Michele Marullo Tarcaniota”, In. *Dizionario Biografico degli Italiani* 71, 2008, sub voce).; A member of the Tarchaniontes family (through his mother, Euphrosyne), a family of noble Greek lineage; (McGann, Michael J., “The Ancona Epitaphs of Manilus Marullus”, = *Bibliothèque d’Humanisme et de la Renaissance* 42, 1980, 401–404.); The “genes” of Michael’s father, Manilus, were nevertheless predominant, and – through his father (Manilus) – a descendant of the imperial days of the *Historia Augusta* (This genealogy was most likely a forgery; cf. Syme, Richard, *Ammianus and the Historia Augusta*. Oxford, 1968. 163.) as well as – and more importantly in the Italian Renaissance – the protégé of Lorenzo di Pierfrancesco di Medici.; (See also McGann, Michael J., “The Medicean Dedications of Books 1–3 of the *Hymni naturales* of Michael Marullus”, = *Res Publica litterarum* 3, 1980, 87–90.)

Habsburg’ collection, printed in Rome (1488/1489).⁵⁸ Aged 16 (–17) according to his own account,⁵⁹ he spent some years as mercenary, against his own will, in the East (north-west and north of the Black Sea).⁶⁰ Michael Marullus lived in the Scythian environment outlined by Giovanni Mario Filelfo in *Amyris* and populated by various enemies of Mehmed.⁶¹

There, Marullus served a most cruel lord, yet officially against a tyrant [Mehmed],⁶² not against the Turks that had conquered Marullus’ *homeland* (Constantinople and / or Morea).⁶³ Because the lord belonged to the *Bessi*, a Thracian tribe subdued by the Romans and tied to the ancient Dacians,⁶⁴ an

⁵⁸ Perosa, Alessandro, “Studi sulla formazione delle raccolte di poesie del Marullo”, In. Perosa, Alessandro, *Studi di filologia umanistica*. Vol. III. Umanesimo Italiano. Ed. Viti, Paolo, Roma, 2000. 203–243. 209, 214–220.; His *Epigrams*, for which Michael Marullus was and is best known, were apparently first published in Rome and in part (two out of four books) by Eucharius Silber at some point between June 1488 and July 1489, not sooner.

⁵⁹ Because of this, the date of birth of Marullus is debated, for his stay in the East could have taken place only after 1470 (1453 + 16/17, because he was officially born after the fall of Constantinople at the end of May 1453 and sixteen years could also mean seventeen years minus a few months/even a couple of days). Yet, major warfare in the Scythian lands began only a year or two before *Amyris* was written, between 1475 and mid-1476.; (See also Croce, Benedetto, *Poeti e scrittori del pieno e del tardo Rinascimento*. Vol. II., Bari, 1945. 271–272.)

⁶⁰ For Western perceptions of these regions: Paulus, Christof – Weber, Albert, “Venedig und der *wilde Osten*: Wissen, Rang und Interessenräume im ausgehenden Mittelalter”, = *Quellen und Forschungen aus Italienischen Archiven und Bibliotheken* 100, 2020, 208–260.

⁶¹ The enemies were however not so numerous, because of the divided Tartars, of the double-dealing Casimir IV Jagiello of Poland, or of the rivaling Wallachian factions. (For an overview of the years 1475–1476: Pilat – Cristea, *The Ottoman Threat*, 2018. 157–160, 167–173.)

⁶² Haskell, *The Tristia*, 1998. 115, note 26.; See however also Enenkel, *Die Erfindung*, 2008. 368.

⁶³ In spite of his numerous “calls to arms” against the Turks. (For a list of Marullus’ “anti-Ottoman epigrams”, printed in 1488/1489, see Haskell, *The Tristia*, 1998. 115, note 23.)

⁶⁴ The *Bessi* are a matter of controversy, because they were Thracians, alike the *Getes*, viewed either as a different branch of the *Dacians* or as an alternative designation for the *Dacians*. In the fifteenth century, *Getes* and *Dacians* were employed for *Wallachians*, basically without distinction, by, for instance, Enea Silvio Piccolomini / Pius (“Hungary (...) occupies the lands of the *Gepids* and *Dacians* (...), and the *Getes*, of whom some are called *Wallachians* and others *Transylvanians*, submitted to the rule of the *Hungarians* (...). (Piccolomini, Aeneas Silvius, *Europe, c.1400–1458*. Eds. Brown, Robert – Bisaha, Nancy, Washington, DC, 2013. 51–52.); Filelfo Sr., the enemy of the late Pius II, was more “scrupulous”. Via *Jordanes’ Getica*, he connected the *Getes* to the *Goths* (e.g. in his cited letter to *Simonetta*). A year earlier, Filelfo Sr. had urged *Galeazzo Maria Sforza* to understand that there was no *Dacia* other than the Kingdom of Denmark. (Fumagalli, *Francesco Filelfo e il re di Dacia*, 2008. 121.); As a result, the Milanese chancery listed the king of Denmark among the lords In Albania et Sclauonia.; (Biblioteca Ambrosiana,

alternative name for Wallachians in the Late Middle Ages (both in Italy and in Byzantium)⁶⁵ the hideous master of Marullus was identified with Vlad III *Țepeș* of Wallachia,⁶⁶ Stephen III *the Great* of Moldavia,⁶⁷ Basarab IV *Țepeluș* of Wallachia⁶⁸ or even Matthias Corvinus.⁶⁹ The latter was otherwise praised by Marullus, but in an epigram first published in 1497,⁷⁰ after the death of

Milan, Codices, Cod. Z 198 Sup., f. 20^v; Biblioteca Trivulziana, Milan, Codices, Cod. 1325, f. 20^v.; Pop – Simon, Francesco Filelfo, 2022. 154.)

⁶⁵ Spinei, Victor, “La signification des ethnonymes des Daces et des Gètes dans les sources byzantines des X^e–XV^e siècles”, = *Études Byzantines et Post-Byzantines* 2, 1991, 115–131.

⁶⁶ Haskell, *The Tristia*, 1998. 117, note 29.; The quite logical hypothesis (though Vlad III was first recorded as politically active in the 1470s at the beginning of 1474) was considered also by Kidwell (see below). For Vlad III in the 1470s (1473–1476), see most recently Simon, Alexandru, *In the World of Vlad: The Lives and Times of a Warlord*. Berlin, 2021. 191–216.

⁶⁷ Kidwell, Carol, *Marullus: Soldier Poet of the Renaissance*. London, 1989. 32–33, 36–37.; and even Haskell, *The Tristia*, 1998. 117, note 29.; Stephen too could have “fitted the profile”.

⁶⁸ McGann, Michael J., “An Exile’s Hopes: The Search for a Liberator in Michael Marullus”, = *Byzantine and Modern Greek Studies* 37, 2013, 226–244. mainly 230, note 14.

⁶⁹ Enenkel, *Die Erfindung*, 2008. 395–397.; (His references were limited to Vilmos Fraknói’s *Mathias Corvinus, König von Ungarn. 1458–1490*. Freiburg-im-Breisgau, 1891. 175–179.)

⁷⁰ Republished and translated in Marullus, *Poems*, 2012. 173. (Ep. IV. 38. De Mathia Corvini rege Ungariae). In Latin: Legibus imperioque aucto bellique domique, / Vix reliquis laudi iam locus ullus erat; / At, postquam Aonidum studia accessere benigna, / Ulterius dixi ‘nil dare cura potest.’ / Ulterius das ipse tamen, crescenteque passim / Plebe nova, e proprio tecta domosque paras. / Sice ope, sancte, tua, patriae pater, / Undique leges/Crescunt, regna, artes, plebs nova, tecta nova. In English: After your great success in the establishment of law and dominion both in war and in peace, there was hardly any room for further praise. But after the beneficial pursuits of literature and the arts were added to this, I said, “His conduct of affairs cannot possibly produce further results.” Yet you make further progress, and as the new population increase everywhere, you provide homes and dwellings from your own property. So by your help, holy father of the country, everywhere laws, kingdoms, arts, new people, new dwellings. Marullus addressed Matthias Corvinus as a living contemporary. This raises the question of why this particular epigram was omitted from the first Roman collection of Marullus’ verses. Two epigrams were however explicitly dedicated to Maximilian I of Habsburg, king of the Romans since 1486. (II.5, II.37, in Marullus, *Poems*, 2012. 54–57, 90–91.; cf. Wiegand, Hermann, “Politische Panegyrik in den Epigrammata des Michael Marullus: das Beispiel Kaiser Maximilians I.”, In: Lefèvre, Eckard – Schäfer, Eckart (eds.), *Michael Marullus. Ein Grieche als Renaissancedichter in Italien*. Tübingen, 2008. 33–44.; see also Kidwell, Marullus, 1989. 131–140.); In 1488–1489, in spite of the ongoing negotiations, the Habsburgs, chiefly Frederick III and less Maximilian I, were the mortal enemies of Matthias. (Nehring, Karl, *Matthias Corvinus, Kaiser Friedrich III. und das Reich. Zum Hunyadisch-Habsburgischen Gegensatz im Donauraum*. Munich, 1989. 182–192.); The association between Matthias and Maximilian may have been too

the King of Hungary in 1490.⁷¹ Because of this and because of the fact that the autobiographical epigram in question was first published in 1488–1489, at the new height of the *German stories on Dracula*,⁷² but also at a time when Vlad III (*Dracula*), and Stephen III were receiving praise even in Rome,⁷³ it is safer to presume that the cruel lord of Marullus was Basarab IV (provided of course that we accept Marullus' fluid poetic geography of his itineraries).

Marullus was certainly not the “average crusader” (neither did he ever claim to have been one).⁷⁴ He harboured the hope of seeing his homeland liberated (either by Charles VIII of France, following the Valois descent into Italy in 1494–1495,⁷⁵ or by the French king's enemy in the West, Maximilian I of Habsburg, king of the Romans).⁷⁶ Marullus' dreams never became true.

Personal, “National” and “International” Crusader Killing-fields

Giovanni Mario Filelfo and Michael Marullus were both of Byzantine origin (only on the maternal side, in the case of Filelfo Jr.).⁷⁷ Their versed concern

much for Marullus and his German publisher in Rome, under Innocent VIII, in the late 1480s. (On Eucharius Silber and his press: Farenga, Paola, “Le edizioni di Eucario Silber”, In: Chiabò, Myriam – Maddalo, Silvia – Miglio, Massimo et al. (eds.), *Roma di fronte all'Europa al tempo di Alessandro VI*. Rome, 2001. 409–439.)

⁷¹ For Maximilian and Matthias in this context, see also Zambotti, Bernardino, *Diario Ferrarese dall'anno 1476 sino al 1504*. (Rerum Italicarum Scriptores, XXIV/7). Ed. Pardi, Giuseppe, Bologna, 1934. 221. (the “Habsburg opening” of Matthias' tomb in Székesfehérvár)

⁷² On the classic topic: Ursprung, Daniel, “Propaganda și popularizare. Povestirile tipărite despre Vlad Țepeș în contextul anului 1488”, = *Analele Putnei* 14, 2018, 45–60.

⁷³ Callimachus Experiens, Philippus, *Ad Innocentium VIII de bello Turcis inferendo oratio*. Ed. Lichońska, Irmina – Kowalewski, Tadeusz, Warsaw, 1964. 33, 50.; Filippo Buonaccorsi Callimachus was an “enchanted adversary” and “jealous admirer” of King Matthias, to whom he had devoted his own Attila. (Paparelli, Gioacchino, *Callimaco Esperiente (Filippo Buonaccorsi)*. Salerno, 1971. 33, 160–161.; Segel, Harold B., *Renaissance Culture in Poland: The Rise of Humanism, 1470–1543*. Ithaca, NY, 1989. 51–53, 59–60.)

⁷⁴ Bihrer, Andreas, “Aeneas flieht aus Konstantinopel – Exil, Heimatliebe und Türkenkrieg in Michael Marullus' Elegie *De exilio suo* (Epigr. 3, 37)”, In: Lefèvre, Eckard – Schäfer, Eckart (eds.), *Michael Marullus. Ein Grieche als Renaissancedichter in Italien*. Tübingen, 2008. 11–32.

⁷⁵ McGann, Michael J., “A Call to Arms: Michael Marullus to Charles VIII”, = *Byzantinische Forschungen* 16, 1991, 341–450.; Marullus' influence seemed greater at that time.

⁷⁶ Wiegand, Politische Panegyrik, 2008. 43–44.; It should be added that in 1488–1489, when Marullus' epigrams were first published, a crusader congress was prepared in Rome (it was eventually held in 1490). Maximilian I was supposed to lead the crusade, alone, or even together with Matthias. (On the congress, see chiefly Setton, Kenneth M., *The Papacy and Levant (1204–1571)*. Vol. II. The Fifteenth Century., Philadelphia, PA, 1978. 412–416.)

⁷⁷ Hence the questions on Filelfo Jr.'s favourable stand towards the Ottoman conquest of Constantinople. In addition to the exercise of the rightful revenge of the descendants of

with the lands fallen to Mehmed II (destined to rule the world, as a second Alexander) or under Ottoman onslaught (that had Rome as final target) was consequently legitimate and not to be overlooked in the West after 1453.⁷⁸ Dealing with the East was therefore also in the interest of the two lettered *condottieri*, of two poets, who proved not to be “off-beat”, in *Italia* at least.⁷⁹

In the 1470s and still in the 1480s (at the time of the “Djem affair”),⁸⁰ the East suited – maybe more than ever after the fall of Byzantium – the various designs of the West.⁸¹ Pope Pius II, already as Enea Silvio Piccolomini,⁸² had mingled together the Kingdoms of Hungary and Dacia (e.g. in 1453⁸³ and in 1462⁸⁴) “in the manner” in which Gianmario Filelfo, the son of Francesco, Pius’ mortal enemy,⁸⁵ then united – in the Scythian cold – the descendants of Attila (the Hungarians) and of Quirinus, i.e. Romulus (the Wallachians).⁸⁶

the Trojans (the Turks), this was a city not worth saving in fact, a view not so uncommon after 1453.; (See also Simon, Alexandru, “Ways to Liberate Constantinople after 1453: Notes on a Document in the Sate Archives of Milan”, = *Bizantinistica*, 12, 2010 [2011], 239–248.)

⁷⁸ For the changes brought by the fall of Constantinople, see also Petkov, Kiril, “From Schismatic to Fellow Christians: East Central European Religious Attitudes towards the Orthodox Balkans (1354–1572)”, = *Medievalistik* 8, 1995, 171–192. Especially 176.

⁷⁹ In general: Pignatti, Giovanni Mario Filelfo, 1997.; Coppini, Michele Marullo Tarcaniot, 2008.

⁸⁰ See Inalcik, Halil, “A Case Study in Renaissance Diplomacy: The Agreement between Innocent VIII and Bayezid II on Djem Sultan”, = *Journal of Turkish Studies* 3, 1979, 209–223.; Györkös, Attila, “Prince Djem et les relations franco-hongroises, 1486–1490”, In: Draskóczy, István – Farkas, Gábor – Horváth, Iván et al. (eds.), *Matthias Rex 1458–1490. Hungary at the Dawn of the Renaissance*. Budapest, 2013. 1–15. (pdf count).

⁸¹ See also Hankins, James, *Virtue Politics: Soulcraft and Statecraft in Renaissance Italy*. Cambridge, MA, 2019. here for instance 289–384. in relation to Flavio Biondo. (e.g. *Ad Alphonsum Aragonensem serenissimum regem de expeditione in Thurcos*, In: *Scritti inediti e rari di Flavio Biondo*. (Studi e Testi, 45.). Ed. Nogara, Bartolomeo, Vatican City, 1927. 45.)

⁸² “In (anti-) Hunyadi comparison”, see also Pajorin, Klára T., “La pietà di Pio. Ladislao Postumo nella corrispondenza di Enea Silvio Piccolomini”, In: Rotondi Secchi Tarugi, Luisa (ed.), *Pio II nell’epistolografia del Rinascimento*. Florence, 2015. 23–32. 27.

⁸³ *Der Briefwechsel des Eneas Silvius Piccolomini*. (Fontes Rerum Austriacarum. Vol. II., 61–62, 67–68.). Vol. III. Briefe als Bischof von Siena. 1. 23. September 1450–1. Juni 1454., Ed. Wolkan, Rudolf, Vienna, 1918. 190–191. no. 109, (June and July 1453; letter(s) to Pope Nicholas V).

⁸⁴ von Pastor, Ludwig, *Acta inedita historiam pontificum romanorum praesertim saec. XV, XVI, XVII illustrantia*. Vol. I. 1376–1464., Freiburg-im-Breisgau, 1904. 150–162, 153. no. 125. (March 1462; on this Milanese report: Setton, The Papacy, 1978. 206, note 24.)

⁸⁵ Iorga, Nicolae, *Notes et extraits pour servir à l’histoire des croisades au XV^e siècle*. Vol. IV. 1453–1475., Bucharest, 1915. 242. no. 146. (September 1464; Filelfo Sr.’s message to Pope Paul II)

⁸⁶ The political pairing *Ungaria et Valachia* had been officialised by Venice in spring 1475 (Pop, Ioan-Aurel – Simon, Alexandru, “Ungaria et Valachia: promisiunile valahe

Nicholas, the bishop of Modruš had attempted to pitch, across the Adriatic, Dalmatian *Gothia* against King Matthias Corvinus (1472–1473),⁸⁷ one of the “lords” of Marullus, loved by and in love with Ragusa and Naples,⁸⁸ ruled by Ferdinand of Aragon, Matthias’ new father-in-law (since 1474–1476).⁸⁹

Two ugly ducklings, if compared to their reported and assumed roots,⁹⁰ Giovanni Mario Filelfo and Michael Marullus make/made (if, again, at all) something clear through – in divergent manner – by twisted eulogy and by depressed self-appraisal.⁹¹ Anti-Ottoman warfare was a personal, reluctant in both cases option,⁹² and – contradictory – a “national” endeavour, styled in the antic terminology of the Renaissance.⁹³ Either for *Pannonia* or for *Dacia*, we

ale Republicii Sfântului Marcu din anii 1470”, = *Revista Istorică* 25, 2015 [2016], 5–66. 9, note 4.), just before the republic concluded a six-month truce with Mehmed II (that allowed the sultan to conquer Caffa), a truce explicitly mentioned by Filelfo Jr. in his *Amyris*. (Filelfo, *Amyris*, 1978. 197.)

⁸⁷ Špoljarić, Luka, “Nicholas of Modruš and his De Bellis Gothorum: Politics and National History in the Fifteenth-Century Adriatic”, = *Renaissance Quarterly* 72, 2019, 457–491. 476–481.; Špoljarić, Luka, “Zov partenopejskih princeza: Kosače i Frankapani u bračnim pregovorima s napuljskim kraljem Ferranteom”, = *Radovi Zavoda za Hrvatsku Povijest* 52, 2020, 121–188. in this case, especially Appendix, nos 1.1–6. 159–165.

⁸⁸ Nichols, Fred J., “Greek Poets of Exile in Naples: Marullus and Rhallus”, In: Tournoy, Gilbert – Sacré, Dirk (eds.), *Ut granum sinapsis: Essays on Neo-Latin Literature in Honour of Jozef Ijsewijn*. Leuven, 1997. 152–170. 155.; Stojanović, Michael Marullus, 2020. 57–61.

⁸⁹ See Scarton, Elisabetta, “Tra dualità et tradimenti: La politica (matrimoniale) di Ferrante d’Aragona nei primi anni Settanta del Quattrocentoletta attraverso i dispacci sforzeschi da Napoli”, = *eHumanista* 38, 2018, 186–200. 189. (report sent from Naples, 19 March 1474)

⁹⁰ Marullus was an exile, deprived of a proper patria. Filelfo Jr. went against both parents. These sentences might seem harsh. They certainly apply to their careers in the mid-1470s.

⁹¹ Mainly D’Elia, *Genealogy and the Limits of Panegyric*, 2003. 988. (Filelfo Jr.); Enkel, *Die Erfindung*, 2008. 372. (Marullus)

⁹² The “twist” in *Amyris* speaks for itself, while Marullus’ Eastern military experience was, according to himself, that of soldier against his own will. In this last respect, considering the possibility, repeatedly voiced, that Marullus was sent by Venice as a stradiota to fight the Turks in the north (e.g. Kidwell, *Marullus*, 1989. 31–5.; Haskell, *The Tristia*, 1998. 117.; Stojanović, Michael Marullus, 2020. 62.), we recall that (1) Stephen III of Moldavia’s barba (uncle) and envoy was John Tzemplakon, a respected captain of mercenaries (stradioti/stratioti) in Venice’s service and (2) that before turning against them in 1478, Basarab IV Țepeluș (Marullus’ master; cf. McGann, *An Exile’s Hopes*, 2013. 230, note 14.) served both Matthias (1474–1475) and – then – Stephen. (For Tzemplakon and Basarab, see Simon, Alexandru, “The Costs and Benefits of Anti-Ottoman Warfare: Documents on the Case of Moldavia. 1475–1477”, = *Revue Roumaine d’Histoire* 48, 2009, 37–53. 38–39, 50–51.)

⁹³ In particular Hirschi, Caspar, *The Origins of Nationalism: An Alternative History from Ancient Rome to Early Modern Germany*. Cambridge, 2012. 20–49, 81–88.; Well before the eighteenth–nineteenth century (the seminal works of Anderson, Benedict, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*. London, 1983. and Hobsbawm, Eric, *Nations and Nationalism Since 1780: Programme, Myth,*

lack the evidences on Westerners flocking to fight for the Cross after the “miracle of Belgrade”, when the day was won by arguably non-Easterners.⁹⁴

Genuine hopes⁹⁵ and astute plans⁹⁶ rose that the Kingdom of Hungary would become – in the aftermath of Belgrade – a new Holy Land.⁹⁷ Yet, for the time being at least, sources show that only “one or two” Englishmen came to *Pannonia* (and then fell prisoners to the Turks)⁹⁸ and “one or two” Germans came to *Dacia* (and then safely left for the Palestinian Holy Land),⁹⁹ as well as – just potentially – to Portuguese Templar Knights that had to support Stephen III of

Reality. Cambridge, 1991. need no introduction), “nations” were seemingly forged and “traditions” apparently invented.

⁹⁴ Hofer, Johannes, “Der Sieger von Belgrad”, = *Historisches Jahrbuch des Görres-Gesellschaft zur Pflege der Wissenschaft im katholischen Deutschland* 51, 1931, 163–212.; Babinger, Franz, *Der Quellenwert der Berichte über den Entsatz von Belgrad am 21/22 Juli. 1456*. (Sitzungsberichte der Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, VIII, 6.). Munich, 1956.; Housley, Norman, “Giovanni da Capistrano and the Crusade of 1456”, In. Housley, Norman (ed.), *Crusading in the Fifteenth Century: Message and Impact*. New York, 2004. 94–115.; The three fundamental studies cover the much debated question “how was the day won?”.

⁹⁵ Ropa, Anastasija, “Imagining the 1456 Siege of Belgrade in *Capystranus*”, = *The Hungarian Historical Review* 4, 2015, 255–282.; Mixson, James D., *The Crusade of 1456: Texts and Documents in Translation*. Toronto, 2022. (Especially Part III, nos. 17–18 and 21–23.)

⁹⁶ Fodor, Pál, “The Ottoman Empire, Byzantium and Western Christianity: The Implications of the Siege of Belgrade”, = *Acta Orientalia Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae* 41, 2008, 43–51.; Pop, Ioan-Aurel – Simon, Alexandru, “Rapports italiens sur les affrontements de l’année 1456 en Europe centrale-orientale”, = *Revue Roumaine d’Histoire* 51, 2012 [2013], 3–26.

⁹⁷ In this respect, see foremost Weber, Benjamin, “La papauté en Hongrie (1453–1481): engagement financier ou militaire?”, = *Transylvanian Review*, 19, 2009, 21–31.

⁹⁸ See Bárány, Attila, *Magyarország nyugati külpolitikája (1458–1526). Angol-magyar kapcsolatok Mátyás és a Jagellók korában*. (Dissertation – Hungarian Academy of Sciences). Budapest, 2014. 88–92.; (1463–1466) For Edward IV of England in 1479, Robert of Champlayn had been involved in Matthias’ bellis contra teucros vel Turcas, not in a crusade, yet in 1488, Henry VII Tudor named him knight croyse. Apparently, he was not the only Englishman fighting under Matthias (*The Politics of Fifteenth-century England: John Vale’s Book*. Eds. Kekewich, Margaret Lucille – Richmond, Colin – Sutton, Anne F. et al., Stroud, 1995. f. 42/27. 153–154. dated between 1461 and 1464; we would like to thank Dr. Mark Whelan, King’s College London, for this information).; Obviously, the soldiers in Matthias’ – multi-ethnic – Black Army are not to be confused with crusaders (Enenkel made this confusion when attempting to identify Marullus’ master in Matthias).

⁹⁹ [Sebald Rieter Junior,] *Das Reisebuch der Familie Rieter*. Eds. Röhrich, Reinhold – Meisner, Heinrich, Tübingen, 1884. 61.; Armbruster, Adolf, *Der Donau-Karpatenraum in den mittel-und westeuropäischen Quellen das 10.–16. Jahrhunderts. Eine historiographische Imagologie*. Cologne–Vienna, 1990. 110–111.; The last documented “proper crusaders” (not mercenaries) in Wallachia date in fact back to the days of Sigismund of Luxemburg. (e.g. Iorga, Nicolae, “Un prinț cruciat portughez în Țara Românească a secolului XV”, = *Analele Academiei Române. Memoriile Secțiunii Istorice*

Moldavia's recovery of the Crimea (of *Gothia*).¹⁰⁰ Still, money was collected, in the 1470s as well (in Filelfo Jr.'s and Marullus' days) in the West for the use of the East against the Turks, as if the combats involved entire Christendom.¹⁰¹ And, according to the Papacy, they did.¹⁰²

Giovanni Mario Filelfo used the large scale and wrote about "the grand picture". Michael Marullus armed personal experiences and attempted to find a place for himself on "the world stage". The approaches of Filelfo Jr. and Marullus were fundamentally different, yet they promoted the same image, of "bloodlands", for the territories that still lay between the High Porte and the Italian Peninsula, between worlds in fact. Virtually, everybody wanted to aid those lands against the Ottoman advance. Basically, nobody wished to go there and fight. Those areas were after all not the Holy Land.¹⁰³

3rd series, 4, 1925. 333–337.; Rohlik, Heinz, "Rohlik", = *Deutsches Geschichtsbuch* 60, 2007, 155–174. 166.)

¹⁰⁰ The curious information, extracted in the early 1800s from the old princely Moldavian archive, that Stephen III planned to recover Caffa and Theodoro with support from Portuguese Knights (the Portuguese Order of Christ was the only legal form of survival of the Templar Knights), is apparently confirmed by a Milanese report sent from Venice in November 1477.; (For the sources, see Simon, *How to Finance a Greek Rite Athlete*, 2015. 328.)

¹⁰¹ For further data from 1476: Pop – Simon, *The Arbitrage of Foligno*, 2022. 48–51, 54–59.

¹⁰² E.g. the encyclical from 1 July 1475. (Setton, *The Papacy*, 1978. 320, note 23.)

¹⁰³ In spite of various (Western) efforts, such as those made by Pope Sixtus IV to transform Cetatea Albă (that featured prominently in *Amyris*) into an alternative pilgrimage site during the – prolonged – Jubilee year 1475. (e.g. the Redemptor noster bulla first published by Theiner, Augustin, *Vetera monumenta historica Hungariam sacram illustrantia*. Vol. II. Ab Innocentio PP. VI. usque ad Clementem PP.VII. 1352–1526., Rome, 1859. 453–454. no. 636.)

THE ROLE OF THE URBAN MILITARY IN THE MILITARY ORGANIZATION OF THE LATE MEDIEVAL KINGDOM OF HUNGARY

In the case of the late medieval Kingdom of Hungary, a comparative study of the role of towns in warfare is a difficult project for several reasons. One reason for this is that the role of towns in war has not been a mainstream research topic in the wider region, namely in Central Europe. The exception in this respect is German historiography, where many publications deal with the military aspects of urban life, but comparative studies are rare and have been written mainly in the last few decades.¹ In the case of the Kingdom of Hungary, comparative research is made even more difficult by the fact that the most important towns of that kingdom are now located in different countries, so that much of the source material on the subject is often out of the sight of researchers in the country concerned. In addition, recent studies are published mainly in the language of the country, making it even more challenging to create a comprehensive overview of the military role of towns.²

¹ Harald Kleinschmidt and David Eltis also highlighted the lack of previous comparative research: Kleinschmidt, Harald, “Logistik im städtischen Militärwesen des späten Mittelalters. Dargestellt an Beispielen aus dem süddeutschen Raum”, = *Jahrbuch für Wirtschaftsgeschichte* 4, 1991, 79–93. 80.; Eltis, David, “Towns and Defence in Later Medieval Germany”, = *Nottingham Medieval Studies* 33, 1989, 91–103. 91.; A few examples of recent comparative studies: Tlustý, B. Ann, *The Martial Ethic in Early Modern Germany: Civic Duty and the Right of Arms*. New York, 2011.; Isenmann, Eberhard, *Die deutsche Stadt im Mittelalter 1150–1550*. Wien–Köln–Weimar, 2014. 452–457.; *Ein bürgerliches Pulverfass? Waffenbesitz und Waffenkontrolle in der alteuropäischen Stadt*. Eds. Freitag, Werner – Scheutz, Marin, Wien–Köln–Weimar, 2021.

² For instance: Nógrády, Árpád, “Pozsonyi gyalogosok Mátyás seregében”, In. Veszprémy, László (ed.), *Rex invictissimus: hadsereg és hadszervezet a Mátyás kori Magyarországon*. Budapest, 2008. 193–200.; Segeš, Vladimír, “Mestá v uhorskom vojenstve na konci stredoveku”, In. Dangl, Vojtech – Varga, János J. (eds.), *Armáda, mesto, spoločnosť od 15. storočia do roku 1918. Hadsereg, város, társadalom a 15. századtól, 1918-ig*. Bratislava, 2002. 17–30.; Sedláček, Peter, “Mestská domobrana a mestská stráž v Bratislave v polovici 15. storočia”, = *Vojenská História* 16:4, 2012, 6–22.; Sedláček, Peter, “Žoldnieri v Bratislave v polovici 15. storočia”, = *Vojenská História* 17:1, 2013, 6–32.; Domenová, Marcela, “Exposita bellica: mestské hradby, obrana mesta Prešov v 16. storočí (vybrané okruhy v kontexte života mesta a uhorských dejín na prelome stredoveku a novoveku)”, In. Popiolek, Božena – Chłosta-Sikorska, Agnieszka – Gadocha, Marcin (eds.), *W kręgu rodziny epok dawnych: przemoc*. Kraków, 2020. 106–129.; An exception to this is Liviu Cîmpeanu’s study summarising his research on Transylvanian Saxon towns: Cîmpeanu, Liviu, “Ad Retinendam Coronam. Military Organization at the Transylvanian Border in the Late Middle Ages: The Transylvanian-Saxon Militias”, In. Ardelean, Florin Nicolae et al. (eds.), *From Medieval Frontiers to Early Modern Borders in Central and South-Eastern Europe*. Berlin, 2022. 141–174.

Another notable problem connected with research is that of sources. Due to the almost complete destruction of the medieval Hungarian royal archive, the study of the military role of towns can be based primarily on the archives of towns with a sufficient and continuous source base on the subject. As already pointed out by András Kubinyi, the following towns satisfy this criterion: Brassó (Braşov), Beszterce (Bistriţa), Nagyszeben (Sibiu), Eperjes (Prešov), Bártfa (Bardejov), Kassa (Košice), Sopron, Pozsony (Bratislava).³ However, examining the sources of these towns, it soon becomes apparent that none of the archives of these towns is complete, but each of them contains unique sources that contribute specific information to the role of the towns in the war, and more specifically to the various aspects of the urban military organization (urban defense, the military role of the villages owned by the city, the social and ethnic background of the soldiers sent outside the city, and so on). Moreover, in many cases, these sources help to interpret each other, so that their combined analysis helps to better understand these aspects. This is the principle I intend to follow in my present essay, in which I seek to answer the question of how the various Hungarian kings used the military forces of the main towns of the kingdom during the late Middle Ages. For this purpose, I have divided the above-mentioned towns into three groups according to their geopolitical position: towns in western Hungary (Sopron, Bratislava), northeastern Hungary (Bardejov, Prešov, Košice) and southern and eastern Transylvania (the most important Transylvanian Saxon towns: Bistriţa, Braşov, Sibiu). Towns from the same geopolitical background faced similar challenges and probably played the same role in the military aspects of the rulers' urban policy. The time frame for the research is the reign of Matthias Corvinus (1458–1490) and the two Jagiellonian monarchs, Wladislas II (1490–1516) and Louis II (1516–1526). During this era, apart from brief periods, the central government was powerful enough to allow us to examine the military aspects of the rulers' urban policies. The source base of the research consists mainly of the mobilisation orders sent to the towns by the ruler or an officeholder with some military authority, but there are also cases when we can only get information about a given mobilisation from correspondence between towns, from subsequent expressions of thanks or from the entries of town account books or from separate mercenary rolls. In addition, the sources include letters in which the ruler or an officeholder with military authority assures the town of the credibility of the letter's deliverer, which shows that certain orders were only given orally.⁴ Despite the above-mentioned problems of the source base, however, as will be shown below,

³ Kubinyi, András, "Városaink háborús terhei Mátyás alatt", In: Kubinyi, András (ed.), *Nándorfehérvártól Mohácsig: a Mátyás- és Jagelló kor hadtörténete*. Budapest, 2007. 93.

⁴ For instance, in a letter to Bratislava from the king in 1482: "Misimus ad vos hunc fidelem nostrum Emericum Czobor aule nostre familiarem, qui certa quedam nomine nostro vobis dicit, prout a nobis informatus est."; Magyar Nemzeti Levéltár, Budapest (Hungarian National Archives). Mohács előtti gyűjtemény (Pre-Mohács Collection). Diplomatikai levéltár (Diplomatic Archive [hereinafter DL] and Diplomatikai

the temporal and spatial (geographical) distribution of the military forces sent by the towns to the army of the Kingdom of Hungary in various forms shows very well what the towns of the kingdom were used for by the various Hungarian rulers in certain periods, depending on the geopolitical position of the towns.

Towns in northeastern Hungary and western Hungary

In the period under examination, the first great test of strength linked to the towns was the elimination of the Hussite-origin troops in northern Hungary, which was carried out by the urban troops of northeastern Hungary partly on the orders of the king and partly on the orders of the (chief) captains of the Upper Parts acting on behalf of the ruler.⁵ These battles officially lasted until 1467,⁶ but even in 1468 the king ordered soldiers from the towns of Prešov, Bardejov and Košice to support Emeric Szapolyai in the siege of Kapi castle.⁷ In addition to fighting the Hussite-origin units, the towns of the region also had other tasks. In parallel with the regional struggles, in 1464 the king ordered the town of Bardejov to send cavalry against the Ottoman sultan.⁸ This command letter is extremely important because, as we shall see below, the Hungarian rulers only ordered the towns of western and northeastern Hungary to send their soldiers to a greater distance when the sultan's army invaded the country. Furthermore, from 1464 onwards, Matthias also assigned a new role to the towns in this area: he used them as mercenary markets. In a letter dated May 18, 1464, for instance, Matthias forgave Bardejov's 400 florins of tax arrears in exchange for the mercenaries hired for him.⁹ In August 1467, the ruler requested the towns of Bardejov, Prešov, Košice and Lőcse (Levoča) to allow his man Matthias Szántói to enter the towns to recruit soldiers.¹⁰ And in 1481, Valentine Huszti recruited mercenaries for the king in Košice, which was also announced in the surrounding towns.¹¹ After 1468, the next major mobilisation event affecting the towns of this region was the offensive by the

fényképgyűjtemény (Diplomatic Photo Collection [hereinafter DF] (<https://archives.hungaricana.hu/en/charters/>)). DF 240660.

⁵ Horváth, Richárd, "A Felső Részek kapitánysága a Mátyás-korban", = *Századok* 137, 2003, 943–944.

⁶ For the events of this period, see: Tóth-Szabó, Pál, *A cseh-huszita mozgalmak és uralom története Magyarországon*. Budapest, 1917. 303–330.; Gácsová, Alžbeta, "Boje Mateja I. proti Jánovi Jiskrovi z Brandýsa a bratříkom v rokoch 1458–1467", = *Historický časopis* 25, 1977, 186–216.; Krajewski, Karol, "Jeszcze raz w sprawie działalności Piotra i Mikołaja Komorowskich na Górnych Węgrzech w XV wieku", = *Średniowiecze Polskie i Powszechnie* 13, 2021, 148–153.

⁷ DF 214458.

⁸ DF 214238.; The king exempted Košice from the obligation of sending soldiers.; DF 269607.

⁹ DF 214221.

¹⁰ DF 214397.

¹¹ DF 214956.

Prince of Poland, Casimir, in 1471 to obtain the Hungarian crown.¹² This is connected with the letter of command of King Matthias to the town of Košice, dated October 7, 1471, in which he sent Peter Geréb of Vingárt to defend the territory, in which they were obliged to participate.¹³ The mobilisation of the town of Bardejov, which we are informed about from the subsequent gratitude of Matthias dated January 24, 1472, can be also linked to the incursion of the prince of Poland.¹⁴ However, the king then entrusted Emeric Szapolyai with the further fighting, and on January 24 he ordered 400 infantrymen and military equipment to be sent from the towns of Košice, Prešov, Levoča and Bardejov to support him.¹⁵ Interestingly, however, the towns of northeastern Hungary (in respect to the sending of troops) were completely left out of the struggle for the Bohemian crown. The next mobilisation order arrived only in 1483, when the ruler ordered the troops of Košice and Bardejov to Sztropkó (Stropkov) and then Tóketerebes (Třebišov) castle of the disobedient Nicholas Perényi to help Andrew Lábatlani.¹⁶ Subsequently, in 1484, the town of Bardejov received an order to mobilise in connection with the attacking sultan's army, but later it became known that the Ottomans were marching against Kiliia and Bilhorod-Dnistrovskiy in Moldavia (both cities are located in Ukraine today), and then withdrew after their capture,¹⁷ so according to a letter from the bishop of Győr and treasurer, Urban Nagylucsei, the town's troops were mobilised,¹⁸ but not sent. Hereafter, it seems that Matthias succeeded in securing a stable home front for his struggles against the Austrian provinces. It was until his death on April 6, 1490, that the towns of northeastern Hungary did not have to fight in any regional conflicts.

In contrast to the situation outlined above, during the reign of Matthias, the mobilisations of the towns of western Hungary followed a completely different path. Although the two towns examined here, Sopron and Bratislava, were not spared from military events (on 7 September 1465, for instance, the captain Hinko Tannfeld plundered and burned the suburbs of Sopron,¹⁹ and in 1466 mercenaries from Bratislava took part in the siege of nearby Verbó – Vrbové²⁰), no orders from the Hungarian ruler specifically concerning the mobilisation of soldiers were received by either town until the last years of the Austrian

¹² Pálosfalvi, Tamás, *From Nicopolis to Mohács. A History of Ottoman-Hungarian Warfare, 1389–1526*. Leiden–Boston, 2018. 238.

¹³ DF 270443.

¹⁴ DF 214545.

¹⁵ DF 214546.

¹⁶ Bardejov: DF 215046, 215049.; Košice: Teleki, József, *Hunyadiak kora Magyarországon. Oklevéltár*. Vol. XII., Pest, 1857. 249–250, 255–256.

¹⁷ Pálosfalvi, *From Nicopolis*, 2018. 281–283.

¹⁸ DF 215108.

¹⁹ Dávidházy, István, “Házi Jenő okmánytárának hadtörténeti adatai”, = *Soproni Szemle* 70:1, 2016, 63–73. 72.

²⁰ Nógrády, Pozsonyi gyalogosok, 2008. 196–198.

wars.²¹ There is one exception to this, when in 1471 Matthias requested 24 infantrymen from Bratislava against the Ottomans in the south, but as an accompaniment to wagons, and equipped with spades, hoes and axes (i.e. ready for fortification or siege activities), as the enemy was reported to be preparing to siege Belgrade.²² Therefore, if we consider this as a military mobilisation and not as a simple transfer of military equipment, we confirm the above-mentioned perception that the troops of the towns were mobilised from the whole country only in case of an offensive of the Ottoman sultan's army. The actual requests to send soldiers only began in 1485, when on January 29, Matthias urgently requested 100 well-armed infantrymen from the camp near Vienna.²³ This is followed on November 9, 1486, by a request for the same number of infantry troops, with the difference that here the soldiers were requested for the captain of Zistersdorf, Peter Forgács, who took over the soldiers' pay, so here the town was actually only hiring mercenaries.²⁴ Subsequently, still in connection with Bratislava, a letter from April 1487, again informs us of a request for 100 infantrymen, but in this case the king noted that he would keep the soldiers on duty for only a few days, so their pay was probably paid by the town. In Sopron's case, the first such letter of command is also dated to 1487, when the ruler wrote from Lichtenwörth, ordering the town to send 60 infantrymen against those who were delivering food to the enemy.²⁵ The last request was written to Bratislava on February 20, 1490, when the king requested 80 well-equipped infantrymen from the town under the command of the comes (Hun.: ispán) Emeric Cobor – as it turned out later, to Élesszeg (Scharfeneck) – but the town managed to reduce the number of requested soldiers to 50.²⁶ After these orders, however, the death of King Matthias brought to an end the series of instructions for sending soldiers that had survived from his reign.

The towns of northeastern Hungary were actively involved in the struggles against the prince of Poland and elected Hungarian king John Albert.²⁷ After 1492, we have information from Bratislava about the next sending of soldiers,

²¹ It is important to note, however, that during the period under study Sopron was not part of the Kingdom of Hungary until 1463.

²² DL 107589.

²³ Teleki, Hunyadiak, 1857. 279–280.

²⁴ Teleki, Hunyadiak, 1857. 340–341.; The king repeated this order on 17 November: Teleki, Hunyadiak, 1857. 343–344.

²⁵ Teleki, Hunyadiak, 1857. 348–349.

²⁶ Neumann, Tibor, “«Minden időkbén kegyelmes uratok kívánunk lenni», A királyi városok adóztatása a 15. század végén”, In: Weisz, Boglárka – Kádas, István (eds.), *Hatalom, adó, jog: Gazdaságtörténeti tanulmányok a magyar középkorról*. Budapest, 2017. 13–106. 68–69.

²⁷ Neumann, Tibor, “A kassai hadjárat. II. Ulászló zsoldosserege és a lengyelek elleni harc (1490–1491)”, In: Pószán, László – Veszprémy, László (eds.), *Elfeledett háborúk: Középkori csaták és várostromok (6–16. század)*. Budapest, 2016. 363–397.; Further military orders sent to Bardejov: 1491: DF 215680, 215722.; Neumann, Tibor, *A Szapolyai család oklevéltára I. Levelek és oklevelek (1458–1526)*. Budapest, 2012. Nr. 205, 209, 214. [hereinafter Szapolyai oklevéltár]; 1492: DF 215814.

as on January 10, 1495, and then on January 18, 1495, Wladislas II requested 100 infantrymen from the town in connection with the conflict against Lawrence Újlaki, but later, at the request of the town, the king released it from this obligation.²⁸ The next mobilisation period, connected to the towns of northeastern Hungary, is linked to the defense against John Corvinus, the illegitimate son of Matthias. In January 1496, Wladislas II informed Prešov and Bardejov that Corvin intended to recruit Polish mercenaries and invade the country with them, so they should take care of the defense of the town, and he entrusted the defense of the area to Stephen Szapolyai.²⁹ However, further military orders relating to the region ceased after 1498. This was followed by a very long period of peace regarding the obligation of the towns to send troops, interrupted only by two internal conflicts, the siege of Lánzsér in 1512 and the revolt led by George Dózsa in 1514, of which Sopron and Bratislava were mobilised for the first conflict³⁰ and the towns of northeastern Hungary for the second one.³¹ After that during the reign of the Jagiellonian kings, only the news of the Ottoman invasion of 1521 and 1526 brought mobilisation orders to the towns of the two regions under examination.³²

The Transylvanian Saxon towns

The sources of the towns of Bistrița, Brasov and Sibiu show that in 42 of the 69 years of the period under study, the army of one of the Transylvanian towns must have been mobilised. During these years, Sibiu was ordered to send troops in 34 years, Brasov in 19 years and Bistrița in 16 years (at least these are the years when the sources for sending troops survived). More significant periods (longer than two years) without such orders occurred only four times: 1458–1461, 1472–1475, 1498–1500 and 1516–1518. However, the number of supposed two-year periods of peace is also not very significant: the periods 1464–1465, 1488–1489, 1506–1507 can be considered as such. It is therefore obvious that even if the military requests received by the towns did not always result in the actual dispatch of the military,³³ there was still a very lively military life in late medieval Transylvania.

In the period under study, the first definite orders to send soldiers are from 1463,³⁴ which were probably related to the siege of Jajca (Jajce) in 1463.

²⁸ Neumann, Minden időkben, 2017. 78.

²⁹ DF 229091, 216026.

³⁰ Sopron: Házi, Jenő, *Sopron szabad királyi város története*. Vols I/1–7. and II/1–6. Sopron, 1921–1943. Vol. I/6., Nr. 254, 257, 261, 263.; Bratislava: DF 241093, 241095, 241096, 241097, 241101, 241102.

³¹ Fekete Nagy, Antal et al. (eds), *Monumenta rusticorum in Hungaria rebellium anno MDXIV*. Budapest, 1979. 100–101, 109–110, 123, 129–130.

³² 1521: DF 217979.; Kubinyi, Városaink, 2007. 103.; Házi, Sopron, 1929. Vol. I/7., Nr. 14.; 1526: DF 271158, 218457, 218460.; Házi, Sopron, 1929. Vol. I/7., Nr. 138.

³³ Cîmpeanu, Military Organization, 2022. 172–173.

³⁴ Zimmermann, Franz et al. (ed.), *Urkundenbuch zur Geschichte der Deutschen in Siebenbürgen*. Vols I–VII. Hermannstadt–Bucharest, 1892–1991. Vol. IV., Nr. 3340.

The castle finally surrendered at the end of December, but soon afterwards another sixty smaller fortified places fell into the hands of King Matthias.³⁵ After 1464, the ruler's attention was increasingly focused on the western policy of the Kingdom of Hungary, rather than on the Ottoman territories and the Transylvanian-Wallachian border. Regardless of this, military conflicts with the Ottomans continued in Transylvania, which, until 1471, also involved the mobilisation of the Transylvanian Saxon towns.³⁶ The situation of the Ottoman raiders was made easier by the fact that during this period the pro-Ottoman Radu III was the voivode of Wallachia, who regularly allowed them to pass through his territory.³⁷ However, there was also a significant conflict with Moldavia in 1467. The aim of this campaign from the Hungarian point of view was basically to restore the vassalage of Moldavia and to put an end to the hostile attitude of the Moldavian voivode, Stephen the Great, towards the Kingdom of Hungary. Although, according to Antonio Bonfini, King Matthias marched into Transylvania with an army of 12,000 men to put down the local uprising,³⁸ this army was largely replaced before he left for the Moldavian campaign, and therefore included Saxon troops from Sibiu and Brasov.³⁹ However, as a result of the unsuccessful campaign, the troops of the town of Bistrița had to be mobilised against the incursion of Moldavians even in 1469.⁴⁰ The next major mobilisation of the Saxons took place in 1476, when, apparently deliberately timed to coincide with Matthias' marriage to Beatrice of Aragon, Sultan Mehmed II marched with his troops against Moldavia, which had meanwhile reconciled with Matthias. In the course of the campaign, although the sultan was victorious over the aforementioned Stephen the Great, the voivode managed to retreat with his remaining army into the mountains.⁴¹ In consequence of the Ottoman attack the judge royal, Stephen Bátori, was sent to Transylvania, who summoned troops to Torda (Turda) by July 25, where probably – although no orders have survived regarding it – the Saxons also sent troops.⁴² However, this is supported by the fact that after Bátori and the former voivode of Wallachia, Vlad Țepeș,

[hereinafter Urkundenbuch]

³⁵ Pálosfalvi, *From Nicopolis*, 2018. 212–213.

³⁶ 1466: Urkundenbuch, Vol. VI., Nr. 3484.; 1467: Urkundenbuch, Vol. VI., Nr. 3531, 3532.; 1468: Urkundenbuch, Vol. VI., Nr. 3606, 3609, 3627.; 1469: Urkundenbuch, Vol. VI., Nr. 3687, 3689.; 1470: Urkundenbuch, Vol. VI., Nr. 3802, 3826.; 1471: Urkundenbuch, Vol. VI., Nr. 3843.

³⁷ Horváth, Richárd, “Hunyadi Mátyás és Havasalföld”, = *Világtörténet* 32:3–4, 2010, 3–12. 5–7.

³⁸ Fógel, József – Iványi, Béla – Juhász László, *Antonius de Bonfinis. Rerum ungaricarum decades*. Vol. IV/L., Budapest, 1941. Liber I. 143.

³⁹ Urkundenbuch, Vol. VI., Nr. 3578.; *Rechnungen aus dem Archiv der Stadt Hermannstadt in der Sächsischen Nation*. Hermannstadt, 1880. 9–10.

⁴⁰ Urkundenbuch, Vol. VI., Nr. 3723.

⁴¹ Horváth, Richárd – Neumann, Tibor, *Ecsedi Bátori István. Egy katonabáró életpályája (1459–1493)*. Budapest, 2012. 39–40.

⁴² Urkundenbuch, Vol. VII., Nr. 4127.

had succeeded in securing the Ojtoz (Oituz) Pass, they returned to Transylvania with the further aim of attacking the pro-Ottoman voivode of Wallachia, Basarab Laiotă.⁴³ King Matthias also wanted to ensure the necessary army for Bátori by ordering the Saxons in a letter dated September 6 to rise again and march to Wallachia instead of returning home.⁴⁴ Unfortunately, we have no information on which military forces of the Saxon provinces were affected by the events of the campaign detailed so far. On October 2, however, Stephen Bátori ordered the town of Sibiu and the seven Saxon seats to send 50 horsemen and military equipment for the Wallachian campaign.⁴⁵ The next noteworthy event is that in 1478 the Saxons took part in the siege of the castle called Sóllyomkő of the powerful Drágfi family and the Bánfis' center of Sebes in Cluj county.⁴⁶ Then, in 1479, a very significant Ottoman attack was launched against Transylvania, over which the Hungarian army won a great victory at Kenyérmező (Câmpul Pâinii). In this battle troops from the Saxon towns also took part.⁴⁷ After this victorious battle, the Hungarian army prepared for further war.⁴⁸ As part of this, Bátori (by this time as voivode of Transylvania) sent to Brasov the former voivode of Wallachia, Basarab Laiotă cel Bătrân, and ordered the inhabitants of the town to help him in any way they could to defend the kingdom, but, without the knowledge of the Transylvanian voivode, he strictly forbade any incursion into Wallachia.⁴⁹ However, Laiotă, probably with the help of the inhabitants of Brasov, in spite of the order, made an incursion into the territories of Wallachia and kidnapped the wife of the enemy voivode, Basarab Țepeluș cel Tânăr, and also stole a considerable amount of money.⁵⁰ In the following year, 1480, the Ottoman-Hungarian struggles continued, but by this time the Hungarian troops were increasingly taking the initiative.⁵¹ Among the Hungarian armies attacking from several sides were the Transylvanian armies, and in the autumn there were also Saxon troops among the latter. In a letter dated September 27, the voivode of Transylvania Stephen Bátori ordered Brasov to give his men sent to the town help against the Ottomans raiding Szeklerland, and to put their mercenaries at their disposal.⁵² In December, probably also because of an Ottoman attack, the Transylvanian voivode appealed to the mayor of Sibiu, ordering Sibiu to march against the enemy with the Saxons who owned horses ("Saxonibus equos habentibus"),⁵³ and ordered Brasov to hire 110 horsemen

⁴³ Horváth – Neumann, Bátori István, 2012. 40.

⁴⁴ Urkundenbuch, Vol. VII., Nr. 4141.

⁴⁵ Urkundenbuch, Vol. VII., Nr. 4147.

⁴⁶ Urkundenbuch, Vol. VII., Nr. 4287, 4289.

⁴⁷ Szakály, Ferenc – Fodor, Pál, "A kenyérmezei csata, 1479. október 13", = *Hadtörténelmi Közlemények* 111, 1998, 309–350.

⁴⁸ Horváth – Neumann, Bátori István, 2012. 51–52.

⁴⁹ Urkundenbuch, Vol. VII., Nr. 4326.

⁵⁰ Horváth – Neumann, Bátori István, 2012. 52.

⁵¹ Horváth – Neumann, Bátori István, 2012. 53–55.

⁵² Urkundenbuch, Vol. VII., Nr. 4370.

⁵³ Urkundenbuch, Vol. VII., Nr. 4375.

from the men of the deceased voivode of Wallachia.⁵⁴ The following year, 1481, was filled with struggles with the Ottomans, as in previous years. For instance, in February, Bátori ordered the mayor of Sibiu to return to Sibiu “in morte equi” (= lóhalálában, “at breakneck speed” it is a Hungarianism⁵⁵) and on his way send the horsemen and foot soldiers from Aranyosbánya (Baia de Arieş) to Sibiu, furthermore, lead all Saxons “per singula capitula” on horseback or on foot to Szentágota (Agnita).⁵⁶ Subsequently, however, the Saxons’ arms turned in another direction, namely towards Wallachia, where the pro-Ottoman Wallachian voivode was supported by Ottoman troops.⁵⁷ And although the orders to the Saxons were initially mainly about the threat of Ottoman invasions and the mobilisation of troops to deal with them, their troops were certainly involved in the Wallachian campaign.⁵⁸ Although these conflicts could have ended already in September,⁵⁹ on October 7 the provost of Oradea, George, ordered the people of Segesvár (Sighișoara) to march with their troops to Turda. In 1484, however, the situation changed again, when Sultan Bayezid II led his troops on an attack towards the Hungarian borders, but initially it was impossible to accurately assess the target of the Ottoman army. King Matthias therefore sent Bátori to Transylvania as a precaution,⁶⁰ and ordered the Seven and Two Saxon Seats and the town of Cluj to arm 200 horsemen, who were to be sent to the voivode.⁶¹ Although the returning Transylvanian voivode also called an assembly for the Saxons due to the Ottoman invasion, but the purpose of the attack, namely the capture of Kiliia and Bilhorod-Dnistrovskiyi in Moldavia, became known to the Hungarian leadership in the meantime, so the intensity of preparations against the Ottomans decreased.⁶² It is clear from the king’s other instructions that he was no longer preparing primarily for the defense of Transylvania, but for the siege of Vienna. During this time, it seems that Stephen Bátori and his troops were mainly waiting for the sultan to withdraw and secure the borders in this way, as no substantial force concentration and thus no further mobilisation of the Transylvanian towns took place. After the sultan’s invasion, the remaining years of Matthias’s reign in Transylvania can be considered quite peaceful, which can also be observed in the voivode’s activities outside the province.⁶³ This opinion is also confirmed by the requests sent to the Saxons, since Stephen Telegdi, vice-voivode of Transylvania, asked them for troops only once

⁵⁴ Urkundenbuch, Vol. VII., Nr. 4378.

⁵⁵ Szapolyai oklevéltár, 2012. 27. 26. footnote

⁵⁶ Urkundenbuch, Vol. VII., Nr. 4387.

⁵⁷ Horváth – Neumann, Bátori István, 2012. 57–59.

⁵⁸ Urkundenbuch, Vol. VII., Nr. 4392, 4398, 4397, 4405, 4420, 4412, 4426.

⁵⁹ Horváth – Neumann, Bátori István, 2012. 59.

⁶⁰ Horváth – Neumann, Bátori István, 2012. 66.

⁶¹ Urkundenbuch, Vol. VII., Nr. 4559.

⁶² Horváth – Neumann, Bátori István, 2012. 65–70.

⁶³ Horváth – Neumann, Bátori István, 2012. 71–88.

in this period, namely on October 24, 1487, when he ordered the troops of Sibiu to Szászsebes (Sebeş) because of the Ottoman threat.⁶⁴

However, after the death of Matthias, in the second half of 1490, mobilisation against the Ottoman threat again came to the fore.⁶⁵ Although the expected attack did not occur, the soldiers of the Saxon towns were still kept armed, leading to tensions between the vice-voivode and the Saxons.⁶⁶ In 1492, however, Stephen Bátori, the voivode returning to Transylvania, ordered Brasov to send 60 horsemen, although the ruler had originally called on the Saxons to rise up individually, but the expected attack did not happen this time either.⁶⁷ On January 8, 1493, Stephen Telegdi asked the town of Sighişoara to send troops towards Hátszeg (Haţeg) against the Ottomans,⁶⁸ which, probably under the command of the vice-voivode and the count of Sibiu, eventually took part in the battle of Vöröstoronyi-szoros (Pasul Turnu Roşu) against the Ottomans returning from Transylvania.⁶⁹ It was also in this battle that the mayor of Sibiu, George Hecht, who had also taken part in the Battle of Breadfield in 1479, distinguished himself once again (so obviously the Saxon troops were also involved in the battle).⁷⁰ On May 29 of the following year, the Transylvanian voivodes Ladislaus Losonczi and Bartholomew Drágfi ordered the town of Sibiu to send their troops under their own banners (as was the custom) to Marosvásárhely (Târgu Mures),⁷¹ and in 1497 Drágfi sent them similar orders again, referring to the raiding Ottomans.⁷² In 1497, however, the Saxon troops eventually marched with the Transylvanian voivode against the Polish army invading Moldavia.⁷³ After that a significant change only occurred in 1501, when a war broke out between the Ottomans and the Kingdom of Hungary, which lasted until the summer of 1503.⁷⁴ Despite this, the Saxons' weapons did not rest: already on February 25, 1504, King Wladislas II ordered them to be

⁶⁴ Urkundenbuch, Vol. VII., Nr. 4741.

⁶⁵ DF 245379.; Urkundenbuch zur Geschichte der Deutschen in Siebenbürgen Vol. VIII., <http://siebenbuergenurkundenbuch.uni-trier.de/>, Nr. 5124.)

⁶⁶ DF 245453. (Urkundenbuch, Vol. VIII., Nr. 5143.); DF 245384. (Urkundenbuch, Vol. VIII., Nr. 5131.); DF 245380. (Urkundenbuch, Vol. VIII., Nr. 5125.)

⁶⁷ Urkundenbuch, Vol. VIII., Nr. 5245.; Horváth – Neumann, Bátori István, 2012. 112–115.

⁶⁸ DF 245164. (Urkundenbuch, Vol. VIII., Nr. 5302.)

⁶⁹ Gündisch, Gustav, "Incursiunea turcească din anul 1493 în ținutul Sibiului", = *Studii. Revistă de istorie* 14:6, 1961, 1491–1502.

⁷⁰ Urkundenbuch, Vol. VIII., Nr. 5381.

⁷¹ Urkundenbuch, Vol. VIII., Nr. 5423, 5473.; On the relationship between the two voivodes, see: Neumann, Tibor, "Drágfi Bertalan politikai szerepe II. Ulászló király idején", In: Hegyi, Géza – W. Kovács, András (eds.), *A Szilágyság és a Wesselényi család (14–17. század)*. Kolozsvár, 2012. 219–226.

⁷² DF 245468. (Urkundenbuch, Vol. VIII., Nr. 5737.); DF 245469. (Urkundenbuch, Vol. VIII., Nr. 5738.)

⁷³ Diaconescu, Marius, "Mobilizarea oastei maghiare în 1497 (in subsidium et tutelam wayvode Moldauiensis)", = *Analele Putnei* 12:2, 2016, 35–52. 44–47.

⁷⁴ Pálosfalvi, From Nicopolis, 2018. 298–323.

ready, indicating that in the absence of voivode Peter Szentgyörgyi and Bazini he would leave military affairs to the vice-voivode, so that they would stand ready with their troops at the vice-voivode's command.⁷⁵ The first mobilisation took place in March on the orders of the vice-voivode, when he ordered Sibiu to send its infantry and cavalry units to Sighișoara,⁷⁶ and a week later Bistrița was ordered to keep its soldiers ready for the vice-voivode.⁷⁷ Subsequently, in 1505, the Ottoman threat again obliged Bistrița to keep its troops on standby as the enemy gathered at Kisnikápoly (Turnu Măgurele).⁷⁸ After the fighting in the territory of the Kingdom of Hungary, however, the next two major mobilisation periods were connected to Moldavia and Wallachia. In the case of Wallachia, this was due to the expected⁷⁹ and then actual death of Voivode Radu IV and the threat of Ottoman intervention in the succession (the latter, incidentally, soon happened under the leadership of Mihaloğlu Mehmed).⁸⁰ From the archives of the Saxon towns we have information concerning these occurrences from 1508 and 1509.⁸¹ The other major mobilisation period was related to the Tatar attacks on Moldavia in 1510–1511,⁸² in connection with which the armies of Sibiu and Bistrița were called to arms.⁸³ Regarding the year 1512, three command letters for military activity remain. In one of them Nicholas Thuróczy, the Transylvanian vice-voivode, informed Sibiu about the internal fighting in Wallachia and gave orders to guard the roads to prevent the enemy from making an unexpected incursion.⁸⁴ The second letter is an order from John Szapolyai, dated July 12, instructing Bistrița to guard the roads to Moldavia and to capture Mircea IV, the former voivode of Wallachia who had fled from him.⁸⁵ The third one is a mobilisation order from Leonard

⁷⁵ Hurmuzaki, Eudoxiu, *Documente privitoare la istoria Românilor volumul XV. Partea I: 1358–1600. Acte și scrisori din arhivele orașelor ardeleni (Bistrița, Brașov, Sibiu). Publicate după copiile Academiei Române de N. Iorga*. București, 1911. Nr. 302.

⁷⁶ DF 245944.

⁷⁷ DF 247462.

⁷⁸ DF 247475.

⁷⁹ Hurmuzaki, *Documente*, 1911. Nr. 330.

⁸⁰ Feneșan, Cristina, “Mihaloğlu Mehmet Beg et la Principauté de Valachie (1508–1532)”, = *The Journal of Ottoman Studies* 15, 1995, 137–155. 150.

⁸¹ 1508: DF 245659.; Hurmuzaki, *Documente*, 1911. Nr. 332.; Gündisch, Gustav, “Siebenbürgen in der Türkenabwehr 1395–1526”, In. Gündisch, Gustav (ed.), *Aus Geschichte und Kultur der Siebenbürger Sachsen. Ausgewählte Aufsätze und Berichte*. (Schriften zur Landeskunde Siebenbürgens, 14.). Köln, 1987. 36–64. 61.; 1509: Hurmuzaki, *Documente*, 1911. Nr. 351.; DF 245994.

⁸² Ștefănescu, Ștefan – Mureșan, Camil – Teoteoi, Tudor (eds.), *Istoria Românilor*. Vol. IV., București, 2001. 428.

⁸³ Szokola, László, “Adalékok az erdélyi szász városok késő középkori katonai állításához – egy beszercei lista tanulságai”, In. Kis, Iván et al. (eds.), *Micae Mediaevales VIII.: Fiatal történészek dolgozatai a középkori Magyarországról és Európáról*. Budapest, 2019. 101–115. 104–105.

⁸⁴ Hurmuzaki, *Documente*, 1911. Nr. 391.

⁸⁵ Szapolyai oklevéltár, 2012. Nr. 374.

Barlabási, dated only for that year, ordering the troops of Bistrița to Agnita.⁸⁶ These orders, however, can be supplemented with additional data, since, according to the Brasov account books, the town's troops had to be sent out at the order of the voivode sometime in the autumn.⁸⁷ In the following year, in connection with the siege of Szabács (Šabac), Szapolyai ordered that one-sixteenth of the troops of Sibiu and the Seven and Two Saxon Seats be sent to Alvinc (Vințu de Jos).⁸⁸ Interestingly, however, the troops of the Transylvanian nations, and thus the Saxons, did not participate in the crusade in 1514 and in the invasion of Bulgaria by voivode Szapolyai,⁸⁹ but they were mobilised to suppress the revolt led by George Dózsa.⁹⁰ After the suppression of the revolt, at the end of the year, Szapolyai requested 16 riflemen from Bistrița for Turda to prevent banditry, which was on the rise due to the internal fighting.⁹¹ In the year following the revolt, we have information about the Ottomans' incursion again, against whom Szapolyai mobilised the soldiers of several Transylvanian towns, but the enemy's attack was eventually abandoned.⁹² In 1519 the Transylvanian voivode sent orders to Brasov to send 300 horsemen and 50 riflemen to Sighișoara in June to suppress the Szekler rebellion,⁹³ and on August 1 he requested 400 horsemen from the town for the Moldavian voivode.⁹⁴ The sultan's attack on Nándorfehérvár (Belgrad) in 1521, which resulted in the loss of the castle,⁹⁵ caused great fear in the country, but at the same time there was a rumor in Transylvania that Mihaloglu Mehmed wanted to take Brasov,⁹⁶ so the orders to the Saxon towns were divided between these two sources of danger: some orders were directed to the preparation against the sultan's army, more precisely to the army that was gathering to lift the siege, while others called for the defense of Transylvania.⁹⁷ However, much more interesting for the

⁸⁶ Berger, Albert, *Urkunden-Regesten aus dem Archiv der Stadt Bistritz in Siebenbürgen, 1203–1570*. Vol. I., Köln–Böhlau, 1986. Nr. 563.

⁸⁷ *Quellen zur Geschichte der Stadt Kronstadt in Siebenbürgen: Rechnungen aus dem Archiv der Stadt Kronstadt. Rechnungen aus 1503–1526*. Kronstadt, 1886. 195.

⁸⁸ Szapolyai oklevéltár, 2012. Nr. 381.

⁸⁹ Neumann, Tibor, "Bulgária–Erdély–Temesvár: Szapolyai János és a parasztháború", In: C. Tóth, Norbert – Neumann, Tibor (eds.), *Keresztesekből lázadók: Tanulmányok 1514 Magyarországról*. Budapest, 2015. 103–154. 111.

⁹⁰ Szapolyai oklevéltár, 2012. Nr. 393, 395, 400, 401, 402.

⁹¹ Szapolyai oklevéltár, 2012. Nr. 407.

⁹² C. Tóth, Norbert, "The Anti-Ottoman Struggles of Voivode John Szapolyai of Transylvania (1510–1526)", In: Fodor, Pál – Varga, Szabolcs (eds.), *A Forgotten Hungarian Royal Dynasty: The Szapolyais*. Budapest, 2020. 111–125. 120.

⁹³ Szapolyai oklevéltár, 2012. Nr. 487.

⁹⁴ Szapolyai oklevéltár, 2012. Nr. 491.

⁹⁵ Pálosfalvi, From Nicopolis, 2018. 372–395.

⁹⁶ Gündisch, Siebenbürgen in Türkenabwehr, 1987. 62.

⁹⁷ Szapolyai oklevéltár, 2012. Nr. 538, 539, 540.; DF 245790.; *Arhivele Naționale ale României: Arhiva Medievală a României* [hereinafter ANR–AMR] – Brașov – Colecția Documente privilegiate: Nr. 362.; ANR–AMR: Brașov – Colecția de documente Fronius Vol. I., Nr. 228.

present topic are John Szapolyai's instructions concerning his 1522 campaigns in Wallachia and the correspondence between the Saxon towns in connection with it. According to the sources, it seems that at the provincial diet on March 30 in Nagyenyed (Aiud), in preparation for the campaign, a heated debate broke out concerning the participation of the Saxons in the campaign. Originally, the voivode's position was probably that the Saxons should have sent 2,000 infantrymen to the war, but this was eventually done by the individual towns in the form of tax or actually supplied troops. Thus, for instance, Sibiu and part of Brasov sent soldiers to the service of the Transylvanian voivode, while Bistrița and another part of Brasov redeemed the sending of infantrymen with money. Subsequently, however, significantly more Saxon troops took part in the second campaign in the autumn.⁹⁸ This example also shows that the different military obligations (sending troops, war taxes and even the sending of equipment can be mentioned) may have interacted, so their economic impact on towns should be examined in the longer term and in relation to each other.⁹⁹ At the end of April and in May 1523, Leonard Barlabási mobilised the Saxon towns instead of the voivode¹⁰⁰ because of Szapolyai's presence in Buda.¹⁰¹ And at the end of the same year and in April 1524, several mobilisation orders were sent to Sibiu for the defense of Szörényvár (Drobeta-Turnu Severin).¹⁰² However, despite military reinforcements and the fortification of the walls, the castle eventually fell.¹⁰³ Subsequently, although 1525 proved to be a calmer period for the Saxon troops in regard to mobilisations, in 1526 the Saxon towns were mobilised in several cases due to the attacking Ottoman army. Their call to arms was further complicated by the fact that the main target of the sultan's army could not initially be identified, and the conflicting orders eventually led to the Transylvanian armies not taking part in the decisive Battle of Mohács.¹⁰⁴

Summary

In summary, depending on their geopolitical location, the towns of the Kingdom of Hungary provided soldiers to the kingdom for different purposes at various times. In the case of the Transylvanian Saxon towns, it is clear that these towns were almost constantly engaged in active defense against the Ottomans and the Ottoman vassal Crimean Tatars. As a result, their troops were present

⁹⁸ C. Tóth, Norbert, "Szapolyai János 1522. évi havasalföldi hadjáratai. Havasalföld korlátozott függetlenségének biztosítása", = *Hadtörténelmi Közlemények* 125, 2012. 987–1014. 993–1007.

⁹⁹ See also: Neumann, Minden időkbén, 2017. 104.

¹⁰⁰ DF 246153, 246604.

¹⁰¹ Szapolyai oklevéltár, 2012. Nr. 572.

¹⁰² Hurmuzaki, Documente, 1911. Nr. 501.; ANR–AMR – Sibiu – Magistratul oraşului și scaunului Sibiu 1. Colecția de documente medievale: Nr. 271.

¹⁰³ DL 82658.; ANR–AMR – Sibiu – Magistratul oraşului și scaunului Sibiu 1. Colecția de documente medievale. Seria UV. Nr. 1253.

¹⁰⁴ C. Tóth, *Anti-Ottoman Struggles*, 2020. 124–125.; DF 247201, 247817, 247833.; Szapolyai oklevéltár, 2012. Nr. 623, 624, 626, 630, 631, 634.

in the lands of the Wallachia, Moldavia and even in the Ottoman territories. An interesting question, however, is what effect this almost constant military preparedness, even if it did not always involve the sending of armed units, had on the economic life and military organization of the Saxon towns. As far as the towns of northeastern Hungary are concerned, it is clear that their military role was primarily against the Hussite-origin troops in the northern part of the Kingdom of Hungary, and later on mainly in the internal conflicts of the country and in the defense against threats from Poland. Although they were not directly involved in King Matthias' Bohemian and Austrian wars, they played an important role as mercenary markets for the ruler. The free mercenary potential of the region is also illustrated by the fact that a significant number of mercenary leaders offered their services to the local towns during this period.¹⁰⁵ Looking at the western parts of the kingdom, it is clear that the towns here were mainly involved in local conflicts, and at the end of Matthias' reign, in the last phase of the Austrian war, they sent troops to the king of Hungary with their own money, or sent mercenaries at the expense of the monarch. The military power of the western Hungarian towns, however, was almost entirely absent from the defeat of the Hussite-origin troops, and completely absent from Matthias' Bohemian war. It is therefore apparent that the main task of the towns in northeastern Hungary and western Hungary was to secure their immediate surroundings, and that the ruler mobilised the towns in western Hungary to greater distances or beyond the border only in critical cases and only for short periods. There was only one type of event in which the soldiers of the towns were mobilised from all over the country: when the Ottoman sultan himself marched against the Kingdom of Hungary. In my opinion, the military organization of the towns and the economic impact of the military provided by the towns should be examined in the light of these observations.

¹⁰⁵ For instance: DF 213837.; DF 214038.

Mihály Boda

PELBARTUS OF TEMESVÁR'S WARFARE IDEOLOGY. THE EMERGENCE OF JUST WAR DOCTRINE IN MEDIEVAL HUNGARY

Introduction

Pelbartus of Temesvár (Pelbart of Temesvár) (1435–1504), the Franciscan friar, has a prominent position in the development of Hungarian just war thinking. He is perhaps the first author who summarised the just war theory in Hungary. However, his work includes references to medieval forms of warfare ideologies other than just war theory, like holy war ideology and the *iudicium Dei* ideology; and he was not the first author whose works contributed to some extent to Hungarian just war thinking. So one can claim Pelbartus composed a warfare ideology which is the first more or less theoretical approach to warfare justice in Hungary following the more practical approach of the Hungarian historians, like Anonymus and the author of the *Illuminated Codex*. For this reason, in this essay I first present the three basic warfare ideologies of the Middle Ages, then I show the form of just war thinking which appears in the historians' tradition. Finally, I will discuss the compound ideology of Pelbartus.

Christian warfare ideologies in the Middle Ages

One can meet at least three basic forms of medieval warfare ideologies in the sources, books and articles related to the history of medieval mentality and warfare. These are the holy war ideology, the *iudicium Dei* ideology, and the medieval just war theory.

a) Holy war ideology

Christopher Tyerman, writing on the history of crusades, made a crucial distinction between holy war and just war: 'While holy war depended on God's will, constituted a religious act, was directed by clergy, or divinely sanctioned lay rulers, and offered a spiritual reward, just war formed a legal category justified by secular necessity, conduct and aim, attracting temporal benefits'.¹ Similarly, James Turner Johnson claimed holy war originally was a war fought by God's command in ancient Israel. Beyond this sense, however, Johnson observed some other views of holy war, like it was fought on God's behalf or by God Himself, fought for religion or to propagate right religion,

¹ Tyerman, Christopher, *God's War. A new History of the Crusade*. London, 2007. 35.

and finally fought by the “holy” participants.² Abridging these definitions into what I take to be the most important element of holy war I define holy war as a war commanded or intended by God. Command and intention of God depends only on God’s own prospective plans, which can justify war before the fight, when the intention is figured, and the command is issued.

One Christian form of holy war ideology is Saint Augustine’s idea that in holy war Christians – by the divine charity (good intention) in them – punish their sinful enemies in order to help them redeem their (the enemies’) souls. As Augustine tells in his letter to Marcellinus speaking on the prescriptions of God

“Recompense to no man evil for evil”: “These precepts concerning patience ought to be always retained in the habitual discipline of the heart, and the benevolence which prevents the recompensing of evil with evil must be always fully cherished in the disposition. At the same time, many things must be done in correcting with a certain benevolent severity, even against their own wishes, men whose welfare rather than their wishes it is our duty to consult”.³

In this passage correction is a form of justice (punishment of sin), but it is also an instrument of attaining the spiritual welfare of the sinners, that is the peace (salvation) of their souls, which is the intention of God, and which has to be intended by Christian officers. Hence, the most important element of the Augustinian holy war idea is that God’s intention is to redeem human souls, and the justice and punishment are only the instruments of this intention.

In post-Augustinian holy war ideologies, the redemption of souls of the fighting Christians earned significance (instead or beside the redemption of souls of the sinners), and additional instruments appeared as the content of God’s command (instead or beside punishment). One of these instruments was God’s command to liberate Christian peoples from the oppression of the Muslims.⁴

b) *Iudicium Dei*

Iudicium Dei ideology is equally connected to religious and moral concepts, and its most important element is a special understanding of justice: God

² Johnson, James Turner, *The Holy War Idea in Western and Islamic Traditions*. Pennsylvania, 2005. 37–39.

³ Saint Augustine, “Letter 138 (To Marcellinus)”, In. Schaff, Philip (ed.), *Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers of Christian Church*. Vol. I., Buffalo, 1886. 481–488. 485.

⁴ Fulcher of Chartres, “Gesta Francorum Jerusalem Expugnantium”, In. Thatcher, Oliver J. – McNeal, Edgar Holmes (eds.), *A Source Book for Medieval History*. New York, 1905. 513–517.; Pope Innocent III, “71. constitution of IV. Lateran council”, In. *Papal encyclical online, Fourth Lateran Council: 1215*. <https://www.papalencyclicals.net/councils/ecum12-2.htm#71> (Accessed on 20 January 2023)

adjudicates over the deeds of humans with the help His nature and special abilities. This form of justice is called (pure) procedural justice, which “obtains when there is no independent criterion for the right result: instead, there is a correct or fair procedure such that the outcome is likewise correct or fair, whatever it is, provided that the procedure has been properly followed”.⁵ The correct procedure is in the case of the ideology is God’s judging process.

God’s judgement is not entirely unpredictable for people, so they are able to influence that by just and pious, or even unjust and impious lifestyle. However, influence is not equal to determination. So, one cannot be certain that their influence will be successful because God’s judgement concerns all the connecting deeds of the past, present, and future as well,⁶ most of which are knowable only to Him. Even the most pious man cannot have hundred percent certainty.

Another important feature of this justice-related justification of war is the retrospective character of justice.⁷ Whether a deed in general, and the deed of starting a war in particular is just or unjust turns out only by the end of the war, because that end is the judgement of God. If the end is victory, then the war is judged as a just war by God, but if it is defeat then it should be understood as an unjust war and a punishment imposed by God. One cannot say in advance whether a war will be just or unjust because God’s judgement can be observed only after the war.

The third basic element of the ideology of ordeal is the partiality of the ideology, however, with an objective twist. This character is reflected in the God-required form of lifestyle and perhaps in the Biblical concept of “chosen people”, which referred to Christian-German people in the Early Middle Ages.⁸ The required way of life should be in accordance with Christian rules. Respecting these rules may result in God’s help to his people, which leads them to victory against their enemy, but if the people disrespect them, then God may punish his people by giving the victory to the enemy of his people. This shows the partial character of the ideology. However, if the people fail to follow the rules, then God will certainly punish them and give the victory to the enemy. This is the objective twist of the partial content of the ideology because it shows that God has rules only for a special group of persons, the

⁵ Rawls, John, *A Theory of Justice (Revised Edition)*. Cambridge, MA, 1999. 75.

⁶ Geric, József, “Judicium Dei a magyar állam XI. századi külkapcsolataiban [*Judicium Dei* in Hungarian State’s Foreign Relations in the eleventh century]”, In: Mezey, László (ed.), *Athleta Patriae – Tanulmányok Szent László történetéhez* [*Athleta Patriae – Essays for Studying History of Saint Ladislaus*]. Budapest, 1980. 111–134. 118.

⁷ Evans, Robert A. H., “Christian Hermeneutics and Narratives of War in the Carolingian Empire”, = *Transformation: An International Journal of Holistic Mission Studies* 34, 2016, 1–14. 2.

⁸ Cf. Garrison, Mary, “The Franks as the New Israel? Education for Identity from Pippin to Charlemagne”, In: Hen, Yitzhak – Innes, Matthew (eds.), *The Uses of the Past in the Early Middle Ages*, Cambridge, 2004. 114–161. 114–123.; Evans, Christian Hermeneutics, 2016. 6–7.

Christian-German people, however, these rules are objectively imperative in nature. For this reason, partiality of ideology of ordeal should be understood as a particularly addressed set of requirements and not as a practicing unrestricted preference. This is proved by that there are different consequences of respecting and disrespecting the rules, but other peoples (the enemies) can only assist to God's judgement as an instrument.

Finally, the last essential concept of the ideology is God's peace. In the Early Middle Ages peace technically depended on the victory reached on the battlefield, and on the person who reached the victory.⁹ In the sense of the ideology, the victory is the result of God's judgement, and personal help or punishment. Hence, the peace coming into being is a peace in the material world maintained directly by God.¹⁰

Isidore of Seville (560–636) was one of the representatives of this ideology. According to Isidore, Christ is the eternal king and priest at the same time, and his material body is his earthly empire, the Church. The Church includes not only the institutions of the Church but the Christian society and all the Christian people as well. This kingdom of Christ is not supposed to be a unified earthly empire, but it contains the patchwork of several kingdoms, the Christian-German kingdoms. These kingdoms are the cells of the Church and ruled by earthly and human kings. A human king, who is a Christian priest and the chief of the German people, should reflect to Christ in his virtues, so he has to be just along the rules of Christianity and German common law, and he is supposed to be pious and merciful to his people, and to restrict the strictness of the law. Behaving virtuously the king sets a good example to his people, because of which the king is God's gift to the people. His principal responsibility is to care about his own Christian people, and Christians beyond the border of his rule as well. For this reason, the king is permitted to defend his people by war and to extend his rule and Christianity. Kings can be judged only by God, which is slightly contrary to men in general, who are judged by human judges. If a king becomes an unjust, impious, and merciless tyrant, then his people are not permitted to rebel against him, because the judgement is on God's side. God punishes the king and his people as well, if they follow the king in his sin, or if the source of the sin is the people. If the king is a true Christian king, then God helps him against his enemies.¹¹

⁹ Wallace-Hadrill, John Michael, "War and Peace in the earlier Middle Ages: The Prothero Lecture", = *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society* 25, 1975, 157–174. 160–162.

¹⁰ Cf. Boda, Mihály, "The Warfare Ideology of Ordeal: Another Form of Just War Thinking? Theory and Practice from the Early Middle Ages", = *Journal of Military Ethics* (forthcoming).

¹¹ Isidore of Seville, *The Etymologies*. Cambridge, 2006. 117–118, 199–200, 359–360.; Isidore of Seville, *Sententiae*. New York–Mahwah, NJ, 2018. 200, 203.

c) *Medieval just war theory*

According to Tyerman, “just war formed a legal category justified by secular necessity, conduct and aim, attracting temporal benefits”. This definition could be sound if we examined the early modern and modern forms of the theory, but in the Middle Ages the theory was linked always to some religious content beyond legal matters.

The root of the theory goes back to Saint Augustine, perhaps even into the older past. It became apparent in its systematic form only in the twelfth century, in the works of Gratian, and it obtained its medieval canonical form in the works of Saint Thomas Aquinas (1225–1274) in the thirteenth century.¹² The theory lost from its religious character in its medieval development, but it did not become a purely secular idea.

So even in the ideas of Aquinas the theory had religious implications. Aquinas defines just war by three – at first sight – secular terms, that is legitimate authority (princes who do not have a superior), just cause (committed fault which deserves attack) and right intention (advancement of good).¹³ However, he deals with some more or less secondary religious matters in the text in question,¹⁴ and what is more important he places this text into the broader context of Christian peace, particularly into the context of the sins against Christian peace.

Christian peace, as the result of divine charity in us, has four kinds. Firstly, one can distinguish the purely religious peace, which is the perfect peace of the blessed in the heaven, and the imperfect peace, which is the result of the harmonizing effect of charity in a single person and among the persons. This later form of charity-laden peace has again two forms, when charity is expressed by natural friendship among persons in a single polity, and when it is expressed by natural friendship among independent polities. War is a sin contrary to this latest form of imperfect peace, and just war is the way how this form of peace can be maintained.¹⁵ Hence, the purpose of just war is to maintain a result of charity, to keep the peace among polities.

One implication of this consequence is that traditional just war theory applies not only the concept of justice, but a religious concept – the Christian charity-laden temporal peace – as well. The religious concept has logical prior-

¹² Cf. Erdmann, Carl, *The Origin of the Idea of Crusade*. Princeton, NJ, 1977. 244.; Johnson, James Turner, *Just War Tradition and the Restraint of War*. Princeton, NJ, 1981. 121–123.

¹³ Thomas Aquinas, “The Summa theologiae II/II. Question 40: On War”, In. Reichberg, Gregory M. – Syse, Henrik – Begby, Endre (eds.), *The Ethics of War: Classic and Contemporary Readings*. Malden: MA–Oxford–Carlton: Victoria, 2013. 176–182. 177.

¹⁴ Walters, Leroy, “The Just War and the Crusade: Antithese or Analogies?”, = *The Monist* 57, 1973, 584–594. 585–586.

¹⁵ Reichberg, Gregory M., *Thomas Aquinas on War and Peace*. Cambridge, 2018. 17–24, 38.

ity over the concept of justice from the perspective of the whole Christian life. In the particular theory, however, the moral concept of justice has more importance than the religious content. This can be seen from the applied secular concept of natural friendship, which is used to mediate the Christian concept of peace in the analysis of the peace among polities.¹⁶

Just war thinking in medieval Hungary

a) Historians' tradition of just war thinking in the Illuminated Codex and in Anonymus' Gesta Hungarorum

The theoretical form of just war thinking appeared relatively late in Hungary, only in Pelbartus of Temesvár's *Knight George* in the second half of the fifteenth century. However, one can find some elements of just war theory of Saint Thomas Aquinas earlier in the works of the historians, like Anonymus' *Gesta Hungarorum* and the *Illuminated Codex*.¹⁷ Since medieval historians referred to the elements of just war theory only indirectly without building a theory on them, we can call these references as the historians' tradition of just war thinking.

The description of the Hungarian conquest of the Carpathian Basin (or in short, the Conquest) has a prominent place both in the *Gesta Hungarorum* of Anonymus (Master P, notary of Béla III (1172–1196)) (which was written around 1200), and in the *Illuminated Codex* (which was constructed in the fourteenth century but some of its parts had been being written from the eleventh century). The Conquest took place in three phases at the turn of the ninth–tenth centuries: Hungarians conquered Transylvania in the first phase (fighting with the Bulgarians), then they took the Danube-Tisza interfluve in the second (warring with the Moravians), and finally they acquired control over Transdanubia (from the Kingdom of the East Franks). One of the central themes of the narration of the Conquest is the legend of the white horse, which is connected to the second phase and to the hostility with the Moravians.

According to the legend, after the Hungarians scouted the Danube-Tisza Interfluve they sent a messenger to the prince of the Moravians, Svatopluk. After the comeback of the messenger, they consulted the question of “How this land shall be conquered?”. The *Illuminated Codex* continues the narration:

“Then by a common resolve they dispatched the same messenger again to the said leader and sent to him for his land a big horse with a golden saddle adorned with the gold of Arabia and a golden bridle. Seeing it, the duke rejoiced all the more, thinking that they were sending [gifts]

¹⁶ Reichberg, Thomas Aquinas, 2018. 22–27.

¹⁷ The charters were another type of early sources of just war thinking in which many references to unjust private use of violence appeared. See: Tringli, István, “Erőszak, hatalmaskodás, háború [Violence, feud, war]”, In: Hermann, Róbert (ed.), *Magyarország hadtörténete*. I. kötet. [Military History of Hungary. Vol. I.]. Budapest, 2017. 12–16.

as settlers in return for land. When therefore the messenger asked of him land, grass and water, he replied with a smile, In return for this gift let them have as much as they desire.”

And with this answer the messenger returned to his people. In the meantime, Árpád entered Pannonia with the seven leaders, not as settlers, but as owners of the land by hereditary right. Then they sent another messenger to the leader, and this was the message which he delivered:

“Árpád and his people say to you that you may no longer stay upon the land which they bought from you, for with the horse they bought your earth, with the bridle the grass, and with the saddle the water. And you, because of emphyteosis, that is, of need and avarice, granted them land, grass, and water. (...) if they have earth, grass and water, they have all.”¹⁸

Anonymus' report is slightly different. According to him at first prince Salan (Svatopluk) sent messenger to prince Árpád (after the Hungarians had appeared on the land of the Moravians) and messaged the Hungarians to redress the destruction and not to cross the river Bodrog, otherwise Salan would avenge them with the help of the Bulgarians and the Greeks. Anonymus reports the events after this:

“Duke Árpád having heard the embassy of the haughty duke, replied not haughtily, but humbly, saying: Although my forbear, the most powerful King Attila, had the land the which lies between the Danube and the Tisza as far as the border of the Bulgarians, which he, your master, has, I nevertheless, not because I fear that I may be unable to withstand the Greeks and Bulgarians, but rather for the friendship of Salan, your duke, ask as my right one little place for my flocks, namely the land up to the River Louiou, and in addition I ask your lord to send me of his grace two small bottles filled with the water of the Danube and one bag of herbs of the sands of Olpar so that I may test whether the herbs of the sands of Olpar are sweeter than the herbs of the Scythian, that is Dentumoger, and whether the waters of the Danube are better than the waters of the Don [Thanaydis]. And having given this message to them, he enriched them with diverse gifts and having won their goodwill he ordered them home. Then Duke Árpád, having taken counsel, likewise sent his envoys to Duke Salan and sent to him twelve white horses and camels and twelve Cuman boys and, for the duchess, twelve most nimble Ruthene girls and twelve ermine pelts and

¹⁸ Bak, János M. – Veszprémy, László (eds.), *Chronica de gestis Hungarorum e codice picto saec. XIV. / Chronicle of the Deeds of the Hungarians from the Fourteenth-Century Illuminated Codex*. Budapest–New York, 2018. 69–71.

twelve sables and twelve sables”.¹⁹ “Duke Salan, having seen the gifts and heard what they and his own men had to say, was especially happy and he graciously welcomed the envoys and enriched them with diverse gifts and, moreover, agreed to Árpád’s requests.”²⁰

Later, when Salan saw the growing power of Árpád:

“Duke Salan and his nobles, having taken counsel, sent envoys to Duke Árpád, saying that he should leave their land and start homewards to his native soil. When they reached Duke Árpád and relayed to him the message of Duke Salan, Duke Árpád and his nobles angrily replied to Duke Salan through his envoys: The land which lies between the Danube and Tisza, and the water of the Danube that flows from Ratisbon [Ratispona] to Greece, we bought with our money when we were new here and we sent as the price for it twelve white horses etcetera, as above. He, praising the goodness of his land, sent one bag of herbs of the sands of Olpar and two bottles of the waters of the Danube, on account of which we order your lord, Duke Salan, to leave our land and go by the swiftest course to the land of the Bulgarians, whence his forbear came after the death of our ancestor, King Attila. Should he do otherwise, let him know that we will fight him at the earliest opportunity.”²¹

Several varying interpretations of the legend were put forward.²² One part of the interpretations supposes that the legend does not link directly to the Conquest. According to György Györffy the legend is the memory of a previously formed Hungarian-Moravian alliance.²³ Pál Engel thought the contrary. According to him it expresses how Hungarians tried to psychologically cope with the bad memory of the fact that they breached the previously formed Hungarian-Moravian alliance.²⁴

¹⁹ Rady, Martyn, “The Gesta Hungarorum of Anonymus, the Anonymous Notary of King Béla: A Translation”, = *The Slavonic and East European Review* 87, 2009, 681–727. (14) 697.

²⁰ Rady, *The Gesta Hungarorum*, 2009. (16) 698.

²¹ Rady, *The Gesta Hungarorum*, 2009. (38) 711.

²² See: Veszprémy, László, *Történetírás és történetírók az Árpád-kori Magyarországon (XI–XIII. század közepe)* [The writing and writers of history in Árpád-era Hungary, from the eleventh century to the middle of the thirteenth century]. Budapest, 2019. 201–207.

²³ Györffy, György, “Honfoglalás, megtelepedés és kalandozások [Conquest, settlement, and invasions]”, In: Bartha, Antal – Czeglédi, Károly – Róna-Tas, András (eds.), *Magyar őstörténeti tanulmányok* [Hungarian prehistoric studies]. Budapest, 1977. 123–156. 127–129.; Györffy, György, *Krónikáink és a magyar őstörténet – Régi kérdések-új válaszok* [Our chronicles and Hungarian prehistory – Old questions-new answers]. Budapest, 1993. 213–214.

²⁴ Engel, Pál, “A honfoglalás és a fehérló-monda „igaz története” [“The True history” of the Conquest and legend of the white horse]”, In: Engel, Pál, *Honor, vár, ispánság*

Another part of the interpretations links the legend to the Conquest claiming that it narrates the events of it. I take this later assumption and the particular interpretation of Edina Dallos. According to Dallos several interpretations of the legend emerge at the same time. We can distinguish an original cultural interpretation from the time of the Hungarian nomad state (tenth century), a Christian folkish cultural interpretation from the time of the settlement (eleventh century), and a political interpretation from the twelfth century. In the original interpretation Árpád one-sidedly asked the Moravian prince for the symbols of the country (land, grass, and water) which were sent him. According to the Christian folkish interpretation the sending of symbols and the white horse(s) was a two-sided exchange which constituted a purchase. Finally, part of the political interpretation was that the land had been belonged to the Hun king Attila, who was the assumed ancestor of Árpád.²⁵

These three interpretations justify the Hungarian war for the Danubian-Tisza Interfluve differently. From the perspective of the nomad interpretation Hungarians previously acquired a commanding fame and relying on this fame they called the Moravians for submission by asking for the symbols of the country. The Moravian prince submitted (as previously the prince of Vladimir and the prince of Galicia had done²⁶), but later he decided to launch a rebellion, which was repressed by Árpád with war. In this case the justification of the conquer and the war is the fame of the Hungarians, which does not result in objective justice which is independent of the relations of power. It is valid as long as the fame is sound (while Hungarians are not defeated).

According to the Christian interpretation Árpád purchased the land by a two-sided transaction, by which he acquired a right for the land, which established a proper duty to respect this right on the side of the Moravians. Árpád started the war against the Moravians because Moravians violated the right of the Hungarians. In this case the violation of the right was equal to committing injustice, which justified the Hungarian war for regaining the previously purchased land.

Finally, the political interpretation justifies the war by referring to Árpád's hereditary right for the land. Árpád had this right because the land had belonged to king Attila, and Attila was the ancestor of Árpád, so Árpád inherited the right and the land for which no transaction (one-sided, two-sided or whatever) was needed. The right established a duty to respect the right on the side of Moravians as well. The war of the Hungarians was justified because the Moravians did not respect the right of the Hungarians and did not execute their duty. Again, committed injustice justified the war.

[*Honor*, castle, shire]. Budapest, 2003. 649–660. 659.

²⁵ Dallos, Edina, "Adalékok a fehérló monda értelmezéséhez [To the interpretation of the legend of the white horse]", = *Ethnográfia* 111, 2000, 127–146. 140–141.

²⁶ Rady, *The Gesta Hungarorum*, 2009. (11) 693–694.

b) Just war theory in medieval Hungary: Pelbartus of Temesvár's warfare ideology

Pelbartus of Temesvár was a Franciscan friar, who studied in Cracow, and lived in Ozora and Esztergom (both in Hungary).²⁷ Pelbartus was an outstanding preacher of his age, who wrote on warfare ideology in his parables *Knight George* and *For the king Saint Ladislaus*.²⁸

Pelbartus starts his train of thought with a quotation taken from the letter of Saint Paul written to Timothy, a disciple of Saint Paul: "I am giving you this command ... you may fight the battle well, holding on to faith and a good conscience".²⁹ In the original text Saint Paul is speaking against false doctrines, which include false laws and false commands. The nature of the commands in question (both the false and right ones) was religious, the purpose of which was to lead the spiritual life of people. In Pelbartus' work the nature of the command partly changed and it earned a military aspect beside its spiritual one.

Pelbartus divides the quotation into three parts. These parts are (1) "fight the battle well", (2) "I am giving you this command", and finally (3) "holding on to faith and a good conscience". Although, this division is not logically sound, because it includes two contents of the command (1) and (3) and the imperative force of the command (2), but I follow Pelbartus' division. He connects three categories to these parts with the help of which he analyses the quotation. These categories are: (1) the conditions of soldiering, (2) respecting military obligations, and (3) the significance of faith.

The conditions of soldiering are framed by the concept of military profession and include four conditions. The first one is the drill. According to Pelbartus the proper practice for a soldier – the military drill – in the use of weapon and physical endurance is very important, because they are conceptually linked. As Pelbartus says: "the expression 'soldier' is the name of drill and fatigue".³⁰ Practice is proper if the participating soldiers are not jeopardised lethally during it, because practicing the use of violence is not real fight and war. It is without justice to kill the participants of the training. So, "riding and turning

²⁷ For more details on the life of Pelbartus see: Kosztolnyik, Zoltán J., "Pelbartus of Temesvár: a Franciscan Preacher and Writer of the Late Middle Ages in Hungary", = *Vivarium* 5, 1967, 100–110.; Szilády, Áron, *Temesvári Pelbárt élete és munkái* [Life and work of Pelbárt of Temesvár]. Budapest, 1880.

²⁸ I used the Hungarian translation of the texts: Temesvári, Pelbárt, "György vitéz [Knight George]", In: V. Kovács, Sándor (ed.), *Temesvári Pelbárt válogatott írásai* [Selected works of Pelbárt of Temesvár]. Budapest, 1982. 218–225.; Temesvári, Pelbárt, "Szent László királyért: Harmadik beszéd az igazságos ítélkezésről az uralkodásban [For the king Saint Ladislaus: third parable on the just adjudication of the rulers]", In: Madas, Edit (ed.), *Középkori prédikációk Szent László királyról* [Medieval preachings on king Saint Ladislaus]. Budapest, 2008. 225–237.

²⁹ 1 Tim 1.18–1.19.; Temesvári, György vitéz, 1982. 218.

³⁰ Temesvári, György vitéz, 1982. 219.

the horse, the profession of hitting and defending, and the throwing of spear" are the proper practices. Joust is definitely an example of the other type, which endangers the participants and therefore is forbidden. Joust is only "a game for demonstrating power... . Courage without justice is not praiseworthy".³¹

To avoid having courage without justice is the reason why the second condition, the right intention, is important. The right intention cannot be the love of violence, cruel vengefulness, hate, relentlessness, wild retort, and lust for power. Pelbartus does not define positively what right intention is at this point of his analysis, only later, but he lays down that although, he discusses right intention on the second place after physical ability of the proper practice, but the existence of right intention is more crucial for the proper practice than physical ability. So, if someone is physically practiced but does not possess right intention, then he cannot pursue Christian profession of arms.³²

Right intention involves – as the third condition – endurance beside its hitherto undefined content, that a soldier has to persist in right intention and "manfully resist to the devil". If a soldier fails to do this, then he is not suited to be a soldier, instead be a priest, even he possesses right intention. Because the strength of right intention gives the persistent courage in the fight which makes the soldier capable of opposing even the powerful enemy.³³

Another condition of courage beside persistence (and the fourth condition of soldiering) is justice. Justice in a general sense is nothing else than "giving everybody what is his due. According to Bernard it is love, respect, and obedience for God, and brotherly love for neighbours".³⁴ The duty of king as the supreme soldier is "to practice judgement and jurisdiction", and the duty of the other soldiers is to obey justice through the judgements of the king. If a warrior fails to obey the king's judgements, then he is not soldier any more but only a robber. For this reason, in war the king possesses legitimate authority, the entitlement for starting a war. The king adjudicates because he is a public figure, and only if it is certain that the subject of judgement cannot mend his way by himself. In this case "the lawful judgement corrects the evil". Private people are not permitted to adjudicate, because private revenge has to be reserved for God.³⁵

Justice in a particular sense is related to the second category of the analysis, namely to what military obligations have to be generally and systematically respected by soldiers. The first and third obligations define the just causes of war and hence the positive content of right intention. In general, the just cause of war cannot be some secular cause, but someone must serve as a

³¹ Temesvári, György vitéz, 1982. 219.

³² Temesvári, György vitéz, 1982. 219.

³³ Temesvári, György vitéz, 1982. 220–221.

³⁴ Temesvári, György vitéz, 1982. 221.; Bernard is Bernard of Clairvaux (1090–1153) who was one of the organisers of the second crusade and the author of *Regula of the Templars*.

³⁵ Temesvári, György vitéz, 1982. 231–233.

soldier exclusively for God. The fight for God, particularly, includes defending the Holy Church and keeping the peace of it, helping the neighbour and defending the community of neighbours, and finally maintaining the respect for God.³⁶

At first sight, if we interpret maintaining the respect for God as a fight against heretics, then these causes of war authorise only defensive war. However, Pelbartus refers to war for defending the oppressed and war against the enemies of the Church and the infidels.³⁷ The first type of war can be a reference to the crusades, which are offensive enterprises, because it was commonplace to justify a crusade as the liberation of Christians from the Muslim oppression at the age of Pelbartus. The two other types of wars certainly aim at maintaining the respect for God and they can be understood as offensive wars. The emphasis of Pelbartus' text, however, is on the justification of defensive war for the Christian Church and community, and the offensive wars are mentioned only incidentally.

The second obligation reads as Christian soldier realizing one of the just causes has to undertake the risk of injury and even death, in exchange for which he "deserves Heaven and salvation". This can be reached, and this is the fourth obligation, if a soldier confesses and does penance before the battle. Confession and penance secure the right intention of a soldier in battle, for which he deserves Heaven and salvation.³⁸

This obligation is related to the third category stemming from the quotation of Saint Paul, to the significance of faith. God denies the help and victory in war from a soldier who had committed sin but did not confess and did not do penance. Therefore, "he has to persist in faith, and his soul has to be purified from sins". The worst sins are arrogance, bodily sins, rubbering and plundering, and superstitiousness.³⁹

c) Assessment of the historians' tradition and Pelbartus' warfare ideology

Recorded Hungarian just war thinking began in the late twelfth century, and Pelbartus' warfare ideology in the fifteenth century was an important representative of it.⁴⁰ The presented forms of just war thinking applied at least

³⁶ Temesvári, György vitéz, 1982. 221–222.; Temesvári, Szent László királyért, 2008. 227.

³⁷ Temesvári, György vitéz, 1982. 220, 222, 223.

³⁸ Temesvári, György vitéz, 1982. 222–223.

³⁹ Temesvári, György vitéz, 1982. 223–224.

⁴⁰ These two types of just war thinking were not the only forms of just war thinking in the Hungarian Kingdom in the Middle Ages. A third type appeared in the fourteenth century. This was the warfare ideology based on the idea of the Holy Crown. This ideology, however, can be interpreted with the help of the just war theory of Saint Thomas Aquinas, it applies other categories as well. See: Boda, Mihály, "The Hungarian Theory of Just War Based on the Idea of the Holy Crown: A Historical Case of Just Mission", = *Journal of Military Ethics* 20, 2021, 269–280.; Boda, Mihály,

some categories of the just war theory of Saint Thomas Aquinas, though they were not clear examples of it.

The second and third interpretations of the historians' legend of the white horse imply that the claim to justify wars was the part of Hungarian political thinking in the late twelfth century. The categories of this justification were the indirectly applied categories of the just war theory, namely the just cause and the legitimate authority. The list of just causes included the violation of the purchased or inherited right, and the legitimate authority was attributed to the members of the Árpád dynasty. The third category of just war theory, the right intention, is absent from the works of the historians' tradition.

In the case of Pelbartus' warfare ideology one can find clearer appearance of the just war theory of Aquinas, though Pelbartus' ideology is a fusion of the three medieval warfare ideologies. Hence, the three main categories of just war theory appeared. Just causes were to defend the Christian Church and the community of neighbours, and maintain the respect for God. The legitimate authority was attributed generally to the princes, and the right intention had significance both in its negative and positive senses (as avoiding some particular desires, and as promoting respect for God). Beside just war theory we can refer to holy war ideology and *iudicium Dei* ideology. The offensive extension of maintaining the respect for God included war against the infidels and war against the enemies of the Church, which were the forms of holy war ideology, as the fight for the liberation of the oppressed Christian people was. Emphasizing the role of God's help in attaining victory and the role of confession and penance in earning God's help creates a link with *iudicium Dei* ideology. Nevertheless, for Pelbartus just war theory was the most important point of reference, and he applied the other two ideologies only incidentally.

Summary and conclusion

By the twelfth–thirteenth centuries just war theory earned a canonical form in Western Europe through the serious debates of that age.⁴¹ The categories of just war theory were obtained in Hungary as well, however, they did not appear in clear form neither in the late twelfth century nor in fifteenth century. They constituted parts of political and religious thinking, but they were not articulated directly, or if so, then they were not wholly separated from other warfare ideologies. One can meet just cause and legitimate authority in the works of the Hungarian historians, like the work of Anonymus or the *Illuminated Codex*, and beside these with the right intention in the work of Pelbartus. Though the historians only applied just war theory for narrating some past events of the nomad Hungarians and they did not articulate the details of the theory.

“Historical Forms of Just War Theory in Europe and Hungary”, = *AARMS – Academic and Applied Research in Military and Public Management Science* 22, 2023, 61–75.

⁴¹ Russell, Frederick H., *The Just War in the Middle Ages*. Cambridge, 1975. 40–257.

Pelbartus, in turn, elaborated a more or less theoretical warfare ideology from the Christian religious point of view, of which, however, holy war ideology and *iudicium Dei* ideology also constituted integral parts. Nevertheless, these forms of just war thinking constitute important stages in the development of Hungarian just war thinking.

Ferenc Petruska

STATE ORGANISATIONAL PRELUDE AND AFTERMATH OF THE BATTLE OF MOHÁCS

The fall of the medieval Kingdom of Hungary can be traced back to several causes. It is well known that these include the partisanship of the Hungarian nobility, the neglect of the outlying fortresses, and a series of strategic errors in battle.¹ The battle resulted in the death of the king. Furthermore, the death of the king caused a lack of centralised leadership in the country. After the battle's loss and King Louis II's death, Hungary was divided into three and four parts. Why did the loss of the battle and the king's death have such a lasting and recurring effect in poems² and proverbs?

The Tatars conquered Hungary three hundred years before the Battle of Mohács. On April 11, 1241, we lost the Battle of Muhi, but a few decades later, our King Bela IV not only preserved but increased Hungary's territory.³ The devastating Battle of Nikopol (1396) proved that a disciplined Ottoman army, incorporating elements of oriental tactics long forgotten by European knights, could not be destroyed by a casual knightly army lacking the necessary experience. King Sigismund's long reign saw no further attempts at a massive campaign like Nikopol's, but he succeeded in defending the country's borders.⁴ Nor was it the first time a king of Hungary was killed in battle at Mohács. In 1444, at the Battle of Varna (Bulgaria), King Vladislaus (Władysław) attacked the Ottoman janissaries. With only five hundred knights, he attacked the Ottomans' entrenchment, which he broke through in vain, but the janissaries immediately surrounded the king and beheaded him. However, the king's death did not cause the collapse of Hungary because John Hunyadi, the later governor of Hungary, was able to take control of the country.⁵ So, the loss of a country's ruler does not automatically mean the country's downfall.

The author intends to show that the tragic historical consequences of the Battle of Mohács had not only military, personal and financial causes, but also less well-known reasons for the organisation of the state.

¹ Szakály, Ferenc, *A mohácsi csata* [The Battle of Mohács]. Budapest, 1977. 43–90.

² Ady, Endre, *'Nekünk Mohács kell'* [We need Mohács]. 1908. <https://magyar-irodalom.elte.hu/sulinet/igyjo/setup/portrek/ady/mohacs.htm> (Accessed on 8 December 2023)

³ B. Szabó, János, *A Tatárjárás. A mongol hódítás és Magyarország* [The Tatar invasion – The Mongol conquest and Hungary]. Budapest, 2020.

⁴ Rosetti, Radu, "Notes on the Battle of Nicopolis (1396)", = *The Slavonic and East European Review* 15, 1937, 629–638.

⁵ Tarján M., Tamás, 1444. november 10. A várnai csata [The Battle of Varna]. = *Rubicon online* <https://rubicon.hu/kalendarium/1444-november-10-a-varnai-csata> (Accessed on 8 December 2023)

Background to the Mohács tragedy

To examine the organisational antecedents of the state, we must remember the financial and defensive administrative reforms of King Matthias I (1458–1490). He had one of the greatest mercenary armies in Europe. At the beginning of his reign, he helped to remedy the disastrous state of finance with a comprehensive reform. He had to set up a financial organisation covering the whole of Hungary, and he had to centralise the royal revenues. The introduction of new sources of revenue was impossible, thus, the old ones had to be made more efficient.

The king submitted his plans to the Noble Assembly of 1467, and his proposals were accepted. The law was promulgated on March 25, 1467. The Chamber's profit tax was abolished, and a new royal treasury tax was introduced. The latter differed from the former in that exemption was granted to only a few, bringing in more revenue. The thirtieth cents was replaced by the Crown's customs, thus making it possible to return to the treasury the duties on pledges and wages, which were profitable. Silver coins of constant value were introduced into circulation. This no longer had to be redeemed annually, making the various payment obligations more predictable and accountable. This law provided for the inalienability of Crown property and the restitution of what had been alienated.

King Matthias' sources of income can be divided into three main categories. The typical sources of income were salt and ore mining, customs and tax revenues. Extraordinary royal incomes were extraordinary taxes, the alienation and mortgaging of estates, the revenues of ecclesiastical estates in the event of vacancies, royal gifts, and incomes from conquered provinces or countries. At last, there was the financial income from abroad. The first two were the responsibility of the treasurer, while the dispossessor of Buda administered the last one. Instead of the obligatory annual exchange of money, the Hungarian Noble Assembly decided to introduce silver money of a fixed value. This did not lead directly to more revenue.⁶ In the long term, the permanence of the money ensured better predictability and accountability of payment obligations.

The primary source of revenue was the so-called war tax. Its value was one gold florin.⁷ Despite the very high taxation, King Matthias never received more than 500–700 000 gold florins a year.⁸ Before and after his strong-handed reign, the total tax revenue amounted to only 200–250 000 gold florins.⁹

King Matthias succeeded in his efforts to centralise the organisation of the state. Firstly, he pushed the royal council into the background, which used to be under the influence of the barons. He also created new offices, one of which

⁶ *Matthias Corvinus, the King: Tradition and Renewal in the Hungarian Royal Court, 1458–1490*. Exhibition Catalogue: Budapest History Museum, 19 March 2008 – 30 June 2008. Eds. Bakos, Ágnes – Basics, Beatrix – Farbaky, Péter, Budapest, 2008.

⁷ Soós, Ferenc, "Mátyás király 1467. évi pénzügyi reformjának gyakorlati végrehajtása", In: Ulrich, Attila (ed.), *Numizmatika és társtudományok III. Konferencia Nyíregyházán 1997. október 17–19*. Nyíregyháza, 1999. 171–177.

⁸ B. Szabó, János, *A mohácsi csata* [The Battle of Mohács]. Budapest, 2011. 36.

⁹ B. Szabó, *A mohácsi csata*, 2011. 36.

was the Grand Chancellery. It handled the most important state affairs instead of the baronially influenced royal council. It used to have expert secretaries, notaries and clerks who handled the affairs.

The treasury managed the state revenues and collected the royal revenues. The administrators were often skilful officials of noble, bourgeois or even serf origin. By his reforms of state administration and organisation, he reduced the role of the nobility.¹⁰ His aim was a more unified, rational and efficient administration; thus, the nature of his rule was centralised power.¹¹

In the field of military development, the most important thing is that King Matthias set up a permanent mercenary army (the Black Army). Most of the soldiers in the army were Bohemian, Polish and German mercenaries, but there were also Hungarians, South Slavs and Romanians. In the event of war, the number of mercenaries rose to eight thousand infantry and twenty thousand cavalry. With this force, Matthias was partly independent of the barons' army. The cost of the army was extraordinary. Only very rich countries could afford to arm such a large army at that time.¹² Only France's army reached 25 000 men in the last quarter of the fifteenth century.¹³ The king still had at his disposal the auxiliaries of privileged peoples.¹⁴ Matthias prudently avoided large-scale wars on the southern frontier because earlier battles between the Ottoman and Hungarian main forces had mostly ended in devastating defeats.

It cannot be said that the example of King Matthias did not impact the Hungarian military organisation, but it had a deterrant effect. After Matthias' death, the centralised state disappeared along with many of his other achievements. The reign of Matthias was the last period in medieval Hungarian history when a gifted king made the Kingdom of Hungary a major power. However, the economic and social conditions for Matthias' centralising ambitions were not supported because there was no wealthy and populous bourgeoisie stratum to support the centralisation with their taxes. It was Matthias' personal authority and talent that sustained his rule, and that is why his achievements vanished after his death.¹⁵

His successor, King Vladislaus II (1490–1516) was also considered by the nobility to be capable of defending the country even if he was deprived of its income. After 1490, the kings of Hungary tried to reorganise the country's defence by the demands of the coveted peace. In fact, they restored the situation that had existed before the royal mercenary army, and once again relied on the old institutions, leaving the defence of the country to the soldiers of the barons and the high priests. Hungary did not abolish its permanent military, but the Black Army was disbanded in 1493. In the fifteenth century, there were two types of

¹⁰ Matthias Corvinus, the King, 2008.

¹¹ Szakály, A mohácsi csata, 1977. 73–77.

¹² Tóth, Zoltán, *Mátyás király idegen zsoldosserege. (A fekete sereg)* [King Matthias' foreign mercenary army. (The Black Army)]. Budapest, 1925.

¹³ B. Szabó, A mohácsi csata, 2011. 35.

¹⁴ B. Szabó, A mohácsi csata, 2011. 31–35.

¹⁵ Szakály, A mohácsi csata, 1977. 14–15, 73.

standing armies in Hungary. The older of these was the court military. At the turn of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, the so-called *aulici*, who served at the king's side, must have numbered at least 200 and, together with their retainers, provided the king with about 500 men-at-arms. Most members of the *aulici* served the king not as common soldiers but as officers in the larger royal band. According to the article, the royal banner was to consist of 1 000 horse riders.¹⁶

Between 1499 and 1503, Hungary participated in the war against the Ottomans on the side of Venice with an army based on *banderia* in return for a substantial foreign aid. Italian diplomats were, therefore, anxious to be well informed about their ally's army. In 1500, King Władysław II claimed to the Venetian envoy that the high priestly, lordly and county bands consisted of 18–20 000 cavalrymen.¹⁷ This does not include the troops of the Transylvanian Szeklers, with whom the cavalry numbered 40 000.¹⁸ Due to its somewhat different social development from the rest of the Kingdom of Hungary, Transylvania had a large number of soldiers. However, because of their privileges, Transylvanian soldiers were rarely used for anything other than the defence of Transylvania.¹⁹

During the reign of the House of Jagiello, peace came to Hungary. The consequences of decentralisation were not felt for years. In 1516, Louis II, the ten-year-old son of Vladislaus II, was enthroned to the Hungarian throne. Louis was declared of age as a defence against the guardianship of the Polish and German-Roman rulers, and a twenty-eight-member council of trustees was appointed to him, which was to be re-elected annually. In 1516, the truce with the Ottomans was extended for another year. Pope Leo X's crusade to launch a pan-Christian campaign against the Ottomans led to a reluctance on the part of Hungarian diplomacy to extend the truce in 1517. The Ottomans besieged the castle of Jajce (Bosnia and Herzegovina) again. Although by 1518 it looked as if the campaign would be launched, its lead and main supporter, Maximilian I, Holy Roman Emperor, died in early 1519, and the campaign was cancelled. In 1519, the king of Hungary concluded another three-year truce with the Ottomans. But the peace did not last, and in 1520 Sultan Selim I also died, and his son, Suleiman, took over the Ottoman Empire. On May 18, 1521, he launched a campaign to capture Belgrade (Serbia).²⁰ No solid foreign army attacked the country from 1492 until 1521. Peace came at a price. As a result of the long peace, the fighting experience of Matthias' glorious time faded with time. Few Hungarians took part in the constant border skirmishes. Even the occasionally mobilised troops did not always undergo a real baptism of fire.²¹

¹⁶ B. Szabó, *A mohácsi csata*, 2011. 35.

¹⁷ B. Szabó, *A mohácsi csata*, 2011. 38–39.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*

¹⁹ B. Szabó, *A mohácsi csata*, 2011. 39.

²⁰ B. Szabó, *A mohácsi csata*, 2011. 33–34.

²¹ B. Szabó, *A mohácsi csata*, 2011. 40–42.

In the meantime, the enemy's pressure on the frontier was increasing. Belgrade fell in 1521. The sanjak-beys stationed at the border besieged the main strongholds of the bulwark line in 1522, 1523 and 1524. In 1522 and 1525 they attacked Jajce, which guarded the remaining Bosnian territories, in 1523 Petrovaradin (Serbia), which replaced Belgrade was besieged, and Severin (Romania), which guarded the Transylvania, was attacked in 1521 and 1524. Hungary's position was greatly improved by the appointment in 1523 of a strong and determined man, Paul Tomori, to head the most threatened southern frontier. He successfully reorganised the defences, which were chaotic after the fall of Belgrade.

When the Sultan's brother-in-law, Ferhad, the Bosnian Pasha, fell from grace in 1523 for a series of abuses, as punishment he was sent to the Hungarian border. With the reinforcements and border troops that came with him, he immediately embarked on a large-scale raid in the Sirmium region, but it ended in a disastrous Ottoman failure. The Hungarian army of barely 4 000 men annihilated the invaders, who were outnumbered more than three to one. In Transylvania, Voivode John Szapolyai successfully defended against the Turks. However, the Ottoman momentum was not broken. They quickly made up for their losses with their seemingly inexhaustible reserves of men and continued to attack despite the setbacks.²²

In 1526, a public revolt broke out in the Kingdom of Hungary. The army of the country gathered at Tolna on July 2. From there, the king personally led the army against the Ottomans. In medieval Hungarian law, the king's personal march meant that the Hungarian nobility was obliged to go to war. This decision later proved fatal, as the king lost his life on August 29, precisely because of his personal participation. Under these circumstances, there was no money left to pay for equipping the royal army, and the king finally appealed to the papal nuncio. He asked Rome for permission to use the treasures of the churches to defend his country. At the council meeting of June 17, it was decided that the churches' gold and silver should be sent to supply the Hungarian army. Royal commissioners, who were sent out to receive the treasures, faced many difficulties. In several places, the clergy refused to deliver the temple contributions. The seizure of church treasures proved to be totally inadequate to meet the needs.

It is important to clarify why Louis II personally led the Hungarian army. He went against the Ottomans to set an example for the country and persuade the Hungarian nobility to join. On August 6, when Andrew Báthori and his army of 4 000 men arrived at Tolna, the Ottomans were already besieging the castle of Ilok (Croatia), but only a few hundred armed men were waiting at the designated assembly point.²³ In the following days, however, the effect of the

²² B. Szabó, *A mohácsi csata*, 2011. 50.

²³ Négyesi, Lajos, "A mohácsi csatát megelőző katonai döntések", In: Haramza, Márk – Kovaliczky, Gergely – Bertók, Gábor et al. (eds.), *Eke mentén, csata nyomában. A mohácsi csata kutatásának legújabb eredményei. Tanulmánykötet Szűcs József tiszteletére* [Along the plough, in the wake of battle. New studies and insights on the battle of Mohács 1526.

royal example was already felt, as the army grew to nearly eleven thousand with the arrival of the armed men. From here the king sent the noble to Osijek (Croatia) to prevent the Ottoman army from crossing the River Drava. Báthori marched all the way to Mohács with his own men-at-arms, but no one followed. Around July 8, when the Ottoman army captured Ilok, the possibility of defending the Drava line was lost, as even the noble's troops could not reach Osijek before the enemy. Considering the relative positions of the two armies, from then on only the swampy region between the Drava and Karasica rivers offered any chance of getting there in time to try to hold off the Sultan's army. This was also recognised by archbishop and commander-in-chief Paul Tomori, who camped here with his troops of 10 000 men.²⁴ They could have joined forces with the royal army of similar numbers and would have had a chance of taking the fight to them, but they did not have the artillery to do so. Ships carrying cannons were still on their way and there was no telling when they would arrive. On 14 August, when the Rumelian corps reached Osijek, the royal army was still only in Szekszárd. Five days later, at the council of war held in Bába, only Mohács offered a suitable place for the army to camp, as the ships carrying the war equipment could only unload in the city's harbour. From Bába, the Hungarian army marched to Mohács on August 21.²⁵

The battle and the King

On the morning of August 29, 1526, the Hungarian army took up battle formation near Mohács. The king and the noble rode bareheaded in front of the ranks to encourage the warriors. Everyone could see that the young king would not withdraw from the battle and fight with them. The Hungarian leaders could only guess at the enemy's intentions. However, after two o'clock in the afternoon, the situation changed. The spears of enemy troops were spotted beyond the Hungarian right flank. At about four o'clock, the king gave the order to attack. The Hungarian trumpets and drums began to play. Almost at the same time as the Hungarian attack began, a massive crowd of the enemy descended from the hills opposite to the Hungarians, which was most likely the Rumelian cavalry.

The Hungarian attackers could not break through the chained cannons, so they dodged them and threw themselves at the sipahis at the end of the artillery. Not all of those who escaped managed to evade the Hungarian onslaught and those Ottomans who got caught between the attackers and the gun emplacements were cut down by the Croatian Ban's cavalymen.²⁶ The successful start to the battle was more of a sham than anything else. In the hope of victory, Paul

Book of studies in honour of József Szűcs]. (Studia ad Archaeologiam Pazmainensia, 17.). Budapest, 2020. 77–84. 80.

²⁴ Négyesi, A mohácsi csatát megelőző katonai döntések, 2020. 81.

²⁵ *Mohács. Nemzet és Emlékezet* [Mohács. Nation and Memory]. Ed. B. Szabó, János, Budapest, 2006. 144–152.

²⁶ B. Szabó, A mohácsi csata, 2011. 142–146.

Tomori led the second order of battle behind Francis Batthyány. Batthyány's invasion caused heavy losses to the Rumelian cavalry. Unfortunately, the Anatolian corps appeared behind the Rumelians. By the time the Hungarian infantry caught up with the cavalry, the charge had faded. The infantry ran into the rifle fire of the janissaries, and Tomori was killed as his soldiers were turning back.²⁷

The king was rescued from the battle by his soldiers. He tried to flee, but his fate was not known for weeks. Many saw him drown, but there were some who hoped that he survived. So did his wife Mary. With the guidance of an eyewitness, they quickly found the king's weapons and the carcass of his horse. The envoys also found the body of King Louis' Polish-born courtier, Ondrej Trepka, nearby. Eventually, they also found the body of the king under a pile of bodies. The doubters were not convinced by the fact that several forensic doctors had taken it upon themselves to examine Louis's body from a medical point of view.

Among the historical documents of the Archbishop of Esztergom, Antun Verančić (1504–1573), a short paper has survived which gives a concise account of the events. According to this, the king's body was initially hidden by simple fishermen so that the Ottomans would not find it.²⁸ Rumours suggest that he escaped unharmed from the battle but was soon murdered. In the company of Tomori, George Szapolyai, and others, he arrived at Dunaszekcső. The king took a rest at the parish priest's house. Tomori soon went to his lodgings, but Szapolyai stayed with the king. They had a heated dispute, and he stabbed the king three times with his three-edged Bohemian sword.²⁹

The importance of the king

No credible source disputes the earlier or later death of the king. He certainly played no further role in Hungarian history, so the consequences of his death are worth examining. On the one hand, Hungary's loss of independence was caused by the fact that the royal prerogatives were extensive, and in the absence of a king, they were not exercised for long. After the defeat at the Battle of Mohács, there was no further organisation of defence.

The financial situation of the royal family, the treasury, the clarity of the succession to the throne, and the prevalence of sovereignty theories also influenced a king's power. Changes in these factors and the transformation of their proportions radically altered the actual power of the Hungarian king. The king of Hungary is, in principle, the lord of all lands and the country's inhabitants. His power is theoretically unlimited. A large part of Hungary's land was in the hands of the king or his allies, and the ispáns (comes) were the ruler's confidants. No one could institutionally limit his legislative and judicial powers. In principle, the power of the king of Hungary would have been unlimited on the basis that only God could have limited it. But this was never truly the case. As a

²⁷ Szakály, *A mohácsi csata*, 1977. 31–35.

²⁸ B. Szabó, *A mohácsi csata*, 2011. 173.

²⁹ *Örök Mohács: Szövegek és értelmezések* [Eternal Mohács: Texts and Interpretations]. Eds. B. Szabó, János – Farkas, Gábor Farkas, Budapest, 2020. 830–831.

Christian ruler, he was limited by the obligations arising from the requirements of religion, the support of the Church, the spreading and protection of the faith. The fullness of power, which was in principle guaranteed by law, was always limited by social processes and the balance of power in the political elite and in the zones of the orders.³⁰

The king's power was first based on sovereignty. Let us examine the royal prerogatives. The personal sovereignty rights included majesty, the highest human dignity and honour (*majestas*). Hence, the sovereign's inviolability gave him special protection under criminal law. The sovereign could not be held responsible under any circumstances. He could bear the epithet of apostles and the Hungarian royal titles. The Hungarian monarch was entitled to hold court, have a bodyguard, and employ royal courtiers. Since, as a general principle, the king's powers extended to the whole supreme power, he made the supreme rules himself.

This was first a decree, then a royal decree. He could grant privileges, i.e. exceptions to the general rules. During the period of the monarchy, he played a decisive role in drafting laws: he proposed, accepted or rejected bills from the nobility, sanctioned the laws passed and finally promulgated them. The king also had the right to interpret and explain the law.³¹ He exercised judicial power. All legislative powers were inherently based on the king's authority by the seventeenth century. He had full power of action in government and administration. He appointed and dismissed the chief officers of the country. This was the right of appointment. He had extensive authority regarding the church, spanning from establishing the church organization to appointing officials and overseeing their responsibilities. It was the right of primate.³² The most significant aspect of the Battle of Mohács was that King Louis II of Hungary was the supreme warlord who declared war, made peace, ordered the levying of hostilities and disbanded the army. In his absence, none of these powers was exercised for years.

This apparently unlimited power was limited by the sixteenth century. The consolidation of a new social order created the nobility. The interests of the Church and the lords limited the kings of Hungary. The beneficiaries of the throne fights accumulated vast estates. Defending themselves against the barons, the servants set up their interest organisations. The noble county became active and the nobility has born. The king's power was reduced and his rights were limited in the Noble Assembly. The nobility also invaded the traditional spheres of government. They made their influence felt in the offices and exerted influence on the army and taxation.³³ However, Louis II's power was particularly enhanced because he often decided disputes between nobles and commoners.³⁴

³⁰ *Magyar alkotmánytörténet* [Hungarian Constitutional History]. Eds. Mezey, Barna–Gosztonyi, Gergely, Budapest, 2020. 134.

³¹ *Magyar alkotmánytörténet*, 2020. 134–135.

³² *Magyar alkotmánytörténet*, 2020. 136.

³³ *Magyar alkotmánytörténet*, 2020. 133.

³⁴ *Örök Mohács*, 2020. 44, 74, 109.

The substitutability of the king

Even in the sixteenth century, each King of Hungary still had extraordinary power. The extraordinary importance of the king's person, the weight of his powers and his concentrated authority made his replacement inevitable. In the event of the king's inability or death, arrangements had to be made to deal with the urgent affairs of the king and to replace him in his personal administration.

The solution was made more difficult by the king's coronation sanctity, which elevated him from the ranks of the dignitaries of the state. This banned his automatic substitutability and replacement. The most obvious solution was to involve members of the royal family. For centuries, this was based on the patriarchal view that the country's sovereignty was the royal family's private property. Among the members of the royal family, the role of the Queen Mother and the king's wife as a substitute was the main concern. If the king was not of age, he was replaced in the government by his mother, in accordance with the practice of the Árpáds'. If he went abroad, he sometimes nominated someone to take his place, usually his wife or mother. According to Hungarian customs, the king's wife did not have a general right of substitution but had to be commissioned to do so. If there was a woman on the Hungarian throne, she could accompany her husband in the government (*corregens* or co-ruler). She had only unspecified powers. The co-ruler could take part in the government but could not exercise sovereignty or grant privileges. He had to swear an oath of allegiance to the country's rights, and ultimately his function could not affect the powers of the Palatine of Hungary.

The division of royal power according to geographical area can be seen as a partial substitution. The institution of the dukedom was a way of dealing with political disputes and resolving family conflicts. In 1048, for example, Prince Bela received the dukedom over a territory covering about a third of the country from King Andrew I. Similar to the sharing of power in the form of *ducatu*s is the institution of the *rex junior*, or younger king. The junior monarch was crowned during the king's lifetime, as was the case with Bela during the reign of Andrew II, and Stephen during the reign of Bela IV. The power of the younger king was always subordinate to that of the older king. The power of the younger king derived from his father's concession.

If the king was prevented from attending to his domestic affairs, he could call upon his family members, his mother or wife, and a secular or ecclesiastical dignitary to conduct his affairs. The so called *locum tenens regius* was not a full-fledged substitute for the king, since monarchs also exercised their sovereign rights abroad.

The governor usually acted when the monarch was abroad. The function of the procurator as a general substitute for the king was not self-evident. Although Matthias decreed that a governor should replace the king who was at war abroad, rulers usually appointed a governor by individual act, thus emphasising that the governor was not their automatic substitute. While the king appointed a governor to rule in his stead during his stay abroad or when he

was prevented from doing so, Hungarian constitutional history knows of cases where the governor ruled because the king proved to be feeble-minded or unable to manage the affairs of the country because he was under age. The powers of the governor, as determined by the Noble Assembly, were the same as those of the king, subject to natural restrictions. In the administration of justice, he acted by council, but he could not judge in cases of infidelity. He could not grant pardons either. In the exercise of the power of appointment, he acted by a council of four. However, the decision knew no limits in matters of finance, ennoblement, titles and privileges. The assembly elected the governor. He was accountable for his deeds and the assembly also determined his powers.³⁵

The internal political consequences of the battle

Hungarian losses in the Battle of Mohács must have been unusually high. In addition to the king, there were five hundred noblemen, at least four thousand cavalry, and some ten thousand infantry, who were left to defend themselves to the very end. This already exceeded half the number of the Hungarian army. The list of casualties compiled by the Chancellor must have included the approximately two thousand prisoners of war executed in the Sultan's camp. If we agree the Ottoman figure of 24 000 Hungarian corpses buried as credible, we must also include the losses of the civilians accompanying the army.³⁶

The losses were, therefore substantial, even if they were not comparable to the disasters of 1396 at Nikopol (Bulgaria),³⁷ 1444 at Varna (Bulgaria) and 1448 at Fushë-Kosova (Kosovo), when almost the entire Hungarian army was slaughtered in battle.³⁸

The significance of the Battle of Mohács is not the heavy loss of life. One of the greatest disasters of 1526 was perhaps not the defeat itself but the fact that the army was scattered afterwards, leaving Hungary completely defenceless. Several hundred cavalry troops embarked on their journey back to the base in a rush since no one was there to gather the deserters. The king was lost in the marshes around the Csele stream, and both of his chief commanders fell too. According to the Sultan's war diary, no Ottoman sultan had ever won such a victory over the Hungarians. The Sultan did not even allow his soldiers to set up camp that night. Apparently, he feared that the entire army might meet a similar fate to that of the Rumelians if the Hungarians renewed their attack.³⁹

For days afterwards, Sultan Suleiman's armies waited in the field of Mohács. The Sultan marched slowly to the north. On September 12, Suleiman marched

³⁵ Németh, István, *A nádori méltóság a középkori Magyarországon* [The Office of the Palatine in Medieval Hungary]. (A Szent Korona Öröksége, XXXVI.). Budapest, 2021.; Magyar alkotmánytörténet, 2020. 141–146.

³⁶ Négyesi, A mohácsi csatát megelőző katonai döntések, 2020. 82.; Négyesi, Lajos, "A mohácsi csata", = *Hadtörténelmi Közlemények* 107:4, 1994, 62–79. 75–76.

³⁷ Rosetti, Notes on the Battle of Nicopolis, 1937. 630.

³⁸ Tarján M., 1444. november 10.

³⁹ Négyesi, A mohácsi csata, 1994. 77.

into the unprotected royal castle. Upon hearing of the defeat, Queen Mary left Buda immediately with the court and the city's inhabitants. The Sultan plundered the palaces, set fire to the city of Buda and crossed to the left bank of the Danube to Pest on September 25. Dividing his army into two parts, he also ruthlessly marched across the Danube-Tisza region, returning to his empire in mid-October.⁴⁰

Hungary suffered all this paralysed.⁴¹ The voivode carefully evaded the Ottomans on the right bank of the Tisza, who were heading south. The Prince waited with his troops in Tokaj for the Sultan to leave. From there, he called a king-election assembly for November 5 to in Székesfehérvár, where the nobles unanimously elected John Szapolyai as their king. The days of the proud and independent medieval Kingdom of Hungary were numbered. King John could no longer protect the isolated, impoverished and defenceless country.

The Sultan's campaign of 1526 seemed to have achieved its goal. The Hungarian forces were finally annihilated. In the decade that followed the Battle of Mohács, the two kings fought each other for supremacy. Hungary was split into two parts. King John enlisted the help of the Ottoman Sultan. After János Szapolyai's death in 1541, Sultan Suleiman I captured the castle of Buda and the division of Hungary into three parts began.

The Habsburgs took over the western part. The central part was entirely occupied by the Ottomans a few years later and made a province out of it for the Ottoman Empire. In the eastern areas, the Principality of Transylvania was organised under Ottoman feudal rule. It then took more than one hundred and fifty years for half of Europe to unite and finally oust the Ottoman Empire from Hungary.⁴²

Conclusion

There are many reasons for the tragedy of Mohács and the end of the independent and strong Kingdom of Hungary. Mohács was the final confrontation and the final clash of a war that had been going on for a hundred and fifty years with various interruptions. The Kingdom of Hungary had a population of nearly four million. Its economy was in steady decline since the death of King Matthias, and its army was lacking modernisation. The country was utterly disorganised and immersed in party struggles. Hungary could not compete with the Ottoman Empire, which was five times larger in territorially and six times larger regarding its population. Hungary was predestined for defeat because the Ottomans, living under a highly centralised, despotic rule, were able to concentrate their forces much better than the Hungarian state.

The king's involvement in the Battle of Mohács helped the nobility convoke but caused his death. Prior to the battle, the king's very large number of entitlements would have necessitated him being substituted. As discussed above,

⁴⁰ Szakály, *A mohácsi csata*, 1977. 38.

⁴¹ Szakály, *A mohácsi csata*, 1977. 168.

⁴² Szakály, *A mohácsi csata*, 1977. 163–164.

there would have been many opportunities to do so. The king had no substitute, and no one was left to hold Hungary's defence.

The unfortunate combination of the above reasons caused the death of the king, the end of the centralised leadership of Hungary, its division into three parts and the loss of its independence for centuries. Hungarian losses were extremely heavy, even if they were not comparable to the battles of Nikopol (1396), Varna (1444) or Fushë-Kosova (1448).

The Battle of Mohács also decapitated the Hungarian defence administration, as archbishops, bishops, magnates and a great number of nobles were killed. The death of the leaders caused anarchy in the country. The Hungarian state was absent from the daily lives of the Hungarians, except for taxation. The Hungarian state was only partially able to protect its subjects. The Kingdom of Hungary could not protect its territory and keep the peace. The Hungarians survived despite the circumstances. Even according to optimistic estimates, the population of the Kingdom of Hungary stagnated in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.

Zoltán Jobbágy

THE SOCIAL WAVE-FRONT THEORY AND THE FORMS OF WAR

Introduction

The social wave-front theory regards history as a succession of waves of change instead of a discrete one-time event. Its basic assumption is that innovations and breakpoints interrupt human social development and generate waves moving at a certain speed. The theory provides also a useful narrative to understand certain underlying dynamics of war as innovations and breakpoints not only influence human social development but also how wars are waged. The waves do differ in magnitude and can be described as agricultural, industrial, and informational. A thorough understanding of the waves is of utmost importance, since the general conclusion is that every time they clash, bloody wars erupt, as tensions between the representatives of the different waves grow and accumulate. Enemies waging asymmetric, irregular and low intensity wars are very difficult to defeat. They are very resilient and able to turn initial weakness into eventual strengths.

The expected peace period after the demise of the bipolar world order did not last very long. Wars of regional importance started to break out. They were not symmetric, not regular, and not of high intensity. Enemies waging asymmetric, irregular and low intensity wars were various ragtag bands armed and equipped with what they could get in a globalised world. More than three decades after the end of the Cold War, despite some orthodoxy found in the Russo-Ukrainian war erupted in 2022, aberration to war proper still is the norm for waging war.¹ After years of involvement into missions worldwide, it became clear that this breed of enemies is very difficult to defeat. They are very resilient and able to turn initial weakness into eventual strengths. Clausewitz, the great Prussian military theorist made clear that in war nothing is eternal and there could be little doubt that previous ways of fighting would reappear.² A good century ago when soldiers met enemies waging primitive or tribal warfare the result was one-sided and often there was almost no need for elaborated tactics as superiority in armament was mostly decisive in itself. Scholarly research states that imperialist expansion in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century was possible because tribal resistance was crushed with speed and efficiency. The overwhelming success was attributed to asymmetry in the form of military capability. Common thinking has long assumed that the difference in military

¹ Mackenzie, Richard, "The Afghan War", = *Air Force Magazine* 71:9, 1988, September: 150–153.

² Grant, Martin M., "*The COiNventional Wisdom*", = *Small Wars Journal* 2012, August; Clausewitz, Carl von, *On War*. London, 1993. 84, 101, 173, 624.

technology is an important arbiter of war.³ The logical conclusion would be that should military capability imply victory in war, the weaker almost never wins against a stronger, especially when the gap is very large. Yet examples in history suggest otherwise as the weaker side also wins from time to time. The second half of the twentieth century also showed that military and technological superiority are a highly unreliable guide to the outcome of asymmetric wars. In fact, the many wars that were waged after World War II brought home important lessons on the falsity of the conception of military power. It became clear that superiority in military capability does not guarantee victory and under certain circumstances it may be even counter-productive as factor.⁴ Possible explanations among scholars for this tendency is versatile. One assumes that because of the possible negative consequences the weaker side fights harder and displays a willingness to accept losses that would be intolerable to the stronger power. This disparity in interest is one plausible explanation for the weaker side's tenacity and staying power. Another scholar highlights the weaker side's stronger political will, the third regards the weaker side's superior strategy as decisive, whereas another approach underlines the importance of access to external assistance.⁵

Social Wave-front Analysis

In the social wave-front analysis history is regarded as a succession of waves of change instead of a discrete one-time event. Its basic assumption is that human social development is interrupted by innovations and breakpoints that generate waves moving at a certain speed. According to this approach the first agricultural wave started a good ten thousand years ago and lasted until the industrial revolution. Although the force of this wave is exhausted, it still exists in lesser developed societies around the world. The second industrial wave revolutionised life in many parts of the globe within a few centuries but had not spent its force entirely either. However, also this wave harvesting the benefits of fossil energy is about to be replaced by a third major wave with implications still little understood. The challenge is not so much that waves come in a subsequent order, but they co-exist and represent simultaneous im-

³ Heneker, William S. G., *Bush Warfare, The Early Writings of General Sir William C.G. Heneker, KCB KCMG DSO*. Ottawa, 2009. 1–9.; War Office, *British Army Field Service Regulation*. High Wycombe, 1909. 191–212.; Ellis, John, *The Social History of the Machine Gun*. New York, 1975. 86–87.

⁴ LeBlanc, Steven A. – Register, Katherine E., *Constant Battles, The Myth of the Peaceful, Noble Savage*. New York, 2003. 216–218.; Arreguín-Toft, Ivan, “How the Weak Win Wars, A Theory of Asymmetric Conflict”, = *International Security* 26:1, 2001, Summer: 93–128.; Mack, Andrew J. R., “Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars: The Politics of Asymmetric Conflict”, = *World Politics* 27:2, 1975, January: 75–200. 175–185.

⁵ Mack, Why Big Nations, 1975. 175–200.; Arreguín-Toft, How the Weak Win Wars, 2001. 102–123.; Record, Jeffrey, “Why the Strong Lose”, = *Parameters* 35, 2005/06, Winter: 16–31.

pacts with a different rate of speed due to the forces behind them.⁶ The social wave-front analysis got also extended to explain how wars have changed as the waves gained and lost momentum much of the consequences still unclear.⁷ Militaries originally designed to fight symmetric, large-scale conventional wars of attrition against equally sophisticated enemies, clashed with lightly armed warlords, tribesmen, religious and nationalist fanatics during the last couple of decades. Enemies of recent past waged war mostly with conventional or obsolete weapons, whereas NATO and coalition forces responded with state of the art technology and cutting-edge weaponry. This clash of the waves resulted in strange combinations. Soldiers of highly trained American special operations forces requested horse saddles as they found themselves riding horses in the Afghan mountains while maintaining contact with headquarters through high-technology satellite communication. Whatever the combination since Clausewitz we know that war is dangerous business that rested on "... sheer distress at its brutality". The central idea for him was the destruction of the enemy because "... the direct annihilation of the enemy's forces [had] always [to] be the dominant consideration". Thus, the enemy's will had to be broken as a result of destruction and conquest.⁸ His dictum of decisive war however, became challenged as despite NATO's technological superiority and sophistication, a great deal of recent military conflicts has not ended in clear-cut victories. Involvements have been rich in sobering experiences as the ending of conflicts appear to be less decisive and more protracted, often stretching available resources to their limits. The second wave put an emphasis on the instrumental dimension of war and regarded it as a (military) means toward a (political) end. However, most enemies are driven by war's existential dimension and regard war an end in itself.⁹ It seems so that in the last decades a technology-driven warfare faces a mostly idea-driven warfare on a global scale. Some warn that "... the West has reached a point at which it no longer understands the expressive element." It is not able to see violence in a social context and ignores that cruelty and destructiveness of war always lie in social conditions. Wars are part of "... man's social existence" and reflect the society with which they evolve in consonance.¹⁰ Furthermore as the social wave-front analysis assumes "...the way we make wealth and the way we make war are inextricably connected".¹¹

⁶ Toffler, Alvin, *The Third Wave*. New York, 1980. 13–14.

⁷ Toffler, Alvin – Toffler, Heidi, *War and Anti-War, Survival at the Dawn of the 21st Century*. Boston, 1993. 19–25.

⁸ Clausewitz, On War, 1993. 83–85, 110–105, 149, 270.

⁹ Coker, Christopher, *Waging War Without Warriors, The Changing Culture of Military Conflict*. Boulder, 2002. 6–13.; Ho, Joshua, "The Advent of a New Way of War: Theory and Practice of Effects Based Operations", = *Working Paper Series* 57, 2003, December: 1–33. 23–24.

¹⁰ Coker, *Waging War Without Warriors*, 2002. 6.; Clausewitz, On War, 1993. 84, 173.; Hammes, Thomas X., *The Sling and the Stone, On War in the 21st Century*. Minneapolis, 2004. 3.

¹¹ Toffler – Toffler, *War and Anti-War*, 1993. 64.

Understanding the social context is even more important as in human history wars were mostly waged by social entities other than states, fought by social organisations other than armies and with the involvement of combatants other than soldiers.¹² Clausewitz acknowledged that in war nothing is eternal and should he be right than it is of utmost importance to understand the way the West waged wars when it passed through the waves. The social wave-front theory comes as the result of social, cultural and political analyses that focus on the interplay of the existential and instrumental dimensions. In the article historical and military aspects will also be included to help broaden and specify certain changes in the development war. Tools and methods will also be modified to the extent needed to answer the questions of who waged wars, how wars were waged and why they were waged within the respective waves. Although the more one goes back in history, problems with classification and terminology grow. However, this way it becomes possible to war in a comprehensive context as it always "... reflect the politics, economy and (...) technology of a given society."¹³

The First Wave and Warriors

A careful analysis of the origins of warfare should start with primitive societies that lived around the time when the first wave started to accumulate force as even "... [p]rimitive men fought another for possession of hunting-grounds, water-holes, and the best caves."¹⁴ Many pre-historic societies were extremely warlike and fought for a variety of reasons. Males of a given age became as warriors and fought in different forms of war. On the one end of the spectrum there was the ritualised battle waged between opposing tribes on a pre-determined place, mostly to test the enemy's strength or to create a basis for further negotiations. Such engagements were "... much like a duel that [had] been arranged at a meeting place convenient to both sides" with the main reason being mostly the accumulation of slights and offences. This form of war involved little killing and the actual fighting could last for days or even weeks involving equally long periods of interruption. On the other end of the spectrum the more brutal form of war had serious consequences and often meant the annihilation and attrition of neighbouring villages. Settlements were raided and ambushed, the enemy males preferably killed, but women and children occasionally spared and captured. In this early period of human history, waging war was characterised by tribal warriors who were natural fighters as in many pre-historic languages

¹² Crevelde, Martin van, *The Transformation of War*. New York, 1991. 73.

¹³ Clausewitz, *On War*, 1993. 101, 624.; Berkowitz, Bruce, "Warfare in the Information Age", In. Alberts, David S. – Papp, Daniel S. (eds.), *The Information Age: An Anthology on Its Impact and Consequences*. Washington, 1997. 218.

¹⁴ Perrett, Brian, *The Changing Face of Battle, From Teutoburger Wald to Desert Storm*. London, 2000. 9.

the term warrior often meant young man.¹⁵ They were spurred by revenge, expiation of insult, certain mythic necessities or divine demands. Their wars stayed beyond the modern military horizon because they fought "... under the primitive conditions of savage peoples" who displayed nothing more than a "... trial of strength on the open ground".¹⁶ Also later on warriors of all ages derived their self-worth from their own calling and regarded fighting mostly an existential experience based on the overwhelming intensity of emotions and the ambiguous relationship with the enemy. Courage was regarded key to victory and as passionate fighters they wanted to "...live in the memory of others by virtuous deeds" with other emotions being "... no substitute for a thirst for fame". The warrior's relationship with war was personal as he decided the moment of his death freely. Morality played an important role, as warriors were proud of themselves and their enemies. Victory was seen an honour but defeat never a disgrace.¹⁷ Warriors were spurred by a hostile feeling that expressed an "... almost instinctive, passion of hatred." They went to war due to their place in the society fighting for themselves, their families, relatives, friends or allies. As the forces of the first wave accumulated, human civilisation became more developed. Various Greek tribes settled down in the Mediterranean and established advanced entities in form of city-states. Agriculture resulted in an economic surplus and wars of these increasingly sophisticated communities set the basic characteristics of warfare for most of the millennia to come. The pattern of wars fought by weapons of muscle power in hand-to-hand combat with face-to-face killing changed only after the industrial revolution.¹⁸ However, their social sophistication did not mean that Greeks fought "...on behalf of anybody except themselves". Religion determined their life as they regarded the foundation of their city-states a divine act. Secular political reasons as we understand them now, did not play an important role in their wars.¹⁹ They remained warriors, although Greeks were also the first to instrumentalise war. They turned ritualised battles into decisive engagements that expressed more the role of human ingenuity and will than a certain divine providence. Fighting was neither a sheer excellence in individual performance, nor the privilege of a well-defined social class that fought for recognition and cultural status.²⁰ Unlike tribal wars, Greek warfare reflected a careful balance of discipline, morale and technological expertise. Their desire for decisiveness in form of

¹⁵ Clausewitz, *On War*, 1993. 353.; Crevelde, *The Transformation*, 1991. 56–57, 74–75.; Keegan, John, *A History of Warfare*. London, 1994. 98–101.

¹⁶ Keegan, *A History of Warfare*, 1994. 114–115.; Clausewitz, *On War*, 1993. 268, 291.

¹⁷ Coker, *Waging War Without Warriors*, 2002. 30–38.; Clausewitz, *On War*, 1993. 121.

¹⁸ Clausewitz, *On War*, 1993. 84.; Toffler – Toffler, *War and Anti-War*, 1993. 33–36.; Perrett, *The Changing Face of Battle*, 2000. 12–13.

¹⁹ Crevelde, *The Transformation*, 1991. 55–56, 152–153.

²⁰ Coker, *Waging War Without Warriors*, 2002. 24–31.

“... open, direct and deadly confrontation” rested on the idea of attrition.²¹ As highly philosophic people capable of abstract thinking they also turned theoretical knowledge into practice to increase their ability to kill. Their individual courage was subject to obedience in the form of institutionalised bravery. Compared with tribal warriors or their contemporary non-Hellenic enemies Greeks fought with cold reason and not frenzy.²² The Romans took this warfare even a step further as they systematised it. Their legions were highly bureaucratic organisations that systematically applied force to kill and massacre. Their strict discipline and tactical cohesion on the battlefield together with well-planned logistic arrangements resulted that over a long period it was nearly impossible to defeat a well-drilled legion.²³ Romans were bellicose and bureaucratic, and their wars had the function to meet the enemy in order to destroy his ability and will to resist. The way their legions fought was in the eyes of their enemies inhuman and chilling as Romans successfully turned the terror of war into a predictable and cold form of a systematic, cool and head-on butchery.²⁴ However, Roman wars were waged as a continuation of justice and therefore religious in nature. Secular political ideas did not play an important role because war was as a lawsuit that had to be employed should all else failed.²⁵ The fall of the Roman Empire resulted in the political, military and economic disintegration of Europe. However, wars of the coming millennium resembled much of the Greek and Roman heritage. The collapse of empirical institutions and urban culture did not mean the complete disappearance of the ancient military tradition. Classical ideas still penetrated into military practice as both command and discipline followed the ancient model.²⁶ During the early medieval period, wars were waged by different social entities until a class of people known as knights emerged. Wars continued to be the proper test of manhood as even the mounted knights of France, similar to the Meroving warriors, preferred hand-to-hand fighting. Politics was based on right and wars were fought in a religious context. Knights were warriors too, who fought for justice, entitled by a hereditary right. As armed representatives of the society, they regarded war either a quest between socially equals or a business fought in the name of God.²⁷ However, by the fourteenth century the private wars of knights became more and more subject to laws and limitations. War as an appeal to God’s judgement fought by honourable men became not only gradually outlawed, but also militarily

²¹ Hanson, Victor Davis, *Carnage and Culture: Landmark Battles in the Rise to Western Power*. New York, 2002. 3–10, 90–94.

²² Hanson, *Carnage and Culture*, 2002. 230, 273–275.

²³ Coker, *Waging War Without Warriors*, 2002. 38–43.; Perrett, *The Changing Face of Battle*, 2000. 17–18.

²⁴ Hanson, *Carnage and Culture*, 2002. 95–98, 115–120.

²⁵ Creveld, *The Transformation*, 1991. 129.

²⁶ Hanson, *Carnage and Culture*, 2002. 150–157.

²⁷ Creveld, *The Transformation*, 1991. 52–54, 81, 100, 126–137.; Perrett, *The Changing Face of Battle*, 2000. 41–42.

inefficient and expensive.²⁸ Medieval warfare determined by feudal rivalries consisting mostly of personal quarrels fought for personal rights of property, inheritance and succession, slowly turned into wars between increasingly accumulating economic and military powers. Private wars of warriors fought by men-at-arms were replaced by wars between states and lived further only in form of personal duels. Due to the consolidation and increase of princely power wars became more systematic, complete, and the quest for glory was slowly replaced by cautious professional competence when campaigns were planned and conducted.²⁹ Thus wars characterised by hand-to-hand fighting slowly progressed toward "... a more orderly and complex form" that rested increasingly on principles, rules and systems. Armies were no longer led into battle by word of command as a compact whole to display skill and bravery. Simple decisions became complex plans with lengthy dispositions that started to include timetables and various sorts of other calculations.³⁰

The Second Wave and Soldiers

As the first wave started to lose momentum, the act of waging war turned into fighting for "... straightforward conflict of and for state power".³¹ Wars became subject to political considerations and were increasingly waged for political reasons with politics being the most important criterion by which the outcome was judged. Violence was a monopoly of the state and served to achieve political ends. As the influence of religion or religious ideas declined, wars were not waged in the name of God, nor conducted according to such rules.³² Not the warrior's hostile feeling dominated war but the hostile intention of the soldier. Those who fought, were ruled by the mind and since the political object determined the military objective, the hatred between secular political entities slowly replaced the hatred between individuals. War became "... serious means to a serious end" since its reason came out of a political situation and its occasion was due to a political object. It was increasingly an "... instrument of policy" where the political purpose influenced its conduct. Policy permeated all military operations resulting that wars could not "... be considered in isolation from their purpose." Wars became an instrument of the state shaped by political intention and not the 'senseless' feeling of the warrior. Combat, once the place to gain honour and fame became one element of war and its very purpose, the political objective.³³ Officers regarded themselves less as members of a certain warrior caste, but more as servants of the state, who fought due to the dedication to a secular political entity and not just for honour. The undis-

²⁸ Howard, Michael, *War in European History*. Oxford, 1976. 4–12.; Perrett, The Changing Face of Battle, 2000. 46–50.

²⁹ Howard, *War in European History*, 1976. 20–24.

³⁰ Clausewitz, *On War*, 1993. 154, 360–361.

³¹ Howard, *War in European History*, 1976. 30, 46.

³² Crevelde, *The Transformation*, 1991. 125, 141.

³³ Clausewitz, *On War*, 1993. 84–99, 100–108, 158–159.

ciplined feudal wars of men-at-arms were canalised and became a purposeful and legitimate element of the developing state. The right to wage war became the monopoly and concern of the sovereign alone.³⁴ Politics were the womb of war “... where its outlines already [existed] in their hidden rudimentary form, like the characteristics of living creatures in their embryos”.³⁵ The willingness to fight and the desire for victory were subordinated to a purpose that enabled a higher political will to act. Wars meant less killing and more destruction aimed at the enemy’s physical and moral forces. Annihilation was regarded the “... first-born son of war” and the destruction of morality in the form of “... shame and humiliation” an essential part of victory. However, aspects of the warrior tradition still remained as even Clausewitz regarded soldiers “... a kind of guild, in whose regulations, laws, and customs the spirit of war is given pride of place.”³⁶ The growing destructive potential of wars made fighting increasingly anonymous and subject to factors other than passion. In the nineteenth century nationalism entered the stage as even soldiers in the lowest ranks derived their self-esteem from the service they provided for the society. With conscription the relationship with war became more interpersonal as the soldier’s death allowed the political entity to function further. Not war, but the state became an end in itself and the interpersonal relationship demanded “... the willingness, occasionally the eagerness, of people to fight for it and lay down their lives for it”.³⁷ Wars between the peoples were fought increasingly by standardised means as both weapons and soldiers became subject to industrial-style rationalisation.³⁸ Wars were dominated by well organised and large armies. Organisational skill became a war-winning factor as the meaning of courage eroded and meant nothing more than greater discipline under fire. The growing size of the armed forces resulted in an increase in specialisation and compartmentalisation that indicated the arrival of the age of the military organisational genius.³⁹ Whereas a warrior could be seen as a passionate fighter, a soldier of the nation-state was rational as politics and diplomacy not only influenced all the combinations that lead to war, but permeated the operations themselves.⁴⁰ The consequence was that wars were becoming total, fought not by armies, but by nations. Armed forces were an embodiment of the nation and no longer the champion at war. The military was turned into a blunt instrument that served to “... bleed one another dry of resources and of man”. Both soldiers and civilians were tools with the natural consequence of being worn out. Total war required everybody’s

³⁴ Howard, *War in European History*, 1976. 54–74.

³⁵ Clausewitz, *On War*, 1993. 173.; Howard, *War in European History*, 1976. 76, 81.

³⁶ Clausewitz, *On War*, 1993. 111–114, 219, 277, 291.

³⁷ Coker, *Waging War Without Warriors*, 2002. 54–55.; Creveld, Martin van, *The Fate of the State*, 1996. <https://press.armywarcollege.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1764&context=parameters> (Accessed on 23 October 2023)

³⁸ Toffler – Toffler, *War and Anti-War*, 1993. 39–41.

³⁹ Jablonsky, David, “Why is Strategy Difficult”, In: Cerami, Joseph R. – Holcomb, James F. (eds.), *U.S. Army War College Guide to Strategy*. Carlisle, 2001. 148.

⁴⁰ Jomini, Baron Antoine Henri de, *The Art of War*. London, 1992. 2.

contribution and in return everybody became a legitimate target.⁴¹ For Clausewitz war was "... an act of mutual destruction" and the world was never closer to fully realise it than after World War II. He saw the in the opposing armies the incompatible elements that had to interact until one completely disappeared.⁴² The age of global confrontation saw two opposing political economic systems with politics becoming the continuation of war. The destructive potential of the two super powers meant that any confrontation would lead to a global inferno. However, with the collapse state sponsored communism the world arrived "... not at the end of history but at a historic turning point."⁴³

The Third Wave and Operators

The most important hypothesis of the third wave is that as economies transition from a industrial basis to an informational basis, so do the respective armed forces. Although the process is nowhere complete yet, theorists of the social wave-front analysis spread rumours about a new breed of knowledge warriors and software soldiers.⁴⁴ Their assumption is that the person who enters the fight would probably be a sort of operator. The introduction of increasingly sophisticated military technology down to the lowest echelons, the tendency of fielding robots of various types to put military personnel out of harms way means that the traditional role of humans in war might again change. The level of technological sophistication and the sheer quantity of such systems have already "... unbalanced the distinction in war between the rational and the emotional."⁴⁵ For many, war is a technological experience that comes as the result of remotely controlled unmanned aerial and ground vehicles, equipped with various sorts of sensors and weapons that may redefine the role soldiers play in war. Although humans still remain the nucleus of fighting, some of their combat duties might soon be replaced by compact robots armed with small calibre weapons. In a way operated out of harm, such devices would give the ground operator a similar feeling to that of an air force pilot who operates his weapons from the cockpit. These robots could patrol dangerous areas, do area reconnaissance, perimeter defence, outpost or listening post functions just to name some.⁴⁶ Wars of the third wave could become increasingly impersonal as the disengagement from the enemy becomes manifest by the joystick and the screen. The emphasis on technology and machines might personalise interna-

⁴¹ Howard, *War in European History*, 1976. 93, 109–110, 114, 134.; Clausewitz, *On War*, 1993. 385.; Toffler – Toffler, *War and Anti-War*, 1993. 42.

⁴² Clausewitz, *On War*, 1993. 253–254.

⁴³ Creveld, *The Transformation*, 1991. 223.

⁴⁴ Toffler – Toffler, *War and Anti-War*, 1993. 11, 139–144.

⁴⁵ Gray, Chris H., *Postmodern War, the New Politics of Conflict*. London, 1997. 254.

⁴⁶ Shachtman, Noah, *More Robot Grunts Ready for Duty*. *Wired News*. www.wired.com/news/technology/0,1282,65885,00.html?tw=wn_tophead_1 (Accessed on 9 December 2004); Kucera, Joshua, "US Army speeds fielding of armed robots in Iraq", = *Jane's Defence Weekly* 42:5, 2005, 5.

tional conflicts but depersonalise the people who fight in them. The changing role of the nation-state could also redefine the interpersonal relationship with war as one can witness the ties between the military and the nation-state to become loose. The tendency towards this impersonal character is enforced by examples where national militaries were used in multinational forces authorised by entities beyond the nation-state.⁴⁷ The globalised world makes the instrumental dimension increasingly porous as the interdependence blows away much of the border between those who hurt and those who get hurt. This complex setting means that one would probably witness a shift towards certain norms and values that contribute less to the proper functioning of a nation-state, and more of the globalised world. Although democracy, liberalism and human rights are "... often presented to the world as reflecting the desires of the world community" by being universal and global, they often have limited relevance worldwide.⁴⁸ Thus waging third wave war would be more than ever as a sheer technological activity. The more robots take over traditional human responsibilities in war the less it would become an existential experience as wars may see "...technicians divorced emotionally and psychologically from the battlefield."⁴⁹ In order to win war the operator would need qualities other than passion or rationality as the amount of microchips built in the weapon systems and other equipment increases. The transition from a steel-based military technology toward a silicon-based technology requires analytic qualities and intellectual capacity that come both from human skills and powerful information technology networks. No doubt, this synergy of real time data processing and dissemination integrating sensors with weapon systems has already produced impressive military results since the 1990s in the form of innovations.⁵⁰ In order to deal with the complexity of challenges, the operator would be more of an intellectual than just a simple fighter. In order to tackle a vast array of problems within a single mission, roles other than war-fighting become equally important "... not as substitutes but as supplements." The soldier acting as statesman or as scholar would be as important as the soldier who fights, given the multidimensional-

⁴⁷ Miller, Charles B. (Lt. Col.), *Enhancing The Strategic Application of Effects-Based Operations Concepts*. Carlisle, 2002. 2–5.; Gusterson, Hugh, "Nuclear War, the Gulf War, and the Disappearing Body", = *Journal of Urban and Cultural Studies* 2:1, 1991, 45–55. 51.; Toffler, *The Third Wave*, 1980. 79–83, 311–327.; Kaplan, Robert D., "The Coming Anarchy", = *The Atlantic Monthly* 1994, February: 44–77. 68–72.; Moskos, Charles, *The American Soldier after the Cold War: Towards a Post-Modern Military?* Evanston, 1998. 1–2.; Huntington, Samuel, "The Clash of Civilizations?", = *Foreign Affairs* 72, 1993, Summer: 22–49. 26.

⁴⁸ Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations*, 1993. 39–45.

⁴⁹ Coker, *Waging War Without Warriors*, 2002. 172.; Reed, Fred, *Robotic Warfare Drawing Nearer*, www.globalsecurity.org/org/news/2005/050210-robotic-warfare.htm (Accessed on 16 February 2005)

⁵⁰ O'Hanlon, Michael, *Technological Change and the Future Warfare*. Washington, 2000. 67.

ity and sensitivity of challenges in current international security problems.⁵¹ The increasing technological dominance would also redefine the role of morality in war. Wars in the third wave would become mostly amoral as the enemy is regarded as a system composed of sub-systems, elements and nodes. Technology itself is morally blind and together with increasing legal considerations that often influence the conduct of military operations even down to tactical actions, waging war in the third wave would become more a matter of law, but not of morality.⁵² Amorality in military operations has the logical consequence that achieving "... integrated effects" or more precisely massing desired effects could become the main focus. This, however, would represent an antithesis to earlier attrition and annihilation oriented force employment strategies. One would probably witness a shift from the traditional emphasis on tangible attributes in the form of killing and destruction toward intangibles such as influence and control. Global challenges together with technological developments would redefine traditional aspects with the result that "... forces can be geographically dispersed." The presence of force by emphasising power projection as waging war would be less constrained by geographical distance.⁵³ Due to its ancient heritage, the West generally assumes wars to be short and decisive. As Hobbes pointed out time increases suffering and destruction as it consists "... not in battle only, or the act of fighting; but in a tract of time ... [that has] to be considered in the nature of war".⁵⁴ Consequently the longer the duration the greater the enemy has to suffer, the more the enemy suffers the less he has to lose and the greater his determination that not all the suffering is in vain.⁵⁵ Wars understood as short and decisive became manifest during the second wave, but many enemies understand fighting on a much longer time horizon as they represent an earlier wave and wage war differently. The thing that matters is not the way one sees victory, but the way the enemy understands defeat. Wars assumed to be limited in terms of destruction, casualty, and considerably cheap also reflect the mental attitudes of the second wave with a clear distinction between war proper and the post-war period. Military involvements of the recent past tended to be long as the emphasis moved from winning the war towards winning the peace. Military performance on the battlefield became less and less relevant as such wars tend to be lengthy, measured in years and

⁵¹ Toffler – Toffler, *War and Anti-War*, 1993. 94–97.; Dandeker, Christopher, "The United Kingdom: The Overstretched Military", In. Moskos, Charles C. – Williams, John A. – Segal, David R., *The Postmodern Military, Armed Forces after the Cold War*. Oxford, 2000. 36–38.; Ho, Joshua, "The Dimensions of Effects-Based Operations, A View from Singapore", = *Australian Army Journal* 2:1, 2004, 99–106. 104.

⁵² Knouse, Edgar M., *Effects-based Targeting and Operational Art in the 21st Century*. Newport, 1999. 12.

⁵³ Alberts, David S., *Information Age Transformation, Getting to a 21st Century Military*. Washington, 2003. 40, 50–51.; O'Hanlon, Technological Change, 2000. 18.; Toffler – Toffler, *War and Anti-War*, 1993. 59, 71–72.

⁵⁴ Hobbes, Thomas, *Leviathan*. Oxford, 1996. 84.

⁵⁵ Crevel, *The Transformation*, 1991. 144.

not months.⁵⁶ Instead of being defeated according to traditional military terms the enemy must rather be contained or fatigued until a diplomatic solution can be achieved. Will war return as a permanent way of life conceived as a natural phenomenon?⁵⁷ In many parts of the globe this is already a sad fact. The focus on short and clear-cut victories regardless of whether inside or outside the battlefield is increasingly less relevant. The waves tell that during much of human history wars were non-decisive and protracted engagements fought for limited objectives and by limited means. Wars resembled characteristics that rather reflected the existence of tribes than that of states. Conceptual thinking must reflect this paradigm change as attempts to formulate new concepts and put them into practice must use a new vocabulary and assumptions. The point here is that one should not judge whether the term revolution or evolution is more appropriate. Although there is a need for a paradigm change one should bear in mind that "... even today, continuity in the nature of war is at least as important as change."⁵⁸

Special Type of War

In the unfolding third wave, NATO try to maintain a security posture that is favourable for the member states' values and interests. The last decades however, made clear that the clash between representatives of different waves, armed conflicts are near interminable and feature an abundance of strong actor / weak actor interactions. These interactions affect the worldwide system for which globalization offers a limitless terrain. Strong actor / weak actor interactions can erupt anytime and anywhere and display a lethal violence including terror and counter-terror.⁵⁹ The emergence of weak actors on global scale is one among the many undesired consequences of the third wave. In a globalised world, weak actors representing earlier waves increasingly possess the capability and will to challenge the existing status quo set by strong actors. Unlike in the traditional international constellation in which strong actors primarily interact with other strong actors, the last three decades witnessed strong actors increasingly interacting with various sort of weak actors. The complexity of the international theatre provides the latter actors with an abundance of opportunity to become successful even over a long period of time.⁶⁰ The strong actor / weak actor interaction very often results in a confrontation that features a special type of war. This war is often asymmetric, irregular and of low intensity. The consequences

⁵⁶ Hammes, *The Sling and the Stone*, 2004. 208–209.

⁵⁷ Wegman, Yehuda, "Israel's Security Doctrine and the Trap of "Limited Conflict", = *Military Technology* 29:3, 2005, 88–96. 88–89.

⁵⁸ Biddle, Stephen, "Afghanistan and the Future of Warfare", = *Foreign Affairs* 82:2, 2003, March/April: 31–46. 46.

⁵⁹ Hardt, Michael – Negri, Antonio, *Multitude: War and Democracy in the Age of Empire*. London, 2004. 14–18.

⁶⁰ Porkolab, Imre, "When the Goldfish meets the Anaconda: A modern fable on unconventional leadership", = *Counter Terrorism Exchange* 3:3, 2003, 8–12.

are serious as an examination of the outcome of asymmetric conflicts in the last two hundred years reveals: weak actors increasingly win asymmetric conflicts. The tendency is dangerous since the percental outcome of strong actor / weak actor interactions dropped from 88,2:11,8 in the period between 1800–1849, to 79,5:20,5 in the period between 1850–1899, to 55,1:44,9 in the period between 1900–1949, and to 45:55 in the period between 1950–1998.⁶¹ The weak actor very often uses time to help its cause against the strong actor. Clausewitz stated that one can win by using time. Main goals include the setting of limited objectives, for example causing small but continuous casualties to enemy units. In this way, the weak actor can exhaust the strong actor over time.⁶² Strong actor / weak actor interaction is not a new phenomenon as it stands for campaigns of special scope and condition conducted against an adversary who would not meet in the open field. In these campaigns the strong actor very often struggles.⁶³ From a military point of view strong actor / weak actor interaction arises when one actor prosecutes the above-mentioned special type of war. In some cases, such war may start after the defeat of the regular armed forces of the weak actor. It is normally waged by a loose network of combatants and poses a significant challenge to the strong actor. These combatants take mostly an indirect approach as they can occupy large areas, render the roads between cities and often the cities themselves unsafe.⁶⁴ Fighting networks that scarcely display hierarchical structures is difficult, occasionally impossible. They pose a significant challenge to the strong actor and can bog him down into confusing and ambiguous military actions. The strong actor often finds himself in messy situations he can master only by improvisation.⁶⁵ This special type of war featuring asymmetry, irregularity and low intensity extends to and implies unconventional way of using means, methods and tactics by the weak actor to destabilise the environment and make the strong actor vulnerable. Actions of the weak actor deliberately include non-military civilian targets, not respecting the norms of the law of war, and the principles of restrictions in the use of weapons and force. The waging of this special type of war is very often described by the strong actor with the prefix counter: counter-irregular, counter-insurgency, or counter-terrorist.⁶⁶ This requires the strong actor to plan, develop and apply specific response techniques over longer time periods with more or less (un)successful results in defeating the weak actor and ending the conflict. The strong

⁶¹ Arreguin-Toft, Ivan, "How the Weak Win Wars: A Theory of Asymmetric Conflict", = *International Security* 26:1, 2001, 93–128.

⁶² Clausewitz, On War, 1993. 45.

⁶³ Callwell, Charles E., *Small Wars, Their Principles and Practice*. London, 1906, 20–29.

⁶⁴ Schmitt, Carl, *The Theory of the Partisan. A Commentary/Remark on the Concept of the Political*. Berlin, 1963. 42–45.; Creveld, The Transformation, 1991. 112.

⁶⁵ Zinni, Anthony C. "A Commander Reflects, What will be the operations of the future?" = *Proceedings* 126:7, 2000, 34–36.

⁶⁶ Heintschel von Heinegg, Wolff, "Asymmetric Warfare: How to Respond?" = *International Law Studies* 87, 2011, 463–480.

actor is often biased and is unable to see the resulting violence in a social context. He tends to ignore that cruelty and destructiveness of this special type of war express basic social conditions. The social context reflects social existence of a society with which this special type of war evolves.⁶⁷ The enmity inherent in the strong actor / weak actor interaction can become real over time, including continuous terror and counter-terror. This may lead to a vicious circle and result in cruelty, collective punishment, even in participation in genocide. The unavoidable circle of terror and counter-terror including various sorts of war crime leaves nothing else for the strong actor but to criminalise the weak by calling him a terrorist. Treating terrorists often requires premeditated actions also against the civil population. These actions include psychological operations, information operations, and civil-military relations, just to name a few. Due to the methods employed the strong actor very often becomes counter-insurgent or counter-terrorist, and he may even regard and call himself as such. One possible result of the strong actor / weak actor interaction is the shattering of existing social structures that comes as the result of insecurity, anxiety, and common mistrust.⁶⁸ The two major involvements of NATO in the first decade of the 21st century waged in Iraq and Afghanistan were, despite the Alliance's clear technological and material advantage, long campaigns that did not end with a clear defeat of the weak actor. In a classic article published in the *Foreign Affairs* half a century ago Henry Kissinger lamented on what went wrong during the strong actor / weak actor interaction in Viet Nam. He concluded that the Americans wanted to fight a military war, but the adversary fought a political one. The Americans sought physical attrition, whereas the adversary preferred psychological exhaustion. During the war the Americans lost sight of one of the cardinal maxims of this special type of war: the weaker actor wins if he does not lose, and the stronger actor loses if he does not win.⁶⁹ Thus the weak actor tried to exhaust the strong actor and forced the strong actor to change his political objective. In modern conflicts, exhaustion is not only about causing high military casualties, but to remit the political support in the home country of the strong actor. Modern democracies cannot wage war without political and public support for long.⁷⁰ This strong actor / weak actor interaction on a global scale catapults many regions of the world into perpetual and indeterminate states of war with no regard to the international rule of law, no clear distinction between peace and war, and between combatant and non-combatant. This clear blurring of traditional boundaries means that this special type of war can turn into a factor producing and reproducing itself, hence deteriorating all aspects of human life. It permeates life with violence and offers little possibility to dif-

⁶⁷ Coker, *Waging War Without Warriors*, 2002. 36.

⁶⁸ Schmitt, *The Theory of the Partisan*, 1963. 55–62.

⁶⁹ Kissinger, Henry A., "The Viet Nam Negotiations", = *Foreign Affairs* 47, 1969, 211–234.

⁷⁰ Mack, Andrew, "Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars: The Politics of Asymmetric Conflicts", = *World Politics* 27:2, 1975, 175–200.

ferentiate between inside and outside, and between home and abroad.⁷¹ In this special type of war nothing is just or unjust, right or wrong. Justice, injustice and law have no place in it as there is no common power and no law since force and fraud are the cardinal virtues.⁷² Strong actor / weak actor interaction on a global scale means that traditional limitations blur both in space and time. This special type of war can continue for an indefinite period, or it can have no end at all. Due to the uninterrupted, continuous cycle of terror and counter-terror the strong actor must win again and again, every day. Strong actor / weak actor interaction is the product of a rebellion against a legitimate world order not convenient for many, the exercise of brutal and often indiscriminate violence against humans and nearly all aspects of human rights.⁷³

Conclusion

This study consists of five parts and aims at developing a coherent framework for better understanding war. It departs from the social wave-front analysis, any by addressing various social, cultural and political factors it details the characteristics of the respective waves. The study then continues to describe a special type of war that can best approached as a sort of strong actor / weak actor interaction. In terms of research methodology, the study is descriptive, reflective and explanatory. It is descriptive as it describes the social wave-front analysis and the resulting special type of war. It is reflective since by evaluating the underlying theories the author uses Clausewitz's epic volume of *On War* as reference. It is explanatory since in case of inconsistencies are discovered, the author identifies and explains the contributory factors in detail. Although wars are fought in many ways, fighting for secular political reasons became dominant only after the seventeenth century. From then on waging war was understood not as the business of the individual, but as that of the state. Industrialisation resulted that waging war became increasingly a sort of technical problem that at least in theory, could be solved either by better tactics or as industrialisation accelerated by better technology. The appearance of the machine gun and repeating rifle rendered the last chance of an aristocratic, warrior form of warfare obsolete. The ancient tradition explains the preference to fight open, decisive battles according to rules and standards. It should not be surprising, less embarrassing that many of the enemies prefer to fight differently. They see war from a different perspective, fight consequently for different aims and by different means. When the enemies fight wars mostly for their own sake only they do it as warriors in the old form of man against man.

⁷¹ Hardt – Negri, *Multitude*, 2004. 30–34.

⁷² Hobbes, *Leviathan*, 1996. 73.

⁷³ Hardt – Negri, *Multitude*, 2004. 35–37.

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