

CHAPTER 1

EU – 30 YEARS AFTER MAASTRICHT – THE POLISH PERSPECTIVE – FROM HOPE TO DISILLUSIONMENT



ANDRZEJ BRYK

Abstract

After the reunification of Germany, the Maastricht Treaty and the Treaty of Lisbon, the European Union underwent a radical transformation on an axiological, political and systemic level. It has become a messianic project of integration, led by oligarchic elites. The ideology of this legal and political process is a monistic emancipatory liberalism, formed under the influence of a Western European left sympathetic to Marxism and Soviet communism. Its aim is the supposed abolition of oppression and all discrimination with the help of EU Court of Justice jurisprudence and legislation. In reality, the technocrats who run the EU, seek to dismantle the rootedness of citizens of East-Central European nation states in the family, in religions and traditional values. EU legislation, especially the Charter of Fundamental Rights, which is essentially an ideological manifesto, must be viewed and interpreted in this context.

Non-liberal values are regarded by the EU establishment as a source of discrimination and oppression of individuals. Only liberal emancipation from any relationship and community that is not based on completely free, autonomous choice is to guarantee the freedom and happiness of citizens of a new European-wide empire led by Germany.

The plan to build such a total empire with Germany at its head threatens the independence of the post-communist countries of Central Europe, including Poland. It is also reminiscent of the epoch of Soviet dominance. Neo-colonial cooperation between local post-communist elites and centers of power in Brussels and Berlin is also important. A significant proportion of citizens, disillusioned by the imitative

Andrzej Bryk (2025) 'EU – 30 Years After Maastricht – The Polish Perspective – From Hope to Disillusionment'. In: János Ede Szilágyi and György Marinkás (eds.) *Maastricht 30: A Central European Perspective*, pp. 87–130. Miskolc–Budapest, Central European Academic Publishing.

modernization and post-1989 economic policies, are turning to parties offering alternative.. Elites deprecate this phenomenon by referring to it with the pejorative term “populism”, thus attempting to disqualify their opponents as enemies of human rights, of the rule of law and of the so-called “European values”.

Keywords: Poland after 1989, emancipatory liberalism, German neo-imperialism, liberal vision of European integration, technocracy, ‘democratic deficit’ in the EU, European populism

1. Introductory remarks

The histories of Hungary and Poland can be defined, as one of the Hungarian historians somewhere said, as “*a string of victories in defeats*”. It seemed that with the end of Soviet type Communism in 1989 and the subsequent entry of the East Central European post-Communist countries to NATO and the European Union, our defeats turned into victories. Economic recovery and a sense of security seemed to end the geopolitical curse of both countries. The “end of history” was declared, the future looked great and the European Union – content with its “peace benefit” – went “on vacation”, hoping to form now, without any interruptions, the equal, just and “ever closer Union”, the aim enshrined in the European Treaties. Optimism and infantile gestures seemed to cloud sound reasoning and a sense of reality. This pertained especially to the elites and societies of the new post-Communist Member States, for which this historical change of fortune seemed like a miracle. This “miracle” was in a large part a result of the hard work of the people themselves and their ability to use the rational ways of economic activity which were now available to them but had been dysfunctional and inefficient under Communism.¹

- 1 One of the myths concerning the EU is that the rise of prosperity in Poland was a result of EU funding, especially structural funds. In fact, the funds were not big in comparison to the bulk of economic transactions and were focused on specific projects not necessarily immediately needed for growth, like aquaparks, bicycle paths etc. But the transfer of money from the West was not a gift but a brutal mutual transaction. For opening its 40-million market of consumers in Poland, a similar process to what happened in all the countries of the post-Communist East Central Europe counting altogether 100 million consumers, Western firms got in fact a free hand in Poland, taking over inefficient companies for peanuts. Out of every Euro invested in Poland, over 60-80 cents were returned as profits to the Western companies stimulating growth there (85 cents out of every Euro transferred to Poland from Germany were returned there). Moreover, Poland exported tens of thousands of highly educated specialists to these countries who had studied at Polish universities: medical doctors, computer scientists, chemists, biotechnologists, nurses, etc., apart from a couple of millions of cheap labourers. See data by Forbes and also an analytical account of this process in Armand, 2019.

But history has not ended, the internal as well as geopolitical problems within the EU began to mount, and a naïve image of the Union turned into a much more nuanced and sophisticated approach. It is obvious that this predominant perception of the Union as a political and economic project was idealistic. The EU Treaties have often been violated and we may say that they are just a useful formal device to mask *ultra vires* activities of the Union's undemocratic institutions. Moreover, one of the most important dimensions of the Union's actions so far has not been given the attention it deserved. The Union itself is also an ideological construction with its driving principle of “emancipation” from all the previously existing cultural and social institutions defined as oppressive according to the 1968 counterrevolutionary generation, which controls the EU's institutions today. For the people of East-Central Europe who had just left the ideological iron cage of Communism, some aspects of this ideological dimension began to create a sense of an ominous *déjà vu*.

2. Poland and the dynamics of the EU power structures

Within such a general picture we may now look at the Polish political, economic, social and cultural landscape to assess its condition thirty years after the Maastricht Treaty and nearly twenty years after joining the European Union.

2.1. Idealised road to recovery

Public opinion surveys in Poland reveal a rather unclear and confused attitude to the Union. Some show that a slight majority now thinks that the EU has slowly began to be detrimental to Polish economic development and the rationale for staying in it is connected more to security reasons at the time of a volatile geopolitical situation. Other surveys indicate that a substantial and rising number of the people in Poland think that there is life beyond the EU. At the same time, they overwhelmingly want to be within the Union provided it is reformed. Additionally, the picture has been blurred by the Russian invasion of Ukraine, and structural geopolitical changes which forced everybody to sober up from this infantile idea that “history” was something which happens to other people but not the people of Europe.

But this infantile enthusiastic approach towards the EU and the West, which was visible in most of Polish society after the end of Communism and which had essentially an economic rationale, is gone. 30 years after the Maastricht Treaty, a mental revolution took place in Poland, which may partially be attributed to a spectacular rise of relative affluence in Poland, even if not evenly distributed. The Union and the “West” lost their allure due to many blatantly *ultra vires* measures imposed on the “new” members by the non-democratic institutions of the EU and Germany, which has a decisive say in them. Of these, the immigration dictate in 2015 was a

brutal catalyst. The “West” ceased to be a model to be just implemented after the communist debacle. This change of mood was of course connected to a sense of disillusionment stemming from the failure of “the end of history” model proclaiming Western liberal superiority. Affluence is still the goal of East Central European societies but an awareness that the EU has turned out to be wasteful and inefficient in many respects and might be detrimental to this goal has been creeping into Polish consciousness.

The EU ideological program also hit hard on the heritages of the East Central European countries. The policies of multiculturalism and emancipation from communities and relations that are considered anachronistic, such as the nation, the natural family or faith, which are traditional sources of identity for large sections of the societies in this region, were also recognised, especially in Poland, as too reminiscent of the rejected Communist past. The loss of sovereignty, however limited yet, due to federalisation/centralisation plans is also considered a danger. Not only because having an independent state is a value in itself but it also a precondition of economic prosperity. In other words, this mental change stemmed from a painful growing up and disillusionment.²

The end of Communism in 1989 required us to clearly define the new situation and the axioms upon which Polish politics was to be based. They were in fact simple. The most important was a desire to escape from subordination to Soviet and then post-Soviet Russia, which turned out to be culturally and economically dysfunctional and destructive in all its dimensions. In addition to eliminating remnants of the Communist legacy, that is, to purge the apparatchiks from the state structures often infiltrated by the Soviet and then Russian secret service, it was necessary to reform the judiciary, destroy its Communist legacy and to privatise state property in a more or less equitable way. In addition to disclosing documents about former Communist informers, not only so they would be excluded from holding any important state functions but to prevent any danger of blackmailing them from either the Russian or the Western side – especially Germany, where Stasi files were taken over by the new government – as such blackmail could make Polish politics vulnerable to being controlled from the outside. This escape from the East required nevertheless an integration into Western Europe and its organizations as quickly as possible. The strategic goal was to join the EU and NATO.

This was not, properly speaking, a return to Europe. Poland has been part of Europe for over one thousand years. What we wanted to achieve was a rational, efficient economy based on the healthy principles of the market operated by an ethics of solidarity, political democracy and the rebuilding of social and cultural life after the devastations of Communism. This latter task also involved a recovery of the history falsified by Communism, including all its victims buried in unknown graves. In general, Poland wanted prosperity, security, liberty and patriotism, which meant the rebuilding of all the institutions destroyed or made dysfunctional by the rule of

2 See Cichocki, 2018, pp. 323–326.

Communism. All of this was mixed with a very rosy view in the public opinion of what Western Europe and the European Union represented in all these dimensions which we thought were crucial to the development of Poland. If one may use the analytical category of modernisation, Poland was to finish the Western modernisation the of the 19th and the 20th century, the fruits of which were partially denied to us by a crippled development due to partitions in the end of the 18th century, then by the devastations of the First and Second World War, and finally by the Communist rule.

2.2. Emancipation through bureaucratic structures

However, at the turn of the 21st century, the European Union was already in a different stage of modernisation, defined by the post-1968 countercultural elites in much broader and comprehensive ways. EU defined itself as a post-political, post-heroic, post-national and post-religious project. Nation states and nationalisms/patriotism stood at the very centre of this ideological approach as being allegedly responsible for World War II. The EU was to end such criminal competition between the states. The fallacy of this idea was obvious, but its purpose was to hide a neo-Marxist project. It was the two empires, the Third Reich and the USSR, which used their universalist ideology of race and class to execute genocidal policies, who were responsible for the war, not the nation states.

The post-nation state approach was long in the making, already suggested by an influential book *The Authoritarian Personality* published in 1950 in New York by Theodore Adorno, a member of the Frankfurt School.³ He claimed that it was the entire project of Western culture that had caused the calamities of the 20th century. Emancipation from the shackles of European heritage was a guarantee that such a catastrophe would never happen again. This message corresponded with the revolutionary project of the Western 1968 generation, which rebelled against the legacy of racism and colonialism and considered the program of emancipation as a tool of transformation, beginning from culture and then reaching into the entire bourgeois economic and social structure. This idea was first contemplated by Italian Communist Antonio Gramsci, who spoke about a “*long march through the institutions*”. The generation of 1968 added another slogan to it: “the personal is political”, meaning that all human relations are based on oppressive structures and need to be liberated according to the equality principle ultimately defined as equal human rights.

There was, some claimed, an alternative model for the unification of Europe, in fact vehemently promoted by its political “Founding Fathers”, that is Christian Democrats like Robert Schuman, Konrad Adenauer and Alcide De Gasperi, with their natural law ethos as the ethical code of Europe. This model of unification was based on a union of nation states and reverence for the European heritage, which had been betrayed by the totalitarian empires of Germany and the Soviet Union. But once the

3 Adorno et al., 1950.

unification speeded up and once the generation of 1968 began to be responsible for it, the project evolved into another one. Its “Founding Father” was an Italian Communist, Altiero Spinelli, and his ideas were expressed in the Manifesto of Ventotene of 1944 with a post-national and universalist vision of overcoming European heritage. His universalist cosmopolitan project corresponded perfectly with the emancipatory, post-national, post-historic, post-heroic and post-religious perspective of the generation of 1968, amounting to a destruction of the entire European heritage as utterly corrupted by Nazism, colonialism and racism. This approach looked at European history through the prism of ideology, applying to it the so-called “Hitler screen”. This intellectual device defined the past as a string of violence intertwined with worthless customs and empty rituals. History had to begin anew, and the only proper course of action was to create, from the top down, a new “correct”, “non-discriminating” historical narrative. This “new history” was to be read backwards in the light of the “European values” created out of a mixture of radical emancipatory policies.⁴ This dominating post-1968 liberal left cultural criticism understood culture essentially as a battle between “oppressors” and the “oppressed” for the final emancipation, which would end history. The new class conflict was going to create a tolerant, inclusive, non-judgmental moral education overcoming the classical one, which was by definition hierarchical thus unequal, and used moral distinctions of “good” and “bad”, which were now branded as suspect.⁵

“European values” combined with the liberal understanding of human rights were to form the new, uniform ideology of the united Europe. But this ideological project already had at hand a useful model for this transformative purpose, proposed at the beginning of forming a united Europe next to the model of the Founding Fathers. This model was created by Alexandre Kojève and some French bureaucrats, who looked at Europe as a material for transformation by technocratic experts. Their task was to transform the Europe of nation states into a post-national and post-democratic empire, capable to compete with the USSR and the United States. This globalist cosmopolitan model of Kojève and the expert bureaucrats found a useful ally in the clearly formulated ideology of emancipation. It was exactly here that we may find the origins of this unity of the global neo-liberal economic plan and the liberal-left cultural emancipation, working together towards a transformation of the world from one populated by people living in their different nation states, communities, cultures and religions into a world liberated from these and populated by sheer consumers of goods and individually chosen values.

4 A perfect embodiment of this ideological approach is the Museum of European History in Brussels, in which European history is presented, to simplify it, as a string of sorry events finally leading to a glorious European Union with, among other artefacts of this paradise, the abortion forceps on display. For the Eastern European observer, this approach was a kind of *déjà vu* reminder of an ideological approach to history used not so long ago as a tool of forming a “new man” with a properly shaped consciousness.

5 See Bryk, 2008, pp. 119–151.

2.3. Backwards tendencies instead of smooth metamorphosis

It was exactly here where this model of the European unification, officially part of the post-Maastricht development, began to clash with the cultural codes of the East-Central European states. What they wanted to rebuild, besides a devastated economy, was their history and culture equally devastated and falsified by the Communist way of modernization. This cultural conflict was to explode, also in all kinds of political clashes, dubbed by the liberal establishment of the EU with the vague but derogatory term “populist”. These new post-1968 elites, who were building the united Europe, considered themselves as a revolutionary avant-garde of a radical emancipatory project. Their aim was to create new Europeans with a new consciousness, cut off from the past and looking towards the future. This solidified itself into the official European ideology, based on “European values”, a mutation of “liberalism”. This project was without doubt allied with the acceleration after 1990 and its “end of history” globalist dream of rearranging the world. It was based on liberal internationalism, a global open market tied with the democratic plan to extend it to the entire world and possibly to create global post-political expert elites, guaranteeing uninterrupted economic growth without crises and fundamental political conflicts according to the image they had of stability.

This order was to be promoted not only by the West under the supervision of the US but also by the global liberal elites represented in international organizations, NGOs with an extended network of lawyers, universities and people working in the field of media and culture, who were pushing to realise such a vision beyond any control, while monopolising the language and cultural code of the global discourse in general. The main language of this project became the language of liberal human rights, replacing the Christian as well as humanistic Enlightenment world view with their distinctive anthropology and axiology, so far universally present in the Western world. As a consequence, the EU became in fact an ideological project, with the aim of uniting Europeans solely around an ideal lying in the future, the eschatological horizon to be realised in history, which, to be successful, required an escape from historical Western heritage defined as an obstacle on the way to an ideal Europe. Its past was to be remembered essentially as a string of calamities, only the future mattered as it was planned by uncontrolled liberal elites. The culture of Europe was to be secular messianism and its constitutional structure was to be founded on the post-1945 German model of constitutional patriotism. Any form of particularity which was contrary to European universalism (religious, national etc.), and which might provoke judgments and a moral hierarchy leading to conflicts and inequality, was to be avoided. This messianism with its dream of eternal peace reflected a utopian dream to end human alienation.

Public opinion did not fully realise that such a thorough ideological modernisation required emancipation from everything that shapes Polish identity, that is, national consciousness, tradition, Christianity, natural family, in fact culture, which not much earlier Communists had wanted to destroy as part of their plans of brutal emancipation

from the 'old world' by primitive political and economic means. Polish people wanted to restore these devastated institutions and to become a normal democratic state.

From this perspective, Poland and post-Communist East Central Europe in general was immediately defined as a problem by the 1968 post-national, post-historical, post-religious and post-heroic emancipatory elites. For them, the modernisation of Poland was not to be limited to the post-Communist economic underdevelopment but had to comprise a thorough emancipation from the entire cultural paradigm to fit the already established Western model. Chantal Mouffe, Belgian feminist coming out of the 1968 generation, stated this in the most unequivocal words when, while discussing the enlargement of the European Union to include the post-Communist countries, she stressed that liberal society found itself in search of a new enemy to be killed and it found it in the East Central Europe, which

has to have its democracy enlarged and deepened so all repressed and excluded could be liberated from the traditional ties of oppression –the place of family, religion, so to gain a bigger freedom to “difference and expression” (...) there exists cultural and political “house of slavery” built on superstitions of tradition and interpersonal relationships.⁶

What for Poland was its treasure, that is, history and memory, strong institutions like family or faith, which were pillars of resistance against totalitarianism, suddenly were branded as oppressive and in need of modernization, that is, emancipation to true freedom. The challenge of the new situation wrongly recognised was well captured by a Polish philosopher Ryszard Legutko, saying that for Poland and the East-Central European countries the major problem was

not so much the restoration of political freedom, this was done nearly automatically, but rather rebuilding of the 'old' surviving remnants of the pre-communist past. It was necessary to formulate anew or to activate the basic distinctions, unveil the new meanings of the old conceptions, to reactivate mores, enliven institutions, to mend the ruptured past. And it was this problem which caused the major explosion of discussions in the post-communist world. The recaptured negative freedom did not solve the problem. There were many controversies concerning the question to which to build bridges to the currents of the past, how to define concepts, how to perceive the human nature, how to form the hierarchy of aims. For some, anything old was worthless and they tried – like in the state of nature – to build the rules from scratch; others were searching for solutions by importing the rules from outside. The argument got complicated because there were no consent as to which fragments of reality survived a destruction of communism, and which were lost.⁷

6 In: Bielik-Robson, 2001, p. 16. Today Mouffe would mention sex and nature as “houses of slavery” in need of emancipation and the application of gender ideology.

7 Legutko, 2007, p. 79.

3. Facing ideologically driven integration

Poland found itself in a situation in which a weaker civilization meeting a stronger one faced the dramatic question how to modernise without at the same time losing elements of its cultural identity. The only culture which was now to be a glue in this new Europe was to be based on abstract liberal human rights equal for all and based on a very definite revolutionary anthropology. The problem with such rights was that they were endlessly proliferating, since this anthropology defined a human being as an autonomous bearer of subjective identity demanding rights from society, which had no legitimate criteria of distinguishing between them.⁸ This emancipation from culture had already begun to become dysfunctional in the West, and now it was about to undermine the foundation of Poland's classical understanding of modernisation, which was looking with suspicion both on the emancipatory cultural model of the 1968 revolt and also on the most radical neo-liberal market economic reforms.

In other words, the moment Poland joined the EU, the latter had a very clear ideological orthodoxy, a peculiar mixture of ideas born out of the traumas of the Second World War and the neo-Marxist approach to culture. What the European Union after Maastricht wanted to finish in terms of the implementation of the abovementioned principles was exactly what the East Central European countries experienced under Communism. It was not a coincidence that the entire post-communist elite, which had found itself a comfortable place in post-1989 Poland, recognised the EU project as a great chance to convert Poland into this emancipatory cultural model in a much more effective and subtle way than the unsophisticated Soviet-backed Communist officials were able to do. Additionally, the post-Communist elite found a safe haven against any attempts to punish them for their previous sins.

3.1. *The enforcement of an arbitrarily defined axiology*

Here lies till today a major line of cultural rupture Poland and other East-Central European states experience, because the idea of the EU is based on such an “emancipatory” model of “European values” brutally imposed by undemocratic Brussels institutions, including the courts. They interpret them as the Communist once interpreted “socialist values:” their meaning is subject to the interests of the most oligarchical and ideological lobbies within EU bureaucracy. In other words, from the beginning of its inception, the EU defined itself not only as an economic or political project but integrally, a *déjà vu* for the East Central European countries, as a community not of laws but of new values, derived from a particular ideological and anthropological vision.⁹

8 See Puppink, 2018.

9 One of the first persons who warned against this danger was an outstanding German philosopher, Robert Spaemann. See his article Spaemann, 2005.

Today, 20 years after joining the EU, the real challenge for Poland, its politics and economy, is not “escaping” Russia and its influence, even after the invasion in Ukraine. If there is any Russian influence, it resides in the West, in Brussels, Paris and Berlin, through all kinds of political links, money transfers, foundations and sentiments which treat East Central Europe increasingly as a problem for both sides. For these, obviously weaker, countries, the EU is a challenge because it has become imperial and oligarchical, that is, a fundamentally undemocratic project. Here the conflict provokes the division between the liberal oligarchical elites and the so called “populists,” or in other words, between uncontrolled global transnationalists, sometimes called “anywheres”, and democrats called “somewheres”, who rebel against post-democratic post-politics. The conflict can be defined as a conflict between post-democratic liberalism and democratic post-liberalism.

One of the most visible problems of the EU today is turning a living, functioning democracy, mainly in Eastern and Central Europe, into a supervised democracy, while at the very same time turning political problems into governance problems of an expert, technocratic management by means of procedures, directives and regulations created by the EU commissars (again a *déjà vu* and a familiar term in the collective memory of the post-Communist states) without any effective control by the people.

These EU legislative measures function increasingly as a justification and creation of institutions and social rules which are only considered legitimate if they support the messianic project of unification at any cost. Formal law is shaped in a way to justify a particular project, to shape Treaties in a proper way, which is exactly an application and deepening of the bureaucratic governance mentioned above. This voluntarism is deepened by the nebulous provisions of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, which have at their core the “European values” as in fact understood by their authors to be the same as human rights and the dignity of man, and a general clause that “all discrimination is forbidden”. These nebulous provisions could be and have been used in the interpretation of the Treaties to provide justifications for changes not in line with the Treaties, or even contrary to them. In turn, the European Court of Justice, which does not constitute an appeal level of national courts and tribunals but is authorised to judge only within the strictly delineated spheres of competences granted by the Treaties, tries to create a doctrine which would make Union law superior to the Constitutions of Member States. It gets support from all the non-democratic institutions of the EU while viciously criticising

the constitutional courts of nation states, especially in case of Poland, which uphold the supremacy of national constitutions.¹⁰

3.2. Bogus democracy with artificial demos

The mantra incessantly repeated by the liberal elites of the EU is their alleged readiness to remedy the most visible structural constitutional flaw of democratic deficit, which is supposed to limit this technocratic, bureaucratic and increasingly oligarchical and corrupt governance beyond control. It is oligarchical not only in political or economic terms but also, and this is especially poignant for the people who experienced Communism in East-Central Europe, oligarchical in the ideological sense, that is, imposing a monistic liberal anthropology as a basis of the non-negotiable axiology of the EU, attacking e.g. religious freedom or parents' rights to bring up their children, even if, formally, such freedoms are guaranteed by law.

But this recurrent refrain about democratic deficit waiting to be remedied is propagandistic babble. In the EU, this “lack of democracy” is not a deficit but a consequence of a plan consciously imposed, without which the overreaching aim of centralisation and federalisation of the Union could not be realised. Democracy, regardless of how many forms it has taken, is based on two principles: the responsibility of the rulers, something which Americans called a possibility to “throw the rascals out of office” understood as a public service, and representation. But the latter is not possible in the EU because the European demos does not exist. The real demos, which also plays a controlling role, functions only on the nation state level. The nations of Europe, this demos within different nation states, resist federalisation and bureaucratisation beyond their control, even if this resistance is chaotic and hereto unsuccessful. This failure is partially due to the fact that EU elites pursue federalisation in cooperation with a large chunk of the liberal elites of nation states, who place their loyalty outside their country and into the European Union's internationalism for ideological or comprador reasons. Moreover, support for all-European electoral rolls is a fraud from a democratic point of view, since such rolls have the same credibility and power to control the rulers as the electoral rolls uniting all the nations of the USSR in one Soviet nation and citizenship.

10 But there are “equal” and “more equal” states within the Union. The bodies of the EU do not take action when the German Constitutional Court reaches a decision which defines European law as unconstitutional, blatantly showing the double standard policy of Western countries against the post-Communist ones which joined the Union in 2014, but also indicating that such a verdict of the German Constitutional Court is politically and constitutionally “safe” since it is Germany which will govern the European Union within the prospective federal Europe, creating a superstate along the lines of the Second Reich (the German Empire established in 1871).

The plan is to base the citizenship of Europe on the new morality of “European values”, which are supposedly synonymous with human rights, reflecting the universal project of human brotherhood, of which the EU is to be a vanguard. But these “European values” allegedly reflecting human rights were in fact just liberal human rights with their crippled idea of equality. The ideological character of such human rights was obvious.

The major problem with them was that the principle of equality in liberal “emancipatory” reasoning became hostage to the idea of autonomous equality. But as Antoine Saint-Exupéry wrote:

one can be equal only in relation to something (...). An ordinary soldier and a captain are equal in relation to the nation. Equality is an empty word without any meaning if it cannot be related to anything.

In other words, a liberal in such a situation chooses the commandments which he wants to obey himself. But such morality, the very essence of today’s liberal theory of emancipation, makes the individual’s senseless rebellion the highest value. Within such an approach to culture, nothing can stand and be accepted as *sui generis* good, and every cultural code can automatically be defined as oppression. Such a liberal questioning of everything must stand finally in the face of emptiness and accept that as the highest value. This stance is allegedly a way to achieve an endless auto-creation of one’s authentic self in all dimensions, a proper definition of true human being and the very idea of freedom. But as Roger Scruton observed, ‘*Freedom is a very good horse, but you have to ride it somewhere*’. Such a concept of freedom is in fact a rebellion in the name of instinct, the affirmation of the barbarian never recognising any authority, moral hierarchy, never bending his neck in the face of greatness. To obey such an authority or objective morality would mean, by the liberal definition, a condition of inequality which is discriminatory by definition, and at the same time a form of false consciousness.¹¹

The idea that the dry and anthropologically very shallow “European values”, which are identical with human rights, can be the glue to keep the Europeans together, since they assume that such values constitute a state of their true emancipation from historical oppression, obligations and institutions, and that this idea would provide legitimacy to the entire project, was really an act of desperation. As Pierre Manent commented

Europe’s situation today is quite grim [because] the project of nurturing and cultivating the European spirit turns into a permanent, systematic criticism of the European life and history. The European authorities and institutions speak on behalf of the new man, who cuts himself off from the actual, true history of Europe. It cares mainly to preserve and praise its newest innocence. Today’s Europe is first of all a

11 See Scruton, 2002, p. 278.

destruction – in the name of human rights – of everything, which in our manners and moral views betrays the slightest manifestations of Christianity. The human rights doctrine cut off from any references to the common good becomes exclusively a discourse accompanying devaluation of human relations. Religion of rights, deprived of any other orientation, cannot create anything and be any support. True resources and natural riches of Europe cannot be found in the political apparatus or ideology of the Union. If they have not yet been exhausted, they can be discovered in the old nations and the old religion of Europe (...) [we have] no other sources of community life which would have any meaning and sense and which could be called European, retaining the minimum validity requirements. Whatever else it might be, and it is many other things, Europe cannot be understood and cannot be kept alive without taking into account its Christian roots. European Christianity is not a “spiritual point of honor” or “the place of memory” or the “Monument of History”. It takes part in the process of European life.¹²

3.3. An empire of forced emancipation

The head-on clash with the aspirations of Poland within the EU could not be more glaring, even if at the beginning it somehow went unnoticed because of the economic rewards, which lifted the country out of relative poverty and made it one of the most dynamic economies in Europe. Additionally, this growth was the reward which the majority of society expected from joining the EU and considered as crucial. But the general misconception was that Poland was entering “classical” Western Europe and the EU, which people thought represented the vision of Schuman, Adenauer or de Gasperi, not realising that it was already in its most advanced emancipatory stage of the post-1968 period.

This challenge was strictly connected with the problem of Germany after its unification in 1990 and its soon-to-be-gained dominance over the EU after the Maastricht and especially the Lisbon Treaty. The postmodern, post-national, post-religious, post-historical and post-heroic public ethic of the EU corresponded well with the German problem of self-definition after its defeat in the Second World War, the legacy of genocidal policies, the American imposition of the democratic system, which Germany, in contrast with the rule of law, had never had until then. Germany had to redefine itself, and it converted this redefinition into a tool of political and ideological domination. Germany knew that they could not find anything positive in their history in political terms, thus its thinking was straightforward: we committed horrible crimes, but we repented and became, as one of the German journalists rather hubristically remarked, the “moral empire”. Thus, we will be now arbiters, judging who a “good” European is and who is not, how to look at history and what should be a proper “memory” of it. Germany knew it did not have any “good” history which could provide it with a basis of identity. For this reason, their history was to be in

12 Manent, 2014, pp. 72–73.

the future, the utopia of the Union, of which Germans were to be a crucial keystone and the only patriotism worthy of the name was to be “constitutional patriotism”.

For this to happen, all other elements of identity that have historically existed, including nation states and memory, were to be defined as “nationalistic” and “racist”, as potential sources of oppression and disruption. In other words, Germany defined their unique, horrible history as the universal history of the European states.¹³ In that sense, the European Union was – apart from being an economic and political project – in its essence a monistic axiological project in which, as mentioned, “European values”, a kind of liberal monism excluding plurality and true freedom, were an integral part of the modernisation enterprise which the EU wanted to apply to East-Central Europe. Modernisation was more than just a civilisational project of accepting economic or managerial rationality, which would enable the post-Communist states to rebuild the devastated material basis of their communal existence. It was at the same time a total rejection of the “old gods”, just like the pagan idols were rejected during the conversion to Christianity in the 9th and 10th centuries, a complete transformation of minds and souls, if need be, by the force of laws, courts, the media and educational systems, as well as economic blackmailing with an incessant pressure to conform. This was an unintended parody, a *déjà vu* of the recently discarded Communist logic, if not methods, of modernisation, that is, the creation of the “new man”, the European man.¹⁴

This total modernisation understood as emancipation also constituted a bridge through which the modernisers of the EU made a deal with the post-Communist political elites and the liberal-left intelligentsia mainly originating in their particular nation states. For instance, Poland was defined as a non-emancipated “problem” despite Communists efforts since 1944 to do exactly this.¹⁵ They claimed that the Communist modernisation failed because it was openly coercive, primitive and thus inefficient. But now the EU was to achieve modernisation in a more subtle and efficient way. The leading liberal-left intellectual of post-Communist Poland and a former opposition leader remarked that he was not afraid of the post-Communists and their policies but of what would emerge out the ruins of Communism, that is, the ugly face of Polish antisemitism, nationalism and all forms of bigotry and xenophobia.

It was for this reason that this side of the Polish post-Communist elite monopolised the language of communication with the EU elites. They were simply speaking the same language of modernisation and emancipation. Poland was to be its subject.

13 For a comprehensive account of this German transformation and its influence on Europe see Krasnodębski, 2006.

14 Within such a perspective of modernisation which was to be global or cosmopolitan, like the Communist one was, the nation state and Christianity as anthropological competitors to this monistic liberal anthropology and its practical consequences, were to vanish. The challenge of such a modernisation was especially acute for Poland.

15 As a Stalinist philosopher Tadeusz Kroński remarked to Polish poet Czesław Miłosz in a letter in 1948: ‘We with the Soviet rifle butts teach the people in this country to think rationally without alienation’ (Miłosz, 1999).

The strength and paramount influence of that post-Communist elite, united with the liberal-left intellectuals who formed one wing of the opposition against Communism, came not only from their loyalty towards the present-day EU and its ideology of emancipation, due to which they received protection from Brussels and Berlin (they all hoped that nation states would eventually be dissolved). This strength also came from how the post-Communist transformation took place in Poland. It was based on two corrupting axioms, which introduced into Polish politics and society a conflict between two camps speaking different languages about reality, the very classical definition of a culture war.

One axiom was based on the so-called “round table” talks between Communists and the liberal wing of the opposition based, to simplify this process a bit, on the idea of an “ordered”, gradual transfer of power to the democratic people in exchange for a transfer of state property to the former Communists as private proprietors. The second, which was connected to the first, was to guarantee that the post-Communists and their institutions, as well as their initial dealings in free Poland – some of the most important of which were the judiciary and the media – were not to be reformed. This shaky security of these elites naturally made them consider the structures of the post-1968 EU as their major ally, which led them to abandon Polish interests.

In other words, post-Communist elites immediately positioned themselves as typical comprador-type neocolonial elites.¹⁶ The process of getting out of the Communist economic debacle was corrupted, amounting in some respects to a form of economic colonisation. The same “xerox” type policy was applied to all aspects of cultural, economic and political life. The language of transformation was monopolised by the liberal-left EU elites, and the neo-liberal economic model of transformation was accepted. This “imitation” type transformation disregarded both political culture and down-to-earth common sense. This transformation was the “original sin” of Polish politics, which corrupted public discourse, made Polish elites full of complexes, and divided them permanently into two still existing camps: those considering Poland as an independent state within the language of the Treaties with their basic idea of subsidiarity, and those who transferred their loyalty to the bureaucratic centres of Brussels and Berlin, the idea of the federal EU state and Poland as its self-governing province or a region similar to German lands. This resulted in a permanent division of labour within the Union into centre and periphery, or to put it in another way, a developing centre and the auxiliary providers for this centre.¹⁷ Liberal elites, the beneficiaries of the transformation, also accepted a permanent division of society into winners and losers without any social safety valves; moreover, they began to look down on the victims of this brutal transformation as people

16 More on this in the context of the centre-periphery model to which East-Central Europe was to be reduced by the old Western European elites: Zarycki, 2009, pp. 169–181.

17 This policy accepted as its axiom the principle “there is no alternative” to the already set model of development. The best work showing this complicated web of dependencies and negative consequences is Krasnodębski, 2003; on the economic aspects of these oligarchical transformations see Kieżun and Bielecki, 2013.

with crippled personalities and ignorant minds, full of envy, hatred and dangerous “populist” emotions.¹⁸

Within such a general picture of the Polish transformation, the 18th century mental division of Europe was reasserted with full force. It began after the partitions and the elimination of the Polish state in 1795 when Russia, Prussia and Austria, the empires which destroyed the country, began to treat this zone of Europe as a place under their tutelage, while imposing on Western Europe a language of justification of this international crime. They defined this region as backward, incapable of ruling itself and capable of modernisation only by the logic of these empires. It was then that the very term Eastern Europe was created, denoting a troubling, festering region which needs to be civilised.¹⁹ When Germany was created in 1871 as a unitary state, the German sense of mission towards the East, which had already been formulated by its liberals during the Frankfurt Parliamentary debates at the time of the Spring of Nations in 1848, began to be brutally applied. This message, with clear racial overtones combined with the *Kulturtrager* mentality, defined Poles as a problem to be put under constant supervision and ultimately as a population destined for forceful assimilation or destruction. It was an image of the East in relation to which German universalism defined itself as a form of cosmopolitanism. Their idea of liberty was always an idea of a Promethean mission to be carried to the backward regions, the liberty of the “iron” necessity.²⁰ This attitude was reborn after Germany was unified in 1990 and rose spectacularly to political superiority, which quickly defined the European Union as a tool of this mission.²¹ That was bound to clash with the attitude

18 This of course is a typical attitude of the global liberal elites today. For instance, liberal Hilary Clinton, a competitor for the presidency of the US against Donald Trump, branded his supporters as “deplorable”.

19 See an analysis of this Enlightenment creation of the “inferior” Eastern Europe as a region to be civilised: Wolff 1994.

20 The German theory of the state, which was subtly connected with the Volk mythology, was based on an idea that the state was an entity apart from society. The state was “hovering” over society in charge of guarding the very essence of universality embodied, the essence of perfect rationality. The entire German philosophy and political thinking has always tended to absolutise the state. The state was the equivalent of the absolutist king along the lines of Jean Bodin’s *Six Books of the Commonwealth* of 1576. Because of this, the idea of sovereignty as Germans understood it historically played a role separated from the sovereignty of the people. They tried to combine this idea of the state, the Reich, the imperial idea with their cultural idea of the nation as *Volk*, which resulted in calamities. It is no coincidence that today this German universalism of the state-empire has difficulty to subject itself to the modern idea of the nation and the nation state. See Krasnodębski, 2023, pp. 360–361, 367–370. Thus, Germany faces ‘the same dilemma as before – either to be a sovereign nation state among other sovereign states, with which one can create more or less close alliances, or to return to its old messianism of building transnational [post-national-AB] European “polity” – to a political unification of Europe, which has so many times ended with catastrophe, also for the Germans’ (Krasnodębski, 2023, p. 337).

21 As P. Manent observed, ‘German power is today simply disproportionate. What is natural, this power is essentially used exclusively in the national interest of Germany. In Europe, which was to put an end to the reign of the nation states, the real advantage belongs to the Germans, which makes the idea of the European community nonsensical’ (Manent, 2014, p. 73).

of the East Central European states, which after decades of Communist oppression wanted to build their own place under the sun in a free Europe, as cooperating nation states within the general framework of the Treaties.²²

The states of this post-Communist zone desperately wanted to have their nation states since they realised, a mental frame that history has many times corroborated, that without truly independent states, their very existence might again be endangered. Again they experienced enormous pressure from the strongest players of Western Europe to deprive them of this right of self-determination and independent governance. This, especially German, attitude of “supervision” was shared with Russia, which formed an economic alliance with Germany, but with geopolitical implications. In fact, that was nothing new, since during the epoch of Communist dominance over Central and Eastern-European states, this zone was happily ceded to the USSR for modernisation and then forgotten.

When the Communist period was over, Germany immediately assumed the role of a supervising teacher over “retarded” Poland in need of upbringing – not only in pragmatic, economic matters but also cultural and moral ones of teaching Poland what the true “European values”, defined by them, were supposed to be. This was a tool of propaganda, one aspect of a neocolonial dominance.²³ Hungarian writer Péter Esterházy observed wryly on this German and European liberal critique of East Central Europeans about the enlarged Europe after joining the EU in 2004:

For a long time I was an Eastern European, after that I rose to the club of Central Europeans (...). [Not long ago] I became a new European. but before I managed to adjust a little to this fact, I have learned now that I am not an original European.²⁴

In Poland and other countries of the “new” Europe, this attitude radically activated a brutal “imperial” type intervention *per fas et nefas* of the EU bureaucracy, with Germany as its main engine. Any democratic government, elected in Poland or elsewhere, which does not meet the German and the EU oligarchy’s criteria of “true” liberty and “European values” is viciously attacked economically and politically with an orchestrated media campaign. This German imperialistic universalism, whether it showed itself in the form of the Holy German Empire, the Enlightenment idea or the liberal idea of the emancipatory European Union, is the source of the constant

22 See Cichocki, 2018a, pp. 295–326.

23 Thompson, 2006.

24 The statement was in response to Jürgen Habermas, a leading proponent of the European Union as an ideological project and the most senior member of the Frankfurt School, which shaped the imagination of Western European intellectuals and politicians of the 1968 generation. Péter Esterházy is quoted in *Ci wspaniali rdzenni Europejczycy* in: Cichocki, 2005, p. 176; In other words, as Tony Judt observed in 1996 in an influential article (Judt, 1996), entering a club requires accepting the rules of the game, even if this is bitter experience. But even after joining the club, the countries of East Central Europe were immediately threatened that the old boys would retain the upper position and make decisions about the future shape of the European Union.

inability to build a Europe, today the EU, on equal terms. There is no indication that Germany has changed that superior cultural or other attitude towards Poland, since that stems not only from Germany's self-definition as a "moral superpower" but also from a strategic aim of the entire German policy to build around itself a federal "European state". This "European state" allows Germans to cut themselves off from their imperialist and genocidal heritage, while at the very same time realise their eternal dream, always present in various cultural, legal and political forms, of being the superpower by means of the circle of European marches dependent on Berlin.

Thus, the most important challenge for Poland as well as for the other East Central European countries in the EU has been how not to be reduced to dependency, not only in economic terms, but also in the cultural sense of not being crushed by the emancipatory ideology sealed into an unofficial secular "religion" of the Union. Here from the beginning an enormous role was played by a neo-colonial takeover of an overwhelming part of the Polish media market by Western proprietors.²⁵

In addition to the media market, Poland was flooded with liberal foreign foundations, NGOs and other institutions of the so-called "civil society", many financed by global liberal organizations like the Soros Foundation. They are supported if they realise emancipatory programs which uproot people from religious structures, the natural family and patriotic organisations, defined by liberals as nationalist and even fascist, which do not share the liberal-left canon of values.²⁶ Thus, it is not surprising that Poland and other post-communist states sensed that they were escaping from one ideological regime to the other. As a political scientist Andrew Janos wrote:

- 25 Any attempt to demonopolise the media market in Poland controlled by foreign owners, predominantly of liberal left sort, is immediately attacked as a violation of free press and speech, even though in Western countries, drastic legal limitations of such monopolistic practices are a standard procedure.
- 26 This is connected with a change of language and a reversal of meanings of particular concepts. When Polish patriots organise annually the so called "March of Independence" (pol. Marsz niepodległości) to commemorate Polish independence won in 1918, it is habitually treated as a "fascist" gathering. One of the most vocal liberal-left members of the European Parliament and a hater of nation states, especially Poland, Guy Verhofstadt shouted in indignation in Parliament after one of these marches: '60 thousand fascists marched in the streets of Warsaw –neo-Nazis, white supremacists. I am talking about Warsaw, Poland, 300 kilometres (...) from [World War II Nazi German death camps] Auschwitz and Birkenau'. This was one of the most outrageous speeches one could get from any politician in Europe today. He was not only a totally ignorant apparatchik of the Brussels oligarchy but an ideologically brainwashed mind, who had to be an utter idiot to combine Polish patriotism with Auschwitz, and with what the martyrdom of about 1 mln Jews there, as well as 80 thousand ethnic Poles, means to the collective memory of Poland. A German journalist after the March in 2019 exclaimed with horror 'They waved Polish flags, the right-wing extremism'. In turn, a journalist from one of the most liberal left newspapers in Poland shouted on TV after the march: 'Horror, they shouted racist and fascists slogans: "God, Honor, Homeland"'. German leftist activists come to such marches to battle the military history reconstruction groups (which portray, for instance, the anti-German resistance units during the war, branding them as "fascists"). An editorial of the leading liberal left newspaper *Gazeta Wyborcza* after the military parade on a day of "Polish troops' festival" in August wrote: 'Patriotism is like racism'. These statements represent the most striking examples of a totalitarian, emancipatory mind (Karp, 2019, p. 74).

the differences between the old (Soviet) and new (western) hegemony are, of course fundamental, but to see the differences between these two regimes, the observer could not ignore certain elements of continuity. First of all, we have to remember that the transition does not mean a change from hierarchy to equality, but from the one form of hierarchy to other. There is no doubt who is the leader in today's Central and Eastern Europe, or (...) who is "missionary" and who a "local native", whose fate is to wait for a conversion to the universalistic canon (...). Communism tried to create "a new man", when the new missionaries of the new universalism want to create new liberal personalities, equipped with transnational sentiments of the new age and liberated from the traditional social ethic and different taboo.²⁷

4. Liberalism against liberty

Many thinkers, not only of a conservative disposition, realise that today the ideological menace is not in fact coming from the East. Russia is still a military threat and was partially an economic one when it tried to take over some strategic branches of the Polish energy infrastructure already after 1990 and when the German-Russian pipelines North Stream I and II were strategically aimed against Poland. True, there are some remnants of the post-Communist, post-1989 legacies in politics, economy or even intelligence, but they are not influencing the main tone of Polish politics anymore. After the invasion of Ukraine, the menace from Russia might be military, but it has lost any ideological or cultural influence. It is the ideological, cultural menace from the West and its UE's institutions infected by it.

This menace might be defined as a motley of modern post-Marxist doctrines presenting themselves as different forms of emancipation.²⁸ The program of the drastic redefinition of all aspects of communal and relational life by the ideology of emancipation is being perceived as another totalitarian attempt to create a "new man". When the dominant, mainstream liberal authors in Western Europe, in alliance with their colleagues in Poland and other East Central European states, develop a narrative of the destruction of liberal democracy in these countries defined solely in their terms, their opponents discover with shock that the core of this allegedly liberal democratic narrative is woven out of the old Marxist ideas, sometimes overtly Communist, in other words, that liberal democracy of this sort repeats the cultural program of Communists not so long rejected in the East, of uprooting from the cherished values, relations and institutions.²⁹ This identity-based resistance, dubbed by

²⁷ Janos, 2000, cited in: Krasnodębski, 2008.

²⁸ This ideological Communism and its Marxist core were in fact coming from Western Europe.

²⁹ See for instance Krasnodębski, 2023c, pp. 237–277; Wildstein, 2020, Legutko, 2021; Kołakowska, 2016.

the emancipatory European liberal elites as “populism” in contradistinction to the acceptable, non-relational identities (e.g. the sexual ones) has been a constant feature of Poland till today, even if on the level of politics, the dominating liberal elites formed an alliance with the EU liberal elites.³⁰

Liberty in East Central Europe is also defined as resistance against any attack on national identity and culture, a danger Western countries never experienced. This attack was first of all an attack against communities which could nurture them, the nation and its culture, a fundamentally anti-imperialist idea, which today is also understood as a resistance against this totalising emancipatory ideology. The liberal-left deputies crushingly dominating in the European Parliament refused to give Poland its legitimate money (a loan for recovery from the COVID pandemic) because they did not like its conservative government, which was democratically elected in 2015.

They wanted, as one German deputy, Katerine Barley, *nomen est omen*, stated, to “starve Poland” and overthrow it, not listening to any arguments but looking at the whole situation solely through an ideological lens, by definition distorting and falsifying reality. They began to criminalise Poland by associating it with words such as “dictatorship”, “lawless” and even “fascist”. The attack was officially about Poland violating the “rule of law” despite the fact that all the judiciary reforms branded that way were common in Western European countries. This criticism was explained by some EU bureaucrats as legitimate in relation to Poland, a state too immature to make any reforms without supervision, a neocolonial attitude in a Union allegedly of equal partners. But the deeper cause of the attack was fear that this ideological liberal orthodoxy, never regulated by the EU Treaties and thus illegal, might be subverted by the very fact that a “politically incorrect” government was elected by the Polish people.

This shows that today’s liberalism has turned into an EU “religion”, with its “European values” catalogue never legally and precisely defined. Such a liberal “religion” was created to realise a secular eschatology or, to put it in another way, its aim was to impose one, universal state morality on all. The European Union lives in this modernising universalism understood as emancipation in the name of a crystal-clear final humanity, of which the end station is an emancipation from the world marred by evil of which gender, transgender and transhumanism experiments are just a beginning. This is a new form of gnostic thinking, where pure will and subjective choice will liberate us from an existential evil, a hubristic attempt to

30 Identity is a universal concept. The main aspect of identity which characterises its liberal or liberal-left interpretation is its subjective, individualist form, rooted in the autonomy principle in contrast to relational or communal obligations. The other side stresses exactly this communal (patriotism, religion, family) and relational character of identity. It may be defined as conservative or communitarian, but it applies to many forms of resistance against the liberal form.

create a universal and unifying story of humanity but without a unifying narrator.³¹ Liberal secular “religion” tries to strengthen the institutions of the state for the sole purpose of keeping in check people and groups (religious, conservative movements, traditional families etc.) that do not share the liberal anthropology and its exclusive definition who a human being is and should be. Thus, everybody can have a different view of reality provided this is the same view as the liberal one, in other words ‘*there is no liberty for the enemies of liberty*’, the words attributed in 1793 to a Jacobin of the French Revolution, De Saint Just. Different views are tolerated in private, but their public dissemination, and the “contamination” of the volatile public opinion, cannot be tolerated. This is a monistic, rigid and fundamentalist worldview, imposed on all people through institutions not tolerating competitive views. Moreover, it is being defined as the only rational one capable of discerning universal values representing one truly global human civilization fighting dangerous phenomena of “illiberalism”, “illiberal democracy” and “populism”.³²

4.1. The transformation of conscience through soft coercion

The aforementioned universal project of toleration and non-judgmental attitude towards any opinion stemming from moral autocreation might be misjudged as relativism or nihilism, but this is a misconception. In fact, it is a highly moralistic agenda, trying by all kinds of micro-rules (one of the most important ones is the hazy legal category of “hate speech”) to create social peace, which requires the elimination of competitive moral systems.

Liberal absolutism, so forcefully applied in East Central Europe the same way as it was applied already in Western Europe, does not tolerate the “enemies of humanity” defined situationally and ideologically as “populists”, “racists”, “bigots”, “homophobes”, “transphobes” etc. The category of judgment is emancipation from any relational (not created by choice), moral and social entities of the nation, religion, family or sex. Human rights are defined in an antagonistic way, destroying the normative, relational dimension of everything which determines an individual: the cultural, religious, moral, national. Their social and moral role is to bring a unity of sentiment and will, eliminating evil, which is allegedly not rooted in the nature of man but just a passing phase humanity is going through. Unified progress has been well advanced and thus all remnants of the old reactionary sentiments, discriminations and judgments must be eliminated, not necessarily by force, but by attempts to shame people out of their opposition to the “new brave world”.

- 31 Such a universal narrator making sense of the world existed in the moral nature of the Greeks, the idea of natural law, or as the Biblical God of Jews and Christians. See Jenson 2010. But ‘if man’s very being depends on his will alone, however, there is no reason why we ought to remain what we are. This belief that man can make a better man than the one God created is what prevents us from appreciating what we are’, this is a source of modern existential uneasiness (Schall, 2018/19).
- 32 See on this: Legutko, 2016; Bryk, 2021b, pp. 3–32; also, Bryk, 2021a.

Western Europe condemned fascism and Nazism, identified nationalism and right-wing extremism with patriotism, and it was with horror that they suddenly saw it in Eastern Europe. Globalism was to void the love of one's country defined as tribal selfishness, one has to be a citizen of the world and accept the universalist perspective with human rights as its moral content. Cultural identity was defined as withdrawal into oneself, the cult of heroes and heroism were things of the past, and the warriors were to be supplanted by merchants, while the Judaic and Christian moral code was an anachronism. Law and morality were to be provided by the multicultural kaleidoscope regulated by administrative rules. All such rules were to ensure that not only wars and menacing ideologies would be terminated but human evil as such, as a social phenomenon, might finally end.³³ This universalist, emancipatory approach clashed head-on with the cultures of the East-Central Europe nations, which Communism had wanted to destroy, which, when threatened with annihilation, wanted to rebuild these cultures as an important basis of their economic and technical modernisation. This liberal emancipatory universalism began suddenly to resemble a new totalitarian coercion, even if for now in a soft form.³⁴

This is utopia without physical terror but with the public annihilation of those thinking differently, with psychotherapy or brainwashing people in various "workshops" about diversity and sensitivity. Social engineering is organised by the strongest in the market of ideas, organizations, law and economy.³⁵ Such a project of the EU causes the project to be not only illegible, but also dysfunctional on many levels and treated as a cover for warming up and instigating many powerful interests, rhetorically using the ideological mace of the European project to realise their own goals. These clashes of perceptions between Poland and the European Union establishment have caused a deep division in Polish society. This is apparent in the refusal to grant legitimacy to any democratically elected government which does not fully accept this ideological definition of the European Union imposed by its increasingly oligarchical liberal establishment, in alliance with the comprador elites of these countries focusing on this ideological European project. It was visible especially after the conservative government was formed by the winning party PiS (Polish: *Prawo i*

33 Delsol, 2018.

34 Legutko, 2016.

35 This is a universal theme of all totalitarian utopias, for which, as Orwell or Huxley described, the main task is to erase the past, the memory of what happened, because that would give a chance for comparison and enable the discernment of the lie of such totalitarian projects and as a consequence would foster resistance. The paradox of such an approach in Europe is that there is only enmity towards the (Western) European heritage, while they idealise other traditions, the purpose of which is usually to treat them as weapons for destroying the European ones. This is one of reasons for the "open borders" policy of uncontrolled, illegal immigration.

Sprawiedliwość, that is, “Law and Justice”).³⁶ It was immediately branded as populist and acting against “European values” by the EU establishment because it wanted, in a very inefficient way, to limit the consequences of two strategies of the European Union which violated the Treaties.

One was a cultural, in fact ideological, emancipation strategy with sexual revolution and gender ideology as its core, as well as the corresponding censorship of hate speech, the forced acceptance of illegal immigrants as a practical realisation of multiculturalism focused on the dissolution of the nation state, and finally an understanding of human rights in a very narrow, liberal way.

The other, the economic strategy was a plan to impose on the weaker states a classical centre–periphery division within the EU, in which Poland, as well as other East Central European states, were given a subsidiary role in a just-to-be-formed federal state (in fact centralised bureaucratic state) controlled by Germany via Brussels. Poland under the PiS government tried to achieve a modicum of subjectivity within this economic centre–periphery model. In cultural matters, it tried to defend its sovereignty; these matters are left exclusively to the nation states by the Treaties but this is totally disregarded by the EU liberal-left establishment. The Polish opposition treated the PiS approach as showing foolish ambitions and in cultural and moral spheres as exactly contrary to the ideological emancipatory aim of the EU, which the opposition supported. For this purpose, having the total support of the liberal establishment of the EU and especially Berlin (which had in fact declared a propaganda, political and economic war on Polish government since 2015), the opposition began

36 The government was conservative, at least rhetorically, in the cultural sense, but not in the sense of pursuing the neo-liberal model of economic development. In the latter sense it was social-democratic or pursuing a policy known in Germany as ordoliberalism, as this term was understood in Europe in the 1950s and 1960s. In Poland, it partially represented a tradition of the Polish Solidarity Movement of 1980-81. This greatest freedom movement of modern Europe had nothing to do with the emancipatory movements of the 1968 generation but much more with a return of the true source of Polish and European tradition and institutions destroyed by Communism.

to use a tactic of criminalisation by association, defining the government as “illegal”, “unconstitutional”, “anti-European”, “against European values”.³⁷

4.2. Poorly hidden antidemocratic attitudes of the liberal-left elite

The PiS government, which ruled Poland for 8 years, tried to treat seriously the formal clauses of the Treaties, thinking naively that it really was law, not a law driven by ideology, which indeed was the game in the EU. Its policy was naïve, since if one sits at the table playing poker with a cheater one can still win because the rules are clear, but if one sits with a cheater who is ideologically intoxicated one cannot. PiS did not define the enemy properly, as someone who might be termed a global progressive “liberalocracy”, which thinks that a conservative government may rule only if it respects the rules established by it and can be changed only by it. This division has been permanently set. We live in a world in which progressive or postmodern liberalism is a hegemonic cultural code and its language defines reality, the air you breathe. Any attempt to pull the reins is declared as illegitimate and requiring decisive actions both on a political level (against “populists”) and on a legal level, in defence of the “rule of law”.³⁸

37 The PiS party won in the election of 2023, but it was unable to form a government. The opposition formed a coalition government, and such attacks immediately ceased because this government adjusted immediately to all the economic, social and cultural goals of the EU liberal-left establishment (including climate policy, the relocation of illegal immigrants, gender indoctrination etc.). It also communicated right at the beginning that it was going to use the constitution in a clearly ideological way. If it was necessary to undo the “anti-European” policies of the PiS party, the law and the constitution were to be disregarded. Only an orthodox liberal-left regime was allowed, excluding any pluralistic diversity. The most striking example of this attitude is a statement of a new minister of justice who remarked that ‘we have a situation in which we are restoring constitutionality [of everything] and are looking for a legal basis to do this’. (quoted after: Czerwiński, 2024). This is a statement similar to a dictum attributed to Stalin’s General Prosecutor Andrej Wyszynski: ‘give me a man (an enemy) and I will find a (legal) paragraph (to sentence him)’. Prime minister Donald Tusk remarked: ‘All we are going to do is to be done according to the rule of law as we understand it’. A judge of the European Union’s Court of Justice and a former chief Judge of the Polish Constitutional Court, Marek Safjan, an enemy of the PiS government, a classic example of the globalist pro-centralist European elite, added, ‘We have to break free from the trap of formalism’. These remarks represent a classical approach to law as proposed by Nazi constitutionalist Carl Schmitt, the so called decisionism, according to which what is valid is not the general legal norm but the decision of the one who has power. Another former chief Judge of the Polish Constitutional Court, Andrzej Zoll, orienting itself towards the German understanding how the United Europe should look like and very much, even if subconsciously, applying to Poland the German experience and understanding of history and law stated, ‘As for introducing the rule of law, the new government cannot do it by legislative (parliamentary) means’. In other words, if one wants to fight fascism, one must destroy it forcefully and then establish true democracy and constitution (as the Americans did it in Germany in 1945).

38 It is not a coincidence that a rebellion against PiS government was started by the judges who were not at all decommunised after 1989, and who think that the EU is their natural ally protecting their interests. And now they do not want to recognise judges nominated legally by the organs they consider illegitimate, like the president.

Culture is also a battlefield, where any attempt to question emancipation policies from any relational and normative context is treated as a counterrevolution, thus the ideological language, at the very centre of which is “homophobia”, “transphobia” and anything else that has been defined by the “liberalocracy” as “hate speech”. This reaction, nowadays very visible in Poland, has a very strong class component but is quite different from the historical aristocracy or nobility, which had nevertheless a deep sense of obligation towards those of the lower ranks. The new aristocracy looks at the lower classes with disdain, considering them a mob which has no right to demand anything from them, since they are a meritocratic elite which does not have any debt or obligations towards others. It also has ample legal, financial, cultural etc. means to deal with the consequences of their cultural policies of eradication/emancipation, which devastate the weakest. Their definition of liberty is not a human concept but an ideology which places freedom solely at the service of the autonomous, subjective individual no matter what. This is the essence of the modern alliance between the economic elite and the cultural one.³⁹

For example, this elitist disdain is visible in a commentary of the prominent liberal-left English intellectual Timothy Garton Ash, once quite a good observer of the changes in post-transitional East-Central Europe but now a “court intellectual” of the most orthodox “liberalocracy” and a self-nominated “enlightened” educator of the rebellious Poles. In 2022 he wrote in the most prominent liberal-left paper “Gazeta Wyborcza” about Poland before the election of president Duda, who represented the PiS: ‘Democracy dies in darkness. The night is approaching over one of the weakest democracies of the European Union (...) democracy will be castrated’, then he called Giorgia Meloni “post-neofascist” and warned against ‘the creeping normalization of the far right’, a typical babble of this sort of blinded liberal-left European intellectuals. After the elections in which PiS lost power, he continued: ‘the process of cleaning up after PiS in Poland is underway, which Americans should watch closely. Perhaps the same thing awaits them after the end of Trump’s possible second term (...). [The Tusk’s government] continues to clean the strongholds of the PiS state with an “iron broom”’.⁴⁰

In other words, in the case of Tusk’s coalition even the most illegal actions, which *per se* are legitimate against conservative government, constitute a test ground of how to deal with other possible conservative governments which might challenge the liberal establishment in the EU and the US. It is the right, not the law, that is the problem of the liberal elites and to eliminate this danger, extraordinary measures can be taken, including a coup, provided it is a liberal one.⁴¹ This class/cultural

39 See Benoist, 2022, pp. 42–63; Bryk, 2021b.

40 Ash 2024; the quote is a reference to Tusk’s statement in 2022: ‘give me 400 days and I will make order with an “iron broom”’.

41 Such an attitude of disdain is visible across the Atlantic Ocean as well. This is the attitude which Hilary Clinton showed when it she said that such people were ‘deplorable’ and Mark Tushnett, professor at Harvard University (!) defined them as losers, especially the religious ones, who should be, in fact, locked up in cultural ghettos and the courts should be used for this task (Tushnett, 2016).

conflict is now defining Western politics with the “liberalocracy” using all means available to defeat its opponents should they ever manage to come to power by democratic means.

5. Towards ‘a new empire’

With such an opponent one can either upset the table and walk away, a drastic move not even contemplated by anyone in the Polish conditions, or you can play fox and save what you can. In this game, the major line of contention was which law was sovereign, the EU *acquis* or the constitutions of the Member States. The Treaties never granted such a power to the EU, meaning such a law had to be accepted by the nation states as sovereign law through the ordinary constitutional procedure, but the European Union’s Court of Justice interpreted the EU law the other way round, working hand in hand with the bureaucracy of Brussels.

This illegal activity of the EU was dealing also the most dramatic issue challenging the Union, that is, immigration policy. Driven by the “*herzlich willkommen*” policy of Angela Merkel and stemming from the universal but misguided compassion of universalist ethics, this policy violated the European Treaties, forcing the EU countries to accept the erroneous German policy, which had no logic behind it and created a huge mafia of human trafficking, operating hand in hand with NGOs financed from European state budgets.⁴² These misguided policies were forcefully rejected by Poland and other East and Central European countries as illegal and stemming, apart from other causes, from the fear and paralysis of European leaders, the post-colonial complexes of Western countries as well as a ram to destroy nation states through a great replacement experiment.⁴³

42 The mafias were acting out of incredibly lucrative financial interests. In turn, non-governmental organizations operate on the basis of the ethics of global humanity and a presumed right of immigration for every human being in the world regardless of the laws of states and the consequences of abandoning the principles of prudence and political and social responsibility.

43 The administrative relocation of illegal immigrants (invited illegally by Germany in 2015 in fact on behalf of the UE) was an act of desperation of EU bureaucracy controlled by the strongest states (mainly Germany) because it was not able to cope with them. It is against the European Treaties, and therefore the EU leaders created ideas to justify it as “forceful solidarity”. Moreover, such a policy requires that countries in which immigrants do not want to settle should keep them by force because if not even social benefits are given to such immigrants in a country which will have to accept them, it would prevent them from migrating to richer ones. The immigration policy is one of the most dysfunctional, ideologically driven, and helpless policies of the EU. See for instance Murray, 2017.

5.1. *Centralising opportunism*

Nevertheless, EU bureaucracy treats every crisis as a chance to strengthen the federalisation project. A mechanism was created to react to internal and external dangers, which is to centralise decisions and resources which are necessary to finance the new obligations and limit the space of manoeuvring of the nation states. The war in Ukraine gave the EU a chance to strengthen the Union's centralization process orchestrated around Germany, along with France and the Benelux countries. A possible end of *Pax Americana* in conjunction with the Russian menace is looked upon by Germany and its allies in need of centralisation as a great chance. Germany, which in fact had an interest in the Russian aggression against Ukraine, as it gave them a chance to cut Europe away from Russia at least for a time before they centralise it, is the real winner here. Its historical obsession with subjugating Europe is currently being realised by means of the EU, of which they are planning to become the hegemon. This is a role they understand well, since Germany has never in fact been a nation state but a state which controlled its subjects irrespective who they were, a classical empire. So today, federalisation will follow, after which they might make a decision to sustain the Ukrainian resistance by all kinds of help and finally to freeze the war there and resume cooperation with Russia, leaving Ukraine devastated and exploited by both Russia and Germany in cooperation with Ukrainian oligarchs. Poland and East Central Europe will not only economically be squeezed into the centre-periphery model but also deprived of its equal role within the NATO, because East Central Europe will be redefined as a Russian sphere of interest. This would mean finally kicking the Americans out of Europe, and ending the *Pax Americana* on a global level. This common strategy of Germany and Russia will pose a real threat to Polish subjectivity in the European Union.

It seems then that the Ukrainian crisis, after the financial one in 2018, the Covid pandemic and the illegal immigration catastrophe, has been used to transfer power from the nation states to the EU oligarchy. This centralised, undemocratic empire of the European Union, with different nations governed by comprador administrative elites subordinated to the centre governed by Germany *à la* Second Reich, meets surprisingly little effective resistance in a situation where the formal democratic process becomes more and more useless, merely an empty ritual, the so-called “feast of democracy”. Potentially, the cultural paradigm within Europe must change before such a political strategy could even be contemplated.

This “federalisation” project of the EU seems to be deprived of any safety valve to prevent it from making wrong decisions and losing competitiveness in the world. There is an atmosphere of gloomy uncertainty, including in Poland. Whether the EU will experience its Spring of Nations again no one knows, but many things in it have gone wrong, which might evoke a creeping sense of loss of legitimacy of the entire project among the people. Right now, the EU cosmopolitan establishment has invested too much in this project not to use all the necessary measures to mend it and silence its opponents. But sooner or later, something might crack.

At present, the liberal elites of the EU seem to have put everything on one card, a race in which the EU bureaucracy tries to build the European superstate before they might be effectively challenged by all-European antiglobalistic movements centred on freedom and the nation state.

In such a European Union there is no place for a free and independent Poland, moreover, no place for a Poland treated as an equal partner. Poland has again found itself in a very precarious crush zone between Germany and Russia. The American attitude is here also very important, because the American liberal elites today are the twin brother of the European liberal elites, who do not put their strength into a defence of liberty but into the ideology of all-encompassing social and cultural emancipation. The neoliberal economic elites joined hands here with the cultural neo-Marxist universal elites at the expense of ordinary people.⁴⁴

5.2. Liberal “restoration of order” in practice: the Polish case

All the aforementioned geopolitical challenges can be found in Poland, which is torn by bitter internal conflicts. The elections of 2023 showed what was in fact the major dividing line. A large part of Polish society does not mind the further federalisation/centralisation of the EU under the German plan. For them, the Polish state functions already as an equivalent of the European/German land or region and its political, economic and cultural field of sovereign manoeuvring within the EU does not have any value.⁴⁵ They are convinced of their moral superiority and the new government formed by the Civic Coalition (Polish: *Koalicja Obywatelska*, KO) in the autumn of 2023, which represents these people, thinks that it can act *per fas et nefas* because no one will control it. The PiS government operated in an extremely hostile environment, despite the fact that its alleged breach of the rule of law, especially the constitution, could never be proved by its opponents, even if some of the government’s actions could legally be interpreted as stretching the law. The PiS government was hated not for its actions but for what it was. It defended the nation state as a unit of the EU, the cultural identity and plurality of the media market and finally a substantial amount of economic field of manoeuvring in the form of investments and reforms blocked by Brussels according to the plan of a Union economically divided according to the centre-periphery model.

All this was a defence, in accordance with the Treaties, of the minimum of sovereignty and the room for independent political manoeuvre. But PiS voters were not

44 This includes also the messianic zeal to fight global warming, behind which there are no rational scientific arguments but big corporate money. Global warming is a fact but human responsibility for it is negligible. Literature on this is already voluminous, even if the scientific establishment has its own financial reasons not to tolerate ‘heretics’. See Koonin, 2021; a good review of the subject is also Hayward, 2021/22.

45 Recent surveys conducted after the 2023 election showed that 14% of the population consider the Polish state to be unimportant to them and they think it should be sucked into the European Union as an unimportant administrative region. 28% would not have any objections if that happened.

treated as second class citizens by Brussel's liberal establishment because it hated PiS and its policies. It hated the PiS party because it hated its voters for representing this type of European "populism", existing in many other European states, claiming they have not been sufficiently modernised and educated, in wit emancipated from the reactionary past and still harbour illegitimate views.⁴⁶ The government had to fight the powerful machinery of the ideologically obsessed oligarchy of the EU, liberal western media, George Soros's net of foundations and money, and a strong internal opposition. It was also incessantly attacked by the opinion- shaping elites, who use the dominant and free liberal media controlled by Western corporations, acting in a monopolistic way unimaginable in Western Europe. But despite this, Poland still has a pluralistic media market, there is a choice available, a situation unimaginable in countries which are in principle pluralistic, but nearly all write the same commentaries in the language of the same monistic liberal narrative.

The new government will have all these actors, the EU, liberal media, foundations financed by big money not against but supporting it no matter what. They will ignore, hide and justify anything this government does because it acts on the "progressive" side of history.

As professor Kim Scheppele of Princeton University, somewhere stated, when "restoring democracy" by the new government of Poland, the letter of the law cannot be necessarily observed, the "real constitution" is in the minds of the people, and not on paper. And if what is on paper does not represent the values which are in human heads, then one does not need to limit oneself. Some Polish apologists for the KO government were thus convinced that violation of the constitution is justified if such a move could restore state's constitutionality, which for such commentators was exactly violated.⁴⁷

Klaus Dieter Bachmann, a typical journalist of the liberal German establishment and thus by implication a European centralist, who has been in Poland for years, attacked the PiS government officially in the name of "true" democracy. Staying there in fact to guard the German interests and follow the line of the German government he wrote:

Tusk's government – to repair the state – must introduce authoritarian rule: remove judges from the Constitutional Court and the Supreme Court, bypass the president's

46 Among an avalanche of ignorant, often ideologically motivated articles about Poland in the Western press, which are full of lies and bad will, one stands out for truly trying to understand what Poland under the PiS government wanted to achieve and why it was hated for this (see Caldwell, 2021/22). Unfortunately, the political and economic goals of the PiS party did not necessarily translate into very effective results. Even though the resistance of the Brussels establishment and the liberal media was colossal, there were also other reasons for this failure. Political naivety and a kind of neo-feudal reverence for superior masters, thought to be powerful, also needs to be diagnosed.

47 One is reminded of Lenin's statement made in 1919: 'Our moral code is absolutely new (...). We can do everything because we are the first in the world who draw a sword not to enslave but in the name of liberty and liberation from subjugation', *Krasnyj miecz*, 18 VIII 1919, as quoted by: Bäcker, 1992.

veto and the Constitutional Court's rulings, take over the state media, bypassing procedures, introduce the power of a police state.⁴⁸

Donald Tusk himself said on the X platform: 'The PiS occupation of the country has just ended (...), only the occupiers' reputation will stay with them for a long time.'⁴⁹ That is why Tusk's actions will never be criticised by the EU establishment. On the contrary, his policies will be applauded and supported with all means, because he was sent from the chambers of the Brussels "crystal palace" to "put things in order in Poland". Comments like the opinions of Bachman and Tusk quoted above show that for such people 'dictatorship in the defence of liberal democracy' is justified and democratic elections are to be treated as legitimate only if they represent the values defined solely by liberal oligarchical elites.⁵⁰

This is what the future looks like not only for Poland but for the entire European Union. Liberal elites have realised that a rising resistance against their globalist, monistic ideology has been so strong and gaining ground that their power might be endangered. So, they will use all the means possible to retain it, since, as the old adage says, 'there can be no freedom for the enemies of freedom [as we understand this]'.⁵¹

As a part of this "restoration of democracy", the incessant work on people's consciousness must be intensified. The Civic Coalition (KO) government formed after the election in 2023 has thus as its aim not to reform the economy and many historically inefficient state institutions, but to modernise social consciousness into a monistic ideology of liberal emancipation defined as orthodoxy by the European Union. This ideology as the official secular "religion" of the EU must never be challenged again by "heretics". The new government consists mainly of the members of the old post-Communist elites and former anti-Communist oppositional activists who allied with them, plus new radicals coming from the "green" camp, as well as the neo-Marxist cultural emancipatory groups of the coalition parties. This is in part a repetition of the original alliance of the first government created after the fall of Communism in 1989. Together they placed their loyalty in the EU project, the former group for the safety of their position and the property they had acquired in exchange for giving up

48 Bachmann, 2023, cited in Buczyńska, 2023.

49 As quoted by: Bruszewski, 2024.

50 This recalls a minister of Great Britain, Robert Stewart Castlereagh, who during the Vienna Congress in 1815 said that 'the fundamental problem of politics (...) is not to control lawlessness, but to limit a temptation to pursue righteousness'.

51 The liberal elite treat society as a 'problem' waiting to be emancipated, which causes enormous social dysfunctions, violence and chaos. This is the same program which the oligarchs in some Ancient Greek cities swore to implement when they were taking office: 'I will be an enemy of the people and in this Council I will do as much harm to them as I can' (in Glotz, 1968, 114 and 326, cited in Delsol, 2017).

power, the latter for the ideological reasons of sharing the liberal-left aims of emancipatory transformation of a not-properly-modernised Poland.⁵²

Dictatorship under the banner of liberal democracy might be a small price to pay for retaining power and realising the all-European centralising plans, which in itself do not have much to do with democratic government. Prime minister Tusk boasted that his task must be treated as an experiment on a global scale, a laboratory of dealing with “populists”, that is, rebellious nations which have to learn that they can vote but it does not mean they can freely choose.⁵³

One of the most perceptive commentators of the Polish political scene, after a month of Tusk’s KO government, especially focusing on its attempts to subvert the constitutional prerogatives of the president by just a parliamentary majority vote, observed that

the originality of the construction of a limited state emergency based on an idea to suspend one of the [president’s] prerogatives is in fact a (...) revolutionary idea (...). In the entire modern European history such a case has not been recorded. It means subverting the legal force of one of the crucial constitutional institutions of a country, including courts established by its laws, now proclaimed as “not courts”. It is interesting to observe the consequences of this unprecedented act, in its [Polish] and international dimensions. One has to have crystal clear understanding what happened. Something like this has never happened in any country – not with the Third Reich courts during denazification process, not with the Soviet Union courts, or the satellite states after the fall of communism. Neither in Nuremberg nor in the Hague, nor in any other tribunal, no one would even think, to declare the nazi or the soviet courts as “not courts” and their verdicts as not existing. And in Poland [after 1989] even [the most radical parties] demands to break off the continuity of the state with the [Polish communist state] did not consider Stalinist courts as *per non est*, but only created procedures to invalidate their judgments. The scale of the attack on the

52 One of the most important “modernising” goals of this coalition it is to neutralise the cultural and moral influence of the Catholic Church as well as its historical role in the anti-Communist resistance. That is why the departments of education were given to the most radical neo-Marxist cultural leftists, whose aim is to “modernise” students’ minds. The Church is plagued by its big internal problems. They are not dissimilar to the ones American or the European Churches experience, although they are not as grave in Poland as in other countries, and in addition, the mills of the emancipatory revolution (including many aspects of the most radical forms of the sexual revolution) have so far not led to its collapse as in Ireland. Secularisation in Poland is slower and this also stems from a collective distrust towards any ideological thinking, of which the liberal-left emancipatory ideology, the official ideology of the EU, is a visible example.

53 In the supporting reactions of the liberal leaders of the EU and also of the American Biden administration, including the current ambassador of the US who became a tool of propaganda for the cultural revolution in Poland, the country is treated as an important experiment, in other words a testing ground how far non-democratic means can be applied without social resistance.

rule of law that the Polish state is now facing is, in this sense, a new phenomenon beginning a completely new era on our continent.⁵⁴

The final aim is to destroy the opposition and its status of representing the interests of Poland within the EU, so it will not threaten the neocolonial plans of Germany in Poland within a centralised Europe, which it controls politically and economically. The new pro-centralisation KO government has already decided to slow down, if not altogether stop, investments which were to be a competition to German economy, for instance the cargo port in Świnoujście, the Central Communication Port near Warsaw, which had been planned to be the main passenger and logistical investment in East Central Europe, possibly the nuclear energy plants and armaments contracts signed with Americans and the South Koreans. It also plans to introduce the Euro, a dysfunctional currency, which punishes weaker countries, handicapping their economies.⁵⁵

5.3. Changing paths in American politics

Relations with the United States is another issue. One option is that Americans will give up on Poland and East Central Europe and give Germany and the EU total political as well as economic control over it. If this happens, for reasons having to do with costs, geopolitical overstretching or its internal “civil war”, Americans might be easily betrayed by Germany, which is dreaming about strategic independence and being open to China and eventually Russia, thus the US would lose its most loyal European ally. Today Germany is triumphant, since it thinks that it has more influence in Europe than even a year ago, since despite the perturbations it benefits from the Russo-Ukrainian conflict. Russia might finally accept a negotiation offer from the Franco-German partners, but the spheres of power will have to be redefined according to her wishes. Nothing stands in the way of Germany to subordinate all European states and renew cooperation with Russia.

This is the way Europe will perish under the blows of totalitarian Germany and Russia in the absence of a clear US strategy, of which the most erroneous and constant objective is to support Germany as *primus inter pares* in Europe. Americans seem to support the centralisation of the continent under the German banner, which seems to stabilise Germany and thus the entire continent. But it is doubtful that once Europe is centralised the US will have control over it. And totally ruined Ukraine, which orients itself towards Germany and against Poland, will have to pay the price by being subjected to the economic and political exploitation of Germany. The Ukrainian nation will be a toy in this process, besides the fact that Ukraine will be played against Poland by both Germany and Russia. In order for this not to

54 Rokita, 2024.

55 The issues of nuclear power plants and armament contracts will not be nullified altogether because of a danger of multibillion lawsuits for breaking them.

happen, the United States should resurrect the idea of the Tree Seas Initiative, which would require a massive American investment there, at the moment a very unlikely move.

In the meantime, the American Democratic Party and president Biden are much closer ideologically to the new KO government than to the PiS party. In their eyes, KO politicians are allies in the common cause of globalism, a generic name for a motley of ideologies concerning open borders and immigration, climate policy, abortion support and gender ideology. The new government can be a useful tool for realising this policy in Poland, and this is also in line with the liberal neo-Marxist ideological policy and centralization plan of the EU. Democratic values, which the US administration and the liberal establishment support today all over the world and consider to be the *sine qua non* condition of universal humanity, are much more focused on LGBT+, abortion and gender issues.⁵⁶ The PiS government, professing conservative cultural values and defending sovereignty, seemed to be an oddity to the Western liberal establishment, and a dangerous “populist” one. For them, everyone who is against this cultural neo-Marxist emancipatory revolution, cannot by definition be a democrat and must be neutralised. Even pope Francis considered Catholic Poland, in its cultural, not necessarily confessional, dimension, as a brake to introducing changes in the universal Catholic Church which would match the postulates of the liberal-left global establishment, making the Church a tool of the global revolution, with aims and values contrary to the basics of Catholic theology.⁵⁷

The geopolitical interests of Americans can be equally well served by the KO government, and here its policy towards Ukraine, that is, unconditional support, has not changed at all. Today, for the West and its dominant liberal elites, what is called right-wing populism, that is, the defence of national sovereignty, resistance to opening borders to mass illegal immigration and a preservation of religious and traditional identity not emancipated from all natural relations and authorities, means a danger to be battled endlessly. The belief in our “common Western values”: freedom of the press and speech, the rule of law and reverence for human dignity, once existing in Poland and East Central Europe, are now subject to a severe test and seem

56 It is not a coincidence that the present ambassador of the US to Poland, Mark Brzezinski, has focused among other cultural issues on LGBT+ rights and abortion issues, thus fraternising with the political and cultural liberal elites, which hated the PiS government, and trying to make the impression that LGBT+ people are somehow persecuted. This can of course be defined this way only if you consider the denial of homosexual so-called ‘marriage’ and the adoption of children by them as rights in a universal sense of the term, which is of course nonsense. For these institutions to be introduced, one needs first to redefine the anthropology upon which such rights can be created, which is in itself an imposition, in a sense of a “state religion”. All the rights of such people are otherwise fully respected in Poland, such as cultural, financial rights, rights stemming from mutual human relations etc.

57 The green light for liberal-left media and politicians in Poland to attack John Paul II and Benedict XVI for their theological and moral issues, the latter unsupported by any proof, came first from Vatican (!).

to be for many an expression of naivety.⁵⁸ The same can be said about the Polish attitude towards the West in general, which is characterised by disillusionment and *déjà vu* because of its present monistic ideological self-definition, which resembles too much, even if in a mild form, to the not-so-long-discarded Communist regime.⁵⁹

5.4. *Hidden but constant conflict*

Poland is entering a period of confusion and chaos, since its partners, opponents and enemies try to use undemocratic methods to influence its internal as well as foreign policies. For the last several years, Poland has experienced a permanent hybrid *de facto* war orchestrated by Germany, the aim of which was to overthrow the PiS government. Poland was also an inspiration for rising democratic movements all over Europe, which have had enough of the policies that were bringing them economic crises and increasing, for too many, an ideologically generated poverty. For this purpose of overthrowing the government, the liberal establishment of the EU, helped by the global elites, mobilised all available economic, political, and media resources.

The issue was not a defence of the “rule of law” in Poland against “populism”, the official mantra of the EU bureaucracy, which to the older generation of Poles sounds too similar to the once used phrase, coming from Moscow, “the defence of socialist values” during the “Solidarity” movement in 1980-81. From the beginning of the PiS government in 2015, Brussels decided to get rid of this hated “right-wing, nationalist, conservative government”, and a reason for this was obvious. If the very aim of European bureaucrats and ideologues was centralisation and thus the imposition of one global ideology on all states, then treating sovereignty and independence as a point of reference, which the PiS government stressed, was a scandal. Not only did it block the very aim of centralisation, but together with other states it could become a source of rebellion. Brussels did not hide what it wanted to achieve. All the states of the EU were to submit to gender ideology, with special emphasis put on the ideologically defined rights of LGBT people, open borders and the outrageous climate change policy.⁶⁰

58 The exceptional pro-American positive public attitude in Poland is over and hostile attitudes are already clearly visible across all groups of the Polish society.

59 Cf. Bryk, 2021b.

60 Here what is especially imminent is the ‘open borders’ policy, and the most dramatic question which the EU, the United States and the West in general must answer is whether it can still show an existential self-preservation instinct to somehow control the global migration of people, which has demolished all the established categories of political rule, such as citizenship, subsidiarity, nation state etc. Western democracy is changing into a useless ritual, in which citizens are being deprived of real alternatives, and must support the liberal establishment policies, otherwise they are delegitimised in many areas of public and increasingly also of private life. This is in fact a clash of the global ideology of ‘humanity’ with nation states within a framework of international law and cooperation. A good overview of this dilemma is given by Amstutz, 2015.

These have been the preeminent goals which were to lead to the destruction of the nation state and to the impoverishment of the European citizens. The EU was playing a game with the PiS government, which this government did not understand, therefore it was not fit to govern. Or if it understood the EU game and did not resist it openly, then it was cowardly, pretending that one could earn something by pretending to govern independently. When the chairman of the PiS party, Jarosław Kaczyński said that ‘we made a grave mistake’, ‘the rule of law’ game was a fraud and the issue was that ‘not these certified to rule in Poland ruled it in fact, and that the EU today is in a state of complete degeneration’, he might have been right.⁶¹ But such statements sound like crying over spilled milk. The PiS government managed to veto the COVID money given on condition that “the rule of law” must be observed (which the commissars defined endlessly as not yet achieved without giving any definition what it meant), veto the climate change policy craziness, support the self-government structures in Poland which enacted A Charter of Family Rights and resisted the LGBT indoctrination of children for which the EU gave enormous money, and finally denounce the Istanbul Convention, which imposed gender ideology on all countries.⁶²

All these measures should have been taken not only in the name of sovereignty and the defence of the nation state, but in the name of human freedom including freedom of speech – now under threats due to “hate speech” being punishable by criminal law –, of association, of religion, and finally of parents to bring up their children.⁶³ The new government will be totally subservient to the EU’s aims, since the prime minister plays a role of a comprador envoy to ensure that this will happen. The Polish case and to a certain degree the Hungarian case, with the EU threatening today to destroy Hungary’s economy, shows that Brussels no longer has any

61 As quoted in Stelmach, 2024.

62 Many countries of the EU either rejected or have not ultimately ratified this ideological convention. Recently it was the Czech Senate which refused to ratify it (Górny, 2024).

63 Such a resolution to punish “hate speech” has been passed by the EU Parliament, and the KO government wants to put such a clause in the criminal code mainly to stop the criticism of the LGBT ideology. This ideology constitutes a fascinating example of an alliance of the most oligarchical global corporations and the neo-Marxist cultural liberal-left, the most powerful tool to destroy traditional relations between the sexes with the objective to turn people into an uprooted mass. It has nothing to do with the persecution of such people. Poland has never had any criminalisation of homosexuality since its first independent Criminal Code of 1932, and the LGBT index of discrimination and acts of violence in Poland is one of the lowest in Europe. All examples of alleged discrimination focus on a redefinition of natural marriage, which has never been for all, and the adoption of children, rights which might be extended to all on the condition that the anthropology of marriage is to be changed. All the civil rights of LGBT people are observed in Poland. The issue is in fact a ban on any criticism of gender ideology by means of “hate speech” laws, a form of liberal despotism, of which the major example is the Irish law against “hate speech”. But this is an American as well as all-European problem. For instance, half of German population thinks that it cannot express its opinions on political matters without fear, which today means everything, since cultural Marxism proclaiming the axiom that “the personal is political” is based on unequal power relations in need of emancipation, and it is this axiom which drives progressives of all sorts.

inhibitions in its imperialistic aims, it breaks all norms. It is not only anti-democratic but in many aspects degenerated, desperately inept, economically degrading and demographically dying, with flocks of venal, corrupted bureaucrats. Finally, in many respects it is systemically criminal because, in fact even if not in principle, it is ex-territorial in a judicial sense of the word, as demonstrated by an incessant string of covered-up corruption cases.⁶⁴

6. Conclusions

It seems that as for now, Poland has lost its “window of opportunity”. It has been unable to change the geopolitical game by convincing the US to send masses of armaments to Ukraine to let its army to break out of the trap of ‘enough to survive, too little to win’, gain initiative and effectively put Russia on the defensive. Immediately extending unprecedented help to the millions of the Ukrainian refugees with all the social benefits of the Polish citizens and sending huge amounts of armaments, it was naïve and unaware of how quickly Ukrainian oligarchical elites would take a vassal position vis-à-vis Germany, which was playing its own game. Finally, a large part of Polish society became hysterical and subject to a demonization of the PiS government (which committed too many mistakes on their own), delivering power to the representatives of, in many respects, foreign interests. It was tired of endless fights against EU institutions, pushed by the Western partners and bombarded with propaganda by a media controlled from the outside of Poland, and concluded that giving away power to the KO and its leader Donald Tusk would bring peace. The majority of Polish people, politically immature as they might be, decided not to support a course of sovereignty-building regional independence. Poland again will be a playing field of foreign interests without any ability to realise its own ones, a situation reminiscent for many of the 18th century.

64 In this context, one is tempted to quote liberal-left Katherine Barley, a German deputy of the EU Parliament interviewed by the German public radio station Deutschland Funk in 2020. Even though she is, being one of the EU parliament members, “an intellectually challenged person”, she stated that Poland breaks “the rule of law” and thus it is necessary to “starve it financially”. Well, Germans have great experience in such practices. Barley is commonly known as not only being one of the most intellectually limited members of Parliament, but also as a person showing revolutionary zeal in fighting against Polish “fascists”, one of alas many such politicians in the Parliament. One cannot resist the thought that in Germans there must be a certain atavistic urge not only to constantly instruct all the people defined as inferior but to subjugate, kill or starve everyone who does not subject to their will. In the ears of the older generation of Poles, her comment immediately recalled the killing by starvation of a Catholic priest, Father Maksymilian Kolbe, in the Nazi German Auschwitz concentration camp, who was finally killed with a lethal injection. He gave his life in exchange for another prisoner sentenced to death in the camp. For Barley’s statement see e.g. Pankowska, 2020.

6.1. A split rooted in culture and ideology

This part of Polish society, for which an independent Polish state is not a value, supported institutionally by the EU, dominant liberal media networks, NGOs and the present government, place their loyalty in Brussels and Berlin. They treat Poland as a culturally and socially anachronistic remnant of the past, to be transformed according to the new emancipation ideology. Brussels and Berlin are the places of true authority, power and distribution of prestige for them, not the democratically elected government of their own country, let alone the Polish community, with which they do not want to have anything in common. They thus side with EU authorities, which in the alleged name of the rule of law, and the “defence of liberal democracy” punish any sovereign decisions of Poland if those do not accord with their aims. Therefore, this part of the Polish population defends the right of these foreign authorities to interfere and have veto power over anything which the legal authorities of Poland do. For them, the Polish reason of the state in its most fundamental aspects should be defined outside of Poland. They understand Poland, as one of the most perceptive analysts of the contemporary divide summed up, as a region

as a so called small homeland, a geographical –ethnic region with a specific past, not as a political entity, not as a state, but as part of a larger political whole – the European Union, on which they pin their hopes, and which arouses their fascination. They are supporters of modernization understood as a closer and closer inclusion of Poland to the UE, what is supposed to be a guarantee of security, development and prosperity of Poles. Polish culture, Polish ethos are to be reformulated accordingly, so that they can fit into this larger whole, so as to get rid of the elements, which from this point of view have become unnecessary and anachronistic, together with the traditional religiosity.⁶⁵

This outside interference, which this part of the Polish society supports, is mixed with the already mentioned historically grounded prejudice that East Central Europe must be incessantly watched over, otherwise liberal democracy, as defined by Brussels and Berlin, will slide towards bloody nationalism and authoritarianism. This interference constitutes a kind of a moral imperative. In Poland, this attitude was born in the 18th century. After a long period of anarchy and decline, the reforms of the Commonwealth were fiercely resisted by opponents who in the name of “liberty” called on neighbouring autocratic empires to intervene, and this soon destroyed the Republic altogether.⁶⁶

For an equally large part of Polish citizens, the sovereign Polish state, even if limited by EU Treaties, is and should continue to be of paramount value in politics, economy and culture, if Poland does not want to decline into a state exploited by

65 Krasnodebski, 2023b, p. 425.

66 See Butterwick, 2020, an excellent recent study.

foreign interests. They view contemporary Poland as a historical continuation of its earlier forms, a state with its distinctive cultural and political code worth defending, which represents a real contribution to the cultural, political and economic well-being of the European heritage. This heritage, constantly redefined and enriched, also adapting to contemporary challenges and needs, is a value in itself and should be a source of worthy obligations. For this reason, they are sure that there exist

important reasons to strengthen the state decision center, at the expense of professional corporations, self-government, and even against the principle of separation of powers (which even in the countries of the European core never were so divided as to paralyze the state actions). This ethos grows out of a conviction that the nature of man or politics has not basically changed. The European Union does not end political and economic rivalry between the states.⁶⁷

This Polish divide and conflict are visible in different societies of the entire European Union, even though in varying degrees of intensity. But in Poland and East Central Europe, there is the additional gloomy factor that this region has historically been treated as “God’s Playground”, characterised by calamities and a loss of control over one’s fate. For these countries, especially Poland, their own state has a more important, one may even say existential value.⁶⁸ From this perspective, security within the EU seems to many people to be precarious, since in some respects this project resembles dangers well-known from history. We may thus say that today in Poland there is

an ongoing dispute between these two ethos, influenced by various processes, which take place in all of Europe. The future will show, how it will be resolved. One thing is certain: this will decide the fate of Poland.⁶⁹

We may thus say that Polish society has grown up. Today, interests, obligations, loyalties and conflicts are much more visible, and the mindless enthusiasm of the first years after joining the EU has changed into a much more realistic attitude, although Polish society has become deeply divided, possibly permanently. The main division concerns the attitude towards a separate, independent nation state and whether such a state is a prerequisite for escaping a trap of the so-called “average development” (middle-income trap), the logic of which, that is, the centre-periphery model, is dictated by the strongest in the EU. Poles have mentally escaped the trap of average development, they expect something more than additional allowances for wages, for the unemployed, for children, for loans and for pensions, provided by the

67 Krasnodębski, 2023b, p. 425.

68 The phrase is taken from the title of Davies, 1981.

69 Krasnodębski, 2023b, p. 425.

state or by the EU, for which in the end they must pay anyway with lower-paid jobs, higher prices, inferior education, and exorbitant prices for apartments.⁷⁰

What still unites these two camps is the dominant aim of economic advancement. It may well be that if the EU's internal and geopolitical problems continue to grow at this rate, the conflicts might accelerate in the most unpredictable way. Whether this happens will depend, in fact, on cultural and mental factors, that is, the realisation that the structure of the EU resembles not a truly federal state *à la* American republic but a classical oligarchy using public resources for private gains, and whether this oligarchy will have enough “bread and circuses” to mask this reality. The EU as a whole has practically stopped developing, it has plunged into economic stagnation, and in some areas it is shrinking economically.⁷¹

The reasons for that are manifold: the crazy climate change policy, opening the borders to illegal (!) mass immigration, a recent opening of the EU market to the Ukrainian agricultural products.⁷² The latter move has much less to do with helping a fighting country (which would require transferring this agriculture produce to Africa etc. where it is needed, as it was originally declared), than with destroying European agriculture and helping Ukrainian and European (Dutch, French, German) oligarchs to get more profits. Poland, incidentally, is the main victim of this policy. Finally, there is political correctness, a mild term for a uniform totalitarian thinking, at the very centre of which stands idealistic

70 See remarks made by the chairman of the Warsaw Enterprise Institute Tomasz Wróblewski quoted in Cygan 2024.

71 Still in 2008, the EU economy was larger than that of the US, although even then it was visible that the so-called Lisbon Agenda of 2000, which was going to speed up development in the EU, was just wishful thinking with its idea that in 2010, the GNP per capita in the EU would be higher than in the US. In 2008, the GNP was 16.3 billion dollars in the EU and in the US, 14.8 billion. In 2022, the EU GNP was 16.6, a very insubstantial growth, while the American one was 25.5 billion. The GNP of France had declined by 5%, that of Spain by 14%, that of Italy by 17 %. The GNP of Germany rose by 8.5%, but in 2023 it entered a phase of a deepening, structural recession, and the IMF predicts that in the next years it will be the worst of the developing economies. And *The Economist* called Germany “the sick man of Europe”. It is for this reason that Germany pushes for centralisation with itself at the helm, since it wants to support itself with the economies of other countries, especially those in the Euro-zone, and to neutralise investments which might be competitive to Germany, like the Central Communication Port in Poland or making Poland the major recipient of the German windmills with a blockade to atomic energy plants. Even if the contracts with Americans (Westinghouse) will be honoured on paper, the additional environmental rules of the European Commission might make it difficult to implement them, with Poland paying the costs of these regulations. We do not have to deal with a temporary economic crisis but a stable tendency in the EU, a permacrisis, as the Centre of European Politics named it. Europe is shrinking. Eurostat shows that 8.3% of EU citizens cannot afford a warm meal every second day. The German Statistical Bureau announced that 21% of Germans (17.3 million people) are in danger of poverty or social exclusion. One may of course argue that the data on poverty etc. are not so different from the US, but they are radically different if they are compared with Europe decades ago and until the 1990ies.

72 For someone who remembers Communism it is truly amusing to define ‘the climate’ as a new god and declare the global world rulers as priests of the new cult, who want to decide about every aspect of our life and demand a sacrifice of people’s freedoms and rights in the name of saving the planet.

nihilism.⁷³ But there is no doubt that this is the only region of the world which is not developing economically while its social fabric, let alone its cultural one, with war beyond its borders, has been unravelling for some time. If this awareness is awakened in people, the section of the Polish society which supports full centralisation out of laziness, resignation, or true ideological zeal might change its attitude. A real factor aiding this process might be resistance against the so called, loosely defined “woke” ideology, which right now is being considered by Brussels the “faith” of the Union, to be imposed on all as the official “state religion” followed by all.⁷⁴

In general, we may conclude that with a gradual but nevertheless inescapable loss of sovereignty, which is visible on the horizon, and with a determined plan of Germany since 1991 to use the EU as a non-military tool of its imperial politics, a discussion in Poland must and will finally begin over the pros and cons of our membership in the EU. The so-called “Polexit” might be inevitable unless the present structure of the European Union is radically changed, and the ideological follies of its oligarchical bureaucracy blocked. But this will finally be decided by the next generations of Poles, as well as by all the nations of Europe, who will have to decide

73 I borrow this term from R.R. Reno, who, applying this term to the US, defined an ideology which is applicable to the EU as well. Reno defined it as a drive to educate society ‘to believe that there is no transcendence. Human beings are a bundle of instincts, they’re told, or software in meat hardware, or some other reductive explanation. And yet utopian progressive goals are championed with great conviction and unstinting ardor. It’s hard to square the circle. On the one hand the natural sciences, social sciences, and humanities teach an implicit (and sometimes explicit) nihilism; on the other hand, activists tout revolutionary idealism. All truth is “socially constructed”, but the postmodern mind somehow knows that the rainbow flag represents the best and noblest aspirations, not just for our society, but for the entire world. [This constitutes this] strange combination of idealism and nihilism’. (Reno, 2024).

74 In fact, “woke” ideology, understood in the most general terms of emancipation ideology (climate policy, multiculturalism, hate speech, gender ideology, transhumanism) and the centralisation of the EU go hand in hand and support each other. Emancipation from established relations, bonds of solidarity, love and in general any communal roots, including religion, nation states, family with a disdain of motherhood and fatherhood, history and memory, makes centralisation an easy enterprise and a Darwinian ‘fight of all hyper-individualists against all other hyper-individualists’, carriers of ever-changing genders with constantly fluid identities, with a language of liberal rights as its cover, is a perfect environment for globalist purposes, and other civilizations are ready to take advantage of it, especially China.

whether the Polish state, even within a very extensive network of all European cooperation, is of any value for them.⁷⁵ But as T.S. Eliot put it:

there is no such thing as a Lost Cause because there is no such thing as a Gained Cause. We fight for lost causes because we know that our defeat and dismay may be the preface to our successors' victory, though that victory itself will be temporary; we fight rather to keep something alive than in the expectation that anything will triumph.⁷⁶

75 With this comes a question of culture and identity, something which Abraham Lincoln in the American context called the "mystic chords of memory". The decision is thus in fact existential, cultural, and the threats are not so much military but cultural, as they come from this "mythical", once-dreamed-about "West", which has ceased to be mythical, and its new form shows its imperialistic fangs towards the truly weakest at every level of meaningful human life. With this comes a general question: 'If Europe is one, what unites its Western and Eastern part?' Not in terms of civilisational historical belonging, since for instance Poland has always belonged culturally to the West, in its Roman, not German, version, but today the European West has ceased to be the historical "West", becoming an anti-West. The two parts of the continent are different. We are not a community of fate, since our historical experiences are different. Nearly all the countries between Germany and Russia have had a long period when they did not exist as states. That is why we look differently at a policy of open borders or the centralisation zeal of Brussels bureaucrats. We are not a community of memory. We still remember the German and the Soviet genocidal occupation during the Second World War and the Communist period, which the Western European countries did not experience. Our heroes from the times of the war or the anti-Communist resistance are not heroes for the other half of Europe, in fact in many times they are considered there as anti-heroes. Marxism, in its cultural form as well, for us is not a hope of humanity as for Brussels ideologues, but rather a blind alley. That is why in Eastern Europe we look with suspicion and disdain at all utopian plans of social engineering. Also, we are not a community of values, since many of the values enshrined in Western European elites and treated as universal or European ones are not values for us, and we still believe that this aspect of the EU, which the Treaties leave within the jurisdiction of individual countries, should never be imposed on us, because that would constitute an act of sheer ideological violence, a bitter *déjà vu* of the Communist past. This concerns issues like gender ideology or the role of religion, not so much in confessional terms as in cultural terms. What can unite us, and this was a great project of unity, was a community of plural organisms governed by laws. That is, a Europe of nation states, not a centralised, inefficient and ideologically driven Mammoth wearing a pickelhaube with a rainbow stick on it. See on this a very deep analysis in Spaemann, 2005.

76 Eliot 2014, p. 49.

References

- Amstutz, M.R. (2015) 'Two Theories of Immigration', *First Things*, 2015/12 [Online]. Available at: <https://www.firstthings.com/article/2015/12/two-theories-of-immigration> (Accessed: 11 February 2024).
- Armand, C. (2019) 'What rich countries get wrong about the EU budget: Most of the money in Europe flows from East to West, not the other way around', *Politico*, 6 December 2019 [Online]. Available at: <https://www.politico.eu/article/what-rich-countries-get-wrong-about-the-eu-budget-east-west-euroskeptic-cohesion-policy/> (Accessed: 8 January 2024).
- Ash, T.G. (2024) 'Obserwowanie z zewnątrz uzdrawiania państwa po ośmiu latach populizmu jest fascynujące', *Gazeta Wyborcza*, 30 January 2024. [Online]. Available at: <https://wyborcza.pl/7,179012,30646928,garton-ash-obserwowanie-z-zewnatrz-uzdrawiania-panstwa-po-osmiu.html> (accessed: 11 February 2024).
- Bachmann, K. (2023) 'Nach Polen-Wahl: Die neue Tusk-Regierung muss wie Kaczynski regieren, um Polen zu verändern', *Berliner Zeitung*, 21 October 2023 [Online]. Available at: <https://www.berliner-zeitung.de/politik-gesellschaft/nach-polen-wahl-die-neue-tusk-regierung-muss-wie-kaczynski-regieren-um-polen-zu-veraendern-li.2150885> (Accessed: 11 February 2024).
- Bäcker, R. (1992) *Totalitaryzm: Geneza. Istota. Upadek*. Toruń: Info-Trade.
- Benoist de, A. (2022) *Przeciw Liberalizmowi: Społeczeństwo to nie rynek*. Warszawa: Instytut Zamoyskiego.
- Bielik-Robson, A. (2001) 'Nowa Lewica i kapitalizm', *Życie*, 7 June 2001. [Online]. Available at: <http://niniwa22.cba.pl/nowalewicakapitalizm.html> (Accessed: 11 February 2024).
- Bruszewski, G. (2024) 'Premier Tusk: skończyła się pisowska okupacja Polski, skończą się okupacje przez PiS państwowych urzędów', *Polska Agencja Prasowa* 14 January 2024. [Online]. Available at: <https://www.pap.pl/aktualnosci/premier-tusk-skonczyla-sie-pisowska-okupacja-polski-skoncza-sie-okupacje-przez-pis> (Accessed: 11 February 2024).
- Bryk, A. (2008) 'The United States, the European Union, Eastern Europe: Challenges and Different Responses to Modernity', *Krakowskie Studia Międzynarodowe*, 2008/1, pp. 109–227.
- Bryk, A. (2021a) 'Liberalna demokracja, oligarchizacja a tzw. rewolta populistyczna' [Online]. Available at: <https://isk.org.pl/raporty-analizy-ekspertyzy-i-opinie/> (Accessed: 8 January 2024).
- Bryk, A. (2021b) 'La démocratie libérale, l'oligarchisation et la prétendue révolte populiste en Europe' in Haupais N., Tristan Pouthier T., Szewedo P., Zagórski W. (eds.) *Le constitutionnalisme face Au populisme en Europe centrale*. Bayonne: Institut Francophone pour la Justice et la Démocratie, pp. 3–32.
- Buczyńska, J. (2023) 'Niemcy mówią Tuskowi jak rządzić: Państwo policyjne, eliminacja mediów publicznych', *wGospodarcze.pl*, 24 October 2023. [Online]. Available at: <https://wgospodarcze.pl/informacje/134397-niemcy-mowia-tuskowi-jak-rzadzic-panstwo-policyjne-eliminacja-mediow-publicznych> (Accessed: 11 February 2024).
- Butterwick, R. (2020) *The Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, 1733-1795: Light and Flame*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Caldwell, Ch. (2021/2022) 'Poland against the Progressives: The continent the most resolute defender of sovereignty', *Claremont Review of Books*, Winter 2021/22 [Online]. Available at: <https://claremontreviewofbooks.com/poland-against-the-progressives/> (Accessed: 11 February 2024).
- Cichocki, M. (2005) *Władza i pamięć*. Kraków: OMP.

- Cichocki, M. (2018a) 'Niemieccy hegemoni' in Cichocki, M. (ed.) *Północ i Południe: Teksty o Polskiej Kulturze i Historii*. Warszawa: Teologia Polityczna, pp. 295–326.
- Cichocki, M. (2018b) *Północ i Południe. Teksty o polskiej kulturze i historii*. Warszawa: Teologia Polityczna.
- Cygan, D. (2024) 'Wróblewski ostrzega polityków przed "zabiciem" CPK. "Za cztery lata nie będzie po nich śladu"', *DoRzeczy*, 09. February 2024 [Online]. Available at: <https://dorzeczy.pl/kraj/547755/cpk-wroblewski-ostrzega-politykow-przed-zabiciem-projektu.html> (Accessed: 11 February 2024).
- Czermiński, J. (2024) 'Przejęcie TVP. Adam Bodnar: Przywracamy konstytucyjność i szukamy jakiejś podstawy prawnej', *Rzeczpospolita* 29.12.2023 [Online]. Available at: <https://www.rp.pl/polityka/art39633681-przejecie-tvp-adam-bodnar-przywracamy-konstytucyjnosci-i-szukamy-jakiejs-podstawy-prawnej> (Accessed: 8 January 2024).
- Davies, N. (1981) *God's Playground: History of Poland*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Delsol, Ch. (2017) *Nienawiść do świata: Totalitaryzmy i ponowoczesność*. Warszawa: Pax.
- Delsol, Ch. (2018) 'Rewolucja konserwatywna przechodzi przez Europę', *Wszystko, co najważniejsze*, 17 June 2018. [Online]. Available at: <https://wszystkoconajwazniejsze.pl/chantal-delsol-rewolucja-konserwatywna-przechodzi-przez-europe/> (Accessed: 11 February 2024).
- Eliot, T.S. (2014) *Essays Ancient and Modern*. New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co.
- Glotz, G. (1968) *La Cite grecque*. Paris: Albin Michel.
- Górny, G. (2024) 'Czeski senat odrzucił Konwencję Sтамburską', *wPolityce.pl*, 26 January 2024 [Online]. Available at: <https://wpolityce.pl/swiat/679622-czeski-senat-odrzucl-konwencje-stambulska> (Accessed: 11 February 2024).
- Hayward, S.F. (2021/2022) 'Who Broke Climate Science?', *Claremont Review of Books*, Winter 2021/22, pp. 42–44.
- Janos, A.C. (2000) *Central and Eastern Europe in the Modern World. The Politics of Borderlands for Pre- to Post communism*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- Jenson, R. (2010) 'How the World Lost Its story', *First Things*, 2010/3, pp. 31–37.
- Judt, T. (1996) 'Europe: the Grand Illusion', *New York Review of Books*, 43(12), pp. 6–9.
- Judt, T. (2011) *A Grand Illusion?: An Essay on Europe*. New York: New York University Press.
- Karp, H. (2019) 'N jak Niepodległość', *Sieci*, 2019/18-24th November.
- Kieżun, W., Bielecki, C. (2013) *Patologia Transformacji*. Warszawa: Poltext.
- Kołąkowska, A. (2016) *Plaga słowików*. Warszawa: Teologia Polityczna.
- Koonin, S.E. (2021) *Unsettled: What Climate Science Tell Us, What it Doesn't and Why it Matters*. Dallas: BenBella Books.
- Krasnodębski, Z. (2003) *Demokracja Peryferii*. Gdańsk: słowo/obraz terytoria.
- Krasnodębski, Z. (2006) *Zmiana klimatu*. Kraków: OMP.
- Krasnodębski, Z. (2008) 'Epitafium dla chwilowego radykała', *Rzeczpospolita*, 08 August 2008. [Online]. Available at: <https://www.rp.pl/publicystyka/art8380321-epitafium-dla-chwilowego-radykala> (accessed: 8 January 2024).
- Krasnodębski, Z. (2023a) *Kurtyna podniesiona*. Kraków: OMP.
- Krasnodębski, Z. (2023b) 'Polskie kształty wolności' in Krasnodębski, Z. (ed.) *Kurtyna podniesiona*. Kraków: OMP, pp. 402–425.
- Krasnodębski, Z. (2023c) 'Destrukcyjny bunt' in Krasnodębski, Z. (ed.) *Kurtyna podniesiona*. Kraków: OMP, pp. 237–277.
- Legutko, R. (2007) *Traktat o wolności*. Gdańsk: słowo/obraz/terytoria.
- Legutko, R. (2016) *The Demon in Democracy: Totalitarian Temptations in Free Societies*. New York-London: Encounter Books.

- Legutko, R. (2021) *Cunning of Freedom: Saving the Self in an Age of False Idols*. New York-London: Encounter Books.
- Manent P. (2014) 'Nieczytelny krajobraz', *Res Publica Nova*, 2014/1.
- Miłosz, C. (1999) *Zaraz po wojnie. Korespondencja z pisarzami 1945–1950*. Kraków: Wydawnictwo Znak.
- Murray, D. (2017) *The Strange Death of Liberal Europe*. London: Bloomsbury Publishing.
- Pankowska, M. (2020) 'Niemka chce zagłodzić Polskę i Węgry? Prawica w amoku po słowach wiceprzewodniczącej PE', *OKO.press*, 02 October 2020. [Online]. Available at: <https://oko.press/niemka-chce-zaglodzic-polske-i-wegry> (Accessed: 11 February 2024).
- Puppinck, G. (2018) *Les droits de l'homme dénaturé*. Paris: Editions du Cerf.
- Reno, R.R. (2024) 'Idealistic nihilism', *First Things*, 2024/2 [Online]. Available at: <https://www.firstthings.com/article/2024/02/idealistic-nihilism> (Accessed: 11 February 2024).
- Rokita, J.M. (2024), 'Proceduralizm i przemoc', *Teologia Polityczna*, 09 January 2024. [Online]. Available at: <https://teologiapolityczna.pl/jan-rokita-proceduralizm-i-przemoc> (Accessed: 11 February 2024).
- Schall, J.V. (2018/2019) 'Yee Shall Be as Gods', *Claremont Review of Books*, Winter 2018/19.
- Scruton, R. (2002) *Co znaczy konserwatyzm*. Poznań: Zysk i S-ka.
- Spaemann, R. (2005) 'Europa nie jest związkiem wartości' *Europa*, 25 November 2005.
- Stelmach, W. (2024), 'Kaczyński w Sejmie: Popełniliśmy błąd, bardzo ciężki błąd', *RMF 24/Fakty*, 16 January 2024 [Online]. Available at: https://www.rmf24.pl/fakty/polska/news-kaczynski-w-sejmie-popelnilismy-blad-bardzo-ciezki-blad,nId,7272770#crp_state=1 (Accessed: 11 February 2024).
- Thompson, E. (2006) 'Sarmatyzm i postkolonializm', *Europa*, 18 November 2006. [Online]. Available at: <https://wiadomosci.dziennik.pl/wydarzenia/artykuly/193060,sarmatyzm-i-postkolonializm.html> (Accessed: 8 January 2024).
- Tushnett, M. (2016) *Abandoning Defensive Crouch. Liberal Constitutionalism*, 06 May 2016. [Online]. Available at: <https://balkin.blogspot.com/2016/05/abandoning-defensive-crouch-liberal.html> (Accessed: 29 December 2023).
- Wildstein, B. (2020) *Bunt i afirmacja: Esej o naszych czasach*. Warszawa: PIW.
- Wolff, L. (1994) *Inventing Eastern Europe. The Mind of Civilization on the Mind of the Enlightenment*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- Żakowski, J. (2023) 'Zdelegalizować Kaczyńskiego, Trumpa i Orbána? Czyli jak naprawić kraj po populistach. Będzie wrzask', *Polityka*, 03 December 2023. [Online]. Available at: <https://www.polityka.pl/tygodnikpolityka/spoleczenstwo/2236218,1,zdelegalizowac-kaczynskiego-trumpa-i-orbna-czyli-jak-naprawic-kraj-po-populistach-bedzie-wrzask.read> (Accessed: 11 February 2024).
- Zarycki, T. (2009) 'Ku socjologicznej analizie dyskursu elit peryferyjnych - polskie problemy z peryferyjnością' in Zahorska, M., Nasalska, E. (eds.) *Wartości, polityka, społeczeństwo*. Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Naukowe Scholar, pp. 169–181.