

QUOTAS

The 'Jewish Question' and Higher Education
in Central Europe, 1880-1945



EDITED BY

Michael L. Miller & Judith Szapor

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THE PREHISTORY OF THE HUNGARIAN NUMERUS CLAUSUS LAW

Political Antisemitism in Hungary,
1895–1914

Miklós Konrád

“The bill introducing the *numerus clausus* marks the end of the liberal spirit,” declared István Haller, Minister of Education and Religious Affairs, during the presentation, on 2 September 1920, of the bill which was to limit Jews’ access to Hungarian universities.¹ Haller could not have been more accurate in his formulation. Promulgated on 26 September, the *numerus clausus* law (Act XXV of 1920) on the “regulation of enrollment” in the universities put an end to the equality of rights between Jews and Christians in Hungary. For Hungarian Jews, the era of emancipation thus proved to have been rather brief. After three decades of often heated political debate about the “Jewish question” and the way Jews should integrate into Christian Hungarian society, the Emancipation Act XVII of 1867 granted the “Israelite inhabitants of the country” political and civil equality with Christians. However, the process of emancipation was not completed until twenty-eight years later. Thanks to two laws passed in 1895, the Jewish religion was then elevated to equal status with the Christian religions. Among other things, this meant that it finally became possible to convert to Judaism. Of this full equality of rights, Jews would only benefit for a quarter of a century.

One of the paradoxes of Hungarian Jewish history is that while the period of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy (1867–1918) was

certainly its golden age, the period was not only characterized by a philosemitism of the Christian political and cultural elites unparalleled in Central Europe, but was also marked by the founding in 1883 of the first European political party to include the word “antisemitic” in its name,² and was followed, two years after the dissolution of the empire, by the first antisemitic law in Europe. That the Hungarian *numerus clausus* law was indeed the first antisemitic law in twentieth-century Europe is something that nobody in Western historiography and not many in Hungary dispute.³ The *numerus clausus* law constituted a fundamental break in the history of Hungarian Jews. This is best measured by the dramatic shift in the attitude of the Christian political establishment toward the Jews.

From the period of the Hungarian Vormärz (1830–1848) until the dissolution of the Austro-Hungarian Empire in 1918, the traditional Hungarian political elite proclaimed that Jews, henceforth defined solely by their religious affiliation, could become true Hungarians, and that such a transformation was desirable and beneficial for the country. The philosemitism of political power holders stemmed in part from principled liberalism but was dictated above all by self-interest. While Jews played an essential role in the economic modernization of Hungary,⁴ they also increased the proportion of Magyars by declaring, census after census, in ever-increasing numbers their mother tongue to be Hungarian.⁵ This “statistical assimilation”⁶ was of paramount importance to the Hungarian political elite in a country where Magyars constituted a minority of the population throughout the nineteenth century. Their proportion exceeded 50 percent only at the 1900 census—precisely due to the linguistic acculturation of the Jews.⁷ Emancipating the Jews and promoting—at least at the level of discourse—their integration was in the fundamental interest of the political establishment.

The result is well known. In Ezra Mendelsohn’s laconic words, “prewar Hungary was, clearly, a good place for the Jews.”⁸ Certainly, baptism remained the price to pay for structural integration into the traditional Christian elite, that is, marriage to a member of the aristocracy or the middle nobility. But at this price, and in contrast to the situation of the Jews in the German Empire, integration became quite possible.⁹ It is also true that discrimination against the hiring of Jews in the civil service remained a per-

manent feature of the Dualist period. This too, however, was an obstacle religious conversion could overcome. And once again in contrast to Germany, where discrimination was openly avowed, in Hungary it had at least the merit of remaining shameful, officially denied by the authorities.¹⁰ It could not have been otherwise, since the political establishment never ceased to express its benevolence toward Jewish citizens. And it is undeniable that it firmly opposed the antisemitic movement of the 1880s, and did not place any obstacles in the way of Jews' economic and cultural advancement.

In order to fully understand the attitude of traditional political elites toward Jews in the Dualist era, it is essential to emphasize the inherent antagonism of Hungarian liberal nationalism, which remained the dominant, virtually hegemonic ideology of these elites throughout the half century of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. Its nationalism demanded a cultural homogenization that its liberalism prevented from being achieved by (too openly) illiberal means. What did this mean in practice? Because of its nationalism, the Hungarian political elite exerted an assimilationist pressure on Jews that intensified the higher one climbed in society and moved away from traditionally "Jewish" professions. But because of its liberalism (and of course a good dose of pragmatism), this same elite did nothing to force ultra-Orthodox Jews to acculturate and abandon their traditional way of life. Talking about Hungarian Jews in the decades leading up to World War I is to talk about a heterodox conglomerate including Jewish members of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, more than half of whom were converts,¹¹ and Hasidic Jews living in the northeast of the country in almost total cultural isolation.¹² If successive governments allowed the latter to live as they wished, light years away from any commitment to Hungarian nationalism, they did not try to stop the development of a discourse that, under the guise of condemning "caftan Jews" who refused to acculturate, denigrated them in terms differing from antisemitic writings only in that they were preceded or followed by the praise of the "brave" Magyarized Jews. It is consequently difficult to consider the Dualist period as the golden age of Hungarian Jewry without any reservations. However, if one considers their situation before their emancipation in 1867, as well as after the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, the qualification does seem irrefutable.¹³

Indeed, after half a century of—at least officially—philosemitic governments, the dissolution of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy in 1918, the democratic revolution of autumn 1918 led by Mihály Károlyi, and the Republic of Councils of 1919 changed the situation entirely. In parallel with the exacerbation of economic and social tensions caused by a world war that was dragging on, antisemitism was on the rise from the summer of 1916.¹⁴ It degenerated in the fall of 1918 and led to a multiplication of violent actions throughout the country.¹⁵ But the worst was yet to come. The high proportion of Jews (mostly converted or “konfessionslos”) among the commissars of the Republic of Councils in 1919 (twenty-one out of thirty-four),¹⁶ and the identification by Christian public opinion of the Republic of Councils with the Jews, led after the fall of Béla Kun’s regime to a period of antisemitic fury and violence such as Hungary had never known. Between August 1919 and May 1920, hundreds or even a thousand Jews—generally, but not necessarily, Communists—were murdered.¹⁷ Parallel to these events, the signing of the Treaty of Trianon on 4 June 1920 also contributed—albeit indirectly—to the worsening of the Jewish condition in Hungary. The peace treaty, which deprived the country of two-thirds of its territory and the majority of its population, was not only a tragic event for Hungarians (including Magyarized Jews). It also transformed Hungary from the most ethnically diverse country in Europe into a virtually homogeneous nation-state.¹⁸ The foremost reason for the Hungarian elites to curry favor with the Jewish community disappeared overnight. Jews lost the main component of their political appeal. The combined result of these developments was dramatic for the Jews who went from being brave citizens of the Jewish faith praised for identifying with the Magyars to being the enemies of a Hungarian nation that the interwar political regime, symbolized by Admiral Miklós Horthy, defined primarily as Christian.¹⁹ In the following years some government officials would reluctantly admit that *some* Jews could be good Hungarian patriots, but the Horthy regime was fundamentally an antisemitic regime. The numerus clausus law of 1920 was a symbol of this.

Considering the importance in Hungarian Jewish history of this law, which brought the era of emancipation to an abrupt end, it is surprising that historians hardly ever trace its origins to the pre-world war years. There can be no doubt that among its di-

rect causes, the identification of the Republic of Councils with the Jews was a determining factor. The constant attacks in the press and in the lower house from August 1916 accusing Jews of being war profiteers and avoiding the front also played a considerable role. But can we not detect earlier the seeds of the evolution that eventually led to the vote of the *numerus clausus*?

On 16 September 1920, in his speech to the National Assembly resulting from the January 1920 elections, the Roman Catholic Bishop Ottokár Prohászka, one of the main instigators of the *numerus clausus* law, repeatedly stated that the law was intended to come to the aid of the “Hungarian” (i.e., non-Jewish) middle class, to prevent it from continuing to cede ground to the Jews who aimed to dominate and ultimately supplant it.²⁰ As Gyula Kornis, a Catholic priest, professor of philosophy at the University of Budapest, and member of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, wrote in 1921, “it is through the university *numerus clausus* that the nation’s survival instinct is trying—belatedly—to prevent the definitive Jewish takeover of the educated strata.”²¹ These statements were familiar to many, given that one of the salient features of Hungarian antisemitism from the end of the 1890s was precisely the multiplication of writings and speeches sounding the alarm about Jewish “conquest” of the educated middle classes, and warning of the catastrophe that a Jewish-dominated Hungarian middle class would represent for the entire nation.

Yet this characteristic of prewar Hungarian antisemitism has never been mentioned by historians, although some of them have noted that in the 1900s, antisemitic discourse shifted from the theme of Jewish economic domination to hostility against their allegedly exaggerated presence among the liberal and intellectual professions.²² This scarcity of analyses results from historians’ apparent indifference to the antisemitism of the years 1890–1914, or, more precisely, from their greater interest in the more spectacular and dramatic antisemitic crises of the preceding and following periods. After Judit Kubinszky’s now classic work published in 1975,²³ several books have been published in recent years on the first wave of modern antisemitism in Hungary (1875–90), Győző Istóczy’s antisemitic movement, and the ritual murder charge of Tiszaeszlár.²⁴ The increased interest in recent decades in antisemitism during the Horthy era (1919–44) has also resulted in a growing number of books dealing with this matter.²⁵ Péter Bihari

published an excellent book on the rise of antisemitism during World War I, while Béla Bodó's monograph finally provides us with a comprehensive overview of the so-called white terror that followed the fall of the Republic of Councils.²⁶ The antisemitism of the years 1900–14, however, has still not been the subject of a single monograph. Similarly, there are no studies that specifically address antisemitic attacks on Jews in the professions, and Jewish intellectuals in particular, during this period. There are probably several explanations for this. One is that historians have focused not so much on exploring the antisemitic fears that the "rise" of the Jews had fueled in the Christian middle classes, but rather—more classically—on mapping the leading antisemitic forces in the period, that is, the diverse organizations of political Catholicism and the agrarian camp, and presenting a general outline of their views.²⁷ Another reason might be the weight of historical tradition opposing the liberal Dualist era to the illiberal Horthy era. The contrast is in many respects correct, but it does not encourage one to seek the origins of interwar period's pervasive antisemitism in the years before 1914.

The result is that almost no historian has traced the origins of the *numerus clausus* to the years preceding World War I. The question of the weight of prewar antisemitic ideas in the introduction of the *numerus clausus* in 1920 has never been asked, which is all the more striking since several historians have attempted to demonstrate the continuity of antisemitism between the Dualist and the interwar period.²⁸ This disregard is apparent both in works devoted to the Dualist period and to the Horthy era. Miklós Szabó's posthumous magnum opus on the history of Hungarian "right-wing radicalism" between 1867 and 1918 offers a masterful overview of conservative and neoconservative thought in the Dualist era, yet it does not offer any hypothesis on the origins of the *numerus clausus*, a law that the book mentions only four times, including twice in footnotes.²⁹ The introductory chapter of Katalin Szegvári's book on the *numerus clausus* law offers an overview of Hungarian antisemitism since the end of the eighteenth century, but ignores the question of the law's ideological antecedents.³⁰ Most historians who have considered the causes of the *numerus clausus* have simply stated that it was intended to reduce the proportion of Jewish students in order to make it easier for future Christian graduates to pursue careers.

Only a few authors have mentioned in passing that the growing number of Jews in the professions and among intellectuals, as well as the allegedly “destructive” opinions they expressed about Hungarian political and social conditions, became the object of antisemitic attacks as early as the 1900s.³¹ In this chapter, I contend that the history of the *numerus clausus* begins in the last years of the nineteenth century. I argue that the prehistory of the *numerus clausus* law, almost totally ignored by historiography, is far more important than these scattered remarks suggest.

Analysis of the sources for the period between the late 1890s and 1914 reveals that in the eyes of the few overt antisemites, and especially among the growing camp of clerical and agrarian neoconservatives, whose rhetoric and worldview were antisemitic even though they avoided openly identifying themselves as antisemites, the main concern in these years became that the Christian middle class would be dominated by Jewish university-educated intellectuals, and that by becoming the central element of the Hungarian middle strata, Jews would acquire a dominant position among the country’s intellectual and cultural elite. Jews would then be only one step away from what was the most horrifying vision in the antisemitic imagination: the conquest of political power.³² This phantasm played an even more decisive role in the antisemitic mental universe from the second half of the 1900s, when it was nourished by hostility against a young generation of progressive Jewish intellectuals engaged in the struggle for the democratic transformation of the country, some of whom, such as bourgeois radical leader Oszkár Jászi, would occupy a ministerial position in the government of Mihály Károlyi in 1918.³³

In what follows, I will present the evolution of antisemitic discourse on what was perceived as the “Jewish takeover” of the middle class and the offensive of left-wing Jewish intellectuals against the established order. I will conclude with a brief evocation of the first calls for restricting Jewish access to universities. Calls for such discriminatory legislation were more frequent than historiography has previously assumed. These calls, which were only one facet of a radical antisemitic discourse ranging from demands for a more or less total revocation of emancipation to threats of violence against Jews, reveal that even before 1914, the idea that equal rights of citizens was not necessarily an intangible principle of modern Hungarian society began to gain ground.

The idea that the Jews were on their way to dominating the Hungarian middle class appeared in the Hungarian political discourse at the end of the nineteenth century. At the time, there was no officially antisemitic political party in Hungary. But even if the People's Party (Néppárt), a Catholic party founded in January 1895, did not mention Jews in its official program, the speeches of its MPs, present in the lower house from the legislative elections of 1896, as well as its press organs, were marked by an antisemitism whose intensity varied but grew continuously over the years.³⁴ The party's MPs generally remained more moderate than the party newspapers. This did not prevent Antal Mócsy from telling the lower house in March 1898 of his fear that the Jews "would occupy the same dominant position in the intellectual professions as they had succeeded in occupying during the last thirty liberal years in the economic sphere."³⁵ Mócsy's speech provoked strong reactions both in the lower house and in the press. This was a sign that we were only at the beginning of a new era. In its editorial, the daily newspaper *Alkotmány* (Constitution), the official organ of the People's Party, defended Mócsy, while rehashing only old clichés about the dishonest practices of Jewish merchants and financiers.³⁶

There was, however, already fear among some that the Jews would come to dominate the educated Christian middle class, and this fear was soon associated with concerns about the increasing number of Jews among university students. The first expressions of this concern also date back to the late nineteenth century. In December 1899, journalist Géza Petrássevich published a pamphlet that can be considered in retrospect as one of the most elaborate antisemitic writings of the time. If the future seemed potentially catastrophic to Petrássevich, who made his entire career in Catholic newspapers, it was precisely because of the number of Jews in high schools and universities. In the latter, Petrássevich noted a "terrifying invasion," "frightening" rates of Jewish students, which he said were not found anywhere else in the world. Statistics suggested that after having been squeezed out of the economy, the "Christian element" was unable to stand up to the Jews in the cultural sphere either. (Of course, this was not due to the intellectual inferiority of the Christians, who were only victims of their honesty. In the ruthless world of capitalism, "Christian morality" was doomed to defeat in the face of those

driven by “Talmudic morality.”) The “unstoppable” Jewish advance raised fears of a future in which they alone would have enough university graduates to fill all the positions in the civil service. The prospect of the ultimate nightmare was already on the horizon: “Today the Jews are still only writers, journalists and artists; lawyers, doctors, engineers and bank clerks. But in a short time, and as they emerge in ever greater numbers from institutions of higher learning, they will take possession of the judiciary, the ministries, public education, every conceivable intellectual occupation, and then—the coup de grâce: the counties and public administration.”³⁷

To support his fears about the “disproportionate invasion” of the university,³⁸ Petrássevich published statistics on the increase of the number of Jews among the students of the University of Budapest. Let us consider the figures for all Hungarian universities. While the number of Jews in Hungary increased from 544,279 in 1869 (4 percent of the total population), to 911,227 in 1910 (5 percent of the population), the percentage of Jews among students in higher education rose from 10.3 percent in 1866/1867 to 30.3 percent in 1903/1904. After that date, it began to decline, falling back to 28.6 percent in 1913/14. In some faculties, this decline was minimal. Among medical students, it only fell from 46.8 percent to 46.7 percent. On the other hand, in the law faculties, and it was above all the law degree that opened the doors to positions of responsibility in the civil service, the decline was significantly greater: the rate of Jewish students fell between these two dates from 27.5 to 18.6 percent.³⁹ At the time Petrássevich published his pamphlet, he could not yet have known that the dynamic he considered so threatening would soon be reversed. Would such knowledge have changed his pessimism? What is certain is that the gradual decline from the 1900s in the percentage of Jewish students in most faculties, a decline that everyone could follow over the years in the official statistics, did not alleviate fears that the Hungarian educated middle class would fall under the control of the Jews.

More or less antisemitic authors spoke at the time of Jewish *térfoglalás*, a term literally meaning “occupation of space.” The term is revealing, implying a delimited, circumscribed space within which an increase in the percentage of “Jews” could only be achieved at the expense of “Hungarians,” at the cost of latter

becoming less able to enter this space. In his article on the appearance of the term in the antisemitic vocabulary of the time, Péter Bihari had the judicious suggestion that its success may have been due to its semantic proximity to the term *honfoglalás*, literally “occupation of the homeland,” which was—and still is—the time-honored expression for describing the arrival of Magyar tribes in the Carpathian Basin in the ninth century, and their conquest of the territory that was to become the kingdom of Hungary.⁴⁰ From this point of view, the “occupation of the homeland,” the founding act of the Hungarian state, was in danger of being succeeded by a new conquest of the country, this time achieved by the Jews, and to their sole benefit.

This alarming assessment of the situation inevitably called for a reaction. If nothing was done to stop the Jews, the Hungarians were on their way to oblivion. They were already on the verge of “definitive extinction,” according to a group of anonymous students, authors of a pamphlet published in September 1901, which offered an apocalyptic vision of a Hungary in the grip of destruction and decadence, and of a middle class “lying with a fractured spine,” ravaged by “a godless mercantile spirit.”⁴¹ While student associations close to clerical and agrarian circles began to organize and publish their first antisemitic manifestos calling for social renewal “on a Christian and national basis,”⁴² the official organ of the Catholic People’s Party explicitly pointed out the most threatening new enemy: it was no longer the wealthy Jew but the Jewish graduate and the Jewish intellectual. The unscrupulous Jewish tavern keepers who had become rich on the backs of the peasants and had ended up buying the lands and castles of the Hungarian nobility constituted a national scandal, explained Ödön Beniczky, a future MP of the People’s Party in *Alkotmány* in October 1901, but there was even worse to come. The “real misfortune,” Beniczky announced, was the manifest ambition of the Jews to occupy a position in political and social life corresponding to their economic weight. They already monopolized the press, but now they were conquering an increasing part of the civil service, positions of judicial administration and teaching. “Therein lies the real danger,” exclaimed Beniczky, “for therein begins the de-Christianization of political and social life.”⁴³

The most interesting aspect of these remarks is the fear of seeing Jews “invade” civil service positions. In 1900, Jews constituted

34.1 percent of Hungarian lawyers (57.6 percent in Budapest) and 48.3 percent of doctors (59.1 percent in Budapest). Yet their proportion did not exceed 5 percent in the civil service and the judiciary, spheres where discrimination against Jews, as I noted, remained constant in the Dualist period.⁴⁴ Why, then, this unfounded fear? Perhaps it was due to the difficulty for neoconservative circles, critical of the government's political and economic liberalism but not yet avowedly antisemitic, to find an adequate argumentation. For the editor of the agrarian weekly *Hazánk* (Our Fatherland), the daily newspaper of the League of Hungarian Farmers (*Magyar Gazdaszövetség*), a pressure group founded in 1896 on the model of the German *Bund der Landwirte*, what was regrettable and a cause for concern to the Christian middle class, was not the appearance of Jews in the professions per se, but the fact that they occupied a place "far greater than their proportion [in the total population] entitled them to."⁴⁵ One could say that the author remained moderate in tone. But one could also note that in its essence, this was already the logic of the *numerus clausus*. This logic stemmed from an antisemitism which, even in its moderate version, considered it unacceptable for Jews to exceed a certain level of influence in a country that had to remain in the hands of the traditional Christian Hungarian elite. If they did, a reverse movement became an absolute necessity.

From the middle of the 1900s, the fear of this "great replacement" among the educated middle classes became a regular topic in clerical and agrarian writings. In his sector-by-sector overview of the Jewish conquest of the country, published in 1905, Catholic priest Dániel Keményfy considered "the most saddening phenomenon" to be the Jewish invasion of the intellectual professions. By way of explanation, he noted what seemed to him an obvious fact: "In the field of education, the Christian element is not able to compete with the Jewish element." He too did not fail to support with statistics his anxieties about those who would constitute "the graduates of tomorrow in Hungarian society."⁴⁶ Repeated at length in speeches, articles, and books, the idea that the Jews were "invading" the educated middle class penetrated increasingly large sections of public opinion. They were thus aggressors or, at the very least, intruders meddling with the university, the Academy of Sciences, the judiciary, and cultural institutions, as the editor of *Alkotmány*, Ferenc Bonitz, wrote in

February 1906, adding that these were all sectors that Jews were corrupting “through the destructive immorality that was innate in them.”⁴⁷

The feeling of being under siege was accentuated by the conviction that in the previous two or three generations, the landed nobility—regarded as the backbone of the “historical middle classes”—had itself been the victim of a liberal economic system, of which the Jews had been the greatest beneficiaries. The only sphere of influence left to the descendants of the ruined nobility was the educated middle class. Losing their dominant position there raised the prospect of the “Hungarian element” being excluded from all “leading positions,” as a book published in 1906 by a student association linked to the agrarian movement put it. This was an intolerable prospect since the direction of the country’s affairs was to remain in the hands of the “Hungarian race.”⁴⁸

With the crystallization of the bourgeois radical movement in that same year, the ultimate fear, that of seeing the Jews gain political power, found its point of fixation. That these young intellectuals became the focal point of these fears rather than the Social Democratic Party, is not surprising. Many of the leaders of the Social Democratic Party were also Jews, but the mass of workers affiliated with the party were not. What worried neoconservatives above all was the potential of an opposition force coming socially from within, that is, from the educated middle classes, capable of representing direct competition, and likely to seduce the younger generations of intellectuals. It is striking that from the moment when the radical bourgeois movement led by Oszkár Jászi entered the political arena with a program demanding radical democratization that would have meant a dramatic loss of influence of this elite, the Catholic People’s Party, and the clerical and agrarian organizations considered the radical bourgeois journal, *Huszadik Század* (Twentieth Century), their association (the Society for Social Sciences), as well as all the other associations and organizations that had gathered around them, to be enemy number one.⁴⁹ A considerable part of these progressive intellectuals were Jews (in fact many of them were converted), a fact not insignificant to circles that were already more or less antisemitic, and therefore saw their Jewishness as the cause and the explanation of their action. The frontal assault launched by

Oszkár Jászi and his followers, stated *Alkotmány* in January 1907, was in reality aimed at Christianity and the Hungarian nation. Behind their speeches about “progress,” the real goal of these so-called social scientists was to destroy Christian culture, replacing it with “the spirit of the ghetto and the Talmud.”⁵⁰ Oszkár Jászi was not only the opponent of the established order; he was the enemy of “everything national.”⁵¹

From 1907 on, antisemitic invective against the bourgeois radicals became incessant in clerical and agrarian publications. The official organ of the People’s Party regularly castigated the Society for Social Sciences, which the newspaper considered “in the service of internationalism,” and did not fail to note that its members were “mostly Jews.”⁵² The members of the Society for Social Sciences, those arrogant poseurs who confused modernity with destruction, were representatives of “the disruptive Jewish spirit.”⁵³ The activity report for the year 1907 of the Regnum Marianum, a pastoral association founded in 1903 to nurture the faith of Catholic youth, emphasized the association’s defense activity against those who hated the Christian character of Hungarian society and thought that “the historic Hungarian nation should wither on its own soil, in its own soul.”⁵⁴ Between the bourgeois radicals and Jewish cultural associations, *Alkotmány* explained in 1910, the differences were only cosmetic. It was a simple division of labor. The bourgeois radicals worked to destroy the Christian traditions of the Hungarian nation, while the Hungarian Israelite Literary Association (Izraelita Magyar Irodalmi Társulat) strove to strengthen the attachment of Jews to their own religious and national traditions.⁵⁵ At the same time, the cries of alarm about the percentage of Jews in high schools and universities continued unabated, appearing now in the most venerable Catholic publications. In June 1907, the high school teacher István Miklóssy declared in *Katholikus Szemle* (Catholic Review) that the number of Jewish graduates would soon equal that of the Christians. If this were to happen, the author warned, “Hungary would no longer be a Christian country, since Jewry would constitute the most influential element among its leaders.”⁵⁶

The final stage of this antisemitic rhetoric was reached when fear that the Christian middle class would succumb to the Jews was exacerbated by the growing conviction that the radical bourgeois movement was merely a tool in the hands of Jews engaged in

a power struggle against the established order and its nationalist ideology. Remarkably, the first to express this idea was the widely read *Budapesti Hírlap* (Budapest News), a conservative but also theoretically liberal newspaper. That this daily expressed such concern is symptomatic of the political and intellectual evolution of Hungary in the prewar years, and more specifically of a Christian middle class that was turning more and more to the right. In its editorial of May 1907, the *Budapesti Hírlap* still remained cautious in its criticism. It noted that statistics on the religious affiliation of students indicated that a turnover was fundamentally altering the composition of the Hungarian middle class, and warned "Jewish graduates": they had to "clearly demonstrate" that they were not attracted to the "pseudo-cultural slogans of internationalism."⁵⁷ In the years that followed, the difference between the neoconservative camp and the favorite daily of the conservative yet supposedly also liberal Christian middle classes would be mainly the presence or absence of overtly antisemitic vituperations. In terms of the ambitions they ascribed to Jewish graduates, however, their views were becoming increasingly similar. Regarding the Galileo Circle (Galilei Kör), the freethinking student association close to the bourgeois radicals, the official organ of the Catholic People's Party stated in 1912 that its real aim was "the systematic Jewish takeover of the Hungarian intelligentsia."⁵⁸ The *Budapesti Hírlap* had reached similar conclusions, as evidenced by an editorial published two years earlier under the title "Denominational Domination." The editorial developed the idea that the Galileo Circle's slogans about free thought, democracy, and the total separation of state and church were merely a facade designed to conceal their "real objective," Jewish replacement of the historical middle classes at the top of the state—in short, Jewish takeover of political power.⁵⁹

According to those who positioned themselves as spokespeople for the Christian middle class, the defensive struggle against alleged Jewish ambitions for domination was equally fierce in the cultural field. Among the charges against the Jews, the one most often made in conservative but officially non-antisemitic circles concerned precisely their supposedly harmful and growing influence in Hungarian cultural and literary life. An editorial in *Élet* (Life), a Catholic cultural weekly founded in 1909, pitted the Hungarian middle class against those who wanted to arrogate to

themselves a monopoly on modernity, but had no idea what the “Hungarian culture” of the “typically Hungarian” middle class was, and for good reason, since their culture, “sterile and corrupt from the national point of view,” was a “Jewish, international culture.” These articles dealt with cultural issues, but they spoke of power relations. The *Élet* editorial ended with a call to fight a battle that had become inevitable, since “Hungary belonged to the Hungarians,” and had to be ruled “by the Magyar, not the intruders.”⁶⁰

In the last years before World War I, Hungarian Freemasonry became the new *bête noire* of neoconservatives. It appeared to them as both the symbol of a Jewish bourgeoisie aiming to take the place of the Hungarian middle classes, and of a Jewish intelligentsia aspiring to establish a leftist political regime in which the Jews would be the true masters. This new antisemitic passion was a reaction to an actually rather unsuccessful political initiative by the bourgeois radicals. In an effort to broaden their base among the liberal middle classes, Jászi and his friends tried from 1906 to extend their influence within Freemasonry. As early as the 1880s, the lodges were subject to some antisemitic attacks.⁶¹ But they did not really pique the interest of antisemites until bourgeois radicals entered the lodges in large numbers. In fact, their entry did not fundamentally alter the ideological profile of Freemasonry. Most members were and remained simply liberal bourgeois, culturally tolerant and open to new ideas without truly embracing them. Anticlericalism as an ideology and philanthropy as a main activity remained the two foundations of Hungarian lodges. As for the Jews, their precise percentage among the members of the Masonic lodges is unknown, but it is certain that from the 1890s onward it became considerable.⁶²

That bourgeois radicals did not succeed in gaining a dominant influence in Hungarian Freemasonry, did not matter—the ideal enemy had been found.⁶³ From the end of the 1900s, clerical and agrarian circles concentrated their attacks on the Freemasonry, which, in their view, had become the spearhead of the Jewish offensive to dominate Christian Hungary.⁶⁴ As Károly Huszár, an MP of the Catholic People’s Party and prime minister between November 1919 and March 1920, declared in the lower house in 1911, “Freemasonry is nothing else but the fighting organization of our Israelites against the Hungarian Christian social order.”⁶⁵ The Masonic lodges of Budapest, Huszár wrote in a pamphlet

published the same year, were “authentic yeshivot,” the starting base of the Jews in their war campaign “against Christianity, Hungarian racial ambitions, and the social order.” In Huszár’s view, there was no doubt, “the main point of their program is to crush the Hungarian middle class.”⁶⁶ In the autumn of 1912, even the official organ of the agrarian Hungarian Farmers’ Association (Magyar Gazdaszövetség), which was careful not to appear too openly antisemitic, published a lengthy article on “the Masonic lodges operating under the sign of Jewish radicalism,” which strove to bring down the Hungarian “national state.” The article also castigated the “red-headed young anarchists” of the Galileo Circle, who were “trampling underfoot the most sacred ideas of Christian Magyardom.”⁶⁷

Most of these statements were made by people affiliated with the Catholic People’s Party, or clerical and agrarian organizations that were not officially antisemitic, and which, in the early 1900s, were still routinely engaged in denying that they were.⁶⁸ In this respect, the last years before World War I marked the beginning of a significant turn. At the meeting organized in May 1911 by the Catholic People’s Union (Katolikus Népszövetség) to protest against the “Jewish takeover” of Budapest, Miklós Zboray, one of the vice presidents of the Union and an MP of the Catholic People’s Party, concluded his closing speech with these words: “We do not feel in our struggle hatred for anyone, but if we are accused of antisemitism, that does not scare us either.”⁶⁹ In an article published four months later in the organ of the People’s Party, István Miklóssy no longer bothered with such rhetorical subtleties. As he declared at the end of a long tirade on the ever-increasing power of the Jews: “Considering all this, we are most categorically antisemites.”⁷⁰ What the daily of the People’s Party asserted with aplomb was more difficult to endorse for *Élet*, the Catholic cultural weekly that sought to be as modern as its art nouveau typography. What to do, however, wrote *Élet* in May 1914, in the face of the “invasion” by the Jews of “all the graduate professions”? The weekly felt it had no choice: “If it is only by adhering to antisemitism that we can save the country, then we will adhere to it.”⁷¹

Parallel to these admissions of antisemitism were the first calls for legislative limitations on Jewish access to universities. In this regard, historians usually mention the speech made in the lower

house in January 1907 by Károly Hencz, an MP of the Catholic People's Party. After enumerating the statistics on the percentage of Jews at the University of Budapest, he demanded that the Minister of Education and Religious Affairs "finally establish a *numerus clausus* against Jews" at this university.⁷² His call for legal discrimination against Jews was not an isolated act. Two days later, the People's Party daily newspaper devoted its editorial to Hencz's proposal, giving it wholehearted support. Since Jews made up about 5 percent of the country's population, they should not exceed that percentage at the university either. According to the editorial, the *numerus clausus* was "neither inhumane nor intolerant," but "was intended to support Christian graduates greatly threatened by Israelite intrusion into the graduate professions."⁷³ Four years later, an anonymous pamphlet recommended to the attention of its readers by the venerable *Katholikus Szemle* praised Russia for limiting the access of Jews to the graduate professions, and asserted that, at the very least, Hungary should limit the percentage of Jews in these professions to their proportion in the total population.⁷⁴ A few months later, at the beginning of the new school year, the People's Party newspaper renewed the charge. Considering the "staggering" number of Jews enrolled in the high schools of Budapest, a city that richly deserved the nickname "Judapest," *Alkotmány* demanded that the proportion of Jews admitted to high schools be brought down to their share in the general population. If nothing was done, the educated middle class would soon become totally Jewish. This was evidently unacceptable—"Budapest, after all, is not Jerusalem."⁷⁵ Two weeks later it was the turn of János Molnár, a Catholic priest and MP of the People's Party, to demand in an article in *Alkotmány*, of which he was the owner, the introduction of the *numerus clausus* against Jews in the faculty of arts at the University of Budapest. He too suggested that the quota of Jews among students be lowered to the percentage they represented in the general population.⁷⁶ As is well known, this is exactly what the *numerus clausus* law of 1920 provided.

Calls for the *numerus clausus* remained sporadic before 1914. However, they all had one characteristic that made them clear harbingers of what was to come: not a single author felt the need to justify by any argument his wish to relegate the principle of equality of all citizens before the law to the dustbin of Hungarian history.

After Mihály Károlyi's bourgeois-democratic revolution, which antisemites already thought to be largely the work of the Jews, Béla Kun's Republic of Councils in 1919 would be perceived by a large part of Hungarian society as a Jewish takeover of the country. But if Hungarian society, and in particular the overwhelming majority of the Christian middle classes, experienced the Republic of Councils as a Jewish dictatorship—a fundamental break in the history of a Christian Hungary that had suddenly gone off the rails—it was largely due to the fact that cries of alarm about Jewish domination had been voiced over and over since the 1900s.⁷⁷ The economic hardships of the Christian middle classes during World War I and the trauma of the revolutions of 1918–19 certainly offer a partial explanation for *numerus clausus* law. However, as I have tried to demonstrate in this chapter, they only crystallized fears and resentment that had been growing since the beginning of the twentieth century, eventually making it possible for the idea of restricting Jewish access to universities to have the unfortunate success that it did.

Miklós Konrád is a senior research fellow at the Institute of History of the Research Centre for the Humanities, Budapest. His research interests focus on Hungarian Jewish history in the long nineteenth century. He is the author of *Zsidóságon innen és túl. Zsidók vallásváltása Magyarországon a reformkortól az első világháborúig* (to be published by Indiana University Press in 2024 under the title *Jewishness and Beyond: Jewish Conversions in Hungary 1825–1914*). His current project explores the myth of the Galician Jewish immigration to Hungary.

Notes

1. *Az 1920*, vol. 5, 158–59.
2. The National Antisemitic Party (*Országos Antiszemita Párt*), led by Győző Istóczy and Iván Simonyi, was founded on 6 October 1883, in the wake of the Tiszaeszlár ritual murder accusation, which inflamed the country in May 1882.
3. On the *numerus clausus* law, see Ladányi, *Az egyetemi ifjúság*, 117–18; Karady and Kemény, “Antisemitisme universitaire,” 67–96; Katzburg, *Hungary and the Jews*, 60–79; Szegvári, *Numerus Clausus*; Molnár, *Jogfosztás*; Kovács, *Törvénytől sújtva*; Karady and Nagy, *The Numerus Clausus in*

- Hungary*; Kovács, "The Numerus Clausus and the Anti-Jewish Laws," 37–43. On Hungarian Jewish reactions, see Szapor, "Between Self-Defense and Loyalty," 21–33.
4. Bácskai, *A vállalkozók előfutárai*; Silber, "A Jewish Minority in a Backward Economy," 3–22.
 5. In 1869, the first census of the Dualist period avoided any question about the language spoken by the inhabitants of the country. In the 1880 census, 56.3 percent of the Jews in Hungary and 59.1 percent of those living in Budapest declared Hungarian to be their mother tongue. Their proportion reached 76.9 percent and 90.1 percent respectively in the 1910 census. Zeke, "Statisztikai mellékletek," 190.
 6. Kövér, "'Statisztikai asszimiláció,'" 1221–58.
 7. In the 1900 census, 51.4 percent of the population declared themselves Hungarian-speaking. Without the "statistical assimilation" of Jews, this small majority would not have been reached until 1910. Zeke, "Az izraelita felekezet," 241.
 8. Mendelsohn, *The Jews of East Central Europe*, 94. See also Kann, "Hungarian Jewry," 357–86; Hanák, "Polgárosodás és asszimiláció," 513–36.
 9. The comparison with the German Empire is not accidental. Indeed, Hungary's situation was most comparable to Germany's. Whereas Habsburg officials' only expectations of Jews were acculturation and loyalty to the supranational Austrian state and the monarchy, political elites in Hungary and Germany demanded that their Jewish citizens assimilate without trace by identifying fully with the nations into which they were expected to merge. Even so, there was one essential difference that distorts the comparison: unlike Hungary, whose political elite remained—at least theoretically—staunchly liberal until the fall of the Habsburg Empire, the political regime of the German Second Empire was, at the latest from the end of the 1870s, a fundamentally illiberal one. For the divergence in assimilationist expectations, see Schmidt, "The Terms of Emancipation," 28–47; Rozenblit, "The Jews of Germany and Austria," 1–18.
 10. Konrád, *Zsidóságon innen és túl*, 104–39; Tal, *Christians and Jews in Germany*, 136–37, 140–42; Clark, "The 'Christian' State," 83–84.
 11. Konrád, *Zsidóságon innen és túl*, 271.
 12. For an overview of the Jewish communities in northeast Hungary, see Jelinek, *The Carpathian Diaspora*; Bányai, Fedinec, and Komoróczy, *Zsidók Kárpátalján*.
 13. For the perception of the Dualist period by the contemporary Jewish press and the recurrent expression of frustration and resentment, see Konrád, "A dualizmus mint magyar zsidó aranykor?," 93–108.
 14. Bihari, *Lövészárkok a hátszágban*, 201–22.
 15. Hatos, *Az elátkozott köztársaság*, 181–86.
 16. Egry, *Kérdések és válaszok*, 46. Because of the frequent changes in positions, the percentage of (converted) Jews among the commissars and

- their replacements varied during the 133 days of the dictatorship between 57 and 67 percent. See Hajdu, "Tanácsköztársaság," 72–75.
17. According to Béla Bodó, "between 1,250 and 2,500 Jews may have fallen victim to political and ethnic/religious violence between August 1919 and early 1924." Bodó, *The White Terror*, 95. For much lower estimates, see Romsics, *Hungary in the Twentieth Century*, 110; Bödök, "Politikai erőszak," 85–108; Kóródi, *Adattár a Magyar Nemzeti*.
 18. In the 1920 census, 89.5 percent of the population declared themselves Hungarian-speaking. The rest of the population was mainly German. *Az 1920. évi népszámlálás*, 50.
 19. On the possible meanings—beyond sheer antisemitism—of the "Christian idea" in interwar Hungary, see Hanebrink, *In Defense of Christian Hungary*.
 20. Prohászka, "A numerus clausus-ról," 245–59. In his speech, Bishop Prohászka, the ideological champion of Horthy's "Christian Hungary," used the term "Hungarian" middle class as a synonym for "Christian," which was in itself an implicit affirmation of his antisemitism. On Prohászka, who after a violently antisemitic article published in 1893, followed in the 1900s by a few scattered remarks, did not expound antisemitic ideas until 1918. See Fazekas, "Prohászka Ottokár zsidóellenességéről," 71–86; and Bihari, *Lövészárkok a hátorszáiban*, 34–38. According to the official version, that is, the bill's statement of intent signed by the Minister of Education and Religious Affairs, István Haller, on 22 July 1920, the numerus clausus was only aimed at combating the proletarianization of a graduate population that was considered to have become too numerous. See *Az 1920*, vol. 3, 222–24.
 21. Kornis, *Kultúrpolitikánk irányelvei*, 23.
 22. Lackó: *Sziget és külvilág*, 25–27, 171–72.
 23. Kubinszky, *A politikai antiszemitizmus Magyarországon*. The works published in the following years by Jacob Katz and Andrew Handler relied on Kubinszky's book, which was banally Marxist in its explanation of antisemitism, but accurate in the presentation of events and judicious in its political analyses. See Katz, *From Prejudice to Destruction*, 237–42, 273–80; Handler, *Blood Libel at Tiszaeszlár*; Handler, *An Early Blueprint for Zionism*.
 24. Kövér, *A tisaeszlári dráma*; Blutman, *A rejtélyes tisaeszlári per*; Paksy, *Istóczy Győző*; Kieval, *Blood Inscriptions*.
 25. Paksy, *Az antiszemitizmus alakváltozatai*; Vonyó, *Jobboldali radikálisok Magyarországon*; Paksy, *Nyilas mozgalom Magyarországon*; Paksa, *Magyar nemzetiszocialisták*; Ungváry, *A Horthy-rendszer*.
 26. Bihari, *Lövészárkok a hátorszáiban*; Bodó, *The White Terror*.
 27. Gergely, *A keresztényszocializmus Magyarországon*; Szabó, *Politikai kultúra Magyarországon*; Szabó, *Az újkonzervativizmus*; Deák, *The Economy and Polity*; Gyurgyák, *A zsidókérdés Magyarországon*, 286–371; Hanebrink, *In*

- Defense of Christian Hungary*; Fehér, *A származás kötelez*; Klestenitz, *Pajzs és kard*, 21–134.
28. Szabó, *Az újkonzervativizmus*; Karády, "Continuities of the 'Jewish Question,'" 45–72.
 29. Szabó, *Az újkonzervativizmus*, 211, 258, 267, 335.
 30. Szegvári, *Numerus Clausus rendelkezések*, 13–85.
 31. Szegvári, *Numerus Clausus rendelkezések*, 42; Romsics, "A numerus clausustól a holokausztig," 1343; Katzburg, "Hungarian Antisemitism," 340.
 32. As early as the 1840s, the image of emancipated Jews who would take up leadership positions in the civil service and finally become holders of political power, was a recurring argument among those opposed to granting equal rights to the Jews. See Zsoldos, "Bevezetés," 22–23.
 33. The Károlyi government, which emerged from the democratic revolution of autumn 1918, remained in office from 31 October 1918 to 19 January 1919. Of the fourteen members of the government, five were of Jewish faith or origin. On Oszkár Jászi, baptized by his parents at the age of six, and unable until the end of his life to find a harmonious *modus vivendi* between his Jewish origins and his desire not to be considered Jewish, see Litván, *A Twentieth-Century Prophet*; Konrád, *Zsidóságon innen és túl*, 382–83, 533–38.
 34. For a summary of the history of the party until 1914, see Szabó, "A magyar Néppárt," 123–31.
 35. *Az 1896*, vol. 14, 94.
 36. (Sz.), "Antiszeizmitizmus," 1.
 37. Petrássevich, *Magyarország és a zsidóság*, 159–65. A few years earlier, a Jewish law student by the name of Dezső Tauber, whom Petrássevich had insulted without agreeing to duel with him afterwards, had beaten him in the street with a whip. Obviously, this did not lead Petrássevich to harbor more friendly feelings toward the Jews. M. Sz. [Miksa Szabolcsi], "Újabb párbajok," 9.
 38. Petrássevich, *Magyarország és a zsidóság*, 162.
 39. Kovács, *A zsidóság térfoglalása Magyarországon*, 32.
 40. Bihari, "Élet, tér, foglalás," 15.
 41. *Nemzeti ideál*, 14–15, 26.
 42. Kovács, *Szemere Miklós és a magyar ifjúság*, 143. On neoconservative student associations, see Brázovay, *A kereszt*; Horváth, *Magyar századforduló*, 119–24, 276–78; Szabó, *Az újkonzervativizmus*, 184–209.
 43. Gladiátor [Ödön Beniczky], "A keresztény fogyasztási szövetkezetek," 1.
 44. For statistics, see Zeke, "Statistikai mellékletek," 193. For an overview of the discrimination against Jews in the civil service, see Konrád, *Zsidóságon innen és túl*, 104–39.
 45. (B. B.) [Buday Barna], "Fölösleges emberek," 1.
 46. Keményfy, *A modern keresztény*, 10–12.
 47. (b.) [Bonitz Ferenc], "Az a nép," 1–2.

48. *A magyar ifjúság a magyar népért!*, 12.
49. On the birth in 1900–1901 of the *Huszadik Század* and the Society for Social Sciences, the gradual departure, completed in 1906, of the liberal reformers, and the birth in the years 1906–7 of the bourgeois radical movement, which will become a political party in June 1914, see Litván, “A szociológia első magyar műhelye,” 105–36.
50. Görcsöni, “Tudományos életünk,” 1.
51. “Akiket otthon hagytak,” *Alkotmány* (8 March 1907): 1.
52. “Október tizedike,” *Alkotmány* (2 October 1907): 1–2.
53. “Piklerék,” *Alkotmány* (18 October 1907): 1–2.
54. *Jelentés a Regnum Marianum*, 3–4.
55. Görcsöni, “Izraelita Magyar Irodalmi Társulat,” 11. Like other Jewish Neolog associations of the time, all of which were hostile to Zionism, the Hungarian Israelite Literary Association founded in 1894 considered any national definition of the Jews to be a historical absurdity. On Jewish cultural associations and their efforts to maintain the Jewish identity of the educated middle classes, see Konrád, “Kultúrával az identitásért,” 70–92.
56. Miklóssy, “Magasabb fokú iskolaügyünk felekezeti viszonyai,” 568.
57. “Politikai hullámok,” *Budapesti Hírlap* (28 April 1907): 7.
58. “Izgatás a kereszténység ellen,” *Alkotmány* (31 January 1912): 2. On the Galileo Circle, see Csunderlik, *Radikálisok, szabadgondolkodók, ateisták*.
59. “Felekezeti uralom,” *Budapesti Hírlap* (9 December 1910): 1.
60. Margitay, “Magyar középosztály,” 1–3. Wishing to seduce a cultivated Christian readership, the weekly was cautiously open to literary modernity. This is what led Mario Fenyo to describe it as “mildly progressive in tone.” See Fenyo, *Literature and Political Change*, 48.
61. See the allusions in the speeches of antisemitic MPs Iván Simonyi on 27 January 1883, of Győző Istóczy on 23 November 1883, and of Ignác Zimándy on 18 October 1884. *Az 1881*, vol. 9, 285; *Az 1881*, vol. 13, 209; *Az 1884*, vol. 1, 109–10.
62. Nagy, *Szabadkőművesség a XX*, 24–33; Mucsi, “A polgári radikalizmus ideológiai-politikai tevékenységének kibontakozása,” 740–45. On the tensions within Freemasonry between radical and conservative liberal members, see *Polgárság és szabadkőművesség*. According to the antisemitic pamphleteers of the Horthy era, the proportion of Jews in the Masonic lodges reached 80–90 percent in the years before the World War I. Barcsay, *A szabadkőművesség bűnei*, 110–11; Palatinus, *A szabadkőművesség bűnei*, 110.
63. The trope of the Judeo-Masonic alliance constitutes one of the very few issues where the Hungarian situation lends itself much more to comparison with France than Germany, where unlike the other two countries, Jews had great difficulty to be accepted in the masonic lodges even at the height of the liberal era that would end in the second half of the 1870s. See Katz, *Jews and Freemasons in Europe*, 128–229.

64. In fact, there was only one truly radical lodge, the Martinovics Lodge founded in May 1908 by Oszkár Jászi. Its members included, among others, the poet Endre Ady, the future finance minister of the Károlyi government Pál Szende, and Karl Polányi. See Fukász, "Szabadkőművesség," 55–84.
65. *Az 1910*, vol. 6, 383.
66. Huszár, *A szabadkőművesség nemzeti veszedelem*, 10–11. See also Egy volt orsz. képviselő, *Szabadkőműves emlékeim*; Miklóssy, *A szabadkőművesség önleleplezése*.
67. K. B. [Károly Burián], "Az anarchisták demokráciája," 24.
68. "A námesztói gyilkosság," *Alkotmány* (7 February 1900): 8; "Zsidó-radikális zenebona," *Alkotmány* (15 September 1900): 6; "Rágalmak iskolája," *Hazánk* (20 August 1901): 3.
69. "Katholikus tiltakozó gyűlés a fővárosban," *Alkotmány* (16 May 1911): 5; "A kat. népszövetség nagygyűlése," *Budapesti Hírlap* (16 May 1911): 32–34. The Catholic People's Union was founded in 1908 on the model of the *Volksvereine für das Katholische Deutschland*. It had almost 300,000 members in 1914. Gergely, *A keresztényszocializmus Magyarországon*, 49–50; Szabó, "A magyar Néppárt," 130–31.
70. Miklóssy, "Zsidóság a külföldön és nálunk," 2–3.
71. "Antiszemita!" *Élet* (24 May 1914): 669.
72. *Az 1906*, vol. 5, 196. For mentions by historians of Hencz's speech, see Szabó, *Az újkonzervativizmus*, 267; Kovács, *Törvénytől sújtva*, 31, 54, 69; Kerepeszki, *A Turul Szövetség*, 157; Paksa, "A numerus clausus és módosítása," 138.
73. "A numerus clausus," *Alkotmány* (12 January 1907): 1.
74. Előpataki, *Aforizmák a zsidókról*, 22–23.
75. -szky [Biloveszky József], "Szomorú statisztika," 2–3.
76. J. M. [János Molnár], "A Tanáregyesület ügyéhez," 2.
77. Among the many antisemitic leaflets published after the fall of the Republic of Councils, see, for example, *A zsidók rémuralma Magyarországon. 1919. március 21-től augusztus hó 1-ig* ([Budapest] [1919]); Csopják, *A magyar zsidóság sok és nagy bűne*; Dánér, *A magyarországi zsidókérdés megoldása*; Kmoskó, *Zsidó-keresztény kérdés*. For an analysis of these writings, see Csunderlik, *A "vörös farsangtól" a "vörös tatárjárásig."*

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