

IMMIGRATION, INTEGRATION, MULTICULTURALISM

AN OVERVIEW OF IMMIGRATION POLICIES OF GERMANY IN THE CONTEXT OF ETHNIC CONFLICTS DURING THE SECOND HALF OF THE 20TH CENTURY

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Introduction

Shortly after the wave of refugees to Europe had reached its peak in 2015, a book with the following peculiar title was published by political scientist Herfried Münkler and literary historian Marina Münkler: *The new Germans. A country looks to its future*.¹ The book examines the issues of immigration, as well as the inclusion and integration of refugees from outside Europe from the perspective of the immutability of national identity – joining a long-lasting discourse and leading to further debates after its publication.²

The overriding idea of the book is that the refugee crisis has not only revealed the fundamental problems of the German society but has also shown that old Germany is, irrevocably, a thing of the past. The authors argue that although immigration and the mass influx of refugees are not exceptional and untroubled phenomena, Germany has always managed to reposition and readjust itself. “We are the new Germans” – proclaim the authors in their slightly provocative work. The provocation of the book lies in the authors’ emphasis on the fact that Germany has to become an *immigration country*. It is common knowledge that this issue has been debated for decades in Germany wherein one of the oddest responses was formulated in 1984: “the Federal Republic is not a country of immigration, with

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¹ MÜNKLER, Herfried – MÜNKLER, Marina: *Die neuen Deutschen. Ein Land vor seiner Zukunft*. Berlin, Rowohlt, 2016, in newer edition: Rowohlt Taschenbuch, 2017.

² MINNAARD, Liesbeth analyzed the nation-forming effects of immigration through literary examples: *New Germans, New Dutch. Literary Interventions*. Amsterdam, Amsterdam University Press, 2008. See in particular the first chapter on national identity („National Identity. The Discursive Production of Germanes and Dutchness”), pp. 15-50, WUNDERLICH, Tanja: *Die Neuen Deutschen. Subjektive Dimensionen des Einbürgerungsprozesses*. Stuttgart, Lucius & Lucius, 2005, in newer edition Berlin, Walter de Gruyter, 2016, TIBI, Bassam: *Islamische Zuwanderung und ihre Folgen. Der neue Antisemitismus, Sicherheit und die „neuen Deutschen”* (Wer sind die neuen Deutschen?) Stuttgart, ibidem-Verlag, 2017. See in addition Gülsüm Serdaroglu’s documentary *Die Neuen Deutschen. Dokumentarfilm über Kulturen, Menschen und Identität* (2015), as well as the audio book *Die neuen Deutschen. Vom Dreißigjährigen Krieg bis heute. 400 Jahre Einwanderung nach Deutschland*, 2017 of Die Zeit’s series „Geschichte”.



immigrants”.³ However, if Germany is (going to be) an immigration country, it will be populated by a different German people – sounds a possible objection that transforms the assumptions into an issue of the integration of immigrants.

Is the integration of the masses immigrated to Germany going to be successful? The Müncklers answer this question by recalling the logic of Pascal’s wager. According to Pascal, if we are to decide whether believing or not believing in God is more rational we should bet the former without hesitation since this way if we gain, we gain all; if we lose, we lose nothing.⁴ According to the authors of *The new Germans*, it is rational to bet the success of the integration of refugees on the same basis since – in their opinion – this is the only option with social benefits, while those betting its failure gain nothing. They add that in this case, bettors themselves influence the outcome of wagers because those betting the failure will, rationally, not do anything for its occurrence. It is not our job here to decide on the reliability of this logic; it is sufficient to note that the Pascalian argumentation – whose persuasion strength alone can be a matter of debate – cannot be employed in this case as it assumes that integration takes place within the culture of today’s Germans. However, the characterization of the German people as a *multiethnic* society does not preclude that it moves into a *multicultural* direction which would have a fundamental impact on the conditions of integration.

An interesting feature of the book is that it approaches this issue from the perspective of *change and identity*. Certainly, this issue has been part of human reflection for a long time in diverse areas. For instance, this general issue is touched upon by asking the question how long a person is identical with himself – acknowledging that his body’s cells are replaced every seven years and that during his spiritual development, his habits, disposition and personality go through a significant change every six or seven years entering a new phase. The question of identity in circumstances of change can also be raised in respect of collective entities. The most well-known of these questions concerns the problem of state identity: in what circumstances can, for instance, today’s Republic of Serbia be considered identical with the former State Union of Serbia and Montenegro or with the Serbian member state of former Yugoslavia? Similarly, is the Hungarian State of 1920 identical with the Hungarian Kingdom prior to 1918? Recently, issues of this kind have been intensively discussed mainly in the context of constitutional identity: if a state enters an international integration – which

³ “Die Bundesrepublik ist ein Nichteinwanderungsland mit Einwanderern”, cf. Die Zeit. 1984. Issue 39. For the list and source of the answers characteristic for the period between 1973 and 2015 concerning Die Zeit see (<https://www.zeit.de/2015/38/deutschland-einwanderungsland>) in Die Zeit Online. For the German “immigration machine” see Heins, Volker: Spiegel der Menschheit? Die Zukunft der Migrationsmaschine Deutschland. In: Populismus und Extremismus in Europa. Gesellschaftswissenschaftliche und sozialpsychologische Perspektiven. BRÖMMEL, Winfried – KÖNIG, Helmut – SICKING, Manfred (eds.). Bielefeld, Transcript Verlag, 2017, pp. 149-166.

⁴ Cf. PASCAL, Blaise: Gondolatok [Pensées]. Trans. PÖDÖR, László. Budapest, Gondolat Könyvkiadó, 1983. Note 233. There is a massive academic literature on Pascal’s wager and this particular problem; see e.g. HÁJEK, Alan: Pascal’s Wager. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Zalta, Edward, N. (ed.) 2017. <https://plato.stanford.edu/.../pascal-wager>.

inevitably shapes its characteristics – how long can its constitution be considered identical with the constitution it had before the entry? The issue of “new Germans” is interesting because it raises the above mentioned questions in the context of one *people* and one *nation*: how long can a community with a significant number of other peoples and ethnic groups – including extra-European ethnic groups with their particular skin colors, slanted eyes and dreadlocks – be considered identical with the *German* people and nation? Anticipating these introductory thoughts, I examine below the immigration and integration policies that have characterized Germany’s (until 1990, West Germany’s) social-political life.

1945–1955: The Age of Forced Displacement

The post-World War II German society has been characterized by several factors. One of its most significant characteristics is related to the protocol of the Potsdam Conference, according to which 8-12 million ethnic German people were displaced to Germany between 1945 and 1955 by the great powers. Or to put it differently: by endorsing the principle of collective guilt, that many people were forced out of East-Central Europe and “accepted” by Germany (with modified territories on its eastern borders after the war).

Giving in to the coercion from public authorities, 3 million people from Czechoslovakia, 1.4 million from the pre-war Polish territories, 300 thousand from the free city of Danzig, 200 thousand from Hungary, and 130 thousand people from Romania were displaced to the German “motherland”. The expulsion was incited not only by the revenge of the victorious powers and collective guilt (which was always denied) but also by the will to create an ethnically clean territory: something that was not completely rejected in those times, or at least was not alien to the (Western) great powers. According to the protocol of the Potsdam Conference, German ethnic groups had to leave former East Prussia, Poland (which was in formation according to the decision of the great powers), Czechoslovakia, and Hungary. The protocol suggested that displacement needs to be carried out “in an organized and humane way”; however, practice, it very often materialized in a different way. It is well known, for instance, that many of the Germans displaced from Hungary fled back to their homeland.⁵

⁵ See MERTEN, Ulrich: *Forgotten Voices. The Expulsion of the Germans from Eastern Europe after World War II*. New Brunswick, Transaction Publishers, 2013. From the relatively massive literature on the displacement of Hungarian Germans see – inter alia – FEHÉR, István: *A magyarországi németek kitelepítése, 1945-1950* [*The Displacement of Hungarian Germans, 1945-1950*]. Akadémiai Kiadó, 1988 APOR, Balázs: *The Expulsion of the German Speaking Population from Hungary. = The Expulsion of the ‘German’ Communities from Eastern Europe at the End of the Second World War*. PRAUSER, Steffen – REES, Arfon (eds.). EUI Working Paper. [<http://cadmus.eui.eu>] HEC No. 2004/1, pp. 33-46; ZINNER, Tibor: *A magyarországi németek kitelepítése* [*The Displacement of Hungarian Germans*]. Budapest, Magyar Hivatalos Közlönykiadó, 2004; KIRSCH, András: *A soproni németek kitelepítése* [*The Displacement of Germans from Sopron*]. Sopron, Escort, 2006; and KISARI, Miklósné: 1946: *A mezőberényi németek kitelepítése. Hiánypótló történelemkönyv* [1946: *The Displacement of Germans from Mezőberény. A Niche History Book*]. Mezőberény, Mezőberényi Német Hagyományápoló Egyesület, Mezőberény öröksége 3, 2014. It needs to be pointed out that on the basis of an international agreement – after the so-called Beneš decrees had practically deprived them of their citizenship,

Forced displacements in the 1950s and 60s amounted to more than 60% of the population growth in Germany. Although the newly arrived usually got low-skilled jobs they could still contribute to the growth of the economy.

1955–1973: The Rome Convention and the Recruitment of Guest Workers

The phase following the displacement of ethnic Germans was characterized by the recruitment of guest workers. It commenced in 1955 with the conclusion of a so-called German-Italian recruitment agreement in Rome. As a prelude to the agreement, in November 1954 German Minister of Economy Ludwig Erhard held a meeting with the Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs and negotiated the temporary(!) admission of 100-200 thousand workers despite the relatively low unemployment rate of 7% (in certain federal states, 5%). It was followed by subsequent agreements in the period between 1960 and 1965: in 1960 with Greece and Spain, in 1961 with Turkey, in 1964 with Portugal, in 1968 with Yugoslavia, in 1963 and 1966 with Morocco, and in 1965 with Tunisia. As a result, Turkish, Greek, Portuguese, Yugoslavian, Spanish, Moroccan, and Tunisian guest workers were invited mainly to those sectors of the economy in which low qualifications were sufficient for getting a job, and thus “guests” could also contribute to the development called “German economic miracle”. The invited guest workers partly increased labor supply, compensated for its deficiencies,⁶ and performed so-called buffer functions.⁷ Due to the *increasing* function, the number of foreign workers in Germany between the years 1959 and 1968 was in constant growth, amounting to an increase from around 166 thousand to more than 1 million. On the basis of the *compensating* function guest workers replaced low-skilled, unskilled, and uneducated German workers, thus pushing German skilled workers toward more highly qualified jobs. The *buffer function* meant that in the case of a decrease in demand or layoffs it was foreign workers who were dismissed in the first place. The 1966/67 recession very well illustrates this: in areas of highly cyclical production, the decrease in foreign workforce was around 30% in total.

In the 1970s, these led Germans to realize that although they wanted to invite *workers*, they got *people* – with their respective social, economic, cultural and, most importantly,

basic rights and goods – some 76 thousand Hungarians in Slovakia were displaced to Hungary and thousands of Slovaks in Hungary to Czechoslovakia. For this issue, see *A szlovákiai magyarok kényszertelepítései emlékezete 1945–1948. Visszaemlékezések, tanulmányok, dokumentumok* [The memory of forcible displacement of Hungarians from Slovakia 1945–1948. Memoires, Studies, Documents]. László SZARKA (ed.). Komárom. MTA Etnikai-nemzeti Kisebbségkutató Intézet – Kecskés László Társaság, 2003; *A felvidéki magyarok kitelepítése és deportálása 1945–1948 között. Szöveggyűjtemény a korszak tanulmányozásához* [Displacement and Deportation of Hungarians from Slovakia between 1945 and 1948. A Text Book for Studying the Period]. Komárom, Kecskés László Társaság, 2014.

⁶ See HERBERT, Ulrich: *Geschichte der Ausländerpolitik in Deutschland. Saisonarbeiter, Zwangsarbeiter, Gastarbeiter, Flüchtlinge*. Bonn, Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, 2003, pp. 203–207.

⁷ For the so-called buffer function see BADE Klaus J. 2000. *Europa in Bewegung. Migration vom späten 18. Jahrhundert bis zur Gegenwart*. München, C.H. Beck, pp. 317–331.

religious systems.⁸ The originally planned rotation policy never materialized in the Federal Republic of Germany. The main reason for this was that the forced displacement of workers was rendered impossible by the recruitment agreements concluded with Greece, Italy and Spain – mainly due to the rights granted in the European Community. Only a clause in the German-Turkish agreement enabled the subsequent displacement of foreign workers. Eventually, the main and strongest opponents of the displacement of workers were German companies that did not want to replace their already trained workforce.

Nevertheless, the policy changed, and more and more political forces tried to reduce “immigration” which at that time stood for the employment of foreigners as guest workers⁹ and for their establishing themselves in Germany. In October 1965, a political slogan was formulated (for the first, but not last time) declaring that the Federal Republic of Germany is “not a country of immigration”.

1973: Guest worker stop. 1973–1990: The Age of Adjustments

In the period between 1968 and 1973, the proportion of foreign workers in Germany rose further, reaching its peak: in only a couple of years’ time, the number of guest workers rose from 1.014 million to 2.595 million.

Since 1972, Turks have constituted the biggest national group of guest workers in Germany. The number of foreigners who arrived in Germany for reasons other than employment increased from 815 thousand in 1967 to 1.37 million in 1973. More and more guest worker-immigrants started to have a habitual residence in Germany demonstrating their aim to settle down in the country in the longer term. The situation caused many conflicts; due to the problems that had arisen but could not be solved, Germany ordered the *stop of guest worker recruitment* on 23 November 1973. However, it did not have a significant effect,¹⁰ or only negative effects, namely, that the employment of foreigners already in Germany decreased but illegal immigration¹¹ and the proportion of foreigners living in the country for more than 10 years increased. Foreigners living permanently in Germany received the social benefits of the welfare state that was created in the first decade

⁸ “Wir wollten Arbeitskräfte importieren und es kamen Menschen” [We wanted workers, but we got people]. Cited in: MEIER-BARUN, Karl-HEINZ: *Deutschland. Einwanderungsland*. Frankfurt a. Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 2002, p. 408.

⁹ But who is a “guest worker”? In the 1960s, low-skilled Portuguese guest workers with poor German knowledge were invited to Germany, while 40 years later, highly qualified workers from leading industrial sectors like digital and information technology with German knowledge.

¹⁰ See BOMMES, Michael: *Die Planung der Migration*. In: Michael BOMMES: *Migration und Migrationsforschung in der modernen Gesellschaft*. Institut für Migrationsforschung und Interkulturelle Studien, Themenheft IMIS-Beiträge 338, Universität Osnabrück, pp. 115-136.

¹¹ For a comparison of the German and Italian illegal immigration, see FINOTELLI, Claudia: *Illegale Einwanderung, Flüchtlingsmigration und das Ende des Nord-Süd-Mythos: zur funktionalen Äquivalenz des deutschen und des italienischen Einwanderungsregimes*. Münster, LIT Verlag, 2007, pp. 58-61.

of the second half of the 20th century and entered into its golden age in the subsequent two decades.

As a consequence, from the perspective of immigration and integration, the 1970s and 80s became the so-called *age of adjustments* wherein – apart from the declaration that “Germany is not a country of immigration” – there was an attempt to find a solution to the contradictions of immigration policies. For instance, on the grounds of family reunification, a grant was provided to guest workers returning to their home countries. The underlying concept was simple: 10.500 German Marks of “repatriation grant” (*Rückkehrhilfe*) was provided to foreign workers who return to Turkey.¹² As a result, the return of workers to Turkey commenced; however, those who returned had to face unemployment.¹³ The consequences of the ill-considered political decision regarding the repatriation grant soon became apparent on the German side, as well: many availed themselves of the grant, returned home, but after becoming unemployed there, returned back to Germany in a few years’ time. Due to the constantly rising number of immigrants, xenophobia showed its first signs in the 1980s. In the early 1980s, a study of the so-called Sinus Institute¹⁴ – the first social survey in this area – showed that a considerable part (13-15%) of the population in West-Germany had far-right political views. For instance, 14% (assuming representativeness, 5 million Germans) of the respondents said that they want the Führer back; according to 16% Germany’s welfare was overshadowed by parties and trade unions; while 18% agreed with the following statement: „As a matter of fact, Germany was better under Hitler”. In the same period, Golo Mann – Angelus Gottfried, i.e. Thomas Mann’s son – put it the following way: *Das Boot ist voll!* (The boat is full). These – namely, right-wing political views and xenophobia on the one hand and the disappearance of solidarity on the other – were two interrelating answers, none of which proved historically fortunate.

1990–2000: The Age of Xenophobia

Xenophobia further increased until the early 1990s leading to mass demonstrations as well as racist and xenophobic atrocities. Although immigration data remained moderate in the 1980s relative to the earlier periods, the numbers swiftly increased again in the 1990s.

¹² Cf. SCHROEDTER, Julia HENRIKE: Ehemuster Von Migranten in Westdeutschland. Analysen Zur Sozialen Integration Auf Basis Des Mikrozensus. Berlin, Springer, 2012. 115-117. The repatriation grant was sometimes combined with the educational and training support of those staying in Germany. For a detailed analysis on this system see OLTMER, Jochen: *Migrationsregime vor Ort und lokales Aushandeln von Migration*. Berlin, Springer, 2017, pp. 333-337.

¹³ As a result of the grant, some 300 thousand foreigners per year returned home. For the repatriation grant, see HERBERT, U.: *ibid.* (2003), pp. 254-255.

¹⁴ See Fünf Millionen Deutsche: „Wir sollten wieder einen Führer haben...” Die SINUS-Studie über rechtsextremistische Einstellungen bei den Deutschen. Sinus Institut Reinbeck bei Hamburg (ed.), 1981. Although some authors argue that the methodology of the analysis was disputable they agree with the relevancy of the alarming results of the survey.

During the Helmut Kohl administration, the number of immigrants grew from 4.6 to 7.3 million amounting to a 73% growth in 17 years. The ratio of immigrants from time to time exceeded that of the “guest worker era”. It was mainly the result of the massive changes taking place in world politics such as the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the wars concerning the dissolution of Yugoslavia, as well as human rights abuses in Turkey’s Kurdish regions. The reunification of Germany in 1989-90 further complicated the relations with immigrants. The increasing number of immigrants led to racism and xenophobia giving way to violent mass demonstrations in cities like Heuersverda, Rostock, Möln or Sollingen.¹⁵ In the mid-1990s, with the decrease in the number of immigrants, these mass demonstrations and atrocities (burning down of houses, murder of Turks, bombings) came to an end. The decreasing number of immigrants in the mid-1990s was, in the first place, a result of the so-called “asylum compromise”. Its 1993 implementation led to a situation in which Germany granted asylum to those fleeing persecution but deprived those passing “a safe third country” this right arguing that in such a way they lose their right to asylum in Germany.

2000-2010: Uneven Integration, Uneven Multiculturalism

In the 2000s, dual citizenship became available which meant that children of foreigners, who were permanent residents in Germany and had the possibility to settle down there, could – under certain conditions – get a German passport. It was a major change that marked a significant “reinterpretation” of German citizenship. Formerly, only those could acquire German citizenship who were either born to German parents or met special conditions. After 2000, however, – under certain conditions – also those born in the *territory* of Germany could get dual citizenship in case their parents’ homeland had a special agreement with Germany. The specification of the conditions obviously referred to Turks. They could acquire and hold dual citizenship on the long term; children, who obtained German passports and were born to parents with long-term residence permits, could and had to choose between the citizenships when reaching adulthood.

In 2005, a new immigration law was enacted declaring that integration became the legal obligation of immigrants. The law enabled the acquisition of temporary residence permits (*Aufenthaltserlaubnis*, *Niederlassungserlaubnis*). This was the first time that attending a language course became the legal condition for acquiring a residence permit.

¹⁵ For a summary of right-wing movements and an overview of early research, see special issue 27 of the year 1996 of the journal *Politische Vierteljahresschrift: Rechtsextremismus. Ergebnisse und Perspektiven der Forschung*. Hans-Gerd JASCHKE – Jürgen FALTNER – Jürgen WINKLER (eds.). For the correlations between immigration and xenophobia, see in particular FIJAKOWSKI, J.: *Transnationale Migration und Rechtsextremismus*, *ibid.*, pp. 211-231., as well as KÜCHLER, Manfred: *Xenophobie im internationalen Vergleich*, *ibid.*, pp. 248-264. For this issue see also *Rechtsextremismus und Fremdenfeindlichkeit. Bestandsaufnahme und Interventionsstrategien*. DÜNKEL, Frieder – GENG, Bernd (eds.). (Volume 6 of *Schriften zum Strafvollzug, Jugendstrafrecht und zur Kriminologie*) Mönchengladbach, Forum Verlag Godesberg, 1999.

In 2006, an integration summit was held in Germany, which was attended by the chancellor, representatives of religions, as well as representatives from different communities, the media, trade unions, employers, employees, various charity organizations and immigrants. It was motivated, among others, by a so-called PISA study measuring the educational progress of students. The summit saw the adoption of the National Integration Plan and a dialogue with Muslims. As a result, an “Islam conference” was held in 2006, attended by the government, Muslim associations, as well as individuals. The National Integration Plan was implemented in 2007 when a new residency claim (“long-term residence permit”) was introduced for the tolerated (*gedultete*) in case they met certain criteria. In 2008, citizenship exams were introduced requiring knowledge of the German language, history, law and culture. The standard for language requirements was also raised. These steps suggest that German immigration policies considered the reassuring settlement of the status of those living in Germany to be inevitable on the long run, as well.

In 2013, around 16.5 million people – amounting to 20.5% of the total population (in cities, 46% of children) – had a migrant background. In 2011, the same ratio was 19.5%. In statistics, the term “migrant background” is often debated. According to the Federal Statistical Office, this background is to be attributed to people who moved to the territory of the Federal Republic of Germany after 1949 as well as to foreigners who were born there as such and at least one of whose parents immigrated to Germany or was a foreigner born in Germany. (This term is used since 2005 in statistics.)¹⁶ As of 2013, 1.5 million people immigrated to Germany – parallel to 780 thousand emigrants –, thus, amounting to a population growth of 403 thousand in that year. This was the highest population growth since 1993. Out of the 1.5 million immigrants in Germany, 750 thousand came from member states of the European Union, and more than half of them were Poles. In 2012, a “blue card” was introduced as a kind of permanent residence permit for the highly qualified coming from outside the EU. The card received a lot of criticism because its holders earned a minimum annual wage of 66 thousand Euros. Another changing trend in the 2000s was the growth of immigrants from Southern Europe: accordingly, the number of Greek immigrants increased by 78% in 2011. Furthermore, 86 thousand of students have studied at German universities who obtained their high school certificates elsewhere. In 2012 and 2013, the number of asylum seekers increased by 70%, whereas in 2014 and 2015, 23-24% (thus, one fourth) of the asylum seekers came from Syria (10% from Serbia, 8% from Eritrea, 14% from Kosovo etc.).

The facts outlined above clearly illustrate that on the level of an immigration or integration analysis it is impossible to answer the question whether the changes between

¹⁶ The source of data is the Statistische Bundesamt <http://www.destatis.de>. For the developments in the 2000s, see Handbuch Staat und Migration in Deutschland seit dem 17. Jahrhundert. OLTMER, Jochen (ed.). Berlin, Walter de Gruyter, 2015, and particularly the studies of Barbara DIETZ (pp. 999-1020) and Holger KOLB (pp. 1021-1039). Concerning integration policies – with an extensive outlook on integration theories – cf. HECKMANN, Friedrich: *Integration von Migranten. Einwanderung und neue Nationenbildung*. Berlin, Springer, 2014.

1945 and 2010 created a *new* German *people* or *nation* or not. However, the question can be raised whether the changes in the last two or three decades have transformed the German nation state or not.

In order to answer this question, it needs to be taken into consideration that nation states generally have two major periods. The first one is the period of homogeneous or *homogenizing* nation states that balance their respective societies on linguistic, cultural, religious, economic, and social grounds. This period – lasting for around two or three hundred years – was *the* characteristic for nation states until the mid-20th century. As a result of the catastrophes and various crises in the 20th century, nation states in Western Europe started to pursue a *poliethnic* nationality policy by the middle of the century. It meant that national differences and traditions – for instance, various local autonomies in Spain, different regions in Belgium, as well as countries in Great Britain which gave up their autonomy a few centuries ago – were tried to be politically harmonized. Regional states were born, and *poli-* as well as *multiethnic* policies became the norm. In the 2000s, the general consequence was that *multicultural* societies were born. The vast majority of Western European states did, for a while, support a version of multiculturalism which was considered a way of maintaining the various national, ethnic and social cultures. However, – with the parallel growth of populist far right groups – this led to certain problems in the 2010s that politicians attempted to solve with well-known statements.¹⁷ Despite the fine words, the main tendencies have remained unchanged ever since: immigrants arrive in large numbers and their integration is only partly successful. In view of all this, below I examine in detail the meaning of multiculturalism from the perspective of the state.

Detour: A State Theoretical Interpretation of the Concept of Multiculturalism

Multiculturalism is well-known for its undefined and indefinable nature.¹⁸ The reason for this is that it refers at the same time to a certain, undefined range of *facts* and *values (norms)*,

¹⁷ “Attempts to create a multicultural society have failed” – declared Angela Merkel in 2010. Similarly, David Cameron argued in 2011 that “multiculturalism has failed”. For its journalistic analysis see, inter alia, WEAVER, M.: *Angela Merkel: Multiculturalism has „utterly failed”*. In: Guardian. 17 October 2010. See www.guardian.co. As a general theoretical problem cf. TARAS, Raymond: *Challenging Multiculturalism. European Models of Diversity*. European. Edinburgh, Edinburgh University Press, 2012.

¹⁸ “The terms »multicultural« and »multiculturalism« have no clear or fixed meaning. They may be used simply to record the fact that all contemporary societies – or at least all contemporary liberal democracies – contain a plurality of distinct cultural groups, and that this cultural pluralism is going to persist for as far ahead as we can reasonably foresee” MILLER, David: *On Nationality*. Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1995, p. 130. For the debated nature of the term see Multikulturalität in der Diskussion. Neuere Beiträge zu einem umstrittenen Konzept. EROL, Yildiz (ed.). Wiesbaden, VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften. 2008; and EGEDY, Gergely: *(Multi)-kultúra – konzervatív olvasatban [(Multi)culture – in a conservative reading]*. In: Konzervativizmus az ezredfordulón [Conservatism at the change of the millennium]. Budapest, Magyar Szemle Könyvek, 2001, pp. 53-70; and EGEDY, Gergely: *A multikulturalizmus kihívása: értjük-e Európát? [The Challenge of Multiculturalism: Do we understand Europe?]*. In: Kommentár. Issue 2016/2, pp. 73-86.

and – in some countries – to both *reality* and *ideology*.¹⁹ One of the most visible consequences of this dichotomy is that politicians – if they are smart enough – can easily maneuver between them. The so-called multiculturalism policy index²⁰ illustrates that Western societies – despite some deadlocks²¹ – have become more multicultural than ever. Multiculturalism in Western Europe is not only a demographic fact or an everyday (culinary and consumer)²² experience but also part of the political order of the society. In political sense, multiculturalism stands in the first place for certain policies and not for institutions. It is present in countries where positive steps are taken for the equality and acceptance of immigrants or other groups in the following areas in a certain way and to a certain extent:

- 1) constitutional, legislative, or parliamentary affirmation of multiculturalism,
- 2) the adoption of multiculturalism in school curriculum, especially regarding the so-called culture mediation,
- 3) the inclusion of ethnic representation in the mandate of public media,
- 4) exemptions of certain groups from religious dress codes,
- 5) facilitating the acceptance of dual citizenship,
- 6) the funding of ethnic organizations to support cultural activities,
- 7) the funding of bilingual education or mother tongue instruction of the respective groups, and
- 8) affirmative action for disadvantaged immigrant groups.²³

If steps are taken in all eight areas the respective country is considered the most multicultural (policy score: 8); however, if only in one, it is regarded the least multicultural (policy score: 1). Nonetheless, some analysts argue that even the lowest scoring countries can be considered multicultural. On this basis, the following countries were regarded multicultural in 2010:

¹⁹ FEISCHMIDT, Margit (ed.): *Multikulturalizmus [Multiculturalism]*. Budapest. Osiris Kiadó-Láthatatlan Kollégium, 1997, pp. 8-9. Multiculturalism is an official ideology in Canada and Australia in the first place, while it forms part of the official ideology in Great Britain and Germany through the concepts of multi-racial nation and Einwanderungsland (country of immigration). For its ideological features see WETERLY, Paul: *Multiculturalism*. In: *Political Ideologies*. WETERLY, Paul (ed.) Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2017, pp. 325-360.

²⁰ For the multiculturalism policy index see TOLLEY, Erin: *Multiculturalism Policy Index*. Immigrant Minority Policies. Kingston [Kanada, Ontario], Queen's University School of Policy Studies Publication Unit, 2011. (<http://www.queensu.ca.../mcp/sites/webpublish/...pdf>).

²¹ See BANTING, Keith – KYMLICKA, Will: *Is there Really a Retreat from Multiculturalism Policy? New Evidence from the Multiculturalism Policy Index*. In: *Comparative European Politics*. Vol. 11. Issue 2013/5, pp. 577-598.

²² Multiculturalism as a consumer experience can raise equally complex problems as multiculturalism that is considered part of the political order; see Fish, Stanley: *Butik-multikulturalizmus, avagy miért képtelenek a liberálisok a gyűlölet beszédéről gondolkodni [Boutique multiculturalism, or why liberals are incapable of thinking about hate speech]*. Magyar Lettre International. Issue 31: Issue 1998/4. (originally published in: *Critical Inquiry*. Issue 23. Vol. 1997/2, pp. 378-395.), pp. 378-395.

²³ Cf. KYMLICKA, Will: *Multiculturalism. Success, Failure, and the Future*. Migration Policy Institute Europe, 2012, p. 7.

- Australia (8),
- Canada and Belgium (7.5),
- Sweden (7),
- Finland, New Zealand (6),
- the United Kingdom (5.5),
- Ireland (4),
- Norway, Spain, Portugal (3.5),
- the United States of America (3),
- Germany, Greece (2.5),
- France, the Netherlands (2),
- Austria, Italy (1.5), and
- Switzerland (1).²⁴

As with all measurements, this one is also disputable on the grounds of the measures and reliability of the measuring instrument. Although there might be objections to the policy scores of the respective countries, the index, in general, indicates the receptive and appreciative nature of Western societies. It is, however, very telling that Germany is not on the top of the list; with its policy score of 2.5, the country is considered multicultural but only to a moderate degree.

In political terms, multiculturalism can be regarded as the successor but not the continuation of pluralism. The former is also considered a principle constructing political structure, while the latter is in essence *identity politics* whose aim is to allow members of certain communities to claim respect of their cultural and religious identity, solely on the basis of group membership. For this reason, it is also called „diversity politics”. Nevertheless, it retains its characteristic of being originally evolved in relation to immigration to Western societies;²⁵ thus, its primary subjects are *immigrant ethnic groups*, although in certain countries – to a varying degree and extent – it includes *other groups* that are neglected, oppressed or insulted by the dominant culture. It has been most visibly extended to women and sexual minorities (e.g. homosexuals), as well as to the descendants of the indigenous and aboriginal population of certain countries. In the European societies, the basis for the acceptance of immigrants is freedom of religion which is not much emphasized in the United States because of the local nature of the state-church relation. In Europe, however, the problems raised by multiculturalism – as the majority of immigrants is Muslim – emerge as part of a Muslim-Christian conflict.

²⁴ Source: TOLLEY, op. cit. (2011). (The policy scores of particular countries are shown in brackets.)

²⁵ The argument that multiculturalism arises in Europe in relation to immigration (cf. ARIËNS, Elke – RICHTER, Emanuel – SICKING, Manfred (eds.): *Multikulturalität in Europa: Teilhabe in der Einwanderungsgesellschaft*. Transcript Verlag, Bielefeld, 2013) is not a unique but the typical one. However, it is not insignificant, what kind of an immigration is in question: in the United States, immigration after the end of the “melting pot policy”, while in Australia the first wave of European culture export – that is, Asian immigration following the creation of “white Australia” – opened the door for multiculturalism.

As for the nature of states, multiculturalism is the *last stage of the repel of homogenizing nation states*, whereby states essentially lose their nationally dominant characteristic and – since their dominant characteristic has primarily been the nation for two decades – in a certain sense, their national character, as well. It is well demonstrated by a brochure published in 1982 by an Australian public body, which informs both newly arrived immigrants and citizens about the nature of the Australian society.²⁶

One of the differences between the Australian and German attitudes to multiculturalism lies in the fact that it was the representatives of mostly East-Asian religious groups (Confucianism, Shintoism, Taoism) and believers of the so-called Indian religions (Buddhism, Hinduism) that immigrated to Australia, while it was Muslims immigrating to Europe – and thus to Germany. Islam's vision of the relationship between state and church and the way it views the private sector of society largely differ not only from what Christianity has, for centuries, developed in this respect but also from the approach of Asian religions to this issue.

One of the most significant issues faced by states orienting toward multiculturalism is the way of *integrating* immigrants. For countries without a strong and firm dominant culture (such as Canada) or countries that are uncertain about their culture (like Australians with their notion of “English, white Australia”) multiculturalism might seem more promising than assimilation. It is not a coincidence that the call for *assimilation* was the loudest in the United States where an “American nation” was formed in the course of the 150-year-long “melting pot policy”. Both warning and counter-reaction were the loudest there; see, for instance, the

observations of Samuel P. Huntington,²⁷ with a regional diagnosis.²⁸ The political analysis was completed by self-criticism and correction: “In the 1990s, however, the leaders of the

²⁶ It argues that “multiculturalism is (...) much more than the provision of special services to minority ethnic groups. It is a way of looking at Australian society, and involves living together with an awareness of cultural diversity. We accept our differences and appreciate a variety of lifestyles rather than expect everyone to fit into a standardised pattern. Most of all, multiculturalism requires us to recognise that we each can be »a real Australian«, without necessarily being »a typical Australian«.” Cf. [N. N.], 1982, quoted by STRATTON – ANG, 2013, p. 145. The problems that would arise in the multicultural atmosphere of European metropolises in 2-3 decades' time on the basis of the same policy do not even underpin the brochure's optimistic vision. On the grounds of these problems – for instance, the emergence of “parallel societies” or “ethnic inclusions”, Sharia courts operating in the suburbs of Brussels and London, etc. – a close relationship is still and often assumed between the “real” and “typical” English, German, or French, arguing for the existence of “echte” Germans, “real” Brits, and „vrai” French, etc.

²⁷ “Western culture is challenged by groups within Western societies. One such challenge comes from immigrants from other civilizations who reject assimilation and continue to adhere to and to propagate the values, customs, and cultures of their home societies. This phenomenon is most notable among Muslims in Europe, who are, however, a small minority. It is also manifest, in lesser degree, among Hispanics in the United States, who are a large minority. If assimilation fails in this case, the United States will become a cleft country, with all the potentials for internal strife and disunion that entails. In Europe, Western civilization could also be undermined by the weakening of its central component, Christianity.” Cf. HUNTINGTON,

United States have not only permitted that but assiduously promoted the diversity rather than the unity of the people they govern. [...] The American multiculturalists [...] Instead of attempting to identify the United States with another civilization, however, they wish to create a country of many civilizations, which is to say a country not belonging to any civilization and lacking a cultural core. History shows that no country so constituted can long endure as a coherent society.”²⁹

However, the ideas above cannot be formulated solely from a conservative point of view. Indeed, in a sense, the assessment of Jürgen Habermas overlaps with it, as well – on the basis of facts and not their evaluation. According to him, states are pressured by globalism from the outside and by multiculturalism from the inside. As a result, they are unable to fulfill their traditional functions (e.g. mitigating the consequences of natural disasters or international population movements), the boundaries of their sovereignty are becoming blurred, the cohesive force of national communities weakens, and the democratic legitimacy of nation states – as the basis of the welfare states is being shaken – becomes powerless. Consequently, the age of territorially sovereign nation states is over and – as Habermas put it – it has given way to a *postnational constellation*.³⁰ And in a postnational constellation there are no nation states. For the time being it is hard to answer what kind of states it includes; therefore, just like in other areas, states following the age of nation states are usually – and without much creativity – referred to as “postnational states”. In the political practice – where words transform into votes, influence and, finally, power – this is only rarely articulated.³¹

Samuel P.: *A civilizációk összecsapása és a világrend átalakítása [The clash of civilisations and the remaking of world order]*. Budapest, Európa Könyvkiadó, 2015, p. 529.

²⁸ “Immigration, however, was a potential source of new vigor and human capital provided two conditions were met: first, if priority were given to able, qualified, energetic people with the talents and expertise needed by the host country; second, if the new migrants and their children were assimilated into the cultures of the country and the West. The United States was likely to have problems meeting the first condition and European countries problems meeting the second.” HUNTINGTON: op. cit. (2015), pp. 524-527.

²⁹ Ibid.

³⁰ HABERMAS, Jürgen: *A poszt nemzetközi állapot és a demokrácia jövője*. In: *A poszt nemzetközi állapot. Politikai esszék*. Budapest, L'Harmattan Kiadó – ZSFK, Varietas Europae, 2006. pp. 56-102. For the interpretation of “postnational” – in relation to postnationalism – see further KYMLICKA, Will: *Nacionalizmus, transznacionalizmus és poszt nacionalizmus [Nationalism, transnationalism and postnationalism]*. Replika. 2007. Issue 59, pp. 63-92.

³¹ Not surprisingly, it is articulated in countries where multiculturalism is at an advanced stage. Prime Minister of Canada, Justin Trudeau stressed, for instance, that Canada is becoming a new kind of state, which “is not defined by its European history but by the multiplicity of its identities from all over the world.” “Countries with a strong national identity – linguistic, religious or cultural – are finding it a challenge to effectively integrate people from different backgrounds”, he said in an interview. “In France, there is still a typical and an atypical citizen. Canada does not have that dynamic... There is no core identity, no mainstream in Canada. There are shared values – openness, respect, compassion, willingness to work hard, to be there for each other, to search for equality and justice. Those qualities are what makes us the first postnational state.” Lawson, Guy: *Trudeau's Canada, Again.* = *The New York Times Magazine*. 8 December 2015. Demonstrating his wisdom and understanding of human nature, the journalist making the interview added

Conclusions

To conclude, it can be argued that homogeneous, or more precisely, homogenizing nation states in the West have become states pursuing poli- or multiethnic policies in the last seventy years. In the last three or four decades, some of these states have switched to a multicultural social policy. Multiculturalism is able to eliminate the traditional, state-based cultural core of the society, and – in a historical sense – it evolves in this direction according to its dynamic. Therefore, it can be argued that multi- or poliethnic states pursuing a multicultural policy have a real chance to cease to be states of a particular nation. Those who are against it must stop history. The effect of critical analyses on the problems of “new Germans” points in this direction.³²

that Trudeau said all these “with peculiar Canadian understatement mixed with dynastic confidence” seeming “like a man at the beginning of a very big, and very uncertain, journey”.

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