Divine Event: Philosophical and Theological Approaches

Robert Grzywacz
Ignatianum University in Cracow, Poland
https://orcid.org/0000-0001-8353-6238
robert.grzywacz@ignatianum.edu.pl

REVELATION AS EVENT: RICOEURIAN DISCOURSE AND RICHIRIAN AFFECTIVITY IN THE INTERPRETATION OF BIBLICAL PREHISTORY*

Abstract: This study compares Paul Ricoeur's philosophy of symbolic and linguistic mediation and Marc Richir's transcendental phenomenology in their distinct approaches to revelation through the act of reading biblical prehistory. For Ricoeur, reading involves the intentional exteriorization of discourse, achieving semantic autonomy by projecting a world of text. This interpretive process enables self-purification from narcissistic illusions. Analyzing *Genesis*, Ricoeur emphasizes creation's foundational but inaugurated character, separate from datable history. Biblical accounts are polyphonic, revealing creation as a fragile, broken order. Richir utilizes a hyperbolic phenomenological reduction to reach a realm anterior to symbolic structures. This primordial phenomenalization is connected to non-intentional *phantasia*, fundamentally driven by blind affectivity. Reading constitutes an affective event, employing perceptive *phantasia* to facilitate empathy into characters' non-positional emotional lives. Richir critiques the 'false self' and rejects the traditional interpretation of biblical prehistory. Through Melville, he interprets Ahab's hunt for Leviathan as a tyrannical challenge to creation, demonstrating that Moby Dick embodies the sublime, negative figure of affectivity distorted by tyranny and self-hatred. The *Billy Budd* narrative exposes the inevitable horizon of tyranny underlying the socio-political order. The paper argues that both thinkers seek to liberate selfhood from narcissistic illusions. Ricoeur achieves this through reading as the symbolically mediated event. Richir instead demands an immediate appeal to affectivity.

Keywords: *Ricoeur, Richir, Melville, discourse, affectivity, revelation, biblical prehistory*

*

© 2026. This work is openly licensed via CC BY-NC 4.0., which enables reusers to distribute, remix, adapt, and build upon the material in any medium or format for noncommercial purposes only, and only so long as attribution is given to the creator. Canonical URL: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/

Robert Grzywacz (2026). "Revelation as Event: Ricoeurian Discourse and Richirian Affectivity in the Interpretation of Biblical Prehistory." In M. Nyírő, Zs. Lurcza, P. Makai (eds.): *EVENT and Its Mediation: Interdisciplinary Perspectives in Philosophy, Religious Studies, Literary Studies, and Cultural Theory* (61–81). Miskolc: Miskolc University Press, Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences. https://doi.org/10.70832/EVENTanditsMediation.01

1. Introduction

This paper presents a comparative analysis of Paul Ricoeur's philosophy of symbolic mediation and discourse and Marc Richir's transcendental phenomenology, focusing on their distinct interpretations of the event of revelation through biblical prehistory, specifically the opening chapters of *Genesis*. The central aim is to demonstrate that while both thinkers seek to liberate selfhood from narcissistic illusions, they achieve this goal through different means: Ricoeur through the linguistic mediation, and Richir through the appeal to the immediacy of affectivity. Both authors propose intriguing and penetrating interpretations of biblical prehistory, while almost incidentally articulating weighty anthropological conclusions.

2. Ricoeur and Revelation

Paul Ricoeur is often described as a philosopher of mediation, particularly symbolic and linguistic mediation. In his view, revelation can occur only through mediations, and especially through textual ones. The concept of text is defined fundamentally as "any discourse fixed by writing".[1] Such a definition, in turn, directs us to the question of what discourse is. Ricoeur understands it as a structured event in which someone says something to someone about something.[2] This process involves several essential components of discourse: A speaker, a saying, a said or a sense, a world or reference, established rules, and an address. Thus, discourse itself functions as a text.

With respect to revelation, what is at stake is the 'world' projected by the text.[3] Language, or speech, realizes itself as discourse through an intentional exteriorization. This exteriorization allows the linguistic event to surpass itself and to achieve enduring signification, thereby enabling inscription in writing. When discourse is exteriorized in a written work, its unique style synthesizes the character of the original event with its resulting meaning. Writing is therefore key to the semantic autonomy of the text, allowing the written work to be detached and subsequently reinserted into a new situation through the act of reading.

The function of semantic reference undergoes a profound alteration when discourse becomes text. This alteration occurs because it is no longer possible to point directly to the object being discussed as something belonging to the shared situation of dialogue partners. When discourse is transposed into text, its reference becomes

1 Paul Ricœur, *Hermeneutics and the Social Sciences*, transl. John B. Thompson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016), 107.

2 Paul Ricœur, *Figuring the Sacred: Religion, Narrative, and Imagination*, ed. Mark I. Wallace, transl. David Pellauer (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1995), 220; Paul Ricœur, *Interpretation Theory: Discourse and the Surplus of Meaning* (Fort Worth, TX: Texas Christian University Press, 1976), 9–10.

3 Ricœur, *Hermeneutics and the Social Sciences*, 94–106.

that of a projected world. Crucially, the suspension or abolition of first-order reference – something that occurs especially in works of fiction and poetry – is the necessary condition for the liberation of a second-order reference. This second-order reference allows the text to reach the world at the fundamental level of the life-world *(Lebenswelt)*, as defined by Husserl, or at the level of being-in-the-world, in Heidegger's sense.[4]

To interpret a text means to articulate the specific mode of being-in-the-world disclosed in front of that text. The task of interpretation focuses on the unique world-proposition offered by the text — a world into which the reader may step and dwell in order to project one of their most authentic possibilities. Reading functions paradoxically: It appears alternately as an interruption of the flow of action and as a renewed impetus toward action. This duality arises from the dual role of reading as confrontation and connection between the imaginary world of the text and the actual world of the reader.[5]

In this process, the reader undergoes a kind of 'self-irrealization' that corresponds to the irreality of the fictional world they enter. Reading is therefore conceived as an unreal space in which reflection may pause. Yet the reader, whether consciously or unconsciously, incorporates the insights gained from reading into their existing worldview, thereby enhancing its intelligibility.[6] In this sense, reading constitutes a milieu through which the reader passes. The profound confrontation between the world of the text and the world of the reader is simultaneously marked by stasis (a temporary halt) and impetus (an impulse). The ideal type of reading achieves a fusion without confusion of the horizons of expectation belonging to both the text and the reader. This fusion represents the "fragile unity of stasis and impetus"[7] as two essential moments within the process of refiguration. It is suggested that "the more readers become unreal in their reading, the more profound and far-reaching will be the work's influence on social reality".[8]

Ricoeur's theory employs the concept of threefold *mimesis*: The movement from prefiguration to configuration, and finally to refiguration. This threefold *mimesis* is understood as the work of imagination, realized through the interweaving of the intentionalities of history and fiction — namely, the fictionalization of history and

4 Ibid., 103–104.

5 Paul Ricœur, *Time and Narrative, Vol. III*., transl. Kathleen Blamey and David Pellauer (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988), 179.

6 Paul Ricœur, *Time and Narrative, Vol. I*., transl. Kathleen McLaughlin and David Pellauer (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984), 71, 76–81.

7 Ricœur, *Time and Narrative, Vol. III*., 179.

8 Ibid.

the historicization of fiction.[9] This intertwining of historical and fictional factors, enacted in the act of reading, brings about the narrativization of the reader's identity.[10] The findings hitherto concerning the mimetic process in Ricoeur's view and the act of reading must now be related to a specific group of texts, with due consideration of the possible approaches and modes of reading applicable to them.

Three principal types of reading are explicitly identified, alongside a contemporary methodological approach to Bible. First, historical reading should avoid being burdened with dogmatic prejudices. Secondly, confessional reading is tied to feeling one's membership in a community and a religious tradition. It represents the 'confessional side' of the text. Although serving its own specific objectives, the confessional reading should not remain blissfully ignorant of the historical light cast on the text. Finally, philosophical reading is described as distinct from the reading done for religious community membership, although the activity of reading draws them closer. The philosophical reading of biblical texts must not ignore the confessional side or the findings of historical and philological investigations. The type of reading adopted in what follows corresponds to the last one, speaking in favor of a plural reading method.[11]

At first glance, one might regard biblical hermeneutics as a regional form of hermeneutics in relation to philosophical — and thus general — hermeneutics, implying its subordination to a broader philosophical framework. Theological hermeneutics may initially be viewed as a specialized hermeneutics applied to a particular class of texts, namely the biblical texts. However, theological hermeneutics exhibits such unique characteristics that the relationship gradually reverses, culminating in philosophical hermeneutics becoming subordinated to theological hermeneutics, serving as its instrumental tool.[12] This is the case for several reasons.

In biblical texts, according to Ricoeur, God is named in diverse ways: in narrative, as the subject of a story; in prophecy, as the one who speaks in his own name; in prescription, as the source of imperative command; in wisdom literature, as the source of meaning; and in hymns, as the one invoked in the second person. The word 'God' cannot be reduced to the philosophical concept of 'being'; it conveys more because it presupposes the entire context of narratives, prophecies, laws, wisdom writings, psalms, and so forth. "The referent 'God' is thus intended by the convergence of all these partial discourses. It expresses the circulation of meaning among all the forms

9 Ibid., 180–192.

10 Ibid., 245–248.

11 Paul Ricœur, *Critique and Conviction: Conversations with François Azouvi and Marc de Launay*, transl. Kathleen Blamey (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), 139–141.

12 Paul Ricœur, *From Text to Action: Essays in Hermeneutics, II*., transl. Kathleen Blamey and John B. Thompson (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1991), 89–90.

of discourse wherein God is named."[13] Moreover, it not only serves as the index of the mutual belonging of the original forms of discourse of faith, but also acts as the index of their individual incompleteness.

In confronting the specificity of biblical texts as described above, in the act of reading, the reader may, as a result of refiguration, undergo a peculiar transformation. The reader is called upon to 'repeat' the ceaseless oscillation between the withdrawal of the name of God, whose bearer becomes each individual, isolated discourse naming him, and the quest for a center. The unity of God correlated with the withdrawal of his name is mirrored, on the side of the self, by the disappearance of the ego and the stripping away of selfhood while the center remains pursued. This pursuit of a personal center reflects only an 'imaginative unity', which is perpetually deferred by the withdrawal of the name. Ultimately, revelation articulates a 'shattered' identity — a unity that must always be newly regained.[14]

Crucially, "the self of self-knowledge is not the egotistical and narcissistic ego whose hypocrisy and naivete the hermeneutics of suspicion have denounced, along with its aspects of an ideological superstructure and infantile and neurotic archaism. The self of self-knowledge is the fruit of an examined life, to recall Socrates' phrase in the Apology. And an examined life is, in large part, one purged, one clarified by the cathartic effects of the narratives, be they historical or fictional, conveyed by our culture."[15] It thus turns out that the refigurative effect of reading consists, among other things, in the purification of selfhood from narcissistic tendencies.

3. Richir and Revelatory Phenomena

The focus now shifts to Marc Richir and his perspective on revelation. Richir employs a hyperbolic phenomenological reduction that extends beyond Husserl's own reductions. This radical move excludes not only the ontological positing of structures but also intentional and eidetic structures, thereby seeking access to a realm more fundamental than the symbolic and ontological orders. Phenomena originally phenomenalize themselves within schematism, which functions as a transcendental matrix for individual phenomena and is understood as an unpresentable transcendental rhythm.[16] This matrix is conceived as a field of flickering appearances

[13] Ricœur, *Figuring the Sacred: Religion, Narrative, and Imagination*, 227–228.

[14] Paul Ricœur, *Amour et justice* (Paris: Seuil, 2008), 73–74.

[15] Ricœur, *Time and Narrative, Vol. III*., 247.

[16] Marc Richir, *Phénomènes, temps et êtres: ontologie et phénoménologie* (Montbonnot / Saint-Martin: Jérôme Millon, 1987), 17–62; Alexander Schnell, *Le sens se faisant: Marc Richir et la refondation de la phénoménologie transcendantale* (Bruxelles: Editions Ousia, 2011), 46–63; Staudigl Michael, "Marc Richir i fenomenologia," *Principia* 70 (2023): 57–64.

that precede their symbolic and linguistic institution. Richir stresses the original inadequacy between phenomenon (as mere phenomenon) and its symbolic institution. An architectonic transposition separates the perpetually unstable phenomenological concretudes from their fixation or positing in being. The schematism in question operates within the primordial and likewise unpresentable *chôra*. It articulates phenomena in their initial dispersion, condensation, and explosion — phenomena that Richir refers to as mere phenomena deprived of internal consistency. This motion is fundamentally driven by affectivity, which functions as a blind, anonymous motor within a dimension of absolute inwardness.[17]

This primordial register of phenomenalization constitutes the domain of non-intentional *phantasia*, whose significance, for Richir, exceeds that of intentional imagination. *Phantasia* is the most archaic form of phenomenalization. Its transposition into the order of symbolic institution (language) and the domain of ontology only occurs through acts of intentional imagination. The essence of the act of imagining lies in its intentionality toward an object *(Bildsujet)*, but the intuitive figuration *(Darstellung)* of that object is not what is directly aimed at. This figuration (as a *Bildobjekt*) assumes a paradoxical role: it is not itself an intentional object (not even an imaginary one), nor is it posited for its own sake. Rather, it mediates a specific position, often described as a quasi-position. Its irreality grants it the status of both nothingness and simulacrum, lacking inherent autonomy.[18]

Figuration is characterized as a 'perceptive appearance', which is neither an act of intentional aiming nor the passive reception of an 'imprint'. By contrast, *phantasia* is, for Richir, intermittent and discontinuous, emerging and vanishing in flashes, and is crucially non-present. Its protean nature makes it non-figurative of intentional objects, meaning it is nebulous and internally mutable. Consequently, phantasia is both non-positional (not posited by an ego) and non-intentional in the classical sense. Richir posits that the intentional act of imagination is instituted upon the phenomenological basis of *phantasia* through a kind of immobilization of temporalization in presence. *Phantasia* relates to this specific temporalization in presence, which occurs without an assignable present. Through a momentary halt of this primordial temporalization *phantasia* is transposed into the intentional act of imagining in the guise of 'perceptive appearance'. When a reader deeply engages with a novelistic narrative, imagination (intuitive figuration) arises only in fleeting and ephemeral moments.[19]

---

17 Marc Richir and Sacha Carlson, *L'écart et le rien* (Grenoble: Jérôme Millon, 2015), 147–244; Marc Richir, *Le Corps: essai sur l'intériorité* (Paris: Hatier, 1993), 12–15.

18 Marc Richir, "Imagination et Phantasia chez Husserl," *Eikasía: Revista de Filosofía* 40 (2011): 15–24.

19 Marc Richir, "Du rôle de la phantasia au théâtre et dans le roman," *Littérature* 132 (December 2003): 24–26, 29–33.

In an effective act of reading literature, one has to do with a temporal unfolding of an intrigue among living characters without the necessity of any physical or figurative embodiment. When successful, reading engages far more 'perceptive' *phantasia*, allowing the reader to 'perceive' a 'consistency' or 'concreteness' *(Sachlichkeit)* belonging to the character, existing in presence but outside of any assignable present. Any attempt at visual adaptation (like film) is immediately disappointing, as no actor can capture the character's full complexity.

The core of the reader's activity lies in achieving empathy *(Einfühlung)* into the concrete life of the characters — their "movements of the soul" or "labyrinths of affectivity".[20] This experience is non-positional; the reader feels and understands these plays without positing them in reality. The writer's art, contained in the text, awakens these 'perceptive' *phantasiai* in the reader. Richir asserts that the text should contain indeterminacies rather than overly detailed descriptions, because detailed descriptions appeal to imagination, destroying "phenomenological vivacity". [21] Moreover, 'perceptive' *phantasia* opens onto a concreteness whose horizon is reality — not only in the theater but also in literature. This concreteness exists in perpetual transition between 'pure' *phantasia* and reality, manifesting in a free play without rules. This explains why, for any given literary character, there are potentially many defendable interpretations.[22]

Richir also voices caution concerning the selfhood, noting that nothing may be more indiscreet with regard to the intimacy of the true self than the 'stories' the 'false self' constructs in an attempt to impose coherence upon life. This process is deceptive above all because affectivity intervenes in the form of specific affects. These manufactured 'stories' — whether seductive or repulsive, happy or unhappy — are invariably indiscreet, precisely because they appear to reveal to the narrator the secret or key to their own personality. Here there arises a dangerous collusion between what is indiscreet and what is false. The primordial element whose secret seems to have been uncovered is in fact a pseudo-primordial entity, whose deception is so cunning that, owing to the cleavage or dissociation at play, the true primordial element seems to have been 'forgotten' within it.[23]

In summary, it may be said that for Richir, the text serves as a vehicle for 'perceptive' *phantasiai* that awaken 'life' in the reader. At the same time, he warns against hasty and premature attempts at systematizing experience, which — driven by narcissistic illusion — take place at the expense of living affectivity.

---

[20] Ibid., 31.
[21] Ibid., 30.
[22] Ibid., 28.
[23] Marc Richir, "Le tiers indiscret: Ébauche de phénoménologie génétique," *Archivio di Filosofia* (2007): 169–173.

4. Ricoeur and the Revelatory Aspects of the Biblical Prehistory

Let us now consider how both conceptions of the event of revelation are transposed into the deciphering of the meaning of several key episodes of biblical prehistory, as attested by the opening chapters of Genesis.

Ricoeur, in his reading of biblical prehistory, focuses on the philosophical and hermeneutical implications of the biblical narratives of creation, especially in relation to the history of salvation and the human experience of evil. Following the reading of André LaCocque, Ricoeur accepts that creation belongs to prehistory, the events of which set in motion a dynamism that operates at the very heart of history.[24]

The central hypothesis is that the relation between prehistory and datable history, called the relation of precedence, must be conceived in terms of the intersection of two lines of interpretation. The first stresses the existence of a radical caesura between primordial time and historical time, the impossibility of their chronological coordination. The second emphasizes the inaugural value of the events of the undatable beginnings with respect to the history they initiate. The stories of Gen 2–3 universalize the description of the human condition, transcending the ethnic qualifications of the Jewish people. They function etiologically, explaining the present order of things by their unfolding in primordial time.[25]

Taking first into account the idea of the separation of prehistory from datable history, Ricoeur distinguishes both a formal and a theological aspect of this idea.[26] The first contributes to the overthrow of several historical prejudices concerning creation. First — and here Ricoeur expresses a conviction convergent with Richir's — it turns out that the notion of creation out of nothing *(creatio ex nihilo)* was unknown prior to the Hellenistic period. Meanwhile, the oldest biblical narrative (Gen 2) describes the creative act by means of a formula denoting shaping, conferring form and coherence. Even the didactic poem contained in Gen 1 speaks of the abyss and darkness as already existing, and God's word creates through successive separations of the elements. The notion of creation out of nothing corresponds to much later speculations, which Leibniz relates to the radical origin of things. Next, the separation of prehistoric from historical time serves to problematize the idea of a single, total creation, which appears only in Gen 1 but not in Gen 2–3. The latter chapters recount the creation of man, animals, woman, and the emergence of evil, that is, multiple beginnings, rather than presenting a homogeneous and unifying

[24] André LaCocque and Paul Ricoeur, *Thinking Biblically: Exegetical and Hermeneutical Studies* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998), 31–67; Paul Ricœur, *Critique and Conviction: Conversations with François Azouvi and Marc de Launay*, 31–67.

[25] Ibid., 32–34.

[26] Ibid., 34–38.

account. Furthermore, on the formal side, the rendering of prehistory is accomplished polyphonically, through the participation of a plurality of literary forms: a narrative that sequentially and intelligibly orders events, a didactic poem, hymnic forms. This literary polyphony corresponds to a plurality of models of conceiving the dynamism of the beginnings of creation (following C. Westermann): the model of struggle (Psalms), of fabrication (Gen 2–3), of the word calling into existence (Gen 1). And the traces left by the model of struggle in the other accounts once again bear witness to the post-Hellenistic origin of the speculations from which the idea of creation out of nothing arose.

It further appears that the formal idea of separation finds its substantial reflection in Gen 2–3, which Ricoeur reads as the story of a progressive separation, a differentiation of creation from the Creator, culminating in the 'withdrawal' of God and the expulsion of human beings from the garden of paradise.[27] The stages of this separation are the following: 1) the status of the nature as external and emancipated in relation to the Creator; 2) the establishment of a boundary (the prohibition) becomes the structural mark of the created order and a constitutive property of human finitude, which enables proximity within distance; 3) the transgression of the prohibition reveals in turn a kind of fracture or fissure present in creation, its inherent fragility, and thus introduces a hermeneutics of suspicion undermining the clause of sincerity and the bond of trust, and signaling a sudden transformation of human desire: "When the limit is suspect as a structure, the desire for unlimitedness flows through the breech thereby opened."[28] At the continuation of the narrative, the expulsion from the garden acquires the status of a final separation, which brings to an end the proximity within distance that had characterized the condition of creation. Nevertheless, the desire for unlimitedness, the knowledge of good and evil, and discernment as an expression of responsibility for oneself remain a summary of the ambivalence of the human condition and, at the same time, a phantasm in which it reaches its culminating point.

Turning now to the second line of interpretation of the relation of precedence belonging to biblical prehistory, Ricoeur underscores its foundational, inaugural character.[29] Founding events, such as creation, establish a circular relation with subsequent events. Thus a reading carried out under the sign of discontinuity is complemented by a reading that valorizes continuity. Already the episodes narrated in Gen 2–3 may be schematically represented by means of three concentric circles, illustrating the unprecedented emergence of a new reality: the creation of the world, of humanity, and the appearance of destructive evil. The subsequent chapters, Gen 4–

[27] Ibid., 38–46.
[28] Ibid., 43.
[29] Ibid., 46–54.

11, interpreted from this point of view, recount the manifestation of entirely new realities, situations, relations, or institutions. We would then have such events as: the birth of a child, the first fratricide, the foundation of the city, pastoral life, musical instruments, metallurgy, or cult.[30]

Further history — the datable one — will reveal the dissemination of these beginnings, these founding and inaugural events. Relative beginnings, in turn, activate the symbolism of absolute beginnings, establishing a circular relation of semantic reciprocity. Returning to an earlier theme, Ricoeur remarks: "It is never a question of a Creation *ex nihilo*, the beginning is not unique by definition, and a first event cannot be represented by a point on a line. These events have a temporal thickness that calls for the unfolding of a narrative."[31] In this sense, founding events are endowed with the 'energy of the beginning': they not only precede and inaugurate history but also mobilize it in the course of its development. What is more, the beginning itself is spoken of only 'after the fact', in the course of this unfolding.[32] Thus the biblical narrator projects the experience lived from the perspective of his contemporaneity back onto its beginnings, an operation that approximates such retrospective procedure to the work of the scientist seeking the genesis of a phenomenon. But he could not accomplish this if he were not already somehow acquainted with the idea of the beginning, which he inherits from a prior transmission, narrating an already given situation and human condition. In this way, the subject undergoes a radical decentering: projecting his own present experience onto beginnings, he becomes the recipient of diverse ways in which those beginnings have already been spoken. Thus the biblical discourse of beginnings has the status of a 'broken' discourse.[33]

Recapitulating his meditation on creation and the first chapters of Genesis, Ricoeur first emphasizes the cosmic realism of creation as a certain order.[34] Yet this order, according to Ricoeur, is furthermore characterized, on the one hand, by contingency, and on the other, by fragility. The contingency of creation corrects the idea of an order close to necessity in such a way as to indicate the paradox of the genesis of necessity in contingency: the struggle with chaos, the fabrication analogous to craftsmanship, or the efficacy of the word. Fragility, in turn, points to the existence of a discrepancy or dissonance between the order of creation and the experience of evil. It suggests an internal susceptibility of order to threat, not merely to an external conflict opposed to it. The biblical tree of knowledge ultimately signifies exposure to an alternative, which entails the susceptibility of the created order to disruption and ruin (or salvation). As a

30 Ibid., 47–48.
31 Ibid., 49.
32 Ibid., 50.
33 Ibid., 54, n. 42.
34 LaCocque and Ricoeur, *Thinking Biblically: Exegetical and Hermeneutical* Studies, 55–58.

result, the rather archaic model of struggle seems to surreptitiously animate the narrative development of biblical prehistory.

Ricoeur concludes his reflections by returning to the idea of the precedence of prehistory with respect to datable history, and by taking up the distinction between beginning and origin. Apart form some historical translational decisions,[35] Ricoeur evokes a mode of thought proposed by Franz Rosenzweig.[36] This contemporary philosopher offers thinking on the basis of a conceptual framework whose nodal points are creation, revelation, and redemption. The relations among these points he interprets in terms of a profound temporality, irreducible to linear representations of chronology. Creation, revelation, and redemption do not follow upon one another, but are structured in layers. The creative act manifested in the world is an immemorial past which, however elusive, is at the same time a continually renewed beginning. Revelation, by contrast, is the dialogical and regenerating, ever-repeated address to the individual in the present. Redemption, in turn, is the advent of a new reality as an historical magnitude. Creation "always already there"[37] unites both separation from origin and the impossibility of coordination with historical chronology, on the one hand, and the emergence of multiple beginnings inaugurating history — founding events — on the other. The immemorial past allows us to think simultaneously of an origin that reaches us by way of transmission, of a prior word always already spoken and present, and of an origin that recedes from present experience toward an elusive absolute beginning.

5. Richir on the Revelatory Dimension of the Biblical Mythology

With Richir, the situation is different. First, because he does not devote as extensive a portion of his oeuvre to biblical texts as does Ricoeur. Even the threads of biblical origin present in his thought — which do appear and form the basis of the joint reading proposed here of their revealing content — are generally analyzed by him in a concise and incidental manner, often in the context of another issue. An exception is his book on Herman Melville,[38] in which, through the reading of the central work *Moby Dick* and the author's literary testament *Billy Budd*, the motifs of biblical prehistory that concern us emerge. However, before letting *Melville: Les assises du monde* serve as our guide, it is worthwhile to briefly recall the broader context of Richir's biblical references and the significance of the concepts guiding these references.

35 Ibid., 61–65.
36 Ibid., 65–67.
37 Ibid., 67.
38 Marc Richir, *Melville: Les assises du monde* (Paris: Sens & Tonka, 2013).

Richir turns to the Bible, biblical myths, and Hebrew traditions above all in the context of a critique of premature transition into the register of ontology, an analysis of the symbolic institution of culture and socio-political coexistence, and the opposition of the idea of original guilt to primordial innocence. The first issue connects with the general outlook of Richir's philosophy, which explores areas anterior to symbolic institution, that is, areas in which the dynamic process of phenomenalization — the appearing and disappearing of fleeting and evanescent phenomena – and the making of sense are not immobilized by embedding them in a given ontological order and replaced with a set of ontological simulacra. In this context, biblical prehistory, as a bearer of a highly original mode of thinking, functions as the symbolic institution of both monotheism and humanity — the primordial couple with their offspring.[39] At the same time, it carries out the elimination of mythologies — which Richir distinguishes as a broader category from more localized myths — understood as the symbolic institution of divine lineage and the legitimation of the ruler (the despot), while nevertheless preserving the pluralism of mythologies. This is indicated by the traces of the model of struggle in the account of creation already noted by Ricoeur, which Richir also emphasizes, especially in his critique of the notion of creation *ex nihilo*.[40]

Finally, Richir's own original interpretation of biblical traditions serves to critique and reject the concept of original guilt, as inherited from Heideggerian and Levinasian thought (the idea of substitution), as well as from the idea of the primordial fall referring to the metaphysical characterization of the human condition, which he fundamentally opposes to his phenomenology. By contrast, his own proposal entails the defense of a more primordial innocence, in the sense of a Nietzschean "innocence of becoming".[41] This concept of original innocence pertains to the innocence of experience: Chaotic, dramatic, or serene,[42] a point vividly illustrated in the pages of the book on Melville.

The book under discussion offers the most comprehensive access to Richir's reading of biblical prehistory. Let us now examine this interpretation, each time beginning from a very concise summary of the fundamental motifs of Melville's two principal works.

The core narrative of *Moby Dick* follows Ishmael, the narrator, who joins a whaling voyage to experience the sea and discover the "ungraspable phantom of

39 Ibid., 209, 270–271.
40 Ibid., 117, 152, 210.
41 Friedrich Nietzsche, *The Will to Power*, transl. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Vintage Books, 1968), 299, 402, 416.
42 Richir and Carlson, *L'écart et le rien*, 22, 49–52.

life".[43] He ships aboard the Nantucket whaler, the Pequod, a ship adorned with whale trophies and possessing a melancholy air. Ishmael befriends Queequeg, a tattooed pagan harpooneer from Rokovoko. The ship is commanded by the monomaniacal Captain Ahab, an old man characterized by volcanic energy who had his leg severed by a very white, famous, and deadly monster named Moby Dick. Ahab's central motivation is audacious revenge against the White Whale, whom he sees as a "pasteboard mask" concealing an "inscrutable malice" he intends to "strike through".[44] He nails a gold doubloon to the mast, promising it to the man who first sights Moby Dick. Ahab's crew, including the mates Starbuck (conscientious but coerced), Stubb (jolly and indifferent), and Flask (pervading mediocrity), are swept up by Ahab's obsessive monomania. As the voyage progresses, the ship is surrounded by omens and warnings: Ahab shatters his navigational instrument, the quadrant, defying "science";[45] during a typhoon, lightning illuminates the masts, which Ahab defiantly claims lights the way to the White Whale. Starbuck sees the approaching fate and fears that obeying Ahab means disobeying God. Ahab believes his path is "immutably decreed" by fate.[46] On the third day of the final chase, Moby Dick is sighted. The whale is identified by its pyramidical white hump and wrinkled forehead. Ahab successfully harpoons the whale with a specially forged iron. The White Whale, in its dying fury, attacks and destroys the Pequod. Ahab is caught in the line and dragged to his death. The ship sinks, symbolized by the main-mast and the clinging flag, where Tashtego is dragged down, pulling a screaming sea-hawk with him. Ishmael is pulled towards the vortex of the sinking Pequod. But the vortex fills as he nears its inner circle. Up shoots the coffin-like buoy to which Ishmael clings for nearly twenty-four hours. The Rachel, still searching for its missing whale-boat crew, rescues him.[47]

According to Richir's main theses regarding Melville's heritage, *Moby Dick* is considered the condensed quintessence, center, and sun that powerfully radiates upon all of the author's other works.[48] The biblical references employed in *Moby Dick* center around three interconnected motifs: The tyrannical challenger who commits cosmic blasphemy (Ahab), the unconquered primordial chaos embodied by the sea monster (Leviathan), and the archetypal figure of the solitary outcast and eternal suffering (Ishmael and Job). Although these motifs do not refer exclusively, nor even primarily, to the biblical prehistory known from the Book of Genesis, they undoubtedly provide the most profound testimony to Richir's engagement with

43 Herman Melville, *Moby Dick; Billy Budd* (London: Octopus Books Limited, 1984), 26.
44 Ibid., 128.
45 Ibid., 345.
46 Ibid., 383.
47 Ibid., 390–391.
48 Richir, *Melville: Les assises du monde*, 20.

biblical themes. This is not, to be sure, a direct reading of the Bible itself, but rather an inquiry mediated first through Melville's interpretation; nevertheless, it best exemplifies the aforementioned points of convergence between the Belgian philosopher and the tradition of Hebrew thought. Let us now proceed to examine, one by one, the three motifs previously mentioned.

The character of Captain Ahab is immediately placed within a context of religious and political tyranny through his biblical namesake, King Ahab of Israel (1 Kings 16). The biblical King Ahab was tyrannical and idolatrous, a worshiper of Baal, who met a violent end when dogs licked up his blood. Melville uses this name to signify Captain Ahab's tyrannical nature. Richir further suggests that Melville's Captain Ahab has absorbed the magical attributes of the biblical king's wife, Jezebel. Captain Ahab is characterized as a blasphemer. His defiance reaches a climax in the sacrilegious baptism of the harpoon intended for Moby Dick, where he declares: "I do not baptize thee in the name of the Father, but in the name of the Devil."[49] Richir interprets this as a "strange pact",[50] which transforms Ahab into a tragic hero whose destructive will seeks to operate beyond the influence of both gods and demons. Ahab's tyranny is so pervasive that Melville uses his quest to explore the theological-political foundations of the world.

As far as the second motif is concerned, the central object of Ahab's quest, Moby Dick, is identified with the biblical Leviathan. This creature is described in detail in the Book of Job (40, 25ff and 41, 1ff). Leviathan is linked to the primordial forces of creation and chaos. It is indirectly associated with the 'dragons' *(tannînîm)* or sea monsters created on the fifth day in the Book of Genesis (1, 21). These monsters are tied to the biblical Abyss *(tehôm)*, which is related to the Mesopotamian goddess Tiamat. Richir highlights that early Jewish tradition (Isaiah, Job, Psalms) records a formidable struggle between the Creator (Yahweh/Jahwe) and the gigantic power of the Abyss, often figured as Leviathan. Ahab's pursuit of Moby Dick is thus interpreted as a "terrible and sacrilegious inversion" of God's challenge to Job: "Canst thou catch Leviathan with a hook?"[51] By attempting to hunt the Leviathan, Ahab is essentially trying to "complete the divine creation",[52] thus challenging God's omnipotence. Ahab's ambition is driven by a desire to uncover the deepest foundations of the world. Moby Dick, embodying Leviathan, symbolizes the Sublime and represents the "eternal existence of nameless terrors"[53] that predate Mosaic times. The antediluvian connection is reinforced by the description of Fedallah, Ahab's

49 Melville, *Moby Dick; Billy Budd*, 338 — originally in Latin.
50 Richir, *Melville: Les assises du monde*, 29.
51 Ibid., 38–39.
52 Ibid., 13, 31.
53 Ibid., 49.

Parsee companion, whose ominous presence recalls the 'first generations'. Richir references 'non-canonical Rabbis' who suggested that although Genesis speaks of angels marrying human daughters, "demons also gave themselves to earthly loves".[54]

The last of the aforementioned motifs pertains to the suffering of humanity and the figure of the solitary outcast. The biblical narrative frames the entire story through two figures: The reader/humanity, symbolized by Job, and the narrator, symbolized by Ishmael. Ishmael is the son of Abraham and Hagar. Richir characterizes him as a figure "without a place to dwell among men"[55] and a "lonely wanderer",[56] existing suspended between legality and illegality. Crucially, Ishmael is the sole survivor of the Pequod's catastrophe. This survival casts him in the symbolic role of one of Job's servants, who must bring the catastrophic news of the destruction of his master's property. Ishmael is linked to the "eternal pain"[57] of mankind. The figure of Job is omnipresent. Job, with his "miserable fate and perplexity",[58] symbolizes the reader and all of humanity for whom Melville is writing. The other minor biblical references, Captain Peleg (connected to the division of the earth in Chronicles 1, 19) and Captain Bildad (the moralizing interlocutor from the Book of Job), further anchor the events in a profound, foundational theological framework concerning human existence and suffering.

In synthesis, the biblical foundations of *Moby Dick* revolve around a sacrilegious cosmic struggle: Captain Ahab, driven by tyrannical monomania and an attempt to defy God's creation, seeks to conquer the primordial monster Leviathan, a challenge explicitly posed by Yahweh to Job. The destruction that follows leaves only Ishmael, the symbolic servant of Job, to bear witness to the eternal and solitary suffering that results from such a challenge. Delving into the deeper symbolic intrigue, Ahab's frenzied pursuit of the White Whale unconsciously repeats the primordial, cosmic battle between God and the Abyss — figures like Leviathan or Tiamat. Consequently, Ahab's suffering and his "flame soul"[59] allow him to perceive the enigma at the heart of God, reaching into the oldest layers of humanity's symbolic archaeology and mythological polytheism. Significantly, Moby Dick embodies the sublime. The White Whale is characterized as an unrepresentable and indescribable entity.[60] Richir elaborates that Moby Dick acts as a subtle and negative figure of affectivity, which has been tragically transformed into a monster due to the primary, oppressive vision of tyranny:

---

54 Ibid., 23.
55 Ibid., 17.
56 Ibid., 87.
57 Ibid., 57.
58 Ibid., 39.
59 Ibid., 30.
60 Ibid., 47, 49.

> It is as though, in his spiritual quest, Ahab sought to catch the monster of tyranny at the moment of its birth, in order to leave it behind and thereby gain access to the as yet unknown continent (or rather, ocean) of an innocent affectivity — older than God and the gods, for it is still free from the web of tyranny that disfigures it into terrifying monsters. Moby Dick, the White Whale, is thus, in Melville's language, the sublime yet negative figure of affectivity, transmuted by the apprehension of tyranny as something primordial. Once again, Ahab's hatred of the Leviathan — a hatred which, in itself, may already seem monstrous — is not hatred of affectivity as such, but hatred of an affectivity transformed into fate by tyranny; hence, a tyrannical hatred of tyranny, or rather, a hatred of the tyranny that resides in the innermost depths of the self, in order to uproot tyranny. A paradoxical hatred, therefore, and all the more intense insofar as it stands closest to love.[61]

Moreover, the most terrifying and spiritually significant symbol is the Whale's whiteness. This whiteness simultaneously serves as the most significant symbol of spiritual matters and an agent intensifying terror. This whiteness is described as the "lack of color" or "color through the absence of God".[62] This symbolic absence creates a "terrible sweetness"[63] and presents an "insurmountable wall".[64] The whiteness of the whale symbolizes philosophical chaos, atheism, and the absence of meaning within the void of the universe. Ultimately, Ahab's downfall is interpreted as the defeat of affectivity. His fatal hatred for Leviathan is actually a tyrannical hatred for the tyranny within himself. Moby Dick, therefore, represents Ahab's double, his deepest self. Because Ahab fails to move beyond this internalized tyranny and hatred, he cannot attain access to "innocent affectivity".[65] As Richir states:

> An abyss of affectivity in the process of losing its anchors, endlessly analyzing itself through the manifold traps laid within the endlessly shifting labyrinth of tyranny, which seeks — tyrannically — to surpass itself, to transgress its own limits. The monster that is the Leviathan cannot be wrenched from creation, because it is, ultimately, at the very core of ourselves; and because, within the ancient and immemorial regime of domination — whose decline the thoroughly modern Melville both seeks out and announces — we are incapable of giving form to our affectivity in any way other than through the figure of the monster. To tear the monster entirely out of ourselves would be to tear ourselves from ourselves —

61 Ibid., 44.
62 Ibid., 51.
63 Ibid., 50, 52.
64 Ibid., 52.
65 Ibid., 44.

> that is to say, to tear the gods — and God himself — from themselves as well. What remains — whiteness — becomes abominable, empty. There can be no tyrannical reversal of tyranny, for the tyrant is himself self-hatred, and it is precisely this hatred that converts affectivity into a monster, and into a monster that cannot be extirpated.[66]

The story of Moby Dick thus turns out to be a narrative about the transformations of our affectivity. Let us now cast a glance at the second of Melville's most important works.

The setting of the *Billy Budd* story is the year 1797, when Great Britain was engaged in war with revolutionary France. The narrative centers on the young sailor Billy Budd, a foretopman, who initially served aboard a merchant ship called the 'Rights of Man'. Billy was forcibly impressed into service on a warship named HMS Indomitable. Billy, a presumed foundling, is the "handsome sailor".[67] He is portrayed as extremely engaging, serene, and innocent. He possesses one physical flaw: He is prone to a vocal defect or stutter, which, during moments of strong heart-feeling or tension, can intensify into a convulsed tongue-tie. Billy becomes the object of persecution by Claggart, the ship's master-at-arms, who acts as a chief of police. Claggart attempts to organize a provocation by drawing Billy into preparations for an alleged mutiny. The young sailor, however, disregards the plot. Nonetheless, Claggart proceeds to accuse Billy of being a ringleader before Captain Vere. Captain Vere, who favors Billy and harbors contempt for Claggart, orchestrates a confrontation in his cabin. When summoned to offer his defense, Billy suffers a profound vocal impediment and loses his voice, unable to respond to the false accusations. In this state, the stuttering sailor unexpectedly "shot out"[68] his right arm and struck Claggart, causing the master-at-arms to fall to the deck dead. Billy is placed in custody. Captain Vere swiftly convenes a drum-head court. Under the Captain's insistent pressure, founded on adherence to martial law, the court condemns the handsome sailor to death. Just before his execution, Billy's words wholly unobstructed in the utterance, were these – "God bless Captain Vere!"[69] He was subsequently suspended from the yard-arm. Shortly after this event, Captain Vere died during a skirmish with a French frigate. His final words were reported to have been: "Billy Budd, Billy Budd".[70]

---

66 Ibid., 53.
67 Melville, *Moby Dick; Billy Budd*, 395–396, 399, and so on.
68 Ibid., 428.
69 Ibid., 441.
70 Ibid., 445.

Richir views Herman Melville's final work, *Billy Budd*, as the author's "literary testament",[71] primarily examining the theme of the "impossible foundation"[72] of the world. Specifically, the narrative is interpreted as a reversal of the proto-foundational myth of Cain and Abel (Gen 4, 1–16). In this case, it is a matter of the failed proto-foundation of humanity. This myth reveals the unimaginable "fundamental lie"[73] lying beneath the socio-political order. In this framework, the innocent Billy Budd (analogous to Abel/Hewel) embodies pure, yet silent, affectivity. Conversely, Billy strikes down Claggart (Cain), who represents the tyrant of perversion.

Richir centers his analysis on the figures of Billy Budd and John Claggart, viewing them as embodiment of the archetypal brothers. The name Abel (Hevel) signifies "breath" or "fleeting mist".[74] Abel is characterized as ephemeral, unstable, and possessing nothing, yet he is pure and his offerings are pleasing to God. Billy Budd represents this pristine innocence and is largely ignorant of the notions of good and evil. In the narrative, Billy Budd (Abel) is the one who kills Claggart (Cain).

The name Cain means "acquisition" or "possession".[75] Cain is the sedentary farmer and is interpreted by Richir as the founder, or even 'founding hero', of culture and civilization.[76] Historically, Cain, after his crime, founded the city of Hanok, which means 'foundation'.[77] Richir emphasizes that this foundation of Cain is viewed as a "failed foundation"[78] because it carries the inherent danger of despotism and tyranny. Claggart embodies this tyrannical potential, driven by jealousy and a passion to dominate and appropriate Billy's innocence.

Richir uses the inversion — where Billy Budd/Abel kills Claggart/Cain — to expose the tragic mechanisms underpinning social and political structures. The Law, embodied by Captain Vere — a figure who is neither a despot nor a tyrant, but a representative of the society — is subsequently forced to act. To restore order, especially in the context of war and recent mutinies, the Law is compelled to repeat Cain's original crime. Vere condemns the innocent Billy Budd to execution despite knowing his purity. This forced repetition of the proto-foundational crime — the murder of the innocent — is the critical moment that unveils the deep flaw in the human social-political order. The conclusion for Richir is that this necessity reveals

71 Richir, *Melville: Les assises du monde*, 59.
72 Ibid.
73 Ibid., 60.
74 Ibid., 64.
75 Ibid., 63.
76 Ibid., 64.
77 Ibid.
78 Ibid., 65.

the inevitable "horizon of tyranny"[79] that underlies human society. The law's attempt to restore order exposes its own complicity in violence, creating an unresolvable paradox,[80] "a symbolic aporia that is decidedly insoluble".[81]

Furthermore, the initial myth provides a concept of humanity as remnants of this failed founding moment. The blood of Abel, which cried out from the earth, contained the blood of his unborn children, who were later substituted by Seth, the third son of Adam and Eve. Thus, the history of humanity is a 'relic', or a sequence of "substitutes",[82] who survived the Flood through Noah, a descendant of Seth. *Billy Budd* functions as a "counter-legend" or "counter-myth"[83] which, by inverting the Cain-Abel story, questions whether a foundation based on innocence is even possible and highlights the resulting despair[84] regarding the foundations of the world. Ultimately, the "lost paradise"[85] that Melville attempted to articulate is the primitive and innocent affectivity which, had it prevailed, could have promised a new beginning and the cessation of the era of dominance.

6. Conclusions

The above inquiry into the discursive (in Ricoeur) and affective (in Richir) character of the event of revelation in relation to biblical prehistory has yielded several conclusions that may be articulated. First, it became apparent that both philosophers are deeply invested in the inner conflict within the human being, a conflict that finds affective expression. Ricoeur developed his reflections on this issue by probing human disproportion, affective fragility, and fallibility.[86] Richir, by contrast, became preoccupied with the phenomenon of splitting *(Spaltung)* in the human being and its pivotal significance for a phenomenological psychopathology.[87] Second, it may be said that, with regard to the conflict in question, Ricoeur unfolds a more affirmative line of thought, whereas Richir presents a more sceptical one. Third, what consistently differentiates the two philosophers is the question of the possibility of human renewal — that is, the resources that might serve such renewal. In Ricoeur, it is precisely the idea of creation in Rosenzweig's sense that is invoked as one possible

79 Ibid., 35.
80 Ibid., 60.
81 Ibid., 67.
82 Ibid., 64–65.
83 Ibid., 67.
84 Ibid.
85 Ibid., 89.
86 Paul Ricœur, *Fallible Man: Philosophy of the Will*, transl. Charles A. Kelbley (Chicago: Regnery, 1965).
87 Richir and Carlson, *L'écart et le rien*, 234–237; Marc Richir, *Phantasia, Imagination, Affectivité – Phénoménologie et anthropologie phénoménologique* (Grenoble: Jérôme Millon, 2004).

conceptualization of such resources,[88] whereas in Richir we encounter instead an emphasis on the failure of any foundation in innocence, the annihilation of the aspect of attractiveness constitutive of the moment of the sublime (Ahab), or the turning of the law against pure innocent affectivity (Billy Budd).

To conclude, one might say that, for both Paul Ricoeur and Marc Richir, the 'revelation' in question fundamentally consists in liberating the selfhood from its narcissistic illusions. However, the paths by which each thinker achieves this liberation differ profoundly. For Ricoeur, the path necessarily involves symbolic and linguistic mediation. For Richir, by contrast, it requires an appeal to the immediacy of affectivity, precisely in order to circumvent and avoid such narcissistic illusions.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

[1] LaCocque, André, and Paul Ricoeur. *Thinking Biblically: Exegetical and Hermeneutical Studies*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998.

[2] Melville, Herman. *Moby Dick; Billy Budd*. London: Octopus Books Limited, 1984. Nietzsche, Friedrich. *The Will to Power*. Translated by Walter Kaufmann. New York: Vintage Books, 1968.

[3] Richir, Marc. *Phénomènes, temps et êtres: ontologie et phénoménologie*. Montbonnot / Saint-Martin: Jérôme Millon, 1987.

[4] Richir, Marc. *Le Corps: essai sur l'intériorité*. Paris: Hatier, 1993.

[5] Richir, Marc. "Du rôle de la phantasia au théâtre et dans le roman." *Littérature* 132 (December 2003): 24–33.

[6] Richir, Marc. *Phantasia, Imagination, Affectivité – Phénoménologie et anthropologie phénoménologique*. Grenoble: Jérôme Millon, 2004.

[7] Richir, Marc. "Le tiers indiscret: Ébauche de phénoménologie génétique." *Archivio di Filosofia* (2007): 169–173.

[8] Richir, Marc. "Imagination et Phantasia chez Husserl." *Eikasía: Revista de Filosofía* 40 (2011): 13–20.

[9] Richir, Marc. *Melville: Les assises du monde*. Paris: Sens & Tonka, 2013.

[10] Richir, Marc, and Sacha Carlson. *L'écart et le rien*. Grenoble: Jérôme Millon, 2015.

[88] Paul Ricœur, *Memory, History, Forgetting*, transl. Kathleen Blamey and David Pellauer (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004), 441.

[11] Ricœur, Paul. *Fallible Man: Philosophy of the Will*. Translated by Charles A. Kelbley. Chicago: Regnery, 1965.

[12] Ricœur, Paul. *Interpretation Theory: Discourse and the Surplus of Meaning*. Fort Worth, TX: Texas Christian University Press, 1976.

[13] Ricœur, Paul. *Time and Narrative, Vol. I*. Translated by Kathleen McLaughlin and David Pellauer. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984.

[14] Ricœur, Paul. *Time and Narrative, Vol. III*. Translated by Kathleen Blamey and David Pellauer. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988.

[15] Ricœur, Paul. *From Text to Action: Essays in Hermeneutics, II*. Translated by Kathleen Blamey and John B. Thompson. Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1991.

[16] Ricœur, Paul. *Figuring the Sacred: Religion, Narrative, and Imagination*. Edited by Mark I. Wallace. Translated by David Pellauer. Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1995.

[17] Ricœur, Paul. *Critique and Conviction: Conversations with François Azouvi and Marc de Launay*. Translated by Kathleen Blamey. New York: Columbia University Press, 1998.

[18] Ricœur, Paul. *Memory, History, Forgetting*. Translated by Kathleen Blamey and David Pellauer. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004.

[19] Ricœur, Paul. *Amour et justice*. Paris: Seuil, 2008.

[20] Ricœur, Paul. *Hermeneutics and the Social Sciences*. Translated by John B. Thompson. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016.

[21] Schnell, Alexander. *Le sens se faisant: Marc Richir et la refondation de la phénoménologie transcendantale*. Bruxelles: Editions Ousia, 2011.

[22] Staudigl, Michael. “Marc Richir i fenomenologia.” *Principia* 70 (2023): 47–70. https://doi.org/10.4467/20843887PI.23.002.19381.