THE JAGIELLONIANS IN EUROPE: DYNASTIC DIPLOMACY AND FOREIGN RELATIONS
The Jagiellonians in Europe:
Dynastic diplomacy and foreign relations
Contents

Foreword .........................................................................................................................6
Balázs Nagy: Ceremony and Diplomacy: The Royal Summit in Buda in 1412...9
Gergely Kiss: Un légat pontifical au service de la paix entre Ladislas Jagellon II et l'Ordre Teutonique. Branda Ier di Castiglione et la Hongrie .....21
Ádám Novák: Additions to the itinerary and seals of King Władysław I of Hungary in the light of recent Hungarica research .................................41
Paul Srodecki: ‘Universe christiane reipublice validissima propugnacula‘ – Jagiellonian Europe in bulwark descriptions around 1500..........................57
Katarzyna Niemczyk: Ein Paar Bemerkungen zur moldauischen Politik der Jagiellonen an der Wende des 15. und 16. Jahrhunderts.........................77
Alexandru Simon: Habsburgs, Jagiellonians and Crusading: The Wallachian Case in the 1470s.................................................................91
László Pósán: Die ungarischen Jagiellonen und der Deutsche Orden in der Zeit von Hochmeister Albrecht von Brandenburg (1511-1525).............109
Attila Bárány: The year 1526 and Jagiellonian Diplomacy .................................133
Antonín Kalous: Jagiellonian Kings of Bohemia and Hungary and papal legates......................................................................................159
Gábor Nemes: The relations of the Holy See and Hungary under the pontificate of Clement VII (1523–1526).......................................................171
Péter Tusor: The Hungarian Episcopate and the Papacy after 1526 ..............185
Szymon Brzeziński: Dynastic policy and its limits: the Jagiellonians and post-1541 Hungary .............................................................................209
Abbreviations ..............................................................................................................218
Authors.......................................................................................................................223
Index.............................................................................................................................224
Foreword

FOREWORD

This volume is the proceedings of an international conference and workshop *The Jagiellonians in Europe: Dynastic Diplomacy and Foreign Relations / Die Jagiellonen in Europa: Dynastische und Diplomatische Beziehungen* held on 10-11 April 2015, organized by the Hungarian Academy of Sciences – University of Debrecen Hungary in Medieval Europe “Lendület” Research Group, at the Department of History, Faculty of Arts and Humanities, the University of Debrecen, Hungary.

The organizers aimed to give a broad, different approach, other than the usual national – for us, Hungarian – spectacle and view the dynasty in a European context, mainly concentrating on the European relations and view of Poland, Bohemia and Hungary. Since our perspective is pre-1526, based on our Hungarian-centred researches, we mainly focussed on earlier periods, 15th and early 16th century.

Our aim was to organize a roundtable discussion as well, where the scholars of the different research centres throughout Europe could have an opportunity to have a discussion over the place and role of the Jagiellonian dynasty in the European constellation of the 15th and early 16th centuries.

We were honoured to welcome twenty speakers in six sessions from several countries – beyond the ones that had been under the rule of the Jagiellonian dynasty, i.e. Hungary, Bohemia, Croatia, Slovakia and Poland – from England, Germany and Romania. We were also pleased to welcome Dr. Paul Srodecki (Ostravská univerzita – Universität Giessen) as a guest speaker who launched the program with a key-note lecture (*Humanisten als Träger dynastischer Diplomatie an ostmitteleuropäischen Höfen des ausgehenden Mittelalters*).

The proceedings collect only a number of selected conference papers, nevertheless, beyond the authors of this volume, we welcomed speakers from several institutions and research centres from London to Zagreb (Royal Holloway University of London; University College London; Zemský archív v Opavě, Opava and the Slezské zemské muzeum; University of Szeged; Hrvatska akademija znanosti i umjetnosti). Beyond the scope of the articles, mostly investigating the fields of diplomacy, law, administration and representation, conference papers covered a much broader field ranging from matrimonial diplomacy, through the Habsburg attitude towards the dynasty and the treatment of the Ottoman threat to legal developments and political communication. The conference also had intriguing case studies on “individuals”, such as Prince Sigismund and the counts of Zrin/Zrínyi, while the ideological background of an ideal dynastic rule was seen in a tractate (*De institutione regii pueri*).

The event, as present volume is, was sponsored by the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Office for Research Groups.
Nevertheless, the original idea for the workshop stemmed not only from our Debrecen research group. In July 2014 we organized a session (The Jagellonian 'Empire' and European Diplomacy) at the International Medieval Congress in Leeds, where we came across with the colleagues of two research centres, that is, the European Research Council Research Group The Jagiellonians: Dynasty, Memory & Identity in Central Europe, Faculty of History, University of Oxford and the Instytutu Historii i Archiwistyki, Uniwersytet Mikołaja Kopernika, Toruń, in cooperation with the Towarzystwo Naukowe. There in Leeds, mainly through the intermediation of Dr. Piotr Oliński (Toruń) and Ilya Afanasyev (Oxford) we started a co-operation, first, upon the initiation of Dr. Oliński, leading to a joint enterprise of our Jagiellonian-related conference papers at the IMC, then, to organize a workshop. Since then we have been in a fruitful co-operation with these institutes.

In the Debrecen conference the research groups introduced themselves: a member of the Oxford Jagiellonians Project, Dr. Stanislava Kuzmová gave a presentation of their research program.

In 2015 our cooperation was followed at the International Medieval Congress, where the Debrecen and Toruń colleagues took part in the sessions organized by the Oxford Jagiellonian project (Dynasticism in Medieval and Early Modern Europe and Beyond). Two of the Debrecen research group members – Attila Györkös and myself – took also part with their papers at the Jagiellonians Project’s conference in Somerville College, Oxford, in March 2016 (Dynasty and Dynasticism (1400–1700). We also like to thank the Principal Researcher, Dr. Natalia Nowakowska for their help in our cooperation.

We also hope to follow up and strengthen the coordination of researches with this present volume.

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The Royal Summit in Buda in 1412

Balázs Nagy

Ceremony and Diplomacy: The Royal Summit in Buda in 1412

Medieval royal meetings were complex manifestations of various elements of medieval history. Besides political history, the study of these events touches on the history of rituals and ceremonies and is also relevant to fields like the history of courtly life and urban history.1 Because of the distinctive features of the surviving sources, modern historical research inevitably misses many aspects of royal summits in reconstructing these events. Besides, medieval diplomacy typically used other methods for the communication of monarchs than face-to-face meetings. Correspondence and sending envoys were often used in medieval diplomacy, but the conveyance of diplomatic gifts played an even more important role in the contacts of medieval rulers.2 Special elements of the ceremonies, the location of royal meetings, formal and informal gestures, the exchange of ritual kisses, and dining together also had special importance.3

Some of the medieval royal summits involving rulers of Central European states have been discussed in detail in the historical literature, especially the cases in which the events could be reconstructed with the help of sufficient

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Balázs Nagy

The meeting of Emperor Otto III and Boleslaw I Chrobry of Poland in Gniezno in 1000 had a long-lasting effect on the history of Poland and has also been richly reflected in the historical literature.\(^5\)

In Árpádian-period Hungary, royal meetings were typically marked by visits of the crusading rulers who travelled through the country and met the monarchs. Louis VII of France met King Géza II in 1147, and Emperor Frederick I Barbarossa visited King Béla III in 1189 on his way to the Holy Land, but these diplomatic encounters were incidental and sporadic and the main intentions of the foreign rulers were undoubtedly not meeting with their Hungarian counterparts.\(^6\) In the fourteenth century and the first half of the fifteenth century the diplomatic activity of the rulers of Hungary can be illustrated by many more meetings with foreign monarchs. Not only did the intensity of the royal summits increase significantly, but the character of the meetings also changed fundamentally. Gerald Schwedler, the author of a work summarising the royal and imperial summits of the period 1270 to 1440, notes six meetings of Charles I in Hungary or at the Hungarian border and ten similar meetings of Louis I.\(^7\)

The 1335 meeting of Czech, Polish, and Hungarian monarchs and many other dignitaries in Visegrád played an important role not only in the mid-fourteenth century formation of political contacts among the participating rulers, but also

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\(^7\) Schwedler 2008, 478–9.
in the construction of a new political identity of the relevant countries in the twentieth century, after the political changes at the end of the 1980s.\textsuperscript{8}

In the case of King Sigismund, the frequency and significance of summits were different. Sigismund, also being the king of the Romans from 1410, the king of Bohemia from 1419, and Holy Roman Emperor from 1433, had a much more complex political agenda on a European level than his predecessors. Several of his royal meetings meant an encounter with his older brother, Wenceslas IV of Bohemia. These meetings typically were not held in Hungary, but in Bohemia, Silesia or Austria.\textsuperscript{9} The active Europe-wide diplomacy of Sigismund can be seen in his visits as far as Constantinople and his meeting with Emperor Manuel II in the east in 1396\textsuperscript{10} and his tour in England on the west in 1416.\textsuperscript{11} Most of Sigismund’s meetings with other monarchs did not take place in Hungary, but during his extensive European journeys. One foreign ruler visited Sigismund several times in Hungary; Władysław II of Poland paid his first visit to Hungary in 1397 when, together his wife, Hedwig, the daughter of Louis I, the late king of Hungary, he met Sigismund in Spišská Nová Ves.\textsuperscript{12} At that meeting, Sigismund and Władysław agreed to sign a peace treaty after years of hostility. In previous years Władysław’s troops had attacked the border region of Hungary. Sigismund’s major military defeat by the Ottomans at the battle of Nicopolis in 1396 convinced him to strengthen his ties with Poland, induced him to agree to the conditions of the armistice and renounce his claims.


\textsuperscript{9} Schwedler 2008, 468–9.


to Galicia. In the same treaty, Władysław rescinded his claims to the Hungarian throne.\textsuperscript{13}

After the 1397 meeting some further talks were planned between Sigismund and Władysław II of Poland for November and December 1398, but finally these meetings did not occur.\textsuperscript{14} Sigismund’s next royal meeting in Hungary with another foreign monarch only took place 15 years later, in 1412. It was held between the same partners, Sigismund and Władysław II, but in a fundamentally changed political setting.\textsuperscript{15}

In the early 1400s Władysław attempted to strengthen his claim to the Hungarian crown, which worsened his connections with Sigismund and strengthened the links between the Teutonic knights and Hungary. The Teutonic Order also helped Sigismund to solve his serious financial problem when the knights paid a high price for the pledge of Neumark in Brandenburg in 1402.\textsuperscript{16} To reinforce the political alliance with the Teutonic Order Sigismund signed a pact with the knights in Buda on 20 December 1409.\textsuperscript{17} This treaty meant a clear political position against Poland. Sigismund supported the case of the Teutonic Order even when the military conflict of the Teutonic Order and the Polish-Lithuanian coalition culminated in the 1409–1411 war.\textsuperscript{18} The battle of Tannenberg (Grünwald) on 15 July 1410 and the subsequent peace treaty on 1 February 1411 changed the political status quo between the two great powers north of Hungary and put Poland in a more favourable position. The position of Sigismund also changed in this period, since a fraction of the electors elected him king of the Romans on 20 September 1410. In this situation he was forced to accept the transformed political realities in the north and re-establish his contacts with King Władysław of Poland.\textsuperscript{19}


\textsuperscript{14} Schwedler 2008, 456.

\textsuperscript{15} On the contacts of Sigismund to Poland in general see: Richard Arndt, Die Beziehungen König Sigmunds zu Polen bis zum Ofener Schiedsspruch 1412, Halle 1897.

\textsuperscript{16} Pósán 1998, 638–9.

\textsuperscript{17} ZsO II/1. no. 7230.


\textsuperscript{19} Pósán 1998, 641–3.
The Royal Summit in Buda in 1412

After several years of hostilities, the main steps in the direction of reconciliation between Sigismund and Władysław were the personal meetings the two rulers held in 1412. The family relationships of the queens of both kings might have helped to rebuild friendly relationships between them. Sigismund’s second wife was Barbara of Cilli, who was the second cousin of Anne of Cilli, Queen of Władysław II of Poland. The grandfathers of the two queens, Ulrich (1331?–1368) and Hermann of Cilli (1332/34–1385) were brothers.\(^{20}\)

Communication between the two rulers, indirect at first, started in the Polish-Hungarian border region in February 1412. At that time both of them were already in the region, Władysław II in Stary Sącz, and Sigismund in Kežmarok. The negotiations started through intermediaries and they finally met personally in Stará Lubovňa.\(^{21}\)

Basically, the two rulers spent the next four months together continuously, travelling through Hungary from mid-March until mid-July. The whole process of the events in this period was special because of the duration of the royal meeting, the well documented character of the episode, and the number and positions of the persons participating in the events.

The stay of Władysław II started with a longish tour in North-eastern Hungary.\(^{22}\) The two kings visited Oradea (Várad), the shrine of St. Ladislaus, king of Hungary and the burial place of Sigismund’s first wife, Mary of Hungary.\(^{23}\) The well-informed fifteenth century Polish chronicler, Jan Długosz, describes the itinerary of the royal party in Hungary in detail.\(^{24}\) From Oradea they travelled through Böszörmény, where the two monarchs were entertained at a major hunting party. Eberhard Windecke, Sigismund’s courtier and finan-

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\(^{24}\) On the reliability of Długosz’s account on the events of Władysław II see: Béla Bottló, \textit{Długosz János Historia Polonicaia mint magyar történeti forrás 1385–1418} [The Historia Polonica of Długosz as a Hungarian historical source], Budapest 1932. See especially pp.16–8.
Balázs Nagy

cier, mentions this hunt, dating it to 1416,25 but he was probably incorrect since Sigismund spent the whole year of 1416 out of Hungary.26 After hunting near Böszörmény they travelled through Muhi, Diósgyőr, and Eger, arriving in Buda in late May 1412, just a few days before Pentecost.27

The lengthy journey of the two rulers together was not only necessary to strengthen their recently improved relationship, but also for other political reasons. Sigismund was planning a major international meeting to be held in Buda and the preparations certainly required time, and Sigismund and Władysław spent together this time travelling in Hungary.

In his recent study, Emir O. Filipović lists dignitaries from Germany, among them the prince electors, who were informed in advance about the imminent meeting in the Buda and invited to attend the festivities.28 The bishop of Passau was informed about the forthcoming events on 28 March.29 On 6 April, Sigismund sent letters to the German towns of Frankfurt, Friedberg, Gelnhausen, and Wetzlar informing them about the meeting in Buda planned for the fourteenth day after Pentecost.30

Sigismund tried to secure funding in advance for the high costs of the planned meeting. On 20 April 1412 he sent a letter to the royal town of Sopron informing the citizens that he had agreed on a peace treaty with King Władysław and they were travelling together to Buda, where he intended to entertain his royal guest according to his high status. Sopron, like other royal towns, was required to contribute 300 florins to the costs.31

28 Filipović 2010, 292.
29 Fejér CD, X/5. p.242., no. 107.
31 ‘Cum nos altissimi disponente clemencia cum serenissimo principe domino Wladislao rege Polonie, fratre nostro carissimo super universis et singulis factis inter nos hactenus habitis et hincinde ventilantibus plenam iam et desideratam pacis et concordie unionem facientes et ordinantes, eundem, quem unacum nostra maiestate ad civitatem nostram Budensem ducemus, iuxta nostri status regii decemviri pro speciali vocantatis et leetrici tripudio honosfice velimus pertractari, pro quibus expedietiis, prout ab aliis nostris civitatibus, sic non minus ex parte eostri certam pecunie summam decreverimus nobis assignari.’ In: Jenő Házi, Sopron szabad királyi város története, Vol. I/2., Sopron 1923. pp.54–5. no. 61.
The Royal Summit in Buda in 1412

This large-scale event and royal meeting rightly attracted the attention of several contemporary authors. Eberhard Windecke gave first-hand information on the events.\textsuperscript{32} He was greatly impressed by the delegates present, and refers to the presence of 19 princes, 24 counts, 50 lords, 1400 knights and pages, and 298 heralds.\textsuperscript{33}

A presumably contemporary list of the participants of the meeting has also survived.\textsuperscript{34} Besides the host, Sigismund, and his main guest, Władysław II, this text mentions the king of Bosnia, usually identified as Tvrtko II of Bosnia. Filipović argues convincingly that it was not Tvrtko II but Stjepan Ostojia who visited Buda at that time;\textsuperscript{35} besides him, Hrvoje Vukčić Hrvatinić and Sandalj Hranić Kosača also came from Bosnia and the despot Stefan Lazarević from Serbia, was also, bringing two thousand horses. From Austria, dukes Ernest (the Iron) and Albert II, later successor of Sigismund, also took part in the Buda meeting.

An envoy of the Teutonic knights sent back a report on his experiences in Buda to the commander (commandator, Komtur) of the Order, giving an impressive but different overview of the number and rank of the participants. Besides three kings and three other monarchs, he gives an account of the presence of numerous princes, counts, knights, one cardinal, three archbishops, 11 bishops. Musicians were present also to entertain the delegates and 40 thousand horses were at the disposal of the guests.\textsuperscript{36} The envoy of the Teutonic order lists 17 different languages used at the meeting, among them Greek and Tatar, and also mentions that people from the Holy Land attended the summit.\textsuperscript{37} Among the people coming from remote territories, the report mentions pagans who wore long beards and high hats.\textsuperscript{38}

Długosz reports the arrival in Buda of the envoys of the Jalal al-Din, khan of the Golden Horde, who wanted to meet Władysław II of Poland.\textsuperscript{39} Jalal al-

\textsuperscript{32} Altmann 1893, 10–1. (VII. 15.)
\textsuperscript{33} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{34} Moritz Wertner, ‘Die Ofener Gäste von 1412’, Jahrbuch der (k. k.) heraldischen Gesellschaft “Adler” in Wien 17 (1907), 170–81.; The list was also published in ZsO III. no. 2224., See also the catalogue entry of György Rácz: Sigismundus 2006, 454–5. (no. 5.21).
\textsuperscript{36} Fejér CD, 246–8. See also: Filipović 2010, 294.; Aschbach 1838, Beilage XI. 441–2.
\textsuperscript{37} ‘Abrahemsche lüte von heiligen grabe’. Fejér CD, 247.
\textsuperscript{38} ‘und sust vil beslchter Heiden mit langen Berten groszen Brüchen (Bauchen?) hohen hüten und langen goltern’. Fejér CD, 247.
\textsuperscript{39} Długosz 1997, 203.
Din was an ally of the Polish and Lithuanian rulers in their fight against the Teutonic Order, and according to some reconstructions of the events, Sigismund also wanted to rely on the Tatars against the Ottoman threat.\(^{40}\)

A narrative source from Lübeck also mentions the proceedings in Buda in 1412.\(^ {41}\) Detmar’s *Lübeckische Chronik* continued for the period of 1400 to 1413. The continuation also gives a detailed description of the participants at the Buda meeting.\(^ {42}\)

The royal meeting was accompanied by festivities and various entertainments. At the tournament, a knight from Silesia named Nemsche and a page from Austria won the joust. They were given expensive gifts; each of them got a highly decorated steed. On Csepel Island, south of Buda, a special hunting party was organised for the Polish and Hungarian rulers.\(^ {43}\) Długosz also mentions the procession on the day of Corpus Christi, 2 June.\(^ {44}\) Thus, both secular and spiritual events were organised during the meeting, seeking to promote the mutual understanding of the participants.

Studying the events and the proceedings of the 1412 Buda meeting one should also take into account what conditions the location could offer the participants and also interactions between the participants at the meeting and the urban context of Buda.

Buda had been the location of several previous royal summits; in 1353 Charles IV visited Buda, in 1355 Casimir III of Poland, and in 1366 John V Palaiologos of Byzantium stayed in the city.\(^ {45}\) Sigismund ordered the central

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\(^{41}\) I thank Mark Whelan for drawing this source to my attention.

\(^{42}\) Aus niederdeutschen Chroniken. Aus der Fortsetzung von Detmars lübischer Chronik in der Hamburger Handschrift, in Theodor Hirsch, Max Toeppen and Ernst Streihke (eds.), *Scriptores rerum Prussicarum*, Leipzig 1866, III. p.407. Thanks to Mark Whalen to call my attention to this reference.


administration and the main law courts to move from Visegrád to Buda in the very first years of the fifteenth century, just a few years before the Buda summit.46

New parts of the royal palace had been built in the 1410s and 1420s, probably mainly after the 1412 meeting. Thus, when Władysław and the other monarchs and dignitaries visited, the Buda palace had not yet undergone the main Sigismund-period reconstruction.47

A document from 1437 (i.e., 25 years after the Buda meeting) gives a good overview of the houses of Buda. In that year, Sigismund had developed a plan which finally did not work out, to transfer the universal council from Basel to Buda and therefore ordered a survey of the existing houses to be made in preparation. According to this enumeration, Buda and its suburbs had 967 houses and altogether 1352 rooms that could be heated.48 These numbers were probably slightly lower in 1412. In all probability, the royal palace and other accommodations could not house all the guests arriving for the meeting. To put the meeting to May was certainly also due to the fact that some of the participants, especially their entourage, would have been housed in provisional lodgings.49

György Rácz estimated the number of the participants at the 1335 royal meeting in Visegrád as approximately 10 000 people.50 It is probably an acceptable hypothesis to calculate a higher number of the participants at the 1412 Buda meeting. One cannot reconstruct the population number of Buda because of the lack of adequate written sources, but according to reliable estimates it could not have been higher than 9500.51 This means that in the weeks of the Buda meeting the population of the city must have at least doubled. The high number of visitors in 1412 would have caused major logistical problems for housing and provision.

46 Márta Kondor, ’A királyi kúria bíróságaitól a kancelláriáig. A központi kormányzat és adminisztráció Zsigmond-kori történetéhez’ [From the courts of the Royal Curia to the Chancery], SZ 142 (2008), 404.
49 Albert Gárdonyi, ’Magyarország középkori fővárosa’ [The medieval capital of Hungary], SZ 78 (1944), 226.
51 Végh 2015, 36.
The political outcomes of the meeting of Sigismund and Władysław II were significant. Sigismund agreed to intervene for the reconciliation of Poland and the Teutonic knights. Sigismund also returned to Władysław the Polish crown jewels, which had been kept in Hungary from the reign of Louis I.52

Among the participants of the royal summit information exists only on the further travel of Władysław II and Sigismund. At the end of June Władysław continued his journey towards Székesfehérvár, Tata, Esztergom, and Visegrád, where he again met King Sigismund. The royal party visited some other locations nearby and finally the two monarchs parted from each other in mid-July and the Polish ruler returned to Cracow soon thereafter.

The royal gathering in May-June 1412 was one of the largest and most magnificent royal meetings ever held in medieval Buda. It was a well-documented event thanks to the number and rank of the participants. This event allows one to follow the functioning of medieval diplomacy in action. The descriptions demonstrate very well the role and significance of various practices and rituals connected to such assemblies. No references on gift-giving survive in the case of the 1412 meeting, but twelve years later, when the Byzantine Emperor John VIII visited Sigismund in Buda it was recorded that he received eight gilded chalices, 1000 Hungarian golden florins, various textiles, and six excellent horses.53 We may assume that the donation of gifts also played a role in the 1412 meeting. The repeated hunting parties and ritual occasions like the joint procession at the Corpus Christi feast emphasised the mutual allegiance of the participants, thus serving efficiently the political purposes of the meeting.


53 Altmann 1893, 186–7. CCVII. 220.
Branda Ier di Castiglione et la Hongrie

Gergely Kiss

Un légit pontifical au service de la paix entre Ladislas Jagellon II et l’Ordre Teutonique. Branda Ier di Castiglione et la Hongrie

Introduction

L’historiographie hongroise s’intéresse (et s’intéressait) très peu à la personne de Branda di Castiglione. Suite du fait qu’il manque des études systématiques des représentants pontificaux en Hongrie depuis l’œuvre de Vilmos Fraknói,1 et des défauts méthodologiques, l’étude de ceux-ci offre un beau champ d’action aux médiévistes se souciant d’élucider les différents aspects des relations du royaume magyar et le Siège Apostolique même durant cette période difficile à comprendre qu’était les années du Grand Schisme de l’Occident.

Branda Ier di Castiglione entra en relation avec le royaume de Sigismond de Luxembourg (1382–1437) à deux reprises, d’abord entre 1410 et 1414 ensuite en 1423–1424. Quant à la première, Vilmos Fraknói avait présenté ses activités d’une manière très hétérogène, néanmoins tout en soulignant sa mission diplomatique au service du roi Sigismond qui comprenait des négociations avec le palatin Hermann de Cilli et le traité de Lublo (février 1412). L’auteur érudit a mentionné quelques actes sans ordre précis ce qui rend extrêmement difficile la reconstitution de ce qu’il avait réellement fait en Hongrie dans ces années.2

Fraknói mentionne le nom de Branda pour la première fois en relation avec le droit suprême de patronage royal. L’auteur propose que l’envoyé de Jean XXIII aurait dû en 1410 mettre fin aux conflits des ecclésiastiques issus de la double

* L’auteur est membre du groupement de recherches « MTA-DE „Lendület” Magyarország a Középkori Európában Kutatócsoport », les présentes recherches sont soutenues par le projet de recherche « OTKA NN 109690 Papal delegates in Hungary in the XIth-XIIIth Centuries – online database ».


Gergely Kiss
collation de bénéfice et remettre la paix entre les parties intéressées en préférant la personne étant réellement en fonction. Le contexte de l’apparence de Branda était très favorable de le présenter comme l’acteur de la politique bénéficielle du pape de l’obédience de Pise (Jean XXIII était le successeur d’Alexandre V, élu à Pise), d’une politique basée sans doute sur des actes de collations.

En réalité le seul mandat de ce même pape issu en matière de la politique bénéficielle, ait prétendu à Branda de terminer les procès alimentés par les nominations royales tout en défendant la cause royale. Cependant dans la documentation relative à Branda on en trouve un seul exemple : en 1412 il nomma un chanoine de la collégiale de St Martin de Szepes prévôt de St. Adalbert de Győr. Jean XXIII cassa cette acte négligeant la réservation de toutes les prêbendes majeures, il exigea de Georges le chanoine en question de démissionne. Ensuite c’était lui-même qui le nomma à ce même titre Le pape y ajouta qu’il en voulait manifester un geste de faveur envers le roi Sigismond et de son vicechancelier. Malgré cette indice, l’interprétation que Fraknói propose, relève des doutes.

En 1949 Roger Mols a formulé une lecture qui différait largement de celui de l’érudit hongrois. Mols insistait sur le fait que Branda avait été fut envoyé initialement en tant que reformator generalis pour renouveler la formation intellectuelle des ecclésiastiques sans parler du renforcement des positions de l’église catholique à ces confins entre chrétiens et non fidelès. L’auteur n’oublia pas cependant les activités diplomatiques de Branda, le rôle qu’il jouait dans la régulation du conflit de Ladislas II et l’ordre Teutonique (1411, 1412), l’affaires de Venise (1412–1413) ou la préparation du concile de Constance (1414). C’est cet aspect que la monographie du règne de Sigismond d’Elemér Mályusz a également souligné, mais seulement en relation avec la république italienne.

Dans un deuxième temps Branda fut présent dans le Royaume de Hongrie entre 1423–1424. Ici l’historiographie est apparemment d’accord sur le fait que le cardinal n’avait qu’un rôle secondaire en Hongrie : il assistait aux négociations entre Sigismond de Luxembourg et Ladislas II de Jagellon visant à mettre fin

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3 Fraknói 1901. p.321 (sans référence documentaire précise).
4 Theiner, Vetera monumenta, II.189.
Branda I° di Castiglione et la Hongrie

aux conflits entre la Bohême et la Pologne. Il était également présent en 1424 à la réception des ambassadeurs du sultan Mourad à Buda et à Cracovie au couronnement de la reine de Pologne, Sophie.8

La carrière ecclésiastique de Branda I° di Castiglione

D’après son épitaphe qui précise qu’il mourut en 1443 à l’âge de 93 ans, il serait né en 1350. Le fils aîné de Mapheus (probablement Mathieu) et Lucrèce di Stefani Porro, comtesse de Polenza prit son nom de sa lieu de naissance, Castiglione d’Olona, aux alentours de Milan. Il faisait ses études universitaires à Pavie où il fut gradué doctor in utroque iure avant 1389 et il y enseigna comme professeur du droit canon en 1388–1389. Du 13 mai 1392 au 17 juin 1403 il travailla comme auditeur de la Rota. En 1404 Boniface IX lui attribua le siège épiscopal de Plaisance (Piacenza)9 – qui lui permettait plus tard, en tant que cardinal de se surnommer « Placentinus ». Deux ans plus tard il fut nommé vicechancelier de la curie pontificale à Rome. Comme tant d’autres il prenait place dans les querelles du Grande Schisme d’Occident. Dissident de l’obédience de Grégoire XII, il s’adhéra aux père de de Pise et participa à l’élection d’Alexandre V. Ce premier le priva de son titre épiscopal et lors d’une ambassade en Lombardie qui lui confia Alexandre V, il fut arrêté par le marquis Orlando Pallavicini qu’il l’emprisonna pour trois mois.10


9 Eubel, Hierachia, I, 401.
13 ZsO III, nr. 2606 ; Eubel, Hierachia, I, p.524 ; Mols 1949. 1436.
Gergely Kiss

de l’obédience de Pise fut réhabilité en tant que *apostolicam cancellarium regens* et nommé prévôt à Liège (1418). Entre 1418 et 1419 il tira les revenus de l’évêché de Brixen.\(^{14}\) Après la clôture du concile de Constance Branda administra l’évêché de Lisieux entre le 19 juin 1420 et le 12 avril 1424.\(^{15}\) Quant au cardinalat, le 14 mars 1431 il fut transféré au titre de Porto et St Rufinus\(^{16}\) qu’il quitta dix ans après pour devenir cardinal-évêque de S. Sabina.\(^{17}\)

**Branda Ier di Castiglione et l’Europe Centrale, 1410–1414**

Près de cette riche carrière ecclésiastique les activités complexes de Branda, qui s’étendaient des affaires diplomatiques en passant par la juridiction aux questions de la foi et la discipline des clercs, étaient non négligeables. Peu après l’entrée au service pontifical, en 1401 il reçut un mandat judiciaire, il dut mettre fin à Cologne et à Liège à un débat qui opposait Guillaume de Momalle et Thierry de Nieheim.\(^{18}\) Deux ans plus tard (12 juin 1403) c’est le premier contact avec la Hongrie, quand Boniface IX lui confia la charge de collecteur pour la Hongrie et la Transylvanie.\(^{19}\)

Participant actif des événements du Grand Schisme d’Occident, il était présent en juillet 1407 aux pourparlés visant à élucider les conditions de la rencontre des papes prévue à Savona. Après avoir abandonné Grégoire XII il alla à Pise (mars 1409) pour travailler à l’union de l’Église où il assista au moins à deux sessions du concile. Adhérent à Alexandre V, sa première mission en Lombardie (1410) resta infructueuse, comme on l’a vu.\(^{20}\)

À partir de 1410 il était en mission en Europe Centrale pendant quatre ans presque sans interruption. Ses activités s’étendaient au sens géopolitique à la Hongrie et la Pologne auxquelles s’ajouta en 1413 l’Italie du Nord et l’Empire.\(^{21}\) Les différents aspects relevés par les chercheurs cités ne forment pas une image cohérente qui permettrait de les interpréter dans toutes leurs compléxités. Ne s’intéressant pas forcément à tous ses éléments, plusieurs aspects importants


\(^{15}\) Eubel, *Hierarchia*, I, 304 ; Mols 1949. 1440.


\(^{17}\) Eubel, *Hierarchia*, II, 26, 60 ; Mols 1949. 1441.


\(^{19}\) ZsO vol II, t. 1, nr. 2512 ; Mols 1949a. 1435.

\(^{20}\) Mols 1949a. 1435.

Branda I° di Castiglione et la Hongrie

defrent négligés qui permettent de mieux comprendre et présenter les différentes perspectives de la longueur présence d’un envoyé pontifical.

Avant d’entrer aux détails, il faut bien préciser le processus de l’envoi, les mandats et les autorisations reçues, les facultés concédées et enfin les activités réalisées. Malheureusement la sensibilité à la distinction des types de envoyés pontificaux fait défaut aux études citées, Branda y est toujours qualifié « légal », un terme qui nous invite bien à le préciser. Il pose également problème l’interprétation de ses actes qui n’est point structurée par manque de reconstitution des relations qui se dessinent entre mandats, autorisations, facultés d’une part et des dispositions de Branda d’autre part.

Le tableau présenté montre à première vue la complexité des activités de Branda et permet de reconstituer son tissu structural (Tableau I).

Avant tout, il faut bien préciser que Branda ne reçut aucune autorisation légataire avant l’été de 1411, de plus, durant les mois qui précédaient octobre de cette même année, une variété de désignations s’appliquait pour lui : légal, nonce sans aucune référence à la plus haute qualité des envoyés pontificaux qui était le legatus a latere.22 Bien que Jean XXIII l’ait créé cardinal-prêtre de St Clément au 25 mai ou au 6 juin de 1411,23 il n’obtint son autorisation de legatus a latere qu’au 12 octobre 1411.24

Au 1er août Branda fut envoyé muni d’un mandat général visant à la réforme spirituelle de l’église locale et au renforcement de la collecte des revenus pontificaux. Le cadre géopolitique ne fut pas aussi bien défini, il consistait à la Hongrie et les royaumes soumis à l’autorité de Sigismond de Luxembourg.25 En réalité cette autorisation s’étendait alors au royaume magyar puisque c’était en septembre de 1410 que Sigismond se déclara roi des Romains ce qui fut approuvé seulement l’année suivant, après la mort de son concurrent, Jodok. En même temps le pape confia à Branda une autre tâche, celle de l’enquête de la

22 Cf. Tableau I, nr. 22–24.
23 Cf. Tableau I, nr. 21.
24 Cf. Tableau I, nr. 25.
25 Cf. Tableau I, nr. 1.
fondation d’un *studium generale* en Hongrie qui rejoignait bien évidemment la requête même du roi hongrois.

D’autres mandats de Jean XXIII entrent plus en détails portant sur les deux axes majeures d’action de son envoyé. Il autorisa Branda d’une part de consolider l’église hongroise aux confins des schismatiques et des infidèles, dévastés par les Tartares, etc. en chargeant un nouveau effectif des pasteurs, curés de la cure des âmes. D’autre part le pape lui demanda à plusieurs reprises la mise en fonction de la collecte des revenus pontificaux, soit en général, soit par rapport aux bénéfices vacantes, tout en insistant en même temps sur la révocation des dispositions des « antipapes », c’est-à-dire des papes des autres obédiences.

Suivent après des facultés qui permettaient à cet envoyé de renvoyer des péché, de distribuer des indulgences, d’utiliser des insignes pontificaux et de gérer sa propre procuration de revenus. Elle se concentre soit autour des premiers mandats en août de 1410, soit à la fin de cette même année où Branda est arrivé en personne en Hongrie.

Au début de 1411 Jean XXIII a réitéré un des ses deux mandats initiaux qui prévoyait une fois de plus l’importance de la collecte des revenus pontificale. Ensuite, après plusieurs mois de silence, apparaissaient les propres actions de Branda dans lesquelles, par la suite de sa promotion au cardinalat, il s’intitulait une fois légat et une fois nonce du pape ; en plus il fut nommé légat dans un mandat de provision de bénéfice du pape. Cette autorisation, y compris les

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27 Cf. Tableau I, nr. 5.

28 Cf. Tableau I, nr. 3–4, 6–7.

29 Cf. Tableau I, nr. 8–12, 14–18.


31 Cf. Tableau I, nr. 19.


33 Cf. Tableau I, nr. 23–24.

34 Cf. Tableau I, nr. 22.
Branda Iᵉʳ di Castiglione et la Hongrie

titres utilisés, le caractère de ses activités affirment sans équivoque que Branda était considéré comme *legatus missus*.

Et c’est seulement en octobre de 1411 qu’il reçut une deuxième autorisation légataire, cette fois-ci en tant que *legatus a latere*. La substance de sa mission ne changeait néanmoins, elle consistait toujours à la réforme de l’Église à laquelle s’ajoutait l’union de l’Église en plein schisme. Complétée par une autorisation de procuration et une faculté de collation de bénéfices, les activités de Branda y correspondaient parfaitement jusqu’au début de mars 1412.

Avant il n’était pas chargé de mission diplomatiques, à l’exception d’une seule occasion en 1410 où il fut mentionné pour la première fois dans les querelles du roi de Pologne, Ladislas II de Jagellon et l’Ordre Teutonique. Arrivé en Hongrie, au début de mars en 1411 Branda reçut un mandat direct qui lui demanda d’obliger l’Ordre Teutonique et le roi de Jagellon de faire respecter le traité conclu à Toruń.

Bien que Branda soit revêtu d’une autorisation *a latere*, celle-ci ne s’étendait point à participer aux négociations qui visaient à mettre fin aux tensions des deux parties. Toutefois, l’itinéraire du légat alimente une hypothèse d’après laquelle il prenait parti de ces négociations par défaut. Les controverses de l’Ordre Teutonique et des Jagellons préoccupaient apparemment le pape, il envoya déjà en mars de 1411 son propre neveu, Loisis de Tortellis, suivi en octobre par Conrad, prévôt de Wrocław. La première mission restant inaccomplie, avant l’arrivée du deuxième c’était le roi Sigismond de Luxembourg qui essayait de mettre fin aux tensions qui opposaient alors son royaume et la Pologne (négociations de Sramowce, novembre 1411). Du début de mars en 1412 Branda était présent dans la région où l’entrevue du roi Sigismond et Ladislas II de Jagellon aurait dû lieu. Depuis le début de cette année Branda se trouvait dans l’entourage de Sigismond ce qui explique sa présence aux préparatifs de la rencontre de Lublo. Ainsi il acta à Leutscha au 4 mars, cinq jours plus tard il était l’un de

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35 Cf. Tableau I, nr. 25.
37 Cf. Tableau I, nr. 13. La lettre du pape Jean XXIII adressée aux frères de l’ordre demanda à eux et au roi polonais de respecter le traité qui avait été conclu devant son nonce envoyé en Hongrie. Le texte est particulièrement clair sur ce point, Branda servait de garantir le maintien du compromis, mais il fut envoyé uniquement en Hongrie et aux pays soumis à Sigismond de Luxembourg qui ne comprenait pas la Pologne.
38 Cf. Tableau I, nr. 20.
40 Mols 1949, 1436.
41 Cf. Tableau I, nr. 31.
Gergely Kiss

ces qui assurèrent le sauf-conduit de Ladislas II de Jagellon à Lublo. Il était même présent à Cassovie (26 mars) à l’entourage du cortège royal et enfin à Buda (24 août) où le roi Sigismond mit fin aux conflits par une acte judiciaire solennelle. Grâce à son service Sigismond confirma au 4 septembre 1412 toutes les privilèges de la famille du légat Castiglione.

Malgré son mandat initial dans lequel la réforme spirituelle jouissait d’une grande importance, l’activité réelle du légat Branda passait lentement à la diplomatie. Même si son implication dans les négociations de paix entre l’Ordre Teutonique et la Pologne semblait une improvisation, puisque les envoyés prévus du pape ne sont jamais arrivés, les actes de Branda qu’il eut en Hongrie avaient de moins en moins le caractère de réforme, elle se limitaient d’une part à la juridiction. D’autre part il était de plus en plus actif en tant que diplomate du roi Sigismond.

Le légat qui devint entre-temps administrateur de l’évêché de Veszprém, entra apparemment au service du roi, il gérât entre autres les négociations avec la République de Venise depuis l’hiver de 1412 jusqu’au milieu de l’été de 1413. Il prenait part aux préparatifs qui précédéaient la trêve de Castelletto, il était présent d’une façon permanente dans la région de l’Aquilée et de l’Istrie pendant ces mois. Cette nouvelle tâche justifia enfin l’extension territoriale de son autorisation légataire qui couvrait désormais la Lombardie et l’Empire (Lombardia et Alemannia). Tout cela montrait une fois de plus sa complicité à la diplomatie de Sigismond de Luxembourg. Après les longs mois de services diplomatiques il regagna la Hongrie en automne de 1413, il y hiverna pour

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42 Cf. Tableau I, nr. 32.
43 Cf. Tableau I, nr. 33.
45 DF 287861 ; ZsO III. nr. 2620.
46 Cf. Tableau I, nr. 29–30, 33–34.
47 Cf. Tableau I, nr. 36. 1er septembre 1412 ; Mols 1949. p.1436.
Branda Iᵉʳ di Castiglione et la Hongrie

quitter le royaume au milieu de l’année prochaine avec le roi qui se dirigeait alors au Concile de Constance.5¹

Branda eut donc sans aucune doute une charge diplomatique, mais qui lui a été contribué d’abord éventuellement, en tant que suite logique d’un imprévu qu’imposait le manque des représentants pontificaux lors des négociations entre l’Ordre Teutonique, Ladislas II de Jagellon présidées par Sigismond de Luxembourg. Il est fort probable que le succès du traité de Lublo permettait à ce dernier de profiter bien des qualités de négociateur de Branda dans les affaires qui opposaient la Hongrie et Venise.

Les activités de Branda et son deuxième séjour en Hongrie, 1423–1424

Pendant la décennie qui sépare sa première et deuxième présence en Hongrie, Branda vit des années très chargées. En 1414 il accompagna Sigismond en Italie, il y fut compté parmi les cardinaux qui, en concert avec Jean XXIII, acceptèrent la convocation du Concile de Constance. Branda y jouait un rôle important, d’abord comme un des messagers de Jean XXIII, ensuite, après la fuite de ce dernier, il s’efforçait de le rappeler. Au 2 avril 1415 Branda regagna Constance, il était présent pendant tout le concile sans compter quelques absences (décembre 1415 – janvier 1416, juillet-août 1416, janvier-février 1417), et fit sa vote à l’élection de Martin V qui lui rendit le titre de chancelier du pape (1418).5² Durant ces années il était très actif dans la diplomatie, notamment en France et en Angleterre qui lui attribue la haute confiance de Sigismond. Grâce à lui, Branda reçut de nouvelles autorisations légataires en Europe-Centrale.5³

Mais avant de s’y rendre, il accompagna Martin V au retour à Rome (1419) et séjourna en Italie presque deux ans. Au 13 avril 1421 le pape lui confia la charge de lancer la croisade contre les Hussites (Utraquistes) qui restait infructueuse, Branda se retourna à Rome en octobre de cette même année. Entre 1420 et 1424 il était l’administrateur de l’évêché de Lisieux, succédé par son neveu, Zenon de Castiglione ce qui devait au fait que Branda n’était jamais présent en personne à Lisieux.5⁴ En 1422 il fut envoyé dans l’Empire en tant que réformateur général, une tâche qu’il porta entre le 22 mars et 3 mars 1425. Durant ces trois ans il lançait des réformes en Bavière (à Ratisbonne et Nurenberg) ou à Würzburg, ou bien dans le province de Mayence, il travaillait en compagnie de Sigismond


5⁴ MOLS 1949. p.1440.
pour mettre fin aux conflits des princes allemands, et il est arrivé à convaincre le principe de Brandenbourg d’entreprendre les armes contre les Utraquistes. Il invita au printemps de 1432 même la Pologne à cette croisade prévue en Bohême.\textsuperscript{55} C’est dans le cadre de ces événements qu’on retrouve Branda en Hongrie pour la deuxième fois.

La croisade n’était pas le seul sujet qui préoccupait la papauté, des tensions risquaient d’éclater entre l’Ordre Teutonique et la Pologne sans parler de l’activité intensifiée de la Lithouanie. La crise politique et religieuse en Bohême incitait les parties à arranger leurs conflits et rassurer leur front contre les Utraquistes. Cependant ce n’était pas Branda qui eut le mandat de Martin V pour mener des négociations entre l’Ordre Teutonique et la Pologne, mais un nonce pontifical, Ferdinand de Palacios, évêque de Lugo qui avait eu déjà une charge en 1418–1419. En 1423 Martin V a réitéré son mandat à Palacios qui participait aux négociations polono-hongroises au printemps de 1423. Branda était présent, lui aussi, présent en Hongrie, au moins en automne de cette même année. Selon Fraknói Branda fut présent aux négociations mentionnées en compagnie de Palacios ce qui n’est pas évident puisqu’aucune source pertinante ne l’approuve.\textsuperscript{56} Il est évident en revanche que Branda assista au couronnement de la reine de la Pologne, Sophie – une acte symbolique de la paix entre la Pologne et la Hongrie\textsuperscript{57} – qui eut lieu au 6 mars 1424. Il est fort probable que Branda qui avait une autorisation de « reformator generalis » dans l’Empire qui se combinait avec la préparation de la croisade contre les Utraquistes n’en avait pas pour la Hongrie, sa présence ici semble beaucoup plus d’un passage au marge de sa mission principale. La raison de ce détour était tout à fait raisonnable : la mission de Palacios fut confortée par Martin V qui se servait d’un envoyé bien connu et respecté dans l’entourage de Sigismond: Branda de Castiglione.

**Les dernières années**

En ce qui concerne les dernières années de ce précieux légats, la période de 1425–1431 est très peu connue. Il était en Italie et travaillait pour les négociations entre Florence, Milan et Venise, mais il s’efforçait de donner une impulsion culturelle à sa ville natale, Castiglione où il fonda une collégiale.\textsuperscript{58}

\textsuperscript{55} Mols 1949. p.1438–1439.

\textsuperscript{56} Fraknói 1902. p.4 et note nr. 10.


\textsuperscript{58} Mols 1949. p.1440, 1442–1443.
Depuis 1431 il rentra à la première ligne de la réforme et de l’union de l’Église. Au 14 mars 1431 il changea son titre de cardinalat de St Clément et devint cardinal-évêque de Porto et S. Rufin.\textsuperscript{59} Après avoir conclu certaines affaires en Italie du Nord, il se rendit à Bâle et participait activement aux travaux du concile qu’il présida entre 18 septembre et 13 octobre 1433. Il se montrait un partisan d’Eugène IV même pendant la sécession de Bâle-Ferrara-Florence, de plus, il souscrivit les actes de l’union conclues avec les Grecs, Armeniens et les Coptes (6 juillet, 22 novembre 1439, 4 février 1442).\textsuperscript{60}

Entre-temps il fut transféré au titre du cardinal-évêque de Ste Sabine.\textsuperscript{61} Au 15 août 1442 il s’appara pour la dernière fois en qualité officielle, notamment à la réception du roi René à Rome d’où il retourna à Castiglione et mourut au 3 ou au 4 février 1443.\textsuperscript{62} Branda di Castiglione a légué une patrimoine riche, soit à Castiglione, soit à Pavie où la collégiale et la bibliothèque étaient généreusement dotées par Branda.\textsuperscript{63}

En somme, la relation de Branda di Castiglione et la Hongrie était très complexe. Bien qu’il fût présent en Hongrie à deux reprises (1410/1411–1414 et 1423–1424), son activité ne se limitait pas à la diplomatie. Bien au contraire, en 1410 il fut envoyé en tant que réformateur général chargé en même temps de la collecte des revenus pontificaux. Les autres envoyés de Jean XXIII étant bloqués, Branda eut alors une autorisation secondaire, la gestion des négociations entre l’Ordre Teutonique et la Pologne en concert avec le roi hongrois, Sigismond de Luxembourg. Grâce à celle-ci, il devenait de plus en plus un diplomate préféré du roi des Romains dans les négociations avec Venise et même durant le Concile de Constance. Plus tard, il reprenait sa première entreprise, la réforme de l’Église qui lui contribuait une longue et fructueuse mission dans l’Empire au marge de laquelle il se retournait en Hongrie en 1423–1424 pour travailler à la préparation de la croisade contre les Utraquistes. Il s’impliquait là de nouveau dans des négociations diplomatiques seulement pour épauler un nonce pontifical, Ferdinand de Palacios chargé de constituer l’alliance de la Pologne, la Lithuanie, l’Ordre Teutonique et les royaumes de Sigismond de Luxembourg qui comprenait alors non seulement la Hongrie mais l’Empire aussi. Les activités de Branda en Hongrie, au moins ses actes de 1411–1412 affirment qu’il était avant tout un agent de la réforme mais il pouvait être utile en cas échéant dans la diplomatie ce qui s’imposait de plus en plus lors de sa première mission en Hongrie.

\textsuperscript{59} Mols 1949. p.1440.
\textsuperscript{60} Mols 1949. p.1441.
\textsuperscript{61} Mols 1949. p.1441.
\textsuperscript{62} Mols 1949. p.1442.
\textsuperscript{63} Mols 1949. p.1442–1443.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chronologie</th>
<th>Mandat (autorisation)</th>
<th>Facultés</th>
<th>Activités</th>
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<td>1. 1/8/1410</td>
<td>referendarius</td>
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<td>referendarius</td>
<td>studium generale</td>
<td>Hongrie + royaumes de Sigismond</td>
<td>cum ad Ungarie … partes, Theiner, Vetera monumenta, II,184–5 ; ZsO II/2. nr. 7802.</td>
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<td>referendarius, nuncius</td>
<td>collation des bénéfices</td>
<td>Hongrie + royaumes de Sigismond</td>
<td>ZsO II/2. nr. 7839.</td>
</tr>
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<td>4. 16/8/1410</td>
<td>referendarius, nuncius, spiritualis reformator</td>
<td>révocation des dispositions des antipapes; collation des bénéfices usurpés (Ladislaus de Duracio)</td>
<td>Hongrie + royaumes de Sigismond</td>
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<td>soutien de substitution des missions des Franciscains</td>
<td>Hongrie + royaumes de Sigismond</td>
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<td>révocation des dispositions des antipapes</td>
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<td>évêque de Plaisance</td>
<td>collecte des revenus des prébendes vacantes</td>
<td>Hongrie</td>
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<td>[Hongrie] licence d’absolution</td>
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<td>revenus du légat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16.</td>
<td>29/12/1410</td>
<td>spiritualis reformator</td>
<td>Hongrie + royaumes de Sigismond</td>
<td>rémission de péchés</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17.</td>
<td>29/12/1410</td>
<td>spiritualis reformator</td>
<td>Hongrie + royaumes de Sigismond</td>
<td>rémission de péchés</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18.</td>
<td>29/12/1410</td>
<td>spiritualis reformator</td>
<td>Hongrie + royaumes de Sigismond</td>
<td>indulgence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19.</td>
<td>22/2/1411</td>
<td>spiritualis reformator</td>
<td>collecte des revenus de l’Église Romaine</td>
<td>Hongrie + royaumes de Sigismond</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20.</td>
<td>1/3/1411</td>
<td>spiritualis reformator</td>
<td>controverse de l'ordre Teutonique et Ladislas II de Jagellon</td>
<td>Hongrie + royaumes de Sigismond</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21.</td>
<td>25/5/ ou 6/6 1411</td>
<td>cardinal-prêtre de St Clément</td>
<td>Hongrie + royaumes de Sigismond</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22.</td>
<td>3/6/1411</td>
<td>legatus</td>
<td>promotion (bénéfice)</td>
<td>Hongrie + royaumes de Sigismond</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23.</td>
<td>19/6/1411</td>
<td>nuncius</td>
<td>[Hongrie]</td>
<td>procès d'obéissance (abbés de Tata, de Koppány-monstor et de Pannonhalma)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>24.</td>
<td>25/9/1411</td>
<td>legatus</td>
<td>[Hongrie]</td>
<td>discipline (tarif de sépulture) DF 237 312, ZsO III. nr. 974.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25.</td>
<td>12/10/1411</td>
<td>legatus a latere</td>
<td>autorisation de légat a latere ; union de l’Église, réforme</td>
<td>Hongrie + royaumes de Sigismond ZsO III. nr. 3184.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26.</td>
<td>12/10/1411</td>
<td>legatus a latere</td>
<td>procurement</td>
<td>Hongrie + royaumes de Sigismond ZsO III. nr. 3185.</td>
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<tr>
<td>27.</td>
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<td>Hongrie + royaumes de Sigismond ZsO III. nr. 1054.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28.</td>
<td>6/11/1411</td>
<td>legatus</td>
<td>croisade contre Ladislas de Durace</td>
<td>Hongrie + royaumes de Sigismond ZsO III. nr. 3189.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30.</td>
<td>28/1/1412</td>
<td>generalis reformator</td>
<td>[Hongrie]</td>
<td>juridiction : procès de dîme (abbaye de Pannonhalma, évêché de Veszprém) DF 201 164, 201 169, 201 499, ZsO III. nr. 1658.</td>
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<tr>
<td>No.</td>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Legat</td>
<td>Lieu</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<tr>
<td>-----</td>
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<td>-------------</td>
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<tr>
<td>34</td>
<td>28/7/1412</td>
<td>legatus</td>
<td>Buda</td>
<td>confirmation de privilèges : Ermites de St. Paul en Hongrie</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35</td>
<td>24/8/1412</td>
<td>legatus a latere</td>
<td>Buda</td>
<td>témoin : paix de l’ordre teutonique et Ladislas II de Jagellon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>38</td>
<td>26/9/1412</td>
<td>legatus</td>
<td>Buda</td>
<td>négociations : ordre de St Georges</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40</td>
<td>5/12/1412</td>
<td>legatus</td>
<td>Venise?</td>
<td>négociations : Hongrie-Venise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N°</td>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Nom du légat</td>
<td>Localisation</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<tr>
<td>41.</td>
<td>29/12/1412</td>
<td>legatus</td>
<td>[Hongrie]</td>
<td>nomination à la bénéfice (prévôt de la collégiale St Adalbert de Győr, Georges, fils de Théodoric) [acte cassée par Jean XXIII]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>42.</td>
<td>13/2/1413</td>
<td>legatus</td>
<td>Aquilée</td>
<td>provision</td>
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<tr>
<td>43.</td>
<td>6/3/1413</td>
<td>legatus</td>
<td>Trieste</td>
<td>négociations: Hongrie-Venise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>44.</td>
<td>18/3/1413</td>
<td>legatus</td>
<td>Aquilée</td>
<td>négociations: Hongrie-Venise</td>
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<tr>
<td>46.</td>
<td>17/4/1413</td>
<td>legatus</td>
<td>Castelleto</td>
<td>trève de Castelleto (Hongrie-Venise)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>47.</td>
<td>29/4/1413</td>
<td>(legatus)</td>
<td>Friaul</td>
<td>négociations: Hongrie-Venise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>49.</td>
<td>15/5/1413</td>
<td>legatus</td>
<td>extension territoriale de autorisation de legatus a latere</td>
<td>Alemannia, Lombardia + présence de Sigismond de Luxembourg</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No.</td>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Role</td>
<td>Location</td>
<td>Document Details</td>
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<td>50</td>
<td>8/6/1413</td>
<td>legatus</td>
<td>Hongrie, royauts de Sigismond, Italie</td>
<td>provision ZsO IV. nr. 2851.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>51</td>
<td>22/7/1413</td>
<td>(legatus)</td>
<td>Milan</td>
<td>négociations (alliance avec Milan ?) ZsO IV. nr. 899.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>52</td>
<td>4/10/1413</td>
<td>legatus, administrateur de l'év. de Veszpréma</td>
<td>Veszpréma</td>
<td>mandat d'enquête (revenus du chapitre) ZsO IV. nr. 1154 ; DF 278 000.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>53</td>
<td>18/12/1413</td>
<td>legatus, administrateur de l'év. de Veszpréma</td>
<td>Veszpréma</td>
<td>lettre de confirmation (acte de donation de Jean, prévôt d'Örs) ZsO IV. nr. 1421 ; DF 274 034.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>54</td>
<td>18/12/1413</td>
<td>legatus, administrateur de l'év. de Veszpréma</td>
<td>Veszpréma</td>
<td>lettre de confirmation (acte d'échange) ZsO IV. nr. 1422 ; DL 105 470.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55</td>
<td>av. 23/3/1414</td>
<td>(legatus)</td>
<td>Veszpréma?</td>
<td>juridiction (procès de dîme de Segesd, chapitre de Veszpréma, abbé de Pannonhalma) ZsO IV. nr. 1792 ; DF 200 408.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>56</td>
<td>av. 19/4/1414</td>
<td>referendarius</td>
<td>Veszpréma?</td>
<td>lettre de dispensation (irrégularité, Dominique, fils de Ladislas) ZsO IV. nr. 1888 ; DF 288 704.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>57</td>
<td>av. 18/5/1414</td>
<td>legatus</td>
<td>Veszpréma?</td>
<td>juridiction (prébende de chanoineau chapitre de Várad) ZsO IV. nr. 1996 ; DF 288 725.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
50. 8/6/1413 legatus Hongrie, royaumes de Sigismond, Italie
 provision ZsO IV. nr. 2851.

51. 22/7/1413 (legatus) Milan négociations (alliance avec Milan ?)
 ZsO IV. nr. 899.

52. 4/10/1413 legatus, administrateur de l'év. de Veszprém
 Veszprém mandat d'enquête (revenus du chapitre)
 ZsO IV. nr. 1154 ; DF 278 000.

53. 18/12/1413 legatus, administrateur de l'év. de Veszprém
 Veszprém lettre de confirmation (acte de donation de Jean, prévôt d'Örs)
 ZsO IV. nr. 1421 ; DF 274 034.

54. 18/12/1413 legatus, administrateur de l'év. de Veszprém
 Veszprém lettre de confirmation (acte d'échange)
 ZsO IV. nr. 1422 ; DL 105 470.

55. av. 23/3/1414 (legatus) Veszprém? juridiction (procès de dîme de Segesd, chapitre de Veszprém, abbé de Pannonhalma)
 ZsO IV. nr. 1792 ; DF 200 408.

56. av. 19/4/1414 referendarius Veszprém? lettre de dispensation (irrégularité, Dominique, fils de Ladislas)
 ZsO IV. nr. 1888 ; DF 288 704.

57. av. 18/5/1414 legatus Veszprém? juridiction (prébende de chanoineau chapitre de Várad)
 ZsO IV. nr. 1996 ; DF 288 725.
The itinerary and seals of Władysław I

Ádám Novák

Additions to the itinerary and seals of King Władysław I of Hungary in the light of recent Hungarica research

Introduction

In July 17, 1440, in Székesfehérvár, Władysław III of Poland was crowned King of Hungary. He was the first Jagiellonian King of Hungary, but not the first who ruled both countries by personal union. In my paper I wish to provide some additions to the well-documented history of the short reign of King Władysław. The King’s itinerary and seal usage had been compiled much earlier, however back then Ferenc Dőry, Lajos Bernát Kumorovitz and Stanisław Sroka, who had no access to the Database of the archival sources of the Middle Ages in Hungary. Moreover during my research as a member of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences - University of Debrecen ‘Lendület- Hungary in the Medieval Europe’ Research Group I discovered sources that can complement to what we already know about the itinerary and chancery of King Władysław.

I mainly rely on the collection of my research trip in Warsaw in the first week of December, 2014. My primary aim was to inspect the polysigillic diplomas of the Archivum Główne Akt Dawnych w Warszawie Zbiór Dokumentów pergaminowych catalogue, but further on, I discovered historically important but not yet microfilmed charters. In my recent study I have focussed on the

1 This article is supported by the Hungarian Academy of Sciences - University of Debrecen ‘Lendület’ Research Group ‘Hungary in Medieval Europe’.


6 Hereinafter: AGAD, Dok. Perg.
diplomas issued by Władysław I as King of Hungary. Through my search for polysigillic diplomas issued between 1439 and 1457, in the Haus-, Hof- und Staatsarchiv and in the Archiv Republike Slovenije I found four diplomas sealed by King Władysław and his barons. At first, I am bringing forward the additions for the King’s itinerary, and then describing and examining his seals.

**History of Hungarica research**

The importance of Hungarica was recognized as soon as the nineteenth century and by the turn of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries it was working in an organized conditions. The milestones were the launch of a series of thematic source documents; and in the 1920s, the build-up of the institutional system of the Collegium Hungaricum. The Treaty of Trianon – among others – overwrote this research. The documents of the Upper-Hungarian cities and the well-guarded family archives became Hungarica materials too. By the development of new technological methods – microfilm was used. It made possible to record more archival material in a short time, in its investigate. Antal Fekete Nagy and Bálint Ila were the first to use this method in 1935, while researching the archives of the Szepes (Spiš) chapter, which was a place of authentication (locus credibilis) in the Middle Ages. From that point on the Hungarica research was carried out in shorter or longer research trips, using microfilm technique. Its complete process can be traced back through the papers of Iván Borsa and István Kollega Tarsoly published in the Levełtári Szemle. The result is publicized in the MNL OL DF database dreamed up by Borsa, and made by György Rácz.

Poland was the destination of Hungarian Hungarica researchers many times. They were made microfilm copies of the materials of the local archives, museums, and libraries too, which (the ones from the medieval era) became part of the MNL OL DF database. The most important part of this is the collection of parchment charters in the Archiwum Główne Akt Dawnych w Warszawie.

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7 Ádám Novák, ‘Egy kutatási program első eredményeinek bemutatása – Sokpecsétes oklevelek 1439 és 1457 között’ [Presenting the first results of a research program – Polysigillic diplomas from 1439 to 1457], in Judit Gál et al. (eds.), Micae Mediaevales IV, Budapest 2015, pp.199–212.


The itinerary and seals of Władysław I

The research of this was conducted by Péter Tóth in the 1980s.\textsuperscript{10} Through his selection 82 charters were filmed, which is newly researchable online in black and white microfilm.\textsuperscript{11}

During my stay in Warsaw I discovered that many charters related to Hungary escaped the attention of previous researchers. The reason for this is that the concept of the Hungarica was and still is unclear. István Kollega Tarsoly even cites the relating decree of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences in his work.\textsuperscript{12} However, these categories are quite vague and it is of times the researchers call to define something as “Hungarica”. The number of the relevant but missed charters, of course, is not too high. I found only 4 diplomas from the age of King Sigismond, which were not microfilmed.\textsuperscript{13} Three of these were included in the \textit{Zsigmond-kori Oklevéltár}.\textsuperscript{14} From its third volume, the editors used the manuscript of Elemér Mályusz, complete with the initially blue-labelled catalogue of the Diplomatic Archive and the Diplomatic Photo Collection and later on the MNL OL DL–DF database. The main principle of editing the subsequent volumes have been based on the latter,\textsuperscript{15} so the missing diploma – even if it had been already published – was not included in the \textit{Oklevéltár}.\textsuperscript{16} Therefore, it is important to draw the attention of the researchers to unknown charters, so these could be included in the MNL OL DL–DF database.\textsuperscript{17}

The Hungarian Academy of Sciences ‘\textit{Lendület}’ research programs working with early modern sources pointed out that this may be the right form of a

\textsuperscript{10} Péter Tóth shared his experience with me personally. His statements, comments, and assistance in preparing this paper are gratefully acknowledged.

\textsuperscript{11} MNL OL DL–DF database, accessed 15 September 2015.

\textsuperscript{12} Kollega Tarsoly 1992, 45–6.


\textsuperscript{14} ZsO II. 7525, 7709.; ZsO III. 1902.

\textsuperscript{15} See the prefaces of ZsO III. and V.

\textsuperscript{16} \textit{Monumenta mediæ ævi historica res gestas Poloniae illustrantia. Pomniki dziejowe wieków srednich do objasnienia rzeczy polskich słuzace.} I–XIX, Cracoviae 1874–1927, XII. 127. reg. According to this it seems certain that King Sigismund waited for the King of Poland and his retinue in Ófalu since 19 March 1423.

\textsuperscript{17} For the importance of documenting unknown charters and the history of Hungarica research see: Richard Horváth, ‘Újonnan előkerült középkori oklevélszövegek a Győri Egyházmegyei Levéltárban’ [Recently discovered diploma texts from the Archive of Győr Bishopric], \textit{Levéltaři Szemle} 54:3 (2004), 3–13.
Ádám Novák

systematic source-surveying work. Our HAS–UD ‘Hungary in medieval Europe’ Lendület Research Group also hold it as a passable way. Therefore, we are trying to publish every result of the ‘Hungarica’ research we have carried out. For this, the best technical realization is a digitalized database accessible online, which now is in a beta testing phase. We hope that it will be available for the public in 2016. Its advantage of is that not only the texts and descriptions can be investigated, but the images of the charters and seals as well. As a part of the project, the Hungarian-related charters kept in Warsaw will also be published.

Additions to the itinerary of King Władysław I

A group of diplomas issued by King Władysław I found in the Zbiór Dokumentów pergaminowych amounts to 77 pieces. The contents of these are not related to Hungary, as in most cases they are addressed to Polish persons, arranging Polish matters, and the Polish royal seal hangs on them, however, it is indisputable that these documents were issued by the elected and crowned King of Hungary operating in the territory of the Kingdom of Hungary. I think this fact alone classify them as Hungarica material. They can be used directly in the preparation of the royal itinerary and in the study of seal usage. In the ‘80s Pál Engel pointed out that the Hungarian mediaeval studies has a shortcoming: the royal itineraries are either inaccurate or non-existent. He puts together the itineraries of governor János Hunyadi, and Sigismund of Luxemburg, thereby recovering a huge gap. His work was followed up by Norbert C. Tóth with the itineraries of the Queens. Although Sroka’s work was not yet made on the basis of the MNL OL DL–DF database, its source-base is extensive, leaves only small gaps. The thoroughness of his collection is confirmed by the fact that the database can complete it with only thirteen data. Another nine data came from foreign archives, mostly from the charters of Władysław which are kept in the aforementioned archive in Warsaw.

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19 http://lendulet.memhung.unideb.hu:8080/momentum-web/Momentum_web.html


Sroka chose July 17, 1440 as the starting point of the King’s itinerary, the date of his coronation in Székesfehérvár. The Warsaw-diplomas, the MNL OL–DL DF sources, and the data of the historian Jan Długosz make it possible to compile the itinerary of King Władysław from his election in Krakow up to his coronation in Székesfehérvár. As its starting date we choose the 8th of March, 1440 when in his charter confirmed by the seals of Polish magnates he accepts the conditions of the Hungarian ambassadors.\(^{22}\) However, it is interesting that in a diploma issued on March 2 he already calls himself elected King of Hungary. With regard to the authenticity of diplomas, there can be no doubt. In terms of its content – mortgage loan – it does not belong to those diplomas, which should be faked. In appearance it is also identical to other Polish chancery diplomas of the era. Although its seal is now lost, this fact cannot be decisive due to the dire fate of Polish charters. It can be concluded that the Hungarian ambassadors arriving to Krakow in the last week of February managed to convince the King about the acceptance of the Hungarian throne nearly a week earlier.\(^{23}\) So the unanimous opinion of the contemporary sources and the modern literature, that is, to accept the Hungarian throne was a huge dilemma for the King and the Polish magnates, may be even more correct.\(^{24}\)

\(^{22}\) DL 39 291.

\(^{23}\) One of the ambassadors, János Perényi, Master of the Treasury dates his diploma on the February 17 in Prešov (Eperjes). DF 213 043.

Ádám Novák

*The itinerary of Władysław I King elect from Krakow to Székesfehérvár*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Location</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2 March 1440</td>
<td>Kraków</td>
<td>15 May 1440</td>
<td>Eger</td>
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<tr>
<td>4 March 1440</td>
<td>Kraków</td>
<td>19 May 1440</td>
<td>Pest</td>
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<td>8 March 1440</td>
<td>Kraków</td>
<td>22 May 1440</td>
<td>Buda</td>
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<tr>
<td>17 March 1440</td>
<td>Kraków</td>
<td>31 May 1440</td>
<td>Buda</td>
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<td>5 April 1440</td>
<td>Kraków</td>
<td>15 June 1440</td>
<td>Buda</td>
</tr>
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<td>9 April 1440</td>
<td>Kraków</td>
<td>17 June 1440</td>
<td>Buda</td>
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<td>19–20 April 1440</td>
<td>Sącz (Szandec)</td>
<td>27 June 1440</td>
<td>Buda</td>
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<tr>
<td>25 April 1440</td>
<td>Kežmarok (Késmárk)</td>
<td>29 June 1440</td>
<td>Buda</td>
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<td>27 April 1440</td>
<td>Kežmarok (Késmárk)</td>
<td>1 July 1440</td>
<td>Buda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 May 1440</td>
<td>Kežmarok (Késmárk)</td>
<td>13 July 1440</td>
<td>Buda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 May 1440</td>
<td>Spišská Nová Ves (Igló)</td>
<td>15 July 1440</td>
<td>Buda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 May 1440</td>
<td>Rozhanovce (Rozgony)</td>
<td>17 July 1440</td>
<td>Székesfehérvár</td>
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</table>

25 AGAD, Dok. Perg. 357.


27 AGAD, Dok. Perg. 378.

28 PÁLOSFALVI 2003, 906. Based on Długosz.

29 DL 39291.; DF 276 142.; Ibid., 288 388.

30 PÁLOSFALVI 2003, 906. Based on Długosz.

31 AGAD, Dok. Perg. 6625.

32 Ibid., 4856.

33 Ibid., 8499.

34 DL 13 554.

35 AGAD, Dok. Perg. 355, 4722.

36 DL 13 555.

37 AGAD, Dok. Perg. 7283, 452.

38 DL 49 078.


40 DL 44 295.

41 Ibid., 13 539.

42 Ibid., 59 262.

43 DF 272 930.

44 DL 65 537.

45 DF 281 452., 281 474., 281 735.

46 DL 80 727.

47 PÁLOSFALVI 2003, 906. Based on Długosz.

48 DF 289 009.
The itinerary and seals of Władysław I

The King’s itinerary after his coronation are supplemented by the following data:49

Additions for the itinerary of King Władysław I

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Place(s)</th>
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<td>8–9 January 1441</td>
<td>Buda50</td>
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<td>15 March 1441</td>
<td>Márványkő52</td>
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<tr>
<td>21 March 1441</td>
<td>Németi vár alatt54</td>
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<tr>
<td>3 April 1441</td>
<td>Szentmárton56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 April 1441</td>
<td>Szombathely58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 Nov. 1441</td>
<td>Csepel60</td>
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<tr>
<td>31 Dec. 1441</td>
<td>Buda62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28 Jan. 1442</td>
<td>Between Trnava (Nagyszombat) and Bratislava (Pozsony)64</td>
</tr>
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<td>4 April 1442</td>
<td>Trnava (Nagyszombat)66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 July 1442</td>
<td>Buda68</td>
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<tr>
<td>11 Oct. 1442</td>
<td>Buda70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 January 1443</td>
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<td>8 April 1443</td>
<td>Buda53</td>
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<tr>
<td>25 May 1443</td>
<td>Buda55</td>
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<tr>
<td>13 June 1443</td>
<td>Buda57</td>
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<td>15 June 1443</td>
<td>Buda59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18 Oct. 1443</td>
<td>Near Belgrad (Nándorfehérvár)61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19 Jan. 1444</td>
<td>Sabar – Rácország63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28 Jan. 1444</td>
<td>Buda65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23 June 1444</td>
<td>Buda67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 July 1444</td>
<td>Buda69</td>
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<tr>
<td>11 Oct. 1442</td>
<td>Buda70</td>
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49 My additions do not change the judgement of the events of the reign of King Władyslaw. However, the cumulative nature of historiography requires one to strive to be as comprehensible as possible and collect and arrange all known data.

50 AGAD, Dok. Perg. 4855.; 631.

51 Ibid., 424.

52 DL 13 612.

53 Ibid., 47 696.

54 DF 279 632.

55 DL 44 346.

56 Ibid., 92 916.

57 AGAD, Dok. Perg. 6634.

58 DF 293 348.

59 Ibid., 275 714.

60 Ibid., 286 209.

61 AGAD, Dok. Perg. 4867.

62 DF 262 896.

63 DL 44 357.
Seal usage of King Władysław

According to the literature and the known seal-material Władysław III of Poland used three different seals, and after his election for the Hungarian throne two others were added.

(0) In the literature appears a very similar seal to the next one, that is the Polish secret seal – it holds just a few differences from it. The escutcheon is round base, not heater, and the field lacks the floral ornament. Its minuscular inscription is:

*wladislavs•dei•gracia•rex•polonie•etcetera.*71

After his election this seal disappears, so presumably it was replaced at the beginning of 1440 to the first seal.

(1) The Polish royal secret seal. He uses it till the end of his reign. Roughly 33 mms in diameter, the colour of the wax is red. An escutcheon is visible in its field, in its first and fourth quarters a Polish eagle is displayed, wings elevated; in the second and third quarters Lithuanian chevalier on horse. Literature presumes the Jagiellonian cross patriarchal on the shield of the chevalier. Above the escutcheon are floral ornaments. Its minuscular inscription is:

*wladislavs•dei•gracia•rex•polonie•etcetera.*72

This seal remains in use in the Polish secret chancery until the end of his life.

64 AGAD, Dok. Perg. 428.
65 Haus-, Hof- und Staatsarchiv, Galgóc Archive of the Erdődy family, 347. (Based on the abstracts of Béla Iványi)
66 AGAD, Dok. Perg. 4728.
67 Ibid., 433.
68 DF 269 991.
69 DL 27 504.
70 Ibid., 35 961.
(2) The next one is presumably his Polish royal middle – or bigger – seal. Its wax is red coloured, approximately 46mms in diameter. Armorial bearings are visible in its field as well, in the first and fourth quarters a Polish eagle is displayed, wings elevated, in the second quarter Lithuanian chevalier on horse, in the third quarter Moldavian bull’s head. It is worth noting that a smaller shield is placed above the larger one. We can see a cross patriarchal appearing in it. But since the hill of three mounds is absent from the base, and concerning that Władysław had used this seal previous to his enthronement, we must assume it signifies the Jagiellonian cross patriarchal, not the Hungarian. The field is filled with rich floral ornament. Its minuscular inscription is:

S’wladislai’ter(tio)’dei’gra(cia)’reg(i)’polo(nie)’litw(anie)’p(ri)ncip’sup(?)’
met’he(re)d(is)’russie’etcet(era).73

Its use in the Polish Chancery remained demonstrably until October 1442.74

(3) His first Hungarian royal seal appears at first after his enthronement in Székesfehérvár. Its wax is red, approximately 50mms in diameter. In its escutcheon is the first quarter the Árpád stripes, in the second Polish chevalier on horse, in the third Lithuanian chevalier on horse, in the fourth Hungarian cross patriarchal on hill of three mounds. Its minuscular inscription is:

S•wladislaus•dei•gracia•hungarie•polonie•dalmacie•croacie•(e)tc(etera)•rex.75

Its last use is known from the July 23, 1444.76

(4) The seal appearing in the September 19, 1444, can be visualized by the reconstruction drawing of Ferenc Dőry. The wax is also red coloured, approximately 57mms in diameter. Escutcheon party per pale, stripes of the Árpád and cross patriarchal on hill of three mounds. Its majuscular inscription is:

SIGILLUM:WLADISLAI:DEI:GRACIA:HUNGARIE:POLONIE:
DALMACIE:CROAC(ie):REX:(e)TC(etera).

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74 AGAD, Dok. Perg. 4862.
76 DL 13 791.
Ádám Novák

Dőry, along with the literature, unequivocally sees the Hungarian cross patriarchal on the right side of the escutcheon. The presence of the hill of three mounds is undoubted, however I would not reject the possibility that it is being the mixture of the Jagiellonian and Hungarian charges, a hybrid. 77

(5) We should also mention the „great seal” of Polish King Władysław III, of which has only a single known copy. 78 The seal hangs on the polysigillical charter about the acceptance of the terms of the Hungarian Kingship must belong to King Władysław, since it hangs in the middle, in the most prestigious location. The red wax impression is approx. 53 mms in diameter. In the escutcheon’s dexter base point letter W, in honour a haloed figure with crosier, in his right a crowned man, in his left a woman. Its majuscular inscription is:

SIGILLUM•S•MARIE•DEI•ET•APOSTOLICE•SEDIS•GRATIA•
POLONIE•REGIS. 79

Change of seals or reform of the chancery?

From the itinerary of Sroka we know that until the July 23, 1444 we does not need any special research to determine King Władysław’s exact location using his charters. 80 But on August 1 of the same year, the King left Buda. From the work of Jan Długosz we know that the King was in Szeged, preparing for a war from which he never came back to Buda. 81 From September 7, we regularly find charters issued in the name of the King, but dated in Buda. 82 These are mostly involved in litigation, which means that the King formed his great chancery in the summer of 1444, and had made a new seal for it. Following Ferenc Dőry, 83 Lajos Bernát Kumorovitz 84 assumed that the seal change took place between

77  Dőry 1918–21, 32.
78  DL 39 291.
80  Sroka 1995, 40.
81  Ibid.
82  DL 75 878.
83  Dőry 1918–21, 32.
84  Kumorovitz 1937, 109.
July 23 and September 19, 1444. However, in my opinion, it is not only a change of the seal, but also the establishment of a new chancery.\textsuperscript{85}

The King demonstrably kept with himself the Polish royal secret chancery in the campaign, because his secret seal appears on several diplomas issued in Várad/Oradea.\textsuperscript{86} For the journey of the Hungarian secret chancery is proved by five charters, which are kept in Romania today.\textsuperscript{87} That is why, that publishing after the Paris (Trianon) Peace Treaty (1920), Kumorovitz and Dőry could not use them in their work, their existence is only discovered by archival research, as well as the Diplomatic Photo Collection of the MNL OL. Nowadays these diplomas can easily be found in the MNL OL-DL DF database. Until now, I received my requested photos of the diplomas and seals only from the Direcția Județeană Brașov a Arhivelor Naționale.\textsuperscript{88} Based on this photo there can be no doubt that King Władysław took his old seal with him to the campaign. This means, that based on the success of his long campaign, and the results of the national assembly held in spring 1444, he successfully consolidated his power, and established a constantly working Hungarian greater chancellery in Buda, which gained a new – larger – seal. But for himself and for the Hungarian secret chancellery he kept the old seal, engraved after his coronation. The other four Romanian diplomas’ seal-pictures can confirm this theory, however, in this study I cannot present them.\textsuperscript{89}

\textsuperscript{85} All the more, because diplomas were issued with it even in 1445, after the death of King Władyslaw. See: DF 211 778.; Ibid., 222 208.; Ibid., 222 205.; DL 97 188.; DF 222 214.; DL 13 817.; DF 249 248.; Ibid., 249 249.; Ibid., 285 742.; DL 88 194.; Ibid., 90 975.; DF 200 456.; DL 74 081.; Ibid., 39 561.; DF 250 253.; DL 39 562.; Ibid., 80 829.; Ibid., 80 846.; Ibid., 13 835.; Ibid., 13 836.; Ibid., 65 889. It is important to note that the text of the diplomas cannot help in this question, we must confine ourselves to the examination of the seals.

\textsuperscript{86} AGAD, Dok. Perg. 453, 447.

\textsuperscript{87} DF 278 450.; 246 914., 281 161., 281 109., 280 991.

\textsuperscript{88} Brașov County State Archive. DF 246 914. The slightly blurred but clearly identifiable third seal.

\textsuperscript{89} I have already contacted the Cluj County State Archive and the Historical Museum in Bucharest, but I could not obtain the requested photos until the submission deadline.
Ádám Novák

Appendix

Polysigillic diplomas of King Władysław

This sigillographic research also shows the need for a comprehensive and complete seal index of the complete medieval diplomatic material. The framework of this study cannot include this, not even the seal index of King Władysław. Its reason is that the Diplomatic Photo Collection often leaves in doubt the mere existence of the seals, and we can very rarely obtain any information about their looks. However, my research dedicated to the so-called polysigillic diplomas covers the period of the reign of King Władysław, so it is in my intent to publish the description of the polysigillic diplomas kept in archives abroad, and in this way I would like to contribute for a future seal index of the King.

1\textsuperscript{90}
Date: 8 March 1440
Place: Kraków
MNL OL number: DL 39 291
Abstract: King Władysław with the consent of the magnates confirms King Albert’s donations to his wife, Queen Elizabeth.
Description: Originally 25, now only 16 seals hang from parchment tags. In the middle the great seal of Władysław III, King of Poland, on its both sides seals of Polish magnates: on the left seven (one red and six green), on the right eight (three red, five green) seals. Their description is in the MNL OL DL–DF database.

2\textsuperscript{91}
Date: 15 June 1440
Place: Buda
MNL OL number: DL 13 554
Abstract: King Władysław and his Polish and Hungarian supporters grant salvus conductus to the followers of László Garai, János Kórógyi and Queen Elizabeth.
Description: Originally 18, now only 15 seals (in a row) hang from parchment tags. In the middle (the ninth) Władysław III, King of Poland’s greater seal, on the right Polish, on the left Hungarian magnates’ seals. Out of the remaining

\textsuperscript{90} Published in: Sroka 1995, 168.

\textsuperscript{91} Published in: Márton György Kovachich, Suppleentum ad Vestigia Comitiorum apud Hungaros: ab exordio regni eorum in Pannonia, usque hodiernum diem Celebratorum, Buda 1798, I. p.492.
Hungarian seals two red wax seals belong to prelates, four green wax seals belong to barons. Their distance from the King’s seal follows the order of their owner’s dignity. We can assume that the lost seals belonged to László Pálóci seneschal (2nd) and János Marcali count (comes) of Somogy (3rd). The impressions are strongly blurred. Their description is in the MNL OL DL–DF database.

Assumed order of the sealing persons: János Ország (1st), János Perényi jr. (4th), Matkó Tallóci (5th), Jakab bishop of Szerém (Syrmia) (6th) Lőrinc Hédervári (7th), János bishop of Žengg/Senj (8th), King Władysław (9th) Polish magnates (10th–18th).

3.\(^92\)

Date: 17 April 1441
Place: Szombathely
MNL OL number: DF 287 160
Memoria Hungariae: MH 22001–22009.\(^93\)
Original number: Arhiv Republike Slovenije Sector for the protection of the oldest records no. 4996.

Abstract: The magnates consent that Władysław donates the bishopric of Zagreb to Péter Kottrer.

Description: Originally 9, now only 7 seals hang (in a row) from written parchment tags. In the middle is the first secret seal of Władysław I, King of Hungary. On the left three red wax seals of prelates, on the right three green wax seals of barons. The seals of Imre Marcali (1st) and Simon Pálóci (8th) are lost. The seals are heavily damaged.

Assumed order of the sealing persons: Péter, bishop of Csanád/Cenad (2nd), János, bishop of Várad/Oradea (3rd), Simon, bishop of Eger (4th), King Władysław (5th), Miklós Újlaki (6th), Matkó Tallóci/Talovac (7th), Mihály Ország (9th).

4\(^94\)

Date: 18 April 1441
Place: near Szombathely
MNL OL number: DL 13 619
Ádám Novák

Abstract: King Władysław donates the castle of Simontornya and its belonging estates to Simon Rozgonyi, bishop of Eger, supreme chancellor, for his and his brothers’ services.

Description: Originally three seals were placed on the diploma, now all lost. The assumed order of the seals: in the middle (2nd) the Hungarian royal seal of King Władysław, on the left (1st) (based on its size) the green wax seal of Miklós Újlaki, voivode of Transylvania, on the right the green wax seal of master of the treasury Mihály Ország.

Date: 19 April 1441
Place: Szombathely
MNL OL number: DF 287 162 and DF 258 346
Original number: Arhiv Republike Slovenije Sector for the protection of the oldest records Nr. 4998.
Abstract: Diploma of King Władysław I and his magnates.

Description: The diploma included two times in the MNL OL DF database: there is a microfilm picture of the original charter taken in Vienna (DF 258 346.), and a later picture of a xerox copy (DF 287 162). Originally ten, now only nine seals (in a row) hang on parchment tags. In the middle (5th) the Hungarian royal seal of King Władysław I, on the left three red wax seals of prelates and a green wax seal of a baron. On the right four green wax seals of barons. We assume that the lost green wax seal (the 10th) belonged to Mihály Ország, master of the treasury. The seals are heavily blurred.

Assumed order of the sealing persons: Imre Marcali (1st), Péter, bishop of Csanád (2nd), János, bishop of Várad/Oradea (3rd), Simon, bishop of Eger (4th), King Władysław (5th), Miklós Újlaki (6th), Matkó Tallóci (7th), Simon Cudar (8th), Simon Palóci (9th).

Date: 19 April 1441
Place: Szombathely
MNL OL number: DF 258 347 and DF 287 161
Original number: Arhiv Republike Slovenije Sector for the protection of the oldest records no. 4999.

95 Published in: István Katona, Historia critica regnum Hungariae stirpis Arpadianae, ex fide domesticorum et exterorum scriptorum concinnata, Buda 1779–82, VI/XIII. pp.150–3.
The itinerary and seals of Władysław I

Abstract: King Władysław promises the transfer of some charters to Ulrich of Celje.

Description: The diploma included two times in the MNL OL DF database: there is a microfilm picture of the original charter taken in Vienna (DF 258 347.), and a later picture of a xerox copy (DF 287 161.). Originally ten, now only nine seals (in a row) hang on parchment tags. In the middle (5th) the Hungarian royal seal of King Władysław I, on the left three red wax seals of prelates and a green wax seal of a baron. On the right four green wax seals of barons. We assume that the lost green wax seal (the 10th) belonged to Mihály Ország, master of the treasury. The seals are heavily blurred.

Assumed order of the sealing persons: Imre Marcali (1st) Péter, bishop of Csanád (2nd), János, bishop of Várad (3rd), Simon, bishop of Eger (4th), King Władysław (5th), Miklós Újlaki (6th), Matkó Tallócí (7th), Simon Cudar (8th), Simon Pálócí (9th).

Date: 16 August 1442
Place: Buda
MNL OL number: DF 258 234
Original number: Haus-, Hof- und Staatsarchiv AUR 1442 VIII 16.
Abstract: King Władysław and the Hungarian states grant salvus conductus to Queen Elizabeth.

Description: There are 32 cut marks on the diploma for the parchment tags, but in my opinion two of these, the 14th and the 22nd were not used. Now 29 seals hang on the charter, and a separated one (which was probably the 8th or the 32nd) is kept beside it. In the middle (21st) there are the Hungarian secret seal of King Władysław, on its both sides the seals of Polish and Hungarian prelates, barons and envoys in order of their dignity. Out of the intact seals three red wax seals belong to prelates (two Hungarian and one Polish) and one to a baron. The 1st and 39th are natural colour, the remaining 22 are green. Most of them are blurred and broken.

The seals of the Hungarian prelates and barons are the following: József, bishop of Bosnia (16th), János, bishop of Várad (19th), King Władysław (21st), Miklós Újlaki, voivode of Transylvania (24th), Matkó Tallócí, ban of Dalmatia, Croatia and Slavonia (25th), László Pálócí seneschal (26th), István Bátori, former judge royal (27th), János Marcali count of Somogy (28th), László Losonci (29th).

Jagiellonian Europe in bulwark descriptions

Paul Srodecki

‘Universe christiane reipublice validissima propugnacula‘ –
Jagiellonian Europe in bulwark descriptions around 1500

Against the backdrop of the Ottoman threat, a very common motif in the
diplomatic language of the late Middle Ages and the Early Modern period was
the *topos* of a Christian Occident surrounded by innumerable enemies of the
faith and protected by lands such as Poland, Hungary, and Livonia, stylized as
‘bulwarks of Christianity’. The emergence of this notion and the corresponding
ideology was connected with the political and religious situation of the time.
The presumed existence of an *antemurale* implies the existence of a *murus*, and
of an area protected by it. This was believed to be inhabited by members of the
Christian community. This western *Respublica Christiana* – subordinated to the
secular power of the Emperor and the spiritual power of the Pope – bordered on
heathen, Muslim and schismatic countries to the East.

This contribution seeks to take a closer look at the medial diffusion of the
East Central and South Eastern European ‘bulwark’ *topoi* under the dynasty of
the Jagiellonians in the rest of Europe at the threshold of the Middle Ages and
the Early Modern period. Relevant single-leaf prints, frontispieces, woodcuts
and copperplate engravings representing the respective outpost-countries as
*antemuralia Christianitatis* ensured that the bulwark idea was also spread beyond
the circles of humanistic scholars. Thanks to the new technique of printing,
numerous writings were circulated (the so called *Turcica*) which focussed on the
Ottoman expansion and on the role which Hungary and Poland in particular had
to fulfil in the defence of Latin Christianity. The development of the printing
press meant that a far larger public could now be reached, and the Turkish Wars
belonged, alongside the Italian Wars of the early sixteenth century, to the mili-
tary events which awakened the greatest interest among the European public.¹

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¹ For the bulwark *topoi* in East Central Europe see: Paul Srodecki, *Antemurale Christianitatis.
Zur Genese der Bollwerksrhetorik im östlichen Mitteleuropa an der Schwelle vom Mittelalter zur Frühen
Regardless of Poland’s slowly declining status in the Northern Black Sea Region in the second half of the fifteenth century, the use of the bulwark rhetoric as a diplomatic instrument experienced a new popularity. The spread of Jagiellonian dominion to cover almost the entirety of East Central Europe contributed substantially to this: Under the rule of Casimir IV’s sons, the Jagiellonians ruled in the kingdoms of Poland, Hungary and Bohemia as well as in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania – the ancestral homeland of the dynasty. As Polish and Hungarian fiefdoms, Prussia, Courland and Moldavia were as much a part of the Jagiellonian domains as Livonia, a land fiercely contested between Poland, Muscovy and Sweden. By the year 1500, the so-called ‘Jagiellonian Europe’ was on a par with such powerful Renaissance dynastic dominions as those of the Habsburgs or the Valois.2

Despite John I Albert’s failed Moldavia crusade and Pope Alexander VI’s unsuccessful calls for a crusade against the Ottomans the use of the bulwark topos within Jagiellonian diplomacy increased at the turn of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. Of particular note is the unified position and solidarity which John I Albert and Vladislau II demonstrated to the broader world following the settlement of the dispute over the principality of Moldavia. Both rulers, together with their younger brother Alexander of Lithuania, subsequently worked very closely together and exchanged useful information. Polish and Hungarian diplomats often appeared together as a unified front, and jointly represented the Jagiellonian lands to the outside world.3

The diplomatic cooperation of this period is closely associated with one name in particular, that of the ethnic German Nikolaus von Rosenberg (Polish –

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Mikołaj Rozembarski). In him the Jagiellonians had a very skilled diplomat who represented both John I Albert and Vladislaus II, in particular at the Imperial Diets in Germany. Rosenberg’s speeches at the German Reichstage concerning the fight against the Turks and their allies were based – following Enea Silvio Piccolomini’s ‘Türkenreden’ – on antemurale ideas, and they clearly demonstrate the changes in the diplomatic liaisons of the Jagiellonians by the year of 1500. At the Reichstag in Freiburg in July 1498 the Polish envoy had still only asked for subsidies and military aid for Poland alone, which – plagued by Tatar raids and confronted by the growing power of the Ottomans in South Eastern Europe – had ‘always stood out as the unique bulwark of the Christians’. According to Rosenberg the South Eastern border regions of the Polish kingdom which had been devastated by the infidels could not withstand the growing attacks on their own for much longer. The collapse of the Polish defensive system would finally open the gates to the core lands of Latin Christianity for the enemies of the faith:

‘Non enim dubium est sacram vestram Majestatem [Maximilian I] minime latere, quomodo aliquando Gothi, Hunni, Tartari, cæteraque ignota Scythicæ gentes, non prius in Pannonias, Germaniam, & Italiam, ac deinceps in alias finitimas provincias irrupere, nisi fractis & contritis regionibus Poloniae regni, vt sic facilior illis aditus cæteras regiones inuadendi pateret.’

Two years later, the tone of Rosenberg’s speeches had changed considerably: At the Reichstag in Augsburg the diplomat already depicted Poland and Hungary as two equal-ranking bulwarks of the Western world, which King Maximilian I and the German Princes could not afford to abandon, due to their protective function for the Holy Roman Empire: ‘non permittente duo ista non sua solum sed et universe christianæ reipublicæ validissima propugnacula ab hoste hoc sevissimo amplius opugnari, quod utique non sine multorum finitorum pernicie atque ruina

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4 Mikołaj Rozembarski / Nikolaus Rosenberg originated from the village Rozembark/Rosenberg which was situated in the settlement area of the so-called ‘Walddeutsche’. See: Zofia Kowalska, Mikołaja Rozembarskiego traktat z roku 1499 o pochodzeniu Tatarów. Studium krytyczne i edycja traktatu, Kraków 1993 (Uniwersytet Jagielloński, Varia, 317), pp.9ff. [hereinafter: Kowalska 1993]


posset contingere.⁷ Rosenberg’s speeches, delivered in impeccable Latin shaped by humanist rhetoric, were highly appreciated throughout the Reich, and were printed well into the eighteenth century in various compendia of Reichstag speeches.⁸

Between his speeches in Freiburg and Augsburg Rosenberg published two highly interesting treatises in which he outlined both the Turkish and the Tatar threat. The memorandum Contra Turcos et Asianos adhortacio was addressed to the Holy See and all European rulers. It aimed, through a series of overstatements, to convince Latin Christianity of the situation ad salutarem expeditionem against the Muslim enemies of the faith.⁹ In the absence of contemporary accounts, it is not known if this call for holy war ever reached a broader public. Rosenberg’s second work from this period was the Explanatio compendiosa de situ, moribus et diversitate Scitarum gentium, published in 1499, a largely pejorative tract concerning the origins and barbarity of the Tatars. Although dedicated to the King of the Romans, Maximilian I., the Explanatio compendiosa received positive resonance amongst humanist circles and was subsequently well-known to many East Central and West European scholars such as Stanislav Thurzó or the printer Johannes ‘Oporinus’ Herbst from Basel. The historiographic and geographic description contains explicit appeals to Maximilian which aimed to stir him and thus the Holy Roman Empire into providing active aid against the Tatars and Ottomans. In this, as in his other works, Rosenberg did not hold back on exalted bulwark adscriptions, and he warned the Habsburg ruler of the consequences of the impending doom of Poland and Hungary, the ‘two Christian redoubts’

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Jagiellonian Europe in bulwark descriptions

which alone could preserve the Roman-German Empire from extinction at the hands of the Ottoman-Tatar hordes.10

Rosenberg’s oratorical and written work is representative of the notable increase in the use of the bulwark rhetoric towards the end of the fifteenth century. The image of Poland as a country beset by enemies of the faith on all sides particularly flourished at the turn of the Middle Ages and the Early Modern Period. At this time, the war of faith in the East of Europe found its way into sacral poetry. For example, shortly after the Tatar invasion of 1498, the Bernardine monk Ładyslaw of Gielniów wrote his liturgical acclamation Cantus contra paganos, in which he called upon Jesus Christ for help against the infidels, and this remained popular in Bernardine Franciscan masses up into the seventeenth century.11 Various other elegies written by 1500 demonstrate a similar structure, such as the Tractatus de martyrio sanctorum (first printed in March 1499) or the anonymous prayers Pieśni Sandomierzanina, also attributed


to Ładysław of Gielniów by most Polish literary historians. Additionally, the bulwark description was also mixed with the threatening scenario of the imminent collapse of the Polish outpost in the political rhetoric of the Jagiellonian era: A perennial motive was the outlining of the almost hopeless fight against ‘Turcken, heiden ader Tattern, wider welche man sich als widder die heuptfinde gemeiner cristenheit mus erweren und fechten.’ Depending on the intent and purpose of this rhetoric, this argumentation tended to be combined with a request, a demand, a threat or – in panegyric court poetry – with ostentatious reference to one’s own might.

In the subsequent period, the Jagiellonians increasingly underlined the specific status – in their eyes – of the Polish Crown as a bulwark of Latin Christendom. One can find numerous examples for this in particular in the reign of John I Albert’s successor, his brother Alexander. A letter from October 1502, sent to the Habsburg Maximilian, may be taken as emblematic of the Jagiellonian bulwark rhetoric in the early sixteenth century: Alexander, who as Grand Duke of Lithuania had also ascended the Polish throne following the death of John Albert one year before, described his dominion, the ‘dominia Regni nostri, as imperii Germaniae antemuralia.’ Of special interest here, is the emphasis on the entire territory of the Jagiellonians – that is to say not only on Poland as had been the case in the past – as a bulwark of Germany. Here, therefore, antemurale is primarily equated with the Jagiellonian (respectively Alexander’s) dominion. Remarkably, Alexander did not place the fight against the Muslim world in the first rank of the Jagiellonian defensio fidei, but rather the war against the schismatic East. Thus he warned Maximilian in his letter that his lands, which had been heavily affected by the constant wars against the Ruthenians, Muscovites and Moldavians, could only continue the holy war ‘contra paganos’ with the aid of their neighbours to the West. Were this antemurale to be taken


by the enemies of the faith, the borders would be open to the East, and not only Poland but the whole of Latin Christianity would fall.\textsuperscript{14}

Also quite impressive is the letter of another Jagiellonian from September 1502. In this, Frederick, who as archbishop of Gniezno and bishop of Cracow held the two most important spiritual offices in the kingdom, attempted in the name of the Polish clergy to convince Helena, Alexander’s wife and daughter of the Grand Duke of Moscow Ivan III, to act as a mediator between her father and her husband. Compared to Alexander’s argumentation towards Maximilian outlined above, Frederick twisted the anti-Moscow bulwark rhetoric of his brother right around. The Primate of Poland cleverly presented the war between the Catholic Poland-Lithuania and the Orthodox Grand Duchy of Moscow as a fight ‘inter christianos principes’, which could only be harmful to the ‘propugnaculum religionis nostrae’. Rather, he argued, there should be peace and harmony between these two Christian rulers, so as not to weaken the Christian (in this case the Latin and Greek) world:

\textit{‘Et propterea, etsi spectet ad omnes christianos dominos optare et cooperari pro viribus, ut pax et concordia sit inter religionis nostrae principes, ne sanguis fidelium cum aliqua eiusmodi religionis nota armis propriis diffundatur, tamen potissimum interesse cogitare de his incommodis eos, quibus imprimis ab ipso Salvatore nostro onus studium.’}\textsuperscript{15}

Whilst Alexander emphasised the antagonism between the rightful Latin Christianity and the misled Eastern schismatics in his letter to Maximilian, reducing the enemies of the faith solely to the latter without mentioning the Tatars and Ottomans as he had done in the preceding years, his brother now expressly underlined the commonalities between the two confessions, and between Poland-Lithuania and Moscow more generally. The disparity between Alexander and Frederick's letters once again shows the flexibility with which the bulwark motive was used as an adjustable instrument of diplomatic language in order to achieve specific political goals.\textsuperscript{16}

However, it was not only in foreign policy or inter-dynastic correspondences that the \textit{antemurale} allegory was a proven tool of political rhetoric. This line of argument was also used intensively by the Jagiellonian court in its negotiations with the estates. In December 1502, for example, at a convention in Vilnius, the royal envoy Jan Karwowski asked the assembled Polish and Lithuanian nobility

\textsuperscript{14} Akta Aleksandra, 170–171., no. 118.

\textsuperscript{15} Ibid., 144., no. 104.

\textsuperscript{16} Srodecki 2015, 247–255.
Paul Srodecki

as well as the Prussian estates in the name of Alexander for financial support in the defence of Red Ruthenia, which had to struggle with perpetual Tatar raids. At the same time Karwowski strongly insisted that several legations be sent to the Holy Roman Empire and to the rest of Latin Christianity, in order also to gain support there in the fight against Ottomans, Tatars and Wallachians. The royal envoy openly made use of the bulwark motive in his urgent demand for aid. As in the previous examples Karwowski concluded his argumentations with the well-known threatening scenario in which Poland, 'Regnum istud dicatur antemurale', without external support, could no longer resist 'hostibus populosissimis et potentissimis Turcis, Tartaris et scismaticis' any longer:

'Verum consultius esset, ut V. D. I. interim cum consiliariis universis conveniret et decerneret, ut legarentur nuntii ad Romanorum etc. regem, ad electoresque Imperii et per Germaniam, quibus exponeretur haec quae isti Regno a paganis infertur violentia, captareturque per querimoniam illorum benivolentia. Quatino, dum Regnum istud dicatur antemurale illorum esse et rubundum fuerit, auxilia praestent contra paganos nobis, nobis inquam, qui per tot centena praeteritorum temporum viribus, sanguine et opibus nostris antemurale illud defendere consuevimus etc.'

Alexander also knew how to detach the outpost rhetoric from the image of an all-Christian rampart and to relate to particular selected countries. In a letter to Pope Julius II from December 1504, for instance, the Jagiellonian stylised Poland as 'Almaniae antemurale'. Alexander portrayed the infidel supremacy – consisting of Tatars, Ottomans, Wallachians and not least Muscovites – which Poland had to stave off 'ad commune christianitatis bonum et ad suam filiorumque salutem'. The costs for these defensive tasks, which Alexander calculated at 100,000 Hungarian golden guilders, would exceed by far the financial possibilities of the kingdom, while the rest of Latin Christianity, above all the Holy Roman Empire, would not be involved in the expenses. Alexander referred to the widespread carelessness and impulses which used to exist amongst the Polish public when the Ottoman threat was far away from the Polish frontiers.

Since its foundation, Poland had always been a bastion of the Reich, but it had

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never had received any aid in its fight against the enemies of the faith from the German princes. On the contrary, rather, it had always had to defend itself against German inference and assaults. Finally, Alexander also alleged that Maximilian, together with the German princes, would enter surreptitiously into a relationship with Moscow directed against Poland, which was, after all, ‘the bulwark of the German princes’: ‘Ex parte Imperii, quorum principes Ordini Prutenorum patrocinari consueverunt et nulla unquam auxilia tribuunt illi Regno, quod velud antemurale est principum Germanorum, imo etiam principes Imperii nonnunquam patrocinantur schismaticis illis contra regem nostrum.’

The noticeable increase in the use of the antemurale term in diplomatic language under Alexander is to a large extent connected to the person of Jan Łaski the Elder. Initially as royal secretary and then, from 1503, as great chancellor of Poland he was mainly responsible for the written correspondence of the Jagiellonian courts in Cracow and Vilnius. As early as 1500, the royal chancellery of John I Albert used the antemurale allegory to praise Poland and Venice as the antemuralia of Christianity. Under Łaski’s leadership, the bulwark concept rapidly established itself as a favourite tool of Polish diplomacy, replacing older outpost motifs such as scutum, clipeus, murus or propugnaculum. The success of the antemurale idea is also reflected in its adoption by the Polish nobility – a development which foreshadowed the aristocratic self-perception of the seventeenth century, in which the Polish nobility, the szlachta, in particular saw themselves as the real rampart of Poland and Christianity. At a court meeting in Radom at the beginning of July 1505, for instance, representatives of the nobility announced to the Bohemian delegates in the name of Alexander that Poland was ‘illorum contra paganos antemurale’.

19 Ibid., 444., no. 270.: ‘Animus est ad belligerandum optimus et militum regnicolarum ingens multitudo, tamen quia propter opignorata bona regalia, praeter statum R. Maiestati dignum, Regnum illud omnino exhaustum vel expilatum fuerit pro defensione, quam velut partium Almaniae antemurale ab initio Regni in huneis gestavit, pro quo nulla provincia principum Almaniae auxilia aliqua praebuit unquam, et sicut per tot annorum centena molem illam belli sustinuit, sic necessario successice impendendo iam tandem laecstimum deficere incipit, et omnino tam diuturna belli continuatio communem Regno inopiam intuit.’

20 Ibid., 446., no. 270.


22 Akta Aleksandra, 494., no. 292.
However, self-conceptions which attribute a bulwark position to their own estate are rarely found within the Polish szlachta at the threshold of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. When dealing with the crown, one of their main strategies was to appeal to patriotic feelings and duties. The Field Crown Hetman Piotr Myszkowski gave perhaps the clearest expression to this argumentation when he asked John I Albert in September 1499 for financial and military support ‘pro defensione reipublice et eciam iusticie terrestris’ and for the defence of the faith.23

Valuable evidence of the reception of the external image of the domus Iagiellonica as defenders of the faith in the Christian occident is provided by a letter to Alexander from the Cardinal of Santa Croce in Jerusalemme, Bernardino López de Carvajal. In May 1501, the cardinal emphasised the importance of the Jagiellonians for the spreading of the Catholic faith at the Eastern peripheries of Latin Christianity and outlined his appreciation of the attempts of the Grand Duke of Lithuania for unification with the Orthodox in Ruthenia. The Jagiellonians, this dynasty ‘ex Lithwanie ducibus’, played a crucial role for the countries further to the West, since the growth of the faithful and the extension of Christian power would strengthen this ‘invincible shield against the Turks and Tatars’. It is notable that López de Carvajal summarized the different Jagiellonian territories into one dominion: According to the cardinal, the offspring of the domus Iagiellonica would dominate the whole of East Central Europe since, as well as being Grand Dukes of Lithuania, they were also kings of Poland, Hungary and Bohemia. Furthermore, the Jagiellonian dominion would also include ‘universe Rosolane provincie [...] et Sarmatie etiam’ and would even extend beyond the Don river.24

Similarly to Poland under John I Albert and Alexander, the bulwark rhetoric in Hungary also experienced an upturn around 1500. Proof for this can be found in the increasing use of the terms antemurale or propugnaculum in diplomatic correspondences at the time – especially between the court in Buda and the Holy See. One impressive document completely studded with bulwark allegories is the letter sent by Vladislaus II to Pope Innocent VIII on June 20th 1492, in which the Bohemian-Hungarian king warned the Pope of the impending loss of Belgrade to the Ottomans. Vladislaus described Belgrade and the adjacent fortified towns

23 Anatol Lewicki (ed.), Listy i akta Piotra Myszkowskiego, generalnego starosty ziem ruskich króla Jana Olbrachta, Kraków 1898, p.57., no. 55.
24 CESDQ, III. 494., no. 474.: ‘Pergat itaque excellencia vestra in sanctissimo suvo instituto seminandi unitatem vere fidei in omnibus dominis suis, nam hoc pro ceteris erit scutum inexpugnabile contra Tartaros ac Turcas, quo protectus cum sua singulari prudentia et fidelium suorum militiae robore, et eius fratrum aliorumque christianorum auxiliis, futurum spero, ut sicut ex Lithwanie ducibus brevi tempore, suscepta recta fide, Polonia Bohemie et Hungarie reges dati sunt, ita universe Rosolane provincie dominatus et Sarmatie etiam trans Tanaim imperium, cum animo augende recte religionis, vobis eventurum est, quod faustum et felix deus disponat.’

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Jagiellonian Europe in bulwark descriptions

of the South-Hungarian fortification belt as strategically very important outposts ‘a quibus salus regni huius et universe pene christianitatis dependet’.25 Were Belgrade to be conquered by the infidels, the Jagiellonian claimed, then the enemies of the Christian faith could invade deep into the interior of the Hungarian kingdom. Who then should be ‘the wall and shield of the Catholic Church and the Christian people?’ Hungary, ‘utpote antemurali et scuto indubitato huius orbis parti’, must be helped at once to repulse the Ottomans – otherwise the consequences for the whole of Christendom would be unforeseeable and dramatic.26 Even if he failed to gain external support, however, Vladislaus himself, encouraged by the ‘shield of faith’, would still march on his own against the superior foe and carry out his duty as a defender of the faith.27

In the same year, and in similar terms, another Hungarian delegation declared Vladislaus’ readiness for religious war at the Habsburg court in Vienna. Hungary had protected the rest of Christianity as a ‘shield and forewall’ from the incessant Ottoman attacks for over a hundred years. Therefore, following in this tradition of his predecessors on the Hungarian throne, Vladislaus felt it to be no less than his duty to launch an anti-Turkish crusade. However, should he fail to acquire the financial resources he asked of the Habsburg Maximilian, this venture could only end in failure for the Jagiellonian king.28 The argument of the Christian antemurale and the offer to the Roman-German king to join a Hungarian led ‘cruciata’ as a ‘concapitaneus’ were linked, as in the other examples described above, to precise pecuniary claims. Furthermore, the Jagiellonian bulwark rhetoric had one further additional effect, in that it introduced this motif into the inner-dynastic discourse of the Habsburgs. The instructions of Emperor Frederick III and his son Maximilian in the summer of 1493 to the Habsburg diplomats sent to the Pope to procure support for a crusade against the Ottomans provide an interesting example in this respect. For their part, the Habsburgs demanded both financial as well as military aid from the Holy See and other Christian rulers. In so doing, Frederick and Maximilian spread the bulwark allegory to the Habsburg dominion: the heavy raids and incursions by

26 Ibid., p.389., no. 96.: ‘Nam si arcem illam regnum hoc ammittet, facile postea hostis ille ad viscera regni penetrabit facieisque omnia sue dicioni subiiciet; quod si fiet, non video certe, quo tandem muro et clipeo catholica ecclesia et plebs christianana in hac orbi parte defensabitur.’
27 Ibid., p.388–389., no. 96.: ‘Ego vero, pater beatissime, tametsi in hoc principio mee assumpcionis, non possum non magnopere moveri et ex visceribus turbari, tanta hostis potencia totque eventuris periculis, tamen pro virili mea et relieta facultate regni huius rebus fidei et religionis catholice non decreo, sed me tanto hosti cum dei auxilio opponam et per hos dies, scuto fidei munitus, contra illum proficiscar.’
28 RI XIV, 1,1–2.16., no. 141.
the Ottomans, it warned, these ‘illusiores et hostes domini nostri Jesu Christi et sue sancte sedis’, would increase day by day. Interestingly the ‘terras et dominia hereditaria’ of the Habsburgs are described in the letter as a part of a Christian defensive belt against the Ottomans. Together with Hungary they constitute the ‘clipei et antemuralia christianitatis’. Hence, the Hungarian requests for help bound to financial demands were adopted by the Habsburgs, extended through their own bulwark topoi, cleverly utilized for their particular material interests and passed on to a further authority of Latin Christianity, that is the Pope.29

The gradual consolidation of this antemurale discourse (and the simultaneous displacement of older defensio fidei motifs) in diplomatic correspondences between the Jagiellonians, the Holy See – as well as Venice – and, to a lesser extent, the Habsburgs at the turn of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries was also reflected in the papal replies. In the course of Alexander VI’s repeated calls for a crusade in September 1500 Adriano Castellesi, papal secretary and humanistic writer, flatteringly praised Vladislaus as a ruler dedicated solely to piety and full of religious zeal. Like no other, he would fit these qualities to the Hungarian throne, for this kingdom had always been the ‘forewall of Christianity’. The Holy See put all their hopes of the ‘defence and protection of the Christians from the Turks’ in him.30 Similar phrases had already been used by Alexander himself in June of the same year, when he tried to convince the French King Louis XII to participate in an anti-Turkish campaign led by the Hungarians, who, adjacent to the fierce Muslim world, were ‘propugnaculum quoddam et antemurale Christianitatis in ea parte’.31

In both the Polish and the Hungarian cases, the Jagiellonian use of the bulwark topoi around 1500 needs to be regarded in the context of a European-wide antemurale discourse at that time. Beside the Jagiellonians and the papacy, both the Habsburgs, as mentioned above, and Venice in particular used the bulwark motif as an important part of panegyric self-presentation. The hereditary Habsburg lands were often described by Austrian propaganda in

29 DRTA V,1,1, no. 1, p. 91.: DRTA, V,1.91., no 1.

30 Letter dated September 28 1500, printed in Sanuto, col. 957-959: ‘Sed cum potentia, robore militum, situ ac positione, regnum istud semper christianorum antemurale ac presidium fuerit, in tua majestate, qua suos antecessores reges pietate ac religione non solum æquat sed facile antecellit, spes omni nostra in re hac sita ac locata consistit.’

31 Letter dated June 30 1500: Ibid., col. 436-437: ‘Nos itaque videntes regem illum ac pannonias gentes turcis ipsis confines esse propugnaculum quoddam et antemurale christianitatis in ea parte et ad turcas disturbandos maxime opportunam, decrevimus statim cum ipsis venerabilibus fratribus nostris ad majestatem tuam scribere, et ad eam de tota rerum summa et societatis conficiendae rationem referre.’ Same rhetoric towards the French king can be found in Alexander’s letter from June 1 1500: RI XIV, 3,2.863., no. 14160.
the Late Middle Ages as ‘schilt der christenheyt’, i.e. ‘shield of Christianity’. At the same time, numerous examples of the propagation of the antemurale status through the Venetian Signoria can also be found. The maritime republic continually emphasized its contribution ‘ad propugnationem sancte ecclesie et nominis christiani’. Playing with the Turkish threat, the Venetians, for instance, wrote to Pope Alexander VI in late summer 1500 about the supposed fragility of the ‘Venetian forewall’: ‘Fractum est ac dissipatum antemurale illud, quod infidelium rabiem a Christianis ceruicibus auertebat; quod Italiam ipsam ab eorum impetu tutam securamque reddebat.’

During the Italian Wars of the Renaissance in particular, the bulwark argument was established as a widespread motive of diplomatic speech. Superficially considered as an allegory for the states fighting the Ottomans, in a time of changing coalitions fighting for superiority in Italy it soon became a welcome rhetorical tool for pursuing one’s own dynastic interests and gained currency not only in the afore mentioned courts in Cracow, Buda, Venice, Vienna and Rome, but also in Paris, and even in London. The examples from 1500 listed above, in which Pope Alexander VI pointed out to the French king Hungary’s importance as a Christian outpost, the Signoria complained about the menacing condition of their ‘crumbling forewall’, and Jan Łaski stylized, in the name of John Albert, both Poland and Venice as antemuralia of Latin Christianity, mirror these efforts to form an alliance under the guise of an anti-Turkish crusade. In this, both the Holy See and Venice played an important role as communication centres of European defence against the Ottomans and

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32 DRTA VI.747., no. 120. See: Christina Lutter, Selbstbilder und Fremdwahrnehmung des habsburgischen Kaisertums um 1500 am Beispiel der venezianisch-maximilianischen diplomatischen Kommunikation, in Heinz Duchhardt and Matthias Schnettger (eds.), Reichsständische Libertät und habsburgisches Kaisertum, Mainz 1999 (Veröffentlichungen des Instituts für Europäische Geschichte Mainz. Beihfet, 48), pp.25–42.


34 Letter dated September 9 1500: Sanuto, col. 750. According to Sanuto similar appeals ‘ad tutellam et propugnationem nominis Christiani’ were sent at the same time to Maximilian I, Francis I of France, the Catholic Monarchs of Spain, Vladislaus II, John I Albert, James IV of Scotland, Henry VII of England, Manuel I of Portugal, Frederic I of Naples, Philip I of Castile and the electors of the Holy Roman Empire.

– depending on the international political climate – followed the Jagiellonians in propagating bulwark ideas in the rest of the occident. \(^{36}\)

A potential pact between Venice and the Jagiellonian *propugnacula* established a welcome basis for the Signoria for further panegyric propaganda, as the mercantile republic emphatically declared itself to be the maritime rampart of the whole of Christiandom. A cooperation with the land bulwarks of Poland and Hungary could only strengthen this image. After all, of all the Christian countries praising themselves as defenders of the Christian world, it was only Venice who was actually engaged in real conflict with the Ottomans at the end of the fifteenth century – a conflict that finally led to the loss of several bases in Greece. \(^{37}\) Besides Venice it was especially the Roman Curia under Alexander VI which eagerly endeavoured to include the Jagiellonians into the Holy League (which around 1500 was directed against the Habsburgs). Alexander’s policy towards Italy aimed at the establishment of his own dynasty, and his fairly close relationship to Bayezid II casts doubts upon the seriousness of the pope’s crusade plans of the 1490s. At that time, the Borgia was regularly receiving a significant annual payment from Constantinople for Bayezid’s brother Cem, the pope’s Turkish hostage, and he secretly avoided joining any real campaigns against the Ottomans. \(^{38}\) In their correspondences they often underlined their mutual amity and willingness to help each other, most certainly following the French king Charles VIII’s invasion of Italy in 1494. \(^{39}\)

Against this background, the Borgia’s anti-Ottoman appeals of that time should perhaps be seen as mere rhetoric, which – as was the case with other


Christian rulers involved in the Italian wars – sought to distract attention from his real political goals in Italy by means of propaganda. At the end of May 1500 the pope issued several bulls for collecting crusade tithes in East Central Europe. In the old crusade tradition the Borgia granted indulgences to those who would take the cross or support a crusade monetarily. In fact, the money collected thereby was meant to finance Alexander’s own dynastic plans in the Romagna. The most famous of his crusade bulls was *Quamvis ad ampliandam* from June 1st 1500. In his call ‘pro sancta expedition contra Turcos’ the Pope described the Jagiellonian dominion as a single large outpost of Latin Christianity, whose pious residents would fight on various fronts in the South East and East of Europe against the enemies of the faith. Primarily, however, it was the Jagiellonians whom Alexander flattered the most. He praised both brothers, Vladislaus II and John I Albert, as ‘tanquam validissima fidei christiane et hoc tempore tanto imminenti periculo oportuna propugnacula. Only they were able to lead a successful expeditio contra prefatos Turchos, qui validissimum exercitum terra et mari et in diversis locis adversus ipsos christianos preparaverunt.’

In a further letter, sent separately only to John Albert, Alexander more clearly made use of the dynastic argument, whilst underlining the panegyrical image of the faith-defending *domus Iagellonica* and encouraging the Polish king to emulate his ancestors, ‘qui pro regni sibi commissi situ robore militarique virtute propugnaculum ac antemurale cristianorum adversus ipsorum Turcorum impetus esse consuerunt.’ However, Alexander’s calls for an anti-Turkish crusade were blatantly inconsistent with his political actions, since it was he who – after some smaller skirmishes in the Hungarian-Ottoman border region – arranged a ceasefire with the Sublime Porte in October 1502 and induced both Hungary (February 1503) and Venice (May 1503) to do the same.

Even if a large-scale anti-Turkish crusade around 1500 already failed during the initial planning stage and in the face of the actual goals of the European powers in Italy, the Jagiellonians themselves, especially the Hungarian branch of the dynasty, did not set aside the idea of an armed campaign against the Ottomans. Vladislaus II, who was facing strong magnate opposition in Hungary, linked a prestigious crusade to the strengthening of royal power and hoped

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41 CESDQ III.483. no. 460.

thereby to divert attention from internal political tensions. His efforts finally led to the intended crusade of 1514 which eventually ended in a peasant revolt led by György Dózsa. Remarkably, both in the run-up to and during this unfortunate campaign, both Vladislaus and the Holy See under Pope Leo X propagated the bulwark image of Hungary and the Jagiellonians. Once again, the Jagiellonian lands in Hungary and Poland were described as one large ‘bulwark’ defending the rest of Europe from Ottomans, Tatars and Muscovites.43

The bulwark motive also played an important role in the inner-dynastic communication between Vladislaus and his youngest brother Sigismund, and served to strengthen the so-called ‘Jagiellonian idea’.44 In a letter from 1512, for instance, the latter reminded the Hungarian cardinal and archbishop of Esztergom Tamás Bakócz of the status of Hungary and Poland as antemuralia.45

This view of a Jagiellonian bulwark dominion was also propagated externally under Sigismund. A remarkable example of this self-description is Wawrzyniec Międzyleski’s memorandum Descriptio potentie Turcie, which the diplomat announced in September 1514 in Rome. Beside the epideictic praising of his master, whom he described as ‘velut antemurale Christianorum’ against the unbelievers and schismatics, Międzyleski presented the picture of a defensive belt consisting of Poland, Hungary and Lithuania, protecting the Holy Roman Empire in particular from destruction at the hands of the enemies of the faith.46

The years between the failed György Dózsa uprising of 1514 and the battle of

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44 Baczkowski 1997a.

45 AT II. no. 17. p 13.; AT II.13., no. 17.

Mohács in 1526 are characterized by a lively diplomatic interaction between the Jagiellonian courts in Cracow and Buda (respectively Prague). Here, once again, the Turkish threat and the invocation of the Jagiellonian bulwark *topoi* were the most important issues. Although the Hungarian defeat at Mohács and the war which followed between János Zápolya and the Habsburgs signalled the falling apart of the medieval kingdom of Hungary, the bulwark picture survived in Hungarian society – as it also did in Poland following the dying out of the dynasty in 1572.

Regardless of the dynastic cooperation in the diffusion of the Jagiellonian bulwark images, the internal reception of this rhetoric differed greatly between Poland and Hungary. As early as the beginning of the sixteenth century, the Hungarian nobility, the ‘*nemesség*’, started to adopt the *antemurale* topos for their own purposes – partly to gain increased prestige, partly to gain political advantages. István Werbőczy clarified this new aristocratic self-confidence like no other in his *Tripartitum opus iuris consuetudinarii inclyti regni Hungariae*, which was presented at an assembly in Buda 1514 and first printed in Vienna three years later. Werbőczy equated the *nemesség* with the Hungarian people and emphasized its role in defending Christendom – without mentioning the king or the ruling Jagiellonian dynasty:

‘Thereafter [after the conversion to Christianity] no country or people (I say ungrudgingly) guarded more determinedly or more constantly the protection and expansion of the Christian commonwealth than the Hungarians. Being well trained through many hard-fought battles against the barbarous Mohammedan pest, they have for more than a hundred and forty years (not counting earlier times) time and time again in attack and counterattack waged to their enormous credit the bloodiest wars against the savage Turks. They kept the rest of Christendom safe and unharmed at the cost of their blood, life and wounds (lest the enemy’s rage flood further as across broken levees), with such courage and natural vigour that they virtually lived under arms.’

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A similar development cannot be found among the szlachta, until the second half of the sixteenth century. However, in Poland the adoption of the bulwark rhetoric by the nobles was to have a major effect in the long run, and the szlachta’s perception of themselves – rather than of the current ruler – as a Christian forewall was to belong to the ideological fundaments of the Rzeczpospolita Obojga Narodów, the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth.48

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48 Srodecki 2015, 316-29.
Die moldauische Politik der Jagiellonen

Katarzyna Niemczyk

Ein Paar Bemerkungen zur moldauischen Politik der Jagiellonen an der Wende des 15. und 16. Jahrhunderts


Johannes Albrecht befand sich unter einem starken Einfluss von Filippo Buonaccorsi und wollte um jeden Preis den Krieg gegen die Türkei führen.1 Das war sein großes Ziel und diesem unterordnete er seine Politik. Er bemühte sich, die Koalition gegen die Türkei zu bauen und nachdem dies nicht zum Stande

gekommen war, entschied er sich dafür, das Problem alleine zu lösen. Vor allem wollte er Kilia/Kilya und Akkerman/Bilhorod-Dnistrovskyi erobern. Ihm war es aber klar, dass in diesem Plan auch die Moldau in Rücksicht genommen werden muss. Der kämpferische König wollte also auch die Sache der Moldau mit Hilfe von Gewalt lösen. Ein Beispiel dafür: das Treffen in Levoča.


Die moldauische Politik der Jagiellonen

Wenn man das Benehmen des Stefans des Großen während des Krieges 1497 analysiert, dann kann man vermuten, dass in diesen ‘Gerüchten’ nicht alles falsch war. In solchem Plan müsste ja auch der derzeitigen moldauischen Hospodar eine Rolle spielen. Es gibt auch Vermutungen, dass Johannes Albrecht den Stefan den Großen dazu zwingen wollte, gemeinsame Expedition gegen die Türkei zu führen. Falls er diese Angebote ablehnen würde (was fast sicher war), hätte Albrecht einen guten Vorwand, um seinen Staat anzугreifen. Diese Ideen stoßen jedoch auf Widerspruch des Wladislaus II.

4 Max Töppen (hrsg.), ‘Liborius Naker’s Tagebuch, über den Kriegszug des Hochmeisters Johann v. Tiefen gegen die Türken im Jahre 1497’, in Theodor Hirsch et al. (Hrsg.), Scriptores Rerum Prussicarum, Bd. 5 (1874), V. p.312.; über solches Vorhaben erwähnt auch Marcin Kromer, Kronika polska Marcina Kromera biskupa warmińskiego książ XX dotąd w trzech językach, a mianowicie w łacińskim, polskim i niemieckim wydana, na język polski z łacińskiego przełożona przez Marcina z Blażowa Blażewskiego i wydana w Krakowie w drukarni M. Loba r. 1611., Sanok 1857, p.1328. [Weiterhin: Kromer 1857]


Katarzyna Niemczyk

und wurden abgelehnt. 7 Die lösten trotzdem große Probleme aus. Alle Ideen aus Levoča sollten zwar streng geheim bleiben, jedoch nahm der Freund von Stefan dem Großen: Bartolomeus Drágffy de Belthewk an dem Treffen teil und als er die Pläne des polnischen Königs kennenlernte, entschied er sich dafür, seinem Freund davon zu benachrichtigen. 8 Seit dieser Zeit reagierte die moldauische Herrscher sehr misstrauisch gegenüber jeder polnischen Bewegung. 9 Ob man der Krieg gegen Moldau jedoch als Hauptziel der Expedition 1497 nennen darf, lässt sich streiten. Meiner Meinung nach, wollte Johannes Albrecht hauptsächlich gegen die Türkei kämpfen und die Sache der Moldau gelegentlich lösen. Es wurde ja ein polnischer Bote: Mikolaj Strzyżowski nach Konstantinopel geschickt um zu fordern die Tataren aus dem Bereich von Akkerman zurückzuziehen. 10 Diese Forderung war so unrealistisch, dass die eher als Vorwand dienen sollte, um die Türkei angreifen zu können. 11 Wenn Johannes Albrecht nur gegen der Moldau kämpfen wollte, warum würde er so etwas machen und dadurch die Relationen zur starken Türkei so verschlechtern? 12

Während des Krieges 1497 probierte Johannes Albrecht noch den moldauischen Hospodar: Stefan den Großen, zur Zusammenarbeit zu zwingen und griff Sucava/Suceava an, jedoch ohne Erfolg. Zum Schluss erlitt er (1497) große

11 Solche Vermutungen hatte schon Czamańska 1996, 167.; Johannes Albrecht lehnte auch den Vorschlag des Mehmeds (Sohn von Sultan) ab, was seine Vermittlung zwischen Mengli Girej und Litauer betraf, siehe: Czamańska 1996, 168.
Die moldauische Politik der Jagiellonen

Niederlage bei Kozmin.13 Nach der Niederlage war Johannes Albrecht total niedergeschlagen. Seine Ziele und Ideen die er so stark verfolgte, wurden zerstört. Sogar sein Bruder Friderik appellierte an Johannes Albrecht, damit er seine Kräfte sammelte, weil er ja ein König sei und die Verantwortung für den Staat trage. Frederik bat auch die Mutter darum, damit sie ihren Sohn ermahnte.14


81
Katarzyna Niemczyk

Regierungszeit des Johannes Albrecht wurde das Problem jedoch nicht gelöst. Am 17. Juni 1501 kam der König ums Leben.\(^{18}\)

Diese Sache wurde also seinem Nachfolger Alexander gelassen. Er änderte aber deutlich die polnische Politik gegenüber der Türkei und demzufolge auch gegen Moldau. Der König machte das aus verschiedenen Gründen, die ich hier kurz darstelle.


Damalige militärische Lage Polens war wegen der Verteidigung organisierung sehr problematisch. Der sogenannte Volkssturm war schon damals sehr ineffizient, und die Adligen verweigerten sich, an einem Krieg teilzunehmen. Aus diesem Grund, schon nach der Niederlage bei Kozmin (1497) ordnete der verärgerte Johannes Albrecht an, dass jedem der Militärdienstpflicht nicht erfüllt, das Vermögen beschlagnahmt werden sollte. Aus diesem Grund stiftete er in Krakau ein Gericht unter der Führung von Mikolaj Kamieniecki und Marcin Borzymowski.\(^{19}\) Auf Volksturm konnte man sich nicht verlassen. Wenn es zum Beispiel zum Angriff der Tataren kam, sammelte sich der polnische Volksturm (wenn überhaupt) meistens so lange, dass die Tataren polnische Gebiete schon

\(^{18}\) Papée 1936, 197–8.

Die moldauische Politik der Jagiellonen

beraubt und nach Hause zurückkamen. 20 Polen benötigte also eine feste Armee, die ständig die südöstliche Grenze verteidigen könnte.


Wie ernst das Problem war, zeigte der Versuch des Königs, die zusätzlichen Militärkräfte zu finden. Er versuchte, die Militärdienstpflicht durch eine Steuer zwecks Finanzierung der festen Armee zu ersetzen. Das bereitete aber weite-


Katarzyna Niemczyk

re Schwierigkeiten. Die Adligen wollten die Steuer nicht zahlen, aber wehrten sich gleichzeitig gegen den Militärdienst. Das verursachte zwei Probleme, es gab nach wie vor keine ausreichende Armee und der König musste das Geld für die feste Armee leihen, was seine Verschuldung nur noch vergrößerte. Alexander probierte also auch den Bauern dazu verpflichten, am Krieg teilzunehmen. Von daher hat er 1502 ein entsprechendes Gesetz verkündet, das aber nicht in Kraft gekommen ist.24 Der nächste Versuch, die Situation des Landes zu retten, war im Jahre 1503 die Gründung des neuen Amts: des Hauptmanns der polnischen Krone.25 Als erste Person übte Mikolaj Kamieniecki dieses Amt aus. Da der König viel Zeit in Litauen wegen des Konflikts mit Moskau verbrachte, konnte er selbst der Verteidigung der polnischen Grenzen nicht organisieren und nicht überwachen. Er brauchte jemanden, der ihn im dieser Sache vertreten könnte. Das sollte der Hauptman sein.26

Ein anderes Problem bildete die unterschiedliche Meinung der Einwohner von Großpolen und Kleinpolen betreffs der moldauischen Politik. Die Einwohner von Großpolen waren eher der Meinung, dass Pokutien so weit weg lag, dass man keine Zeit und kein Geld dafür verschwenden sollte und die Sache möglichst schnell gelöst werden muss, ohne Rücksicht auf eventuelle Verluste; die Einwohner von Kleinpolen glaubten dagegen, dass es ein ganz wichtiges Problem ist, und sie wollten auf keinen Fall Pokutien verlieren. Das


26 Ibid.
Die moldauische Politik der Jagiellonen

löste Konflikte aus und verschlechterte noch mehr die polnische Stabilität und Verteidigungsmöglichkeiten.27

Nicht ohne Bedeutung war auch die Meinung des Wladislaus des II., der ein absoluter Gegner des Konflikts sowohl mit der Türkei, aber auch mit der Moldau war.28

Diese alle oben genannten Faktoren verursachten die Änderung der Politik gegenüber Moldau. Polen hatte damals genug Probleme und die Verteidigungsmöglichkeiten waren nicht ausreichend um einen neuen Krieg zu führen. Die höchste Priorität war also die Sicherheit der südöstlichen Grenzen. Polen brauchte keinen Krieg, weder gegen die Türkei, noch gegen Moldau zu führen. Der neue König, der mit diesen Problemen rechnen musste, suchte also andere Lösungen als der Krieg um die Frage Pokutiens aufzuklären. In der Regierungszeit des Alexanders, kann man zwei Phasen in seiner Politik gegenüber Moldau unterscheiden. Die eine ist die Amtszeit des Stefans des Großen in Moldau und die zweite betrifft die Herrschaft von Bogdan dem III. Die Politik gegenüber Stefan, der immer wieder forderte, einen polnischen Boten nach Moldau zu schicken, um das Problem Pokutiens zu lösen, bestand darin auf die Zeit zu spielen. Pokutien blieb ja beim Polen und es gab keinen Grund dafür, die Verhandlungen mit Moldau zu führen. Das war aber nicht ein einziger Grund dafür, warum Polen auf die Zeit spielte. Stefan der Große war damals nämlich schon 70 Jahre alt, und das errog die Hoffnungen, dass er in kurzer Zeit stirbt und vielleicht sein Nachfolger eher kompromissbereit wird.29 Das war aber keine glückliche Politik, weil der Stefan keine Lust dafür hatte, und wenn die polnischen Boten zum geplanten Kongress nicht gekommen waren, anektierte er


Die moldauische Politik der Jagiellonen


36 Spieralski 1965, 103–9.
38 Akta Aleksandra, no. 298.; Borzemski 1889, 379.
Katarzyna Niemczyk

also abgelehnt, Pokutien wurde jedoch nicht zurückgegeben. Doch Bogdan III. fühlte sich zu Recht betrogen. Er hatte ja seine Versprechen erfüllt und dann brach plötzlich die Polen den gegenseitigen Vertrag. Er wollte also selbst die gerechte Strafe zukommen lassen. Aus diesem Grund, noch im September 1506 eroberte er Pokutien. Die polnische Antwort war sehr schnell. Es wurde eine feste Armee unter der Führung von Hauptmann Mikolaj Kamieniecki gesammelt und nach Pokutien geschickt. Doch ihm standen nicht viele Ritter zur Verfügung (2500), deswegen wollte er den Feind möglichst schnell angreifen um ihn überraschen zu können. Das war ihm gelungen. Schon drei Wochen nachdem Bogdan das Pokutien annektierte, also am 29. September, überschritt Kamienieckis Armee den Dnjestr. Er ließ teils seiner Armee in Czesybiessy (liegt heutzutage in der Ukraine), wo sich der größte moldauische Widerstand befand und marschierte weiter nach Moldau. Zuerst wurde aber polnische Vorhut geschlagen, erst der Schlacht zwischen polnischer Hauptarmee und Hauptarmee der Moldau unter der Führung von so genannten Kopacz über den

42 Ibid. 111.
Die moldauische Politik der Jagiellonen

polnischen Sieg entschied. Moldauische Armee wurde geschlagen und Pokutien zurück an Polen angeschlossen.47

Zusammenfassung


Obwohl der Vertrag mit dem Bogdan gebrochen wurde, war die Sache nicht gelöst und kam wieder ins Licht im Jahre 1509 dank dem Papst Julius II. Damals begann der neuen Kapitel im Kampf um Pokutien.

Three Houses collided in East-Central Europe in the second half of the 15th century: two were established names (the Habsburgs and the Jagiellonians), while the third was in the making (the Hunyadi). The clash took on crusader shapes due to the expanding proximity of the Ottoman Empire, the tones and overtones of Papal propaganda and diplomacy, as well as the commercial and political interests of Venice. After the “miracle of Belgrade” (1456), Christian successes were rare, clearly outnumbered by Turkish victories. The surprising victory at Vaslui in January 1475 over the 50,000 strong (120,000 according to contemporary rumours) Ottoman army was consequently viewed with astonishment. The astonishment grew for the victor was a relative newcomer, Stephen III of Moldavia, and because Venice’s and Rome’s recent attempts to involve a major Greek rite power (Muscovy) in the war against Mehmed II had ended in bitter failure. Hence, Venice decided to make the most out of the success and presented yet another major crusader design.

1 Though focused chiefly on two of the three houses, Karl Nehrings Matthias Corvinus, Kaiser Friedrich III. und das Reich. Zum hunyadisch-habsburgischen Gegensatz im Donauraum, München 1989, is still a useful outline of the age.

2 See most recently in these matters Paul Srodecki, Antemurale Christianitatis. Zur Genese der Bollwerksrhetorik im östlichen Mitteleuropa an der Schwelle vom Mittelalter zur Frühen Neuzeit (Historische Studien, 508), Husum 2015.

3 The standard work on the topic is Norman Housley’s Crusading and the Ottoman Threat. 1453–1505, Oxford 2012.


5 Even though he had made a name for himself less than a decade earlier (in late 1467), through his confrontation with Matthias Corvinus (see in this respect also the documents published in Alexandru Simon, ‘Notes and Documents on the Southern Background of Matthias Corvinus’ Bohemian War’, Studia Mediaevalia Bohemica 4:2 (2012), 215–26.)

6 The documents collected 150 years ago by Enrico Cornet (Le guerre dei Veneti nell’Asia, 1470–1474. Documenti cavati dall’Archivio ai Frari in Venezia, Vienna 1856) are more than eloquent. A new modern scholarly approach is needed.

7 For such medieval projects, see the extensive contemporary information collected and analysed by Benjamin Weber, Lutter contre les Turcs. Les formes nouvelles de la croisade pontificale au XV siècle, PhD Thesis, Toulouse 2009.
Let us start with the passages. Passages from the “military half” of the instructions for Paolo Morosini (the highly experienced diplomat sent to Rome\(^8\)), written in Latin, as presented to the papal curia, after discussions based on the “financial half” of the instructions, issued in Italian in order to facilitate negotiations:\(^9\)


Paolo Morosini was not discussing huge numbers, going by other projects from the same year, 1475, according to which Matthias commanded over 100,000 soldiers from Hungary, Wallachia and Moldavia.\(^12\) From this point of view too, 

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\(^8\) For more data: Gino Benzoni, ‘Paolo Morosini’, _Dizionario Bibliografico degli Italiani_ 48 (2012), sub voce.


\(^11\) ASM, A.D.S., _Illyria, Polonia, Russia, Slavonia_, cart. 640, fasc. 2. _Raguza_, nn [March-April 1475; edited under 1462 by Jovan Radonić in _Durad Kastriot Skenderbeg i Albanija XV veku_ (istoriska iratha) [George Castriota Skanderbeg and Albania in the 15th c. (Historical Sources)] (Spomenik, 95), Belgrade 1942, no. 226, p.128; for the correct date of the project (given also the Bohemian involvement), see Alexandru Simon and Cristian Luca, ‘Documentary Perspectives on Matthias Corvinus and Stephen the Great’, _Transylvanian Review_ 17:3 (2008), 85–112, here 87–8.

\(^12\) Even though prompted to accept the military exaggerations, see also Mihai Berza’s ‘Der Kreuzzug gegen die Türken: ein europäisches Problem’, _Revue Historique du Sud-Est Européen_ 19 (1942), 42–74, here 70–2.
The Venetian project of spring 1475 featured several of the points Morosini had presented for the Republic at the Reichstag of Regensburg in mid-1471, when the idea of sending the Wallachians against the Sultan had also re-surfaced. The major difference between the two presentations was that by 1475, following Matthias’s recent anti-Ottoman actions, Emperor Frederick III of Habsburg lost his primacy in the crusade. In parallel, the future Serenissima fuelled the tensions between Matthias (her “strange ally”) and Stephen III (whom she had promoted as an eastern crusader alternative), apparently also by further confusing their areas of interest. Serbia “awarded” (alongside Wallachia) to Stephen III, who was an old Hunyadi target for Matthias as it had been for his father John, who was promised (entire) royal Bulgaria as well (1444), which Venice now “granted” to Stephen, though less publicly. There were grounds enough both for the project’s success and for its failure, as Morosini well knew – even if only because he had passed through Moldavia at the time of the battle of Vaslui.


15 In the autumn of 1473, Stephen rode into Wallachia against the Ottoman power as the ruler of Moldovalachia. For Stephen’s title: M. Berza (ed.), Repertoriul monumentelor și obiectelor de artă din timpul lui Ștefan cel Mare [The Repertoire of Monuments and Artifacts from the Time of Stephen the Great], Bucharest 1958, no. 144, p.388).


and his testimony had fortified the credibility of the victory in Italy, used with Venetian exaggeration and disinformation (a year earlier, the Republic had even invented Turkish victories for her new favourite Stephen III of Moldavia).

The regional developments marked by the Venetian proposal clearly signal earlier preparations and signify profounder contacts than usually assumed. Some are outlined by a set of instructions issued in the name of Emperor Frederick III of Habsburg almost two years prior to the speech delivered in Rome by Morosini.

‘[The documents issued by the Habsburg chancery of Vienna on] VI Novembris 1473. Item litera passus pro patriarcha Anthioceno [Lodovico Severi] / Item missiva ad consules et massarios in Caffa ad habendum eundem patriarcham recommisum, ut possit ire per certas eorum secure/ Item ad idem Principi Megerili Domino Tartarorum [Mengli Ghiray]. / Item ad idem ad Principem Persarum Domino Assembegk [Usun Hassan], / Item ad idem ad Archiepiscopum de Magno Novagarda [Feofil, Archbishop of Novgorod]. / Item ad idem ad Vanoida, in Walachia Capitaneo [Stephen of Moldavia]./ Item ad idem ad Aleca, Capitaneo de Plotzko [Plock, the capital of Masovia]. / Item ad idem ad Martinum Gostoldo, Capitaneo in Thino [Martin Gasztold, Voivode of Kyiv], / Item ad idem ad Kazimiro, Rege Polonie [Casimir IV]; dominus ad voluntatem domini imperatoris [Frederick III] dedit omnes predictas literas gratis patriarche predicto quia pauper fuit (6 November 1473).’

Frederick III hoped to avoid any contacts between Matthias Corvinus and Severi, Pope Sixtus IV’s envoy. Yet he failed. Alike in 1471, when Matthias’s dethronement seemed near, Stephen III too sided with the Hungarian king, not

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with Frederick III or Casimir IV. Additionally, he cleverly exploited the needs of both monarchs, so that – for instance – in 1473 Frederick III, legally co-ruler of Hungary since 1463 and hence the suzerain of Moldavia, still viewed him as “his man”, and so did Casimir IV as well, even though Stephen III repeatedly avoid paying homage in person to the Jagiellonian monarch.

Still, as in most crusader shaped political matters of the age, the answers must be searched mostly in the southern parts of the continent, for the war at the time, especially after Matthias’s Bohemian involvement, was – as it had started out – a confrontation between Venice and Rome, on one side (even though relations between them were quite often tense) and the Ottoman Empire of Mehmed II, on the other side.

In order to better understand the nature and the genesis of the relations between Stephen and Venice, two anonymous reports, both probably drafted in the summer of 1472 might be of relevance. The first one, a Florentine report on the finances and provinces of King Matthias, listed Wallachia as a province of the crown, an indication that Matthias, who quite possibly (in order to remain prudent in this context) viewed Wallachia as his, not only for royal reasons, but also for family (Hunyadi) reasons, was – at least – considering the possibility of dethroning the increasingly provocative Radu III of Wallachia, Mehmed II’s favourite and the brother of Vlad III Dracula, placed in “Hungarian custody” for the past decade. The second one, equally preserved in the Milanese archives, focused more on Moldavia and Wallachia, as well as upon the Wallachian roots.

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of Matthias Corvinus and their impact upon his political and stately status at the start of the 1470s.27

The main passages of Wallachian interest in the Florentine report on Matthias Corvinus’s power structure in 1472:

‘[...] <Le corone>/
La prima Dalmacia [Dalmatia] / La seconda Cornatia [Croatia] / La terza Bohemia [Bohemia] /
Le provincie/
Valachia [Wallachia], Transilvagnia [Transylvania], Sciauvonia [Slavonia], Servia [Serbia], Bosnia [Bosnia], Raguzia [Ragusa], Moravia [Moravia], Silezia [Silesia] [...]’28

The main passages on Wallachia and Moldavia in the “Milanese report” on King Matthias:

‘[...] Li membri che spettano a questo regno sono la Valachia Grande e Piccola [Moldavia and Wallachia] [...] La Valachia Grande e Piccola confina dalla banda del Greco [i.e. in the East] a Levant col Mar Maggiore [Black Sea]. Sul detto mar sono piu luoghi che spettano alla Valachia. Li principali sono Moncastro [Cetatea Albă], Licostomo [i.e. Chilia], Bailigo [Brăila, in Wallachia proper]. Confina Valachia da Sirocho [i.e. in the South/South-East] con la Bulgaria e la Servia, da Greco [meaning here also North-East] con Polonia e Tartaria, da Ponente [i.e. in the North/North-West], con Ungaria, verso Transilvania. [...] Un gran contrario di questo re [Matthias Corvinus] e perché essendo lui disceso da Janus [Jáno/John/Jancho Hunyadi], il qual non era Ungaro nobile, ma Valacho, non di troppo gentil parentella [...]’.29


28 ASM, A.D.S., Potenze Estere, Ungheria, cart. 645. 1491-1536, fasc. [2.] 1492, nn. Because of this chronological misplacement, the document was overlooked in the 1800s.

The Wallachian Case in the 1470s

In 1472 tensions north of the Lower Danube were rising. Hungary and – especially – Moldavia were increasingly interested in an overthrow of Radu III. Stephen III had already begun his attacks on Wallachia. He had even burnt down Brăila, the only major commercial centre in the Danube area left for Radu III after Stephen had taken from him (and the sultan) Chilia in early 1465 (previously taken by Radu from Matthias). Mehmed II could not allow Stephen to have his way. When Usun Hassan challenged Mehmed, the latter was seemingly focused on Wallachia. Domenico Malipiero, the official historian of the Venetian republic, an old politician, and probably one of the best informed persons in the city of St. Mark at that time, recorded these matters.

‘[...] [Mehmed II] ha fatto mettere insieme tutta la zente ce l’ha possuto trazere della Grecia, della Valachia e d’altri paesi circonvicini [in order to defend his positions in Asia Minor against Usun Hassan] [...].’

As Domenico Malipiero was still active on political soil, on several occasions, valuable information (including data on Wallachia and Moldavia as well) became part of his chronicle only after it was “filtered” by the Venetian administration. This matter is particularly relevant in this context for it seems that Mehmed II was about to send his troops against Stephen III, when Usun Hassan attacked, basically allowing Stephen III to marry (in September 1472) Mary of Mangop, from Crimean Theodoro. She was related to both Usun’s wife, and to Zoe Palaeologus, Ivan III of Moscow’s wife-to-be. They married in November the same year 1472.

30 For the changes occurred in Stephen’s policy, see Ovidiu Cristea, ‘Prieten prietenului şi duşman duşmanului: colaborări militare moldo-ottomane în timpul domniei lui Ștefan cel Mare’ [Friend to my friend, enemy to my enemy: Moldavian-Ottoman co-operations during the reign of Stephen the Great], in Putna, ctitorii ei şi lumea lor [Putna, her Ktitors and their world], Bucharest 2011, pp.75–84. Alike in spring 1465, when the tribute of Moldavia was elevated by 50% (from 2,000 to 3,000 ducats), but no further action was undertaken against Stephen.


We avoid discussing the case of Mary of Mangop for two major reasons. First, she is not recorded in any of the preserved contemporary sources discovered so far. She is directly mentioned only in a couple of Moldavian chronicles, all based mainly on the so-called Anonymous Chronicle of the Land of Moldavia\textsuperscript{35} and in a well-informed Russian chronicle (The Chronicle of Hust).\textsuperscript{36} The rest of the (contemporary) information on Mary can be reduced to indirect, contextual sources, such as the one regarding John Tzamplakon, her uncle, Venice's former Greek captain and Stephen III's envoy to Venice\textsuperscript{37} in spring 1477 (out of these sources, the most important – in view of future researches – should be the Venetian administrative document, largely neglected so far, concerning the family of Stephen III that had arrived in Venice on the eve of Mehmed II's Moldavian campaign of July-August 1476 and remained in Venice until after the campaign\textsuperscript{38}). The second reason is the excessive extreme right-wing (whether more pan-Orthodox, pan-European or more nationalist ego-Romanian in essence) post-mortem Romanian use “experienced” by Mary of Mangop.\textsuperscript{39} Under such circumstances, any discussion of Mary's case must be limited to the available data without further off-beat interpretations. New documents will eventually be discovered and scientific research will be resumed in this delicate matter as well.

Between Stephen III's Wallachian victories in the first months of 1471 (the conflict between him and Radu III had re-started in 1469) and the events in the second half of 1472, an apparent truce seems to have been enacted between

\textsuperscript{35} Sources edited and re-edited – under various forms – with minor changes since the 1890s until the early 2000s.

\textsuperscript{36} Hustinskaja lietopis, in \textit{Scriptores Rerum Poloniarum} II. Krakow 1874, Appendix, pp.302–15, here p.304.

\textsuperscript{37} In relation to the question of Stephen III’s Byzantine relatives by marriage, see also the text published in C[onstantin] N. Sathas (ed.), \textit{Documents inédits relatifs à l’histoire de la Grèce au Moyen Âge}, V, Paris 1883, 211–2.

\textsuperscript{38} [A<lexandru>. D<imitrie>. Xenumope], ‘Un nou document privitor la Ştefan cel Mare’ [A New Document on Stephen the Great], \textit{Arbica} 18:7–8 (1907), 364 (re-published, without any reference, by Iorga in 1914).

The Wallachian Case in the 1470s

Moldavia and Wallachia, most likely following the Sultan’s intervention. It was at this moment that, also in view of his Crimean marriage, Stephen sent his and Evdochia Olelkovic of Kyiv’s first-born legitimate son, Alexander, as a hostage to Istanbul. Additional sources to Malipiero’s lines are therefore most needed. In comparison to him, Giovanni Maria Angiolello had fewer political constraints. A well-connected “old Ottoman resident” (he wrote his work after he returned to Europe), Angiolello recorded the battle order of Mehmed II’s army prior to his decisive confrontation with Usun Hassan in the summer of 1473. According to him, the Wallachians were under the command of Prince Mustafa, Mehmed II’s second born – and in those days also his favourite – son, to which Giovanni Maria Angioello too was attached.

‘[...] Il terzo fu Mustafa [i.e. the commander of the third army core of the Ottoman host] secondo figliuolo, il quale medesimamente avea trentamila persone, tra le quali erano dodicimila Valacchi della Valachia Bassa [in the Middle Ages the name was used in the Italian environment for Moldavia in particular, not for Wallachia], e d’essi era capitano uno ch’aveva nome Bataraba [14 months later Radu of Wallachia, from the Dracul branch of the Basarab dynasty, lost his throne to Basarab III Laiotă, from the rival branch Dan, supported by Stephen III (Basarab III was the brother of Wladislaw II, dethroned by Vlad III on the eve of the battle of Belgrade in 1456, when Vlad and Stephen betrayed John Hunyadi and had gone over to Mehmed], e questo colonnello avea da alloggiare alla sinistra del Turco [...]’

40 The edited dossier of these matters can be found also in Alexandru Simon, ‘Quello ch’è apresso el Turcho. About A Son of Stephen the Great’, Annuario del Istituto Romeno di Cultura e Ricerca Umanistica 5-6 (2004-2005), 139–64.


42 In these matters, see for instances the edited sources collected since the late 1960s in Adolf Armbruster’s synthesis Romanitatea românilor. Istoria unei idei [The Romanity of the Romanians: The History of an Idea], Bucharest 1993.


45 [Giovanni Maria Angiolello (c. 1451–c. 1525)] Donado Da Lezze, Historia Turchesca, ed. I[uan]. Ursu, Bucharest 1910 [hereinafter Angiolello], pp.44–6. Unfortunately, a much needed modern edition of the text has not been published so far.
Alexandru Simon

At the battle of Başkent, the Wallachian troops were stationed in a strategic position that implied a significant amount of trust from the Ottoman commander. The position is even more relevant if we compare it to the secondary controlled position held by Laiotă’s troops at the battle of Vaslui in January 1475. Deserted by Stephen in November 1474, Basarab III had gone over to the Turks, and still – at Vaslui – he changed sides at the decisive moment, significantly contributing to Stephen’s victory. A year later, back in the Ottoman camp, Laiotă with approximately 10,000 Wallachian soldiers, was held – at the battle of Râzboieni/Valea Albă at the end of July 1476 – by Sultan Mehmed II in a sort of enclosure in order to avoid new “Wallachian surprises”.\(^{46}\) Given these aspects, the explanation for the strategic position entrusted to the Wallachians at Başkent must be connected to their location (they were far away from their native lands on a foreign, strange, soil) and to their origins (most of these Wallachians were Radu III’s subjects, who had been loyal to Mehmed II since his youth). Consequently, unless Basarab III, Stephen’s man was not in command of all the troops sent from Wallachia and Moldavia to Asia Minor. He himself later wrote to the Transylvanian Saxon city of Braşov that he had spent some time with the Turks, while the repeated Ottoman “pardons” granted to him in 1474 and 1475 indicate that he enjoyed a special relation with Ottoman authorities. It might further explain why Stephen III chose him as an alternative for Radu III in 1471, when it was still unclear how far Stephen was willing to go in his conflict with the Wallachian favourite of the sultan. The name of Basarab given by Angiolello to the commander of the Wallachians at Başkent has to be linked with the one commonly used to designate a Wallachian political and military command between the Southern Carpathians and the Lower Danube.\(^{47}\) This would be – in classic manner – the safest interpretative option.

However, Pietro Caterino Zeno also used Basarab for the commander of the Wallachian forces. Equally an eyewitness of the battle of Başkent/Otlukbeli, on 11 August 1473 (earlier, at Tercan, Usun Hassan, seemed to have won a decisive victory), the Venetian envoy in the Orient, where he was well-connected (his wife, Violante, the daughter of Niccolò Crispo, Lord of Syros and Duke of the Archipelago, and of Valentia Eudoxia Comnena, was the niece of Theodora Kantacuzenos, Usun Hassan’s wife), simply wrote that:

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\(^{46}\) For a preliminary overview of these Wallachian and Moldavian political changes: Simon 2011, 79–96.

‘[...] Il terzo [the third army core of the Ottoman host led by] Mustafa parimente di trenta mila [30,000 soldiers], computati dodici mila Valacchi [12,000 men] condotti da Basaraba lor Capitano, che venne in aiuto del Turco in quella Guerra. [It is highly noteworthy that Basarab was viewed as the captain of the Wallachians not only on that occasion, and that he had come to aid the Ottoman Turks, not so much as a vassal, Pietro Caterino Zeno’s wording would have been different in that case, but as an ally] [...]’\textsuperscript{48}

Zeno’s mission in Asia Minor (1471-1473) came to an end with Usun Hassan’s defeat. Zeno left for Poland and Casimir IV Jagiello and then for Hungary and King Matthias Corvinus (1474). Before retiring from diplomacy (he was awarded a seat in the Venetian Council of the Ten), Caterino Zeno played an important part in the Venetian–Ottoman negotiations of 1475 that led to the conclusion of a six months truce. Zeno was also the one to whom Mara Branković, Murad II’s widow, confided that the Turks had never suffered a greater defeat than at Vaslui.\textsuperscript{49} The “eastern trust” enjoyed by him puts his narrative in a different light.

A few aspects of the case of captain Basarab must therefore be emphasized.
1. The name of the leader of the Walachian troops was a princely name, and it is therefore quite unlikely that Radu III, fearful for his rule, would have employed a captain who had a right to the throne (Mehmed II was a politician and could have removed Radu III from the throne, irrespective of their “friendship”, and replaced him with a more capable commander). 2. Stephen’s (forced) involvement in Asia Minor against Usun indicates that he was not fully determined/ capable of engaging the sultan while the latter faced his Muslim nemesis. Hence, Stephen’s decision to attack Walachia after Usun Hassan’s defeat can be explained by chiefly three reasons: Venetian money, Venetian (and maybe also Roman and Hungarian) political promises and/ or threats (e.g. overrunning Moldavia with Tartars, ‘bought’ by Venice against the Ottomans since 1472) and the fact that Stephen’s downfall seemed inevitable once Radu III’s main army was back in Walachia and Venetian Scutari (attacked by the Rumelian Ottoman forces immediately after their victorious return from Asia Minor), was taken.

\textsuperscript{48} [Caterino Zeno], De i commentarii del viaggio in Persia di M. Caterino Zeno il K. & delle guerre fatte nell’imperio persiano, dal tempo di Ússuncassano, Venice, 1558, ff. 15\textsuperscript{v}–16\textsuperscript{r}. In this case as well, a modern edition is much needed.

In this last respect, in case we trust a report from autumn 1474 which stated that the ruler (Laiotă) enthroned by Stephen III in Radu III’s place was on good terms with the sultan since before his rise to the throne, and if we suppose that captain Basarab in Asia Minor was in fact Laiotă, who commanded Stephen’s troops (Angiolello, who also accompanied Mehmed on his Moldavian campaign of 1476, clearly stated that these troops were from Walachia Bassa), a hypothesis becomes rather plausible: Stephen III thought of dethroning Radu III, without any major Ottoman consequences (at least until Stephen had more regional support), because he was to replace Radu III with a man (Basarab III Laiotă) who enjoyed Sultan Mehmed’s favour. Nonetheless, the Ottoman reaction quickly erased such possibility, although, if we are to confide in Magno and his sources, those eager to attack Stephen in the sultan’s name in 1474, were no elite soldiers.

Unfortunately many Venetian contemporary sources were lost throughout the centuries. Luckily, some of them were directly used by the official “spokesmen” of the Republic. The Wallachian issue of 1473 also comes up in the work of Magno. He was of the best informed Venetian historians, chiefly because he was able to use – almost a century after the events – the Venetian archives largely lost to flames in the 1570s. Magno stated that both Radu and Stephen sent troops to Mehmed for his campaign against Usun.

First, ad annum 1472 (probably in connection to the second half of the year), Stefano Magno wrote:

‘[...] Mahumet [Mehmed II] interim inteso la fuga del fiolo suo dall cittade del Coyno [Konya], et come riddutto era in Caucasus, dove fatti havea aminar tutta gente de Natolia [Anatolia] quello rittorno in Constantinopoli [...] et licencio le nave de Zenovesi che rettenute havea a Pera, lequal parti da Pera [...] et con grande celeritate tutta zente de Grecia commando parrere in la Natolia [...] et dimando aiudo de zente a i vaivoda signori de Walachia Bassa [Moldavia] et Alte [Wallachia], che li mandi piu zente pueleo,

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The Wallachian Case in the 1470s

la mandoli el tribute d’anni 3 [fact confirmed by Ottoman chronicles52] [...] fo dicto havere in dicto persone 200m [200,000 men]. Fo dicto i vaivoda de Valachia havessi promesso persone 12m [12,000 men] [...]’

Yet, less than two years later (in spring 1474), Wallachia and Moldavia were no longer loyal Ottoman tools.

‘[..] El signoro Turco [Mehmed II] intervenne con detta la zente adi 21 mazo [21 May] le fe provocans da Constantinople andar in Adrianople ad espedire el numero exercito in Valachia. Ma avanti l’esercito adunare, primi furono alcuni Tambelani che vivano a quelli confini, i quali volve evver primi pavone con 15m [15,000 men] in numero persone in Valachia in equal paese entradi, i Valachi, che messe s’havessano insidiere deno fueri in un nebito, et occupari tutti i passi, et revoli de lugo, de violi tutti a pelli. Questo se ha per lettera dal ultimo zugno [30 June] de Venetia, <e> de 10 luglio [10 July; Magno used dispatchi from the 1470s as references] al qual lugo andado el domino Signore con grande viletudine [...]’.53

It is nevertheless difficult to tell which Wallachia was the Ottoman target. Moldavia had already been attacked in December 1473.54 It is more plausible that by June 1474 Wallachia had become a battlefield.

Magno revealed that there was much more to the Wallachian story of 1473. An – in fact invaluable – Ottoman source sheds additional light on the matter. Me’ali’s – still unedited – chronicle claimed that – after Mehmed II returned from Asia Minor to Istanbul (the return did not take place sooner than December 1473, after Stephen’s Wallachian campaign of November), the sultan ordered Isa Beg to enter Moldavia. An offspring of the Mihaloğlu family, of Serbian, and maybe also Wallachian (Basarab) princely origins,55 the latter successfully accomplished


his task together with 10,000 soldiers. The “Venetian style” relations between Stephen III and Prince Djem/Cem (and his entourage), in view of what seems to have been a “sketch” of a – failed – coup de palais, increased Mehmed’s anger. The fourteen year old Djem had been entrusted by his father with the defence of the European borders while he was away on campaign against Usun Hassan. Alike his father’s – still – Moldavian vassal, Djem had been in close contacts with the future Serenissima.

In more than one respect, the events of 1473-1474, recall those of 1443-1444. Then Mehmed II became heir to the throne and afterwards even sultan with the aid of Mara Brankovic, and of her – possibly – relative, Skanderbeg, the latter engineered the assassinated Alaeddin Ali Çelebi, the favourite son of Murad II, who was under immense pressure from King Vlađislau I (III) Jagiello of Poland and Hungary and John Hunyadi, Voivode of Transylvania. To what extent, Mahmud Anghelović, of princely Serbian origins as well, and thrice Grand Vezir (the last time he had been removed from office by Mehmed II after his return to Istanbul at the end of 1473), was involved in the “conspiracies” of 1473-1474 (in spring 1474, Mustafa lost his life) remains unclear. He was certainly imprisoned (in May-June, after Mustafa’s death) and then executed (July 1474). One of the main charges brought against him was that he had allowed (as in “had freed”) the Eflaki to move.

Another episode from Me’ali’s chronicle has to be recalled. Süleyman, Djem’s tutor (a lālā), went virtually mad when he saw a Moldavian envoy in Adrianople, where Djem resided. Rapidly informed about the outcome of Başkent, Stephen

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56 For the source and its peculiarities, see Mihail Guboglu, Izvoare turco-persane privind relațiile lui Ştefan cel Mare cu Imperiul Otoman [Turkish-Persian Sources on the Relations between Stephen the Great and the Ottoman Empire], Revista Arhivelor 59:2 (1982), 34–5; Cristea-Pienaru 2012, 30.


58 See N. Iorga, Veneţia în Marea Neagră. III. Originea legăturilor cu Ştefan cel Mare şi mediul politic al dezvoltării lor [Venice in the Black Sea. III. The Origins of the Relations with Stephen the Great and the Political Environment of their Development], in Idem, Studii asupra evului mediu românesc [Studies on the Romanian Middle Ages], ed. Ş. Papacostea, Bucharest 1984, pp.230–96, at nos. 1-2, pp.251–2. (The study, with its appendix, was first published in 1914).

59 New researches in the Venetian archives, related to the documents published by Iorga, are of crucial importance.


61 The relevant contemporary sources were quoted and discussed by Stavrides 2001, 183, 342.

62 In these matters: Guboglu 1982, 34–5; Cristea-Pienaru 2012, 30–1.
had sent his men to Djem. Even if we presume that the news had reached him via the Black Sea, we cannot date the encounter in Adrianople prior to October 1473, a month before Stephen III’s major attack on Wallachia. In return, it can be stated that Stephen III entered Wallachia some two weeks after his envoys, who had met with Süleyman, returned from the empire. Their encounter with Süleyman had been dramatic. When Stephen III’s envoys reached the court of Djem, news on Usun Hassan’s victory and Mehmed’s death had multiplied. At least this is the Ottoman version of the events; but similar information (stories) circulated also in the Italian environment. Süleyman had counselled Djem to proclaim himself sultan. Djem followed his advice. But Mehmed returned, Djem went into hiding for a while. He returned and was pardoned. After Mustafa’s death, Djem received his position at Konya, in Asia Minor. Süleyman and other councillors of Djem were however executed.63 Sultan Mehmed II showed no mercy.

Coincidences were few in number also in the 1470s. Because of the manner in which Me’ali’s chronicle “restructured”/ “reshaped data”, facts and events it is difficult to tell how much Stephen (and his men) and Süleyman knew of what had happened at Başkent when the meeting of Adrianople took place (the former probably knew more). At any rate, following Djem’s proclamation as Sultan, the arrival of the Moldavian envoys placed Süleyman in a highly difficult position. If Stephen had any doubts that he had to attack, the return of his envoys from Adrianople erased them. In early November, Stephen III entered Wallachia.64 The Ottomans immediately threatened Matthias.65 In February 1474, Ali burnt down Oradea.66 For Mehmed II it was clear that Stephen III had been acting with King Matthias’s support, who was coming out of his “crusader retirement” enabled – because of the Transylvanian rebellion and his Moldavian failure in 1467 – since spring 1468 by prolonged two year truces with the Sultan.67 Between the two

63 In this matter, see the extensive analysis with further references in Cristea-Pienaru 2012, 30–1.
64 Cronica moldo-germană [The Moldavian-German Chronicle], in Petre P. Panaitescu (ed.), Cronicile slavo-romne din secolele XV-XVI publicate de Ioan Bogdan [The 15th–16th Century Slavic-Romanian Chronicles published by Ioan Bogdan], Bucharest 1959, pp.28–37, at p.29. (A propaganda work drafted around 1502 for Stephen’s Habsburg allies.)
65 József Gellich [and Lajos Thallóczy] (eds.), Diplomatarium relationum reipublicae regis Hungariae cum regno Hungariae. Ragusa és Magyarország összeköttetéseinek oklevélét a, Budapest 1887, no. 385, p.631. (The source was frequently neglected.)
67 For the edited and unedited sources on the first years of the 1470s, see Alexandru Simon, ‘Between the Adriatic and the Black Sea: Matthias Corvinus and the Ottoman Empire after the Fall of Negroponte’, Radovi Zavoda za Hrvatsku Povijest 42:2 (2010), 359–75, especially pp. 367–72.
main traditional Christian monarchs of the region, Frederick III and Casimir IV, who thought that they controlled Stephen and had Matthias cornered, the two “newcomers”, Matthias Corvinus and Stephen III, without officially breaking off relations with Mehmed II until the last months of 1473, had manoeuvred their own paths possibly since as early as the summer of 1471 when Stephen III had not endorsed the conspiracy68 and the Polish attack on Matthias.69

68 Seemingly the “Vitéz plot”, though poorly enacted, was more far-reaching than usually assumed, involving Venice too. New archival researches are required for the analysis of a series of events that included the Papal elections of 1471.

69 E.g. Eudoxiu De Hurmuzaki, Documente privitoare la istoria românilor [Documents regarding the history of the Romanians], XV-1. Acte și scrisori din arhivele orașelor arădenă Bistrița, Brașov, Sibiu, 1358–1600 [Documents and letters from Archives of the Transylvania cities of Bistrița, Brașov and Sibiu], ed. N. Iorga, Bucharest 1911, no. 133, p.77.
László Pósán

Die ungarischen Jagiellonen und der Deutsche Orden in der Zeit von Hochmeister Albrecht von Brandenburg (1511-1525)


2 Ibid., no. 19397.
3 Ibid., no. 19400.

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7 Sach 2002,170-1.
Die ungarischen Jagiellonen und der Deutsche Orden


12 AT I. no. 165.

László Pósán


15 Sach 2002, 171.
17 Erich Joachim, Die Politik des letzten Hochmeisters in Preußen Albrecht von Brandenburg, Berlin 1892, I. no. 20. [Weiterhin: Joachim 1892]
18 Ibid., no. 30.
19 Sach 2002,179.
20 Hubatsch-Joachim 1973, no. 19444.
Die ungarischen Jagiellonen und der Deutsche Orden


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26 Joachim 1892, no. 51.; Sach 2002, 185–186.


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27 Joachim 1892, no. 48.
31 Hoffmann 1910, 27.
32 Hubatsch-joachim 1973, no. 19558.
Die ungarischen Jagiellonen und der Deutsche Orden
die polnisch-russische Krieg aus, der 10 Jahre lang dauerte. Die Kaiser war mit
dem italienischen Krieg und mit den Konflikten mit den Franzosen beschäftigt.
1511 wurde ein Bündnis gegen Frankreich, die sog. Heilige Liga, geschlossen,
die der Befreiung Italiens von Frankreich dienen sollte. Maximilian und die
Fürsten des Reiches sicherten dem Hochmeister ihre politische Unterstützung
zu und ermunterten ihn die Konflikte zwischen dem Deutschen Orden und
Polen durch Verhandlungen zu lösen. Auf dem Reichstag in Trier wurde die
Entscheidung getroffen, die Verhandlungen auf den nächsten Landtag zu
verschieben. Der Kaiser war nur bereit, einen Brief an den polnischen König zu
schreiben, um die Verhandlungen mit dem Hochmeister anzuregen. Wegen des
Mangels an militärischer Hilfe vom Reich musste Albrecht von Brandenburg
mit dem Krakauer Hof Verhandlungen beginnen. Nach mehrmaligem Briefwechsel
mit den Polen vereinbarten sie, dass sie die umstrittenen Punkte am 24. Juni
1512 in Krakau besprechen werden. Der polnische König verschob dies aber
um ein paar Wochen, weil er sich entschloss, mit dem Orden im November
1512 in Petrikau auf dem polnischen Landtag Verhandlungen zu führen. Er
wollte damit klar machen, dass Ostpreußen und der Deutsche Orden zu Polen
gehörten und deswegen die Fragen hinsichtlich des Ordens im Sejm besprochen
werden müssten. Hochmeister Albrecht wollte dies aber nicht anerkennen.
Deswegen schickte er nicht einen Würdenträger des Ordens, sondern seinen
Bruder Kasimir, der im Dienst des Kaisers stand, am 2. November 1512 nach
Petrikau, um in seinem Namen mit dem polnischen König Verhandlungen zu
führen. Die Verhandlungen in Petrikau waren der letzte Versuch, die Konflikte
zwischen dem Deutschen Orden und Polen auf Grund des Friedens von Thorn
von 1466 friedlich zu lösen. Die Vereinbarung vom 17. Dezember 1512 sicherte
dem polnischen König bei der Wahl des Bischofs von Ermland großen Einfluss
tzu und garantierte die Grenzen gezogen im Frieden von Thorn. Polen sah dafür
von dem Artikel ab, der vorscrieb, auch polnische Adlige in den Deutschen

33 Norman Davies, Lengyelország története. [Geschichte Polens], Budapest 2006, p.125.; Jerzy
Antemurale Christianitatis. Zur Genese der Bollwerksrhetorik im östlichen Mitteleuropa an der Schwelle
34 Pósán 2003, 374.
36 Sach 2002,186.
37 Walther Hubatsch und Erich Joachim (Hrsg.), Regesta Historico-Diplomatica ordinis S. Mariae
Theutonicorum, 1198-1525. Pars II.: Regesta Privilegiorum Ordinis S. Mariae Theutonicorum. Mit
einem Anhang: Papst- und Konzilsurkunden, Göttingen 1949, no. 3926. (Weiterhin: Hubatsch-
Joachim 1949)

Im Sommer 1512 erklärte Großfürst Wassili von Moskau dem polnisch-litauischen Staat den Krieg. Der Landmeister des Deutschen Ordens in Livland teilte dem Hochmeister am 13. Februar 1513 mit, dass die russischen Truppen...

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39 Ibid.
40 AT II. no. 164.
41 Ibid., no. 229.; HUBATSCH-JOACHIM 1973, no. 19702.
43 HUBATSCH-JOACHIM 1973, no. 19626.
44 Ibid., no. 19653.
Die ungarischen Jagiellonen und der Deutsche Orden
unter Führung von Herzog Michail Glinski Smolensk belagern. 45 Mit Blick auf
die politischen Ziele in Preußen und unter Berücksichtigung der aktuellen
militärischen Lage forderte Sigismund nach der Verhandlung in Petrikau keinen
Trueheid vom Großmeister, sondern bat um militärische Unterstützung im
russischen Krieg. 46 Hochmeister Albrecht von Brandenburg geriet in eine
sensible Lage. Der Deutsche Orden, der einmal mit der Absicht gegründet
worden war, gegen die Feinde des Christentums, des Katholizismus aufzutreten,
konnte den Kampf gegen das orthodoxe, schismatische Moskau nicht ablehnen.
Aber so ein Auftreten hätte die antipolnischen preußisch-russischen
Beziehungen zerstören können. Aber auch aus politischer Überlegung war die
Bitte des polnischen Königs inakzeptabel, denn der Hochmeister hätte mit der
Teilnahme am Krieg die Vereinbarung in Petrikau und damit den Friedensvertrag
von 1466 und die Oberhoheit der polnischen Krone anerkannt. Um Zeit zu
 gewinnen, antwortete der Hochmeister, dass er erst den Reichstag des Staates
des Deutschen Ordens einberufen wolle. 47 Der Reichstag trat im April 1513
zusammen. 48 Davor beriet er über die aktuelle Lage mit den Fürsten von
Brandenburg und Sachsen, mit dem Landmeister von Livland und mit dem
Landkomtur der Ballei von Elsass. 49 Er bat auch den Heiligen Stuhl in dieser
Situation um Rat, um eine für den Orden akzeptable Lösung finden zu können,
da der Papst den Frieden von Thorn nicht anerkannte. Papst Leo X. bat
Sigismund Anfang April 1513 in einem Brief, seine Beziehung zum Deutschen
Orden in Ordnung zu bringen. 50 Ende des Monats rief er beide Parteien auf, die
Streitigkeiten durch Verhandlungen beizulegen. 51 Der Hochmeister versuchte
durch seinen Bruder Kasimir, der am kaiserlichen Hof diente, zu erfahren,
welchen Standpunkt Maximilian in dieser Frage vertrat. Markgraf Kasimir
äußerte sich in einem Brief vom 25. April 1513 an Albrecht über die Einstellung
des Kaisers zu den wichtigsten Fragen des damaligen Europa, also auch zur
Frage des Deutschen Ordens. Er schrieb, dass er vom Kaiser beauftragt wurde,
den ungarisch-böhmischen König Vladislav zu treffen. 52 Der andere Bruder des
Hochmeisters, Georg von Brandenburg, berichtete am 6. Juni 1513 in einem

45 Ibid., no. 19653.
46 Ibid., no. 19676, 19677, 19688, 19704, 19722, 19723.
47 Ibid., no. 19676, 19677, 19688, 19704, 19722, 19723.
48 ASP V. no. 204.
50 Ibid., no. 19723, 19724, 19725, 19727.
51 Ibid., no. 19750.
52 Ibid., no. 19745.

53 Ibid., no. 19783.
54 Ibid., no. 19782.
55 Ibid., no. 19852.
56 Ibid., no. 19885.
57 AT II. no. 312.
58 Sach 2002,190.
59 HUBATSCH-JOACHIM 1973, no. 19950.
60 Ibid., no. 20012, 20013, 20014, 20015, 20016.

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63 Hubatsch-Joachim 1973, no. 20209, 20215, 20219.
64 Sach 2002, 212–3.; Srodecki 2015, 297.
66 Ibid., no. 20289.
67 Kulcsár 1989, 151.

Die polnische Politik von Maximilian hatte nach dem 22. Juli 1515 das Ziel, den Frieden mit den Jagiellonen zu bewahren, da seine Lage an der italienischen Front nicht besonders gut war. Auch die Frage der kaiserlichen Thronerbfolge
Die ungarischen Jagiellonen und der Deutsche Orden


\(^{71}\) Sach 1998, 353.

\(^{72}\) Hubatsch-Joachim 1973, no. 20550, 20552.

\(^{73}\) Sach 1998, 353-4.

\(^{74}\) Hubatsch-Joachim 1973, no. 20646.

\(^{75}\) Ibid., no. 20726.

\(^{76}\) Ibid., no. 20792, 20802.


\footnote{Hubatsch-Joachim 1973, no. 21062.}

\footnote{Ibid., no. 21090.}
Die ungarischen Jagiellonen und der Deutsche Orden


85 Ibid., no. 20952, 20990.
86 Ibid., no. 21083, 21092, 21101.
87 Ibid., no. 20868, 20870.
89 KOLBERG 1905, 217–8.
90 SACH 2002, 375.
91 HUBATSCH-JOACHIM 1973, no. 21088, 21089.
92 Ibid., 21114, 21153, 21198, 21208.
Die ungarischen Jagiellonen und der Deutsche Orden


97 ASPK VII. no. 148.
99 Aufzeichnungen, 330.
100 Marian Biskup, Wojny polski z zakonem krzyżackim (1308-1521), Danzig 1993, pp.260-328.
101 Fuchs 1979, 79.
102 Hubatsch-Joachim 1973, no. 23239.
103 Ibid., no. 23629.
104 Ibid., no. 23513.
105 Ibid., no. 23584.
106 Ibid., no. 23534.
László Pósán


107 Ibid., no. 23641, 23643.
108 Ibid., no. 23654.
109 Aufzeichnungen 341.
111 Ibid., no. 23756.
112 Ibid., no. 23709.
113 Ibid., no. 23792.
114 Ibid., no. 23816.
Die ungarischen Jagiellonen und der Deutsche Orden


115 Ibid., no. 23842.
116 Ibid., no. 23869, 23887, 23922.
117 Ibid., no. 23957, 23981, 24049, 24087, 24269.
118 Ibid., no. 23865, 23981.
119 Ibid., no. 24265.
120 Ibid., no. 24266.
121 Ibid., no. 24355.
122 Hubatsch-Joachim 1949, no. 4051.
123 Hubatsch-Joachim 1973, no. 24728.
László Pósán


\textsuperscript{124} Kulcsár 1989, 180.
\textsuperscript{125} Hubatsch-Joachim 1973, no. 24872.
\textsuperscript{126} Paul Tschackert (Hrsg.), Urkundenbuch zur Reformationsgeschichte des Herzogthums Preußen, Leipzig 1890, I. no. 55. [Weiterhin: Tschackert 1890]
\textsuperscript{127} Fuchs 1979, 94–5.; Zombori 2004, 251.
\textsuperscript{128} Geheimes Staatsarchiv PK, XX. HA Hist. StA Königsberg, Ordensfolianten 49, Bl. 28–29.

130 Hubatsch-Joachim 1949, no. 348.
131 Ibid., no. 4100.
133 Zombori 2004, 231.
134 Hubatsch-Joachim 1949, no. 4105
135 Ibid., no. 4106.


136 Tschackert 1890, no. 248.
137 Zivier 1915, 270.
139 Hubatsch-Joachim 1949, no. 4108.
140 Csepregi 2007, 66.
141 Tschackert 1890, no. 316.
142 Ibid., no. 265, 284, 285, 286, 287, 288.
143 Ibid., no. 333, 334.
Die ungarischen Jagiellonen und der Deutsche Orden


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144 Meier 1967, 179.
146 Hubatsch-Joachim 1949, no. 4132.
The paper investigates whether the Jagiellonian kingdoms could have acted as a dynastic bloc in their foreign relations, especially towards the Ottomans in the year 1526, focussing as well largely on the antecedents of 1523-1525. I am seeking to explore whether there might have been any chances of a possible co-operation between Poland and Hungary regarding their relationship to the Turks, either before the peace signed by King Sigismund the Old with Sultan Suleiman in November 1525, or, even afterwards, in the first months of the tragic year leading up to the battlefield of Mohács, 29 August 1526.

Giving an outline of the conditions resulting in Poland concluding a treaty with the Ottomans in 1525, I would introduce the military and political situation the Jagiellonians were to face from the side of Moldavia, the Tatars and the Teutonic Order. King Sigismund needed to protect its eastern-south-eastern borders, which were continuously and systematically threatened by the instigation of the Sublime Porte as Suleiman insisted on detaching the Jagiellonian relative of King Louis II before embarking on a large campaign against Hungary. One of the major questions is how Hungarian diplomacy treated Polish peacemaking either in the months preceding the November 1525 treaty, or, afterwards: in an examination of the Hungarian attempts towards Sigismund to intermediate to the Porte to have the Kingdom of Hungary involved in the Ottoman peace, I am interested whether Louis’s government saw any chance of reconciliation with the Turks.

Another point of concern is how the Western powers looked upon the formerly existing dynastic coordination. How the policy-making centres of Europe saw Hungary’s chances of survival after the Polish peace? How did Suleiman’s breaking a ‘gap’ between the Jagiellonian dynasty affect the West in forwarding aid and military subsidies to Hungary?

In researching Jagiellonian diplomacy, particularly of the crowns of Hungary-Bohemia and Poland-Lithuania from the 1490s to the mid-1520s, one is to face an ever present dichotomy of approaches, i.e. whether the monarchs were acting as a real dynastic bloc, or they, amidst fraternal strife had no chance for any kind of concerted action but they made up only a conglomerate of crowns. The issues seem to be always the same: could the rulers, Vladislaus II

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of Hungary, his son, Louis II, and Alexander I and Sigismund I of Poland take a track of a familiar accord, make a common dynastic foreign policy on the basis of mutual interests and joint aid. The traditional view in historiography has been up until most recently that they were unable to co-operate, they could not take a unified stand – especially against the Ottomans. Polish diplomacy was largely affected by her relations to the Habsburgs and their allies (Teutonic Order and Moscow), as well as towards the Crimean Tatars, which set the course of her path, and her relationship to the Ottomans. That is why Poland was not possible to take part and supply aid to the Hungarian Jagiellonians. In my view the situation is not so simple, and the period of 1490-1526 is not to be overgeneralized: there were shorter phases where familiar concord, or attempts to have at least a mutual understanding was manifest in different spheres. There was a regular communication, beyond royal correspondence high dignitaries, secular and ecclesiastical officials in Poland and Hungary were keeping in touch, for instance the Ottoman news or the talks with Western envoys spread rapidly between the courts. There were coordinated negotiations, joint and allied treaties (e.g. 1500-1502 with France and England); joint embassies were commissioned, concerted *procurationes* were issued for envoys (e.g. for Girolamo Balbi in 1521 to the Empire, England and France). The two kingdoms were several times represented commonly by one envoy in Rome or in Venice. Even papal envoys treated the crowns jointly (e.g. Burgio and Campeggio, as seen below).

The outset to have an overview of the Jagiellonian foreign policy in the mid-1520s is the October-November 1523 talks of Sopron and Wiener Neustadt. The negotiations were mainly aimed to deal with the Habsburgs and have them embraced in practice in the anti-Ottoman struggle, however, Hungarian political leadership fed high hopes that Poland could be more actively involved in the effort and would offer aid for a planned great enterprise. King Sigismund of Poland did not take part in person, but had himself represented by Chancellor Krzysztof Szydłowiecki, and it seemed the conference would have at least a partial success as the parties managed to bring forward conciliation between Poland and the Teutonic Order. Although it was in the first place Ferdinand of
Habsburg whom the Hungarians asked aid from, however, he, alike the Imperial Council, sought to have warrants first as the Jagiellonians themselves would raise a sufficient army. True to say the Prince was at that time full-heartedly promoting the cause of the Turkish war. King Louis II of Hungary made an offer to recruit 60 thousand men and 100 cannons, while Archduke Ferdinand promised to supply 10 thousand soldiers and 30 cannons, which, finally did never in fact arrive, though a certain amount was rendered for the defence of the Croatian borders. It seemed the king of Poland was by any means willing to support the war effort and, though he did not state explicitly that he would not offer anything, but put it in a way that “he cannot state with what military aid he could assist against the Turks”. Nonetheless, although the king did not make his standpoint clear, his ambassador was to suggest informally that Louis has no other choice but move towards a peace with the Porte.

The congress thus had an uneven success. It seemed more and more obvious that Sigismund was not to get entangled in any kind of an anti-Ottoman alliance. The East-Central European crusading coalition was feared to break. The Poles sought to reconcile with the Ottomans and protect their eastern borders from the Crimean Tatars, which, in Hungary, revalued and reappraised the significance of the Western aid. What was the reason for this volte-face – the signals of which, nonetheless, were foreshown years before?

From the late 1510s on Poland treated her relationship to the Turks with greatest caution. King Sigismund refrained himself from large-scale anti-Ottoman assaults, while, at the same time in his phraseology he kept on using the crusading propaganda. However, one was to feel that the tone of Polish diplomacy was getting more and more reserved towards crusading schemes and Poland was standing off and keeping a distance from any allied, anti-Ottoman

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1 “Et hiis de causis sua maiestas non potest specifice nominare certum numerum gencium, quibus posset maiestatem vestram relevare et contra communem hostem adiuvere.”: Chancellor Krzysztof Szydłowiecki, *Primus legationum diversarum tomus*, Archiwum Główne Akt Dawnych w Warszawie, L(ibri) L(egationum), vol. 22.: Published: *Krzysztof Szydłowiecki kancellár naplója 1523-ból*, [Szydłowiecki’s Diary from 1523] ed. István Zombori, transl. Géza Érszegi, Budapest 2004, [hereinafter Szydłowiecki] p.123. [I refer to page numbers when necessary, otherwise only document numbers are given.]

front. The king found that it was a stable peace with the Turks that served the best for his nation.\(^3\)

To shed light to the background, it needs to have an overview of the Polish-Moldavian, and -Tatar relations. During the minority of Stephen IV (Ștefăniță, 1517–1527) Prince of Moldavia, up to the beginning of 1523 Moldavia was governed by a regency council. The regency government – in contrast to the hectic rule of the former prince, Bogdan III (1504–1517), who was taking turns allying with either the Turks and the Tatars, or the Poles – tried now to take a pro-Jagiellonian and anti-Ottoman stand.\(^4\) Stephen IV, however, had himself come of age, suppressed the opposing boyars, the opportunity of which the Turks seized and increased their influence in Moldavia. King Louis, in a letter of June 1523 made a reference that the Turks made the Voivod of Wallachia flee and at the same time subdued the “other” Wallachia, that is, Moldavia, with the armies of which, added to the Tatars and their own forces are now threatening Hungary itself.\(^5\) That is why a Polish envoy, Wawrzyniec Mieczysłeski, bishop of Kamianets-Podilskyi (1518-1529) was detained in the principality as will be shown below in greater detail.\(^6\) The Voivod was willingly reporting any new information to the High Porte.\(^7\) Andrea dal Burgo, imperial envoy in Hungary reported that in Spring 1523 the Turks asked the Voivod of Moldavia to let free

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\(^3\) Zombori 2004, 241., 245.


\(^6\) Laurentius/Wawrzyniec Miedzileński/Miedzilewski/Miedźgrzeski/Miedźileczki/Niedzielski (1480–1529).

passage for her troops through his principality. Moreover, the Turks kept on laying assaults into Wallachia and Moldavia. Poland was closely touched by the more and more regular Ottoman onslaughts not far from her borders thus tried to step towards a rapprochement. The Ottomans, notwithstanding, found it very handy to divide the Jagiellonians' huge conglomerate of crowns in this way and detach King Sigismund from his Hungarian nephew. In this they had recourse to the military aid of the Crimean Tatar khan, who, from 1516 onwards, in accordance with the Turkish assaults was making inroads into Polish territory, then, an even more imminent greater danger was hanging over since in 1519 the khan allied with two of the staunchest enemies of the Polish Jagiellonians, the Teutonic Order and Moscow. For a while the political situation seemed to improve as in 1522 Poland managed for a short time to sign an armistice with the Tatars, and the hopes for a peace, however, vanished with the death of Khan Mehmed I Giray in 1523. King Sigismund found it more important to protect his eastern, south-eastern borders from the Ottoman-Tatar menace than give a helping hand to his nephew, King Louis. Although in 1522 he tried to forge an anti-Ottoman alliance with Emperor Charles V, and made attempts to come to terms with Prince Stephen IV of Moldavia, as his expectations failed, he moved closer to a reconciliation with the Turks. Polish envoys were still present at the 1522 Reichstag, but they did not take part at the next one, which was a clear sign that Poland gave up the hopes for an imperial aid and made all effort to come to a compromise with the Sultan. From 1523 they made concrete steps to bring forward a long-term armistice. Sigismund was even reproved by the Pope. The contemporaries felt that the Polish behaviour was partly to blame because in May 1523 papal legate, Cardinal Tommaso de Vio “freezed” the crusading aid sent by the Holy See to Hungary.

The Polish and Hungarian political leadership might have had a last chance if they succeeded in keeping the voivod of Moldavia within the anti-Ottoman league. The Prince was nevertheless resolute is his pro-Turkish stand. The King of Poland was only interested in an anti-Ottoman war if he could make the King of Hungary put down the Moldavian voivod himself. As it will be seen below, Sigismund gave instructions under these terms to his envoy commissioned for

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the Sopron, Wiener Neustadt and Pozsony/Pressburg/Bratislava negotiations. Nonetheless, Sigismund would have rather welcome a convenient peace with the Turks, with which he could keep a tight hold over his Tatar neighbours.

The Moldavian and Tatar affairs had a great effect on Poland’s rapprochement with the Turks, which alike influenced Hungary’s stand. In October and November Chancellor Szydłowiecki was several times resolutely representing Sigismund’s standpoint: in his speeches of, for instance, 17 and 18 October he spoke out firmly that Louis should consolidate his relations with the Turks, even though he did not state expressly that he was to conclude peace. Both Sigismund and his ambassador expressed several times that „the Emperor of the Turks rendered the Khan of the Tartars, and is helping him with men and money” to lay assaults in both Hungary and Polish Podolia, which was to prevent the Poles from supplying any aid to Hungary.\textsuperscript{11} The envoy warned King Louis that „the Emperor of the Turks is preparing with all his might, with all his manpower to invade Hungary in the following summer”. In the secret instructions to the Chancellor King Sigismund stated not less than the Ottomans would not only attack the kingdom with all their forces but are wishing to march into and occupy it”\textsuperscript{12}. The Sultan is instigating the Tatars to make disturbances of all kinds in order to divert the king of the Poles’ attention from so as he could not send any aid to his nephew.\textsuperscript{13} The Polish envoy suggested that „the king of Poland could only help Louis if she had looked after his own kingdoms and if he was could do it freely”.\textsuperscript{14} In addition, Sigismund advised King Louis, „yet he decided to enter into war” against the Ottomans, „he was to take it into consideration how he could trust the aid of foreign princes”.\textsuperscript{15} In a way, the King of Poland warned his nephew that he had no other choice, there was no real hope for a Western aid in practice. Before 1 November 1523 Emperor Charles was informed by the imperial envoy that Szydłowiecki let Louis know that he received news from

\textsuperscript{11} “imperatorem Tartarorum ad hoc cesar Turcarum instituit et adiuvat gentibus et pecunis, ut regem meum et regna eius invadat, ... ut sic impediret suam maiestatem, ne maiestati vestre opem ferre possit”: Szydłowiecki, 122.

\textsuperscript{12} “[…] imperator Turcorum cum omnibus copiis et viribus suis anno et estate proximo vult regnum Vngariae agredi et ingredi, ut voto suo potiri possit et ne opem ferre possemus eius maiestati et eius regnis”: Szydłowiecki, 114.

\textsuperscript{13} “constituit Turcus imperatorem Tartarorum ... ... Omnibus modis regnum Polonie infestet et invadat, ut sic avertat regem Polonie, ne posset opem ferre nepoti suo et regno Hungarie”: Szydłowiecki, 120.

\textsuperscript{14} „sua maiestas ... provisis regnis suis – quantumcunque poterit – adiumento erit maiestati vestre et regno Hungarie, si modo id licite facere poterit”: Szydłowiecki, 123.

\textsuperscript{15} “[…] maiestas vestra preconciat bene ... quomodo fidem debet subsidiis aliorum principum et externis presidis”: Szydłowiecki, 123.
his monarch that the Turks together with the Tatars are making preparations
to overrun both countries the following year. That is, the Ottoman strategy of
detachment was already present at the Wiener Neustadt talks in 1523.

Hungary was fully informed of Moldavian affairs. Even before the Wiener
Neustadt talks, in August and September 1523 King Sigismund sent several
letters to King Louis complaining over the Moldavian situation. He reported
several times that the Voivod was threatening him with war, allied with the
Tatars and the Turks. In secret Stephen instigated the Tatars to lay assaults
against Polish territories. The King of Poland expressed that the prospect that
the Ottomans gain a firm hand over Moldavia would deprive both Jagiellonian
kingdoms of a part of their shields. In Wiener Neustadt, after 20 October King
Louis indignantly protested against the detention of the Polish envoy in a letter
to Prince Stephen. Furthermore, he did even send an embassy to Moldavia
in order to press the Voivod to set the bishop of Kamianets free. The King of
Poland, through his commissioner, Chancellor Szydłowiecki recommended
that King Louis dispatch an army led by the voivod of Transylvania and have
Prince Stephen deposed and install a reliable new voivod instead, which was,
however, treated much more cautiously at the Hungarian court. The Hungarian
government did not wish to get entangled in a new military conflict with
Moldavia at all as they did their best not to confront the High Port in a new
front. Therefore, they found they had better have the matter settled slowly by
itself. Hungary, with a possible political action did not mean to bring forth the
greater of two evils, that is, the chance the Voivod of Moldavia would flee to the
Ottoman court with his faithful followers. Here it was the Turks who were in
the winner position and it is to be assumed that any Hungarian intervention
would have worsened the situation. Chancellor Szydłowiecki felt himself that
“his chances were rather poor in the matter” and noted that there was not much
hope for a prompt action for his majesty had followed all the advice not to make
any attempt at all against the Voivod of Moldavia”. What the Chancellor finally
managed to achieve was that the bishop of Eger expressed his king’s disapproval
to the refugee boyars about the Prince’s cruelties. He, nevertheless, did even
encourage them to return home. King Louis did not move off his track in the
matter and did not risk a new conflict. It did however serve right for the Turks’

16 Zombori 2004, 323.
18 AT VI. n. 309.; Zombori 2004, 294.
19 “[… ] maiestas regia secuta est omnium vota, ut nichil penitus attemptetur nichilque agatur
contra waywodam Moldavie”. SZYDŁOWIECKI, p.172.
purposes since they wanted that Louis’s decision be not appreciated at the Polish court and in this way the gap between the two Jagiellonians could be widened. The King of Hungary wished to preserve the status quo, the Turks – even despite the defeat at the battle of Szávaszentdáber/Sremska Mitrovica (1523) – were able to fix the terms with all their might. The Ottomans surrounded and were approaching the Jagiellonians from several fronts and gaining new positions – the castles of Klis, Szörény/Turnu Severin, the territoriers of Bosnia, Moldavia, and the Crimean Khanate. The Turks were not too much cast back by the loss at Szávaszentdábe.20 There would not have been point in bringing forward a peace offer, since they could take the initiative as the money collected for the 1523 crusade was seized by the legate sent to Hungary, thus, the army was not raised, furthermore, after the death of Pope Adrian VI a new pontiff was elected, who was expected to take new measures and accomplish the task of the defence against the Turkish menace.

To have a clearer view of the relations between Poland, Hungary and Moldavia at the time, one might look at a less known document preserved at the Manuscripts Collection of the British Library. As far as I know, the letter was only taken notice of in a document collection of a Hungarian amateur historian, who did not manage to reveal its author. The letter was written on 13 January 1524, from Cracow to Legate Tommaso de Vio, Cardinal San Sisto.21 We assume that the writer is Bishop Wawrzyniec Międzyleski, who, in 1523 was commissioned, together with Jerzy Krupski, castellan of Lwów/Lviv to treat with the Prince of Moldavia in the matter of the refugee boyars.22 Then, the

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bishop was detained and taken captive of by „the insane youth”, Ștefâniță for a couple of months.23

The letter supplies very valuable information about Moldavian matters. The most important first-hand information from Moldavia is that the “Turks would willingly enter into a peace” with the King of Poland, and, they are preparing to make steps in Moldavia to pave the way of a compromise.

The author of the letter knew at the beginning of January in Poland that the Legate was still in the company of King Louis, he probably did not have new information when the talks after Wiener Neustadt in Pozsony ended – the Polish Chancellor left for Cracow on 16 December –, and thus hoped that through Cardinal de Vio he could address his words to the ruler of Hungary as well.24 It is conspicuous that the bishop is thinking in a joint Jagiellonian political sphere since he is talking of Poland and Hungary in particular in the plural, addressing his words to both rulers as “our monarchs” (per nostros reges) as well as referring to the two kingdoms as “ours” (ad regna nostra scilicet Hungariam et Poloniam). One feels the author is consciously treating the two countries as one, as having the same, mutual dynastic interests, expressing that they have to follow the same political track. He is to warn the King of Hungary that the Sultan is to deceive the King of Poland, he is only “holding out a carrot” for him, in fact he is preparing a great campaign at the background. Beyond his designs to invade Italy, at the same time Sultan Suleiman is wishing, augmented with the allied forces of the Tatars and the Moldavians, to lay waste to Poland and Hungary.25

Despite the fact that Turkish troops were very close to the Moldavian-Polish borders, the Sultan did not attack but was satisfied with a demonstration of force. As justified by the letter, based on the bishop’s information from the Moldavian court, Suleiman did not find a two-front war feasible, and beyond floating a constant military threat he was to make a compromise with Poland. However, the text of the letter does not suggest that the Sultan was by any means afraid of the Christians’ strength, not at all of their “useless negotiations”, since their arms “got blunted”. He did not “meet any resistance” at the capture of

23 “[…] per Stephanum Vojevodam insanum juvenem detentus in Valachia”: AT VI. n. 275.; Documente n. 304.
24 Zombori 2004, 324.
25 “turcus eo intendit animum ut non modo ex turcis suum struat exercitum sed etiam ex tartaris de taurica et transalpina quibus duabus regionibus bellicosis dedit […] ex Moldavis confit exercitum ad regna nostra scilicet Hungariam et Poloniam”: BL Cotton MS Vespasian F. I. fos. 15–16.
Belgrade, for months’ time there was “no sword drawn against them”.26 He was not planning any peace with the Hungarians but before making preparations for a great campaign against the Danubian shield of strongholds, he was to prevent any chance of a common Jagiellonian defence and even wished to force Sigismund to ask for a truce himself.

The Hungarian leadership was aware that a great, two-pronged Ottoman attack was to be expected. The bishop was right: a few days after the letter arrived, the Turks set out against the stronghold of Klis (5 February) and, in another part of the frontline, laid siege to Szörény, which was to fall by September 1524.27 The West was aroused by such “bad news”, of which the Imperial envoy in Rome, the Duke of Sessa in no time rushed to let his lord know.28 It was not only Bishop Międzyłeski through whom they learnt of the designs. In accordance with this, King Louis II, more or less at the same time, on 12 January wrote to his Rome envoy, István Brodarics, and informed him that he learnt through envoys and spies that the Turks had already been inciting their allies, the Tatars to invade Hungary in that March.29

The writer of the letter is aware that the peace offer of the Turks was “unsteady and fraudulent”, and it was only a part of a “divide et impera” tactics.30 The only solution could have been an alliance between the Christian coalition with Persia at the back of the Ottomans and the Crimean Tatars, yet the author points it out how “ignominiously” the envoys of the Shah, the Sophi were treated in Moldavia, and, what is more, Voivod Stephen did even declare war against Persia, with which all the chances for a living relationship came into nothing.31 Nonetheless, the “message” of the letter was that at that time, at the beginning of 1523 King Sigismund was still unwilling to treat with the Ottomans, since, as justified by the bishop, he „does not wish to get disjointed from the body of

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26 “Turcus nihil metuit christianorum vires, sive longas et inanes consultationes contra eum nostras [...] Nam cum debellasset et obsidione eingens intercepsset Taurinus seu Albanenander nullam repressionem nullum gladium adversus se vibratum per multos menses vidit.”: Ibid.


29 DF 276 058.

30 “[... ] incerte pacis atque fictae”: BL Cotton MS Vespasian F. I. fos. 15–16..

31 “Oratores autem principis persarum Sophi ignominiose sunt excepti et tractati non enim pacem afferebant sed bellum denunciabant.”: Ibid.
1526 and Jagiellonian Diplomacy

the Church”, which means there might have been a slight hope for a dynastic co-operation. It is to be stressed that King Sigismund, in spite of all enchanting Ottoman offers and the Western aid lagging long behind is not intending to treat for a truce. It seems however astonishing, especially in regard to the former stand the King was for decades taking with the Ottomans: in the rivalry of the Tatars, Moscow, and the Teutonic Order he was primarily concerned to have himself secured from the south. The re-emergence of Sigismund’s crusading fervour might have not been entirely genuine. It might have been deliberately directed to the papal legate, keeping a tight hand over the crusading aids, and, through him, to the whole Curia. The King was to demonstrate it gently that although he does not share Louis’s crusading zeal and would not for the time being take part with all his might in an anti-Ottoman campaign, he is still eager to pay attention to Hungary’s planned campaign as he is still not cut off from the “ecclesia”, i.e. he would neither give up the hopes to receive Western help at all.

The Międzyleski-letter might have induced the Hungarian diplomacy to make an appeal to the Western princes and the Holy See and ask aid again in February 1524 as they learnt of the attitude of the Poles and the circumstances of the Ottoman peace offer towards Poland. In fact the Hungarian leadership did not lay much hope in a reappraisal of Sigismund’s political doctrines and did not expect that Poland would stay within the Christian coalition in the long run. In this situation the Ottomans’ detachment strategy worked well and Poland was pressed into a three-year peace in 1525.

All this strengthened the positions of a – if not always existing, but recurrently emerging – Hungarian ‘peace party’ that set out to reach a compromise. It might be concluded from the reports of the Imperial envoy, Andrea dal Burgo that a possible armistice had a number of supporters in the Hungarian leadership. In the spring of 1523, when the Turks summoned the Voivod of Moldavia to enter into a military alliance and demanded a passage for his troops, the possibility was raised in principle in what way Hungary could apply for a truce. On the other hand, Sultan Suleiman, even amidst the military operations and ongoing sieges might have made informal inquiries about the purposes of the Hungarian court through his envoy staying in Buda from 1521 onwards. Nevertheless, it seems rather unlikely, in addition, does not simply fit into the Turkish politics of 1524 that they come forward with any kind of a peace initiative towards Hungary.

32 “nollet se disjungere a corpore ecclesiae”: Ibid.
33 “[…] princeps presertim intuitus serenissimi Regis Hungariae nepotis sui propter quod totam militiam regni sui movere decrevit ad resistendum vere instanti potentiae turcarum”: Ibid.
35 Andrea dal Burgo’s report to Salamanca, 5 May 1523: KUBINYI 2004, 142.
The Hungarian ‘pro-compromise’ side might have yet found a means to feel out subtly of the Sultan’s designs and it does not seem improbable that they, in informal meetings and secret talks sounded the Ottoman chavus in Hungary. However in July 1523 the Royal Council issued a resolution that “although the Turks suffered great losses in the Rhodes campaign, they are not lacking in strength, and since they have sufficient knowledge of the inner conflicts of the Christians, they will not be inclined to an armistice, what is more, will take even more courage.” Nonetheless, an attempt might have just as well been made to learn of the ‘evil’ designs.

It became clear for the Hungarian leadership that they were only to rely on external help, there was no other choice. Poland was unavoidably drifting towards an Ottoman peace. King Louis already in a letter of July 1524 to Pope Clement VII stressed that the fate of Hungary stood or fell with a peace between Christian princes, for which he was urgently appealing again in July. At that time the King made a last attempt to apply to the Christian princes, the Emperor, the kings of France, Portugal and England and made it clear the situation was acute and the country would not be able to stand out against the Ottoman pressure any longer without financial aid. In his letter to the Emperor the monarch emphasized that the Turks had opened the way in land and at sea to invade the whole Europe, that is, it was also Germany that was under immediate threat now. They are constantly attacking the confines, capturing cities, and “this kingdom, together with our own crown and person could be wiped off and brought to an end”. Louis has still hopes that the Emperor would be more eager for a compromise, but expresses that “the permanent rivalry” of

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36 Andrea dal Burgo’s report to Ferdinand, 3 July 1523: Kubinyi 2004, 141.
the princes is dangerous. The Emperor’s task would now be the protection of Germany proper, which could only be saved through a general, large-scale campaign, embracing the two strongest armies of the Christian world. In this sense King Louis wrote several letters to Christian princes, pointing out that it was now the Empire that was to be defended.

A good insight into Hungarian politics as well as Polish and Ottoman relations in 1525 can be given by the letters of the new legate to Hungary, Cardinal Lorenzo Campeggio, written not only to Rome, but also addressed to his patron, one of the prime movers of European diplomacy of the time, Cardinal Thomas Wolsey, Lord Chancellor of England, Archbishop of York. Their warm relationship started in the 1510s and it was through Wolsey’s intermediation that Campeggio was installed into the bishopric of Salisbury. The legate was staying in Buda as the representative of the Holy See from the end of 1524 to the summer of the following year, and his objective ‘external’ perspective can shed much light onto the workings of Jagiellonian diplomacy. Most of his reports to the papal Curia are known, however, the several times longer dispatches addressed to Wolsey, mainly held in English archives, have not yet been investigated in historical scholarship. When in Hungary, the legate was primarily concerned of the ongoing Polish-Ottoman rapprochement and Hungarian government’s reactions.

In one of Campeggio’s first letters to Pope Clement VII, of 20 February 1525, he asked for a subsidy to raise an even greater number of mercenaries. He expressed his expectations that despite all the clear signs of an approaching
Attila Bárány

Polish-Turkish compromise the King of Poland would not finally abandon the cause of Christendom. In two months’ time he was not so optimistic. He wrote a letter to Cardinal Wolsey, dated the same day, 26 April, of which the latter is more informative. He received news of Turkish war preparations, which, however, would not be feared unless they knew the “treachery of the tyrant”, i.e. the Sultan, with a planned invasion by the “prefect of the East”, the Beylerbey of Anatolia only to provoke the Christians for a counter-strike. However, the Christians should have by now learnt of his perfidy since the Turks acted “deceitfully” with the King of Poland. They made treaties with Wallachia and Moldavia, and they “have sent to and received ambassadors from Poland to treat of friendship”. It is made clear that it was not only the Turks that sent envoys to the King of Poland to conclude an alliance but vice versa, the Poles commissioned messengers as well, the confoederatio was being negotiated in both directions. Here, in Hungary “they fear” the Ottomans “none [the less], because they have received a severer blow from him, while peace or truce was treated for, than during open war”. In other words, in spite of all the peace treaties with Poland and the Romanian principalities, the Turks do in fact prepare to embark on a large scale campaign against Hungary. The Poles do also fear the Turks, but they cannot do anything but accept the terms.41 Campeggio also wrote a report to Jacopo Sadoleto, papal secretary, dated ten days before, 16 April 1525, in which he also let him know of these affairs, though in a less informative way.42

Another new insight can be supplied about the workings of Jagiellonian diplomacy in the mid-1520 through the letters of István Brodarics, the envoy of King Louis II to the Holy See, who was more or less regularly commissioned as a representative of the Polish monarchy as well. There was a ‘last’ cause for which the Polish and Hungarian Jagiellonians were acting in concord: after the battle of Pavia in early 1525 both crowns made serious efforts to set King Francis I

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42 “Re [di Polonia] essa intenderá la praticha et manegio che ha col Turcho […] Radul Vayvoda de Transalpina dicesi essere d’accordo col Turcho, et el simile si dice del Moldavo […] Ha etiam detto cheh Turcho teme cheh suo Bassa qual mando in Oriente, non se levi contra de lui, […] cosa che sarebbe molto in proposito per tutti Christiani”: Relationes oratorum pontificiorum 1524-1526, (Monumenta Vaticana Hungariae historiam regni Hungariae illustrantia), Budapest 1884 [2001], [hereinafter Mon. Vat.] II/1. n. 46. pp.168–9.

146
of France free of his Habsburg captivity. The two monarchies were taking joint steps and Brodarics was charged as a joint ambassador to treat with the Emperor in the regard in the spring. King Louis, having just learnt of Pavia, addressed a letter to Charles V to have the King of France liberated in order to preserve the balance of powers, inevitable for the protection of Christendom. The Polish ruler did neither wish an aggrandizement of Habsburg power that is why he sought for taking the same track with his Hungarian nephew. Brodarics was sent out to meet the King of France in his Italian captivity in Italy, in Pizzighettone and negotiate with him about the conditions of a possible peace. The envoy did let King Sigismund of Poland let know of everything in his mission. (Although we know that Brodarics wrote to the King of Poland particularly of his meeting with the King of France, his letter has not survived.) When treating with the Valois ruler in Pizzighettone, Brodarics was promised that the French would aid Hungary against the Turks in return for Louis’s intermediation to have Francis released. Brodarics was also commissioned by Pope Clement VII, together with Cardinal Giovanni Salviati, Bishop of Ferrara, apostolic protonotary to treat with King Francis and Emperor Charles V to bring forward a truce. Brodarics did in fact bring it to King Francis’s knowledge that if his mission failed and France would not give any help, Hungary was not possible to save, unless, at the price of a Turkish peace. The envoy made it absolutely clear that after the turnover of the political situation following Pavia there was a real chance – if at least for a certain proportion of the Hungarian leadership – for a compromise with the

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45 Brodericus, Epistulae, n. 40.

46 To King Sigismund: Rome, 17 May 1525: Brodericus, Epistulae, n. 43.


48 “Pontifex in facto pacis inter caesarem et Christianissimum regem faciendae ... laborat, delegit eius rei gratia [...] cardinalem Salviati, ad cessarem mittendum. Cum quo consultissimum iudicaret me quoque, qui huius potissimum rei gratia a maiestate domini mei [...] missus sum, illec proficisci”. Brodarics’s letter, Rome, 17 May 1525: Brodericus, Epistulae, n. 43. On 20 May he wrote to Salviati that he was ordered beside him to treat with King Francis by the Pope. Brodericus, Epistulae, n. 44.
Ottomans.\textsuperscript{49} On 10 June Brodarics still hoped that there was a solution since he wrote to Legate Giovanni Salvati that after having talks with the King of France, and treating also with the Emperor’s representatives in Italy, it seemed necessary to meet with Charles V himself, and they both were needed to travel to Spain to see him in person and discuss the matter.\textsuperscript{50} However, the mission to the Emperor was to be cancelled. He wrote in a sad tone to King Sigismund on 4 July that he was not going to Barcelona, and, for which, as he confessed at that time, he did not see any reason.\textsuperscript{51} According to the pope it was because King Louis’s letter arrived late in which he again assured that he wished to see the King of France free, by which time the Emperor stubbornly rejected any talks over. Brodarics emphasized that the mission would have been much useful both for the Polish and the Hungarian monarchs since the peace would have largely helped in bearing the burden of the Turkish war.\textsuperscript{52} What is the most important in regard to the Poles’ relationship with the Ottomans is that the Hungarian envoy might have found it probable that with the possibility of a Habsburg-Valois peace in the near future, the King of Poland would reassess his position towards the Turks.

Even more intriguing evidence is a deciphered \textit{scheda}, a sheet with a few sentences, attached to the letter as a post scriptum. This draws a clear picture of the mobility space of contemporary Hungarian foreign policy and Louis’s chances in relation to a general European peace and a Western financial aid. Brodarics gives up all hope about any compromise between Christian princes. It turns out what hindered him in fact in his work an absolving his mission in Spain as well as shows the reason why the Pope’s stand-point also changed in regard to the Emperor. It is to be made clear there is no chance for a peace, Charles V is adamant, it is not to be thought that he would be at all more compromising in the long run. The solution is to be found in a new direction. The

\textsuperscript{49} “[…] essemus securi de salute Christianae Reipublicae, praesertim ob eum animum, quem certe magnum et excellentem in rege Christianissimo esse animadverti superioribus diebus, dum apud eum essem […] sin minus ego, quantumcunque cogitem, […] non video ullam aliquam salutis nostrae rationem”: Brodarics to King Sigismund, Rome, 17 May 1525: Brodericus, Epistulae, n. 43.
\textsuperscript{50} Brodericus, Epistulae, n. 45.
\textsuperscript{51} Brodericus, Epistulae, n. n. 47., AT VII. n. 72. p.304.
\textsuperscript{52} “Et ego ita certe existimo, Sapientissime Rex, non futuram suisse hanc vel mean vel alterius et prudentioris et maioris me […] illuc profectionem a statu praesentium rerum atque ab illorum principum nunc inter se tractatibus alienam. Non enim dubito Vestrarum Maiestatum auctoritatem, qui soli cum vestris subditis sustinetis pondus diei et aestus, multum potuisse illos monere, et plus quam omnium reliquorum principum auctoritatem.” Ibid.
only way to survive is not to have the relationship towards the Turks depended on a peace between Christian princes. If an opportunity arose, it is to be grasped and make peace with the Turks. Brodarics put it straight and asked Sigismund „if His Majesty would make peace with the Turks, and do not wish the complete overthrow of his nephew’s country, he was not to lose time to have him and his kingdom involved in the treaty.”

All efforts failed however, Charles was by no means willing at that time to take Francis’s liberation into consideration. Brodarics’s expectations in regard to King Francis did alike scatter. It was to be sadly recognized by himself: after the battle of Mohács he wrote how disappointed he was in his hopes about the French aid. He was disillusioned at King Francis’s promise, who he was desperately begging not to leave the Hungarians in the greatest peril. The monarch did assure him he would supply aid to protect Hungary, if once he was to gain his freedom again. Yet, all came to nothing amidst power politics.

Brodarics was not the only one in his expectations for an Ottoman peace. In April–May the possibility did come again to the forefront in Hungary. The King and the government found the situation utterly hopeless. That is why the Hungarian leadership decided to make informal inquiries about a possible inclusion of the kingdom in the would-be Polish peace treaty peace. Poland had by that time advanced in their negotiations. First, King Louis was to sound out how the Ottomans would react at all, through a mission towards the Turkish envoys for the time being present in Poland. An envoy, Johannes Statileo was commissioned to feel out the Turkish stand-point in Cracow and follow the course of the on-going Polish-Ottoman talks. It was also a possibility that a

53 “Interpretatio schedae oratoris domini regis Hungariae per cifram scriptae: Si Maiestas Vestra habet aliquam bonam occasionem facienda pacis cum Turca, fortasse non erit malum, non pendere a spe istius pacis inter Christianos, quae parva est immo nulla, neque credo aliquid secuturum. […] Si Maiestas Vestra faciat pacem, et si non vult extremum excidium nepotis sui et regnorum eius, includendus videtur ipse quoque et regna illius pacem”: Ibid.

54 In 1526 King Louis appealed to King Francis again „[…] regi Gallorum et illud in memoriam reduct, quid sibi in oppido Picziogetone captivus per oratorem suum de defendenda Hungaria et ferendis, si Deus eum pristinae libertae restituisset, sappetiis promiserit”: [Stephanus BRODERICUS] De conflictu Hungarorum cum Solymano Turcarum imperatore ad Mohach historia verissima edidit Petrus KULCSÁR, Budapest 1985, pp.27–8.


56 Also reported by the Venetian secretary Vincenzo Guidoto: István BALOGH, Velencei diplomaták Magyarországról, 1500–1526. Forrásanalmány, [Venetian diplomats on Hungary] Szeged 1929, p.lxxvi.
Turkish envoy would even come to Hungary, as reported by the Papal nuncio, Baron Burgio.\footnote{Burgio, 26 April: Mon. Vat. II/1. n. 47.; Kosáry 1978, 155.}

Although László Szalkai, Archbishop of Esztergom utterly refused the idea of an Ottoman peace, and did even prohibit anyone mention an armistice or truce at all,\footnote{“[…] li quali intendono trattare questo articolo de la pace, de la quale niuno sin qui era stato ardito parlarne, peroche già fu fatta una ordinatione sotto gravissime pene, che niuno potesse parlare di pace o tregua col Turcho”: Campeggio: 8 May 1525: Man Vat. II/1. n. 49. p.179.} others in the Hungarian leadership were not so rigid. Even the papal nuncio, Burgio and the legate, Campeggio were now less rejective about a chance of an Ottoman-Hungarian compromise, as the situation in the West still seemed chaotic after the shock of Pavia.\footnote{Kosáry 1978, 155.} Campeggio, however judged that the situation was even dangerous for Italy itself, since he reported that a Polish peace would make it possible for the Turks to invade Italy in three directions, from Sicily, Apulia and Genova.\footnote{“[…] il Turcho con quel Re et questo la tregua o pace, che verrá ad assaltare l'Italia da tre parti, in Sicilia, in Puglia et in Genoia”: Campeggio: 8 May 1525: Man Vat. II/1. n. 49. p.183.} Burgio at the same time reported that Statileo’s mission did not fail since the King of Poland sent an envoy to Hungary with a proposal that Hungary be in fact included in their Turkish treaty. The nuncio pointed out that the Polish envoy was commissioned upon the wish of the Hungarian councillors, who would have liked to enter on to a peace, but had no courage to bring it forward at the Hungarian parliament.\footnote{“Il Re Pollono manda uno ambaxatore a questa Maestá, et viene per proponere la pace o treuga cum il Turco, la quale il Turco li offerisce per suo nuntio. […] questo ambaxatore sia stato ordinato da questi Signori, perche loro non ossano proponere la pace o treuga cum il Turco in dieta.”: Burgio to Sadoletto: 8 May 1525: Mon. Vat. II/1. n. 48.} This was to be supported by King Louis himself as well, as he abandoned all chances of a Western aid.\footnote{Guidoto’s report of 30 April 1525: Gusztáv Wenzel, ‘Marino Sanuto Világkrónikájának Magyarországot illető tudósításai’, [Sanuto’s reports on Hungary] Magyar Történelmi Tár 8/13/25 (1878), 325.}

Nevertheless, the Ottomans promptly refused any peace negotiations and did reject to include Hungary in the treaty.\footnote{Jan Dąbrowski, ‘Lengyelország és a török veszedelem Mohács előtt’ [Poland and the Ottoman threat before Mohács], in Mohácsi emlékkönyv 1526 [Mohács memorial book], Ed. Imre Lukinich, Budapest 1926, p.138.} In addition, at the Hungarian parliament the lesser noble opposition inexorably refused a Turkish peace.\footnote{“[…] et la nobilita non vive di altro che di la guerra”: Burgio to Sadoletto: 8 May 1525: Mon. Vat. II/1. cxxi.; n. 48.;}

Yet, in this critical situation the Hungarian leadership desperately sought
now to apply to the Turks directly — although the final appeal through Polish intermediation was again rigidly refused by Grand Vizier Ibrahim in November 1525. Nevertheless, even on this last occasion they did not “dare” to send an envoy to Constantinople, being afraid of the protest of the opposition, but to Cracow to the Turkish ambassador present. What is more, they went as far as Pál Tomori, Archbishop of Kalocsa and Warden of the Southern Marches — though it was only allegedly reported — treated with the Turkish chavus, Behram, held in captivity in Hungary, and asked him to write to the Sultan of Hungary’s appeal for peace. Yet, there was no answer. The government was hastily and desperately begging for help.

All this explains why Louis made a last, panic-stricken attempt in early 1526 to ask aid from the West. King Louis and Queen Maria addressed letters to all the Christian princes, and sent an envoy to Charles V. There being no hope for a Turkish peace, all the straws had to be grasped. The government would have even been pleased to get any kind of help. In the autumn of 1525 the Pope sent grain, ammunition, cannons and only 4,000 florins, however, in the bleak prospects they insisted that each ducat would do. The treasury, being arrears with months’ wages, was not able to pay the garrisons any longer from November 1525. In lack of food and fodder, the castle guards left their positions in greater and greater number. Some key strongholds got simply abandoned. The only means available for the time being were the wages Burgio paid for 300 soldiers. Some wardens of the confines did order their troops back from the borders. It was feared that the Turkish forces of the marches would embark on a siege against the key positions of Pétervárad/Petrovaradin or Titel. The pro-compromise side of Croatian nobles, having been floating the alternative of a

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68 “La Maestati Sue scrivirono per hora lettere a tutti li Principi, conforme di quelle che ha fatto Nostro Signore, […] Apresso poi Sua Maestà fa pensiero di mandare ambaxatori […] et per Caesare serra expedito lo, primo”: Burgio, 5 March 1526: Mon. Vat. II/1. n. 85.
71 Burgio: 30 November 1525: Mon. Vat. II/1. n. 72.
72 Burgio: 2 October 1525: Mon. Vat. II/1. n. 68
Turkish truce for years, raised the issue again. Nevertheless, the Turks laid down now new terms: beyond submission and taxation they demanded free passage for their armies through the country.\textsuperscript{73} In October 1525 a commissioner of the sultan was sent to Croatia, charged with tempting the nobles to pay homage to the High Porte in return for exemption from taxation.

There was a last attempt for a joint Jagiellonian action. It is known from a 17 November letter of Cardinal Campeggio, staying at that time in Italy that the King of Hungary was planning to meet the King of Poland “shortly” at Olomouc, where they were expecting Archduke Ferdinand as well. Although we do not know much more of the would-be negotiations, King Louis might have “begged” for another meeting from his uncle to try to persuade him to make another inquiry whether the Ottomans would have Hungary included in the peace. They might have wished to meet with Ferdinand, and discuss what urgent help he could give if the Ottomans refused the Hungarian peace again.\textsuperscript{74} All was in vain, the Olomouc meeting was not to take place, and days before Campeggio reported of his expectations for a solution between the Jagiellonians, on 15 November the King of Poland concluded a treaty with Sultan Suleiman.\textsuperscript{75}

With the separate Polish peace European politics took an abrupt turn. Clement VII decided to send an aid of 50 thousand ducats to Hungary.\textsuperscript{76} As the reports to the Spanish court raised the likelihood of a Hungarian-Ottoman peace and a large-scale Turkish assault into Italy, more exactly Naples,\textsuperscript{77} early in March 1526 Charles V declared that he was preparing to embark on campaign to face the Ottomans. He emphasized that the situation was acute due to the Polish peace that is why he was willing to help with men and money.\textsuperscript{78} Yet the Emperor was more than watchful in financial questions and in practice he was

\textsuperscript{73} “[…] tutti quelli Conti di Croatia volino far liga cun il Turco et farsi loro tributarii. Il Turco li fa condizione di donarli tutti li soi villani che l'have guadagnato per avanti et altri tanti castelli in Skiaovonia di quelli che aquistiranò; ma vole da loro lo passo libero per ogni parte che volino andare”. Burgio: 10 October 1525: Mon. Vat. II/1. 69. p.274., partly to be found in DF 276 094.

\textsuperscript{74} “[…] cum Polonie Regi apud Olmuczum conventurum”: 17 November 1525: BL Cotton MS Vitellius B. IV fos. 210–214.; Letters and Papers Henry VIII, IV/1. n. 1771. It is not published by Theiner.

\textsuperscript{75} Kosáry 1978, 156.

\textsuperscript{76} CSP Spain, III. n. 412.

\textsuperscript{77} CSP Spain, III. n. 363.

\textsuperscript{78} Edward Lee to Henry VIII, Seville, 12 March 1526: “He make the preparation with all spede towards Italie […] bicause He is nowe advertysid of ij great armes oone by sea a noother by lande, wiche the Turc hath mad redie to invade Italie and Hungarie […] He tolde me also that the sáied Turc hathe taken treaux with the Kyng of Poil, but with the Kyng of Hungarie he will none take. Wherfor the Emperour entendeth to help Hym with men and monaye”: BL Cotton MS Vespasian C. III f. 223.; Letters and Papers Henry VIII, IV/1. n. 2022.
to get most assured whether the menace against Christendom was real. In a few days’ time, when asked about his commitment to go to war against the Ottomans, he answered “such reports [of a Turkish invasion] are so often spread, I know not what to believe”. There was no money that could be pressed from Charles, even when the Turks were standing on the battlefield of Mohács. In this it seemed King Sigismund was right: already in 1524, explaining his reasons for an Ottoman compromise, he “foretold” that they could not rely on Western promises and encouragement, since the princes are fighting for others’ lands, they take no care of us and the protection of Christendom.

One of our prime concerns is how the Western powers looked upon the formerly existing dynastic coordination. As Tudor England was one of the two powers supplying monetary aid in fact, I am trying to shed light to the Western attitude towards Jagiellonian diplomacy through English sources. I am interested how the policy-making centres of Europe saw Hungary’s chances of survival after the Polish peace, and how this was reflected in English foreign policy in 1526.

King Louis II wrote a letter on 25 March to Henry VIII, appealing financial aid from the *Defensor Fidei*. We do not have an answer, but on the basis of the Tudor monarch’s letter of 16 April to Pope Clement VII, we might reconstruct the English standpoint. The grief that King Henry felt for the danger of Hungary from the Turks has been increased by the calamities he has most recently heard. England has information of the oncoming campaign of the Sultan. However, the King expresses that he regrets he can give no aid to Hungary “on account of the distance”, and the “present incertitude” existing in Christendom. The latter expression might refer to the fact that the English government received news in April, and even in May that there was still a chance for a Turkish-Hungarian truce. On 21 May the Spanish envoy of the Tudors reported that although he had reliable news that the Turks had arrived to Hungary, he did also receive information through “merchants” that the King of Hungary has already become

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80 “[…] nihil minus pensi habeant quam nostrum et commune rei christianae discrimen”: AT VII. n. 84.; Hopp 1992, 71.


tributary unto the Turk". Returning to Henry’s words, he explains that England being far away from the theatre of war, he is not the one who is to stop “the fatal storm” off Christendom. It is conspicuous that he points out that those princes who are nearer to the threat have not been possible to unite for the cause. He will give an insignificant aid but he is uncertain what the princes to whose kingdoms Hungary is closer are to do. He is to give support but before he wishes to learn of the designs of these princes, how true their souls are, what help they are to give. It seems the King might have referred to Poland and the Habsburgs as the princes closer. It means that the Tudors did not find it impossible that the Polish Jagiellonians would yet enter into the Christian coalition if Hungary was in fact attacked. If so, England made it clear she would supply help to protect her “friends”, in the plural, which might have even included Poland as well.

Parallel evidence is a letter written by Cardinal Wolsey to the Pope, dated the same day. The Archbishop of York is aware of the menace threatening the whole Christendom, which can be fatal if not beaten back by a united front of Christian princes. He emphasizes the same, that is, those princes who are closer do not make all effort against the Turks. These princes, who might have just as include Poland as well, are to take up arms. He asks the Pope to intervene and

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83 “The Legate here sheueth me that he hath certayne A vorde that a greate ost of Turccs ben arrived in Hungaria. [...] Somme saye that the merchauntes have letters that the Kynge of Hungarie is allredie becomme tributarie unto the Turke.” Seville, The National Archives / Public Record Office [TNA/PRO] State Papers [SP] 1/38 f. 160.; Letters and Papers Henry VIII, IV/1. n. 2195.

84 “[...] casum eo magis indolemus, quod non fuerit a Christianis Principibus inter se dissidentibus, ut sepe antea potuit, previsus, et quod in nostra solius, qui longe absumus, manu tam exciosam a Christiana republica procellam depellere neutiquam situm sit. Quid enim Nos soli his Principibus, quorum ex proppingo magis hac in re negotium agitur, vix solide conciliatis, tanto intervalllo ab Hungaria sejuncti prestare possumus? Nullius profecto momenti esset quicquid opis aut subsidij in sublevanda illius regni merisiera a solis Nobis, qui tantum non modo in nostris, verum et amicorum tuendis causis impendimus, impresentia conferretur; incertique quid apud ceteros Principes, quorum preter communem causam hec res propius interest statum sit, videremur parum prudenter nostris actionibus consuluisse, nullaque in re potentes Turcarum apparatus repressisse.” [...].

report if all the rest of the princes went to war as well. If so, England would do her duty.86

England was one of the two powers supplying monetary aid in fact, of 25,000 ducats, which an envoy was commissioned to take to King Louis, however, Sir John Wallop did not reach Hungary in time but after the fall of the kingdom.

The Polish Jagiellonians’ diplomatic position might be investigated through a couple of documents of correspondence between Tudor England and Poland in 1526. Cardinal Wolsey made attempts to learn how strongly the Polish peace was carved into stone, and how firm was the “non-intervention” stand the Polish leadership was taking up before sending the money in practice to Hungary.

In May 1526 there was an unheard intensification of Polish-English royal and diplomatic correspondence. During 11-14 May four letters were issued by King Sigismund to Henry VIII and Wolsey on the accusation of Polish merchants of heresy in England.87 Heretic books were found at the lodgings of Danzig/Gdańsk tradesmen in England, and a Polish envoy, Felix ab Allen went to London in order to ask Wolsey to absolve them of the charge of heresy.88 A few weeks later, the London Venetian ambassador, Gasparo Spinelli also reported that the Jagiellonian envoy, Sigismund’s royal chamberlain arrived and intervened on account of certain Poles who had been condemned for Lutheranism. The whole affair is not simply only about the condemnation of Polish merchants. What is important for our concerns in the report is that touching the news of the Turk’s marching into Hungary, the Polish ambassador “told him [Wolsey] that the King of Poland had been requested by the Turk to make a truce, but refused, unless it were to include his nephew the King of Hungary, which truce was to last five years. The Cardinal said he would await the next letters from Rome as to whether this

86 “[…] intellexi, quantum periculi atque discriminis non Regno solummodo Hungariae, sed etiam, nisi unitis principum animis mature occurratur, universae christianitati a Turcis immineat: […] studio, Regie Maiestati crebro commendare, que ut est christianae religionis amantissima, ita propensionem quanadam Catholico principe dignam in tantis arcendis malis constanter semper exhibet, cuius vires, quum non huismodi sint, quae solae possint tam grandi Turcarum ingruenti turbini mederi, a Vestra Beatitudine certior fieri expectat, quid re vera ceteri christiani principes, tanto exitio viciniores effecturi sint, ipsam principis officii nec defuisse antea, nec impressionia defuturam esse, in qua optima voluntate conabor illam perpetuò conservare. […] si qua in re mea opera his usu esse poterit, haud committam, ut Beatudinis Vestrae monitis, vel me officii immemor fuisse dicar, quod autem ministerium meum ipsa presens exoptat.” Ibid.


truce would take effect. It is unbelievable at the first sight: King Sigismund was asked by the sultan to make a peace, then, he refused the offer since King Louis was not included in the treaty. Wolsey might have had a good knowledge of the 1525 peace between Poland and the Porte, and it is obscure why he would ask it at the Curia whether there was any chance for a peace with Hungary. There might be however a solution. The Venetian envoy might have misunderstood something in the Polish-English talks. The Cardinal could have made inquiries whether the King of Poland would at all be willing to revalue and renegotiate the terms of the November 1525 treaty in the light of the given situation, i.e. as the Ottomans had launched a great campaign against Hungary. Wolsey could have let the Poles know that he disapproved the Ottoman peace and made it clear England would not support Poland further in his conflicts with the Teutonic Order. However, if they were to reassess their relationship towards the Turks, Wolsey might be able to give them financial assistance as they are about to do in the case of Hungary. That is, Spinelli’s words might refer to a new peace.

There was communication between England and Poland in other channels even before May. Chancellor Szydłowieczki wrote a letter to the King of England on 11 June, referring to an earlier request from Henry VIII. The King of England asked for Polish falcons, however, we do not have this letter. The Chancellor promised to send some by way of an Englishman – “James, of the household of the Duke of Norfolk” – present in Poland at that time. The Duke of Norfolk’s falconer was received in Poland with great hospitality and the Chancellor sent the finest falcons, even all of his own. “If the King wishes for more falcons next year, he should send a man at the beginning of spring”. There is also a reference to a certain Philip Bijschow or a certain Joannes de Werden, who “will forward letters to him”. The document shows that there was a regular communication between the two courts. Probably the business of falcons might not be taken literally, it was only, on our opinion, a “cover story”. The two kingdoms contacted informally – a formal envoy cannot be sent out since “officially” Poland concluded a peace agreement with the Heathen, thus, was on the other side than England striving for Christ’s cause. The important thing is that there was an English envoy – a reliable retainer of the household of one of the closest followers of the Tudor monarch – present in England, as well as a number of Polish envoys were to travel to England, did stay in the country in June, and there was a possibility that Chancellor Szydłowieczki would commission others. Felix ab Allen was staying at the English court up until early 1527. These missions are not known

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89 Calendar to the English Affairs, existing in the Archives and Collections of Venice and in other Libraries of Northern Italy, ed. Rawdon Brown, I-III. 1202-1526. London 1864-69, III. n. 1307.

90 TNA/PRO SP 1/38. f. 195.; Letters and Papers Henry VIII, IV/1. n. 2241.; Jasnowski 1948, 8.
to touch the issue of the Turkish war in Hungary, but judging from the fact that the envoys were travelling to and fro just at the same time when Ottoman armies were marching against King Louis II, it seems unlikely that they talked only of heretics and falcons. On 15 June King Henry answered Sigismund about the charges of heresy, though formally he did not mention any other issue.91

The English government wished to feel out the standpoint of the Polish Jagiellonians: if their stand was not inexorably rigid against the Ottomans, there was a way to reassess their position about the crusading aid. A hypothetical assumption is that even further English monetary aid might have been given to Louis II if Wolsey could get himself convinced that the Polish standpoint towards the Ottomans was not irreversible, and Sigismund might have given at least formal support to his Jagiellonian nephew.

Antonín Kalous

Jagiellonian Kings of Bohemia and Hungary and papal legates

The two kingdoms of Central Europe, Kingdom of Bohemia and Kingdom of Hungary, were a target of the Polish foreign policy throughout the fifteenth century. The kings of the Polish-Lithuanian state were negotiating, plotting, fighting to get the respective thrones. The serious attempts came with the Polish or rather Lithuanian involvement in the Hussite wars in the person of Sigismund Korybut, who was operating several times in the Bohemian lands. The first successful attempt, however, was linked to Hungary and the accession of Vladislaus III, King of Poland, to the Hungarian throne as Vladislaus I in direct competition to the Habsburgs. The period of “national” kings that followed the Habsburg intermezzo was, however, followed by the rule of Vladislaus II as King of Bohemia from 1471 and as King of Hungary from 1490. His rule is the most significant trace of the Jagiellonian presence in the two kingdoms. This presence, however, proved to be very short-lived as Vladislaus’ son Louis II at Mohács together with his life lost the two kingdoms for the Polish-Lithuanian royal dynasty, which never recovered in the fight for dominance in Central Europe and the field was taken over by the successful Habsburgs.

These regions drew attention not only of the competing dynasties, but also of the revived papal diplomacy of the fifteenth century. After the schism, the region was attracting papal representatives due to the problematic nature of the political and ecclesiastical developments. In Bohemia, the Hussite wars needed to be checked by the crusades, organized—though unsuccessfully—by papal legates de latere. Even though the papal (and conciliar) diplomacy was then used mainly for negotiation with the Utraquists, the crusading idea revived in the later years of the rule of George of Poděbrady, King of Bohemia. In the case of Hungary, papal legates or other representatives were frequently involved in the organisation of the crusades against the other archenemy of the late-medieval Christianity, the Ottoman Turks. The later wars against George, King of Bohemia, were partially organized from Hungary, with the help of the papal...

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Antonín Kalous
diplomats. When Vladislaus II gained the throne of Prague, the papal presence in the dealings of the region had a long history and the legates, nuncios and other representatives continued in their efforts to solve the troublesome situation between Hungary, Bohemia and Poland.

Apart from the crusade, the main topics of the legatine representation in Hungary and Bohemia during the reign of the Jagiellonian kings were related to the church development in Bohemia and Moravia. First, the attempts to secure peace between the warring kings of Central Europe, in particular in relation to the conflicts of King Matthias of Hungary and King Casimir of Poland on one side and King Matthias and King Vladislaus on the other. When the peace was concluded, the conflicting situation ceased and the activity of the legates was limited to the renewed negotiations about the status of the Utraquist church and its possible unification with the Catholics. These talks were a highlight in the beginning of the 1520s, when the Roman church was threatened by an even bigger problem of the German Reformation. The specific relations of individual legates and nuncios to the Jagiellonian kings might be also observed apart from these two biggest topics of papal diplomacy.

What was the relation of the individual papal legates to individual kings? How did they communicate? What were the problems or matters that were present in their meetings? Could there be a personal relation of these persons as individuals? Such questions arise when we start thinking of the papal diplomats in relation to the Jagiellonian kings. This study will present activities of some of the legates that visited the region in the period of the rule of Jagiellonian kings. It does not pretend to cover all the legates and all the sources, but rather tends to bring forth some of the topics, which illustrate the relation of the kings and legates. Naturally, we might start with Vladislaus, who ruled in Bohemia for forty-five years, the last twenty-six of which he sat on the throne of Hungary as well.

Even though Vladislaus was a Catholic with no heretical inclinations, for a long time he was not taken into account by the papacy, or rather not considered as a legal King of Bohemia. That is why, there were practically no dealings between the king and the papal diplomats of any rank, until he was recognized in the late 1480s; after he became the king of Hungary the contacts intensified, as they were related mostly to the kingdom of Hungary. One such example might be the treatment of the Utraquist uprising in Prague in 1483, when Catholic city councillors were cast down out of the windows of the Old Town city hall. This event stoked fears of a new Hussite war and Pope Sixtus IV

started sending letters to all possible recipients in Central Europe, neighbouring
German bishops and princes, administrator of the Prague archdiocese, and even
to the kings of Poland and Hungary, never mentioning Vladislaus as King of
Bohemia, actually never mentioning Vladislaus at all. What he mentioned,
however, was the title of King Matthias. Usually, in most of the correspondence
Matthias is entitled *rex Hungarie;* in this case he is *rex Hungarie et Bohemie.*
The pope, moreover, wrote to his legate *de latere* in the region, Giovanni d’Aragona,
who was asked to urge the king to fight the heretics, as it was always proper
for him to protect the Catholics: ‘that kingdom of Bohemia, in which he has
so many nice provinces, would not be without danger, if the heretics prevail’.
The legate also learned that the pope wrote to a nuncio *cum potestate legati de
latere,* who should also talk to ‘our most beloved sons in Christ Frederick etc.
and Matthias, king of Hungary and Bohemia’. The nuncio was the bishop of
Città di Castello Bartolomeo Maraschi, who was active in the region of Central
Europe in 1483–1485. The assignments of the nuncio and orator, as he was also
named, were quite clearly stated in the previous letter. When writing to him, the
pope (or the curia) put it into lengthy sentences and nice words, Matthias being
king of Hungary and Bohemia and the ‘kingdom of Bohemia subjected to him’. Vladislaus as King of Bohemia was left out completely, not being mentioned
even in the breve to his father, Casimir of Poland.

Vladislaus became king of Bohemia even for the papal curia only after
1487, when the Czech obedience embassy was finally favourably received by
Pope Innocent VIII, who was not on such good terms with Matthias Corvinus
as his predecessors were. The legates and nuncios, who came to Central Europe
with the tasks to organize peace in the region because of the war against the
Ottoman Turks, were usually sent to the King of Hungary, Matthias Corvinus,
and to the King of Poland, Casimir IV. Before the recognition by the papal

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4 The confirmation of Matthias as King of Bohemia was problematic and the discussions
protracted between 1471 and 1475 (with papal nuncio Lorenzo Roverella and legate Marco Barbo
involved), when Pope Sixtus IV confirmed the election of Matthias on 9 December (cf. Třeboň,
Státní oblastní archiv, fond Historica, sign. 2883).

5 Archivio segreto vaticano (=ASV), Arm. XXXIX 16, fol. 91r–91v, quotes 91r.

6 ASV, Arm. XXXIX 16, fol. 91v–92v, quote 92r, ‘regnum illud Bohemie sibi etiam subiectum’.

7 ASV, Arm. XXXIX 16, fol. 89v–90r; edited by Augustinus Theiner, (ed.), *Vetera Monumenta
Poloniae et Lithuaniae gentiumque finitimarem historiam illustrantia,* Roma 1861, II. p.228, nr.
CCLIV.

8 Attested in Enrico Celani, (ed.), *Johannis Burckardi Liber Notarum ab anno MCCCCLXXXIII
usque ad annum MDVI,* Città di Castello 1906, I. pp.196–198; cf. also Josef Macek, ‘Prag und
Rom am Ende des 15. Jahrhunderts: Zum Verhältnis der päpstlichen Kurie zur böhmischen
Reformation’, in Sabine Weiss *et al.* (eds.), *Historische Blickpunkte: Festschrift für Johann Rainer,
curia, it was never Vladislaus. It is only the nuncio *cum potestate legati de latere* Angelo Pecchinoli, whose faculties and instructions named Vladislaus as King of Bohemia, even if it was in reference to events before the official acceptance of Vladislaus by the papal curia.9

A substantial change was brought about by the new position and title of Vladislaus, when he sat on the throne of the Kingdom of Hungary, as it was even reported by the aforementioned nuncio Angelo Pecchinoli. On 18 July 1490 Pecchinoli wrote from Buda and spoke of public acclamation of the king in Buda (on 15 July) as well as the troubles with the struggle between the Jagiellonian pretenders to the throne: it was believed that Casimir, King of Poland, would make peace and agreement between the warring brothers.10 Vladislaus then became not only the recognized King of Bohemia, but also as King of Hungary the successor of Matthias Corvinus, who inherited all his activities, issues and strives. For the curia, then, Vladislaus is predominantly the King of Hungary.

The assignments and tasks of papal legates and nuncios in Central Europe did not change much after Vladislaus’ ascension of the Hungarian throne. Obviously, the only crucial mission that lost its purpose with the death of Matthias Corvinus was the conflict between the King of Hungary and Emperor Frederick III. Legates and nuncios had much more personal contact and dealings with the king in Hungary than they had before. For example, papal nuncio *cum potestate legati de latere* Orso Orsini was present in Hungary in the time when the jurisdiction of the Roman curia and legatine powers within Hungarian church were reviewed again by the land diets. The king of Hungary was traditionally holding the patronage right of the Hungarian church, which was renewed by the document of the Council of Constance for King Sigismund.11 Another right, or *libertas regni*, was the right to initiate all lawsuits in Hungary and not elsewhere, as would be the case with citing inhabitants of Hungary before the Roman curia.12 Such claims were made in the decrees of the diets in 1440, 1445,

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10 Venezia, Biblioteca Nazionale Marciana, Lat. X 175 (=3622), f. 116r–116v (I am now preparing an edition of the documents related to the legation of Angelo Pecchinoli).


12 On the discussion of forbidding even the appeal, see Erdő 2001, 67–8.
1447, 1471 and 1481 before the time of Vladislaus. An innovation that was brought by the diets of the first years of the reign of Vladislaus was a mention of the legatine powers. All the citations and summoning in various lawsuits to the Roman curia and 'when a legate of the pope comes to this kingdom of Hungary, into his presence' were to cease immediately. The legatine jurisdiction, as it was practiced in western Christendom, was based on the power of the pope to be the judge ordinary in any diocese. Thus, the legate as the direct representative of the pope assumed the same power. Consequently, in the kingdom of Hungary, where the liberty of the kingdom forbade the papal jurisdiction in the first instance, the legatine powers in such matters were also to be dismissed. In 1495, the decree specifically named Orso Orsini: all the cases, which were judged by him, should be brought back to the judges ordinary. The jurisdictional powers of the legates in Hungary were, thus, substantially reduced.

The evergreen among the tasks of the papal legatine representation in the two kingdoms of Vladislaus and his son Louis were the negotiations for a union between the Utraquists and the Roman church. It was handled basically without much interference of King Vladislaus or his son and successor King Louis. Among those, who were more or less actively participating in the talks, were Bartolomeo Maraschi, Angelo Pecchinoli, Orso Orsini, Pietro Isvalies and during the reign of Louis Lorenzo Campeggi and Antonio Burgio. Moreover, it was Cardinal Pietro Isvalies, legatus de latere, who was commissioned to follow the Olomouc matters; matters of disputations between the still more firmly established Unity of Brethren and the Dominicans represented by Heinrich Kramer (Institoris), who actively participated in the disputes and had several of
his works printed in Olomouc. The Catholic city became a centre for discussions between Catholics and the reformed groups from the vicinity.  

Similarly, the topic of the crusade could not be avoided, even though it could have connotations that would not be expected. Basically, all the legates were coming with the rhetoric of crusade in their credentials and especially in their bulla legationis, the main bull which gave reasons for their legations. As kings of Hungary, Vladislaus as well as Louis were expected to fulfill the hopes of the papacy and the Christian world and to be the proponents of the war against the Ottoman Turks. It was true, for example, for the afore-mentioned Cardinal Pietro Isvalies, who even printed his crusade indulgence letters in Olomouc (even with a reference and in fact advertisement to the newly published Clippeum of Heinrich Kramer). After some rest in the last two decades of the fifteenth and the first decade of the sixteenth centuries, the Ottomans started to attack their north-western border again. The transition between Vladislaus and Louis, his son, was on the one hand, uncontested and quite typical, on the other hand, Louis, who was not even ten years old, had to have guardians in his youth. Vladislaus wanted to secure his position on all sides, so he had asked not only the Emperor and the King of Poland, with whom they celebrated the double wedding in Vienna a year earlier, but also the Holy Roman Church and Pope Leo X to be the guardians of the young king. The pope promised to do all he could to help and support his rule. Cardinal Tamás Bakócz, papal legate de latere in Hungary already since 1513, was to be aided in this task by the archbishop of

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Reggio di Calabria Roberto Latino Orsini. His legation, which is accounted by many historians (Setton, Smolucha) and mentioned by Paride Grassi, the papal master of ceremonies—Roberto was sent to Hungary after the obsequies of King Vladislaus on 3 June 1516 in Rome—, however, most probably never happened, as András Kubinyi claimed. Certainly, no local sources are known, that would mention any activity of Roberto Orsini.

The guardianship of the pope was not only crucial for the church in Hungary, but also for the continuous fight against the advancing Ottoman Turks. In this sense, Tamás Bakócz was still present in Hungary; his name was, however, compromised in the failed crusading attempt of 1514. In 1518 Pope Leo X was organizing a crusade that was designed to encompass the whole continent. Four papal legates were sent all around Europe and in this sense the organisation was similar to that of Pope Sixtus IV in 1471, who dispatched five papal legates. Paride Grassi, the above-mentioned papal master of ceremonies, recounted a fascinating discussion he held with the pope:

‘And when I told the pope, why he did not create another legate to the kings of Hungary and Poland, he responded that already for long there is the cardinal of Esztergom [Tamás Bakócz], destined by himself as legate on this matter.

I replied that the cardinal of Esztergom is not a useful legate, because he is of the same nation and a creation of the king of Hungary (regis Hungarie creatura). He does not behave as a legate, but rather as the chaplain of the king, for when he should be, as the papal legate, above the king, not only is he not above the king, but he is below him and in all matters he is reduced as a minor and his minister, as when the king washes hands he passes him towel and during mass he administers peace and the book, what he should not do. And therefore, in these and other things, the legate lessens the honour of the Holy See, because the legate should be above any kings.

And the pope responded that he had learned the same about the cardinal from many others, that he behaves improperly with honour, on the contrary rather with disgrace of the apostolic see, and that he was insufficiently accepted by the nation and little esteemed, wherefore he [the pope] wanted to provide for.

23 Paride de Grassi, Il diario di Leone X, Roma 1884, p.34.
On that I said it would be good, if his sanctity sent there another prelate as a nuncio, who would at the same time provide for a legate, so that the two strongest kings would embark on that expedition against the Turks.

And the pope responded to me that there are no doubts about the two kings, because they daily disturb the pope (papam interpellabant) with various envoys and letters about that expedition, because they are first endangered, if the Turk attacks Christendom.25

One might see, that Tamás Bakócz was not in high esteem with the pope and the Roman curia and as a legate not really sufficient and fulfilling his tasks. As a local cardinal, he had too much association with the king, even though he was not the creation of Louis, but rather his predecessors’, Matthias’ and Vladislau’s.26 The general crusade in 1518 did not materialize and the fight against the Ottomans was postponed again.

Only in the 1520s the situation started to be critical for the república Christiana. New legates and nuncios were sent with the typical tasks of organizing or overseeing the crusade and helping to stop the inner danger of the church, i.e. the advance of the German Reformation, as mentioned earlier. Even though the legates were no longer the great leaders of the crusades in the style of the first crusade and Bishop Adhémar of Le Puy, or even the crusades of the first half of the fifteenth century against the Hussites or Ottomans and Cardinal

25 Paride Grassi, Diarium Curiae Romanae, in Christ. Godofredus Hoffmannus (ed.), Nova scriptorum ac monumentorum ... collectio..., Leipzig, 1731–1733, I. pp.402–4, ‘Et cum dicerem pape, quare etiam non faceret alium legatum ad regem Hungarie et Polonie, respondit mihi, quod ibi esset cardinalis Strigoniensis, ut legatus destinatus iam diu ab ipso super hac materia. Replicavi, per ipsum Strigoniensem non esse utilem legatum, quia cum sit de natione et tanquam regis Hungariae creatora, non se gerit tanquam legatum, sed tanquam capellanum regis; nam cum debet esse tanquam legatus apostolicus supra regem, non solum non est supra regem, sed sub illo et in omnibus regi defert tanquam minor; sed et minister eius, quia lavanti manus regi ministrat mappam et in missa pacem et librum, quod non debet facere, resistet in his et in aliis ipse legatus detractit honoris sedis apostolice, quia semper legati debent esse supra reges quosque tuos. Et papa respondit, quod hoc idem a pluribus aliis de hoc Strigoniensi cardinali intellexit, qui se male habebat cum honore, et ipse dedecore sedis apostolice et quod ille esset malus habebat, unde volebat providere. Desuper dixi bonum fore, si sanctitas sua etiam illuc destinaret unum prelatum tanquam nuncio, qui simul cum legato providet, ut reges illi duo potentissimi venirent ad expeditionem istam contra Turcas. Et papa mihi respondit, quod non esset de his duobus regibus dubitantum, quia ipsi quotidianum papam interpellabant, cum diversis nuncius et litteris super hac expeditione, quia in primo periculo sunt, si Turcos christianitatem petit.’

Giuliano Cesarini, they were still present as observers and representatives of the involvement of the papacy. In the late years of Louis II, it was Cardinal Lorenzo Campeggi, who was present in the Hungarian court as legate de latere and organized mainly the anti-Reformation matters, but also the famous nuncio Giovanni Antonio Buglio, barone di Burgio. He was a nuncio of the new design, an observer and reporter in various matters of the state and of the church, including the struggle against the enemies of the faith. In his case, he was close to the king or even the royal couple and participated in the ceremonial presentation of the Christian forces of the kingdom. A drawing of the structure of the army, which ceremonially left the Hungarian capital a few weeks before the decisive battle at Mohács, for example, documents his involvement. The nuncio’s position is quite close to the king and the central representatives of the kingdom: he (il signor barone) followed the king between Elek Thurzó, master of the treasury, and the archbishop of Esztergom László Szalkai. Only behind them appeared the royal standard; which illustrates the closest position within the royal train. The closeness to the king was crucial for the representation of the papal intentions in the region. The unsuccessful outcome of the campaign is well known and does not need further commentaries.

The crucial position of the kingdom of Hungary in the fight against the Ottomans was acknowledged in the frequent presence of the legates at the Hungarian and Bohemian royal court in Buda. A few examples might illustrate the situations, in which the legates and the king (or the royal couple) would meet. Cardinal Pietro Isvalies, legate de latere, who was mentioned above and who later became the bishop of Veszprém and the protector of Hungary, Poland and Bohemia at the papal curia, was present in Central Europe between 1501 and 1503. In 1502 he was, together with Tamás Bakócz, present at the most significant event of Hungary of that year, namely the royal wedding and the coronation of the new queen, Anne of Foix and Candale. According to the diary


of the frequently mentioned Paride Grassi, Cardinal Pietro was the one, who held the service and celebrated the wedding itself. The Roman diary of Grassi preserved a liturgical order for the ritual, which is entitled: Ordo servandis in sponsalitis regis quem servavit cardinalis Reginus legatus in Ungaria, quando rex desponsavit reginam anno domini 1502.\(^{29}\) Cardinalis Reginus is naturally Pietro Isvalies, who was the highest ranking ecclesiastical dignitary present, surpassing even Cardinal Tamás Bakócz, who was not created legatus de latere yet.

The cooperation of the legate and the king was, however, not always that ideal. On ceremonial level, the meetings of legates and kings might cause problems. Legatine ceremonial was, at the end of the fifteenth century, clearly designed and had rigid rules. The legate was supposed to stand above the king, as even Paride Grassi remarked.\(^{30}\) In 1523, the young king Louis and his queen Mary welcomed at their court in Bratislava (Pozsony, Preßburg) the papal legate de latere Cardinal Tommaso De Vio. After the talks in Vienna and Wiener Neustadt, the court moved to Bratislava, where the Polish ambassador, Chancellor Krzysztof Szydłowiecki reported a meeting of the king and the legate in the local parish church of St Martin during the celebrations of All Saints’ Day. The legate requested to be given the Gospel before the royal couple, which, however, was prevented by the representatives of the land. According to Szydłowiecki’s account it was the pride of the nobles that was stronger and thus no one was given either the Gospel or any other ceremonialia.\(^{31}\) The presence of the legate in the city continued and apart from visiting the local church at important feast days, the legate had dinner with the royal couple after the new pope Clement VII was elected, to prove that the discord in the church concerning the precedence was only temporary.\(^{32}\) Similarly, when Cardinal Lorenzo Campeggi came to Hungary in 1524, he was greeted by the king one mile outside Buda and later had breakfast with the royal couple, before he delivered the speech about his legation to Hungary in the royal council.\(^{33}\)

The position of the papal legates and nuncios in relation to the Jagiellonian kings of Bohemia and Hungary was to a large extent drawn by the official


\(^{32}\) Zombori 2004, 190.

\(^{33}\) Fraknói 1884, 101–108, nr. 32.
position of both the parties. It is difficult to find any sign of personal relations that would prove some non-standard relations. Before the permanent nuncios started to appear on a regular basis, after the system of papal representation went through a thorough restructuring, the legates and/or nuncios were assigned individual specific tasks that reflected general politics of the papacy and its relation to both the kingdoms. From an unwanted king, Vladislaus became the prominent exponent of papal policy in Central Europe and even more so his son Louis. When peace in Central Europe was secured by the ascension of the Polish throne by Vladislaus’ beloved younger brother Sigismund and the agreements of Vladislaus with the Emperor, the main task of all the legates was again the fight against the Ottomans and newly the German Reformation. Day-to-day practice, however, and their presence at the royal court might have brought the church dignitaries closer to the kings and queens on a personal level as well. The available sources represent still a limitation here.
The Holy See and Hungary under Clement VII

Gábor Nemes

The relations of the Holy See and Hungary under the pontificate of Clement VII (1523–1526)

‘The archives of the Roman Holy See can be compared to the mines, where the deeper a miner reaches the richer and more valuable strikes he finds.’

(Vilmos Fraknói)

Due to the scarcity of the Hungarian Medieval documents, which have survived the storms of history, the Hungarian historians have always put great emphasis on the study of foreign sources referring to Hungary with the researches at the Vatican Secret Archives having been in the forefront. Since the opening of the Archivo Segreto Vaticano in 1881 Hungarian historians have studied first of all the registers of bulls and the fonds of the Apostolic Camera, while the study of the briefs as the second type of the papal documents besides bulls, have remained neglected. Although Vilmos Fraknói published most of the briefs issued during the reign of Mathias I (Hunyadi), the sources of the Jagiellonian Age have remained untouched.1

Why are these briefs2 important? The practical demand of creating a new form of correspondence for the diplomatic letters and the confidential measures concerning the state administration instead of the slow, overstuffed Apostolic Chancery often consisting of unreliable persons rose in the chaotic period of

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the Avignon Papacy: this new form of correspondence is the brief. During the fifteenth century the demand for the work of domestic and private secretaries (secretarius domesticus et intimus) depending directly from the Pope further intensified so that the Pope could have direct insight into the content of the letters to be sent out. Initially, issuing the brief was exclusively the duty of the secretaries, who worded and penned them according to the verbal instruction of the Pope. From the beginning of the fifteenth century the Holy See carried out its diplomatic correspondence almost exclusively in the form of brief.

Comparing to the clumsy administration of the Chancery and the Chamber the faster and cheaper expedition of the briefs resulted in the fact that from the middle of the fifteenth century more and more applicants turned to the Holy See for papal license in briefs instead of bulls.

In contrast to the compact series of the registers of supplications and bulls, the briefs issued before the organisational reforms of the Council of Trent can be found in scattered form in the Vatican Archives. Most of the briefs can be found in the archaic part of the archives, i.e. in the so called Armadi. Here, in addition to the registers of briefs and drafts, the legacies of secretaries contained briefs referring to Hungarian – first of all – diplomatic matters (Arm. XXXIX–

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The Holy See and Hungary under Clement VII

The Archives of the Dataria Apostolica contains the documents of those applicants who expected briefs for their applications (Brevia Lateranensia). The Archivum Arcis of the Castle of the Holy Angel keeps first of all the original testimonials of the returned envoys of the Holy See.

Based on the papal briefs and supplemented them with the letters of Hungarian reference sent to the Holy See, the reports of nuncios’ and other envoys’ reports, the Hungarian documentary sources as well as the recent international and Hungarian literature I have reviewed this crucial period in the light of new points of view.

The briefs that I have revealed and published have offered a possibility to review the mentioned three years of relations of the Kingdom of Hungary and the Holy See in the light of the available sources and the recent literature. More than a hundred and ten years have passed since Vilmos Fraknói published his basic monograph about the relations of Hungary and the Holy See and

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11 Mon. Vat. II/1.


13 Gábor Nemes, Brevia Clementina. VII. Kelemen pápa magyar vonatkozású brévéi (1523–1526) [The Hungarian related briefs of Clement VII] (Collectanea Vaticana Hungariae, I/12; Publicationes Archivi Dioecesani Jauriensis. Fontes, studia, 23), Budapest/Győr/Roma 2015.

14 Vilmos Fraknói, Magyarország egyházi és politikai összeköttetései a római Szentszékkel I–III [The political and ecclesiastical connections of Hungary with the Roman Holy See], Budapest 1901–1903. [hereinafter: Fraknói 1902]
the contributions dedicated to this issue since then, have all been based on his work.¹⁶ The result of my research could be grouped into three fields:

• I have outlined the participants of the relations between the two states in the possibly wildest spectre touching also their role in the connections.
• I have reviewed the efforts of the Pope in the interest of Hungary at the different Christian courts.
• I have summarised the role the diplomacy of the Holy See played in the domestic policy of Hungary.

The manifolded character of the relations between Hungary and the Holy See was a result of the diverse role of the Pope himself. The Holy Father, as the ruler of the Papal State, was an active participator of not only the Italian but also the whole European policy and held diplomatic connections with the courts of other countries. A lot of ecclesiastical and secular individuals turned to the Pope as the head of the Holy Church so that he did justice or favour. Since the courts of the Curia were forums of higher instances, a lot of people went to Rome in legal matters. Besides, Rome was also one of the most widely visited places of pilgrimage.

The highest ranking envoys that the Pope could send to a certain country were the legates, who usually were persons of outstanding abilities, experienced diplomats and mainly cardinals.¹⁷ In May 1523 Pope Adrian VI sent the learned Dominican cardinal, Tommaso de Vio to Hungary, who were staying in Buda for almost a year.¹⁸ A new legate, Cardinal Lorenzo Campeggi(o) was appointed in January 1524 and arrived at the Hungarian court at the end of the year after having stayed in Nürnberg and Vienna. He remained in Buda for about half a year.¹⁹ In addition to the diplomatic representation the legates supervised the

¹⁷ Antonín Kalous, Plenitudo potestatis in partibus? Papežští legáti a nunciové ve střední Evropě na konci středověku (1450–1526) [Papal legates and nuncios in Central Europe in the late Middle Ages] (Knižnice Matice Moravské, 30), Brno 2010.
¹⁸ Consistorialia, no. 21, 36, 38.
¹⁹ Consistorialia, no. 43.; Nemes 2015a, no. 7–9, 19–21, 35, 64, 69, 72, 89.
money of the papal financial aid that was deposited in the Fugger Factory of Buda and acted as judges in lawsuits concerning the Holy See. During his stay in Buda, Campeggi lead the discussions preparing the union of the Czech Catholics and Utraquists, tried to mediate in the canonisation of John of Capistrano towards the Pope and managed to persuade the Archbishop of Esztergom: László Szalkai to have himself consecrated to a priest.\textsuperscript{20}

While the legates stayed at their destination for a specific mission and for shorter periods of time, the standing representation was the duty of the apostolic nuncios. The office of the standing envoy’s duty of the Holy Father in Buda was fulfilled for more than three years by Giovanni Antonio Burgio who arrived in Hungary together with Legate Vio in the summer of 1523.\textsuperscript{21}

The operations of Nuncio Burgio were basically determined by the instructions he received from Rome. His primary duty was the diplomatic correspondence and the information provision, so he regularly sent reports (\textit{dispacci}) to Jacopo Sadoleto, who was responsible for contacting with the envoys.\textsuperscript{22} Burgio handed the letters of the Holy See while commenting them according to the instructions of the Curia.\textsuperscript{23} He also maintained contacts with the papal envoys staying at the neighbouring courts (especially with Nuncio Girolamo Rorario having been sent to the Austrian Archduke, Ferdinand) and interfered at the Holy See in the interest of Hungarian applicants.\textsuperscript{24}

Burgio’s reports have not ceased to strongly influence and shape the general picture of Hungary before the Battle of Mohács. It was András Kubinyi, who first observed that Burgio, the papal diplomat of Sicily, was often misinformed by János Bornemissza, the biggest intriguing of the time, so this study also contributes to the study of the reliability of the picture having been provided by the papal nuncio.\textsuperscript{25}


\textsuperscript{22} \textit{Mon. Vat.} II/1.

\textsuperscript{23} Nemes 2015a, no. 7, 35, 59, 89, 106, 141–2, 146, 150.

\textsuperscript{24} Besenyei, Fejedelmi, 122–123, no. XIX/1.; Archivio Segreto Vaticano [hereinafter: ASV], Segreteria di Stato, Principi, vol. 2, fol. 344’.

The Pope might have sent his deputies to arrange any specific matters. He sent two deputies to distribute the supplies having been sent to support the Croatian-Dalmatian frontier: Thomas Niger/Tommaso Negri/Toma Crnić, the Bishop of Trau in 1524 and Leonardo Cresci in 1525–1536. While the latter is known only as a familiar of the Pope, Thomas Niger was an old, experienced diplomat of the Holy See.26

The relations between the Kingdom of Hungary and the Holy See from a Hungarian side showed a very colourful picture: Hungary was represented in the Vatican mainly by Italians who could find their ways easier in the maze of the curia offices.

As the Paragraph 65 of Decree 1514 of Vladislaus II strongly restricted the Hungarian prelates’ travels to Rome, they could not be appointed to be papal deputies. As a counterpart of the papal legates representing the Pope in the country of destination, the Hungarian king was represented in Rome at the highest level by the cardinal protector. During my research I managed to reconstruct the medieval antecedents of the important role of this office in the early modern age.27 One of the most important duties of the protector was the administration of the matters concerning the benefices; he would supervise the ecclesiastic lawsuits and carried out deputy’s appointments.28 After possible antecedents of the fifteenth century (Gabriele Rangoni, Giovanni d’Aragona, Rodrigo Borgia, Giambattista Orsini) the first person having been called 'the


cardinal protector of Hungary’, was Cardinal Pietro Isvalies, a former legate to Hungary and an administrator of the Episcopate of Veszprém.29

After Isvalies the same Giulio de Medici Cardinal Vice-Chancellor, a nephew of Pope Leo X became the protector, who ascended the papal throne under the name Clement VII in 1523. As for his operations as protector we mainly have data of offering benefices and he running the earliest known canonical investigation of Hungarian reference.30

My researches have revealed that after the election of Cardinal Medici to Pope, Giovanni Salviati became the cardinal protector of Hungary. Since in the years 1520 and 1521 he reported about the Hungarian provision at the consistory several times in parallel with his relative, Cardinal Protector Giulio de Medici, it can be supposed that he represented the Hungarian interests as a Vice-Protector that time. Salviati also informed the Pope about the inheritance matter of János Lászai confessor father based in Rome,31 followed the developments of the fights on the Croatian frontier against the Turks,32 the matter of the union of the Czech Catholics and Utraquists33 as well as the developments of the discussions between Poland and the Teutonic Knights.34 To maintain continuous information flow he also ran regular correspondence with Nuncio Burgio.35

It was the Florentine Francesco Marsuppini who served the longest in Rome on behalf of the Kingdom of Hungary. He was a familiar and secretary of Cardinal Tamás Bakócz already in 1511.36 Later, except for some periods of intermission he officially stayed in Rome for more than two decades. His main duty was to deliver the letters from Hungary to the Curia and report about them before the Consistory. Besides, he provided information to the Buda court and

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30 Consistorialia, no. 20.
31 DL 82 653.
34 Ibid., no. 44.
35 Nemes 2015a, no. 7.
Nuncio Burgio. He was remunerated partly by regular provisions in cash and partly – following the contemporary practice – by benefices.  

The envoy of the Hungarian king, who spent years in Rome, was István Brodarics/Stephanus Brodericus/Stjepan Brodarić, Provost of Pécs, who represented the interests of both the Hungarian court and Poland, since the Polish deputy Bishop Ciolek plocki had died. Brodarics appeared at the Consistory several times, where he held oratories before the Pope when commenting the letters sent from Hungary. Sometimes he read out the letter before the body of the cardinals and once he translated the speech of the deputy of the Croatian Ban János Torquatus (Karlovics)/Ivan Karlović Kurjaković delivered in Croatian into Latin.

Besides the Hungarian and the Polish kings he also corresponded with Archduke Ferdinand, and when the Holy Father sent the Cardinal Protector of Hungary: Salviati to Parma, he was also informed about the Hungarian news by way of Brodarics staying in Rome.

When Brodarics was away from office, he was substituted by his secretary Imre Kálnai. The Hungarian legation in Rome employed a special commissioner for running the everyday businesses at the different offices of the Curia, namely Egidio Zefiri, who came from the Amelia Diocese in Umbria. Similarly, an experienced person, Pietro Antonio Berri from Parma became the secretary of the Hungarian legation, who had been the scribe of Cardinal Vio during his legate mission to Hungary.

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39 Consistorialia, no. 32.


The Holy See and Hungary under Clement VII

In addition to the Hungarian deputies in Rome there were several envoys with ad hoc assignments, who were partly the couriers of the Hungarian court, partly pilgrims who were commissioned with dispatching letters to Rome (i.e. István Brodarics’s brother Mátyás, the late Péter Berislav’s cousin, János and István Aczél, Castellan of Pozsony/Pressburg/Bratislava).44

The main coordinators of the money transfers between Hungary and the Holy See both in Rome and Hungary were the powerful Fuggers whose overall European connection network was also an important channel of the information flow. Most of the dues payable for the different benefices arrived at Rome through the Fuggers and their factors often delivered even the bulls. The papal financial aids deposited at the Fuggers served not only the purpose of the defence, but also the costs of the papal ‘legation’ in Buda were partly covered by them.45

While at the turn of the fifteenth and sixteenth century the number of the Hungarian pilgrims to Rome was demonstratively high, it decreased radically in the years before the Battle of Mohács. However, in spite of the Turkish threat, the war in Northern-Italy and the plague hitting Rome, there were some who ventured to travel even in these years, i.e. István Aczél, Castellan of Pozsony (Pressburg/Bratislava), Chamberlain László Kanizsai, Steward of the Household András Trepka.46 The Hungarian confessor fathers provided for the spiritual care of the Hungarian pilgrims in Rome, but during the Holy Year a Croatian confessor also served at St. Peter Basilica, namely Andreas Vrecsevic/Vrčević.47

The ecclesiastical travelled to Rome not only on pilgrimage, but also to find justice, and there were others, who wanted to study. The most famous Hungarian student of the time in Rome was Tamás Nádasdi, the would-be Lord Palatine, who escorted Cardinal Vio during his legate mission to Hungary as his interpreter in the summer of 1523.48 Again others were attracted to Rome by its

44 Nemes 2015b, 494–5.; Nemes 2015a, no. 10, 75–77, 82.
47 Nemes 2015a, no. 102.
vivid, humanist spiritual life: Girolamo Balbi moved here in 1524 and Georg von Logau gained recognition with his poetry amongst the learned men of the Eternal City and he received two testimonials from Pope Clement VII upon leaving for home.

As a result of the new sources the number of the participators in the relations of the two states has grown considerably and the nature and quality of the relations have also became more refined. In the years before Mohács the representation of Hungary in Rome can be considered continuous and full. However, this interest representation did not operate in today’s institutional forms, but it was based on the informal channels of an intricate network of personal connections.

Since the middle of the fifteenth century a key element of the foreign policy of the Papal State was the fight against the biggest enemy of Christianity: the Ottoman Empire. The Holy See offered assistance to the Hungarian Kingdom in its fight against the Turks not only by financial support, but the main motif of the Pope in shaping the connection system of the European countries was the consolation of the different courts with each other to create a single front against the Turks.

In 1526 the Pope sent letters calling for assistance repeatedly to the German, French, English and Portuguese courts. On 1 March 1526 the Pope sent Capino de Capi to Francis I King of France to urge him to assist Hungary against the Turkish threat, but the nuncio rather entered into discussion to create the League of Cognac against Emperor Charles V. Due mainly to the tense political atmosphere in Europe these letters of Clement VII calling for assistance hardly had any results.


The Holy See and Hungary under Clement VII

In its fight against the Turks the Holy See attributed a prominent role to Poland which had tensions with almost all of its neighbours. The Hungarian king Louis II received important role in negotiating peace between Poland and the Teutonic Knights, and the papal legates and nuncios also took part actively in these negotiations.\textsuperscript{52}

His Holiness also interfered several times with shaping the internal political power relations of Hungary in order to rule out political figures causing internal hardships and support figures that were loyal to the Holy See beyond doubt. Although István Werbőczy/Verbőci enjoyed the full support of the Pope, his promotion to the office of the Lord Palatine cannot be attributed to any direct papal interference.\textsuperscript{53}

However, in case of the Chancellor’s office his Holiness exerted serious pressure. He promoted István Brodarics, the Hungarian king’s envoy to Rome to the office, instead of László Szalkai Archbishop of Esztergom, who was presented in unfavourable light in Nuncio Burgio’s reports to Rome who had received this denouncing information from János Bornemissza. At the same time, the diplomacy of the Holy See got into difficult situation, since the Pope would have needed the services of Szalkai in the matter of returning the Czech Utraquists to the Catholic Church which issue had gained importance because of the unification of the radical Picard sect with the Lutherans. So, Clement VII had promised the biretta to Szalkai in case of the success of the confessional union, but later he made it dependent upon Szalkai’s resign from his Chancellor’s office. Paradoxically, the promised biretta was simultaneously a means of motivation and recompense.\textsuperscript{54}

In conclusion, the effect of the diplomacy of the Holy See to the Hungarian domestic policy cannot be considered beneficial. The confessional union failed, due partly to the tense domestic political situation in Bohemia and partly to the unrelenting attitude of Legate Campeggi and the weakened political influence of Szalkai, who, as a consequence of Nuncio Burgio’s denouncing reports and the papal strive to change the composition of the cardinals’ body, was not ap-

\textsuperscript{52} Fraknói 1902, II. 349–51.; Nemes 2015a, no. 98.
\textsuperscript{53} Nemes 2014, 3–4; Nemes 2015a, no. 116–121.
pointed to be a cardinal. On the other hand, István Brodarics, who was weightless in the internal matters, received one of the most important positions of the country: the Chancellor’s office.

Since the end of the fifteenth century, when the Hungarian kings could not fully fulfill their duty of defending the southern frontiers, the dominant political actors of Croatia and Dalmatia – that were under the protection of the Hungarian Crown – the Frangepáns, Péter Beriszló and János Torquatus intensified their own diplomatic activities. After the fall of Nándorfehérvár (Belgrád), Knin and Scardona, Klissza/Klis became one of the most important fortresses, so even Pope Clement VII considered its support as a priority. Following the example of his predecessor Adrian VI, he supported the forts in dire strait with money, corn and war materials. In order to evade misuse he commissioned his own men: Bishop Thomas Niger and Leonardo Cresci with the distribution of the aids. This measure seemed also justified by the fact that the captains of Zengg/Senj: Péter Krusics/ Petar Kružić and Gergely Orlovics/Grgur Orlović, who were always in need of money, tried to better their situation with violent actions in many cases; i.e. they sold the corn having been sent by Pope Adrian VI for their own purse, occupied a Turkish commercial ship in Zara having been under Venetian control and confiscated several benefices of the Bishop of Zengg. An intensive relationship was created between the Pope and the Frangepán/Frankopan family the members of which asked for protection from His Holiness and the Holy See in their difficult situation.

The Papal State offered assistance to the Hungarian Kingdom in its fight against the Turks not only by financial and diplomatic means, but also with its spiritual power. An example of this was that in the Holy Year of 1525, when – because of the Roman plague and the standing Turkish threat – only a very small number of pilgrims could visit the Holy City, the Pope was generous to offer indulgence licenses, thus the subjects of Bernát Frangepán/Bernardin Frankopan, the soldiers of Kristó Frangepán/Krsto Frankopan with a white cross on their chests and the inhabitants of Klissza received indulgence by visiting the nominated churches in the Holy Year.

55 Nemes 2015a, no. 27, 59–60.
56 Nemes 2012, 57–64.
57 Nemes 2012, 64–5; Nemes 2015a, no. 78–79, 99–100.
The Hungarian Episcopate and the Papacy

Péter Tusor

The Hungarian Episcopate and the Papacy after 1526

After the Battle of Mohács (1526) the peculiar but consolidated conditions between the Papacy and the Kingdom of Hungary became more radicalised. In Hungary this was manifested in the almost complete expropriation of benefices by the state. The greatest part of provostries and abbeys were transferred as a pledge to secular, and often even to Protestant owners. In the first half of the sixteenth century the pledging of bishoprics also became general practice (e.g. Győr, Nyitra/Nitra), and some of them were even left unfilled subsequently for years or decades (Esztergom, Eger). The revenues in such cases went to the Chamber. The situation was not any better when there was an appointed prelate at the head of the diocese. He too had to devote a significant part of his incomes to state purposes. It also happened that he did not even come to own the revenues but was merely paid a pension that was determined by the monarch. These developments, together with the practice that characterized the late Middle Ages, represented the clearest case of the intertwining of the (Catholic) Church and the State in Europe. Apart from the Hungarian monarch, who could in this way rely on an internal power base that was free from problems of succession and was solely dependent on him, the most fervent enthusiasts and beneficiaries of the system were members of the local hierarchy. In spite of the economic restrictions, the immediate ownership of benefices from the fifteenth century on proved a considerable advantage for Hungarian bishops. This peculiar state church structure, just as in France, was characterized by a

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1 See Péter Tusor, *The Hungarian Royal Patronage and Supremacy in the Hunyadis’ and Jagellos’ Age*, under publication.

2 The mechanism of the transfer as a pledge and the difficulties of the taking out of pawn on the evidence of the diocese, gained by the Thurzós: Gabriella Erdélyi, *Bethlenfalvi Thurzó Elek levelezése (Források a Habsburg–magyar kapcsolatok történetéhez)*, [Elek Thurzó’s correspondence. Sources to Habsburg-Hungarian relations] Budapest 2005, I. ad indicem.


5 Cf. for example, Helmut Goetz (ed.), *Nuntiatur Giovanni Delfinos (1572–1573)*, Tübingen 1982, n. 30; the earlier editor of Delfino’s reports do not know Fraknói’s edition.
special ideological background in ecclesiastical circles. The main element beside the tenets of Werbőczy, presumably due to the histories of Antonio Bonfini († 1502) and János Thuróczy (†1489), was an ever more emphatic stressing of St. Stephen's traditions. These traditions were associated with the interesting implication, which was only informally voiced but more and more often applied in practice, that after their frequent relocations consecrated bishops were not obliged to obtain the papal bulls to sanction their governance of their new bishoprics. The Hungarian opinion and practice is explained most intelligibly by nuncio Camillo Caetani (1591–1592) to his successor, Cesare Speciano (1592–1598) in his instruction of 1592:

'The root of the problems in Hungary – namely the Holy See do not fill the episcopal sees, moreover the bishoprics are charged with pensions and the prelates call themselves bishops without an apostolic confirmation – is the prelates themselves. They, in order to win their monarch's favour, state that all the dioceses were founded by their king, St Stephen, and their kings are more privileged than all the monarchs in Europe. They, practically speaking, practice a sacred jurisdiction over the bishoprics. What one should demand of them, however, they show respect towards the Apostolic See, for which we have to express the signs of love in many different ways [...]'.

The Hungarian opinion could hardly gain ground even after having sent letters of royal bearer to the Pope after Mohács. It seems, the simple supplicant form remained at John I (Szapolyai), of which the royal granting's term of

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7 To prove that it did not always mean the neglect of the confirmational process, but its peculiar shortening, see the following presented unique interpretation of Kutassy on the validity of the cedula consistorialis.

8 'Di questi inconvenienti, che si vedono in Ungaria, che sua maestà non proveva alle chiese, che gravava i vescovati di pensione d'autorità propria, li prelati ardicono di chiamarsi vescovi senza la confermazione apostolica; ne sono causa l'istessi prelati, li quali per acquistare la grazia di sua maestà asseriscono, che il santo re Stefano di Ungaria ha fondato tutte quelle chiese, et che i re loro hanno azione sopra i vescovati più privilegiata che gli altri re dell'Europa et giurisdizione quasi sacrata. Et meritano sopra id ciò gran riprensione, sebbene per il resto si mostrano molto devoti della sede apostolica et de suoi ministri, et devono essere trattati con ogni sorte di amorevolezza da nostra signoria con lettere in questo ingresso et poi secondo l'occorrenze delle loro venute in questa corte.' Biblioteca Casanatense (Roma), ms. 2672, fol. 84r. See its edition, Joseph Schweizer (ed.), Die Nuntiatur am Kaiserhofe. III. Die Nuntien in Prag: Alfonso Visconte 1589–1591, Camillo Caetani 1591–1592, Paderborn 1919, n. 284. 584–585; as I happened to copy the whole by hand, I will refer to the original. The document was used by Fraknói, as well, however, he did not make the most of the valuable information. – Alfonso Gesualdo (who was
The Hungarian Episcopate and the Papacy

‘collatio’ reduced the value in the Curia’s esteem.\(^9\) Ferdinand I, on behalf of Tamás Szalaházy’s bishopric of Eger, made an exceptional request to Clement VII on 24 September 1527.\(^10\) At the supplication of Pál Várdai’s archbishopric of Esztergom in 1528, there is already the concept of \(ius\) \(patronatus\) and \(praesentatio\), exercised according to the predecessors’ example.\(^11\) From the middle of the century, namely from the proposals of 1550, there are mainly corresponding texts, in which, besides the consolidation of the advowson and the terms of \(elegimus\) and \(nominamus\) and \(praesentamus\), the verb of \(supplicare\) vanishes, since it is exchanged for the more neutral verb, \(rogare\).\(^12\) Likewise, it happened in the royal bearer documents of the late sixteenth century, though, there are some varieties (for example, \(electionem\), \(nominatem\) and \(postulationem\), \(eligeremus\), \(nominaremus\) and \(sanctitati\) \(vestrae\) \(pro\) \(impertienda\) \(benedictione\) \(et\) \(confirmatione\).\(^13\)

In the middle of the sixteenth century Hungarian demands were expanded with one more element. This was the demand that papal bulls should be issued free of charge in the form of annates or other taxes. The payment acquittal was well aware of the details, though, he did not have close relations with the Hungarian prelates) launched the curial campaign against the Hungarian bishops’ anti-canonical practice, in 1589. The description and the loquacious documents of the exceedingly interesting and important case: Fraknói 1895, 275–86; Vilmos Fraknói, Magyarország egyházi és politikai összeköttetései a római Szentszékkel, [Hungary’s ecclesiastic and political relations with the Holy See] Budapest 1903, III. 222–227; Vilmos Fraknói Okleveltár a magyar királyi kongyúri jog történetéhez, [Charter collection for the royal patronage right in Hungary] Budapest 1899, nn. 97–100. (Gesualdo’s letter repeated edition without referring to Fraknói: Schweizer 1919, pp.Xxi–Xxiv, note 3.). Cesare Speciano mentions first the obtainment of the papal bulls, though, his information was indirect. On the effort of the nuncios and the observance of the canons: Fraknói 1895, \(loc.\) \(cit.;\) Fraknói 1903, pp. 259–262; Okleveltár, nn. 101–106; and Natale Mosconi (ed.), La nunziatura di Praga di Cesare Speciano (1592–1598) nelle carte inedite Vaticane e Ambrosiane I–V, Brescia 1966–7, passim.

\(^9\) Archivio Segreto Vaticano (ASV), Archivum Arcis (A.A.), I–XVIII, n. 5243; Augustinus Theiner (ed.), \(Vetera\) \(monumenta\) \(Slavorum\) \(meridionalium\) \(historiam\) \(illustrantia\) \(maximam\) \(partem\) \(nondum\) \(edita\) \(ex\) \(Tabulariis\) \(Vaticaniis\) \(deprompta\) \(collecta\) \(ac\) \(serie\) \(chronologica\) \(disposita\), Romae–Zagrabiae 1863, I, p.628 [n. 860].

\(^10\) Fraknói 1899, n. 74.

\(^11\) ASV A.A., I–XVIII, n. 2453; Theiner 1863, p.598 [n. 817].


\(^13\) See for example the letters of Maximilian I (Vienna, 8 March 1569) – and Rudolph II (21 February 1588) written concerning on different bishoprics: ASV Segreteria di Stato, Principi, vol. 30, fol. 51“ and vol. 44, fol. 80“.
included in the bull of Constance but presumably in the interest of keeping the whole system alive they had not taken advantage of it. The old-new argument was referring to the costs of the fight against the Turks and to the idea of *propugnaculum Christianitatis*. This common denominator was always present in the relationship of Hungary with the papacy in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, and greatly contributed to the evolution of the state church in Hungary, beginning with Constance, when the idea was born, leading to the seizure of the revenues of bishoprics on the grounds of defence expenses.

The idea of the bulwark of Christianity in this case did not prove effective enough. Although it was on account of this argument, constantly and rightfully referred to by both clerical and secular circles, that the papacy, contrary to what happened in England in the sixteenth century and in France in the seventeenth century, did never launch a sweeping attack against the Hungarian state church system that would have made use of solemn excommunication, and time and again, especially during the Long Turkish War, contributed enormous sums towards the expenses of warfare, in the case of the annates it only granted occasional concessions. We are aware of only one case where Rome applied sanction against the Hungarian prelates for their illegal possession of benefices, for which they needed to be given absolution in 1554. Cardinal Medici wrote the following about this:

'I introduced the Hungarian dioceses at the consistory according to the royal nomination; their filling was favourable conducted along with the absolution of the bishops from the canonical threats, owing to their control over their diocese without a papal confirmation…I beg…, that henceforth [Your Majesty] do not let an appointed function in his diocese without a papal confirmation, otherwise it would show a bad

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14 The following extract from Giovanni Morone’s instruction of 24 October 1536 is a descriptive example for this: ‘*Quia regnum Hungariae fuit semper validum propugnaculum et veluti antemurale Christianitatis, ideo iudicavit sanctissimus dominus noster non esse praedictum regnum ob discordiam principum super temporalibus rebus ortam a sanctitate sua in spiritualibus deserendum […]*’ Walter Friedensburg (ed.), *Nuntiatur des Morone 1536–1538*, Gotha 1892, n. 2. pp. 58–9.


example to Christianity and can be interpreted here as a sign of detestation [towards the Holy See].

Previously, Ferdinand I pleaded the fact in vain that the prelates were the head of the country as an excuse for the prelates’ pluralism and the anti-canonical possession of benefices and he made promises in vain of the obtaining of the bulls. The bishop of Modrus, who – owing to the closeness of Venetian territories – was to face an inquisitional process, was saved by the nuncio of Vienna. He insisted that he gave permission to the diocese’s registering due to the prolongation of papal sede vacante and the royal proposal to Rome. He argued that, the removal of the well-operating prelate would create a scandal, followed by more serious problems, such as the vacancies, or the fact, that the bishopric of Győr was still transferred as a pledge for 50 thousand Forints. Nuncio Delfino completely supplies us with those circumstances that stood as viewpoints for making the Papal Curia reconsider in case of the probable application of the canonical punishments.

Already in 1552, there was a separate cardinal part-congregation established for the Hungarian problems. Although, we do not know much about its functioning, it could be regarded as the archetype of the Congregazione d’Ungheria, which operated during the long turkish war. The administration of the Hungarian affairs took place rather in the Congregatio Germanica, yet, the involvement of the Holy Office is out of the question due to the anti-canonical behaviour.

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18 See the report of nuncio Girolamo Martinego (1550–1554) Vienna, 11 June, 1553, which cites the royal excuse: ‘essendo gli prelati membri principali del regno, la necessità era tale, che senza notabil pregiudizio non potevano far’ di meno.’ Helmut Goetz (ed.), Nuntiatur des Girolamo Martinego (1550–1554), Tübingen 1965, n. 120. p.250.

19 His report was dated in Vienna, on 12 August, 1556. Goetz 1970, n. 139, pp.286–90 and n. 136 and n. 138.


21 ‘Intorno alle chiese d’Ungaria sua santità ha voluto, che siano considerate nella congregazione Germanica le cose adotte da vostra signoria illustissima, come si farà per pigliarne poi qualche buon consiglio a gloria di Dio et consolazione di tant’anime, che ivi restano perdute […]’ The curial order to nuncio Caetani from February 1592, Schweizer 1919, nn. 223. 446.
To revert to the question of the annates: the emphasis of the event of *propugnaculum Christianitatis* was only restrained, they made occasional concessions. The question of paying the taxes had a central role already in 1539, when after a long pause, with the conclusion of the Treaty of Várad/Oradea a canonical settlement of the Hungarian bishops’ situation became possible, which had been prevented by the parallel appointments made by King János I (Szapolyai) and the Habsburgs. In 1548 and 1550 the problem’s solution was urged by parliamentary laws and by a legation sent in the name of the country. The main difficulty for Rome was the fact that already at this time a great portion of taxes would end up in the hands of various officers in the Curia. On the other hand, a general exemption would have made a negative example for other national churches. Nonetheless, the balance of the papal state budget was not yet nearly so unfavourable as not to make possible a momentary yielding to the Hungarian demands in 1550.

In 1554, a temporary arrangement suggested by Vienna was made, which fitted both the principle of reservation of curial rights as well as the Hungarian interests, according to which the taxes paid would be directly spent on the maintenance of border fortresses. In the following breve, written by Julius III to nuncio Zacharia Delfino (1554–1556 and 1561–1565) one can read:

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23 The necessity of the filling of the episcopal sees was highlighted by Fraknói, who stated that the texts underlined the ecclesiastical superiority of the monarch and the archbishop of Esztergom. Fraknói 1895, pp.243–4; Fraknói 1903, pp.71–3.

The Hungarian Episcopate and the Papacy

'We are sending Thou these bulls of appointment with leaden seal, accompanied by the register of those demands that are deserved by the officials of the Apostolic Chancery and the Roman Curia, who issued these documents. We enjoin Thou to convey the bulls to the bishops apiece and have them pay their debts, which keep by yourself. [...] We command Thou to give the sum to His Majesty, the king of Hungary or to the one he orders, to devote the fund to those fortresses and bulwarks, which are being built in Hungary against the formidable enemies of Christianity. 25

Ferdinand I, failed in his effort to finalise this arrangement. 26 Concerning the annates, a case-by-case agreement would have to be made in the years to come. This was mainly successful, 27 though, not always. On 12 August 1556 nuncio Delfino reported to Rome that János Újlaki, the bishop of Tinin, who had been already acquainted with his duties for a year, did not want to obtain the bulls since he did not have any hopes of dispensing with the annate. 28 According to the report of Stanislaus Hosius (1560–1561) on 30 May 1560, Ferdinand was complaining that under the pontificate of Paul IV (1555–1559) nobody won confirmation from the territory of his countries. Specifically, he suggested that the annates of the Hungarian bishops should be dispensed with, due to Hungary’s catastrophic pastoral state, since there were barely ten priests in each diocese. 29

On the Hungarian side, they tried in vain to regard the regular concessions as acquired right, even in the late sixteenth century, however, from the middle of the century the demand of dispensing with the annates was a part of the royal

25 Rome, 11 and 22 September, 1554: ‘[…] provisionis sub plumbo expeditas litteras nunc tibi mittimus una cum indice iurium atque emolumentorum, quae propter huiusmodi expeditiones camerae apostolicae et Romanae curiae officialibus debentur, tibi mandantes, ut praedictas litteras ipsis episcopis et singulis eorum ita tradas, ut praedicta iura et emolumenta occasione ipsorum expeditionis per eos debita, ab eisdem exigas caque per te exacta penes te conserves […] – Ungariae regi illustri, seu quibus ille iusserit, nostro nomine consignes, in propugnaculis et munitionibus quae ab ipsius serenitate ad praedicti Ungariae regni ab immanissimo Christiani nominis hoste defensionem extruuntur, impendendam, tibi per praesentes committimus et mandamus.’ Published: Goetz 1970, pp. 20–3, nn. 10–11.


28 ‘…nè pensa di mandare a Roma, perché dice che non ha un quattrino, et il vescovo Jauriense novamente tornato di costà ha affirmato che egli non può sperar grazia circa l’annata.’ Goetz 1970, nn. 139. pp. 289–90.

29 Steinherz 1897, nn. 9. 39.
Péter Tusor

bearer documents.30 Antonio Puteo (1587–1589) warned – in written form, as well – the Royal Chancery to phrase that part of the presentational document, which related to the discharge of the annates, in more of a request nature. He added that the Hungarian prelates, as a sign of their willingness to compromise, should pay the servitia minuta, the well proportioned tax, owing to the officials besides the items of the fixed documentary tax.31

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The question of the payment of the annates coupled with other difficulties of a technical nature. In the system after the Council of Trent, the bishop’s sources of livelihood had to be accounted for and the canonical investigation process had to be conducted in a more precise way. A long series of events show how it burdened the relationships of the Hungarian episcopate and the Roman Curia. On 12 July 1572 Tolomeo Galli, secretary of states, informed Giovanni Delfino, the nuncio of Vienna (1571–1578), of the following:

As far as the canonical filling of the bishoprics, recommended by the Emperor concerns, in the name of that benevolence that the Holy See desires to show for His Majesty, he ordered to summon up those documents and processes that were composed under his sainted predecessor and can be found at cardinal Morone. Yet, I denoted him that these minutes are very incomplete and they do not confirm that their proper livelihood is provided. Neither do they prove that the consecrated priests are of legal origin, whether they meet the other requirements of the Council of Trent and they took their creed in a proper form. As a consequence of all these, his predecessor denied the canonical institution. Therefore, His Majesty must be informed that the process should be conducted again, and the minutes should be sent in a proper issue to enable His Holiness to confirm them without affronting God and a scandal. In such cases, as His Majesty is aware, he acts with due foresight.32

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30 Cf. for example the letters of Maximilian and Rudolph: ASV Segr. Stato, Principi, vol. 30, fol. 51v and vol. 44, fol. 80v.

31 See the instruction left to Alfonso Visconti in 1589. Schweizer 1912, nn. 262. 506.

32 ‘Et quanto alla spedizione d’vescovati desiderata et raccomandata da sua maestà Cesarea conforme a la buona volontà, che ha di compiacere a la maestà sua in tutto quel che possa, ha ordinato che si trovino i processi et le scritture mandate sopra ciò in tempo della santa memoria del suo predecessore, li quali sono in mano dell’illustrissimo cardinal Morone protettore. Ma io ho inteso, che detti processi erano molto defectivi, et che oltre il non haversi certezza del modo, con che potessero sostenersi i vescovi, non constava che li nominati fussero in sacri et nati di legittimo matrimonio et havessero le altre qualità requisite da i sacri canonii et dal concilio di Trento et sopra tutto che havessero fatta come s’usa la professione de la fede, et che questa fu la causa che detto predecessore non passò la spedizione.
Due to the regulation of Pope Gregory, the bulls were issued – if the cardinals of the inquisition had not found the 'signs of heresy' – without repeating the process and free of charge, considering the Habsburg monarch. There occurred some problems in the conduct of the process also in the following decades, especially when the nuncios granted their duties to the prelates. It happened chiefly in the second part of the 1580s under the nunciature of Antonio Puteo and Filippo Spinelli (1598–1603). In 1588, Puteo entrusted Franciscus de Andreis, the bishop of Scopia and working as the auxiliary bishop of Esztergom, with the conduct of the processes of Tinin/Knin, Zagreb, Veszprém, Csanád/Cenad, Pécs, Várad/Oradea and Nyitra/Nitra. Puteo often called his attention not to send the minutes immediately to Rome but to him, since he had to sign them first to make them valid.

Under the service of Spinelli, Primate János Kutassy controlled the canonical process. Moreover, we can find examples to a process, where, on the basis of the regulation, the nominee himself organized a part of it, though, without much success. This part was the avowal of the Tridentine Creed (Professio Fidei Tridentina), which was taken very seriously on the consistorial meetings and
almost in case of the smallest mistake, its repetition was ordered. The nuncios usually complied with their duty, so did Zaccaria Delfino and Cesare Speciano around 1590. Speciano – who was previously the confidant of Carlo Borromeo – charged commission only in case of Vác in 1597, however, he did not entrust a local bishop but the Jesuit Antonio Possevino.

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There were two methods of introducing the Roman stage of the *institutio canonica* – or rather the ‘*expeditio*’, which not only marks the issue of the bulls but it depicts a much longer procedure. Either the representative (agent) of the nominees conveyed the minutes and documents to Rome and gave to the cardinal (protector), or the nuncio sent it over through the papal Secretariat of State. The delivery of the royal presentational documents to the Pope (and to the protector to deal with the case) was normally the task of the imperial legate, however, it happened that the agent organized it.

The reformed conduct of the examinations, the meticulous, circumstantial and expensive obtainment of the bulls caused severe problems, not only in the Hungarian relation but also for instance in the case of the archbishop of Prague. The problem greatly contributed to the fact that the Hungarian prelates persistently adhered to the ideology of the state church, and made even more emphatic the lack of a proper high-level representation in the Curia that would have helped to overcome occasional, concrete problems. They were satisfied with the royal appointment, they neglected their bulls’ obtainment or they wanted to use the ‘back door’ during the process. A perfect example of this is that behaviour, when, despite the nuncios’ prohibition, the Hungarian prelates – besides that they regarded the request and claim for the concession of the annates as an acquired right – did not feel obliged to pay even the tax for the expediting

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41 Tusor and Nemes 2011, nn. 130, 188, 191, 192, 210, 211, 212, 213, 216, 217, 218, 222.
42 Goetz 1982, pp. 46–47, n. 21; and more, *ibid.*, nn. 27, 30, 62, 74, 83, 117.
43 Mosconi 1966, III. nn. 70, 110, IV. n. 15.
44 Mosconi 1966, IV. n. 49.
45 Schweizer 1912, n. 312.
46 *Cfr.* for example Fraknói 1899, n. 80.
48 Bues 1990, *ad indicem.*
The Hungarian Episcopate and the Papacy

the bulls. János Kutassy’s, the bishop of Győr (later primate of Hungary), proposition was conducted without any hindrances on the secret consistory on 23 September 1593, in other words, the *institutio canonica* happened. He had the *cedula consistorialis* sent by his assistant with the explanation that this document proved the authoritativeness of the provision, so they did not need to bother about the complicated office charges of the bull. The ingenuity of Kutassy – which demonstrated his thorough knowledge of the curial inner policy – did not win the appreciation of nuncio Cesare Speciano. The prelate-diplomat could hardly regain possession of the original document from the bishop of Győr, moreover, he could scarcely persuade the bishop that the document, written as a basis of the draft, was not equal to a papal bull.\(^4^9\)

The behaviour of the Hungarian episcopacy put an emphasis on the lack of a Hungarian higher curial representation, which could solve the temporal or concrete problems. Two out of the three agencies – the cardinal protectorate and the royal legacy – integrated into the system of the Habsburg diplomacy, due to the personal union concluded between the Hungarian and the imperial court in 1556. The practical transformation of the *Protettorato d’Ungheria* to *Protettorato degli stati ereditari* caused numerous problems. The protectors, who operated with a more and more precise bureaucracy,\(^5^0\) especially Alfonso Gesualdo, regularly had confrontations with the Hungarian practice and ideology. They decided to face this polemic not only as the emissaries of the doctrines of Trent and as the protectors of the canon law. They were also financially involved in this question, since a particular sum from the tax of the *institutio canonica* was their due (the so-called *propina*), however, the Hungarian nominees were not willing to pay it.\(^5^1\) Nor did they pay, when the protector achieved the concession at the Pope and the College of Cardinals. However, Gesualdo proudly announced his achievements to Rudolph II in 1598.\(^5^2\)


\(^{5^0}\) The canonical registers were preserved in the protectorial office of Gesualdo, and if it was needed, they could search for the eleven year-old documents.


\(^{5^2}\) Schweizer 1912, n. 240.
Péter Tusor

This lack of proper representation could not be compensated for by the relatively modern form of communication with the Curia that was developed in the last decades of the sixteenth century. At this time, between 1573 and ca. 1600, the Hungarian hierarchy had a permanent chargé d’affaires in Rome in the person of the owner of the provostry of Ság, Francesco Diotalevi.

We have scarce information about Diotalevi. György Draskovich mentions in one of his letters that he was Antal Veranchich’s secretary, who accompanied his master to Turkey, as well. In 1586 he was considered to be the Roman chargé d’affaires of the Hungarian prelates. As far as Caetani was concerned, he was in the inner circle of the Curia, however, according to his writings – and other resources’ honorabilis address – he might take only the smaller orders. On 16 September 1586 – probably by Draskovich’s recommendation – after the death of Miklós Telegdy, he won the vacant provostry of Ság. The appointment refers to the services to the Holy Crown, the king and his predecessors as a Roman agent (‘fidelis nostri nobilis Francisci Diotallevi fidelim nostrorum reverendissimi et reverendorum universorum episcoporum Hungariae in Urbe agentis’). Yet, he did not receive the whole benefice, he was obliged to share it with Philippo de Monte (magister capellae Caesareae et regiae), for whom he granted 550 Forints within 4 years. Then, with the assistance of an imperial committee, he paid him up by granting a single allocation of 266 Forint, which could be his one-year income. The compromise of the possession with full power was reached on 23 July 1591. The possible year of Diotalevi’s death is 1603, since the provostry

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53 ‘…qui a multis annis dominis praedatis Hungaris, maiestatis vestrae sacratissimae sacellam Romae inservivit et nunc quoque inservivit, et qui ad latus reverendissimi quondam archiepiscopi Verantii dum Constantinopolis oratum ageret maioribus maiestatis vestrae sacratissimae fideliter inservivit […]’. Draskovich to the monarch on 19 February 1586. Österreichisches Staatsarchiv (ÖStA), Haus-, Hof- und Staatsarchiv (HHStA), Ungarische Akten (Hungarica), Allgemeine Akten, Fz. 116, fol. 28–29.

54 See the preceding note. - László Lukács, in his brief memoir, reckons that his Roman agency’s establishment was in 1568 and his death at the turn of the century. He highlights that he was the agent of the Hungarian Paulines, and in this position he came to a clash with István Szántó, in relation to the Collegium Germanicum et Hungaricum (Monumenta Antiquae Hungariae. 1550–1600, Romae 1969–1987, I. 891, 5. note [n. 344]; II, nn. 254. 274. 344).


56 Magyar Nemzeti Levéltár Országos Levéltára (MNL-OL), Magyar Kancelláriai Levéltár [MKL], Magyar Királyi Kancellária, Libri regii (A 57), vol. 4, n. 484.

57 MNL-OL MKL Libri regii (A 57), vol. 4, n. 479.

58 MNL-OL MKL Libri regii (A 57), vol. 4, n. 625.
of Ság was already vacant on 5 January 1604, moreover the deed of gift, issued to Faustus Veranchich on 18 December 1604, specifically referred to his death.\textsuperscript{59} The latest researches have also dealt with his character, since nuncio Spinelli’s main-instruction of 1598 mentioned his role in the episcopal confirmations. However, Klaus Jaitner – though, he knew about his ‘Séez’ provostry in Ság and his shuttling between Rome and Hungary (he visited his home still in 1601) – in his memoirs, confused Diotalevi with his best-known namesake, with Francesco Diotalevi (†1622), who was the referendarius of the Apostolic Signatura, then a bishop and a nuncio in Poland.\textsuperscript{60} The Hungarian agent could have agreed with such a career, however, his paths were determined by a different way. While his namesake was from Rimini, he was from Fano, according to our sources.\textsuperscript{61} This is proved by our sources, implying that he obtained an \textit{indigenatus} in Hungary: ‘\textit{Quasi procesi li doverà portare a Roma il signor Francesco Diotalleui da Fano, ma modo ungaro […]}’

At present we only have sporadic data concerning his activities. As a secretary to Veranchich, he had on several occasions visited the Curia: made \textit{ad limina} visits, organised the obtainment of bishop’s bulls,\textsuperscript{62} and cooperated in his patron’s appointment as cardinal.\textsuperscript{63} His tasks included similar things in later years as well, and it is mainly on his account that in the years 1570–1580 the frequency of papal confirmations, if not exactly to the extent and with the speed expected by Rome, increased significantly.\textsuperscript{64} The urges of the Curia, addressed to the Hungarian bishops, to send somebody to obtain the bulls, often mentioned


\textsuperscript{60} Klaus Jaitner (ed.), \textit{Die Hauptinstruktionen Clemens’ VIII. für die Nuntien und Legaten an den europäischen Fürstenhöfen 1592–1605}, Tübingen 1984, II. p.568, note 5.

\textsuperscript{61} MNL-OL MKL Libri regii (A 57), vol. 4, n. 625; Mosconi 1966, IV. n. 15 (the quotation is from the report of Speciano).

\textsuperscript{62} See for example, Mosconi 1966, III. nn. 74–83. 117.

\textsuperscript{63} ‘\textit{Itaque cum videretur mibi non sufficere, ut saltem meis humillimis litteris maiestati vestrae sacratissimae gratias agerem, nobilem virum Franciscum Diotalleuium, qui meus in hoc negotio Romae procurator fuit… pro humillimis gratii agendis ad aulam maiestatis vestrae sacratissimae misi. Itaque maiestati vestrae sacratissimae humillime supplico, dignetur ipsum benigne audire et clementissimis oculis intueri. Quod ego per omnem vitam meam a maiestate vestra sacratissima orationibus et fidelibus servititis meis promereri contendam.}’ Draskovich’s already quoted letter to the monarch: ÖStA HHStA Ung. Akt., Allg. Akt., Fz. 116, fol. 28–29. \textit{Cfr.:} Tusor 2005, p.54.

\textsuperscript{64} \textit{Cfr.} Schweizer 1912, nn. 36. 42. 83. 170. 331; Tusor and Nemes 2011, nn. 183ss.
the name of Diotalevi. It happened only in 1593, when nuncio Speciano did not consider him but the so-called ‘Signor Castellano’, as the agent. Furthermore, previously, Speciano put the blame also on him that the *cedula consistorialis* was sent to Kutassy. On the other hand, Castellano’s assistance could only be temporal.\(^{65}\) Besides, not only did Diotalevi represent the Hungarian prelates but the bishop of Passau, as well.\(^{66}\)

The existence of such an agent, often making the way between Italy and Hungary in later years too, was mostly the result of favourable personal conditions: an Italian humanist having links and a benefice in Hungary, who also acquired diplomatic experience in the service of Veranchich, rather than of a consciously planned decision based on a recognition of needs.

Diotalevi’s activities could not hide the fact that direct contacts between the hierarchy and the Roman centre became incredibly sparse in the second half of the sixteenth century. Between 1556 and 1600 not one Hungarian prelate visited the Eternal City, which is rather striking, especially in comparison with the diplomatic surge of the previous decades caused primarily by the struggle for the throne.\(^{67}\)

Somewhat surprisingly, almost no problem was caused by the fact that, in direct opposition to the Hungarian position, the papacy of the age was even calling into question the Hungarian kings’ rights over ecclesiastical benefices. This opinion of the Apostolic See was first voiced in 1539. Its position was openly formulated

\(^{65}\) Mosconi 1966, III. nn. 110. 30.

\(^{66}\) Schweizer 1912, nn. 78. 165. 184 [p.343, note 1.]. 224.

\(^{67}\) Cf r. Fraknói 1903, pp.3–71; Lipót Öváry (ed.), *III. Pál pápa és Farnese Sándor bíbornok Magyarországra vonatkozó diplomáciai levelezései (1535–1549)*, [The correspondence of Pope Paul III and Cardinal Alessandro Farnese regarding Hungary] Budapest 1879, *passim* (his details are processed by Fraknói). Just as additional data. In March, 1543 a legate visited Rome, by representing the Hungarian orders and asking for subsidy, however he was welcomed with a great suspicion, since there was not a hint about Ferdinand in his letter of credence, though, the monarch participated in the Diet of Pozsony/Pressburg/Bratislava. Ludwig Cardauns (ed.), *Berichte vom Regensburger und Speierer Reichstag 1541, 1542. Nuntiaturen Verallos und Poggios. Sendungen Farneses und Sfondratos 1541–1544*, Berlin 1912, n. 132. Prior to 1600, in 1556, the last person from the episcopacy to visit Rome was Pál Gregoriánzci, who organized the confirmations. Cf r. Goetz 1965, n. 24; Goetz 1970, n. 139, pp.289–90; the documents of his last Roman legate: ASV A.A., I–XVIII, nn. 1604ss. – For some important members of the Hungarian episcopate from the second half of the sixteenth century see a new approach: Zsófia Gál-mlakár, ‘Verancsics Antal korának humanista hálózatábán. Vázlat egy kapcsolatháló modelllezéséhez’, [In the Humanist network of Veranchich’s age. Sketch to model a network of connections] *Publicationes Universitatis Miskolciensis. Sectio Philosophica* 14:2 (2009), 115–144.
one decade later. On 4 July 1550, a consistorial decree announced in connection with seven bishoprics (Eger, Pécs, Veszprém, Vác, Nyitra, Zagreb and Tinin) that the bulls should only be dispatched on the basis of a papal disposition (‘ad meram dispositionem sanctitatis suae’), as the rights of the king of Hungary could not be verified (‘de nominatione et praesentatione regis Ungariae nihil constat’). 68 In fact, an extraordinary situation arose in which after the Turkish seizure of Buda the royal archive was also lost to the Turks and since the papal privilege could not be authentically certified, as always in the coming years, the Hungarians could only quote the laws and traditions of the country, and a reference to Constance in Werbőczy’s history. This was hardly satisfactory in Rome’s opinion, especially with regard to the fact that, as has been mentioned, the consistorial documents in general preserved no sign of any involvement by the monarch.

We might not be mistaken if we state that the consistorial decree’s issue of 4 July 1550 was for tactical reasons. It was composed in order to settle the matters, its main aim was to prohibit the seculars from being granted benefices. Two weeks earlier, on 21 June, the papal breve, which appointed Ágoston Sbardellati, bishop of Vác, to the administrator of Esztergom for two years, mentions the Hungarian monarch’s advowson, based on apostolic privilege over Esztergom, 69 moreover, the Curia did not even attempt to enforce its canonical opinion in practice. 70 At the same time, the Roman Curia did not even try to vindicate its position in practice. In 1539 and 1550 the papal bulls were obtained by the monarch’s nominees. The same happened in 1554. Thereafter, the framework of a modus vivendi started to evolve, 71 in so far as the royal nomination was declared in the consistorial documents. The first known example for this was the consistorial decree, which made György Draskovich the bishop of Zagreb on 22 March 1564. 72

During the pontificate of Pius IV (1559–1565) the contours of a modus vivendi were beginning to take form, inasmuch as in later curial documents,

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68 Fraknői 1895, pp.250–5; for the decree which encloses the special annate concession see: Fraknői 1899, 101–102, n. 79; and Tüsor and Nemes 2011, n. 118.

69 The only exception of this could be Esztergom, as the royal rights were exceptionally accepted in the case of primatial see: ‘Cum, sicut accepimus, ecclesia Strigoniensis, que de iurepatronatus charissimi in Christo filii nostri Ferdinandi Romanorum et Ungarie regis illustri, ex privilegio apostolico, cui non est hactenus in aliquo derogatum, esse dignoscitur [...]' Fraknői 1899, n. 77. 99.

70 He tried the observance of the right of spolium. His attempts to gain the bequest of György Fráter and János Statilio, the bishop of Transylvania, were vain. Cardauns, Berichte vom Regensburger und Speyerer Reichstag, n. 106. 217; Fraknői 1895, p.254.

71 The summary of the confirmations and annate minutes from the sixteenth century: Fraknői 1895, pp.250–5; Fraknői 1903, pp.89–90.

72 Tüsor and Nemes 2011, 130; Van Gulik et al. 1923, p.338.
although by no means consistently, the fact of the monarch’s nomination was regularly recorded. The reason must clearly be seen in the strengthening of Ferdinand I’s positions and then in the personal union of the Hungarian and the imperial crown (1556). In the consistorial protocols of the second half of the sixteenth century the formula *ad nominationem Caesaris uti regis Hungariae* certainly occurs for a good reason.73

The papacy was consistent in trying to exert influence, at times in an urging manner, on the filling of Hungarian episcopal sees only through the court of Vienna/Prague.74 The papal diplomacy occasionally made its recommendations of persons to the Habsburg court, for instance, so did they operate in favour of Demeter Náprágy, Pál Baranyay, who finally died in the battle of Mezőkeresztes, the bishopric of György Draskovich in Pécs and the bishopric of Faustus Veranchich in Zengg.75 We have no knowledge of any one canonical institution having been hindered during the sixteenth century because of a debate concerning ‘the right of supreme patronage’.76

Rome did not hesitate to accept the monarch’s patronage in the dioceses under enemy rule and was in fact urging institutions, although not primarily

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73 *Cfr.* Van Gulik *et al.* 1923, 98. 161. 172. 216. 259. 294. 301. 304 (Veszprém, 25 September 1570). 313–314 (Tenin/Knin, 26 January 1571). 325. 326. 331. 338; Fraknói 1899, n. 90. According to Gerhard Hartmann, as he wrote it in his summary, the date of the obtainment of the nominational right over the Hungarian bishoprics by Ferdinand, in parallel with the Kingdom of Bohemia, was in 1561. However, it is not precisely true, but he touches upon the essence. *Der Bischof: seine Wahl und Ernennung*, p.29.

74 A huge amount of examples on this in the reports: Goetz 1965, nn. 88. 116. 120; Steinherz 1897, n. 9; Goetz 1982, nn. 2. 8. 11. 12. 22. 25. 27; Bues 1990, nn. 49. 50. 71. 101. 112. 115. 116. 132. 142. 157. 175. 252. 292; Ignaz Philipp Dengel (ed.), *Nuntius Biglia 1566 (Juni) – 1569 (Dezember). Commendone als Legat bei Kaiser Maximilian II. 1568 (Oktober) – 1569 (Jänner)*, Wien 1939, nn. 75. 106b. 112. 116. 121. 133. 141. 147; Joseph Schweizer (ed.), *Die Nuntiatur am Kaiserhofe. I. Germanico Malaspina und Filippo Sega (Giovanni Andrea Caligari in Graz)*, Padernborn 1905, p. 214 and nn. 115. 174 (Sega’s order to his successor, Giacomo Puteo, in case of which chairs’ filling he should cooperate with the Hungarian chancellor); Schweizer 1912, nn. 46. 51. 84; Schweizer 1919, nn. 96. 284; Mosconi 1966, II. nn. 40. 51, III. n. 31, IV. n. 12; Mosconi 1967, V. nn. 6. 12 (mainly); and Fraknói 1895, 256–274; Fraknói 1899, nn. 84–86. 104–106. – *Cfr.* furthermore, the notes of the consistorial papers. Tusor and Nemes 2011, *passim.*


76 The only – not in relation to a titular see – and well-known refusal was conducted partly due to the nominee’s, the later cardinal Ferenc Forgách, young age, partly due to his ‘heretic’ origin (it is less known). The stories are told by the instruction of Caetano: Biblioteca Casanatense, ms. 2672, fol. 84r; *cfr.* Schweizer 1919, nn. 284. 585; and Gesualdo’s report on 25 April, 1589: Schweizer 1912, nn. 240. 441.
The Hungarian Episcopate and the Papacy

from a pastoral point of view. In his report on 26 October 1572, nuncio Dolfin was for the filling of the episcopal see in Kalocsa, since in this way its suffragant bishoprics would not be without a metropolitan. It was directly stated in the main instruction of Speciano that the monarch should appoint bishops also to the sees in the territory under Turkish rule, since they could function on the Diet with profit. According to the report of 10 August 1592, the nuncio tried to persuade Rudolph to make the appointments, however he was reluctant to comply, due to the fact that he would have had to arrange the payments, as well. The solution was found in the wealthier German auxiliary bishoprics, namely, they received the titles of the sees in the territory under Turkish rule. The nuncio called the monarch’s attention to live up to the unique opportunity that the Pope denied to the other governors, no matter if it was in contrast to the decrees of the Council of Trent. The priesthood in the territory under Turkish rule was re-established in another way, based on the assistance of the Franciscan monks from Bosnia in the sixteenth century. It was of a more decisive and conscious nature.

The Tridentine papacy relied on the Habsburgs and the hierarchies, controlled and authorised by them, in the territory of the Hungarian monarch. The popes regarded the Habsburg House as the main force that could ensure the repression of Protestantism. There are no tracks of the nuncios’ direct intervention in the Hungarian ecclesiastical affairs, they rarely had visits to Hungary, only in case of Diets. They intended to make Hungarian clerics obey the canons and introduce the reforms through the Habsburgs. This is attested to by the interventions they made on several occasions for this purpose in Vienna and Prague, so that Hungarian prelates would not fail to honour their obligations to Rome: to obtain the bulls (which would usually occur after such actions in a ‘collective’ manner); to visit ad limina; to abandon the practice of taking over the governance of their dioceses and using their pontifical insignia instantly after their appointment; to conduct the canonical inspections according to the reform

77 Goetz 1982, 179–180, n. 74.
78 Jaitner 1984, I. nn. 10. 55–58.
79 Mosconi 1966, I. n. 28; see more, Fraknói 1895, pp.262–3.
80 Tusor and Nemes 2011, nn. 116. 175. 176. 177. 208. 209.
81 Fraknói 1903, pp.148–51.; 196–204.
82 In such ‘little’ cases, like the strengthening of the new calendar’s spreading. Cf r. Schweizer 1905, n. 27.
Péter Tusor

regulations, making the obligatory profession of faith and profession of Trent; and finally to obey their obligation of residence.83

Occasionally, we also come across direct influence. In 1587–1588, nuncio Puteo was nearly begging Péter Heresinczy, the bishop of Győr, to send somebody to Rome to obtain the papal bulls – be it Diotalevi, or somebody else. It would have meant to express their respect towards the Apostolic See, otherwise they could have appeared as if they despised the Pope. As a rare exception, the nuncio, by nearly losing his nerve, divulged the ecclesiastical censorships, though, only in words, because he did not like mentioning them. According to his instruction to his successor, he desired to affect the conscience of the Hungarian prelates.84 The canonical legitimation of the Hungarian dioceses’ administration was usually demonstrated in a ‘condensed’ way; in 1560, 1568, 1573, 1578 and 1583. The occasional arrangements became urging necessity due to the repeated vacancies.85

The representatives of the Apostolic See required the assistance of the state power in the introduction of the Tridentine centralisation’s main tools, in the ad limina visit and the report-making. In 1589, the Hungarian bishops were reluctant to obey the order – one of the bishops had to go to Rome to make a report – of Sixtus V and his Secretariat [of State], conveying by Alfonso Visconti. They referred to the fact that they complied with their duties through their agent, which was accepted by Rome, notwithstanding that the permanent residence of Diotalevi – highlighted by the Secretariat – was Rome. Already Puteo dealt with the question, and as he informed his successor, he took the necessary steps not only by the Emperor, but by Archduke Ernst.86

The nuncios were against the manifestations of the practice of the state church’s ideology already in the second half of the sixteenth century, as an example, they were against the prelates’ immediate assumption of the dioceses’ administration after their appointment. The effort of the papal diplomacy, namely that, like the Germans, the Hungarian bishops should not receive royal authorisation for taking possession their benefices, was rejected in the imperial court in Prague. Their explanation was that in contrast to the German capitular election, the royal appointment is a guarantee of the decent and ‘non-heretical’ people’s appointment so the adoption of the German solution was gratuitous in Hungary. They added, if one of the Hungarian prelates does not take possession

83 See the earlier noted reports of the nuncios, concerning the filling of the ecclesiastical sees and the conduct of the processes.

84 Schweizer 1912, nn. 312. 331. 262. 505–506.


86 For example Schweizer 1919, nn. 20. 36. 42 and n. 262, 511; cf. Fraknóí 1903, p.222.
The Hungarian Episcopate and the Papacy

of his benefice immediately after his appointment, he could face a severe financial crises, since the chancery directly gains the control of his former benefice.87

Neither the problems, nor the state role were eliminated, when the Hungarian hierarchy tried to harmonise the canons with the unique local practice, namely, that the ecclesiastical and non-ecclesiastical badges were used right after the royal appointment. It happened that Antal Veranchich, before the coronation of Rudolph in 1572, applied for the permission of the pontifical liturgical badges’ usage – for the earlier appointed bishops – during the service from Rome. He referred to the undue length of the confirmation process and to the scarce number of bishops (in the course of the liturgical coronation process, only the consecrated bishops could participate). Although, the Holy See was not refusal, according to cardinal Galli, the request was addressed late, moreover it should not have been submitted by the primate but by the legate of the Emperor. This case is exemplary, since it proves how much easier it was to refer to the ideology of the state church than to bother with obtaining curial confirmation.88

Finally, we could mention the nuncios’ appeals, in which they urged that, in Hungary, the canonical investigation process should be conducted according to the reform regulations along with the obligatory act of swearing the Tridentine oath and a vow of belief,89 moreover, they wanted the residence commitment to be kept.90

Neither could the influence of the Tridentine papacy on the hierarchy and the state power interfere in the Hungarian system, nor the Protestantism. However, the Tridentine papacy did not manage to undermine the close alliance of clerics and power in Hungary, yet they might not want to do, understanding that it was basically not against Rome and could perfectly function in the repression of Protestantism. Apart from the uncertainty of confessional boundaries,91 the ‘consensual Catholicism’ of Ferdinand I, Maximilian and partly of Rudolph II, and the commencing Long Turkish War, it was mainly this intertwining of church and state that thwarted the immediate introduction of the Tridentine

87 On the cases of 1587 see Puteo’s report: Schweizer 1912, 58–59 (= Fraknói 1899, n. 93).
88 The request of Veranchich, the answer of cardinal Galli, the description of the coronation: Goetz 1982, nn. 43, 56, furthermore 455–456, ind. n. 18.
89 See the sources quoted concerning the difficulties of the conduct of the processes.
90 The situation of the court-chancellor was problematic already at this time, however, in his case the nuncio held out the prospect of the papal exemption. Steinherz 1897, n. 29. There occured similarly a problem with the court-chancellor in 1587: Schweizer 1912, n. 46.
91 These can be traced back the most remarkably in the reports of Antonio Possevino. Cfr. Fraknói 1903, pp.158–95; the latest source on the function of the Jesuit diplomat in Central Europe: John Patrick Donnelly, ‘Antonio Possevino S.J., as Papal Mediator between Emperor Rudolf II and King Stephan Bathory’, Archivum Historicum Societatis Jesu 69 (2000), 3–56.
programme in Hungary. In the state power itself, which was Catholic owing to the dynasty, and on the higher decision making level – for instance, in the Secret Council (Consilium Intimum), 92 or in the Hungarian Council (Consilium Hungaricum) – the Protestant presence was significant. However odd it was, in the appointment of the Catholic bishops, also the Protestant landlords’ vote and opinion was determinate. 93 This explains, by itself, the peculiarities of the Hungarian episcopacy’s behaviour and the moderate enthusiasm towards the ideas of Trent and towards the regulations of the Roman Curia. It was hardly accidental that the modification of the councils’ constitution was the emphasised duty of the nuncio. 94

As long as the state, controlling the ecclesiastical structures and being served by the hierarchy, did not stabilize its confessional nature and did not and could not launch the repression against the Protestants, the Hungarian realization of the program of Trent was not feasible. Efforts made by the papal nuncios and some committed reform prelates, such as Miklós Oláh (archbishop of Esztergom), György Draskovich (archbishop of Kalocsa, later cardinal), Miklós Telegdy (bishop of Pécs) or András Monoszlay (bishop of Veszprém), were all in vain. The results achieved by the Hungarian hierarchy until the beginning of the seventeenth century were rather insignificant: despite the ever increasing efforts only a few secularised benefices had been regained, and only a minimal Jesuit presence established. 95 The new generation of priests was educated practically only in the small seminary of Nagyszombat (Tyrnavia/Trnava), founded by Oláh, complemented by some Hungarian students studying in the colleges of

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92 The incomplete processing of the Habsburg Geheimer Rat monographer: Henry Frederick Schwarz, The Imperial Privy Council in the Seventeenth Century, Cambridge 1943. (I do not intend to cite here the newer results of the sources on the age of, for example Maximilian II and Leopold I.)

93 See for example Tusor and Nemes 2011, n. 221 and n. 240.

94 Jaitner 1984, I. n. 10 (55–58), n. 35 (252–254); II. n. 71 (568), n. 95 (709–710); Zdeněk Kristen (ed.), Johannis Stephani Ferrerii nuntii apostolici apud imperatorem epistulae et acta, Pragae 1944, I/1. n. 2 (9–10). Cfr. more Mosconi 1966, I. n 52; II. n. 37.

95 The detailed catalogue of the pawned benefices: Bues 1990, 418–419, ind. n. 5.
The Hungarian Episcopate and the Papacy

Vienna and Olmütz/Olomouc. Those clerics, who did not become Protestant, from the higher, middle or lower clergy kept their late medieval, renaissance nature until the end of the sixteenth century.

But importantly, with all that said, the peculiar Hungarian state church system was not characterised by anticurialism proper. In practice the Hungarian state church system went way beyond the conditions in France (in one case the papacy took action against the non-canonical use of a benefice exactly in order to set an example for France), but unlike Gallicanism, it was not supported by publications. The reports of papal nuncios, while condemning the abuses, on several occasions highlighted the ‘devotion’ of Hungarian prelates to the Holy See. This again can only be explained in the context of the war against the Turks.

The lack of militant publications could not however obscure the fact that Hungarian and curial opinions were getting ever further from each other. The unresolved situation of the question of the appointment of bishops carried in itself the risk of several potential sharp conflicts, which up to that point had been avoided due to the flexibility of the Tridentine papacy. This, however, could no longer be expected from a more rigorous papacy, thinking exclusively in Italian dimensions. The changes in the traditional system of relations with the Habsburgs in the first half of the seventeenth century, and the developing organisation of missions in South-East Europe threatened with the opening of hitherto unknown front lines. It was so especially because from the period of the Long Turkish War the attention of the imperial court also turned more intensively toward the Balkans.

This became manifested in the ever more frequent conferment of bishopric titles in the area, some of which unquestionably belonged to the Hungarian sphere of interests.

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However, the obtainment of the title of Scopia did not cause any problems, the first hindrance of this nature occurred in 1587–1588, though, it did not lead to a significant tension. Nuncio Puteo removed the profissio fidei from György Zalatnaky, the newly appointed bishop of Roson, and conducted his process. Moreover, as in Prague, nobody was aware of the location of the bishopric, the conduct of this phase of the process, dealing with this question, was entrusted to the nominee himself: ‘presupponendo esso nominato di far poi essaminare costi sopra il restante, che sarà necessario alla validità del processo.’ Nevertheless, the case was blocked in Rome, since they were not convinced that the right of nominatio belonged to the Emperor.99

The gradual increase of the arguments of this nature indicated the decline in the cooperation of crucial importance between the Habsburgs and the papacy in the late sixteenth century, whose consequences the Hungarian Catholic confessionalism’s development, represented by Péter Pázmány, suffered.

Szymon Brzeziński

Dynastic policy and its limits: the Jagiellonians and post-1541 Hungary

Several decades ago the American historian Paula Sutter Fichtner pointed out the limits of the Habsburg dynasticism in struggle for Hungary in the 1540s. Based on the events of 1542, she indicated that dynastic connections of this ruling house, although strong, proved as not sufficient to provide tools to restrain the Ottoman rule in Hungary.\(^1\) Realization of dynastic potential rested upon fragile cooperation of its members. Moreover, the case of Ferdinand I and the House of Habsburg in fight for Hungary in 1542 reflected a general discrepancy of the contemporary rulers, frequently forced to maneuver between interests of the dynasty, own country and depending territories.\(^2\) More recently, a similar conclusion drew Zoltán Korpás in his analysis of the Emperor Charles V’s pragmatic, but not unconcerned attitude toward Hungary and the war against the Ottomans in Central Europe.\(^3\) With reference to this opinions on Habsburg policy I give a brief outline of key aspects of the policy of Sigismund I and Sigismund II August, Kings of Poland and Grand Dukes of Lithuania, toward Hungary in the 1540s.

This period is important for several reasons. First of all, it faced an essential geopolitical shift in South-Eastern Europe as the Ottoman expansion led to the tripartite division of Hungary in 1541. The event caused a significant resonance in the Jagiellonian countries, comparable to the defeat of Mohács. In the following years the division of Hungary and its permanence became even clearer as the attempts to integrate the remains of medieval Hungary and to stop the Ottomans failed. Parallel to that, an eastern Hungarian state came into being, which later became Principality of Transylvania. The key roles in it were played by non-dynastic actors, above all the influential bishop and treasurer George Martinuzzi (known also as Brother George/Frater György) and Peter Petrovics, ban of Temesvár. As Isabel of Jagiellon, daughter of King Sigismund I of Poland, married John Zapolya in 1539, her brother and heir of the Polish-

\(^2\) Ibid., 406–407.
Lithuanian throne Sigismund August in 1543 after several years of postponed negotiations married Elisabeth of Austria, daughter of Ferdinand I. The relations with the Ottoman Empire were based upon the Polish-Ottoman treaty from 1533 and remained stable despite the permanent tensions in the borderland region. Therefore, the Jagiellonians were diplomatically bound to major actors of the conflict in the Carpathian Basin. Moreover, this involved dynastic ties with antagonists in the struggle for Hungary.

Recently historiography largely contributed to our understanding of the process of the Ottoman conquest of Hungary, the Ottoman-Habsburg rivalry and shaping of the Transylvanian state, together with its external and internal factors.¹ I do not attempt to summarize its results here. However, I think there is a need to reconsider some opinions on Polish-Hungarian relations in this period. For example, Janusz Pajewski, author of an impactful pre-war Polish monograph on the Polish policy toward Hungary between 1540 and 1571, blamed Sigismund I for a ‘lack of policy toward Hungary’ and opposed the ‘weak’ Sigismund to Bona, his royal consort, which he perceived as a main author of the Polish policy in Hungarian matters. This kind of dual diplomacy was perceived then as a cause of failure, expressed by the decisions of the 1549 Habsburg-Jagiellonian treaty of Prague.² That view, in somewhat moderated form, was basically shared also by more recent authors.³ A much more balanced approach presented by

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Anna Sucheni-Grabowska. According to her research, the Jagiellonians did not abandon active policy towards Hungary, but were forced to reemphasize their goals by growing importance of Baltic, Livonian and Muscovite issues.7

It seems necessary then to highlight the continuity of Jagiellonian diplomacy. Contrary to widespread chronological patterns, the so-called ‘Jagiellonian age’ in Hungary did not end with the disaster of 1526. The dynasty continued to affect the country after this date – mainly due to the fact that Isabel of Jagiellon remained Queen of Hungary up to her death in 1559. Both her widowhood (as of July 1540) and endangered reign strengthened the role of bonds with the family of origin. That also concerned her son, John Sigismund, who later made use of his Jagiellonian kinship.

Both marriages, that of Isabel with John Zapolya and of Sigismund August with Elisabeth, were parallel political steps and just seemingly in contradictory directions. The marriage of Isabel with Zapolya was a counterweight to the strengthened position of the House of Habsburg in Central Europe. Both contracts revealed an unchanged belief in effectiveness of dynastic policy in securing the country’s and the dynasty’s position.8 In case of the marriage with Zapolya, it proved to be more durable and decisive than many agreements or treaties, negotiated and signed so eagerly in those years by Habsburgs, the Zapolyan (Transylvanian) and Polish sides in order to settle the situations of Hungary.9 However, the situation in Hungary became highly complicated in consequence of the events of 1540 and 1541: the birth of Zapolya’s heir, the death of Zapolya, the failed military attempts of Ferdinand to occupy whole Hungary and finally but decisively, the Ottoman seizure of Buda and central Hungary. Dynastic marriage undoubtedly remained an eligible mean of


211
diplomacy in settling down the Hungarian issues, as revealed by repeated efforts to arrange marriages of the widowed Isabel and, later, of John Sigismund.10 Meaningful remains an example from 1545, when the Habsburg agents spread a rumour about planned marriage of John Sigismund with (intended to be baptized) daughter of sultan, what should have secured the Zapolya’s heir rule over vast part of Hungary.11 Yet, the contest for Hungary with the Ottomans was not to be settled by such means, well-known for European side of the conflict.12 The situation demanded other instruments of diplomacy and statecraft, which could help to meet the changing conditions in the region.

The first major motive of the Jagiellonian policy toward Hungary after Zapolya’s death were the family relations, that is, the fate of Queen Isabel and her estates in Hungary. In the 1540s it remained a main issue in the dynasty’s relations with Hungary, Austria, and Ottoman Empire. As Sigismund I ensured Ferdinand I in January 1541, Isabel’s dowry was then the limit of Jagiellonian ambitions in Hungary.13 Of course it cannot be a surprise at all, but we should notice that the family relations of Jagiellonians appeared as very close, even if we consider the usual courtesy, expressed in correspondence and also keep in mind


The Jagiellonians and post-1541 Hungary

some serious conflicts, which later emerged between the family members because of Sigismund August’s marriages. Things did not change, however, in the relations of the royal parents toward Isabel. She was their beloved child, just as her brother. Significantly, that relation was expressed also in the marriage contract of Isabel. Royal letters to her were full of warmth and care. King Sigismund for many times hurried his daughter to deliver news about her and her welfare — as in June 1539, when he stated that he expected a courier from her for a long time and that is why he decided to send his own with greetings. This was especially apparent in the first months and years of Isabel’s reign in Hungary and was obviously even strengthened by the dramatic events of 1540–1541. This attitude did not change in the following years. After 1541, the royal worries concerned Isabel’s security, revenues and court. The latter was expected to be ‘proper’, that is, corresponding to her royal descent and dignity. The problem returned again and again in the 1540s because of the internal struggle in Transylvania of Martinuzzi and his followers and on the other hand, of Petrovics and other supporters of the Zapolyas. Especially painful for Isabel were accusations against her raised by Martinuzzi to her parents. What is noteworthy, the diplomatic actions in Isabel’s interest were frequently undertaken jointly by her royal parents. This was the case in December 1542, when the envoy of Ferdinand I, Gáspár Serédy, reported to his sovereign that Sigismund and Bona were real authors of Isabel’s policy, carried on ‘ex suggestione regis ac praesertim reginae Poloniae’ — which was, by the way, an answer to the numerous former requests of the widowed queen. Similar views expressed also another informer of Ferdinand, Maciej Łobocki, reporting on the attitude of the Polish royal pair toward the 1542 treaty of Gyalu/Gilău between Ferdinand and Isabel.

Not only Sigismund and Bona tried to interfere the situation on behalf of Isabel. From mid-1540s Sigismund August joined them in these efforts, which coincided with his growing role after he took over rule in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania in 1544. In his letter to Martinuzzi from 1546 he insisted on safeguarding the sister’s security and adequate conditions (meaning proper

15 Biblioteka Czartoryskich w Krakowie (Czartoryski Library, Cracow), Teki Naruszewicza [hereinafter: TN], 56.675, no. 134.
court and financial conditions of the household), that is, he joined the efforts and argumentation of his parents.\textsuperscript{19} As Sigismund August assured Isabel in June 1548, shortly after he succeeded his father, looking after sister was indispensable part of the royal ‘officium’.\textsuperscript{20} He undertook the duty to look after unmarried sisters and widowed Isabel. It meant he declared to continue to use this argument as a tool in his policy. The next years of his reign showed that he was able to use this position in diplomatic mediation between the Zapolyas (Isabel and John Sigismund) and Ferdinand I. That was the aim of the 1549 Transylvanian legation of bishop Andrzej Zebrzydowski who previously already served as envoy in Hungarian matters to Ferdinand in 1543.\textsuperscript{21} The 1549 treaty of Prague between Sigismund August and Ferdinand settled down the relations between two monarchs, among them also the Hungarian issue. It did not mean an abandonment of Hungarian policy and still gave Jagiellonians some possibilities to take advantage of Queen Isabel’s rights, even if her situation actually became a real burden for her brother.\textsuperscript{22}

As Queen of Hungary Isabel met serious difficulties in exercising her power in the 1540s. She remained largely dependent to hostile parties and often seemed to be an object of other policies. Organization of power in the Transylvanian state made it harder to constitute a centre of royal authority with adequate resources, which could be then influenced by usual means. It was caused by the essential role of non-dynastic actors (above all Martinuzzi) and rapidly changing political relations and loyalties.\textsuperscript{23} It was not without a reason that the Jagiellonian diplomacy so constantly insisted on providing Isabel proper financial background to exercise her power. Additionally, the Jagiellonian dynasticism met serious difficulties in the late 1540s originating from the relations of the members of the dynasty. Because of internal conflicts between the members of the royal family (above all between Queen Bona and Sigismund August) and as a result of age and worsening health of Sigismund I the marriages of Jagiellonian

\textsuperscript{19} Biblioteka Kórnicka PAN (Polish Academy of Sciences, Kórnik Library), Ms 221, f.164–6.

\textsuperscript{20} Ibid., f.444–6.


\textsuperscript{22} HHStA, Staatsabteilung Polen, Karton 6, Konv. 1, f.63–9v.; Sucheni-grabowska 1981.

princesses were delayed until 1550s (Sophia) and 1560s (Catherine). That fact influenced the dynasty’s effectiveness in relations with other ruling houses. Death of Elisabeth of Austria in 1545 undermined the Habsburg alliance. Decease of the aged monarch and shift on the Polish-Lithuanian throne made it necessary for the Jagiellonians to renew the alliances with Habsburgs and Ottomans. This need affected their attitude to the Hungarian issues after 1548.

Parallel to that challenges the Jagiellonians noticeably tended to rely on Isabel’s opinion in matters that concerned her and her reign. At the end of 1541, Sigismund I, Bona and Sigismund August stated in the joint mission to Isabel that they wish to help her, but not to enforce anything upon her against her will. As they directly wrote, she should not rely solely on their opinions, as they want to follow her mind.24 This view repeated in the following years.25 It may be considered as an excuse and solely diplomatic trick, which aimed to keep a convenient distance in highly complicated Hungarian matters. But it is equally justified to interpret such words as an evidence of close family relations and careful usage of them in foreign policy. Behavior of Isabel after death of Sigismund I supports this view. As she emphasized to the Porte in October 1548, close family ties will not urge her to leave Hungary.26

Undoubtedly the fate and security of Isabel and her son were a chief matter for the Jagiellonians in their south-eastern diplomacy. From this perspective, an opinion of Jagiellonian ‘withdrawal’ from Hungary in this period seems to be a misinterpretation. It does not mean that the dynasty’s policy did not evolve: in 1541–1542 the royal parents clearly advised Isabel to return to Poland, even if they treated such a decision only as temporary. In the following years, after the failure of Habsburg attempts to regain Hungary in 1542, proven elusiveness of Ferdinand’s promises according Isabel’s future Hungarian domains and – last but not least – considerable military successes of Ottoman armies in the Carpathian Basin, the main goal of the Jagiellonians was to prevent an internal conflict in Transylvania and strengthen the position of the new country in order to avoid further Ottoman expansion in the region. A plan to send Isabel back to Poland appeared again in 1548, but it was not initiated by the Jagiellonians.

24  Joint legation of Sigismund I, Sigismund August and Bona to Isabel, 25 November 1541, Ossol., Ms 179/II, f.197–198v; TN, 58.381–4., no. 86.
25  See: Teki Górskiego, 23.13–14v (legation of Sigismund I to Isabel, 16 August 1542), 35 (March 1543), 96v–97v (Sigismund’s answer to the legation from Isabel, in June 1543, concerning her doubts whether to stay in Transylvania or leave the country).
Another question is, what use the dynasty made out of the family ties. It is noteworthy to examine the arguments by which the royal policy tried to explain key decisions. In correspondence with political actors outside the family, the responsibilities emerging from valid alliances, above all with the Ottomans, dominated the family’s duties. The cautious attitude of King Sigismund, characteristic also for his earlier policy toward Hungary, was present after Isabel’s marriage as well. In January 1540 in the letter to Piotr Knita, the voivode of Cracow, he distinguished that in the Hungarian question there were ‘public’ and ‘private matters’. He declared the ‘public’ ones as more important in making decisions. However, at that time, the king concentrated on ‘private matter’, that is, securing Isabel’s property in Hungary and declared his readiness to abandon serious plans in his Hungarian policy. After Zapolya’s death the king constantly refused to help militarily (as in a letter from 13th August 1540 to Petrovics and Martinuzzi). As he repeatedly described his situation, using a phrase by Plautus from Erasmian Adagia, he found himself ‘between the shrine and the stone’. In a letter to Hungarian lords loyal to Isabel at the beginning of 1541 he used threats from Muscovy and Tatars as an excuse. ‘It is easy to start the war’ – claimed Sigismund – ‘but it is hard to finish it’. A major reason behind this policy was the will to maintain peaceful relations with the sultan. On the other hand, Sigismund was well aware of his duties toward daughter and grandson, as he expressed his doubts in the aforementioned letter to senators, asking them for advice in August 1540. The ‘public’ prevailed in the king’s argumentation for the Emperor Charles V from 5 October 1540: ‘Dear is our daughter to us, dear is her son, but dearer is the good and peace of the Christian commonwealth’. Such declarations were rather rhetoric, as the Jagiellonian diplomacy served both goals: to secure a possibly best and

27 Ossol., Ms 179/II, f.36v–38; TN, 57.4–5, no. 2.
28 Sigismund I to Ferdinand I, 10 January 1540, Ossol., Ms 179/II, f.40v–41.
29 AGAD, LL, vol. 9, f.9v–11 (Tóth 2003, no. 146); TN, 57.455–7, no. 121.
31 Ossol., Ms 179/II, f.46.
firm position for the family and to keep as large part of Hungary out of direct
Ottoman authority as possible.

In decisive for Hungary the early 1540s and in the following period as well the
Jagiellonian diplomacy had indeed dual character. This dualism, however,
should not be described through diversity of policies (‘active’ Bona vs. ‘weak’
or ‘lukewarm’ Sigismund), but as dualism of principles of dynastic policy and
pragmatic approach. Nevertheless, the dynastic (‘private’) goals were interrelated
with those defined as ‘public’, state interests. Separating or opposing them
according to modern patterns would be artificial. The royal diplomacy used
both arguments, depending on the recipient. I suggest then to be very careful
in applying the modern idea of the ‘reason of state’ to this policy. It had much
more common with classical understanding of this idea and with a type of ruler
promoted by Erasmus. Therefore, it is more useful to consider this policy as
cautious continuation, a careful and tactic ‘appeasement’, as a matter of fact, an
effect of so carefully maintained relations of Jagiellonians with the Ottoman
Empire. Jagiellonian aim was not to act directly, not to be burdened by rule over
Hungary but simultaneously to prevent negative trends there: extending zone
of instability and further Ottoman expansion, highly unfavourable for Polish
and Lithuanian domains.34 They accomplished this general goal. Paradoxically,
the difficult situation in the Carpathian Basin, an effect of a policy realized by
mainly dynastic means had to be solved by consciously restrained dynasticism.
The Jagiellonians used the advantages of dynastic ties, but were well aware of
their limitations. The European dynasticism met difficulties in confrontation
with the Porte. In contrary to failed Habsburg attempts to control whole
Hungary, sovereigns from Cracow and Vilnius were able to earlier realize this
limits and concentrated to save what can be saved. Nevertheless, Hungary should
not be seen solely as an ‘obstacle’ in the Jagiellonian policy. The engagement of
the dynasty still made it possible to save at least some chances to play a role in
the Carpathian Basin, all that in extremely unfavourable circumstances.

34 See: Teréz Oborní and Szabolcs Varga, ‘Peace as the Basis of Power in the courts of Wladislaw
II of Jagiellon and John I of Szapolyai’, in Arno Strohmeyer and Norbert Spannenberger
## Abbreviations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AGAD. LL</td>
<td>Archiwum Główne Akt Dawnych w Warszawie Zbiór Dokumentów pergaminowych. Libri Legationum</td>
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<td>ANF</td>
<td>Archives nationales (France), Paris</td>
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<td>ASF AA</td>
<td>Archivio Segreto Vaticano. Archivum Arcis</td>
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<td>ASM. A.D.S.</td>
<td>Archivio di Stato di Milano. Archivio Ducale Sforzesco</td>
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<td>BL</td>
<td>British Library, London</td>
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<tr>
<td>BnF</td>
<td>BNF – Bibliothèque nationale de France, Paris</td>
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<tr>
<td>BAV</td>
<td>Bibliotheca Apostolica Vaticana</td>
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<tr>
<td>CESDQ</td>
<td><em>Codex Epistolaris Saeculi Decimi Quinti</em></td>
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<tr>
<td>Documente</td>
<td>Documente privitoare la istoria Românilor. 1510–1530. Culese, adnotate și publicate de Nic. Densușianu. București, 1892. (Documente privitoare la istoria Românilor culese de Eudoxiu de Hurmuzaki, II/3.)</td>
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<tr>
<td>DF</td>
<td>Magyar Nemzeti Levéltár, Országos Levéltár, Diplomatikai Fényképgyűjtemény</td>
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<td>DL</td>
<td>Magyar Nemzeti Levéltár, Országos Levéltár, Diplomatikai Levéltár</td>
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<td>Eubel, Hierarchia</td>
<td>Conrad EUBEL et al., Hierarchia catholica medii aevi, sive Summorum Pontificum, S. R. E. cardinalium, ecclesiarium antistitum series ab anno 1198 usque ad annum perducta e documenta tabularii praesertim Vaticani collecta, digesta, I-III. Monasterii 1913-23)</td>
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<tr>
<td>HHStA</td>
<td>Haus-, Hof- und Staatsarchiv des Österreichischen Staatsarchivs, Wien</td>
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<tr>
<td>Index</td>
<td>Index actorum Romanorum pontificum ab Innocentio III ad Martinum V electum, Citta del Vaticano 1975-2003.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Letters and Papers
Henry VIII

Itineraria

Katona, Historia critica

MDE

Mon.Vat.
Relationes oratorum pontificiorum. Magyarországi pápai követek jelentései 1524-1526. (Monumenta Vaticana Hungariae historiam regni Hungariae illustrantia. Vatikáni Magyar Okirattár, Series 2, t. 1.) (Budapest 1884 [2001])

MNL OL
Magyar Nemzeti Levéltár, Országos Levéltár

OBA
Ordensbriefarchiv, Geheimes Staatsarchiv Preußischer Kulturbesitz, Berlin

MTT
Magyar Történelmi Tár

Óváry I.

RI

220
RGS

*Rerum Germanicarum Scriptores*

Rymer, Foedera


TNA/PRO

Public Record Office / The National Archives, Kew, Surrey, England

Sanuto


Simonyi, Ogmánytár


Sigismundus


SZ

Századok

Theiner, VMHH


Theiner, Vetera monumenta Slavorum

Theiner, Augustinus

Vetera monumenta Poloniae et Lithuaniae gentiumque finitimarum historiam illustrantia, maximam partem nondum edita, ex tabulariis vaticanis deprompta, collecta, ac serie chronologica dioposita, I–IV. ed. Romae 1864.

TSZ

Történelmi Szemle

ZsO

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INDEX

Adrian VI, Pope (1522-1523) – 140, 174, 182
Alaeddin/Alaettin (Ali) Çelebi, Ottoman Mufti (†1496) – 104
Albert of Habsburg, Archduke of Austria, King of Hungary and Bohemia (1437/38-39), elected King of the Romans (as Albert II, 1438-39) – 15, 52
Adhémar of Le Puy/Monteil, Bishop of Le Puy-en-Velay, leader of the First Crusade (†1098) – 166
Alexander, King of Poland (1501-1506) – 58, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 77, 82, 83, 84, 85, 87, 110, 134
Alexander VI, Pope (1492-1503) – 58, 68, 69, 70, 71

Tamás/Thomas Bakóc(z), Archbishop of Esztergom, Chancellor (†1521) – 72, 164, 165, 166, 167, 168, 177
Barbara (of Cilli/Cillei), Queen of Sigismund (†1451) – 13
Basarab III Laiotă, Prince of Wallachia (1473-1475, 1475/76-77) – 99, 100, 101, 102, 103
Bayezid II, Sultan (1481-1512) – 70
Bogdan III, Prince of Moldavia (1504-1517) – 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 136
Bolesław I Chrobry, Duke/King of Poland (992-1025) – 10

Antonio Bonfini, chronicler (†1503) – 186
István Brodarics/Brodericus, Bishop of Vác and Pécs, Chancellor (†1539) – 142, 146, 147, 148, 149, 178, 179, 181, 182
Giovanni Antonio Buglio, baron of Burgio, papal envoy (†1545) – 134, 150, 151, 163, 167, 175, 177, 178, 181
Andrea da(l)/del Burgo/Borgo, imperial envoy (†1533) – 136, 143

Camillo Caetani, patriarch of Alexandria, papal diplomat, nuncius (†1602) – 186, 196
Lorenzo Campeggi/Campeggio, Cardinal, papal legate, bishop of Salisbury (†1539) – 134, 145, 146, 150, 152, 163, 167, 168, 174, 175, 181
Casimir III, King of Poland (1333-1370) – 16
Casimir IV, King of Poland (1444-1492) – 58, 92, 94, 95, 101, 106, 160, 161, 162
Giuliano/Julian Cesarini, Cardinal, Papal Legate (†1444) – 167
Charles I, King of Hungary (1301-1342) – 10
Charles IV, Holy Roman Emperor (1346-1378) – 16
Charles V, Holy Roman Emperor (1516-1556) – 124, 125, 127, 128, 137, 138, 147, 148, 149, 151, 152, 153, 180, 209, 216
Charles VIII, King of France (1483-1498) – 70
Hermann of Cilli/Cillei, ban of Croatian and Slavonia (1406-1408, 1423-1435) – 13, 21
Johannes/János Corvinus/Corwin, illegitimate son of Matthias, Duke and ban of Slavonia, ban of Croatia (†1504) – 110
Clement VII, Pope (1523-1534) [= Cardinal Medici; Giulio de’ Medici] – 144, 145, 147, 152, 153, 168, 171, 177, 180, 181, 182, 187, 188
Niccolò Crispo, Venetian patrician, Lord of Syros, Regent of the Duchy of the Archipelago (†1450) – 100
Zacharia Delfino, Cardinal, Bishop of Lesina, nuncius (†1584) – 189, 190, 191, 194
Djem/Cem, Ottoman Prince (†1495) – 70, 104, 105
Jan Długosz, chronicler (†1480) – 13, 15, 16, 45, 50
György Dózsa (†1514) – 72
György/George Draskovich, Cardinal, Archbishop of Kalocsa (1582-1587) – 196, 199, 200, 204
Elisabeth of Luxemburg, Queen consort of Germany, Hungary and Bohemia (†1442) – 52, 55
Elisabeth von Habsburg, Queen consort of Poland (†1505) – 87
Elisabeth of Austria, Queen consort of Poland (†1545) – 210, 211, 215
Ernest, Duke of Austria (†1424) – 15
Ernest/Ernst of Habsburg, Archduke, Governor of the Spanish Netherlands (†1595) – 202
Eugene IV, Pope (1431-1447) – 31
Frederick III of Habsburg, King of the Romans Holy Roman Emperor (1440/1452-1493) – 67, 93, 94, 95, 106, 161, 162
Friedrich/Frederick III, Elector of Saxony (†1525) – 109, 111, 112, 121, 123
Friedrich/Frederick I(V), Markgraf von Brandenburg-Ansbach-Kulmbach and Bayreuth (†1536) – 112
Frederick I Barbarossa, King of the Romans, Holy Roman Emperor (1152/55-1190) – 10
Francis I, King of France (1515-1547) – 124, 146, 147, 149, 180
László/Ladislaus Garai, Jr, ban of Macsó/Mačva, Lord Palatine (†1459) – 52
Géza II, King of Hungary (1141-1162) – 10
George of Poděbrady, King of Bohemia (1458-1471) – 159
Paride Grassi/Paris Grassus, theologian, papal master of ceremonies, Bishop of Pesaro (†1528) – 165, 168
Henry VIII, King of England (1509-1547) – 153, 154, 155, 156, 157
János Hunyadi, Voivode of Transylvania, Governor (†1456) – 44, 93, 96, 99, 104
Innocent VIII, Pope (1484-1492) – 66, 161
Ismail I/Shāh Ismā’il, “Sophi” Safavīruler of Persia (1501-1524) – 142
Isabel/(la) Jagiellon, Queen of Hungary, Governor of Transylvania (†1559) – 209, 211, 212, 213, 214, 215, 216
Pietro Isvalies, Cardinal, Bishop of Reggio di Calabria (†1511) – 163, 164, 167, 168, 177
Ivan/Iwan III, Grand Prince of Moscow (1462–1505) – 63, 97, 118, 119
Jalal al-Din ibn Tokhtamysh, Khan of the Golden Horde (1411–12) – 15
John XXIII, Antipope (1410-1415) – 21, 22, 23, 25, 26, 29, 31, 37
John/Jan/Johannes I Albert/Albrecht, King of Poland (1492-1501) – 58, 59, 62, 65, 66, 69, 71, 77, 79, 80, 81, 82
John Sigismund/János Zsigmond (Szapolyai), King of Hungary (1540-1570), Prince of Transylvania (1570–1571) – 73, 110, 111, 114, 119, 121, 122, 186, 190, 209, 211, 212, 214, 216
John V Palaiologos, Byzantine Emperor (1341–1379, 1390–1391) – 16
John VIII Palaiologos, Byzantine Emperor (1425–1448) – 18
Julius II, Pope (1503–1513) – 64, 89
Julius III, Pope (1550–1555) – 190
László Kanizsai, Voivode of Transylvania (1461–1477) – 179
János/John Kórógyi, Lord Chief Judge, ban of Macsó/Mačva (†1456) – 52
Sigismund Korybut, of the Jagiellonian dynasty, Hussite military commander (†1435) – 159
Heinrich Kramer/Institoris/Henryk Instytor, Dominican friar, inquisitor in Bohemia (†1505) – 163, 164
Leo X, Pope (1513–1521) – 72, 117, 119, 124, 164, 165, 177
Louis I, King of Hungary (1342–1382) – 10, 11, 18
Louis VII, King of France (1137–1180) – 10
Louis XII, King of France, (1498–1515) – 68
Manuel II Palaiologos, Emperor of Byzantium (1391–1425) – 11
Bartolomeo Maraschi, Bishop of Città di Castello (†1487) – 161, 163
Mary/Maria of Mangop/Mangup (or Doros)/Maria Asanina Palaiologina, Princess Consort of Moldavia (1472–1477) – 97, 98
Mary/Maria of Habsburg, Queen of Hungary (†1558) – 13, 110, 128, 151, 168
Matthias Corvinus [ Hunyadi], King of Hungary (1458–1490) – 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 101, 105, 106, 110, 160, 161, 162, 166
Maximilian II, Holy Roman Emperor (1564–1576) – 203
Mehmed II, Sultan (1444–1446, 1451–1481) – 91, 95, 97, 98, 99, 100, 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106
Mehmed I Giray Khan of the Crimean Khanate (1515–1523) – 137
Meñli I Giray, Khan of the Crimean Khanate (1468–1475, 1478–1515) – 118
Wawrzyniec Międzyleski, bishop of Kamianets-Podilskyi (†1529) – 72, 136, 140, 142, 143
Murad II, Sultan (1421-1444, 1446-1451) – 101, 104
Tamás/Thomas Nádasdi/Nádasdy, Lord Chief Judge, Lord Palatine (†1562) – 179
Orso Orsini, Count of Nola, Duke of Ascoli Satriano (†1479) – 162, 163
Roberto Latino Orsini, Archbishop of Reggio di Calabria (†1520) – 165
Otto III, King of the Romans, Holy Roman Emperor (983/996-1002) – 10
Paul IV, Pope (1555-1559) – 191
Péter Pázmány, Archbishop of Esztergom (1616-1637) – 206
Angelo Pecchinoli, papal nuncio, Bishop of Orte and Civita Castellana (†1492) – 162, 163
János Perényi, Master of the Treasury (†1458) – 53
Pius IV, Pope (1559-1565) – 199
Radu III, Prince of Wallachia (†1475) – 95, 97, 98, 99, 100, 101, 102
Rudolph II, Holy Roman Emperor (1576-1612) – 195, 201, 203
Giovanni Salviati, Cardinal, Bishop of Ferrara, apostolic protonotary (†1553) – 147, 148, 177, 178
Lodovico Severi da Bologna, papal nuncio (1455-1457) – 94
Sigismund of Luxemburg, King of Hungary, Romans, Bohemia, Holy Roman Emperor (1387/1419/1410/1433-1437) – 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 43, 44, 72, 78, 162, 169
Sigismund II August, King of Poland (1548-1572) – 209, 210, 211, 213, 214, 215
Sixtus IV, Pope (1471-1484) – 94, 160, 165
Sixtus V, Pope (1585-1590) – 202
Cesare Speciano, Bishop of Novara and Cremona (†1607) – 186, 194, 195, 198, 201
St Stephen, King of Hungary (1000-1038) – 186
Stephen III, Prince of Moldavia (1457-1504) – 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 97, 98, 99, 100, 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106
Stephen IV/Ștefăniță, Prince/Voivod of Moldavia (1517-1527) – 136, 137, 139, 142
Süleyman/Suleiman the Magnificent (1520-1566) – 104, 105, 133, 141, 143, 152
Krzysztof Szydłowiecki, Chancellor of Poland (†1532) – 134, 138, 139, 156, 168
László/Ladislaus Szalkai, Archbishop of Esztergom, Chancellor (1526) – 150, 167, 175, 181
János/John Szapolyai, King of Hungary (1526-1540) – 73, 110, 111, 114, 119, 122, 186, 190, 209, 211, 212, 216
Pál/Paul Tomori, Warden of the Southern Marches, Archbishop of Kalocsa (1523-1526) – 151

227
Johannes de Thurócz/János/John Thuróczy, jurist, chronicler (†1488/89?) – 186
Elek Thurzó, Master of the Treasury, Lord Chief Judge (†1543) – 167
Tvrtko II, King of Bosnia (1404-1409, 1421-1443) – 15

János/John Újlaki, Royal Chamberlain, Bishop of Vác (1560-1578) – 191
Miklós Újlaki, Ban of Macsó (1439-1477) – 53, 54, 55
Usun/Uzun Has(s)an, Sultan of the Aq Qoyunlu dynasty, of the Oghuz Turkic tribal federation (†1478) – 94, 97, 99, 100, 101, 102, 104, 105

Vassili/Vasily/Wassili III, Grand Prince of Moscow (1505-1533) – 116, 118, 119, 126
Tommaso de Vio, Cardinal, Papal Legate (†1534) – 137, 140, 141, 168, 174, 175, 178, 179
Vlad III, Prince of Wallachia (1431-1476/77) – 95, 99

István Werbőczy/Verbőci, jurist, Personalis, Judge Royal, Lord Palatine (1525-1526) – 73, 181, 186, 199
Eberhard Windecke, historian (†1440/1441) – 13, 15

Zoe Palaeologus/Sophia Palaiologina, Grand Princess of Moscow, consort of Ivan III (†1503) – 97