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György Rákóczi II's Attempt to Establish a Local Power Base among the Tributaries of the Ottoman Empire 1653–1657

Early Modern South-Eastern Europe is usually regarded as the playground of empires: the overwhelming influence of the Ottoman Empire was continuously challenged by the Habsburgs and Venice in the borderlands; in the case of the tributary states (especially Moldavia in the late sixteenth century), also by Poland-Lithuania. Local powers, independent or at least semi-independent from the Empire, were altogether missing: the few attempts to establish a power base in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries originated from the tributary states of the Ottoman Empire. Some of these were connected to anti-Ottoman wars at the end of both centuries: at the turn of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, Zsigmond Báthory, Prince of Transylvania (1588–1602, with intervals) created a wider sphere of influence by making the two Romanian Voievods of Moldavia and Wallachia his vassals; the latter, Michael the Brave (1593–1601) made his own attempt to establish a local power base by conquering Transylvania as well as Moldavia some years later.¹ Both of them enjoyed Habsburg support – at least at specific points in their endeavours –, not unlike those who tried to use the opportunity of the great anti-Ottoman wars a hundred years later to cut a slice of the newly re-conquered territories for themselves, such as Đorđe Branković (1645–1711).² The case of György Rákóczi II of Transylvania (1648–1660, with intervals), which this chapter will discuss in detail, is peculiar in the sense that – although it took place at a moment when all great powers were involved in major conflicts (or were in a phase of exhaustion after them) – it was not connected to any of the greater conflicts of the Empires against each other.

In the 1650s, the Ottoman Empire went through one of the greatest political crises of its history. The court of the infant Sultan was characterized by the constant struggle of various factions and frequent political changes. The Grand Viziers, replacing each other at an accelerated pace, had to face a series of acute problems:

1 Alexander Randa, *Pro Republica Christiana: Die Walachei im „langen“ Türkenkrieg der katholischen Universalmächte 1593–1606*. München: s.n. 1964; Sándor László Tóth, *A mezőkeresztési csata és a tizenötéves háború*. Szeged: Belvedere Meridionale 2000, pp. 375–417; Gábor Barta, The First Period of the Principality of Transylvania (1526–1606). In: László Makkai and András Mócsy, ed., *History of Transylvania*, 3 vols., *From the Beginnings to 1606*. New York: Columbia UP 2002, vol. 1, pp. 743–57.

2 Radovan Samardžić, Count Djordje Branković's Political and Historical Impact on the Serbs. In: Ivo Banac and Frank E. Sysyn, eds., *Concepts of Nationhood in Early Modern Eastern Europe*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute 1986 (published as vol. 10. of *Harvard Ukrainian Studies*), pp. 508–23.

financial problems led to irregularities in the payment of the armies and thus often to revolts. The war against Venice brought serious defeats in the second half of the decade: the fleet of the Serenissima almost managed to cut off Constantinople from the Mediterranean in 1656.³ Other powers with an interest in South-Eastern Europe were also experiencing serious problems. Although the Habsburg Empire managed to put an end to the Thirty Years War in 1648, the conference for the execution of the Treaties of Westphalia continued well into the 1650s; and it took a longer period of recovery before the Emperor could venture another major military enterprise.⁴ For the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, the year of the European peace meant the beginning of decade-long warfare, because the revolt of the Cossacks, headed by Bohdan Khmelnytsky (1595–1657), proved to be much harder to handle than the earlier ones, especially when the Hetman managed to recruit allies: first the Tatar Khan and, after 1654, the Russian Tsar. The aggravation of the Commonwealth's military difficulties, especially after the Swedish attack of 1655, made it impossible for King John Casimir (1648–1668) to carry on his ambitious anti-Ottoman plans.⁵

The involvement of the neighboring empires in various conflicts in other regions provided the leaders of semi-independent political entities at their borderlands with the opportunity to be more ambitious concerning their goals and to widen their sphere of influence. This enlargement was most successfully achieved in the direction of other political entities not directly incorporated into any of the empires: that is to say, tributary states at the borders of the Ottoman Empire tried to gain control over other tributaries in order to stand a better chance against the Empire in the long run. The method of gaining control, however, varied in the different cases of the Tatars, the Cossacks and Transylvanians.

Tatar and Cossack attempts to gain influence

The first target for interest of the above three powers was the land situated between them: Moldavia. In the early 1650s, the Voievodate was ruled by Vasile Lupu (1634–

3 Jozef Matuz, *Das Osmanische Reich: Grundlinien seiner Geschichte*. Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft 1985, pp. 165–78; Ekkehard Eickhoff, *Venedig, Wien und die Osmanen: Umbruch in Südosteuropa 1645–1700*. München: Callwey 1970, pp. 138–49; Kenneth M. Setton, *Venice, Austria and the Turks in the Seventeenth Century*. Philadelphia: American Philosophical Society 1991, pp. 172–89; Metin Kunt, Naimâ, Köprülü, and the Grand Vezirate, *Boğaziçi Üniversitesi Dergisi: Hümaniter Bilimler – Humanities*, 1 (1973), 57–64.

4 Charles Ingrao, *The Habsburg Monarchy 1618–1815*. Cambridge: Cambridge UP 1994, pp. 44–67; Jean Béranger, *A History of the Habsburg Empire 1273–1700*. London, New York: Longman 1994, pp. 283–303; Imre Gonda and Emil Niederhauser, *Die Habsburger: Ein europäisches Phänomen*. Vienna, Budapest: Kremayr & Scheriau and Corvina 1983, pp. 93–107.

5 Norman Davies, *God's Playground: A History of Poland*. 2 vols. Oxford: Clarendon 1981, *The Origins to 1795*, vol. 1, pp. 458–69; for the early 1650s, see Frank E. Sysyn, *Between Poland and the Ukraine: The Dilemma of Adam Kysil, 1600–1653*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute 1985.

1653), a boyar of Albanian origin, probably one of the most talented and ambitious politicians on the Moldavian throne in the seventeenth century.⁶ He had filled some of the most important ranks of the Voivodate before; therefore, he was already an experienced politician when he took over the rule of Moldavia in 1634. Through an iron-handed policy in internal affairs, and through the repeated transformation of his council, it became possible for him to enforce his high-flying plans in the field of foreign policy. In this, he also benefited from the fact that he had gained the throne as the candidate backed by the Ottoman power; and enjoyed the support of the Sublime Porte and Greek circles in Constantinople throughout his – at least among seventeenth-century Moldavian Voievodes – unusually long reign. Parallel to his excellent Ottoman connections, he also established good contacts with the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and married his daughter, Maria, to one of the wealthiest Lithuanian aristocrats, the Calvinist Janusz Radziwiłł.⁷ He even survived two failed attempts to conquer Wallachia in the 1630s – something that would have cost most other Moldavian Voievodes their throne.

Nevertheless, Vasile Lupu had to face severe threats from the neighbouring countries in the early 1650s. Islâm III Giray (1644–1654), the Crimean Khan, sent his troops to collect booty from the territory of the Voivodate under the pretext that they were taking revenge for a Moldavian attack against some Tatar soldiers the previous year.⁸ Another version of this traditional strategy was used by his successor, Mehmed IV Giray (1654–1666) in the second half of the 1650s: the Khan threatened the Moldavian Voievod with punitive campaigns if he did not support his war against Muscovy and the Cossacks. It was probably the success of this strategy and the large sums he could extract from the Moldavian ruler that motivated him to extend his scope further: Transylvanian diplomats at the Sublime Porte had to invest considerable energy in 1655–1656 to convince Ottoman dignitaries that they would

6 Vasile Lupu's most recent biographies are: Constantin Șerban, *Vasile Lupu, Domn al Moldovei (1634–1653)*. Bucharest: Editura Academiei Române 1991; Ion Eremia, *Relațiile externe ale lui Vasile Lupu (1634–1653): Contribuții la istoria diplomației moldovenești în secolul al XVII-lea*. Chișinău: Cartdidact 1999. See also (in German) the summary by Daniel Ursprung, *Herrschaftslegitimation zwischen Tradition und Innovation: Repräsentation und Inszenierung von Herrschaft in der rumänischen Geschichte*. Kronstadt, Heidelberg: Aldus: Arbeitskreis für Siebenbürgische Landeskunde 2007, pp. 134–41.

7 On his Polish contacts, see Ilona Czamańska, From the Moghilas to Dosoftei: The Polish–Romanian Relations in the 17th Century. In: Veniamin Ciobanu, ed., *Romanian and Polish Peoples in East-Central Europe (17th–20th Centuries)*. Iași: Juminea 2003, pp. 18–9; Dariusz Milewski, Between a Magnate and a Cossack: Two Marriages of Vasile Lupu's Daughters, *Series Byzantina*, 6 (2008), 45–55.

8 Adolf Armbruster, ed., *Grausame Zeiten in der Moldau: Die Moldauische Chronik des Miron Costin 1593–1661*. Graz: Styria 1980, pp. 179–80. Another raid, from the year 1652, is documented by the letter from György Rákóczi II to Zsuzsanna Lorántffy (Gyógy, 18 July 1652) Sándor Szilágyi, ed., *A két Rákóczy György családi levelezése. (Monumenta Hungariae Historica. Ser. I. Diplomataria, vol. 24)*. Budapest: Magyar Tudományos Akadémia 1875 (henceforth MHHD XXIV), p. 467.

prohibit any punitive measures against the Principality in case György Rákóczi II were unwilling to respond the Khan's urgent demands for payment.⁹

Sheer force was also part of the method used by Bohdan Khmelnytsky to establish his influence in Moldavia, but he also found other means of maintaining it in the long run. Following a peace agreement that later proved to be temporary, there were no military activities in the Cossacks' ongoing war against Poland-Lithuania in 1650. The Hetman joined the Tatar campaign against Moldavia and extracted a promise from Lupu that he would give the hand of his daughter to Khmelnytsky's son. Although the Voievod tried pulling every string possible in the next two years to declare this promise null and void, another Cossack campaign to Moldavia in 1652 forced him to keep his word and Tymish Khmelnytsky did receive the Voievod's daughter Ruxandra as his wife.¹⁰ The Hetman's aim was clearly to widen his sphere of influence and recruit some further support. Apart from the resources of Moldavia, he could also count on using Lupu's connections to the Polish Protestants, a group he had tried to win for his cause several times earlier; and also to the Ottoman Empire, for whose help Khmelnytsky had frequently asked in the preceding years.¹¹ For Lupu, on the other hand, this Cossack connection meant a breach of his earlier pro-Polish policies and proved to be fatal. György Rákóczi II, the Prince of

⁹ See the letters of Máté Balogh and Jakab Harsányi to György Rákóczi II (Istanbul, 22 January and 4 February 1656) Sándor Szilágyi, ed., *Okmánytár II. Rákóczy György diplomáciai összeköttetéseihez*. (Monumenta Hungariae Historica. Ser. I. Diplomataria, 23.) Budapest: Eggenberger 1874 (henceforth MHHD XXIII), pp. 297, 309. See also on the Tatar claims against Transylvania: Maxim Mordovin, Petki István, II. Rákóczi György főudvarmestere. In: Gábor Kármán and András Péter Szabó, ed., *Szerencsének elegyes forgása: II. Rákóczi György és kora*. Budapest: L'Harmattan 2009, pp. 389–90. The Moldavian Voievod, according to his own report, paid a large sum to the Tatars; however, he was not inclined to establish the custom of paying a permanent, yearly tribute: see the letters of Gheorghe Ștefan to György Rákóczi II (Suceava, 10 November and 16 December 1655) MHHD XXIII, pp. 263–4; Sándor Szilágyi, ed., *Erdélyi országgyűlési emlékek történeti bevezetésekkel*, vol. 11, 1649–1658. Budapest: Magyar Tudományos Akadémia 1886, p. 533.

¹⁰ Mykhailo Hrushevsky, *History of Ukraine-Rus'*, vol. 9, book 1, *The Cossack Age, 1650–1653*. Edmondson – Toronto: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies Press 2005, pp. 80–113, 516–32; Sysyn, *Between Poland and the Ukraine*, p. 186; Eduard Baidaus, Les relations moldopolonaises dans le contexte de la crise politique dans l'Europe de l'Est (*au milieu du XVII^e siècle*). In: Ciobanu, ed., *Romanian and Polish Peoples*, pp. 27–38; Milewski, *Between a Magnate and a Cossack*, pp. 57–64.

¹¹ On the contacts between the Cossack hetman and the Ottoman Empire, see: Peter Bartl, *Der Kosakenstaat und das Osmanische Reich im 17. und in der ersten Hälfte des 18. Jahrhunderts*, *Südost-Forschungen*, 33 (1974), 173–4; and various source editions: Jan Rypka, *Aus der Korrespondenz der Hohen Pforte mit Bogdan Chmelnicki*. In: Miloš Weingart, Josef Dobiáš and Milada Paulová, ed., *Z dějin východní Evropy a slovanstva: Sborník věnovaný Jaroslava Bidlovi*. Praha: Bečková 1928, pp. 482–98; idem, *Weitere Beiträge zur Korrespondenz der Hohen Pforte mit Bogdan Chmel'nyckij*, *Archiv Orientální*, 2 (1930), 262–83; Chantal Lemercier-Quelquejey, *Les relations entre la Porte Ottomane et les cosaques Zaporogues au milieu du XVII^e siècle: Une lettre inédite de Bohdan Hmelnickij au Padichah ottoman*, *Cahiers du Monde Russe et Soviétique*, 11 (1970), 454–61.

Transylvania – who looked upon both the Hetman and Vasile Lupu with great suspicion – considered the marital connection between them an imminent threat on the border of his country and was further embittered by the dubious, but not altogether implausible, news that they wanted to conquer Wallachia together for Tymish.¹²

Transylvania: gaining influence

The year of 1653 thus brought a conflict that involved most of the major political entities of Eastern Europe. György Rákóczi II activated his contacts with the opponents of Vasile Lupu inside Moldavia, such as Gheorghe Ștefan, the country's High Chancellor (*logofăt mare*) since 1651, whose contacts to the Transylvanian Princes had dated back to 1643 and with whom confidential relations were established at the turn of the decade.¹³ Parallel to a revolt started by Gheorghe Ștefan, Transylvanian and Wallachian troops entered the country at the beginning of 1653. Lupu had to flee, and Gheorghe Ștefan was elected Voievod, but the old ruler was back in Moldavia as early as May, with the support of numerous Cossack armies. He emerged victorious, but his re-conquest of the country proved to be only temporary. Vasile Lupu became over-ambitious during his successful advance through Moldavia and made a third attempt to conquer Wallachia; however, just like his two earlier ventures in the 1630s, this campaign also failed and his troops were crushed at the battle by the Finta, not far from Târgoviște, at the end of May. After a short period of rallying the allied forces, the troops of Matei Basarab, Voievod of Wallachia (1632–1654), Gheorghe Ștefan and János Kemény, György Rákóczi II's general, entered Moldavia and defeated Vasile Lupu's surviving army. The Voievod, who had been ruling the country for nineteen years, had to leave it for the second time in a few months – and this time forever.¹⁴ Military activities lasted until mid-October, when the fortress of Suceava,

12 In a letter to his mother Zsuzsanna Lorántffy, György Rákóczi II informed her that Vasile Lupu and Tymish Khmelnytsky had already agreed to conquer Wallachia for the latter and that there was a risk they would also invade Transylvania (Gyógy, 18 July 1652) MHHD XXIV, p. 467.

13 See the most recent biography of Gheorghe Ștefan: Petronel Zahariuc, *Țara Moldovei în vremea lui Gheorghe Ștefan voievod (1653–1658)*. Iași: Editura Universității „Alexandru Ioan Cuza” 2003. On his early contacts with Transylvania, see Idem. “Gheorghe Ștefan moldvai vajda és II. Rákóczi György erdélyi fejedelem kapcsolata”. In: Gábor Kármán and András Péter Szabó, ed., *Szerecsének elegyes forgása. II. Rákóczi György és kora*. Budapest: L'Harmattan 2009, pp. 62–8. In a letter to the Prince, his most important counsellor, János Kemény, reminded György Rákóczi II that Gheorghe Ștefan, who had been at his court as an envoy, should not be let go without at least a small estate, as he had already been faithful to the Prince and would be even more inclined to be so afterwards (Nagyszeben, 18 April 1649) Magyar Országos Levéltár, Magyar Kamara Archivuma E 190 Archivum Familiae Rákóczi (henceforth MOL E 190) Nr. 5370.

14 A detailed description of the events is offered by Petronel Zahariuc, “Prima domnie” a lui Gheorghe Ștefan (4/14 aprilie – 21 aprilie/1 mai 1653), *Studii și Materiale de Istorie Medie*, 21 (2003), pp. 293–308; Idem, “A doua domnie” a lui Vasile Lupu (21 aprilie/1 mai – 6/16

defended by Lupu's remaining soldiers, fell into the hands of the joint Moldavian–Transylvanian–Wallachian troops after the death of Tymish Khmelnytsky, who had personally led the Cossack troops supporting the defenders. Even the armies of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth became involved in the conflict, as they hindered the arrival of further Cossack reinforcements; whereas the involvement of the Tatar Khan, feared by many, remained limited to territories further away.¹⁵

Military achievements had to be backed by a diplomatic campaign in Istanbul: as the legitimacy of the Voievod's rule depended on the consent of the Sublime Porte, the attempts of Rákóczi's envoys to convince the Grand Vizier about the justness of their cause were almost as important as the repeated success of their weapons on the battlefields. In the early phase of the year, Dervish Mehmed Pasha seemed to be rather supportive of Vasile Lupu, but the news of the battle at the Finta, as well as the Transylvanian diplomatic pressure, made him change his favours. The decisive moment came in November, when Gheorghe Ștefan, the new Voievod, proved himself capable of paying the yearly tribute of his country to the Sublime Porte. This, however, would not have been possible without the help of György Rákóczi II: the Prince not only gave his diplomatic support to the Voievod, but also lent him massive amounts of money, which made Gheorghe Ștefan seriously indebted to the Transylvanian ruler.¹⁶

Moldavia thus entered Rákóczi's sphere of influence in 1653; two years later, the Transylvanian Prince had a chance to secure his control over Wallachia as well. Matei Basarab's contacts with Transylvania were very different from those of Vasile Lupu: the Wallachian Voievod seized power in the early 1630s with Transylvanian support and, in the absence of powerful supporters in Istanbul, also needed the backing of the Rákóczi family in order to maintain his rule for more than twenty years. He had to pay dearly for it, also in cash: a biannual payment of 5,000 florins was contracted between the two rulers. In order not to anger the Ottomans, who were supposed to be the only beneficiaries of tribute payment from these countries, this was not called a tribute, but was rather disguised as compensation for the tax paid to Matei Basarab for the sheep herded from Transylvania to Wallachia. Nevertheless, several sources suggest that Transylvanian politicians regarded this payment as a tribute. Apart from this, Matei Basarab also had to inform the Transylvanian Prince about any developments and offer postal services for him.¹⁷ The Wallachian Voievod made several

Julie 1653). In: Ionel Căndea, Paul Cernovodeanu and Gheorghe Lazăr, ed., *Închinare lui Petre Ș. Năsturel la 80 de ani*. Brăila: Muzeul Brăilei – Istros 2003, pp. 369–86.

15 On the details of the military activities, see in Ion Sîrbu, *Matei-vodă Băsarab's auswärtige Beziehungen (Zur Geschichte des europäischen Orients)*. Leipzig: Friedrich 1899, pp. 308–50; Zahariuc, *Țara Moldovei*, pp. 104–98; Sándor Gebei, *II. Rákóczi György erdélyi fejedelem külpolitikája (1648–1657)*. Eger: EKTF–Liceum 1996, pp. 61–5.

16 For the details of the diplomatic campaign, see Gábor Kármán, *Erdélyi külpolitika a veszt-fájlai béke után*. Budapest: L'Harmattan 2011, pp. 239–43.

17 Sîrbu, *Matei-vodă Băsarab's auswärtige Beziehungen*, pp. 50–65; Ferenc Görög, *A két Rákóczi György fönhatósági joga a két oláh vajdaság fölött*. Budapest: Franklin 1904, pp. 16–7. For the

attempts to break free from Transylvanian pressure, but he did not receive the help that he pleaded for from the Habsburgs and could not use the opportunity created by the change of the ruler in the Principality of Transylvania in 1648 either: he had to remain in his position committed to the Rákóczi.¹⁸

Therefore, the death of Matei Basarab in 1654 brought unwelcome changes for György Rákóczi II in the contacts between his country and Wallachia. The new ruler, Constantin Șerban, was elected by local boyars as opposed to Diicul Buicescu, the candidate supported by the Transylvanian ruler. As Constantin had nothing to thank the Transylvanian ruler for, he did not consider himself limited by Matei's treaties with the Rákóczi.¹⁹ This was about to change in not much more than a year, as Constantin Șerban did not have the chance to enjoy his rule undisturbed for long. In 1655, his soldiers rioted and the revolt spread quickly through the country, also involving many other social groups.²⁰ Although some speculated that Rákóczi himself might have stood behind these events, the personal correspondence of the Prince suggests otherwise.²¹ In any case, the crisis in Wallachia played well into his hand: many boyars fled to Transylvania and even Constantin Șerban, who took refuge in Ottoman territory in Silistria, pleaded for his help. György Rákóczi II consulted his counsellors, then mobilized his own forces as well as his Moldavian ally. Together with Gheorghe Ștefan, he defeated the army of the rioters in a single battle between Șoplea and Ploiești on 26th June 1655. As the action had previously been negotiated with the Pasha of Silistria, who showed support towards Constantin Șerban, the scant enthusiasm displayed by the Sublime Porte for the role of the Prince of Transylvania in securing the position of the Wallachian ruler must have come rather

texts of the treaty, as well as its confirmation in 1647: Áron Szilády and Sándor Szilágyi, ed., *Török-magyarokori állam-okmánytár*, vol. 2. Pest: Eggenberger 1868, pp. 239–40, 244–5; Andrei Veress, ed. *Documente privitoare la istoria Ardealului, Moldovei și Țării-Românești*, vol. 10, *Acte și scrisori (1637–1660)*. Bucharest: Imprimeria Națională 1938, pp. 199–200. Contrary to the fiction of “compensation for sheep”, György Rákóczi II clearly specified the payment of the Wallachian Voievod as a “gift in money and horses” in a letter to his younger brother, Zsigmond (Radnót, 8 May 1650) MHHD XXIV, p. 419.

18 On the details, see Sîrbu, *Matei-Șerban Bășarab's auswärtige Beziehungen*, pp. 266–304; Kármán, *Erdélyi külpolitika*, pp. 232–6.

19 On Constantin Șerban, see his biography: Nicolae Stoicescu, *Constantin Șerban*. Bucharest: Editura Militară 1990. On his relations to Transylvania in the beginning of his rule: Kármán, *Erdélyi külpolitika*, pp. 254–5.

20 The most comprehensive account on the revolt: Lúdia A. Demény, Lajos Demény and Nicolae Stoicescu, *Răscoală seimenilor sau răscoală populară? 1655, Țară Românească*. Bucharest: Editura Științifică 1968. See also Kármán, *Erdélyi külpolitika*, pp. 254–6.

21 For the accusations concerning Rákóczi's role in starting the revolt, see the reports of Simon Reniger to the Emperor Ferdinand III (Istanbul, 24 April and 3 June 1655) Österreichisches Staatsarchiv, Haus-, Hof-, und Staatsarchiv, Staatenabteilungen Türkei I. (henceforth HHStA Türkei) Kt. 127. Fasc. 63/a. Konv. E fol. 30r, resp. 65r–v). For the contrary conclusions, see e.g. the letter of Zsuzsanna Lorántffy to György Rákóczi II (Sárospatak, 28 April 1655) MHHD XXIV, p. 490.

unexpectedly.²² Apart from the reservations about Constantin's person, this came primarily from the fact that György Rákóczi II had gained influence in both Romanian Voievodates in only two years.

Transylvania: maintaining influence

The most important instruments of this influence were the treaties concluded between the Prince and the Voievods. To be precise, the texts which have been preserved are not treaties in the narrower sense of the word, but rather declarations issued by the Voievods: contrary to the forms used for arrangements with Western powers – which included the stipulations concerning both sides of the agreement – these covenants functioned in a more archaic way: both parties swore only on their part of the obligations. We can only assume that the Prince of Transylvania also issued similar declarations, as none of these are preserved from these years. In the case of Wallachia, there are several sources that document the Voievod's obligations. A draft of a treaty compiled by Constantin Șerban in May 1655 – before his restoration to the throne of Wallachia – has survived. It includes the confirmation of the earlier treaties of Matei Basarab, with specific emphasis on the fact that his military commitment would also be valid in case of a Turkish or Tatar attack.²³ The copy which was finally signed by the Voievod does not specify these two powers, but it is obvious that Constantin Șerban had to help the Prince against them as well, as the section excluding these potential adversaries – which had usually been present in similar documents from the earlier period – is missing from this one. The declaration also specified a sum of 3,000 golden coins that the Wallachian Voievod was supposed to pay for György Rákóczi II each year. According to the text of the treaty, this meant a rise compared to Matei Basarab's earlier payment, specified here at 2,500 golden coins.²⁴ We have no documentary evidence of any change in this pay-

22 The dispatches of the Habsburg ambassador present an ambivalent picture: Simon Reniger reported contradictory information as to whether Grand Vizier Kara Murad Pasha supported the Transylvanian and Moldavian intervention in favour of Constantin Șerban, or not (Istanbul, 14 and 20 June 1655) HHStA Türkei Kt. 127. Fasc. 63/a. Konv. E fol. 84r–v, resp. 90v–91r. The Transylvanian envoys, in their turn, reported on the many signs of the Sublime Porte's dissatisfaction: see the reports of Jakab Harsányi Nagy to György Rákóczi II (22 and 23 July 1655) Sándor Szilágyi, ed., *Levelek és okiratok II. Rákóczy György fejedelem diplomáciai összeköttetései történetéhez*, *Történelmi Társulat*, 12 (1889) (henceforth TT 1889), pp. 669–71; resp. MHHHD XXIII, pp. 213–4. According to the knowledge of Gheorghe Ștefan, Kara Murad himself was much against Constantin Șerban: see his letter to Rákóczi (Iași, 19 August 1655) Sándor Szilágyi, ed., *Erdély és az északkeleti háború*, vol. 1. Budapest: Magyar Tudományos Akadémia 1890 (henceforth EÉKH I), p. 432.

23 The draft, dated by the editors to 1 May 1655, is published in TT 1889, p. 663.

24 Declaration of Constantin Șerban (Târgoviște, without date) József Kemény, ed., *Notitia historica-diplomatica archivi et literalium capituli Albensis Transilvaniae*. Cibinii: Thierry 1836, pp. 129–32. The editors of the collection of the Romanian states' treaties dated the document to December 1655. See Ion Ionașcu, Petre Bărbulescu and Gheorghe Gheorghe, ed.,

ment; however, Claes Rålamb, the Swedish envoy to Constantinople, was told by his Moldavian conversation partner in 1657 that Wallachia had to pay 5,000 ducats annually.²⁵ It is also noteworthy that the text of Constantin Șerban's declaration abandons the earlier fiction about the motivation for the payment: instead of calling it a compensation for the sheep tax, it refers to the sum clearly as a "neighbourly gift."

In the case of Moldavia, it is more problematic to reconstruct the obligations of the local ruler towards György Rákóczi II, as the documents that would have specified these have not survived. The only source which has a similar function is a declaration made in the name of the population of Moldavia, but not that of the Voievode: in this, they promised to be faithful to Rákóczi in general terms.²⁶ It is nevertheless likely that Gheorghe Ștefan did sign a declaration in his own name which is, however, lost. In any case, there is significant evidence that the Voievod, just like his Wallachian colleague, also paid an annual gift to the Prince of Transylvania. According to Claes Rålamb, this also amounted to 5,000 ducats and he was also obliged to help György Rákóczi II against Ottoman attacks.²⁷ The terms of the treaty must have been very similar to that of the "model treaty" between Matei Basarab and György Rákóczi I twenty years previously, especially as several sources suggest that the Moldavian Voievod was obliged to give horses as gifts.²⁸ It is also quite certain that Gheorghe Ștefan took upon himself military obligations in his declaration. Apart from Rålamb's testimony, it is also clear from the Voievode's further activities that he took part in the Wallachian campaign of 1655 in person and also sent auxiliary troops to the Polish campaign of György Rákóczi II two years later.

Apart from agreeing to these yearly payments, the Voievods also had to pay the price for Rákóczi's assistance in creating and maintaining their power. As noted be-

Tratatete internaționale ale României 1354–1920: Texte rezumate, adnotări, bibliografie, vol. 1. Bucharest: Editura Științifică și Enciclopedică 1975, p. 109. Another document – probably with identical content – was still available in the eighteenth century, but has disappeared in the meantime from the collections of the Hungarian State Archives: see the entry in the index (MOL Magyar Kamara Archivuma E 149 Acta Transsylvanica 6. kötet A Fasc. 4. Nr. 27.): "Jurata Reversales Constantini Sorban Valachia Vajvodæ vi quarum pro sui Principatum restitutione semel ad fidelitatem, reciprocaque servitia et annuam m3 Aureorum præstationem Georgio Rakoczy Transylvania Principi obstrictum reddit. In Orig."

25 Claes Rålamb, *Diarium under resa till Konstantinopel 1657–1658*, Christian Callmer, ed. Stockholm: Norstedt 1963, p. 73. This sum, depending on which kind of ducats and golden coins the sources refer to, may even be close to the sum specified in the treaty. Rålamb's co-traveller, Conrad Jacob Hildebrandt, noted in turn that Wallachia had to pay 20,000 golden coins to Transylvania annually, which is obviously exaggerated: see Franz Babinger, ed. *Conrad Jacob Hildebrandt's dreifache swedische Gesandtschaftsreise nach Siebenbürgen, der Ukraine und Constantinopel (1656–1658)*. Leiden: Brill 1937, p. 47.

26 Declaration of the Moldavian population (Iași, 24 December 1654) TT 1889, pp. 658–60.

27 Rålamb, *Diarium*, p. 73. Hildebrandt again gives the exaggerated figure of 40,000 golden coins per year: see Babinger, ed., *Conrad Jacob Hildebrandt's*, p. 47.

28 See e.g. the letter of Gheorghe Ștefan to György Rákóczi II (Iași, 20 January 1656), from which it is clear that the Transylvanian Prince had been complaining about the quality of the horses he received as a gift – and not for the first time: MHHH XXIII. p. 293.

fore, Gheorghe Ștefan became seriously indebted to the Prince of Transylvania so that his war-torn country would be able to pay the tribute to the Sublime Porte in 1653; he also needed loans from György Rákóczi again for the same purpose in the following year. In April 1655, his debts amounted to as much as 74,900 golden coins (149,800 thalers): a considerable sum, which was more than that paid by Transylvania to the Sublime Porte in four years.²⁹ It is not clear whether this sum also included the residue of another debt: shortly after the successful siege of Suceava, János Kemény let Gheorghe Ștefan sign a promissory note according to which Rákóczi's troops were to hand over every valuable they found in the castle; whereas the Voievod, in his turn, promised to pay the Transylvanians 100,000 golden coins and 25,000 thalers.³⁰ The Transylvanian dignitaries were not particularly patient creditors, either: there are several letters known from November–December 1653 in which Gheorghe Ștefan pleads with János Kemény to consider his dire situation and wait for the repayment, as the Voievod not only had to collect the tribute to the Porte, but also had to pay money promised to the Crimean Khan and the Pasha of Silistria and needed to maintain his army. Kemény seems to have remained unyielding in this point and even took some officers of the Voievod, who also owed him money, into captivity.³¹ These direct methods were certainly not used later on, when the war was over, but the debt of the Voievod could very well be used later on as a means of pressure: in 1655, when Gheorghe Ștefan had to ask for further debt-rescheduling, he had to pawn the castle of Chotin, one of the most important fortifications in Moldavia, to the Prince of Transylvania, for as long as the repayment did not take place.³²

Similar arrangements are not known in the case of Wallachia: Constantin Șerban seems not to have become as indebted to György Rákóczi II as his Moldavian colleague, at least not financially. Although the Habsburg ambassador could report from the Porte as common knowledge that the Prince ransacked the country, the Transylvanians seem to have tried to make a point in minimizing the casualties of the civil population in this war: at least Rákóczi's general, János Boros, who stayed in Wallachia after the Prince's departure, asked him to intercede with Gheorghe

29 Gheorghe Ștefan's promissory note (Iași, 23 April 1655) TT 1889, p. 661. The debt was also acknowledged in a declaration of "the boyars of Moldavia and the inhabitants of the country", *ibid.*, p. 662. For later data about this debt, see Zahariuc, Gheorghe Ștefan, p. 83.

30 Gheorghe Ștefan's promissory note, published from János Kemény's sketch (s.l., 30 October 1653) EÉKH I, pp. 281–2.

31 See the letters of Gheorghe Ștefan to János Kemény (Roman, 22 November, 27 November and 9 December 1653) Alexandru Lăpedatu, *Din grijile și greutățile unei domnii...: Opt scrisori ale lui Gheorghe Ștefan-vodă către Ioan Kemény. Academia Română: Memoriile Secțiunii Istorice*, Ser. 3, 12 (1932), pp. 267–8, 273–4, 280. Gheorghe Ștefan also donated a village in Moldavia to János Kemény, but as the donation letter is undated, it is not clear whether the act preceded this conflict, or was an attempt by the Voievode to ease the pressure of the Transylvanian general, see Károly Magyarai, ed. *Adalékok Kemény János életéhez 1634–1660. Történelmi Tár*, 28 (1905), p. 472.

32 See his declaration (Iași, 23 April 1655) TT 1889, pp. 662–3.

Ștefan so as to make the Moldavian troops stop pillaging.³³ This, however, was also necessary because the Transylvanian intervention, as well as the restored Voievod, remained highly unpopular. It was again Boros who noted that when Hrizea din Bogdănei – the counter-Voievod appointed by the rebels and taken captive during the military activities – was taken to Constantin Șerban, the people stood outside the palace, cried and kissed his feet as he came out.³⁴ Even if the rebel army was defeated, the pacification of the country took a long time and Wallachia remained in an unstable situation.³⁵ This must have contributed to the Prince's decision to remove from Wallachia thirty-two cannons taken from the rebels. This action, which may have been mainly motivated by the need to disarm the potential opponents of Constantin Șerban in the country, was nevertheless one of the most important objections the Sublime Porte raised against the Transylvanian campaign.³⁶

An even worse impression was created by the fact that Rákóczi left a force of 2,000 soldiers in the country.³⁷ This phenomenon was not unprecedented: even after the main Transylvanian troops left Moldavia in 1653, a contingent of 2,000 soldiers was left there. This arrangement was, however, meant to be temporary: György Rákóczi II intended to remove them as soon as the King of Poland was ready to secure his back by confirming their *coniunctio armorum*, created in that year, in written form.³⁸ From the later period we have no data about a Transylvanian military presence in Gheorghe Ștefan's country. By contrast to this, when Claes Râlamb travelled

33 Letter of János Boros to György Rákóczi II (Târgoviște, 18 July 1655) MHHD XXIII, pp. 208–9.

34 Letter of János Boros to György Rákóczi II (Târgoviște, 18 July 1655) MHHD XXIII, pp. 206–7.

35 As a Transylvanian diplomat at the Sublime Porte, Jakab Harsányi Nagy wrote, “The Wallachians, even if they show false friendship in their deteriorated situation, would only be on the look-out for revenge for all the massacred *călărași, drabanți, seimeni* [various types of the rebelling soldiers], whatever relatives are left behind them: brothers, sons, brothers-in-law or other.” Harsányi's letter to György Rákóczi II (Istanbul, 4 June 1655) MHHD XXIII, p. 190.

36 See the report of Jakab Harsányi (Istanbul, 17 July 1655) MHHD XXIII, p. 204; and Simon Reniger's letter to Emperor Ferdinand III (Istanbul, 8 September 1655) HHStA Türkei Kt. 127. Fasc. 63/a. Konv. F. fol. 19r. The latter mentions forty cannons.

37 See the letter of Simon Reniger to Ferdinand III quoted in the previous note (fol. 19r); on the reservations of dignitaries at the Sublime Porte about this arrangement, also the report of Jakab Harsányi Nagy to György Rákóczi II (Istanbul, 14 June 1655) TT 1889, p. 667.

38 According to his letter to Zsuzsanna Lorántffy, he gave them the order to “leave the Voievod as if they were deserting” as soon as the King's guarantee was given (Görgény, 16 October 1653) MOL Magyar Kamara Archivuma E 204 Missiles 37. doboz, placed mistakenly under the date 17 September. Rather unexpectedly for the Prince, the contingent ended up in Poland and participated in the military activities around Zhvanets against the Cossacks and Tatars. See the letters of György Rákóczi II to András Klobusiczky (Malomfalva, 24 October 1653) EÉKH I, p. 279.; and to Zsuzsanna Lorántffy (Balázsfalva, 20 December 1653) MHHD XXIV, pp. 479–80.

through Wallachia in 1657, he still found a 1500-men-strong Transylvanian guard at the court of Constantin Șerban: it seems that the military presence was continued even beyond the most immediate aftermath of the 1655 revolt.³⁹ This leads to the conclusion that while the establishment of the Transylvanian guard may have been motivated by the Wallachian Voievod's personal need for security, its maintenance was probably even more beneficial for György Rákóczi II, who thus gained a further channel through which to influence the decisions of the court at Târgoviște. The presence of the guard may easily have been more important for maintaining the Prince's political control over Wallachia than the stipulation in Constantin Șerban's declaration that he would consult Rákóczi during the process of filling the posts of his most important dignitaries: there is no known case for the application of this arrangement, which would have probably meant some sort of veto right on the long run.⁴⁰

The least of the services the guard could provide for the Prince of Transylvania was for its leader, Kelemen Mikes, to inform György Rákóczi II about the events at Târgoviște.⁴¹ He was also not the only one who fulfilled his task: the Hungarian scribe of the Voievod, Péter Budai, sent frequent reports on Constantin Șerban's activities to the Transylvanian Prince.⁴² There are no surviving reports from the Hungarian scribe residing at the court of Gheorghe Ștefan, but the sheer fact that one was employed in Iași is worth noting. At least in this period, the language of communication was a good indicator of the position of the tributary states towards one another. Matei Basarab's letters to the subsequent Princes of Transylvania were all written in Hungarian, whereas Vasile Lupu always used Latin for communication. Even if not all Hungarian scribes at the courts of Târgoviște and Iași functioned as Transylvanian spies, the adoption of Hungarian as a language of communication by the Voievods clearly showed their place in the power relationship. This is well illustrated by the fact that after the fall of Vasile Lupu, even the Moldavian Voievod started to use Hungarian in his letters to Transylvania: the entire correspondence between Gheorghe Ștefan and György Rákóczi II, but also between the Voievod and János Kemény, is exclusively in Hungarian.⁴³

39 Rálamb, *Diarium*, p. 85.

40 Kemény, ed., *Notita*, p. 132.

41 Sadly, only one of these reports survives from the period after the 1655 rebellion and its immediate aftermath: Kelemen Mikes to György Rákóczi II (Târgoviște, 10 October 1656) MHHH XXIII, pp. 480–1.

42 On his career, see Susana Andrea, *Din relațiile Transilvaniei cu Moldova și Țara Românească în sec. al XVII-lea*. Cluj-Napoca: s.n. 1997, pp. 67–76; and, partly correcting her interpretations: Klára Jakó, Budai Péter: Egy újszerű értelmiségi pálya előfutára a hanyatló erdélyi fejedelemségben. In: Judit Pál and Enikő Rűsz-Fogarasi, ed., *Studii de istorie modernă a Transilvaniei / Tanulmányok Erdély újkori történelméről: Omagiu profesorului / Magyarai András / emlékkönyv*. Cluj-Napoca: Presa Universitară Clujeană 2002, pp. 132–7.

43 On the problem of the language of the Romanian Voievodes' correspondence and the Hungarian scribes, see Andrea, *Din relațiile Transilvaniei cu Moldova*; Klára Jakó, *Die un-*

We can conclude that the methods used by György Rákóczi II to gain influence in the Romanian Voievodates were much more elaborate than those used by Bohdan Khmelnytsky, not to mention the members of the Giray family. Sheer force did play a part in all three attempts, but in the case of the Transylvanian Prince, military engagement was complemented by a system of control maintained by various pillars. In the case of the Cossack Hetman, it was the marriage of their children that was supposed to strengthen their connection and provide Khmelnytsky with a channel through which to influence Vasile Lupu's politics. This was a well-known method in Early Modern European politics for establishing and maintaining political contacts and was also used by rulers of Transylvania.⁴⁴ As a matter of fact, an earlier candidate to become Ruxandra's fiancé was György Rákóczi II's younger brother, Zsigmond: the marriage negotiations were only broken off in 1648 because their father, György Rákóczi I, died and Vasile Lupu had doubts about the son's unproblematic succession.⁴⁵ What is more, shortly before Tymish married his daughter, the Moldavian Voievod again raised the question whether she could instead be married to Zsigmond – but the death of the young Prince excluded this as an escape route for Lupu from this unwanted connection.⁴⁶ Marriage policy was not part of Transylvanian strategy in the latter part of the decade, but this was not due to any misgivings towards it, but rather because the Principality, as well as the neighboring Voievodates, lacked a suitably-aged family member who could have been an ample candidate.

In other respects, similar goals called for similar methods – nevertheless, putting them into practice showed some clear differences in quality. Military actions leading to the establishment of political influence needed a legitimization acceptable for an international audience; and this was clear for the Tatar Khan, the Cossack Hetman and the Prince of Transylvania as well. The former two, however, chose a strategy which was somewhat dubious in the eyes of the contemporary public when they both claimed revenge as motivation for their attack on Moldavia: Islam Giray

garischsprachige Korrespondenz der Woiwoden und obersten Amtsträger in der Moldau und der Walachei: Edition ausgewählter Beispiele aus dem 16.–18. Jahrhundert, *Ungarn-Jahrbuch*, 26 (2004), 209–30; Eadem, Magyar secretariusok Moldva fejedelmi kancelláriájában. In: Judit Pál and Gábor Sipos, ed., *Emlékkönyv Csetri Elek születésének nyolcvanadik évfordulójára*. Kolozsvár: Erdélyi Múzeum-Egyesület 2004, pp. 178–94.

44 Hermann Weber, Die Bedeutung der Dynastien für die europäische Geschichte der frühen Neuzeit. In: *Das Haus Wittelsbach und die europäische Dynastien*. München: Beck 1981. (published as issue 44/1 of *Zeitschrift für Bayerische Landesgeschichte*), pp. 5–32; Martin Peters, Können Ehen Frieden stiften? Europäische Friedens- und Heiratsverträge der Vormoderne, *Jahrbuch für Europäische Geschichte*, 8 (2007), 121–33.

45 For details, see Sándor Szilágyi, *Felső-vadászi Rákóczy Zsigmond*. Budapest: Magyar Történelmi Társulat 1886, pp. 91–2. János Kemény, who was the main negotiator of the Transylvanian side in this issue, clearly points to Vasile Lupu as the party responsible for calling off the talks, see his *Önéletírása*. In: Éva V. Windisch, ed., *Kemény János és Bethlen Miklós művei*. Budapest: Szépirodalmi 1980, pp. 297–300.

46 Letter of György Rákóczi II to János Kemény (Dés, 15 December 1651) Veress, ed., *Documente*, vol. 10, pp. 235–6.

referred to a skirmish against his troops the previous year, whereas Khmelnytsky recalled the Voievod's assistance in the rescue of an enemy of his.⁴⁷ The Prince of Transylvania, on the other hand, had a more sophisticated approach – and more luck – when looking for arguments to build up his case. In the case of Wallachia, crushing a dangerous revolt was supposed to work for any audience, whereas the legitimation of the Moldavian intervention was varied according to the fora to which it was addressed. Towards the Sublime Porte, Rákóczi could state that he was only helping the boyars in a country of the Sultan (Moldavia) to rid themselves of a tyrant and peace-breaker.⁴⁸ On the other hand, he could devise a legitimatory strategy acceptable to a contemporary Western and internal audience: that of the pre-emptive strike against an aggressive neighbour. In this, he was assisted by his counsellors, among them Johann Heinrich Bisterfeld, professor at the Academy of Gyulaféhérvár, who was well acquainted with contemporary trends in political thought.⁴⁹

At the same time, there are some methods peculiar to the Transylvanian attempt to create a sphere of influence which are not known to have been used by Bohdan Khmelnytsky, not to mention the Crimean Khans. A written treaty must have been an important instrument of coercion even if it had to be kept secret from the Sublime Porte: their sheer existence must have been a useful instrument for holding the Wallachian and Moldavian Voievods in check. Also, while the Transylvanian political elite had consciously been looking for confidantes among the dignitaries of the Romanian principalities – and had found one in the person of Gheorghe Ștefan – there are no data about similar attempts concerning the Cossacks or Tatars. Even if Khmelnytsky had been successful in establishing a personal connection to the main decision-maker of the country, the Voievod himself, the forced character of this relationship did not produce the same, lasting influence that György Rákóczi I achieved with Matei Basarab's Wallachia by supporting the Voievod in his seizing of the throne and maintaining of his power. Also, the removal of Vasile Lupu from the throne – which was actually a consequence of the Hetman's step, experienced by the neighbours as a destabilization of the system – left Khmelnytsky without further supporters in Moldavia who could have functioned as a channel for his influence

47 On the various motivations attributed to the Moldavian campaign, see Hrushevsky, *History*, pp. 80–4.

48 Speech of the Moldavian boyars against Vasile Lupu at the Sublime Porte, Áron Szilády and Sándor Szilágyi, ed., *Török-magyarokori állam-okmánytár*, 5 vols. Pest: Eggenberger 1870, vol. 3, pp. 420–4. The publishers of the source edition suggested that it was written at the turn of 1652–53, but this is clearly mistaken, as it mentions the siege of Suceava and the death of Tymish Khmelnytsky. It was most probably submitted in late September 1653 by a mission of the boyars; see the report of Simon Reniger (Istanbul, 28 September 1653) HHStA Türkei Kt. 126. Fasc. 62/b. Konv. E. fol. 44v–45v.

49 See my *Bellum iustum*-érvelések II. Rákóczi György háborúiban, *Századok*, 140 (2006), 939–71; a shorter version is also available in Romanian: Argumentarea *bellum iustum* în campania din Moldova a lui Gheorghe Rákóczi al II-lea în anul 1653, *Studia Universitatis Petru Maior: Series Historia*, 6 (2006), 23–42.

in the country. Moreover, and this seems to be the third pillar of the Transylvanian attempt to create a broader power base, there is no information that the Cossack Hetman would have stationed troops at least partly loyal to him or informants in the Voievodate. In any case, it may come as a surprise that, contrary to what would have been evidence in a similar situation in Western Europe, the Transylvanian Prince also did not station any official resident envoy at the Romanian Voievods' court: even if some of its functions, such as information gathering, were taken over by at least some Hungarian scribes at these courts, they were certainly not seen as the official representatives of the Princes, who continued to communicate with the Voievodes through ad hoc envoys.⁵⁰ Whether this was due to the costs related to such a standing embassy, a prohibition of the Sublime Porte in order to avoid the strengthening of the relationship between its tributaries, or perhaps the lack of initiative on the part of the Transylvanian elite, remains unrevealed by the sources and thus has to be left open.

Using the strategies and methods analysed above, György Rákóczi II managed to stand up as a Voievod-maker and between 1653 and 1655, when the political crisis of the Sublime Porte was at its deepest, the Transylvanian Prince could successfully enlarge his sphere of influence over the two neighbouring tributary states of the Ottoman Empire. The creation of influence did not follow a pre-devised plan: although securing the reliability of the two Voievodates had constantly been a vital preference in Transylvanian politics, György Rákóczi II – in this case – did nothing more than to use ample opportunities in an effective way. His further fate, however, also showed the limits of the possibilities of local power bases not directly connected to imperial designs. His next attempt had to be to try his luck against an empire; and invading the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth in 1657, even if he was allied to Sweden and the Cossacks, proved to be a fiasco. The Sublime Porte, which was quickly regaining its vigour under the iron-handed rule of Grand Vizier Köprülü Mehmed, stopped tolerating the ambitions of its subject: within only a few months after the failed campaign, both Romanian Voievods and the Prince himself were dethroned and the short-lived attempt of György Rákóczi II to establish a local power base lay in ruins.⁵¹

50 On the establishment of the Early Modern European diplomatic system of standing embassies, see the classic work of Garrett Mattingly, *Renaissance Diplomacy*. Baltimore: Penguin 1955; also Charles H. Carter, *The Ambassadors of Early Modern Europe: Patterns of Diplomatic Representation in the Early Seventeenth Century*. In: Idem, ed., *From the Renaissance to the Counter-Reformation: Essays in Honor of Garrett Mattingly*. New York: Random House 1965, pp. 269–95; Matthew Smith Anderson, *The Rise of Modern Diplomacy 1450–1919*. London, New York: Longman 1993.

51 On the Transylvanian campaign of 1657 in Poland and the events of the following years, see most recently Sándor Gebei, II Rákóczi György lengyelországi hadjárata, 1657, *Hadtörténelmi Közlemények*, 105, no. 2 (1992), pp. 30–64; János B. Szabó, II. Rákóczi György 1658. évi török háborúja, *Hadtörténelmi Közlemények*, 114 (2001), 231–78; Idem: Erdély katasztrófája 1658-ban: A védelem összeomlásának politikai és pszichológiai okai, *Aetas*, 21, no. 2–3. (2006), 204–18. On the deposition of the Romanian Voievodes: Zahariuc, *Țara Moldovei*, pp. 371–83.