Folk Psyhology Is Not a Metarepresentational Device

Demeter, Tamás (2009) Folk Psyhology Is Not a Metarepresentational Device. European Journal of Analytic Philosophy, 5 (1). pp. 19-38. ISSN 1845-8475

[img] PDF
1.pdf - Accepted Version
Restricted to Registered users only

Download (176kB)


Here I challenge the philosophical consensus that we use folk psychology for the purposes of metarepresentation. The paper intends to show that folk psychology should not be conceived on par with fact-stating discourses in spite of what its surface semantics may suggest. I argue that folkpsychological discourse is organised in a way and has conceptual characteristics such that it cannot fulfill a fact-stating function. To support this claim I develop an open question argument for psychological interpretations, and I draw attention to the central role of rationality, the conceptual connections, and the essential evaluative content inherent in folk psychological ascriptions. As a conclusion I propose that a fictionalist account of the discourse would fit its characteristics better than a factualist-realist interpretation.

Item Type: Article
Subjects: B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion / filozófia, pszichológia, vallás > BD Speculative Philosophy / rendszeres filozófia > BD3 Philosophy of mind and spirit / szellem filozófiája
Depositing User: Gábor Forrai
Date Deposited: 05 Nov 2012 09:52
Last Modified: 06 Nov 2012 07:55

Actions (login required)

Edit Item Edit Item