Kinateder, M. and Kiss, Hubert János (2014) Sequential decisions in the Diamond-Dybvig banking model. JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL STABILITY, 15. pp. 149-160. ISSN 1572-3089
|
Text
MK_KHJ_Sequential_decisions_JFS_2014_u.pdf Download (710kB) | Preview |
Abstract
Abstract We study the Diamond-Dybvig model of financial intermediation (Diamond, D., Dybvig, P., 1983. Bank runs, deposit insurance and liquidity. Journal of Political Economy 91 (3), 401–419.) under the assumption that depositors have information about previous decisions. Depositors decide sequentially whether to withdraw their funds or continue holding them in the bank. If depositors observe the history of all previous decisions, we show that there are no bank runs in equilibrium independently of whether the realized type vector selected by nature is of perfect or imperfect information. Our result is robust to several extensions.
| Item Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Uncontrolled Keywords: | Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium; IMPERFECT INFORMATION; Bank run |
| Subjects: | H Social Sciences / társadalomtudományok > HB Economic Theory / közgazdaságtudomány |
| SWORD Depositor: | MTMT SWORD |
| Depositing User: | MTMT SWORD |
| Date Deposited: | 01 Mar 2016 14:29 |
| Last Modified: | 01 Mar 2016 14:29 |
| URI: | http://real.mtak.hu/id/eprint/33927 |
Actions (login required)
 |
Edit Item |
