Számadó, Szabolcs (2018) When honesty and cheating pay off: the evolution of honest and dishonest equilibria in a conventional signalling game. BMC EVOLUTIONARY BIOLOGY, 17 (270). ISSN 1471-2148
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Abstract
In this study, I investigate the effects of four modelling assumptions: the role of an extended strategy set, the initial population composition (seeding), the differences in pay-offs and finally different parameter spaces. I investigate the effects of these factors on the evolvability of both honest and mixed cheating strategies. I show that both honest and cheating equilibria readily evolve and that the investigated parameter range and the seeding of the starting populations have the greatest influence on the outcome.
| Item Type: | Article |
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| Subjects: | H Social Sciences / társadalomtudományok > H Social Sciences (General) / társadalomtudomány általában |
| Depositing User: | Veronika Tamás |
| Date Deposited: | 17 Jan 2019 13:04 |
| Last Modified: | 05 Apr 2023 07:55 |
| URI: | http://real.mtak.hu/id/eprint/90107 |
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