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When honesty and cheating pay off: the evolution of honest and dishonest equilibria in a conventional signalling game

Számadó, Szabolcs (2018) When honesty and cheating pay off: the evolution of honest and dishonest equilibria in a conventional signalling game. BMC EVOLUTIONARY BIOLOGY, 17 (270). ISSN 1471-2148

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Abstract

In this study, I investigate the effects of four modelling assumptions: the role of an extended strategy set, the initial population composition (seeding), the differences in pay-offs and finally different parameter spaces. I investigate the effects of these factors on the evolvability of both honest and mixed cheating strategies. I show that both honest and cheating equilibria readily evolve and that the investigated parameter range and the seeding of the starting populations have the greatest influence on the outcome.

Item Type: Article
Subjects: H Social Sciences / társadalomtudományok > H Social Sciences (General) / társadalomtudomány általában
Depositing User: Veronika Tamás
Date Deposited: 17 Jan 2019 13:04
Last Modified: 05 Apr 2023 07:55
URI: http://real.mtak.hu/id/eprint/90107

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