Bernáth, László and Inan, Daniel Haydar (2023) The Transcendental Phenomenological Argument against Eternalism. METAPHYSICA. pp. 1-17. ISSN 1437-2053
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Abstract
In this paper, we argue against eternalism on the basis of certain phenomenological considerations regarding our experiential life in a relatively novel way. Contrary to well-known phenomenological arguments that attempt to refute tenseless theories of time, our argument that we call the Transcendental Phenomenological Argument against Eternalism is against both tenseless and tensed versions of eternalism. The argument is based on the fact that one experiences a phenomenological succession of experiences, and it shows that perdurantist forms of eternalism have to either deny this fact or should embrace ad hoc and metaphysically implausible assumptions about the nature of the mind. As we argue, neither of these options seems to be too promising.
| Item Type: | Article |
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| Uncontrolled Keywords: | eternalism, perdurantism, tensed theory of time, tenseless theory of time, phenomenology of time |
| Subjects: | B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion / filozófia, pszichológia, vallás > BD Speculative Philosophy / rendszeres filozófia > BD1 Metaphysics / metafizika B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion / filozófia, pszichológia, vallás > BD Speculative Philosophy / rendszeres filozófia > BD1 Metaphysics / metafizika > BD11 Ontology / ontológia |
| Depositing User: | László Bernáth |
| Date Deposited: | 23 Aug 2023 10:58 |
| Last Modified: | 13 Sep 2023 11:40 |
| URI: | http://real.mtak.hu/id/eprint/171962 |
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