Endogenous money, soft budget constraint and the banking regulation

Ábel, István and Mérő, Katalin (2023) Endogenous money, soft budget constraint and the banking regulation. ACTA OECONOMICA, 73 (S1). pp. 99-118. ISSN 0001-6373

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Abstract

A key observation of the endogenous money theory is that banks create deposits (money) by lending. This means that banks apparently face soft budget constraint in responding to demand for credit. However, there are several limiting factors, which can make the banks' money creation somewhat constrained, and can thus harden their budget constraint. Such factors include the need to preserve banks' profitability and the bank regulations (the capital and liquidity requirements). Previous literature on soft budget constraint (SBC) in banking mentioned government bailouts, central banks lender-of-last-resort policies, or the poorly informed depositors who over-finance banks, as reasons for the SBC for banks. Taking the endogenous money theory as a starting point, we use a different approach. We analyze whether the tools that aimed to keep the bank's budget constrain hard are appropriate for this purpose. Our analysis, as well as lessons from several recent bank crisis episodes suggest, that under current banking regulation SBC is an inherent feature of banking.

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