Johnen, Johnen and Somogyi, Róbert (2024) Deceptive Features on Platforms. ECONOMIC JOURNAL, 134 (662). pp. 2470-2493. ISSN 0013-0133
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Abstract
Many products sold on online platforms have additional features like fees for services, shipping, luggage, upgrades etc. We study when a two-sided platform shrouds additional features towards potentially-naive buyers. We explore a novel mechanism according to which platforms shroud to manipulate network externalities between buyers and sellers. Exploring this mechanism, we argue the advent of online marketplaces led to less-transparent markets. First, platforms have stronger incentives to shroud seller fees than sellers themselves. Second, platforms shroud their own fees less if they earn more revenue from sellers; so when sellers on the platform compete more fiercely, platforms—somewhat perversely—shroud more. We connect these results to many applications and the current debate on regulating online platforms.
| Item Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Uncontrolled Keywords: | D18 - Consumer Protection, D47 - Market Design, D83 - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness, L15 - Information and Product Quality; Standardization and Compatibility |
| Subjects: | H Social Sciences / társadalomtudományok > HB Economic Theory / közgazdaságtudomány |
| SWORD Depositor: | MTMT SWORD |
| Depositing User: | MTMT SWORD |
| Date Deposited: | 23 Aug 2024 07:28 |
| Last Modified: | 23 Aug 2024 07:28 |
| URI: | https://real.mtak.hu/id/eprint/203196 |
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