The Role of Experience in Descartes’ Metaphysics : Analyzing the Difference Between Intuitus, Intelligentia, and Experientia

Ayumu, Tamura (2023) The Role of Experience in Descartes’ Metaphysics : Analyzing the Difference Between Intuitus, Intelligentia, and Experientia. MAGYAR FILOZÓFIAI SZEMLE, 67 (2). pp. 179-195. ISSN 0025-0090

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Abstract

In Rules for the Direction of the Mind,1 Descartes defined intuition (intuitio) as “the conception of a clear and attentive mind, which is so easy and distinct that there can be no room for doubt about what we are understanding” (Reg., AT-X, 368), and deduction (deductio) as “the inference of something as following necessarily from some other propositions which are known with certainty” (ibid., 369). However, in addition to intuition, experience (experientia) is also presented as the opposite of deduction. Descartes states the following in Rule II: […] we should bear in mind that there are two ways of arriving at a knowledge of things – through experience and through deduction. (ibid., AT-X, 365.)

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