Phenomenology and Deep General Anaesthesia. Empirically Applied Phenomenology as a Leading Clue to Uncovering the Ultimate Neural Foundations of Consciousness

Marosán, Bence Péter (2023) Phenomenology and Deep General Anaesthesia. Empirically Applied Phenomenology as a Leading Clue to Uncovering the Ultimate Neural Foundations of Consciousness. In: ‘Lived Experience in Theory & in Practice’. Annual Conference of the British Society for Phenomenology, 29-31 August 2023, Manchester, ENGLAND. (Unpublished)

Preview

Text Phenomenology and DGA-Manchester-2023.pdf - Published Version Download (321kB) | Preview

Abstract

Empirical applications of phenomenology (in the Husserlian sense) in consciousness research have a long history. In the last three decades, neurophenomenology (primarily associated with Francisco Varela and his followers) and microphenomenology (as practiced by Claire Petitmengin and her colleagues), as well as applications of phenomenology in the cognitive sciences (notably by Shaun Gallagher, Dan Zahavi, and others) have played leading roles in empirical phenomenological research. In this presentation, my goal is to propose a very particular sort of empirical application of phenomenology, one which could be highly promising in uncovering the ultimate neurological foundations of consciousness on the minimal level. More specifically, I propose to apply the phenomenological method in experiments based on emergence from deep general anaesthesia. It should be noted that such experiments have been used to help identify the neurological foundations of consciousness since at least the early 2000s in a systematic way. However, the particular experimental approach that I suggest differs from previous experiments in at least two regards. First, phenomenology serves as its theoretical basis. In other words, it presupposes that consciousness always has a concrete form: it is the conscious expression or manifestation of a concrete, bodily way of being-in-the-world. These bodily neurological foundations of consciousness must reflect – in one way or another – the concrete and coherent character of consciousness. Second, I would like to offer an experimental method to test whether the cortex is necessary for the deepest form of consciousness. To this end, I endeavour to devise an experimental setup that allows the investigation of neural activity and presumable conscious experiences in patients emerging from general anaesthesia – before the full activation of the cortex.

Actions (login required)

Edit Item