Would we recognize instances of philosophical knowledge?

Bernáth, László and Tőzsér, János (2025) Would we recognize instances of philosophical knowledge? THE PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY. ISSN 0031-8094 (In Press)

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Abstract

It is a widespread assumption that permanent philosophical dissensus indicates that none of the par- ties has philosophical knowledge. However, this assumption is based on the view that the philosophers’ community would recognize instances of individual philosophical knowledge if someone had such epis- temic achievement. The problem is that it is challenging to justify this view because the idea that the community of philosophers is e pistemicall y de prived is neither self-contradictory nor falsified by the available evidence. So it seems that one should be agnostic about the abilities of the community of philosophers. In our paper, we propose a non-evidential way of defending the trust in the philosophers’ community. We argue that one can hold—without (almost) any evidence—the belief that the com- munity would recognize instances of philosophical knowledge because one is e pistemicall y entitled to believe in the minimal reliability of the community of philosophers.

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