State Owners in the Internal Market: Medicine or Poison?

Horváth M., Tamás and Bartha, Ildikó (2025) State Owners in the Internal Market: Medicine or Poison? STUDIA IURIDICA LUBLINENSIA, 34 (4). ISSN 1731-6375 (print); 2449-8289 (online) (In Press)

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Abstract

State-owned enterprises (SOEs) rank among the largest market players and their importance has increased in recent decades. In developed countries, this trend is part of the functioning of a normal market economy as SOEs may serve as an instrument to reduce market failures. However, the existence of such companies may also lead to undue competitive advantages, as the case of some Chinese monopolies and certain Central and Eastern European countries in democratic backsliding shows. This study analyses the conflict between the benefits and harms of SOEs in the context of the EU internal market and the global economy, and seeks to highlight the potential risks to European integration that state ownership in competition may pose. The study is based on comparative legal research, complemented by quantitative analysis.

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