Lying generators

Csercsik, Dávid (2015) Lying generators. Műhelytanulmányok = Discussion Papers (MT-DP ). Institute of Economics, Centre for Economic and Regional Studies, Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Budapest. ISBN 978-615-5447-70-9

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Abstract

Optimal power flow (OPF) problems are focussing on the question how a power transmission network can be operated in the most economic way. T he general aim in such scenarios is to optimize generator scheduling in order to meet cons umption re�quirements, transmission constraints and to minimize the overall generation cost and transmission losses. We use a simple lossless DC load flow model for the descript ion of the transmission network, and assume linearly decreasing marginal cost of generat ors with different parameters for each generator. We consider a scenario in which the gene ration values regarding the OPF are calculated by a central authority who is aware of t he network parameters and production characteristics. Furthermore, we assume that a cent ral mechanism is applied for the determination of generator payoffs in order to cove r their generation costs and assign them with some profit. We analyze the situation when gen erators may provide false information about their production parameters and thus manipula te the OPF computation in order to potentially increase their resulting profit. We con sider two central payoff mechanisms and compare their vulnerability for such manipulations and analyze their effect on the total social cost.

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