The populist voter trap: why regime change may not end populism : Lessons from Hungary’s electoral autocracy

Szabó, Andrea and Sebestyén, Annamária and Böcskei, Balázs (2026) The populist voter trap: why regime change may not end populism : Lessons from Hungary’s electoral autocracy. POST-SOVIET AFFAIRS. ISSN 1060-586X (In Press)

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Abstract

This article examines how demand-side populism evolves under populist incumbency in an electoral autocracy. Focusing on Hungary between 2010 and 2025, it asks whether prolonged exposure to a governing populist regime leads to the erosion, consolidation, or redistribution of populist attitudes among voters. Drawing on two surveys, the study combines harmonised longitudinal indicators with a contemporary ideational populism scale to capture change and continuity in populist-aligned attitudes. The findings reveal a pattern best described as persistence with recomposition. While aggregate endorsement of three comparable populist-aligned items – cultural protectionism, sovereigntist “own path versus the West” orientation, and leader-centred representation – declines over time, broader people – elite antagonistic and anti-compromise predispositions remain widely available in 2025. Populist attitudes do not shift uniformly across the electorate; instead, they re-sort across partisan publics and dimensions. By 2025, populist attitudes are no longer confined to the governing camp but are also present within the largest opposition electorate, including a new mass opposition challenger, structured by perceived regime disadvantage. Overall, the Hungarian case shows that demand-side populism can persist under populist incumbency while becoming cross-bloc as opposition realignment renders regime change electorally plausible.

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