The survival of the weakest in a biased donation game

Wang, Chaoqian and Li, Jingyang and Wang, Xinwei and Zhu, Wenqiang and Szolnoki, Attila (2026) The survival of the weakest in a biased donation game. APPLIED MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTATION, 525. ISSN 0096-3003

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Abstract

Cooperating first then mimicking the partner’s act been proven to be an effective way in utilizing reciprocity in social dilemmas. However, the extent to which this, called Tit-for-Tat, strategy should be regarded as equivalent to unconditional cooperators remains controversial. Here, we introduce a biased Tit-for-Tat (T) strategy that cooperates differently toward unconditional cooperators (C) and fellow T players through independent bias parameters. The results show that, even under strong dilemmas in the donation game framework, this three-strategy system can exhibit diverse phase diagrams on the parameter plane. In particular, when T-bias is small and C-bias is large, a “hidden T phase” emerges, in which the weakest T strategy dominates. The dominance of the weakened T strategy originates from a counterintuitive mechanism characterizing non-transitive ecological systems: T suppresses its relative fitness to C, rapidly eliminates the cyclic dominance clusters, and subsequently expands slowly to take over the entire population. Analysis in well-mixed populations confirms that this phenomenon arises from structured populations. Our study thus reveals the subtle role of bias regulation in cooperative modes by emphasizing the “survival of the weakest” effect in a broader context.

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