Regulating the Regulators : Digital Platforms as Quasi-Administrative Authorities in China’s Food Safety Governance

Lu, Yi (2026) Regulating the Regulators : Digital Platforms as Quasi-Administrative Authorities in China’s Food Safety Governance. INSTITUTIONES ADMINISTRATIONIS - JOURNAL OF ADMINISTRATIVE SCIENCES, 6 (1). pp. 6-23. ISSN 2786-1929

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Abstract

China’s 2026 Provisions on livestream e-commerce food safety vest digital platforms with core regulatory functions that are functionally equivalent to those of administrative agencies. These functions include licensing, inspection, standard-setting, and sanctioning. Platforms now screen vendor credentials, deploy algorithmic surveillance, and impose sanctions up to permanent blacklisting. These powers mirror core administrative functions, yet Chinese law classifies them as private “corporate responsibility.” This classification displaces core administrative law constraints on platform power. Duties of reason-giving, procedural fairness, and the availability of judicial review are thereby excluded. This article exposes the accountability vacuum that results. Comparison with the EU Digital Services Act demonstrates that procedural safeguards need not compromise regulatory efficiency. This article proposes four interventions that establish minimum procedural safeguards for platform-mediated governance, including mandatory internal review, a duty to provide reasons, bridging mechanisms for dispute resolution, and technological due process embedded in platform architecture.

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