Shifting From Unanimity to Qualified Majority Voting in the EU Enlargement Process?

Bohinc, Rado (2026) Shifting From Unanimity to Qualified Majority Voting in the EU Enlargement Process? In: EU Enlargement and Successful Integration: Is There a Way? Studies of the Central European Professors’ Network . Central European Academic Publishing, Miskolc-Budapest, pp. 499-528. ISBN 978-615-7027-65-7, 978-615-7027-66-4, 978-615-7027-67-1

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Abstract

This chapter will attempt to answer the question about whether the concerns of small members in protecting the fundamental values of the EU and their sovereignty, when shifting to QMV, are justified; and furthermore, whether the QMV could enhance the EU’s influence in CFSP and manage internal conflicts. Answers will also be sought to the question of whether QMV would enhance the EU’s credibility in the perception of candidate countries by making the decision-making process faster and more efficient. Using theoretical and legal analysis of the relevant provisions of EU Treaties and other legal instruments, the issue of the correlation between the decision-making process established within the EU and the EU’s efficiency in implementing its enlargement policy will be explored. Arguments will be presented for and against the introduction of QMV in CFSP and to answer the question of whether, to increase the EU’s credibility in enlargement, it is necessary to amend the provisions of the Treaties, or whether it is sufficient to interpret them. The debates on EU enlargement, on the reasons for delays in the process, and on proposals for acceleration of the process, at national compared to EU level in the real geopolitical context, are both controversial and complex. The positions on this are directly contradictory, depending on whether they come from EU bodies or from the Member States. There are also cracks in theoretical and expert knowledge. Some of this is presented in this chapter, focusing on the method of decision-making (by consensus, or by over-voting) in the accession process. For example, in the so-called ‘EU enlargement paradox’ the Clingendael Report, states that EU enlargement is both inevitable and impossible at the same time. It is inevitable for geostrategic reasons, and impossible for political institutional reasons.

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