Structure in Legal Systems. Artificiality, Relativity, and Interdependency of Structuring Elements in a Practical (Hermeneutical) Context

Varga, Csaba (2002) Structure in Legal Systems. Artificiality, Relativity, and Interdependency of Structuring Elements in a Practical (Hermeneutical) Context. Acta Juridica Hungarica, 43 (3-4). pp. 233-242. ISSN 1216-2574

Preview

Text ajur.43.2002.3-4.3.pdf Download (86kB) | Preview

Abstract

Does the legal system have a structure (according to sources and branches of law, general and special parts of codes, principles, rules and exceptions in regulation, etc.), or structuring is taken into it from the outside? And providing that it is taken, whoever is taking it? For neither principles, nor rules are given in themselves, separated from each other in a way classified in terms of the law's taxonomic systemicity as bearing their own separate meaning. All this can be but the result of a constitutive act. Based upon legal doctrines, it is judicial practice that builds different propositions into either principles or rules. Or, it is not logic itself that labels anything as a structuring element identified as either principle or rule but we, who ponder the mode of how to construct a sequence of distinction, deduction and justification conclusive enough to convince those controlling the issue we propose in the procedural hierarchy. Therefore the structuring features in law are construed and construing, constructed and constructing at the same time, for they do not and cannot exist in and by themselves at all.

Actions (login required)

Edit Item