Biró, Péter and Klijn, Flip (2013) Matching with couples: a Multidisciplinary Survey. INTERNATIONAL GAME THEORY REVIEW, 15 (2). pp. 1-18. ISSN 0219-1989
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Official URL: http://www.worldscientific.com/toc/igtr/15/02
Abstract
This survey deals with two-sided matching markets where one set of agents (workers/residents) has to be matched with another set of agents (firms/hospitals). We first give a short overview of a selection of classical results. Then, we review recent contributions to a complex and representative case of matching with complementarities, namely matching markets with couples. We discuss contributions from computer scientists, economists, and game theorists. © 2013 World Scientific Publishing Company.
| Item Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Uncontrolled Keywords: | STABILITY; restricted domains; Matching; large markets; incentive compatibility; Couples; Computational complexity |
| Subjects: | H Social Sciences / társadalomtudományok > HB Economic Theory / közgazdaságtudomány |
| SWORD Depositor: | MTMT SWORD |
| Depositing User: | MTMT SWORD |
| Date Deposited: | 28 Oct 2013 10:43 |
| Last Modified: | 02 Mar 2016 07:05 |
| URI: | http://real.mtak.hu/id/eprint/7036 |
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