Számadó, Szabolcs (2019) One problem, too many solutions: How costly is honest signalling of need? PLOS ONE. ISSN 1932-6203
|
Text
szamadoetal2019_oneproblem.pdf Download (1MB) | Preview |
Official URL: https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0208443
Abstract
Our results show that costly signalling theory cannot predict a unique equilibrium cost in signalling games of parent-offspring conflicts if signal cost depends on offspring condition. It follows, contrary to previous claims, that the existence of parent-offspring conflict does not imply costly equilibrium signals.
| Item Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Subjects: | H Social Sciences / társadalomtudományok > H Social Sciences (General) / társadalomtudomány általában |
| Depositing User: | Veronika Tamás |
| Date Deposited: | 17 Jan 2019 12:52 |
| Last Modified: | 05 Apr 2023 07:55 |
| URI: | http://real.mtak.hu/id/eprint/90105 |
Actions (login required)
 |
Edit Item |
