Xu, Chenggang (2019) The pitfalls of a centralized bureaucracy. Acta Oeconomica, 69 (1). pp. 1-16. ISSN 0001-6373
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Official URL: https://doi.org/10.1556/032.2019.69.1.1
Abstract
The incentive problem is a vital issue in all transition economies and China is not an exception. This paper summarises how China partially solved this problem at early stages of post-Mao reforms and why the Chinese solution is only transitory, which explains severe problems that China is facing now. The paper also discusses the incentive mechanisms in the judicial system and the effect of the soft budget constraint (SBC) syndrome on incentives, including the relationship between institutions and innovation.
| Item Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Subjects: | H Social Sciences / társadalomtudományok > H Social Sciences (General) / társadalomtudomány általában |
| Depositing User: | Eszter Bálint |
| Date Deposited: | 21 Jun 2019 07:11 |
| Last Modified: | 31 Mar 2021 23:15 |
| URI: | http://real.mtak.hu/id/eprint/94048 |
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