Can, Burak and Csóka, Péter and Ergin, Emre (2020) How to choose a fair delegation? ECONOMIC THEORY. pp. 1-35. ISSN 0938-2259 (print); 1432-0479 (online)
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Abstract
This paper analyzes how to choose a delegation, a committee to represent a society such as in a peace conference. We propose normative conditions and seek Pareto optimal, consistent, neutral, and non-manipulable ways to choose a delegation. We show that a class of threshold rules is characterized by these criteria. The rules do not choose a fixed number of delegates, but instead require different sizes of delegations, depending on the heterogeneity in society. Therefore the resulting delegations are very inclusive, and with t delegates the ratio of individuals whose opinions are not included is always below 0.5(t). For instance, a delegation of size two should have at least 75% support from the society and therefore only less than 25% of the opinion pool can be neglected.
| Item Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Uncontrolled Keywords: | Aggregation rules; Committee selection; Conflict management; Kemeny distance; Strategy-proofness |
| Subjects: | H Social Sciences / társadalomtudományok > HD Industries. Land use. Labor / ipar, földhasználat, munkaügy > HD1 Industries / ipar > HD14 Management. Industrial Management / ügyvitel, igazgatás |
| SWORD Depositor: | MTMT SWORD |
| Depositing User: | MTMT SWORD |
| Date Deposited: | 05 Feb 2021 09:30 |
| Last Modified: | 05 Feb 2021 09:30 |
| URI: | http://real.mtak.hu/id/eprint/120699 |
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