Institutions, democracy and growth in the very long run

Yanovskiy, Konstantin and Shulgin, Sergey (2013) Institutions, democracy and growth in the very long run. Acta Oeconomica, 63 (4). pp. 493-510. ISSN 0001-6373

Text aoecon.63.2013.4.5.pdf Restricted to Repository staff only until 31 December 2033. Download (92kB)

Abstract

We tested the hypothesis of the political basis for economic rights and constructed our own variables of political regimes’ classification for the years 1820–2000. We found significant positive interdependencies between democracy indicators and economic growth. The protection of private property rights requires, first and foremost, due guarantees for personal immunity. Discretionary arrests and property seizures undermine any formal guarantees of private property, low taxation benefits, etc. Personal immunity should be defended even for “unpleasant” persons or for the possible political opponents of the country’s ruler.

Actions (login required)

Edit Item