Exclusionary Price Abuses in the EU (A developmental approach with regards to networks)

Belényesi, Pál (2006) Exclusionary Price Abuses in the EU (A developmental approach with regards to networks). Acta Juridica Hungarica, 47 (3). pp. 249-272. ISSN 1216-2574

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Abstract

The liberalization processes, which started in the 90's in Europe, opened up a new area for competition policy and competition scrutiny and enforcement. Both ex-ante regulation and competition policy are responsible for the consumer friendly implementation and advancement of the legislation related to the liberalization of certain public utilities. Every industry that has incumbents faces the problem of granting access to the facilities owned by the “big ones”. Competition policy targets best achievable market conditions which provide the customers with the lowest prices and the market with most efficient behavior. In the long term this is only attainable with colorful market scene, vibrant conditions to operate and more options for the final customers to choose form. This, however, can be turned down by anti-competitive behavior of the participants that intends to eliminate competitors from the market. One of the various ways to achieve this is to use pricing methodologies which may straightforwardly result in forcing dependent market players to leave the playing field. Is there a way to control dominant undertakings' pricing methodologies? Can Article 82 of the EC Treaty be generalized? How did the European Court of Justice and the Commission formulate the practice towards these type of behaviors?  

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