Interdependent network reciprocity in evolutionary games

Wang, Zhen and Szolnoki, Attila and Perz, M (2013) Interdependent network reciprocity in evolutionary games. SCIENTIFIC REPORTS, 3 (1183). pp. 1-12. ISSN 2045-2322

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Abstract

Besides the structure of interactions within networks, also the interactions between networks are of the outmost importance. We therefore study the outcome of the public goods game on two interdependent networks that are connected by means of a utility function, which determines how payoffs on both networks jointly influence the success of players in each individual network. We show that an unbiased coupling allows the spontaneous emergence of interdependent network reciprocity, which is capable to maintain healthy levels of public cooperation even in extremely adverse conditions. The mechanism, however, requires simultaneous formation of correlated cooperator clusters on both networks. If this does not emerge or if the coordination process is disturbed, network reciprocity fails, resulting in the total collapse of cooperation. Network interdependence can thus be exploited effectively to promote cooperation past the limits imposed by isolated networks, but only if the coordination between the interdependent networks is not disturbed

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