Augustine on Divine Ideas as Epistemological Criteria

Kendeffy, Gábor (2002) Augustine on Divine Ideas as Epistemological Criteria. Acta Antiqua, 42 (1-4). pp. 181-193. ISSN 0044-5975

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Abstract

To what extent, if at all, can we say that the bishop of Hippo thought that the eternal rules function as truth-criteria for empirical knowledge? In the first part of this paper the author tries to show that the position according to which Augustine's theory of illumination provides a theory of knowledge that accounts even for sense-perception is extreme and based in part on a flawed interpretation of the texts; hence it is impossible to regard Augustine's eternal rules as truth-criteria in the true sense of the term. On the other hand, the aim of the second section is to argue that certain pragmatic traits can indeed be found in Augustine's “epistemology”. He rejects dogmatism on moral grounds and states that it is the duty of the Christian philosopher to extend his researches to the sphere of empirical knowledge. The eternal rules, it can be said, serve as points of reference for a form of probabilism.

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