When optimal foragers meet in a game theoretical conflict: A model of kleptoparasitism

Garay, József and Cressman, Ross Eric and Xu, Fei and Broom, Mark and Csiszár, Villő and Móri, Tamás Ferenc (2020) When optimal foragers meet in a game theoretical conflict: A model of kleptoparasitism. JOURNAL OF THEORETICAL BIOLOGY, 502. p. 110306. ISSN 0022-5193


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Kleptoparasitism can be considered as a game theoretical problem and a foraging tactic at the same time, so the aim of this paper is to combine the basic ideas of two research lines: evolutionary game theory and optimal foraging theory. To unify these theories, firstly, we take into account the fact that kleptoparasitism between foragers has two consequences: the interaction takes time and affects the net energy intake of both contestants. This phenomenon is modeled by a matrix game under time constraints. Secondly, we also give freedom to each forager to avoid interactions, since in optimal foraging theory foragers can ignore each food type (we have two prey types: either a prey item in possession of another predator or a free prey individual is discovered). The main question of the present paper is whether the zero-one rule of optimal foraging theory (always or never select a prey type) is valid or not, in the case where foragers interact with each other? In our foraging game we consider predators who engage in contests (contestants) and those who never do (avoiders), and in general those who play a mixture of the two strategies. Here the classical zero-one rule does not hold. Firstly, the pure avoider phenotype is never an ESS. Secondly, the pure contestant can be a strict ESS, but we show this is not necessarily so. Thirdly, we give an example when there is mixed ESS.

Item Type: Article
Subjects: Q Science / természettudomány > QL Zoology / állattan > QL750-QL782.5 Animal behavior / etológia, állat-viselkedéstan
Depositing User: Dr József Garay
Date Deposited: 01 Apr 2021 11:50
Last Modified: 01 Apr 2021 11:50

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