REAL

The strong core of housing markets with partial order preferences

Schlotter, Ildikó Anna and Mendoza-Cadena, Mirabel (2026) The strong core of housing markets with partial order preferences. JOURNAL OF MATHEMATICAL ECONOMICS, 126. No. -103288. ISSN 0304-4068

[img]
Preview
Text
1-s2.0-S0304406826000765-main.pdf - Published Version

Download (1MB) | Preview

Abstract

We study the strong core of housing markets when agents’ preferences over houses are expressed as partial orders. We provide a structural characterization of the strong core, and propose an efficient algorithm that finds an allocation in the strong core or decides that it is empty, even in the presence of forced and forbidden arcs. The algorithm satisfies the property of weak group-strategyproofness. Additionally, we show that certain results known for the strong core in the case where agents’ preferences are weak orders can be extended to the setting with partial order preferences; among others, we show that the strong core in such housing markets satisfies the property of respecting improvements.

Item Type: Article
Uncontrolled Keywords: Housing market, Strong core, Partial orders, Forced and forbidden arcs, Strategyproofness, Property of respecting improvement
Subjects: H Social Sciences / társadalomtudományok > HB Economic Theory / közgazdaságtudomány > HB5 Mathematical economics / matematikai közgazdaságtan
SWORD Depositor: MTMT SWORD
Depositing User: MTMT SWORD
Date Deposited: 18 Aug 2026 11:27
Last Modified: 18 Aug 2026 11:27
URI: https://real.mtak.hu/id/eprint/244256

Actions (login required)

Edit Item Edit Item